



The National Study of Military History

T. Miller Maguire M.A., LL.D., F.R.Hist.S.

To cite this article: T. Miller Maguire M.A., LL.D., F.R.Hist.S. (1897) The National Study of Military History, Royal United Services Institution. Journal, 41:231, 598-622, DOI: [10.1080/03071849709416028](https://doi.org/10.1080/03071849709416028)

To link to this article: <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/03071849709416028>



Published online: 11 Sep 2009.



Submit your article to this journal [↗](#)



Article views: 8



View related articles [↗](#)

THE NATIONAL STUDY OF MILITARY HISTORY.

*By T. MILLER MAGUIRE, M.A., LL.D., F.R.Hist.S.,
of the Inner Temple, Barrister-at-Law.*

Tuesday, March 9th, 1897.

Major-General J. F. MAURICE, C.B., R.A., *p.s.c.*, (Commanding the
Woolwich District), in the Chair.

LECTURE.

IT might at first sight appear superfluous to occupy the time of such an Institution as this in trying to prove what seems an educational axiom. All other civilised nations admit at once that the study of their national history is an absolutely indispensable branch of polite knowledge, and that a person, however well instructed otherwise, who is ignorant of the annals of his native land has obtained no education worthy of the name. Accordingly, Sallust thought it desirable to do for Rome what had been so well done for Greece, and in an oft-quoted passage justifies his ambition to leave behind him literary records of the speeches of Roman orators and the manœuvres of Roman generals. His writings, as well as those of Cæsar, Livy, and Tacitus, have ever since been a portion of the intellectual nutriment of every European scholar. Greek orators assumed that their hearers were conversant with the exploits of their ancestors; a citizen of Athens in the time of Alexander who could not set forth the deeds of Miltiades, or Cimon, or Pericles, would have been regarded with amused contempt; and great historians obtained an immortality of popularity which keeps their own names and the fame of the heroes of Thermopylæ and Cunaxa still fresh by the banks of the Hudson, the Isis, and the Seine.

HISTORY IN GERMANY.

Prince Bismarck, in this generation, has treated with bitter scorn a few Brandenburg schoolmasters who allowed some recruits of the 3rd Corps to enter the Prussian Army in ignorance of the career of that great Prussian King who was saved from ruin by the British under Pitt. The clerks, the merchants, the lawyers, the officers of Germany, are thoroughly grounded in the annals of the Fatherland. History occupies a prominent place in all the upper schools; to classical history is added a far-reaching

course of modern history. More English history is obligatory on every German officer than on any British officer. I quote from a German Army Order (1895):—"A *thorough* knowledge of history forms an essential part of a general education, and is in many respects of the greatest use to every officer in his profession." Then follows an elaborate programme, which is *obligatory*, and which enables a Prussian officer to take part with effect in any political or historical discussion for the rest of his life.

IN FRANCE.

In France a high standard of patriotism is set before the youth of all classes from their earliest years. In the primary elementary schools history, geography, and the conditions of national life are taught for five hours weekly—and well taught, especially the modern history of the country from the end of the Middle Ages, and the political and physical geography of France and its Colonies. The conditions of sea-borne commerce are also taught, though the mercantile tonnage of France is trifling compared with ours. For boys of from sixteen to seventeen in the secondary schools lessons on the modern history of, not only France, but the United Kingdom and the United States, are obligatory. For all young folk in *Lycées* most admirable little popular histories are prepared, setting forth the glories of the old Monarchy, of the Republic, and of the Empire. I am sorry to say one which I have beside me, and which is up-to-date, is not very complimentary to England. Numerous engravings of brilliant military enterprises present to ingenious youths a panoramic sketch of national greatness, endurance, and self-sacrifice. The reign of Charles VII. is displayed in the life of Joan of Arc; Bayard gives a tone to the time of Louis XII. Dry details of the war of the Revolution are omitted, and the principal military facts are grouped round the names of Hoche, Kléber, and Marceau. No cadet can enter St. Cyr without a sound knowledge of modern history and geography, both of which are the most highly-marked subjects.

