V.—ON THE DISTINCTION OF INNER AND OUTER EXPERIENCE.

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WE may regard this problem from two points of view. In the first place we may treat the question simply from the historical standpoint, and try to show the causes which led to the gradual separation of experience into two different spheres, an outward and an inward. From the nature of the case such an investigation must be largely psychological. It cannot in itself be taken as determining the ultimate validity of the distinction, though it may furnish facts which an epistemological theory must take into consideration. But, in the second place, we can try to determine the real meaning and value of the distinction in the ultimate nature of things; and this of course will be a problem for metaphysical discussion. A larger inquiry of this kind may furnish the conclusion that experience is fundamentally one, and that outer and inner are only different phases or stages in its development. Or it may lead us to conclude that the contrast we make and act upon in our ordinary conduct is based upon a real difference which is more than one of degree. It will be convenient for us to consider first of all the genesis of the distinction.

For ordinary thought nothing seems more obvious than the difference between outer and inner experience. And one naturally assumes that a distinction, which he draws himself so readily, was always drawn with the same facility. But undoubtedly this cannot have been the case. If we distinguish two grades of experience, the former perceptual and therefore concrete and individual, the latter conceptual or generalised, it will only be at the second stage that the distinction is consciously made. The separation into two spheres, inner and outer, and the apt reference of experience to one or other of them, imply some development of the power of generalisation. To a merely perceptual con-

sciousness the act of reflexion which marks off the percept from the perceiving mind would not be possible. Nevertheless we must guard against a rigid division of perceptual from conceptual experience. For the process of development is continuous, and in perception itself unconscious inference is present. Even in the higher animal self-conservation implies a rudimentary capacity to draw conclusions. Only, however, on the level of conscious generalisation can individual experience receive a name and acquire a meaning. In his *Lectures on Naturalism and Agnosticism* Prof. Ward has justly insisted that conceptual thought is developed by intersubjective intercourse. In other words it involves language, and therefore a social system. It is not as an isolated individual but as a member of society that man has universalised his experience. On the other hand, we must bear in mind that intersubjective intercourse could not create an intellectual realm apart, but has only developed to clear consciousness elements implicitly present at the perceptual stage.

If, then, the distinction of outer and inner experience only becomes possible on the level of conceptual thought, how and why was it made and elaborated then? Great certainty on such a matter can hardly be expected. I shall first examine an ingenious theory on this point which is originally due to R. Avenarius. It is termed the fallacy of introjection. The theory is reproduced by Prof. Ward in his *Lectures on Naturalism and Agnosticism*, and for convenience I shall take his statements in explanation. Substantially the process called introjection rests on an error which is due to common thought and language. Its essence "consists in applying to the experiences of my fellow-creatures conceptions which have no counterpart in my own. . . . Of another common thought and language lead me to assume not merely that his experience is distinct from mine, but that it is *in* him in the form of sensations, perceptions, and other 'internal states'. . . . Thus while my environment is an external world for me, his experience is for me an internal world in him."¹ Consequently as we apply this conception to the experience of others, and they do the same for us, we are also led to apply it to ourselves, and so to construe our own experience in the light "of a false but highly plausible analogy".

The foregoing solution of the problem is plausible, but, as it stands, somewhat artificial and not quite convincing.

¹ *Naturalism and Agnosticism*, vol. ii., p. 172.

Beyond doubt intersubjective intercourse has been necessary to develop a distinction which implies conceptual thinking. But the part in introjection assigned to an "involuntary error" due to common thought and language is hardly intelligible and appears to be superfluous. Evidently some psychical growth is presupposed in the act of interpretation by which common thought places the thoughts and perceptions of another *within* him. The process of *inreading* would be meaningless unless each individual had already some key to it in his own experience.¹ Generalised experience implies a society, but it is not credible that men in society elaborated a distinction which did not somehow rest upon and appeal to the life-history of individuals.

What facts then led to the historical genesis of this distinction? One of the earliest would be the distinction of the body from surrounding objects. The beginnings of this separation take us back to the animal world. An animal would have no chance of survival in the struggle for existence if it did not note the difference between visual changes due to movement on its own part and those due to movement on the part of the object.² But man might have consciously differentiated his body from surrounding objects without recognising a soul or life within the body. The phenomena of sleep and dreams must have decisively contributed to this further result. In the lower culture dreams are regarded as real occurrences, and are attributed to a second or shadowy self within, which can leave the body and return to it. In giving clearness to, and in marking off, the experiences of this inner self no doubt the utterances and testimony of other individuals were highly important. Then the voice and the breath coming from within seemed a witness of the reality of the soul in the eyes of primitive men.³ When conceptual thinking had given some fixity and generality to the notion of a soul, we may conjecture that the phenomena of error and illusion—facts which must have been soon noted because practically so important—were treated in the same way as dreams and attributed to the inner self which of course was still conceived in a material way. A conscious contrast between

¹ A similar objection is urged against Avenarius's view of introjection by W. Jerusalem, in his suggestive book, *Die Urtheilsfunction*, vide p. 245.

