VII.—TIMELESSNESS.

By F. B. JEVONS.

“We bear Time to his tomb in Eternity.”

THE words are successive—when we come to think of it, but the line is viewed by the mind as a whole. The succession of the words may be the given fact, and the association of them into a whole may be a subsequent proceeding. Or, second, the line may be the given fact, and the dissociation of it into separate words may be the subsequent proceeding, just as the dissociation of a word into its constituent syllables or letters is an analysis to which we may subsequently, though we do not always, proceed. Or yet again, in the third place, conceivably both the succession and the simultaneity may be not only given, but also ultimate fact. Or, fourth, time-distinctions may indeed be given, but may be appearance, false appearance, and Timelessness the ultimate fact.

I. I will take first the view that the words are really successive, and only appear to be simultaneous, or a unity, or a whole, or non-successive—whichever way you choose to put it. On this view they appear in what is called by Mr. E. R. Clay (*The Alternative*, p. 167), “the Specious Present.” He says: “all the notes of a bar of song seem to the listener to be contained in the present. All the changes of place of a meteor seem to the beholder to be contained in the present. At the instant of the termination of such series, no part of the time measured by them seems to be a past.” This Specious Present “is really a part of the past—a recent past—delusively given as being a time that intervenes between the past and the future.” The notes, or the words, only seem present; they are

really past, in spite of the fact that every one appears present. Professor W. James (*Principles of Psychology*, I, p. 610) quotes Mr. Clay and adopts the theory of the Specious Present: it is "a duration block." "The experience is from the outset a synthetic datum, not a simple one." "The original experience of both space and time is always of something already given as a unit, inside of which attention afterwards discriminates parts in relation to each other." The number of successive impressions which can appear to be contained in the Specious Present seems to be differently estimated, and has no importance for the present purpose, as the Specious Present does not really last from six to twelve seconds—the events that succeeded each other in those seconds appear to be presented all together in the Specious Present, but that is mere appearance, such a present is "specious" not real. This seems to be the view of Professor Ward also, who, in the article on Psychology in the *Encyclopædia Britannica* says, "in reality, past, present, and future are differences in time, but in presentation all that corresponds to these differences is in consciousness simultaneously."

The position, then, is that there are differences in time, viz., the past, present, and future; and that in consciousness there is something which corresponds to those differences, but this corresponding difference is non-temporal, for all that corresponds to the time-differences is in consciousness simultaneously; and, therefore, since past and future cannot really be simultaneous, whereas what corresponds to them in consciousness is simultaneous in presentation, the differences in presentation are themselves non-temporal, though somehow they correspond to real differences in time. What is known, therefore, is the non-temporal differences. What is assumed is the existence in reality of time-distinctions corresponding to the non-temporal differences. First, then, we have to enquire: granted that the reality of time may come to be known, in what way do the non-temporal distinctions which are given simultaneously in

presentation, warrant or compel us to infer the existence of time-differences corresponding to them, that is to infer the reality of time, or to assume its reality? Next, if the Specious Present is only apparent or appearance, what is the nature of the real present?

As to the first point, Volkmann (*Lehrbuch der Psychologie*, II, p. 12) calls attention to the antithesis "dass die Vorstellungen A und B, um in Nacheinander vorgestellt zu werden, d.h. damit die Vorstellungen nacheinander erscheinen, muss ihr Vorstellen gegenwärtig sein," that is, as Professor James interprets it (p. 629), "If A and B are to be represented *as occurring in succession* they must be *simultaneously represented*; if we are to think of them as one after the other, we must *think* them both at once." What seems to be implied is that (1) A is succeeded by B—idea B succeeds idea A, but there is thus far no idea of succession; (2) A and B are next "simultaneously represented"—neither, apparently, is present any longer; both are re-presented; and, because they are re-presented together, we are able to *think* of them as one after the other. It would seem, then, that in stage (1) we have no idea whatever that there is any succession. Now (*a*) if we do not know that there was any succession, we have no right to say that A was succeeded by B; (*b*) if we know that A was succeeded by B, it is incorrect to say that we have not the idea of succession in this stage. But (*b*), if admitted, makes it superfluous to go on to stage (2)—we know of the succession, before the simultaneous representation takes place; and it is not from the simultaneous representation that we infer the succession. So let us adopt (*a*). Then in stage (1), whatever else we know about B and A, we have no idea of their succession. As Mr. S. H. Hodgson puts it, in a passage which will be quoted again later, "in an isolated moment, we could not tell which part of it came first"—in the isolated moment A B we could not tell whether A or B came first. It is in stage (2), when their re-presentations are simultaneous, that we think of them, or interpret the presentations,