IN THE UNITED STATES.

With reference to America, no cadet can enter West Point till he has made himself familiar with the constitution and history of the United States. In the secondary schools of the States modern history is taught three times weekly for six consecutive years at least; every young scholar of both sexes is thoroughly grounded in the details of national life. The military records are perchance painted in too flattering colours, but every child is taught all about the War of Independence, from Lexington to York Town, and about the War of Secession, from the Bull Run to the Appomattox. Patriotism is aglow in the breasts of the children in the school forms of the mighty American Republic. Lord Wolseley directed public attention to the fact in March, 1896.

IN RUSSIA.

What about Russia, the Colossus of Eastern Europe and Northern Asia? I have not had under my hand the educational programmes of

Russia ; but a very well-informed subject of the Tsar thus writes to me :—
 “National and military history are taught in every middle-class school. Great stress is laid upon these subjects.” And he goes on to say how he was taught modern history and geography as a boy. The result is good, of course ; yet no educated Russian would deny that the descendants of the Plantagenets rule over a far more magnificent realm than the House of Romanoff.

THE LONDON SCHOOL BOARD.

The Council of the Institution selected as my subject, “The National Study of Military History.” I did not suggest the subject. Why did they suggest it ? I did not like to ask. ’Twas my privilege to obey. But, I suppose, because in England it is scarcely any exaggeration to say that in most schools history is not taught at all. I saw in the *Times*, a few weeks ago, this statement from a “Works Manager”:—“Is it not strange that a boy, aged fourteen, should be able to pass through all the standards with distinction without being taught one word of geography or history ? I have considerable experience of London School Board boys soon after they leave school, and it is seldom that I can find one who has learned any history or geography.”

Having read this grave indictment, I went to a Board School myself with General Sim, and I found that the statement was only too true ; not one boy in any standard had been taught one word of history. The school was in a poor district, and the boys had read some history stories in the course of ordinary reading lessons, but they never had been taught anything about Elizabeth, or Nelson, or Wellington, or our Army in Europe or in Asia. National pride, glory and fame, honour and prowess, were to these poor victims of scholastic pedantry merely empty sounds. Were it not that occasionally they glanced at illustrated papers through the shop windows of the Strand, these future voters on the dearest interests of 400,000,000 of the human race would not ever have attained to even a glimmering idea of what the word Empire means. *This is a most ignominious state of things ; most disgraceful to school managers and likely to be dangerous to the State.* I venture to assert that these poor little waifs and strays of the sordid civilisation of our slums would have followed with the keenest interest any good lecture about our sailors and soldiers and their deeds ; and I say, too, from a long and extensive acquaintance with the very poorest of our people, that when the boys went home to tea or supper their parents would gladly have heard the stories retold. Why not try to elevate them ? Why not give them good examples ? Why not supply them with some noble impulses ? Why not fill their young souls with patriotism ? Why not embue them with pride in England, pride in London, and then perchance they might at last take a pride in themselves. Religion being excluded, historic examples alone could convince them that, “unless above himself he can erect himself, how poor a thing is man !” Make them believe that we, poor and rich, have a splendid inheritance of honour, and surely they will rise above their present level.

OUR "PUBLIC" SCHOOLS.

As to the public schools frequented by the fortunate children of opulence, I have no intention of adopting the usual style of adulation in which it is found convenient to speak of them, or of being in the least censorious. But I put it in all sincerity to the boards of management and the masters, if it be a desirable thing that the vast majority of gentlemen who leave these institutions at the age of from seventeen to nineteen should have to admit that they are in a disgraceful state of ignorance of the political, constitutional, and military history of the British Empire; yet, in their capacity as civilians they will assuredly govern the Empire for good or for evil, or in the capacity of soldiers they will be bound in its interests to fight and, perchance, to die. I should like some answer to this question from some member of the governing or teaching staff of some of these corporations.

OUR MILITARY COLLEGES.

With regard to our military colleges:—

In June, 1896, sixty-seven of the successful candidates for Sandhurst were utterly ignorant of English history and general modern history, and, therefore, are now seriously handicapped in all their military studies.

In June of the same year thirty-seven out of the forty successful candidates for Woolwich knew nothing about modern history, which leads to a necessary inference that our Artillery and Engineer officers as a rule have never learned the very subjects which are most valuable to them as gentlemen, as citizens, and as soldiers.

For entrance to the British Staff College, military history is *not obligatory*, and scores 500 marks. Mathematics are obligatory; a failure in any one mathematical subject means the rejection of the most brilliant tactician, strategist, draughtsman, and linguist; and mathematics score 900 marks.

I think I have said enough to prove that the public authorities of this country at the present time deliberately discourage the study of political and military history. In consequence, I need scarcely say that patriotic citizens regard the whole system of our modern instruction with reprobation and indignation—feelings which have been very clearly expressed by the present Prime Minister, and by such a distinguished authority as the late Professor Huxley, and by leading members of every political party.

OUR CHRONICLE OF GLORY.

And yet in the whole annals of recorded time, when had any nation such a chronicle of glory by sea and land as appertains to our isles, long the "greatest" within civilised knowledge, and still the "best of all the main"? I turn from pedantic neglect of our military history to the subject itself, and I find that I have with me the triumphant eulogy of the poets and orators of our own land, and the honest appreciation and admiration of the choicest spirits of foreign countries. Well might old Fletcher sing of Westminster Abbey—

"Here's an acre sown indeed,
With the richest, royallest seed."

And well might the American Webster, forgetting for a moment local jealousy, exult in the recollection that the morning drum tap of the red-coats of the old country followed the sun and kept company with the hours.

POSITION OF OUR EMPIRE.

"That strain we heard is of a higher mood." In a dread and stately procession for a thousand years we follow in the pages of Gibbon, rulers and warriors of a declining Empire struggling against its doom. Nothing could well be of more absorbing interest, except our own records affording us a sublimer spectacle of kings and soldiers with but few intervals of interruption and defeat, century and century strengthening the foundations of our power at home, and expanding our territories abroad. Our State, which had not a single foreign possession at the accession of Queen Elizabeth and only counted less than 121,000 square miles of home territory, extends its dominions in the sixtieth year of the reign of Queen Victoria over 11,000,000 square miles and its most beneficial authority over 400,000,000 of mankind. Such is to-day the sum of our military history. All depends on our sword—but for the sword our Empire could have never arisen, and without it the mighty fabric crumbles to dust. We have our £12,000,000,000 of capital, it is true; "but he who has better iron will seize all this gold."

OUR MEDIEVAL HISTORY.

Now for some details :—

I pass over the Crusades and the romantic incidents in the careers of so many of our princes and barons in that Levant, where our Navy is now busy in preventing the old feud between the followers of the Crescent and the Cross from involving Europe and Asia in a common catastrophe. I have not time to narrate the many actions of the Hundred Years' War, from the fight of Sluys to the loss of Bordeaux.

French children are taught these things. To them Du Guesclin is a familiar sound. But few English boys know how the banner of St. George was carried in triumph from Calais to Paris and from the Somme to the Ebro, and how our infantry in 1415 had won the first position among the fighting men in Europe—when not serving in our own ranks they were gladly welcomed everywhere as mercenaries—a reputation which at the beginning of this century they regained, the Prussian Baron Müffling describing them as the "soldiers of battle" after Waterloo.

How proud our people used to be of their martial achievements is proved by the prologue of our first great national poet. Chaucer introduces a Knight, whose services had been distinguished against Moors and Turks, and a Squire and an Archer who had struggled against French foemen in Flanders and in Picardy; and to-day the most popular of his poems are tales of chivalry.

But though mediæval military history will always have charms for the young and the curious, the Imperial career of our nation dates from the glorious days of great Elizabeth.

THE SIXTEENTH AND SEVENTEENTH CENTURIES.

I do not envy the Briton who can read without swelling pride of the exploits of our "sea-dogs" in the Spanish Main, of the "journey of Portugal," of the repulse of the Armada, of the capture of Cadiz, of the toilsome pilgrimages of our merchant adventurers to Syria, to Muscovy, and to Delhi, in search of the treasures "of Ormus and of Ind, and where the gorgeous East showers on her kings barbaric, pearls and gold."

That the days of the glorious Queen, girt with many a baron bold, should be considered by schoolmasters of less importance to Englishman than the epoch of Pericles, is really a provoking absurdity. Mahan's "Sea Power," or some similar work, should be a text-book in every higher class of every public school. The sons of the first of Naval Powers should learn, before manhood calls them to daily toil and to the duties of the electorate, the conditions of our country's pre-eminence. Our struggles against Spain and Holland, and Lewis the XIV. in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth centuries when we laid the foundations of our commercial greatness, should be explained to them betimes.

I have before me a popular history of Greece used by some schools, out of which boys are compelled to make up the details of the expedition to Syracuse, of the mutilation of the Hermæ, and of the proceedings of Cleon and Alcibiades; yet these same boys are absolutely prevented by the arrangements of the same schools from studying how Blake maintained the honour of their own flag, how we sent troops under William III. to the Continent to save Holland from the French, how our command of the sea was shaken at Beachy Head and recovered at La Hogue.

I suggest that such a scholastic system is an anachronism.

The late Professor Seeley, shortly and clearly and with eloquence described the effect of the New World on the Old, and how our military policy was influenced by our commercial policy and how we conquered India. In how many schools is the "Expansion of England" a text-book? I contend that it would be at least as useful to our youths as any chapters in the history of Italy, even chapters relating to the very interesting and instructive struggle between Rome and Carthage for the command of the Mediterranean.

The origin and development of our Regular Standing Army after the close of the Civil War, the duties which it has to discharge, the difference between the military conditions of our State and of other countries, the nature of the auxiliary forces which supplement our Regular Army, the functions of our Navy, offensive and defensive, should be matters of common knowledge. The dissemination of this knowledge with historical illustrations of knotty points would facilitate the tasks of our statesmen, would prepare politicians for the sage and fruitful discussion of questions upon the proper solution of which the existence of the Kingdom depends; this knowledge would prevent the alternate cold fits and panics with regard to military preparations, which are, as the Commander-in-Chief points out, a discredit to the reputation of our people for business-like capacity in the conduct of public affairs.

OUR HISTORY IN THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY.

From every point of view the campaigns of our ancestors in the eighteenth century are worthy of national study and of national commemoration. Let us see: as our Navy had practically command of the sea—for the battle of Malaga, 1704, though not a decisive victory, was sufficient—we traversed the Atlantic and Mediterranean at our will in the days of Queen Anne; therefore, while France could make no counter-stroke against our isles we were able to send an Army under Marlborough up the Rhine, across the Neckar, on to the Danube, to deliver Austria by the splendid victory of Blenheim, and to march back across the Rhine, to invest towns on the Moselle, and finally reach the capital of Belgium.

MARLBOROUGH.

This campaign of 1704-5 was at least as fine an enterprise as Scipio's movement into Spain, and I believe that Marlborough was as good a strategist as any Roman general. It is deplorable that most British gentlemen have not the least notion about the general course of the War of the Spanish Succession, in which not only was our Army illustrious, but, as Mahan says, "Britain became not a Naval Power, but *the* Naval Power." We won! the French lost; German soldiers were mere mercenaries under our officers; yet we ignore this war, while Frenchmen and Germans give it the closest study, and by the orders of Napoleon a life of John Churchill, in three volumes, was composed for the use of his staff.

Lack of time prevents me from dwelling on any details of the war that raged in every quarter of the globe 1739-1748. But again Britain held her own, and the action of her sailors and soldiers had a lasting effect on the destinies of mankind. We held the balance of power throughout the last century; as we can do again when our people please. I should like General Maurice's opinion on this point of the balance of power.

THE SEVEN YEARS' WAR.

One would gladly linger over the marvellous military activity, whereby at the instigation of the elder Pitt, men like Clive and Wolfe, Hawke and Boscawen, turned the gloom of the opening years of the Seven Years' War into the transcendent glory of 1758-1762. How remarkable that a nation of only 14,000,000 inhabitants should have been able to spend for warlike purposes £120,000,000 in a few years, and to send forth naval and military expeditions to India, the west coast of Africa, Quebec and Montreal, the Weser and the Elbe, the coast of France, the coast of Portugal, to Cuba and to Manila; to triumph over Oriental despots and the fleets of leading European Powers! All this was combined with an enormous increase in the commerce and comfort of its people and an elevation in their moral condition. This "speeding" o'er the universe at the bidding of our ministers, "posting over land and water without rest," was accomplished with sailing-ships or upon roads which would have driven a Cæsar mad; and yet in the same year our soldiers fought and won battles by the banks of the Hooghly, the Senegal and the Ohio, while our sailors in the same year were hovering about

the Bay of Bengal, the mouth of the Vilaine and the mouth of the St. Lawrence.

I put it to you, Mr. Chairman and gentlemen, if, while every Prussian learns in detail the exploits of the forces of Frederick the Great in the Seven Years' War, it be not an ignominious thing for our teachers to condemn their pupils to indifference to the genius and energy which handed down to this generation the Dominion of Canada and the Empire of India? There would be ten times more subscriptions to the Indian Famine Relief Fund; every operative would rush to contribute his shilling, if our system of instruction allowed either our leisured folk or our toiling folk to understand what this Empire of India means to them. Suppose we lost it, by how many shillings per annum would each man, woman, and child, in the United Kingdom be the poorer? And as to the Dominion of Canada; how few understand the significance of the great coaling stations and naval depôts on its western and eastern coasts, how few comprehend the strategic importance of the Canadian Pacific Railway! I commend to struggling parents, anxious about provision for their sons, Mr. Parkin's work on the "Great Dominion." I fancy a study of pages 35-38 will make them awake to the gravity of the position of some of their offspring.

The French in Europe, who have not governed Canada for more than a century, study its history; we who acquired it by a rare display of naval and military skill and bravery, and who have retained it in spite of desperate odds, prefer Coriolanus to Wolfe, Spartacus to Amherst, and Conon at Ægospotamos 405 B.C. to Hawke at Quiberon 1759 A.D. Some here may be pleased to know that "Conon with the few Athenian ships that were ready for sea fled southward"; but many, perhaps, would prefer to learn how the daring Admiral Hawke, in spite of the prudent protest of his pilot and very dangerous waters, secured for his native island immunity from invasion.

THE LOSS OF THE UNITED STATES EXPLAINED.

"Prosperity doth best discover vice; adversity doth best discover virtue." Between 1778 and 1782 we were unfortunate indeed, and yet beyond all doubt these four years are highly instructive to the students of military history.

MAHAN'S USEFUL LABOURS.

No fact in connection with our history lately has been more interesting than the extraordinary awakening of all classes of the community to the fact, that command of the sea is the mainstay of the British Empire. This is now recognised as a political commonplace. Yet we can remember when naval strategy was to most historical students an empty phrase, it conveyed no idea to the ordinary mind, its principles were a blank, nor were there any convenient works to enlighten the schoolboy, the press, or the statesman. The labours of a few writers within the past ten years have made all clear. I don't mention Britons (to particularise would be obnoxious in this assembly); but if Captain Mahan, of the United States Navy, had been an Englishman of the most zealous patriotism, he could not have done us greater service than by the publication of his three

epoch-making volumes. We must rejoice at the popularity of these works. Quotations therefrom should be constantly hurled at the "Little Englander"; next to the decoration of the Nelson Monument on Trafalgar Day, nothing can more seriously upset his mental calm, or more completely ruffle his cosmopolitan anti-nationalism.

FRANKLIN'S FALLACY.

Mahan completely exposes a few fallacies: one is that the American colonists themselves won their independence in this war. Franklin at the close of the long struggle put on his old coat again, and declared that the serpent had been strangled by the infant Hercules; it would have been more to the point to declare that the little Hercules would have perished in his cradle but for his French nurse. We lost our colonies because for a while we lost command of the sea, the lack of energy on the part of our Admiral Graves contributed more to the result than the skill of Washington. Washington himself said:—"In any operation and under all circumstances a naval superiority is to be considered as a fundamental principle and the basis upon which every hope of success must ultimately depend." Notwithstanding the war with the colonists, notwithstanding the troubles in Ireland, our Navy and Army recovered themselves by the close of 1782. De Suffren was defeated in the East Indies; Hastings held his own with the Mahrattas, and practically put an end to the power of Hyder Ali; Rodney restored our prestige in the West Indies; and Elliot kept the banner of St. George floating in triumph over the Rock of Gibraltar.

If our high-spirited youth very properly learn of the heroism of Brasidas and his mother's celebrated epitaph, "Sparta hath many a worthier son than he," surely they might also be taught even at the knees of their own mothers the outlines of the repulse of de Crillon in Europe, and the triumph of Coote in Asia.

It is singular to observe in connection with these great naval struggles how clear-sighted was the philosophy of Bacon; his views were based on experience; he was no mere doctrinaire; he taught that the military policy of States was everything, and their internal concerns of comparatively trifling importance. He laid it down that history makes men "wise," and the following sentence is almost a compendium of the teachings of Admiral Colomb, of Mr. Wilkinson, and of Mr. Wilson—I see Mr. Wilkinson present, and I trust, Sir, you will allow me to congratulate him and his fellows on their interesting and useful toil: their labours of love, equally creditable to themselves and beneficial to their country.

BACON'S VIEWS.

"To be master of the sea is an abridgment of a monarchy. Cicero writing to Atticus of Pompey's preparation against Cæsar, saith, 'Pompey's plan is plainly taken from Themistocles, for he judges that whoever becomes master of the sea is master of all things,' and without doubt, Pompey had tired out Cæsar if upon vain confidence he had not left that way. We observe the great effects of battles by sea; the battle of Actium decided the Empire of the world; the battle of Lepanto arrested the greatness of the Turk. There be many examples where

sea-fights have been final to the war; but this is when princes, or States, have set up their rest upon the battles; but *this much is certain*, that he that commands the sea is at great liberty, and may take as much and as little of the war as he will; whereas those that be strongest by land, are nevertheless, many times in great straits. Surely at this day, with us of Europe, the vantage of strength at sea (which is one of the principal dowries of this Kingdom of Great Britain) is great; both because most Kingdoms of Europe are not entirely inland, but girt with the sea most part of their compass, and because *the wealth of both Indies seems in great part but an accessory to the command of the seas.*—"True Greatness of Kingdoms and Estates," 1612.) Was not this prophetic philosophy of the sage in 1612 verified from 1781-1782?

BRITISH ACTIVITY FROM 1793-1815.

The wars of the French Revolution and the campaigns of Napoleon are certainly no longer an unexplored mine. Dwellers in Paris are daily reminded by the nomenclature of the streets and public buildings of the glories of the early days of this century. How many statues of naval heroes adorn the streets of our country? Napoleon in particular has been the theme of numerous recent writers, German and American; nor have British officers failed to contribute their quota of admiration to his genius. Our Continental neighbours are quite right in doing honour to departed greatness, nor can we have any desire to blame them; indeed, I believe a French officer of distinction in London has recently said that if the French and Spanish Navies had won the battles, on the days of St. Vincent and Trafalgar, the monuments of their admirals would have been decorated with laurel every Sunday from then till now; and they would have well earned this tribute to the last infirmity of noble minds, for they would have given command of the sea to France.

Yet beyond doubt, the British as a nation did much finer things from 1793 till 1815 than the French; though without the advantage at the start of soldier leaders of the very rarest powers, they made a permanent impression on every part of the world in that critical time. Yet strange to say, details of Ushant, Camperdown, Alexandria, Acre, Assaye, Laswari, Maida, the Lines of Torres Vedras, Badajos, are to the vast majority of our people utterly unknown. Throughout the period 1793-1815 we spent on military purposes £1,000,000,000; our fleets covered the sea; in one and the same year we sent expeditions to the Cape, Buenos Ayres, