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THE FIRST EUROPEAN CONGRESS¹

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Most current references to European Congresses prior to the one now sitting in Paris go no farther back than the Congress of Vienna in 1815. These references generally suggest that, whatever may have been done at Vienna, this we do not propose to do at Paris. The implication is that the European world has been running on the wrong track, and that now it is the mission of somebody to set it right and start it anew on wiser and safer lines. Students of history, however, know that Vienna and Paris mark only two stages in a long succession of efforts to bring the peoples of Europe into some kind of harmonious working together for common ends. The terminology of these attempts, the immediate interests involved, vary greatly, so greatly that the casual reader of history easily fails to recognize the community of purpose; but to one who has in mind the fundamental principle of historic continuity the chain of ideas is fairly distinct and complete.

Not to push that principle too far, I am asking your attention to certain aspects of what may fairly be called the First European Congress. You will not find it under that name in historical manuals. There it figures as the Council of Constance, and is commonly treated as a religious conference, held in an obscure sub-alpine German town in the early years of the fifteenth century precisely corresponding to the dates of the recent European war, 1414 to 1418. Its character as a religious assembly,

¹ An Address delivered before the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, March 12, 1919.

however, was completely overshadowed by its constantly increasing importance as a forum for the discussion of every variety of European interest. And this universal character was not accidental. It had been prepared for by a long series of preliminary discussions covering at least a full generation and pointing with ever increasing distinctness towards a General Council for their adequate publicity and their possible solution.

The immediate incitement to these preliminary debates was the occurrence in the year 1378 of the so-called, and well-called, Great Schism in the administration of the Church of the West. For seventy years previous to that date the head of the Roman Catholic world had been a Frenchman and had lived in France, under the protection of the French government and generally in harmony with its political policies. This French residence, with its diversion of the papal interests from Italy and Germany, and with its obvious suggestion of enmity to England — for this is the period of the Hundred Years' War between England and France — had brought out a continuous line of protest, and this protest culminated in the year 1376 in the return of Pope Gregory XI to Rome and his death there in 1378.

The election which followed, the first in Rome for two generations, resulted in the choice of an Italian, who called himself Urban VI, and whose election was, as we should say, "made unanimous" by the recognition of the individual cardinals, the constitutional electoral body of the Church. Within a few weeks, however, the French elements in the cardinalate began to discover certain irregularities in the election of Pope Urban, and to develop certain scruples of conscience in regard to their own action. They seceded from the Curia and proceeded to elect a pope of their own, a French nobleman, Clement VII, a relative of the French king, who was undoubtedly privy to the proceedings.

The casual story of the Schism represents these two reverend prelates, sitting on their respective thrones, making faces and hurling anathemas at each other to the grief and scandal of Christendom; but with all that we are not concerned. What interests us is the storm of discussion that almost instantly broke forth as to the means by which this obvious scandal could be healed. Politically Europe divided pretty nearly on the lines already indicated by previous antagonisms. The Latin peoples, plus Scotland — which may fairly be described as the Ireland of that day — stood by the French pope. The Germanic nations, including England and northern Italy, supported the “Roman” claim. A flood of pamphlets, of which the University of Paris was the most prolific source, examined the question in all conceivable lights and suggested a great variety of remedies.

At first the discussion turned naturally upon the legal aspects of the case. “Who began it?” “Whose fault was it?” “Which election was the legitimate one?” These were the questions on which the greatest jurists of the day displayed their learning, their ingenuity, and also, it must be confessed, their party allegiances. Precisely the same thing happened in the recent war. We began with furious debates about the “guilt” of Germany, and Germany retorted with pious insistence upon the “threatening attitude” of France. But very soon it became evident then as now that no progress could be made by this method. The Schism was there; the thing to do was to get rid of it. But how? Each pope declared himself to be the divinely selected successor to St. Peter and so bound to carry out the divine purpose by holding on. All sorts of devices were suggested; we are concerned with only one. From a very early stage all signs began to point towards the holding of a General Council.

