

The chief lesson of our Psalm is one which may seem at first sight somewhat commonplace, but which is nevertheless supremely important; this, namely, *the necessity of performing courageously and conscientiously the hard and uninteresting tasks of daily life, and the exceeding recompense which awaits those who do so.* Life is indeed different with us all, and no two of us have precisely the same difficulties to encounter; and therefore each must adapt the lesson to his own peculiar circumstances. For all of us alike, however, it is utterly true that the circumstances, often so trivial and depressing, amid which we find ourselves day by day, are God's challenge to us to behave as true-hearted and noble-minded men, and win for ourselves a priceless heritage of peace and blessedness. There are no circumstances so trivial or mean that they cannot serve as an arena wherein to discipline and strengthen our manhood. 'The Situation,' says Carlyle, 'that has not its Duty, its Ideal, was never yet occupied by man. Yes here, in this poor, miserable, hampered, despicable Actual, wherein thou even now standest, here or nowhere is thy Ideal: work it out therefrom; and working, believe, live, be free.' We would be less discontented with our circumstances did we but realize that these circumstances, dull and prosaic as they mostly appear, are the material, and the only material, out of which we are to fashion our eternal destinies; and the way to ennoble our lives

is not by attempting to escape from our appointed lot, but by accepting it bravely and lovingly, and compelling it to serve the grand ends of our moral and spiritual advancement.

Our Psalm has a very special message for those of us who are young and have life before us in all its hope and mystery. It warns us against those sins which so constantly and urgently beset us—fretfulness at the drudgery of life, discouragement at our repeated failures, and discontent at our slow promotion; and it reminds us that in these very things lies our most sacred opportunity. There is indeed no harm in the young man's ambition to be successful. Quite the contrary. But let us give success its true definition. Let us realize that we are here in this world of wonder and mystery for grander, diviner, and more enduring ends than money-getting and self-pleasing. We are here to play the hero and win the priceless possessions of manhood, purity, and love, which, more and more as our lives unfold, are perceived to be the only ends worth striving after. And these high ends we shall attain, not by snatching greedily and selfishly at worldly prizes, but rather by living gently and greatly in the places where God has put us, and striving to prove ourselves, in every least detail, worthy sons of the Heavenly Father and worthy brethren of the Lord Jesus Christ, His perfect Son and our glorious Elder Brother.

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## 'The Death of Christ.'<sup>1</sup>

BY THE REV. W. MORGAN, M.A., TARBOLTON.

DR. DENNEY'S book is dominated throughout by a practical motive. He believes that the death of Christ has not that central place in current which it has in apostolic Christianity; and he seeks, by setting it in the relief in which it stands out in the New Testament, to call back Christian thought, and especially Christian preaching, to the doctrine of the Cross as the constitutive element in the Gospel.

<sup>1</sup> *The Death of Christ: Its Place and Interpretation in the New Testament.* By James Denney, D.D., Professor of New Testament Language, Literature, and Theology, United Free Church College, Glasgow. London: Hodder & Stoughton.

The book has all the qualities which we are accustomed to expect in Dr. Denney's writing. The style is lucid, vigorous, and flowing. There is no display of learning in the shape of swollen footnotes, but it is everywhere clear that the author has taken up his position in full view of whatever of importance has been written on the subject. Last, but not least, every page is aglow with moral and religious fervour. In the tone of the book there is but one thing to regret. Dr. Denney is a little too fond of playing the part of the Apostle John to his opponents' Cerinthus. He has no patience with any view other than his own, and rather brushes it aside with con-

tempt, or explains it by a lack of Christian experience, than subjects it to fair examination.

The thesis he sets out to prove is that the death of Christ is the central fact in every New Testament book, and that it receives everywhere the same interpretation—the interpretation, namely, that it is a propitiation offered to God for man's sin, an equivalent for man's forfeited life. We naturally start from the teaching of Jesus Himself as given in the Synoptic Gospels. Do His own words support the view that His one object in coming into the world was to die? In opposition to those who find in His life an early period of hopefulness as to the immediate success of His work, Dr. Denney maintains that a consciousness of the tragic issue was with Him from the first. Wholly ignoring the general tenor of Christ's early teaching, he rests his case mainly on the voice from heaven at the baptism. The words, 'This is My beloved Son in whom I am well pleased,' are an echo of Is 42<sup>1</sup>, and therefore warrant the conclusion that the Messianic consciousness of Jesus was one with the consciousness of the 'Suffering Servant.' Dr. Denney, however, admits that it is only after the events at Cæsarea Philippi that reference to the death becomes unambiguous: 'From that time forth began Jesus to show unto His disciples how that He must go unto Jerusalem to be killed, and be raised again the third day.' Great stress is laid on the necessity indicated by the *must*. This necessity is interpreted as submission to the Divine will as expressed, not in outward events, but in Scripture; and the Scripture in view could have been none other than that which tells of the work of the suffering servant. What Christ sought to teach His disciples was that the necessity to suffer and die was involved in His vocation.