as having been successive. But what is the ground for so thinking them? They are given as simultaneous. Up to this stage, we have not even the idea of succession: granted that we get it somehow at this stage, what is there to lead us to believe that it is a valid idea and not a false inference? Volkmann's argument apparently is "if A and B are to be represented as *occurring in succession* they must be *simultaneously represented*." That may be so, or it may not. But the fact that they are represented as occurring in one way cannot be in itself a decisive proof that they really occur in a totally different way.

In Volkmann's argument, the differences between the re-presentations are temporal. In Professor Ward's the differences are non-temporal, as we have seen, and are differences in presentation. At the back of Volkmann's re-presentations lay presentations. At the back of Professor Ward's presentation lies reality: differences in time are in reality, what corresponds to them is in presentation, and is non-temporal. But if we seek to find in these non-temporal distinctions anything that will prove that there are time-differences corresponding to them somehow, we shall be disappointed. In presentation the non-temporal distinctions are given simultaneously; but how or why we should infer from that fact that the temporal differences are not simultaneous, does not appear clear. If we confine ourselves, as at present we are doing, to our presentations, and if in our presentations we come across none but non-temporal distinctions, then we have no experience of temporal differences; and so, no warrant for assuming them to exist. Why do we, in order to explain the non-temporal differences which alone are presented to us, resort to the hypothesis (for from this point of view it is nothing more) that, outside, away from (we cannot, without begging the question, say "before") the non-temporal differences of presentation, there are time-differences? and what exactly are these "time" differences, from this point of view? On what ground are they supposed

different from the non-temporal distinctions which alone are presented to us? How do we know that they even exist, if they do not occur in presentation? and how do we know that they correspond somehow to the time-differences and do not correspond exactly? Of course, if they do correspond exactly, then past, present, and future co-exist in reality as they do in presentation, and no otherwise. That, however, is the second of the four possibilities which I am considering; and I shall deal with it shortly.

Before doing so, I must notice that Mr. L. T. Hobhouse, in his *Theory of Knowledge*, when he is discussing "the contents of Apprehension" (pp. 50 ff.), comes to the conclusion that "we must admit that successive facts are present to one and the same act of apprehension"; and, paradoxical though it may seem, "the immediate past remains actually present to the apprehending consciousness." This, then, assumes that the change from immediate past to actual present is a change which goes on in reality, and of which a consciousness may (or may not) have apprehension. That assumption may or may not commend itself to us when we come to consider it. Anyhow it seems to make the change from past to present a change that goes on quite independently of the consciousness; and to make it the business of the consciousness to apprehend the change; and it seems to present the difficulty as being: given the change from past to present, how does the consciousness apprehend it? And the solution offered by Mr. Hobhouse is that *to the apprehending consciousness* "the immediate past remains actually present." Now, without venturing to say how Mr. Hobhouse would interpret his words, we may say that they are patient of being interpreted to mean that, whereas to the apprehending consciousness the immediate past remains actually present, in reality it does not, *i.e.*, that the past cannot actually be present, the "now" cannot in reality be "not now," but to the apprehending consciousness the past may appear present, though it cannot really be so.