² Stout, *Manual of Psychology*, p. 323.

³ There seem to be reminiscences of ancient beliefs about respiration in the Ionic school. Anaximenes, for example, supposes the soul to be composed of air, ἡ ψυχὴ φησίν, ἡ ἡμετέρα ἀπὸ οὐρα συνεπαρεί ἡμᾶς (Ritter and Praller, 20). Heraclitus speaks of it as a bright exhalation, ἀραθυμίαρις.

objects given in presentation and objects reproduced in memory and imagination cannot be primitive, but when the differentiation was made the latter processes would naturally fall to be regarded as inward. We need only further mention the activity of the will, with the corresponding sense of a resisting environment, which would give force and vividness to the incipient distinction between an outward world and an inward self.

If our view be right, then, the distinction of outer and inner has its rude beginning in the animistic mode of thought: and animism, as Dr. Tylor and others have shown, is universal in the lower culture. Survivals among civilised races prove the presence among them long before of animistic beliefs. Avenarius supposes that the widespread phenomena of animism is an extension to nature of the principle of introjection as applied to human beings. This is true if introjection means nothing more than the attribution of a soul. But the act of interpretation by which we place the thoughts and perceptions of another man within him as "internal states" is a somewhat developed one. It is not natural to make the cruder phenomena of animism depend on introjection thus conceived. We do better justice to the facts when we conclude that the distinction of outer and inner has its germ in the experience of individuals. The distinction was then developed by intersubjective intercourse, and the notion of an internal soul came to be applied not only to human beings but also to natural objects. The idea of "internal experience" is later, and grows out of the theory of a soul or finer second self within the body.

We find then this theory of a fallacy of primitive thought does not solve our problem. But though we trace the distinction to a basis in the actual experience of individuals, the larger question of its final validity still remains. For it is always possible that thought may misconstrue experience. And, so far as we have gone, the division of our world into two spheres may or may not have a justification in the real nature of things. To this further aspect of the problem we now turn.

The expression outer and inner when applied to experience is to some extent metaphorical. For experience is not a process carried on within the head, nor are objects which appear external to us and to one another on that account outside consciousness. The distinction of inner and outer is one which falls within experience, and what we call an outward object and an inward idea are alike states of consciousness. That externality in space is not externality to mind

was clearly brought out by Kant. It lay beyond Kant's mental horizon to discuss the distinction of outer and inner from the point of view of the historical growth of experience. But he accepts the distinction as justifiable and incorporates it in his theory of knowledge. That which is in space and time belongs to outer sense, that which is in time alone belongs to inner sense. And there is a necessary connexion between the two spheres, for that which is determined in space is determined from the side of the subject in terms of inner sense. By attending to the mental process by which all objects become possible the inward side of experience would be differentiated from the outer. But Kant afterwards saw that in putting this interpretation on the common distinction he involved himself in difficulties which affected the consistency of his theoretical philosophy. For the inner life was perpetually changing, and we could not, as he thought, apply to it the category of substance as the permanent in time. Nor could that product of Kantian abstraction, the spectral pure ego which was without content, serve as a permanent unity to which inner changes were referred.

Accordingly in the second edition of the *Critique*, in the "Remark on the Principles of Judgment," we find Kant modifying his earlier view, and asserting that outer sense is presupposed in the conscious determination of ourselves in time. "It is by means of external perception that we make intelligible to ourselves the various successive changes in which we ourselves exist. . . . No change can possibly be an object of experience apart from the consciousness of something that is permanent, and in inner sense nothing that is permanent can be found." On this view it would be as logically subsequent to and contrasted with the determination of objects in space that the consciousness of inner experience is possible.¹ It is of course evident that Kant in

¹ Dr. Caird thinks that the modifications in statement made by Kant in dealing with this point in the second edition of his *Critique* indicate a movement of his mind, of which perhaps he was not himself fully conscious, towards a larger and more consistent idealism (*Phil. of Kant*, i., 417, 614). I am not aware how far he is supported in this view by competent Kantian scholars. But I venture to think that Kant simply desired to give a statement of his critical idealism less open to objection and more carefully guarded than that which he had given in the first edition and in the *Prolegomena*. While he shows in the second edition that inner sense depends on outer sense, he also repeats that a phenomenon (*Erscheinung*) must be a phenomenon of Something (ed. Kehrbach, p. 23). And though he admits that this reference of perception to a reality beyond it might not be necessary for *intellectual* perception (*op. cit.* p. 32), yet it is no part of his theory that human intelligence is implicitly a consciousness which is capable of exercising an *intellectuelle Anschauung*.