But what was a Council? and how could it be called? Obviously neither pope would call a Council to depose

himself; and yet all formal orthodox definitions of a Council included the pope as an integral part of it, and it was universally understood that only a pope could call a valid Council. An assembly summoned in any other way might be ever so imposing in numbers or in weight, but a Council it would not be. Fortunately the way to a solution of this deadlock had been prepared by a profound transformation in European methods of thought that had slowly been making its way for two generations. I refer, of course, to the Nominalistic philosophy, which under the lead of the Englishman, William Ockham (d. 1349), was gradually replacing the mediæval, realistic method of looking at the world of nature and of human relations. In consequence of this transformation men were becoming accustomed to the amazing proposition that the State and the Church alike consisted of the individuals who composed them, and that the law, alike of State and of Church, was to be found in the will of the whole body of the citizens of each.

Here was the clue to the solution of the problem of the Schism. The wrangling of the parties went on. Schismatic popes died and new ones were elected by their respective partisans. But meanwhile there had been growing in both camps a new sense of the supreme importance of unity. In 1408 a group of cardinals from both sides united in a call for a Council at Pisa in Italy. Both popes anathematized everybody concerned, but the thing went on. The call was answered. A considerable assembly met at Pisa, declared both popes deposed and supervised the election in due canonical form of a new pope. The actual election was conducted by the "union" cardinals, but the Council as such validated the election. Of course neither of the rival popes accepted the result. There was now a triple schism. On the death of the "Pisan" pope within a year, a successor to him was chosen by "his" cardinals, and the Schism was still on.

The most important act of the Council at Pisa was its adjournment to a date. That act expressed the feeling of Europe that the Council ought to be a continuing body, the real representative of European opinion in religious matters, and every one knew that there was no subject in the range of European politics that might not in some way be included under the head of religion. It was in pursuance of this adjournment that the Council of Constance, after long negotiations, came together. The choice of the place was the first victory for the party which we may henceforth describe as the party of Reform. Hitherto all councils since the establishment of the papal system had been held either in Italy or, as happened on one or two occasions, in some place under papal control. Now the emperor Sigismund, making himself the spokesman for the universal sentiment of western Christendom, insisted that the forthcoming council should be held outside of Italy, and the "Pisan" pope, John XXIII, driven to extremities by the pressure of Italian politics, was forced to consent. Constance was an imperial German city, accessible from all parts of Europe, in the midst of a fertile country well furnished with roads and waterways for the transport of provisions in large quantities. The emperor made himself the protector of the Council, and the city magistracy undertook the supervision of law and order.

The call to Constance came from Pope John XXIII, not of his own volition but to save his face and to prevent the still greater evil of a call by the emperor or some other power. John's personal character does not greatly concern us. If we could believe one half of the indictment found against him at Constance, we should have to think of him as a blackguard of the deepest dye. A south-Italian, educated as a soldier and a pirate, he had turned to the more profitable trade of a churchman and had risen by all the arts of a successful politician to the

cardinalate and so to the summit of earthly greatness. As pope he had called out endless antagonisms, but might perhaps have overcome these, had it not been for that awakening of the European conscience which had already once expressed itself at Pisa. To this imperative demand even a John XXIII had to bow. When he could no longer resist, he called the Council and came personally to attend it. He came expecting to be its presiding genius; he found himself a criminal before its tribunal, and, like a more recent partner in the divine administration of the universe, he took to his heels at the critical moment, deserted his party and his cause and left the field open for the free action of the great conference he had defied.

As regards the composition of the Council, we are interested especially in the representation of the lay elements of the population. In all the preliminary discussions especial emphasis had been placed upon this point: that any true expression of the mind of Christendom could come only from the free utterance of all persons competent to speak and not merely from the hitherto dominant clerical order. The effect of this emphasis had been seen at Pisa, but now at Constance it was overwhelming. In practice the representation of the laity took two main forms — the representation of governments and the representation of learning. It is, of course, true that learning was still largely in the hands of clerical persons, but the important thing here is that such persons appeared at Constance rather in their scholarly than in their clerical character.

The Constance chronicler, Ulrich Richental, to whom we are indebted for most of our statistical information on this matter, gives at the close of his narrative a summary of the persons who at one time or another took part in the work of the Council. Making all allowance for the uncertainty of numbers, we gain a fair

notion of the proportion of the lay interests. Besides the emperor and empress there were, says the chronicler, 39 dukes, 32 counts and gentlemen of princely rank, 141 counts, 71 *Freiherrn*, more than 1,500 knights, more than 20,000 (*sic*) squires. More than 83 kings from Asia, Africa, and Europe sent ambassadors. There were 472 embassies from imperial cities and 352 from provincial cities. The universities were represented by 37 persons with 2,000 attendants. There were 217 Doctors of Theology with 2,600 persons, 361 Doctors of Laws with 1,260, 1,400 Masters of Arts and Licentiates with 3,000. A later hand has written into the manuscript a total of more than seventy-two thousand persons who came and went during the four years.²

The objects of the Council of Constance are readily defined as three in number. First, the restoration of unity to the Church; second, the purification of Europe from the effects of the Wyclifite heresies which, continued by the Hussite party in Bohemia, had attacked the very foundations of the mediæval papal system; third, "Reform of the Church in Head and Members." Unity, Orthodoxy, and Administrative Reform — an apparently simple program, as to which, "in principle" as we say nowadays, there was no difference of opinion. Everybody wanted unity, nobody wanted heresy, and nobody would have dared to say that he was not interested in reform. It is always easy to agree on fine principles; it is never easy to determine how those principles shall be applied to the hard facts of human experience. At this moment the whole world is discussing whether we shall first set up a League of Nations and then through this League as an instrument proceed to adjust the clamorous demands of peoples who have suffered and paid the price of war, or whether we shall first try to adjust these claims,

² Richental's figures are notoriously untrustworthy. It would probably be safe to divide his totals here by at least two, and in some cases ten would be the safer divisor.

and then form our League of Nations to enforce them. Precisely the same type of questions appeared at Constance and occupied the earnest attention of the best minds in Europe continuously for more than three years.

Those who desired above all things to save the wreckage of the ancient system insisted that the first duty of the Council was to secure a single pope, who then, in virtue of his divine commission, would proceed to right all wrongs and make schemes of reform unnecessary. The reformers, on the other hand, demanded that the Council should first commit itself definitely to certain specific measures of reform and then proceed to choose a pope to carry them out. The debates on this problem form the chief historic interest of the Council, for it is in these that the real question at issue—the nature of the Church as a human organization and its relation to the civil powers—comes to its fullest and freest expression.

Meanwhile the third problem—the purification of Europe from the stain of heresy—came to the help of the other two. This was a reforming council; but it would have been a fatal blunder at this point if it had seemed in any way to identify itself with those movements for reform which rested upon doctrinal interpretations of Christianity. To have shown tenderness toward the doctrines of Wycliffe or Hus would have been as rash as it would be for the present Peace Conference to negotiate with the rampant Bolshevism of the moment. The comparison is in every way justified. It was a fortunate incident that John Hus, already a popular leader of religious and national thought in Bohemia, accepted the invitation of the Council to come to Constance and defend his opinions. Those who have followed the story of the Czecho-Slovak movement of the last two years will have noticed that its leaders point continually back

to John Hus as their spiritual ancestor. He represented the same hostility to German influence, German Kultur, and German political control which have inspired the patriots of Bohemia in these modern days. He came to Constance trusting in the safe-conduct of the German emperor Sigismund, a shifty politician who would never let a scrap of paper stand between him and the welfare of Christian Europe. Hus was handed over to the clerical tribunal, which passed him back to the secular arm, which fulfilled its undoubted duty by burning him alive. The emperor and the Council had vindicated their orthodoxy in the eyes of Europe and could go on with clean hands to the holy work of union and reform.

The reform propositions at Constance dealt mainly with two aspects of the wide-spread corruption which all friends of religion acknowledged and deplored. One of these was a moral, the other a financial evil. The moral indictment touched the personal quality of the clergy both secular and regular. Of course no one undertook to defend, even by scholastic casuistry, obvious violations of morality, but the Church, in its nervous anxiety to protect the sanctity and validity of those sacramental acts on which the whole framework of society was based, had come to minimize the importance by comparison of the element of personal character. The sacraments of an evil priest, so long as he remained a priest, were equally valid with those of the purest. So important was this distinction felt to be that even in the Augsburg Confession of 1530, the Constitution of Lutheran Protestantism, it was retained and defended. The moral delinquencies of laymen were atoned for by an easy system of clerical book-keeping, which was calling forth the denunciations of clear-sighted and plain-speaking men everywhere. Against these dangers there were but two possible defences — the local episcopal discipline, and the supervision of the national governments, and these

were precisely the two forces which the exaggerated papalism of the fourteenth century had done its best to break down.

To strengthen these two forces — national government and the local episcopate — was to be the most important work at Constance. Essentially it was but one endeavor, for during the whole process of its wonderful expansion the Papacy had found the national state and the national churches its most determined, persistent, and powerful opponents. On the whole, it had so far got the better of them, but now, during the late fourteenth and early fifteenth centuries, a resistless tide of nationalist sentiment had risen, never to fall again. England and France were fighting it out in the Hundred Years' War. Germany, in her Great Charter, the Golden Bull of 1356, had declared herself independent of foreign control. Italy, still divided into warring provinces, was intensely conscious of a national spirit as against all foreign rivalry, and the same was increasingly true of Spain.

The reflection of all this at Constance is seen notably in the forms of procedure decided upon after some active discussion. It had been assumed that the decisions of the Council would be reached by majority voting, and in anticipation of this, Pope John XXIII had come to Constance with a following of perhaps six hundred men. The utter collapse of his cause in the early days of 1415 made it quite certain that the preponderance of Italian influence was once for all broken. The nations as such were to be henceforth the units both of debate and of action. Five great powers — England, France, Germany, Italy, and Spain — agreed upon a scheme which marks a turning-point in the politics of Europe. It was not called a League of Nations, but, partly because it was not so called, it proved to be only so much the more effective in producing common action and a reasonable degree of liberal international sentiment.

The model for the constitution of the several "Nations" at the Council was found in the existing arrangements of the most important universities, such for instance as Paris and Bologna. The "*Universitas*," that is to say, the whole body of teachers and taught, was divided for purposes of administration into groups designated by national terms, but including members of many other nationalities as well. Within these groups were decided the most weighty matters of university policy and discipline. It is probable that the very important part played at Constance by university teachers led to the adoption of this scheme for the Council. Each nation had its own assembly-room where its deputies met regularly to discuss the questions laid before it by a general committee of the Council. Besides these meetings of the several nations there were gatherings of all the national deputies for further discussion. The decisions of each nation on a given subject were submitted to each of the other nations separately, and not until they had been thus approved did they pass on to the General Session of the Council. Within the several nations all members might be present, but only such as were designated by rule could vote. The action of the General Sessions, of which forty-five were held during the four years, seems to have been hardly more than the ratification of what had already been determined upon by the nations.

Even in the General Session, the principle of voting by nations was maintained. After nearly two years of experiment an attempt was made to introduce a majority rule in the final vote, but it was defeated after a rather bitter debate. The ancient theory of unanimity was sustained. Our informant, the French Cardinal Filastre, says that the proposal of majority action was regarded as a sharp trick for some hidden purpose (*astute excogitatum ad aliquos occultos fines*). The procedure by

nations did not, so far as we know, rest upon any formal decree of the Council. It seems to have been adopted by the nations themselves as a measure of practical utility, and to have been accepted by the Roman curial interests as a compromise to avoid worse extremities. The details have to be gathered from rather obscure and scattered hints and references, but the main facts are fairly established. This national and international procedure gave at once to the Council that character as a European Congress which distinguishes it sharply from all previous assemblies. As the debates went on it became increasingly evident that the objects desired by the reforming elements were very largely financial in character and were to be gained only through the action of the national governments. The financial system by which the Papacy lived and thrived had for two generations past been based upon an elaborate scheme of taxation on benefices. Every vacancy in an ecclesiastical office which by any ingenuity could be brought into any sort of relation to the Roman Curia was filled by nomination from Rome, and for this nomination a tax proportioned to the revenues of the benefice was imposed and generally collected. For the higher positions candidates were freely offered by the papal government and accepted with as good grace as might be by the local authorities. Two obvious evils resulted from this practice. Benefices were filled with foreigners bound rather to the interests of Rome than to those of the national state, and money, scarce at best, was diverted from national uses to the support of a power which by its very nature was hostile to every strong local government.

Protests there had been in plenty. England had sought to defend her interests by the famous Statutes of Provisors and *Præmunire*. France had tried to solve her own problem by keeping a hand on the Papacy within her own borders. Germany had sent out a long series

of *Gravamina* in which her wrongs were set forth with convincing eloquence. The trouble was, that by playing off these separate powers against each other the clever politicians of the Roman Curia succeeded in preventing any effective common action. By avoiding direct issues, by bargaining wherever possible, and by the more or less discreet use of the sadly blunted weapons of spiritual discipline the day of reckoning had been postponed. Now, at Constance, the floodgates of the opposition were opened, and from an early moment it became clear that the ancient devices were, at least for the time, utterly discredited. The question was whether this new enthusiasm for Reform would hold out against the marvelously organized and resourceful institution it was seeking to improve.