To understand how the past may appear present without really being so, we may borrow an illustration from Mr. Hobhouse. Assume that an act of apprehension occupies a second; imagine a process which lasts a second, and consists of four stages—A, B, C, D. Each of those stages is over before the next begins; yet “the mind views the process as a whole”: the whole of the process is apprehended at once—a single act of apprehension apprehends it and its parts. But, though the mind views the process, or rather its parts, as simultaneous, still “whether as an event independent of consciousness, or as an occurrence in consciousness, A is certainly not contemporaneous with D.” That is to say, A B C D are in reality facts succeeding one another: A, even as an occurrence in consciousness, is not really contemporaneous with D, yet the two are or appear to be simultaneously presented to consciousness. The presentations, A B C D, are successive, but “at last” they are simultaneously presented to consciousness: “at last, the whole A B C D as facts succeeding one another are simultaneously presented.” As an occurrence in consciousness, or as an event independent of consciousness, they are “certainly not contemporaneous,” but they “are simultaneously presented.” To the apprehending consciousness, therefore, the past appears simultaneous with the present, the “not now” with the “now”; but they are certainly not contemporaneous, they are only “simultaneously presented.”

“The mind,” then, Mr. Hobhouse is clear, “views the process,” A B C, or past, present, and future, “as a whole.” But *why* the mind should view past, present, and future as simultaneous, or present them simultaneously, when they are really successive, Mr. Hobhouse, as far as I can make out, does not explain. Still less, I think, does he prove that the time-differences are not in reality as they are given in apprehension *viz.*, simultaneous.

Still, as the argument is that in reality past, present, and future are successive, and are simultaneous only in appearance,

or as presented, or in the Specious Present, let us see if the Specious Present is a present help.

Past, present, and future are presented or given together; and it is desired to prove that they do not exist together, but only appear so to exist. Now, the Specious Present, I suggest, affords no such proof. It does not prove, it merely asserts, (1) that the presentation in question is appearance, and (2) that the Specious Present is not present, but (in Mr. Clay's words, already quoted) "really is part of the past." It assumes then the very position that wants proving, *viz.*, that time-distinctions are real: it does not prove, it simply assumes, them real. The only question therefore is whether it is a self-consistent assumption, or one which being inconsistent with itself must be dropped by us. Now, it assumes the reality of succession: it assumes, that is to say, that the past must be over when the present begins, and that the past cannot *be* present, even to us. And it goes on to say that the Specious Present "really is part of the past." From which it follows that it cannot be present to us. If, indeed, it were now present to me, giving me an illusory or delusory picture of temporal events, it would be present and it would be "specious." But it is "really a part of the past"; and, if so, it cannot consistently be held, by those who believe in the reality of time-distinctions, to be present. By them it must either be rejected as inconsistent with their belief in the reality of time-distinctions; or, if accepted, be accepted as proving that time-distinctions are not real, inasmuch as it is really present, here and now, and yet is "really a part of the past."

Again, has the Specious Present a time-length? If it really is from six to ten seconds long, as psychologists calculate, then it is so not only in appearance but in reality, and is not merely "specious." But, once more, this gives up the contention that past, present, and future only *appear* to be given together. Then let us take it that it has not really any time-length; and that it is "specious" in appearing to have a duration which

it does not really possess. Let us recognise, in fact, that the intuition of duration does not necessarily imply the duration of intuition. The question then arises whether the Specious Present is really present; or, if we come to that, what do we really mean by the present? If the apparent present is appearance, what is the nature of the real present?

What is the real present? Mr. S. H. Hodgson (*Philosophy of Reflection*, I, 248-254) says, "strictly speaking there is no present: it is composed of past and future divided by an indivisible point or instant. That instant, or time-point, is the strict present." Let us say, divided by a vertical line, having length but no breadth. One side of the line is the past, the other side is the future; but the line has, strictly, no breadth—the past touches the future; the past is one side of the line and the future is the other side, and between them there is nothing. Indeed, there is no between: "strictly speaking there is no present." Yet this line—inasmuch as it consists (if a non-existent thing can consist of anything) only of the meeting of past and future (and the past exists no longer, the future not yet; and the past did, the future will, exist only by becoming present, *i.e.*, by becoming a non-existent thing)—"is a sequence of different feelings." It may be a minimum, but, inasmuch as it consists of present and future, "this minimum has duration"; "a former and a latter are included in the minimum of consciousness"; and "time-duration is inseparable from the minimum, notwithstanding that, in an isolated moment, we could not tell which of it came first."

II. I think it must be admitted the view that past, present, and future are really successive has difficulties: "strictly speaking there is no present," and what appears to be present "is composed of past and future," of which one exists no longer and the other not yet. Indeed, it might even seem from this that time is wholly illusory; but it would be premature to jump to this conclusion before considering the second of the four views which I am proposing to examine. The second

view is that past, present, and future not only are given together but do really co-exist. It is not denied that they succeed or appear to succeed one another ; but it is maintained that they co-exist in reality, as they co-exist in appearance. The question may then be asked : if past, present, and future really co-exist, why do they appear successive ? That question, however, need not now be put : if it can be shown that they really co-exist, the difficulty of understanding why reality should be different from its appearance will not weigh against the demonstrated fact that co-existence is the reality. That question may stand over. The present question is, do they co-exist ? We know they are, or appear, successive ; we want to know whether they really co-exist. Is it an inference, or is it a given fact ? It would hardly seem to be a given fact that the earth was once a molten mass ; neither would the result of the next general election seem to be given now. Both would seem to be inferential. The co-existence then of past, present, and future would seem to be inferred. From what ? From experience. In our experience, a phrase of words or musical notes is, or appears to be, given together : we are aware of the whole phrase, or of the phrase as a whole, and of the several words or notes which compose it. The component words or notes are successive, so that if, or whilst, the second of them is present, the first is past, and the third is future, or yet to come. But, nevertheless, all three are present in the organic whole, in the phrase which alone has meaning, and which must be there in its entirety to be understood, or, for that matter, to be analysed into its constituent and successive words or notes. Indeed, even a word must be given, must be present to the mind *before* it can be analysed into its constituent phonetic elements ; and so a phrase must be there, and its parts co-existent, before its constituent parts can be pronounced successive, or judged to be co-existent even. It is true that our "time-grasp" is limited to six or ten seconds ; and that for us the past, present, and future only co-exist

within that limit. But we have only to imagine a mind whose time-grasp is not subject to limitation, and then everything will be enclosed within its grasp. As Professor Royce puts it (*The World and the Individual*, II, p. 145), in answer to the question, "how then for God shall this difference of past and future be transcended, and all be seen at once? I reply, in precisely the same sense all the notes of the melody except this note are not *when* this note sounds, but are either *no longer* or *not yet*. Yet you may know a series of these notes at once. Now precisely so God knows the whole time-sequence of the world at once. The difference is merely one of span." And Professor Sidgwick (*Dialogue on Time and Common Sense: Mind*, October, 1894) seems to have held much the same view: he says, "I follow these theologians in conceiving the past and future as simultaneously present in knowledge to the Divine Mind; but I am forced to conceive this presence of all the known to the Infinite Knower as perpetual, if I would avoid conceiving it at a point of time."

In Professor Royce's argument we start from experience; the basis which he takes for his argument is the "Specious Present," and the difference between the human and the Divine mind "is merely one of span." The Specious Present is *now*; and it contains, say, three notes, each of which in turn is also *now*; so that, if we confine our attention to the Specious Present, there is a *now* within the *now*, as the present hour is within the present day. On the other hand if we look outside the Specious Present, or the phrase of words or notes, we find that it is preceded and succeeded by a *before* and *after*. Expand the phrase *ad infinitum*; and, if the infinite phrase is *now*, it is in time, and carries with it a *not now*, preceding and succeeding it. If the Specious Present was specious to start with, then expanding it, even *ad infinitum*, will not make it the less specious; the difference between the expanded and the unexpanded forms of it is, we have been assured by Professor Royce, "merely one of span." If so, then the expanded, like

the unexpanded, form is in time. If, on the other hand, the Specious Present of the Infinite Knower is not to be conceived "at a point of time," if it is not in time, it is no *now*, *i.e.*, it is not preceded by a *no longer* or followed by a *not yet*. But if it is not in time, it would be better not to talk of it as "present," for the word inevitably suggests time. Indeed, it is only so far as it suggests time—erroneously from this point of view—only so far as this "specious" present is supposed to be "now," that it is susceptible of time-distinctions, and can be divided into the *no longer* and the *not yet*. If the Specious Present (of *any* mind) is not in time, it is no *now*; nor is any part of it. If it is not temporal to start with, subdivision will not make it temporal. If the simple phrase of words or notes is not *now*, neither can any one of them be *now*: there simply is no *now*, no present—and therefore no past and no future. But if there is no past, present, or future, they cannot co-exist. And, after all, quite apart from argument, it really does seem strange to maintain that the same moments of time are both successive and non-successive, *i.e.*, co-existent, or both simultaneous and not simultaneous. But, inasmuch as without argument it would seem at least as strange to deny as to maintain it; and, since Professor Royce does maintain it, let us consider this, the third of the views which were proposed in the opening paragraph of this paper for examination.

III. The third view is that both the succession and the simultaneity of past, present and future are not only given but are ultimate fact. Professor Royce takes up the position (p. 115) that as a fact of psychology, overlooked by metaphysicians, simultaneity and succession are "present *at once* to our consciousness"; and we have seen already that to assert either of them whilst denying the other results apparently in the necessity of denying both. If either is pronounced appearance, both must be. Let us avoid this, then, by pronouncing both to be real. It is in fact absurd, Professor Royce says, to speak "as if the *at once* implied that there were for us no

temporal distinction between the first and the last beat or note" (p. 143); and it is equally absurd to speak as if it implied no such distinction for the Absolute: "the temporal sequences must be viewed as having in the real world, and for the Absolute, the same twofold character that our temporal experiences have for ourselves" (p. 140). "Present" or "now" has the same two-fold character for the Absolute as for us; the two-fold sense is the ultimate fact (p. 142). Expand the Specious Present, which for us is only a few seconds long, *ad infinitum*, and you get Eternity. You get Eternity, not Timelessness; for the Specious Present, whether it be that of the human or that of the Divine mind, is equally made up of past, present and future, of successive moments. It is, if I may so put it, a temporal (or a temporary) Eternity: "this same temporal world is, when regarded in its wholeness, an Eternal order" (p. 138).

Professor Royce's metaphysical theory of time would appear to be built upon a psychological basis, *i.e.*, upon the psychological theory of the "Specious Present," for he says at the beginning that the psychological theory has been "persistently ignored by many of the metaphysical interpreters of the temporal aspect of the universe" (p. 115), and at the end that "this two-fold view of your nature, as a temporal process and as an eternal system of fact, is precisely as valid and as obvious as the two-fold view of the melody or of the rhythm" (p. 147). So far then as the validity of the metaphysical theory depends upon the validity of the psychological theory, it is open to the same difficulties as those already urged against the "Specious Present." But, not to dwell upon or repeat those difficulties, we may ask, does the assumption that past, present and future are both co-existent and successive, take them out of time or does it not? If it does, then past, present and future, which are distinctions in time, are not in time: and that hardly sounds convincing. If it does not, then past, present and future are in time; and therefore are preceded by a past and followed

by a future. That seems to be the alternative favoured by Professor Royce when he says "there is in fact no last moment" (p. 136). But it seems also to be the alternative which he excludes when he says, "this same temporal world is, *when regarded in its wholeness*, an eternal order." To say "regarded in its wholeness" is to ask us to believe in a present which had no past and has no future, that is to say it requires us to believe in a present time which is not in time. Thus we relapse into the unconvincing position that past, present and future are not in time. This we are reluctant to do—it would be preferable to say that past, present and future, time-distinctions, are not real, and that time, with its distinctions, is mere appearance—and Professor Royce's statement that "there is *in fact* no last moment" must mean that there is in Reality no last moment, and that for the Absolute there is no last moment. Further, if there is in fact no last moment, then there is in fact no first moment; and therefore first and last cannot be comprised in a unity. Nor can they, if they do not exist, help with the aid of other moments (equally non-existent) to form a totality. And, if there is no unity or totality of the moments of time, it is vain to speak of regarding them in their wholeness; and consequently impossible to consider the temporal order as eternal, for that can only be done by regarding the moments of time in their wholeness. The unity or totality of the moments which make up the wholeness of time has precisely the same validity as the moments themselves; and there is "in fact no last moment," no first, and no intervening moments. And, if there are no moments of time, there is no possibility of maintaining that they are (or are not) both successive and co-existent.*

* A practical objection to Royce's argument is that it makes the Freedom of the Will impossible or unacceptable; the time-series is real, we see only a portion of it, and believe that as regards the Not-yet the Will is free. The Absolute sees the whole of the time-series, and sees the truth, viz., that the *not-yet* is just as fixed and unalterable as the

Thus far we have pictured time as a line, or (with Professor Ward) succession as a horizontal line and simultaneity as a vertical line. Thus time has been pictured, in effect, as movement in space, though, of course, no one has thought it to be really so. The question arises, whether if we renounce the picture, we shall shake off any misleading associations. Professor Bergson (*Essai sur les Données Immédiates de la Conscience*, pp. 60–85) argues that we shall. He starts from the position that two points of space may co-exist, but that two moments of time cannot co-exist; simultaneity is possible in space, impossible in time. We do imagine, in a way, illogically, before we think it out, that *before* and *after* exist together, but by *before* and *after* we obviously really mean two moments which do *not* exist together. This self-contradiction is due to the fact that we represent to ourselves, or rather misrepresent, the two *moments* of time as two *points* of space. The points in a line do co-exist; but the moments of time do not. The idea then that the moments of time do what they cannot do, viz., co-exist as points of space co-exist, is due simply to a false picture by which we desert what is given immediately in consciousness and misrepresent time as spread out in space, and confuse the moments of the one with the points of the other. Here then we have the contamination of time with space, from which we must free ourselves if we are to get time as it is given immediately in consciousness. Moments cannot be co-existent in time; points cannot succeed each other in space. Thus if points cannot succeed one another in space, neither is it in space that moments succeed one another; and we have

no-longer—both are there, before Him. The point of view of the Absolute is exactly that of the vertical line from which, in the “Specious Present,” the recent past is seen: nothing is future to Him, for He looks back upon A B C D, all of which events are past to Him, though to A, or to any one at A, it appears that B C D are future. Hence, all freedom is gone, for A B C D are past; it is only from our point of view (A) that B C D appear future and not yet fixed and fact.

to form some idea of the succession of moments of time, uncontaminated by space. Such succession Professor Bergson calls "pure succession." It is "the form assumed by the succession of our conscious states when we abstain from separating a present state from the states preceding it" (p. 75). The states, then, must not be juxtaposed as though they were points in space: they must be organised, as the notes of a melody are organised in a tune. The notes, though they are successive, yet are parts of the air, much as the limbs of an organism though distinct are not separated from one another. The notes interpenetrate. It is only by abstraction that they can be separated. Unless and until they are separated, we have "succession without distinction," *i.e.*, "pure succession." No spatial metaphor is involved in this conception: it would be intelligible to a mind which knew not space. But we go and inject space into this "pure succession" and interpret or misinterpret it as a row of points, *i.e.*, a line in space. When and only when we have done this, we imagine we perceive *before* and *after* simultaneously—whereas we cannot believe really that successive moments are the same moment. In "pure succession" there is no reversibility because there is no order. And there is no order because there are no terms to be arranged in order; and there are no terms, because terms imply distinction; and "pure succession" has been defined to be "succession without distinction" (pp. 76 *ff.*).

Time, then, as it is immediately given in consciousness, is succession without distinction. This succession is defined to be purely temporal and absolutely non-spatial; it must, therefore, be the succession of past, present, and future, of the *now* and the *not now*. But it is succession without distinction. Without distinction of what? is it without distinction of the *now* and the *not now*, or with that distinction and without any other? On the one hand, past, present, and future, the *now* and the *not now* are purely time-distinctions: they are distinc-

tions which are, or may be, absolutely non-spatial. On that view, then, "pure succession" will mean not "succession without time-distinctions" but "succession without spatial distinctions." Subsequently, of course, past, present, and future may be compared to points in a line; but they must first be there in order to be compared. If the imagination is to find a resemblance, there must be something (viz., the moments of time) in which it can, however unreasonably, fancy it detects a resemblance to points in space. In that case, then, past, present and future, the *now* and the *not now*, are given immediately in consciousness; and we are brought back to the question whether what is thus given can be accepted, or whether it is inherently self-contradictory. I think Professor Bergson would himself not wish us to accept it. In that case we are driven on to the other alternative, that "succession without distinction" means "succession without distinction of past, present and future." But if "pure succession" is succession without distinction of the *now* and the *not now*, in what sense is it succession at all? If past, present and future are not of the nature of time, what is that time in which they are known? Surely it is not time at all, but Timelessness? If so, I cannot see what is gained by speaking of "succession": it is a succession in which nothing succeeds. It is also, we may note, a succession which, according to Professor Bergson, "exists solely for the conscious observer," *i.e.*, does not take place in space. Outside me, that is to say in space, there is no time; true duration, the mutual interpenetration of the facts of consciousness, is peculiar to the subject (pp. 81, 82). Thus, as Mr. Bradley says (*Appearance and Reality*, p. 208), "for science reality at least tries to be timeless." And Professor Bergson argues that reality, as object, is timeless; but that reality, as subject, is marked by true duration, that is the mutual interpenetration of the facts of consciousness. But this mutual interpenetration, when we come to look at it, is just that

simultaneous presentation of the contents of the "Specious Present" which leads other writers than Professor Bergson to deny that succession can be ultimate fact. The succession of which we are aware is represented as a succession which is over when we view it, *i.e.*, which must be non-existent (and so a "Specious Present") before, or in order that we may view it—and how can we be aware of what is no longer there when we look for it? An inhabitant of Flat-land, condemned to move always in the same straight line, could never see that his track made a line: he would see it end on; and, to understand that it was a line, he would have to step off it and see it sideways. Thus, the very fact that we are aware of time proves that we are not in time. As Mr. Ritchie put it (*Philosophical Studies*), "to be aware of change of succession we must in some sense stand outside succession" (p. 91), that is to say, "the logical argument for the existence of a timeless self is the possibility of being aware of succession in time" (p. 189). Or, as Mr. Bradley, first of all, had put it, "change must be relative to a permanent" (p. 207). If so, then, as Mr. Ritchie said, "time cannot be an ultimate reality: for it has only a meaning in connection with change" (p. 90).

IV. Thus, we come, in the course of the procession which bears "Time to his tomb in Eternity," to the fourth view mentioned in the opening paragraph, *viz.*, that time-distinctions are indeed given but are appearance, and that Timelessness is the ultimate fact. The alternatives that we have thus far had before us have been: (1) That succession is the ultimate fact and that past, present and future cannot co-exist; (2) that their co-existence and mutual interpenetration is the ultimate fact, and that they are only subsequently spaced out and distinguished—in appearance; (3) that they are ultimately in fact, as they are given in appearance, at once successive and not successive—in reality they both do and do not co-exist.

As they are given in appearance, succession and simultaneity contradict each other. As an appearance, that is, time

contradicts itself. And if any one chooses to say that reality also contradicts itself, others are at liberty to remain unconvinced. If they remain so, if their faith is that reality does not contradict itself, then they must hold that Mr. Bradley sees the truth and says it: in time "we are forced to see the false appearance of a timeless reality" (p. 209).