his treatment of this distinction is greatly influenced by the general theory of experience which he found it necessary to postulate. He could not admit that the self was real in the sense of maintaining its identity amid its changing activities. Hence the fact of external perception was judged necessary to give the contrast of permanence over against inner changes. Yet in Kant's theory it is impossible to understand how a pure form of perception like space, when somehow superinduced on an affection of sense which is mysteriously given, could, even with the necessary help of the schematised categories, produce those *localised* objects in space which fill the field of outer experience. It is conceivable that spatial and temporal relations may have been evolved out of sense-affection as a form which is implicitly contained in it; but it is not intelligible how pure forms of intuition could be read into an alien matter. We refrain, however, from entering on a detailed criticism of Kant, for it will generally be admitted that his theory of knowledge is too unsystematic, too little penetrated by the notion of development, to be accepted as it stands. The motto *simplex sigillum veri* may not always be true, but the cumbersome and ill-adjusted machinery of the *Critique* of itself provokes doubt and unbelief. Let us rather see how Kant's view on this subject is amended and developed by Dr. Caird in his well-known treatise on the *Philosophy of Kant*.¹

Inner and outer experience we are there told are only different stages in the development of consciousness, which in another aspect is the development of the object. From the simplest determinations of the object in space and time we advance organically through the categories, or forms of judgment, to the world as completely determined by reason or self-consciousness, which if logically posterior is the real presupposition of the whole movement. The later and more highly articulated stage of this development is, properly speaking, inner experience, and it can only be distinguished from the consciousness of the world in the sense that it is that consciousness in a more completely developed form. But as each fact of experience involves a reference to the self, so every outer experience will have its inner side. On the other hand, there is no inner experience which is not also outer, but we call it inner because the inner side is specially reflected on,—in other words we definitely recognise it as belonging to the self.

That there are elements of truth in this statement we do

¹ *Phil. of Kant*, vol. i., 614 ff.

not seek to deny. Inner experience could not consistently develop except in relation to and in distinction from outer experience. And what we call an outer experience must also have an inner side. Nor can there be doubt that in the historical growth of experience its two aspects have advanced *pari passu*. None the less it is difficult to regard inner experience as merely outer experience at a more concrete and highly articulated stage of growth. If we set aside for the moment the question whether the distinction between them can be minimised in this fashion, we might still argue that, from the point of view of psychological development, it is inner experience which is primary and outer which is derivative. A developed self-consciousness is mediated by the consciousness of objects, but in the last resort we must postulate a direct and conscious activity of the self as the ground and beginning of all progress in experience. There is a sense in which we must be immediately conscious of the operations of our own minds, and it is only as the result of inferential thought that we mark off a section of experience as outer. On this ground we should be disposed to modify Dr. Caird's statement, and to treat inner experience as fundamentally the more simple and elementary. From this standpoint development begins from an active self in relation to an environment, which gradually distinguishes that environment from itself, and by the aid of conceptual thought defines a portion of its whole experience as external.

But the further question remains whether a distinction of degree between outer and inner experience covers all the facts. Dr. Caird does not find anything in the object as determined in space which is not taken up into self-consciousness. The advance from outer to inner experience is just a process in which thought goes on to a more and more complete determination of things, till "it finds its own unity in the object".¹ It is hard to see how on this view the individuality and uniqueness which we discover in experience are explained at all. And in reference to the matter on hand this theory does not afford room for certain obvious facts. Inner and outer experience refuse to melt into one another in the way suggested. Mere reflexion on the inner side of an outer experience does not lead us to regard it as inner. A man, for instance, examining a statue critically in order to give his opinion of it reflects on the impressions he receives and recognises them as his own. Yet he would not call his experience an inward one. Even more decisively

¹ *Phil. of Kant*, vol. i., p. 470.

would the same individual refuse to term outward his experience when, leaning back on his chair and closing his eyes, he thought out carefully the merits of several possible lines of action in order to select the best. And between the one experience and the other there would appear to him to be a qualitative difference. If every inner experience is outer as well, why do we habitually distinguish what we call subjective mental processes from the perception of outward objects, and contrast the one with the other? No doubt each outer experience has an inward side, and in virtue of this we sometimes wrongly interpret an inner state to signify facts in the external world. But we never mistake our perception of objects in space for a purely inward mental process. We find therefore a difficulty in accepting the view that the contrast of inner and outer experience rests entirely on a difference of degree in the development of consciousness. From this standpoint distinctions which are universally noted and acted upon are not adequately explained.