Dr. Denney proceeds next to the great ransom passage. He rejects the view that would take it in the general sense that Jesus, through faith in God, could reconcile Himself to His death as to something which would, though it was not clear how, contribute to the carrying out of His vocation. The figure is to be taken literally. The lives of the many are somehow under forfeit, and Jesus teaches that the very object of His coming into the world was to lay down His life as a ransom price, that those to whom these forfeited lives belonged might obtain them again. Only one thing would justify Dr. Denney in reading so

much into this passage—if, namely, the idea that forgiveness is morally impossible until justice has first been satisfied by an equivalent for the sinner's forfeited life, were elsewhere expressed by Jesus in unmistakable language. It is notorious that no such words can be adduced. Jesus connected forgiveness in an immediate way with the fatherly love of God, and with the faith, humility, penitence, love, and mercifulness of men; but in no single instance have we the slightest hint of an antinomy between divine justice and divine mercy. Such silence on the part of Jesus is, if we accept Dr. Denney's thesis, nothing less than astounding. It does not lessen the difficulty to be informed that the thrice repeated attempt of Jesus to prepare the minds of His disciples for His death had reference—though the Evangelists are silent about it—to its meaning as a propitiation, and that what the disciples found so hard to understand and credit was just the forensic view of the Atonement. If, as Dr. Denney maintains, the substitution doctrine is the one essential thing in Christianity, and if the Church derived this doctrine from Christ Himself, it is impossible to account for the failure of the Evangelists to preserve His teaching on the subject. In any case it is a precarious proceeding to fill up the blank with conjecture.

It is surprising that in his discussion of the ransom passage Dr. Denney should have failed to draw attention to other passages in which Christ has described His mission. To read the doubtful in the light of the transparent is surely one of the best established canons of exegesis. Such passages are not wanting. At the opening of His ministry Christ announced His programme. He was sent to preach good tidings to the poor, to proclaim release to the captives, and recovering of sight to the blind. The Son of Man, He said on another occasion, is come to seek and to save that which was lost. These are unambiguous utterances; they are in line with the rest of Christ's teaching and with the character of His earthly ministry. The theory that would put them aside in favour of far-fetched inferences must find itself in conflict with fact.

It is natural that the Sacrament of the Supper should play a large part in Dr. Denney's argument. He finds the key to its meaning in the Levitical idea of sacrifice, in which blood was always associated with propitiatory power, and in the New Covenant idea of Jeremiah. The New

Covenant blessing of forgiveness can become ours only through Christ's death as a propitiatory sacrifice. No doubt the sacrificial reference is self-evident, and we can believe that Matthew's expansion of the words of institution—'This is My blood of the *new* covenant, shed for many unto remission of sins'—do not go beyond our Lord's meaning. But it is not possible to extract from the sacrificial reference anything that can be called a philosophy of Christ's death. The sacrificial system was never rationalized as was, to some extent at least, the mythology of Greece. There was no philosophy of sacrifice. The prophets made no attempt to reinterpret it in the light of their spiritual faith, and they derive no idea from it but the very general one of an offering well-pleasing to God. When incorporated by Judaism in the prophetic religion, the sacrificial system was no doubt brought into connexion with moral offences, but how little there was of anything like an explanation of the action of sacrificial blood is shown by the fact that not only moral offences but ceremonial as well, and even the impurity of inanimate objects, were regarded as cleansed or covered by it. Atonement by means of blood was accepted simply and solely as a fact of statutory religion: there is no evidence that it was ever taken up into the domain of the conscience. It is necessary to insist on this because Dr. Denney uniformly takes it for granted that the sacrificial propitiation was a moral idea, and that it had at its basis a doctrine of substitution. As a matter of fact, the idea was not moral, but ceremonial: it was rooted in a conception of God, not as the righteous, but as the holy—the Being who stands apart from all creaturely weakness and defilement. And notwithstanding Holtzmann, there is no clear proof that, even in later Judaism, the life of the victim was regarded as a surrogate for that of the offerer. All we can infer from the New Testament use of sacrificial language is that the death of Christ was thought of as in some way connected with the new covenant of forgiveness. The blood of the new covenant finds no more than an illustration and historical parallel—helpful to the imagination, but with no dogmatic import—in the blood of the old. We are not here in the region of principles.