The actual working-out of reform measures was entrusted to a Reform Commission of thirty-five, representing the nations and including three cardinals. This commission was appointed in July, 1415, and continued in existence for about two years. Its work was continually interrupted by contentions among the nations themselves and undermined by the jealous activity of the curial or papalist party represented by the College of Cardinals as a whole. The result was that in these two years nothing was accomplished by way of reform, except a rather elaborate scheme which never came to a vote in the Council itself. A second commission of twenty-five was appointed in July, 1417, and succeeded in getting an agreement of the nations upon five points, which were then adopted by the Council. Three of these are worth our attention. The first provided for frequent and regular councils, of which the next should meet five years after the present one, the next seven years later, and thereafter every ten years a council should assemble as by law. In case of a future schism in the Papacy a council should assemble of its own motion

without a call. The whole system of financial exactions, of which the so-called *Spolia*, rights of spoil, were the most outrageous, were to be abolished or reduced to lowest terms.

It is obvious that if these reforms could have been carried out in the spirit in which they were voted by the Council, the whole constitution of the Church would have been radically changed. In place of the monarchical-absolutist mediæval government of the Roman Papacy there would have been substituted a constitutional-aristocratic system. The balance of power would, as the Catholic historian Hefele well says, have been thrown on the side of the episcopate, and the episcopate was everywhere more and more coming to be an integral part of the national state. This alternative was cleverly perceived by the curial party, represented, so far as it was represented at all, by the College of Cardinals and supported on the whole by the Italians, French, and Spaniards, while the Germans and English stood out for the Reform.

Again, after these two years of wrestling, this main issue was brought out more clearly than ever. It had become perfectly evident that the question of church government could not be separated from the infinitely complicated network of political interests represented by the several nations. The discussions between the idealists, the "intellectuals" from the universities, and the hard-headed politicians of the several courts of Europe, might go on forever without reaching a practicable working solution. All this tended to the advantage of the only party which had behind it a unified tradition and a clear idea of what it wanted for the future, the party of the Roman Curia. The conduct of the cardinals, twenty-three in number, was throughout extraordinarily discreet, moderate, and persistent. Among them were some of the most active reformers.

It was Peter D'Ailly, Cardinal of Cambrai, who carried through the Council the all-comprehensive declaration: "The Council is above the Pope." An Italian cardinal, Zabarella, had been the spokesman of the Reform Commission. There had been times when the more radical elements, notably the Germans, had suggested the abolition of the College as the worst obstacle to the re-constitution of the Church. Its natural leader, the pope himself, had abandoned it and left it to weather the storm of abuse alone.

The success of the Cardinalate in keeping itself together and lending a hand where it could, gave it a standing by which it was now to profit. The old wrangle as to precedence of business was now, after two years, renewed with redoubled force, and the Cardinalate was able to throw its weight decisively in favor of proceeding at once to the election of a pope, as the only way of reconciling differences and breaking what had threatened to become a fatal deadlock. Indeed, it had only been by means of ceaseless activity and occasional stretches of the police power of the emperor, that the Council had of late been held together at all.

On the problem of the papal election opinions were widely divided. Should the Council accept the result of the Council of Pisa, acknowledge John XXIII with all his crimes upon his head as lawful pope, and proceed to depose his two rivals already set aside at Pisa? That was probably the original plan; but it had been definitely abandoned after the scandalous flight and trial of Pope John. Or, again, should the Council tie itself to one of the other popes, and thus renew the century-long conflict between the interests of France as against all the rest of Europe? That too had become out of the question. The only course was to wipe off the slate and begin over again. Long and tedious negotiations with the Italian and the French claimants resulted finally in a reasonable

prospect that they could be disposed of, and the Council went ahead with its electoral plans.

Here once more the question of procedure became a vital one. The principle of papal election through a College of Roman clergymen established in the middle of the eleventh century, had fixed itself upon the Church as the most effective way of enforcing the theory of the Papacy as the bishopric of Rome in succession to the alleged bishopric of Peter. In order to preserve this tradition intact the Council of Pisa had, to use its own phrase, "committed the election to the College of Cardinals." At Constance the radical party was inclined to side-track the cardinals entirely and cause the Council to elect a pope by its own right as the supreme representative of the entire Christian body. But a pope so elected would obviously have been, not the successor of St. Peter by vote, as the canon law put it, of "the clergy and people of Rome," but only a presiding officer selected without reference to his Roman connection. Fortunately wiser counsels prevailed, and the matter was intrusted to an Electoral Commission composed of six representatives from each of the five nations with the twenty-three cardinals added as a separate "nation." Two-thirds of the members from each nation and two-thirds of the College of Cardinals must agree upon the candidate. Every precaution was taken to secure the inviolability of the Conclave, and after three days, on the 11th of November, Cardinal Otto Colonna, a Roman nobleman of high reputation for piety and ability, was declared pope. He took the name of Martin V.

Thus two of the three original problems of this great conference appeared to be solved: heresy had been emphatically repudiated, and a unified government had been given to the Church of the West. It will surprise no one who has followed the course of the reform propositions at Constance, that the jubilation over these two

successes should have tended to overshadow interest in Reform. Now that the Christian world had a head once more, it was obviously reasonable that he should be given the opportunity to show how far he was willing to go towards satisfying the universal demand for substantial changes in the papal administration. The answer was not long in coming. Within twenty-four hours after his election Pope Martin issued a decree confirming in all essentials the rules of the papal Chancery according to which the whole elaborate system of papal revenues from benefices was administered. The machinery began to work at once, and the usual unseemly scramble for office and privilege gave full occupation to the army of secretaries that had survived the numerous changes of the Curia.

At the same time the new pope professed himself the champion of reform and appointed a third Reform Commission to prepare and report a scheme. In the discussions and in the report of this commission are clearly outlined the two lines of policy which were to form the most significant developments of the next generation. On the one hand, we find a series of general propositions largely of a moral sort, on which all the nations were agreed. On the other, we see the insidious beginnings of a process which after a century of experiment ended, as it must end, in the glorious revolt, the reluctant secessions, and the permanent schisms of the Protestant Revolution. This was the process indicated by the fatal word "Concordat." The papal power, unable to satisfy all the nations at once, proposed a series of separate agreements with each of them in turn. The nations, on their side, wearied with the long delays at Constance, were inclined to go at least part way towards a working compromise. The Council as a whole could accept the general suggestions of the Reform Commission and was not unwilling to leave the rest to the bargaining of the

several nations. Reform at Constance remained largely in the sphere of pious wishes.

It is this fact that has led even so clear-seeing an historian as Bishop Creighton to describe the Council of Constance as a failure. If by that is meant that it came pitifully short of fulfilling the ardent hopes of the best minds, then it was a failure. If, however, we weigh and measure the extraordinary display of activities crowded into those four eventful years, our verdict must be a very different one. For the first time in the history of Europe the great nations as such had met for conference on matters of the highest importance to them all. Their discussions had gone to the very heart of the several problems involved. The ablest men of the day had expressed themselves with unheard-of freedom and frankness. The sounding universalities of the Middle Ages had received a blow from which they were never to recover. The principle of the national state as the defender of the rights and liberties of its subjects had been asserted in ways that were never again to be seriously questioned. I submit that this cannot be described as failure. Finally, the Council in adjourning provided for its continuation, and thus prepared the way for the still more radical Council of Basel, which for seventeen years maintained in the North a tribunal where every problem of European politics came again to discussion.

The analogies between the situation at Constance and that of the present moment have, I hope, become a little clearer from this hasty survey. We too have to meet the conflicting claims of the nations over against the insistent demands of certain universal ideas. It is no longer the Church which voices these demands most clearly. It is the sense of common interest among certain classes cutting crosswise through the national lines. At Constance, back of all the articulate expressions of partisan claims, lay the subtler but none the less decisive

demands of a population emerging from the social and industrial conditions of the Middle Ages and trying blindly to adjust itself to those of the modern world. So today, behind all the obvious motives of national self-interest and behind all the glowing idealisms of our prophets, is working the silent force of the great transition, as yet unaccomplished, from the age of the horse-plough and the hand-loom to the age of the steam tractor and the wireless telegraph. It is only as the negotiators at Paris shall have the insight to perceive and the courage to proclaim a just balance between these conflicting forces, that they can escape the reproach of apparent failure which has fallen upon the Fathers at Constance.