Against this it may be urged that inner and outer experience cannot be two diverse kinds of experience, for both are experiences of the one subject and are distinctions within the one consciousness. We have already admitted this. For the purely perceptual consciousness experience would be one, and the generalised distinction of outward and inward we know is made possible by conceptual thinking. But on the level of mediate thought, or rational inference, a new question presses itself upon us. We ask, Does the ultimate *raison d'être* of the distinction lie in the conscious selves who make it? Or is the inference reasonable that the experience which we name external gets its character from the implication of realities, which are not those of self-conscious subjects? In other words, Is outer experience the interpretation by self-conscious subjects of the action of reals which thought itself does not create? This we believe to be the true solution of the problem, and the explanation of the refusal of outer experience to be taken up into and merged in inner experience.

But before going further let us deal with an objection which is certain to be raised. The assumption that a trans-subjective real is implied in presented objects will be termed gratuitous. The apparent independence of the object, it will be contended, is entirely the outcome of conceptual thought. For the application of the concept generalises the particular experience of perception, and treats it as an instance of a general relation: and this just means that "we are conscious

we have before us an object which exists independently of its presentation in the particular case". On this view the seemingly independent outer object would be, if not relative to the individual thinker, yet relative to "consciousness in general,"—the rational self-consciousness which is the same in all human subjects.

In reply we may point out that conceptual thought depends for its individual reference upon perceptive experience, which is altogether special and concrete. As Kant himself granted, particular connexion in experience can only be learned from experience; laws of nature like gravitation cannot be deduced *a priori*. The ground then of the particular character of individual objects and the special relations in which they stand to one another can only be found in perceptual experience. It is indeed only by an act of abstraction that we can picture a purely percipient ego. But none the less this percipient consciousness must take note of and be affected by realities other than itself, in order that universal experience may have its specific side. For conceptual thought can only evolve out of perception what is implicitly contained in it. That the perceptive consciousness is not aware of this reference of the percept to something beyond itself is no disproof of the fact that there is such a reference. If inferential thought compels us to postulate this reference, we must accept its verdict. For we open the door to a hopeless scepticism, if we refuse to admit that the real must conform to what is rational. I shall now give one or two illustrations to show that experience is not explicable unless we posit such a transsubjective reality.

What we term external experience impresses us as containing an element of inevitableness. We are conscious that we have a share in directing the process of our thoughts or the movement of our limbs, but if we look to the heaven above or the earth around, the things we see we cannot help seeing.¹ The process of consciousness in the individual persons A, B, C and D, may be very different at a particular time, but at a certain moment they all, without choice on their part, register an experience X,—say the appearance of the sun. Let us call the percepts of A, B, C and D, *a*, *b*, *c*, *d*; then *a*, *b*, *c*, *d* contain an implicit reference to *x*, which becomes for universal thinking X. But suppose they do not, and that X is an abstraction elaborated out of *a*, *b*, *c*, *d*.

¹ Berkeley, in his *Principles of Human Knowledge*, distinguishes in this way perception from imagination.

Then there must be some reason in the series *a, b, c, d* why the abstract *X* should be evolved and not *Y* or *Z*. That is to say *a, b, c* and *d* must each be so qualified that it accepts the interpretation *X* but excludes *Y* or *Z*. *Ex hypothesi* the cause of the specially qualified percepts *a, b, c, d* cannot be found in the previous condition of *A, B, C, D*. Nor can the Abstract *X* give any common qualification to these percepts. Consequently the sudden manifestation to different minds, the consistency, the inevitableness of the experience we call *X* becomes quite unintelligible. And the facts remain inexplicable unless we admit that *X* is more than an abstraction, and is significant of something (*x*) which has a reality for itself.

We put the same point in a somewhat different light when we direct attention to the fact that a person refers various experiences which he has had at different times to one object *A*. He has seen *A* frequently, and believes that if he complies with the conditions he will see it again. For popular thought this is the common, if fallacious, argument for the independent existence of *A* as it stands. Plainly however *A* in its unique setting cannot be deduced from the universal side of experience: nor is there any constraining reason in the individual himself why he should refer various percepts to one and the same object *A*. That necessity comes from the side of the object, and *A* must stand for something which has had a determining influence on perception while it persists beyond it. Again, however inadequate the "laws of nature" may be as an explanation of concrete reality, yet they have validity in nature. They enable us to anticipate experience. An eclipse is predicted years before it happens, and it takes place exactly as predicted. Here we have a perceptual experience *A* furnishing the basis for a mathematical construction on which the forecast was made which was verified in perceptual experience *B*. Between *A* and *B* there is a process which need not come into consciousness at all, but must be real if *B* is to take place. The facts require us here to assume that the rational process by which *B* is deduced from *A* has for its counterpart an activity in things which thought interprets but does not create.

These are somewhat obvious instances, but we must not ignore their significance on that account. They all unite in enforcing the one lesson. We admit that the objects of outer experience are ideal constructions, but the facts compel us to add that these constructions can only be valid interpretations of a reality beyond. And in regard to the distinction between inner and outer experience we conclude that outer

experience has the special character which attaches to it, because it directly implies that the subject is influenced by realities other than itself. The subject creates the distinction, but it does so as its interpretation of a real difference within the whole of its experience.

We must now try to form a more definite conception of of this transsubjective reality which we find it necessary to postulate. But we require to state our position in this reference with some care. It will not do to argue that in "physical events" as distinguished from the subjective sequence of ideas we have the fundamental notion of externality.¹ For a 'physical event' is by no means a primitive datum of consciousness but implies ideal construction; and it is absurd to suppose that the object as it exists for developed consciousness has the same significance apart from consciousness. Influenced by these considerations, J. S. Mill, as is well known, defined matter as "a permanent possibility of sensations"; and he explains that these "permanent possibilities" are "not constructed by the mind itself but merely recognised by it".² That which persists through changes and has capacities must in some sense be real; but Mill gives us no light as to how we are to think of this reality. Nor, on the whole, has Kant's treatment of the subject been helpful. His "thing in itself" is at one point regarded as the positive source of sensations, but afterwards it is fined down to a mere limiting notion.³ On neither view is the process of experience intelligible; and the conclusion seemed inevitable that philosophy must either return to the realism of Locke or advance to the absolute idealism of the post-Kantian thinkers. Without committing ourselves to this inference we may frankly allow that the notion of "things in themselves" is inconsistent as well as useless. That which *ex hypothesi* possesses no knowable qualities can never be coerced into active relations with elements within conscious experience. If this were possible the original assumption must have been wrong, and the 'thing in itself' instead of being an impenetrable mystery has some affinity to consciousness. It might seem, then, that in trying to do justice to the facts of outer experience we have reached an *impasse*. On the one side it appears impossible to explain the facts of sense-

¹ *Vide*, MIND, N.S., No. 22, p. 222.

² *Exam. of Hamilton*, 6th ed., p. 239.

³ With this we may compare the Aristotelian $\bar{\alpha}\lambda\eta$ which is sometimes spoken of as mere privation— $\sigma\tau\acute{\epsilon}\rho\eta\sigma\iota\varsigma$, and at other times is regarded as a positive means through which individuals are differentiated.

perception if the object only exists as experienced. On the other side, if we postulate an unknowable reality behind the things of sense, the unity of experience becomes inexplicable.

There is one sense in which no sober idealist refuses to admit that the object of experience has a reality of its own. Among the objects of our experience are other human subjects who, we inevitably infer, have a reality for themselves. Entering into our experience they can never be dissolved into it, but persist beyond it. This is an admission of some significance. For it means that we recognise individual centres of thought, feeling, and will, which decisively influence our consciousness, while they are independent of it. Here we have a principle of individuality as object, whose qualities, as recognised and interpreted by us, are represented in it by modes of its own activity. And when we have admitted this we are bound in consistency to go further. The law of continuity, as justly insisted on by Leibniz, forces us to regard the principle of individuality as having many stages and degrees of development. There is no break in the process by which life advances to consciousness and to self-consciousness; and the line of separation between organic and what we call inorganic matter is a ravishing one. Moreover, the psychologist is compelled to postulate the reality of a sub-conscious mental world, in order to explain phenomena which are manifest above the threshold of consciousness. And it is reasonable to suppose that what is substantial in lower forms of life is one in kind (though very different in degree) with the conscious self in man. The latter would be the *ἐνέργεια* of which the former was the *δύναμις*. The real on which the ideational activity of the subject works in constructing the phenomenal world is, on this view, manifold spiritual substances or causalities; and the diverse qualities of the world as given in experience, would be grounded in the various activities of these substances. The basis of the phenomenon termed matter is, on this theory, an inner life which is allied to our own consciousness.¹ The point we wish to urge, then, is that, if you accept the world of inter-subjective intercourse as a fact, you cannot restrict the principle to the relations of human individuals with one another. The interaction of individuals not existing merely for each other, but each for itself, must also be possible at lower stages of development, and there is no break in the process of advance from the lower to the higher. Hence