From the Synoptists Dr. Denney passes to the earliest Christian teaching as given in Acts. It is surely an extreme position when he denies that

the death ever presented itself as a difficulty to be got over, and when, refusing to see anything of the nature of development, he reads into every statement the full-blown forensic theory. The death of Christ is spoken of in Acts as a crime which God neutralized by the resurrection, as foretold by the prophets, as determined by the counsel and foreknowledge of God; but it is never once described as a propitiation. It is not even brought into connexion with forgiveness at all, forgiveness being preached simply in Jesus' name. Dr. Denney's answer is that the connexion is 'self-evident to anyone who believes in Christianity as a whole, and who reads with a Christian mind!' That is an easy, but not a very convincing, way of getting past the clear evidence that the death of Christ had neither the place nor the significance for primitive Christianity that it afterwards had for Paul.

When we come to the great apostle of the Gentiles, Dr. Denney's labour in maintaining the thesis is conspicuously lightened. No one will deny that the central theme of Paul's Gospel is the cross; and there is now a very general agreement that his epistles contain an interpretation or theory of Christ's death that may be described as forensic. We give his statement of Paul's doctrine in his own words. 'In dying, Christ made our sin His own: He took it on Himself as the reality which it is in God's sight and to God's law: He became sin, became a curse for us. It is this which gives His death a propitiatory character and power: in other words, which makes it possible for God to be at once righteous and a God who accepts as righteous those who believe in Jesus. He is righteous, for in the death of Christ His law is honoured by the Son who takes the sin of the world to Himself as all that it is to God; and He can accept as righteous those who believe in Jesus, for in so believing sin becomes to them what it is to Him.' In this statement Dr. Denney has added to Paul something of his own. Paul does not say that the believer is accepted because sin has become to him what it is to Christ—that would involve a departure from the juristic scheme; what he does say is that faith is imputed for righteousness. But there is a more serious objection to Dr. Denney's presentation of the apostle's doctrine than this. He has taken it out of its historical setting, and given it a modern setting in which it no longer correctly

represents Paul's thought. According to Dr. Denney, the problem which Paul faced, and the premise of his Gospel, is this—How can God justify and yet appear just? Paul, in fact, was confronted by an antinomy between the justice and the mercy of God, and what he found in Christ's death was a solution of that antinomy. Such a position may seem to find support in Ro 3<sup>26</sup>, but in reality it is untenable. We have many glimpses into Paul's inner life, but in none of these is there the slightest indication that he ever, either before or after conversion, viewed forgiveness in the light of a problem. His problem was not that of the possibility of forgiveness; it was the Jewish law, the Old Testament dispensation: how to justify his breach with it, how to demonstrate that the old order had been annulled and a new order inaugurated. The Epistle to the Galatians makes this point sufficiently clear. What Paul meant by the law was the Old Testament dispensation, not however as we, who find its soul in the prophets and psalmists, conceive it, but as the *Pharisees* conceived it—a dispensation that had no principle but strict recompense, and no elements but command, threat, and reward, and that therefore excluded grace by its very idea. If he argued on the hypothesis that the principle of recompense is inviolable, it was not because it presented itself to him in that light in its abstraction, but because it was the governing idea of an order which he accepted without question as of divine institution. Only in the light of this conception of the law can we understand Paul's juristic doctrine. That doctrine had its origin, not so much in his religious experience, as in apologetic necessities. The death of Christ, interpreted as a satisfaction paid to the law, presented itself as a means by which he could justify and enforce a breach with the old order of 'works' and an acceptance of the new order of grace. The law's claims being satisfied, it had no more to say: it was abrogated, and God could now deal with men by way of grace and forgiveness, a way which had, indeed, been in His mind from the first. That the juridical doctrine of reconciliation had its origin in dialectic does not exclude the fact that the apostle could draw from it religious impulse. It is not in this, however, but in another doctrine that we find the deepest rendering of his Christian experience.

As everyone knows, Paul at least seems to have

two doctrines of reconciliation through Christ's death—the juridical already mentioned, and what is usually called the ethico-mystical. Some have attempted to explain the first through the second, and others the second through the first. Most of us have tried our hand at bringing the two into the unity of a single system, and most have given up the task as impossible. It is now all but universally recognized that the two must be left side by side. How does Dr. Denney deal with the difficulty? His manner is as usual somewhat peremptory. 'The dying to sin (of the ethico-mystical doctrine introduced in Ro 6) may,' he says, 'be a new idea to the man who takes the point of view of Paul's opponents, and who does not know what it is to be justified through faith in the propitiation which is in Christ's death; but it is not a new idea to the apostle, nor to anyone who has received the reconciliation he preaches: nor would he be offering any logical defence of his Gospel if it *were* a new idea. It is Christ dying for sin, it is Christ dying our death on the tree, who evokes the faith by which we become right with God; and the faith which He evokes answers to what He is and to what He does: it is faith which has a death to sin in it.' In other words, the ethico-mystical theory does not supplement the juridical, but only exhibits its moral adequacy. Now, whatever we may think of this mode of connecting justification with regeneration, nothing is more certain than that it is not Paul's mode. When in the sixth chapter of Romans he makes the transition from justification to the new life, he does not appeal to gratitude as the connecting link, nor does he subject justifying faith to analysis, in order to show that a dying to sin and a living to holiness are implicit in it. He makes a fresh start, and proceeds without the remotest reference to the juridical idea. When a man is baptized into Christ, Paul argues, when he enters into a living connexion with Christ, he in that very act dies to his old sinful life in the flesh and rises into a new life in the spirit. And this ethical death and resurrection are possible, not because the death of Christ satisfied the claims of the law, but because it had the character of an archetypal dying unto sin, of a destruction of the flesh which is the principle of sin, and because it was followed by a resurrection into a new life which is wholly in the Spirit. The doctrine of a mystical fellowship with Christ in His death and

resurrection is at least as prominent and as characteristic of the apostle as the juridical doctrine. Its independence is further proved by the fact that it is wrought out into detail. It is brought into connexion with his theory of sin as having its seat in the flesh, with his theory of the spirit as the divine principle that stands opposed to flesh, and with his conception of history as an advance from flesh to spirit. There is at least a hint that Paul sometimes considered the problem of the law's abrogation from this point of view: as part of the fleshly order the law lost its validity with the destruction of that order in Christ's flesh. It is, we think, a mistake to reduce the forensic doctrine to the terms of the ethico-mystical as is done by Weizsaecker; but it is equally a mistake to reverse the process. That Paul should have left the two doctrines unconnected will be an offence only to those who seek the greatness of a system in its logical unity.

Space will permit of only one other reference to Dr. Denney's treatment of the New Testament books. It was with some curiosity that we approached his chapter on the Fourth Gospel; not that we doubted his courage, but the ingenuity required seemed in this case almost more than human. Dr. Denney, indeed, surrenders the prologue as hopeless so far as his thesis is concerned, but he contends that the Gospel itself is not to be read from the prologue's standpoint. In this position he has the support of Harnack; but Harnack has found few followers, and the position is hardly capable of defence. The usual view of the Fourth Gospel is that it interprets Christ's work, not through the conception of a propitiatory sacrifice, but through the conceptions of life and light. What we owe to Christ is life eternal, and this life is mediated to us through His revelation of the Father. It is not His death but His life and work as a whole that constitutes the Revelation of Divine grace and truth; His death has a place only as exhibiting with the rest of His life His fidelity and His royalty. This view of the Johannine teaching is not drawn from isolated texts or recondite references, but from the endlessly repeated statements of the book. What has Dr. Denney to advance against this and in favour of his own view that even here the propitiatory sacrifice is the fundamental doctrine? He passes by the general character of the teaching in complete silence, and draws attention to a few isolated

passages; in his own words, 'putting this and that together in order to discover what the writer does not explicitly say.' The first passage cited is the Baptist's reference to Christ as the Lamb of God that taketh away the sin of the world. From this he draws the inference that the author put the conception of Christ as a sacrifice for sin in the forefront of his work. We have already referred to the limited amount of dogma that can be derived from sacrificial language. He finds the same view of Christ's death in the sixth chapter, where Jesus speaks about eating His flesh and drinking His blood, on the ground that these words refer to the Supper. No doubt the words have this reference; but their interpretation is added, and it is not sacrificial: 'The words that I speak unto you, they are spirit, and they are life.' Only in one passage does Dr. Denney profess to find *explicit* support for his view—'For their sakes I sanctify Myself, that they also may be sanctified in truth.' He argues that the sanctification of the Saviour has reference to His death, and the sanctification of the sinner to the sinner's reconciliation; and he concludes that what we have here is just Paul's doctrine, that Christ dies our death that we may be drawn into the fellowship of His death, and so put right with God. But apart from the fact that the reference to the death is more than doubtful, it is clear from what precedes that the medium of sanctification is nothing other than the word of truth.

As a study of New Testament teaching in its historical objectivity, Dr. Denney's book can hardly be taken seriously. The interpretation is determined throughout by dogmatic presuppositions.

The strength of the book lies in its powerful exhibition of the great ideas which have found in the past, and which still find, a home and an instrument in the forensic doctrine of the atonement. No one who considers this doctrine with unbiassed mind but must confess that it presents in the most vivid way the tremendous evil of sin, the transcendent glory and sacrifice of divine grace, and the immeasurable debt which the world owes to Christ. Dr. Denney clings to it with a passionate earnestness. He puts it at the centre not only of life, but of theology. Only in relation to it do other doctrines find their true place. Inspiration means the unity of Scripture, and Scripture finds its point of unity in the sin-bearing. The Person



of Christ must be determined by His atoning work. He is the one who could do this work. The Holy Spirit, psychologically considered, is indistinguishable from that infinite assurance of God's love given in Christ's atoning death. The atonement is also the principle of Christian ethics: the new life is faith's response to its appeal.

It must be said, however, that Dr. Denney has not done much to present the forensic idea in such a form as shall meet the difficulties which many feel regarding it. It involves several presuppositions that the modern mind will not easily grant. For one thing, it involves the view that death—not spiritual but natural death—is the direct consequence of sin and its specific penalty. Dr. Denney attempts to evade the obvious scientific difficulty by asserting that while death comes physically, there is a spiritual element in it. God's voice speaks through it: through death the divine judgment on sin comes home to the conscience. We venture to say that such a statement is true neither to Scripture nor to experience. In the Old Testament an untimely or violent death is indeed regarded as the judgment of heaven; but never a death that comes in the ordinary course of nature. If we except Paul's dogmatic use of the idea, the same thing is true of the New Testament; and even in Paul's theory the emphasis falls more on the violent and therefore penal character of Christ's death than upon the death itself. To speak, as Dr. Denney does, of the sinlessness of Jesus enabling Him to realise its awful character, is to go outside the apostle's thought. And surely there are few Christian people who in the presence of death feel that they are standing face to face with God's judgment on sin. The specific penalty of sin is not a fact of the natural life, but of the moral life; and the old theologians were more logical than Dr. Denney, if less sensitive, when they spoke of Christ as suffering something that corresponded to the spiritual torments of hell. Another presupposition of the forensic theory is that guilt, like a debt, can be legally transferred from one person to another. Dr. Denney gets over the moral difficulty attaching to such an idea of transference by claiming for it the authority of a revealed fact, and by lifting it above moral criticism. 'The obedience of the Redeemer (e.g. His assumption of the sinner's doom) transcends morality, if we will; it is something to which morality is unequal; from the point of view of

ordinary ethics it is a miracle.' 'We ought to feel,' he says again, 'that moralizing objections here are beside the mark, and that is not for sinful men, who do not know what love is, to tell beforehand whether, or how far, the love of God can take upon itself the burden and responsibility of the world's sin, or if it does so, in what way its reality shall be made good.' One might remark that Dr. Denney's free critical position—a position which permits him to reject as legendary more than one fragment of New Testament narrative, and to describe the Epistle to the Hebrews as 'the high water-mark of uninspired writing'—is ill adapted to support an *ab extra* conception of revelation. But apart from this, the idea of a legal transference of merit or demerit will scarcely appear as a moral miracle to any one who is familiar with the literature of Jewish rabbinism. Dr. Denney himself constantly tends to get away from the strict juridical notion, and to give to the fact that Christ took upon Himself our burden a purely ethical expression, forgetting that with the surrender of this notion the forensic theory, as a theory, tumbles into ruin.

Throughout the book Dr. Denney proceeds on the assumption that the Cross and the rationale of it are for religion one and the same thing, and that there is no interpretation of Christ's death which enables us to regard it as a demonstration of love to sinners if its substitutionary character is denied. Apart from the atonement, he tells us further, the love of God has no real meaning, but becomes a mere indeterminate, sentimental expression. Of a like kind is the assertion that the denial of propitiation is equivalent to the denial that Christ has any place in His Gospel at all. Even to those who accept the author's general position such statements must seem wildly extravagant. Can any one fail to see that the love of Christ, as exhibited in His dealing with men, and as brought to its highest power in His death, is a fact, and a fact that has proved itself a redemptive and creative force in the life of mankind, apart from all dogmatic theories. Was it a mere indeterminate sentiment to the woman who was a sinner, or to publicans like Zaccheus? They were but poorly provided with dogma, and yet Christ's love brought them the assurance of forgiveness and saved them. But if the love of Christ is a reality apart from dogma, the love of God must be equally so; for it is from the former

that the latter derives its meaning and power. It is in Christ that we meet with the living God as a power of righteousness and love; and only in contact with that love that was separate from sin and yet sought out the sinner, does the divine condemnation of sin become a reality to us, and the divine forgiveness a reality. In setting the forensic theory of atonement at the centre of religion, Dr. Denney really replaces the fact by an idea drawn from it. Not Christ Himself is made the object of our faith, but an idea of something

great that Christ did for us. It is not, in his account, the love itself in all its richness, as embodied in our Saviour's every word and deed, and reproduced in human lives to-day—it is not that that saves; but the *idea* of a love that was so great that it assumed the responsibilities of our sin. We have already admitted that the forensic theory does embody a great deal of what is true of the reality; but an idea is never so rich as the reality, it is never, in its form at least, so enduring, and it can never take its place.

## Modern Criticism and its Influence on Theology.<sup>1</sup>

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THE aim of the Christian student is truth; and the aim of the Christian teacher is to bring that truth to bear upon human character and life. The Old Testament forms an integral part of the Bible. It was placed in the hands of the Christian Church by its Founder and His Apostles as the record of God's revelation of Himself to His chosen people and the manifold preparation for His own coming; as the source from which instruction in conduct was to be derived and as the means by which the spiritual life was to be fed. We cannot, therefore, treat it as any other book: it is sacred ground; reverence is demanded of us as we approach it. But it is no true reverence which would exempt it from the fullest examination by all legitimate methods of criticism. Inquiry into the origin, the structure, the character, the meaning of the books which compose it is not only permissible, but indispensable. 'To discover more clearly how anything has grown may enable us more truly to estimate its worth and to distinguish it more confidently from all other things.' God's revelation of Himself was progressive, and its interpretation must be progressive. We may reasonably expect that 'every increase of knowledge will bring forth a deeper knowledge of the truth committed to His Church.' New modes of thought, more searching methods of literary and historical investigation, fresh discoveries of

science and archæology, must necessarily affect and modify the interpretation of the Bible. It was once as easy as it was natural to regard the first chapter of Genesis as a literal account of the way in which the universe was brought into being; now that we have read the records of the rocks and learnt some fragments of the mystery of the heavens, we know that it cannot be regarded as literal history. But its religious value remains unaltered. It teaches religious truths which geology and astronomy could never teach with authority—truths which are more important for the mass of mankind than all the results of the most elaborate scientific researches.

But truth is not to be won without effort and, it may be, pain; and even, as it may seem, temporary loss. Times of change must be times of trial. They call for faith, courage, patience, sympathy:—for faith that God is still teaching His Church, as He taught it of old, *πολυμερῶς καὶ πολυτρόπως*, 'by divers portions and in divers manners'; for courage to go forward trustfully, following the light of the reason which God has given us; for patience to 'prove all things' and 'hold fast that which is good'; for sympathy between those who cling to tradition and those who are animated by the desire for progress.

Now, what is the position of students and teachers of the Bible to-day? They are face to face with a treatment of the Bible, especially the Old Testament, which half, nay, a quarter, of a

<sup>1</sup> A paper read at the Church Congress, Northampton, October 1902.