

is quite foreign to this volume to pass judgment upon persons. The volume deals with unbelief taken purely in the theoretic or intellectual sense" (p. 1). The material is grouped under the three general divisions of "Philosophical Theories", "Quasi-Scientific, Theological and Ethical Theories", "Critical Theories". Under the first group "Radical Idealism", "Radical Sensationalism and Materialism", "Positivism", "Agnostic and Anti-theistic Evolution" and "Pessimism"; under the second "The Challenging of the Supernatural", "Denial of the Finality of Christianity", "Denial of the Transcendent Sonship of Jesus Christ" and "Utilitarian and Naturalistic Ethics"; under the last the author treats the criticism of the life of Jesus by Straus, Baur, Renan, Keim and others, and finally radical criticism of the Old and New Testaments.

The author states in his brief preface, "Compact and accurate exposition was the first end kept in view in the preparation of this treatise. Criticism of different forms of unbelief was the second end." It is but fair to say that the author has succeeded remarkably well in both respects. Considering the compass of the book a clearer and more accurate exposition could hardly be made. Naturally it was impossible to go into details at some points where details are almost necessary to a full understanding of some theory. But the author has seized the essential kernel with remarkable success and has set this forth with clearness and succinctness. The style is as limpid as a mountain brook.

His strictures on the various forms of unbelief will not satisfy everyone, of course. But they undoubtedly form a valuable addition to apologetic literature. The book is a very valuable study of one phase of the intellectual and religious life of the nineteenth century.

W. J. MCGLOTHLIN.

Naturalism and Religion.

By Dr. Rudolph Otto, Professor of Theology in the University of Göttingen. Translated by J. Arthur Thomson, Professor of Natural History in the University of Aberdeen, and Margaret R. Thomson. Edited with an introduction by Rev. W. D. Morrison, LL. D. G. P. Putnam's Sons, New York. Williams & Norgate, London. 1907.

This work belongs to the Crown Theological library, and is another attempt to vindicate the validity and freedom of the

religious views of the world and man against the naturalistic interpretation to which purely scientific investigation is thought to tend. The naturalism to which the author addresses himself chiefly is the conception of the world as a closed circle of causation, complete in itself and self-sufficient and self-explanatory. The religious view of the world on which he insists—a rather meagre one—must include mystery, dependence and purpose, for which the naturalistic interpretation would leave no room. Is the religious views to be given up, or are we to conclude that naturalism has reached conclusions which the facts do not justify?

Experts in science have authority in their own sphere—that of facts. The forming of hypotheses to explain the facts goes beyond the realm of pure science. Here others than scientists have rights. Indeed it is only because some scientists think that a description of what is and of how things happen is sufficient without seeking to explain why the world is as it is and why its operations are as they are, that they deny there are mysteries in nature, and that there are evidences of its dependence and purposefulness. But descriptions of facts and processes do not account for them—explain them.

Really the whole of Dr. Otto's book is to show that naturalistic interpreters of the world have no right to restrict inquiry to these narrow limits, and that beyond them there is room for all that constitutes religion and meets its needs.

Perhaps the most valuable part of the work is the author's epitome of the various and conflicting views held by scientists on the issues involved in his discussion. His familiarity with the literature of his subject is very wide. The peculiarity of Darwin's views was not descent of one species from another, but descent *by natural selection*. It is of this descent by natural selection he says: "Again and again we hear and read, even in scientific circles and journals, that Darwinism breaks down at many points, that it is insufficient, and even that it has quite collapsed." He also declares: "The two great doctrines of the schools (of naturalism), Darwinism on the one hand, and mechanical interpretation of life on the other, are both tottering, not because of the criticism of outsiders, but

of specialists within the schools themselves." We cannot even name the leaders in scientific investigation whose views he outlines in support of this statement. He thinks "if it is difficult to resist the impression that in another hundred years—perhaps again from the standpoint of new and definitely accepted mechanical explanations—people will regard our developmental mechanics, cellular mechanics, and other vital mechanics much in the same way as we now look on Vancanson's duck." At the same time he believes some theory of descent will prevail. But he does not distinguish sharply between evolutionary descent—from mere immanent forces—and development—from transcendent influences as well, although he recognizes the need of these latter. Darwin's views that "what appears to be 'purposeful' and 'perfect' is, in truth, only the manifold adaptations of forms of life to the conditions of their existence", and brought about wholly by these conditions themselves, contains incredible elements. The opposing Neo-Samarckian views holding to "the self-adaptation of organisms to the conditions of their existence", is much more in harmony with theological views of the world.

The limits of this review will not permit us to follow Dr. Otto further, as he discusses the failure of naturalism to account for the beginning of life and life itself, self-consciousness itself and its elements, the grand mental powers of man, the freedom of the will, etc. He does not lay much emphasis upon man's moral sense as incapable of naturalistic explanation, and, as we think, too little upon the bearing of his whole discussion upon the fact and nature of God. But he does conclude that "nature is really as Aristotle said, that is, strange, mysterious, and marvelous, indicating God, and pointing, all naturalism and superficial considerations notwithstanding, to something outside of and beyond itself". This is all he thinks religion demands. Many will think religion has a larger need. On the whole, for a treatise to follow and trenchantly and intelligently criticise naturalistic interpretation of the world down to the depths of up-to-date scientific research, we cannot do much better than study this book.

C. GOODSPEED.