¹ Cf., Paulsen, *Einleitung in die Philosophie*, p. 387; Stout, *Manual of Psychology*, p. 54.

there seems to be no valid reason why one should not admit that our so-called external experience involves the presence to our consciousness of manifold spiritual substances which are subjects at lower planes of development. A transsubjective real is inferentially necessary to explain external experience; and as we construe this real in terms of spirit and not of matter we cannot be accused of setting up a dualism which makes knowledge inexplicable. The constructive work of thought has been already referred to. But thought cannot weave out of itself the content of experience. Something must be given, and the requisite *fundamenta relationis* are supplied by individual reals, by everything which possesses a degree of inner life and is for itself as well as for others. On this hypothesis we do justice to the primacy and centrality of the inner life, while we avoid the absurdity of reducing external experience to thought-relations, or of positing unknowable "things in themselves" behind the phenomena of sense.

We are now in a position to deal with a point of some importance which bears on the distinction of inner and outer. We mean the spatial reference which the distinction suggests. It may be assumed here that neither space nor time can be an empty form having a real existence which is somehow applied to things.¹ They must, therefore, be in some way developed out of the content of experience itself: though not real in themselves they must be evolved from some basis in reality, or to use a phrase employed by Leibniz, they must be *phenomena bene fundata*. This point of reference to reality can only be found in the interaction of those individual reals which are the ground of experience. The mutual determination of different spiritual substances would be represented from the standpoint of the perceiving subject under the form of space. And inasmuch as all experience must be construed in terms of the states of a subject for which both itself and other selves exist, we have time as the universal form in which the subject represents everything that happens. The long history of experience and the generalisation which is its outcome have served to invest space and time with a seeming reality and independence of their own. Only the unworkable nature of this conclusion and the contradictions in which it involves him, shake a man's natural faith in an opinion which seems so well founded. It would be too much to say that the theory we accept satisfactorily solves every difficulty, but it avoids a twofold error. For it treats neither space nor

¹ *Vide*, Lotze, *Metaphysics*, bk. ii., chaps. i., iii.

time as an independent real, nor does it reduce them to subjective mental fictions which cut us off from reality. They are representations in the subject, but they are also valid forms under which he interprets what is real.

From the standpoint of the historic development of experience the universal point of view is late. To the merely perceptual consciousness space and time would not be distinguished. The "selective interest" or the practical need which turns the attention of the animal to space and time is concerned with the fact of movement which involves both. I refer to the temporal and spatial adjustments which are necessary to secure food, to seize prey, and to escape a foe. And it is from the association in man of active movement with the capacity of generalising that the differentiation and development of the ideas of space and time are due. The stages of this progress are however matter for psychological discussion. The final result is that space is hypostatized as a comprehensive whole which exists for itself, and which contains within it all that generalised experience treats as an independent reality. And language has given universal currency to the habit of speaking of what is believed to belong to the mind as *in* it and of what does not belong to it as *outside* it. Philosophic reflexion forces us to correct this abstraction. Both the spatial image and the object it contains are shown to belong to the mind as ideal constructions. Yet the common-sense point of view has a certain justification. For ideal construction is at root interpretation; and in the existence and activity of transsubjective realities lies the possibility of our representing to ourselves the world of objects extended in space.

In the remainder of this paper I shall try to answer certain objections which may be made to the theory of reality we have accepted. You have admitted, it will be said, the presence of ideal construction in experience, why should you infer that so-called things are anything more than such constructions? A thing, however seemingly solid, is only the meeting-point of universal qualities or relations. In reply it may be asked, What is meant by a meeting-point? Evidently something which serves as a ground of identity and a bond of connexion between the qualities. These cannot fly loose and unclaimed in the world of experience. For if in a sense they belong to reality as a whole, yet they definitely pertain to particular determinations of reality and not to others. No doubt if we suppose that qualities are somehow attached as adjectives to isolated fragments of reality, we shall be proved inconsistent: the substance does

not exist outside its attributes. But this objection does not apply when we conceive the 'support of qualities' after the analogy of the self, and construe the qualities themselves as representations in consciousness of the interaction between spiritual substances.¹ In a similar spirit it is said that to advocate the reality of things is to champion a mere fiction of the mind. For the so-called thing is "ruined by thought": it goes to pieces under the touch of the speculative inquirer. Popular thought is certainly arbitrary in the way in which it applies the name; and we do not deny that things are sometimes mental fictions. A bag of grain might be called a 'thing,' while the name would not be given to the contents spread out upon the floor. But popular terminology does not concern us here; and we prefer to speak of individual reals which have a being for themselves. These are not due to ideal construction, but are presupposed by it, for without them thought would not have data on which to work. Obviously it will not be possible for us, with our present knowledge, to distinguish what is individual at levels of development far distant from our own.

But even in this sense, it is contended, the existence of individual reals cannot be maintained. The more we reflect the better we shall see that the significance of every predicate involves relations which force us to go beyond the individual itself; and the further we carry the process, the more unreal becomes the abstraction which remains. The fact is, as we learn, that an individual, or monad, is a fiction; it is reducible to a mere adjective which falls within the only true individual, the universe as a whole—the one ultimate reality.

As a result of this drastic argument not only 'things' but conscious selves are 'ruined,' or at least they should be. For the reasoning employed, if valid, ought also to undermine the individuality and identity of the human self by dissolving it into a changing tissue of relations. The logical consequence of this argument must be to discredit any theory of reality which the human ego can form. Experience, on the contrary, testifies to a self which distinguishes itself from its states and maintains its unity in them. And it is after the analogy of the self that we conceive the individual reals which are the ground of the external world as perceived.

It will still be urged that the test of the truth of any theory is its coherency; in other words, if we can "think

¹ It will be said that this is tacitly to admit that the individual is only qualified in virtue of its relations. I do not think so, for the qualities which become explicit through interaction point to positive differences in the monads themselves.

it out" consistently in all its bearings, we establish its claim to truth. And individual reals cannot be "thought out" without yielding up their reality to the absolute. That there is an element of truth in this contention we do not deny, and we will return to the point presently. But if you reduce individuals to mere appearance and turn their identity into a fiction, in the ostensible interests of rational explanation you are ignoring facts which require to be explained. If like Parmenides you say that the *one* only is and the *many* are not, you have still to account for the illusion of 'not-being'.

Suppose for the moment that thought did compel us to merge all individuals in the one perfect individual or absolute, I do not see how on this supposition we are to explain the appearance of individuality within the whole. For it can hardly be maintained that the illusion is due to the abstract method of ordinary thought which concentrates attention on one aspect of reality and neglects the rest. On this assumption the term might be applied or rejected according as the point of view changed. Yet there are centres of experience which claim to have a reality of their own from whatever standpoint they are regarded. And one cannot understand how, if the theory of reality we are considering be true, such a claim could ever come to be made. But, it may be urged, the rights of logical thought are supreme, and to deny these rights is to pave the way to a scepticism of the worst kind. And certainly if thought and reality are not ultimately consistent, philosophical discussion must be fruitless. Still it does not seem to me that the demands of coherent thinking forbid us to attribute reality to individuals which are not themselves absolute. If you assume that the individual is simply its relations, then it may consistently be deprived of any being for itself in the ultimate system: but the validity of the conclusion is spoiled by the inadequacy of the premises. The self which thinks, and so relates itself to other objects and objects to one another in the relational form of consciousness, is not the whole self. And though we are bound to accept the relational system as a valid interpretation by thought of what is given in experience, we are not entitled to say that the whole self of experience is exhausted by this interpretation. Thought presupposes experience, and in some form experience must have preceded the genesis in time of intellectual activity. It is just because experience is richer than thought that a self, or individual centre of experience, is, in Prof. Ward's phrase, a *fundamentum relationis*.

A few further observations on this point may be made. Mr. Bradley has justly remarked that the subject in a judg-

ment must always have a reality beyond the predicate. To reduce the two sides to a fundamental identity as aspects of one thought-content is to destroy the possibility of predication.¹ And this must apply to the judgment of self-consciousness as well as to that of perception. Thus, when we predicate thought of the self, the judgment is made possible by the fact that the self is also a centre of feeling and will, and cannot be dissolved in the pure unity of thought. This distinction makes the judgment significant; and self-consciousness is an illustration of the principle that the object of thought is more than thought. On the other hand, all three elements are embraced in the self as subject of experience, and so the self is not a reality beyond experience in this wider sense. We are not, therefore, entitled to argue that the subject of experience is equivalent to thinking-subject, and on this ground to claim that the object is thought and nothing more. The reality to which I refer my states of consciousness must always be more than these states. We have already tried to show in what way we think this reality is to be conceived.

It would be futile, however, to deny that those who believe the hypothesis of individual reals to be justifiable and even necessary are not in a position of great difficulty when they try to explain their place and meaning in the ultimate system of things. Dr. Ward, for example, in his *Lectures on Naturalism and Agnosticism* accepts the principle of individual selves or centres of experience, but it is somewhat difficult to understand the relations in which he conceives these centres to stand to the Absolute. God, we are told, is "the living Unity of all," and behind the development of experience there can only be "the connecting conserving acts of the one Supreme".² Moreover Dr. Ward admits real contingency in the divine working, but it is the contingency "not of chance but of freedom". In his view the divine Unity which comprehends all is evidently not that of a system where all the elements are determined in relation to one another and to the whole. A view like the foregoing requires a good deal of explanation, and if it obviates certain difficulties, it also exposes itself to certain criticisms. In any case it would have been interesting and valuable to have had a more explicit statement on this point from so able a thinker. For it is just on this question of the relation of individuals which are real to the Absolute that opponents press home their arguments most strongly. Thus it is urged, "those who cling to the idea that there is an absolute

¹ *Appearance and Reality*, p. 170.

² *Op. cit.* vol. ii., pp. 280-281.

principle of individuality in man and in other finite substances seem necessarily to be led to a denial of all real connection or relation between such substances."¹ It must be granted of course that there can be only one absolute Being, and a plurality of *res completae* is impossible. To claim such absolute reality for individuals would be suicidal, seeing that each is only an element in the universe, and all must find a place and receive a meaning in a coherent system. For this we require a supreme connecting and organising activity which is present in all individuals. Lotze tries to satisfy this need by saying that all substances "are parts of a single real Being".² Yet if this statement be accepted as it stands, it does not appear possible to resist the inference that the Pluralism, which philosophy found it necessary to postulate at an earlier stage, is only a temporary hypothesis, and is superseded when thought rises to the final synthesis. The use of the term 'substance' in this connexion has been objected to. Wundt, for example, criticises it, and would substitute for it causality or activity.³ But it is not clear that the material associations which, as he points out, cling to the one word are absent from the other. Moreover, if we are to think of activity at all, it must be as the activity of something real: and we do not mean more when we use the word substance to denote a centre of experience. In his *Microcosmus*, Lotze has stated somewhat differently his attitude to the ultimate Unity which philosophy strives after. "It seems to me that philosophy is the endeavour of the human mind, after this wonderful world has come into existence and we in it, to work its way back in thought and bring the facts of outer and inner experience into connexion so far as our present position in the world allows."⁴ The note of caution here is justifiable. For our thought is necessarily infected by spatial and temporal metaphors. And space and time on any view cannot adequately express the nature of the Absolute. We are inclined to forget that categories which are valid within experience cannot be employed in the same way to the ultimate conditions of experience. And it is evident that no category at our disposal is entirely adequate to explain the relation of the Absolute to the individual.

¹ Caird, *Evolution of Religion*, vol. ii., p. 83.

² *Metaphysics* (Eng. trans.), vol. i., p. 165.

³ *System der Philosophie*, p. 437. Paulsen's position on this point is, I think, just. He advocates the use of the term *substance* here, only demanding that we first make clear what we mean by it. Atomistic associations are of course out of place.

⁴ *Microcosmus* (Eng. trans.), vol. ii., p. 718.

The result of our discussion then is, that the facts of outer experience lead us to infer that the individual subject is here in direct relation with a system of other-selves. In inner experience again, the subject's own activity is primary and relation to other-selves is only indirectly implied. But though we claim that the monads are real, the reality which pertains to each individual can only be secondary or derivative. For the individual has its determinate character elicited through interaction with other monads, and the whole system presupposes an organising ground and principle of unity. If we desire a figurative expression of this unity in difference perhaps we might find it in the connexion of soul and body. In an organism the separate parts, or members, are essentially related to one another, while each has its specific function in the whole. The soul again, or the *ἐντελέχεια* to use Aristotle's word, is the presupposition of the organism and the ideal principle which gives it meaning and truth. By some such analogy we may conceive of the Absolute as immanent in all individuals, yet allowing to each a definite function and degree of reality in the whole, while its own being is not lost in the process of finite experience. For that the universe is a coherent whole is a presupposition both of thought and of ethical action.

A further observation may be added.

In any view we take of the ultimate Unity, we must not ignore the world of ethical and spiritual values. For the facts of moral and religious experience have as good a claim to be taken into account as the facts of science. The tendency to "excessive unification," which Aristotle objected to in Plato, has always been a danger to which philosophy is peculiarly liable. And a philosophy, which in the interests of system undermines the moral-responsibility of the individual and treats religion as an illusion, lays itself open to the charge of explaining away what it cannot explain. The intellectual necessity we are under of striving after unity in all experience must be conditioned by the ethical necessity by which we postulate that the Supreme Reality satisfies our spiritual nature. There can be no final dualism between the two spheres any more than there can be between inner and outer experience. But the Absolute, be it remembered, does not merely explain an aspect of the world but the world as a whole. And a thinker whose outlook is catholic will try neither to ignore nor to misconstrue any phase of experience in order to secure unity of system.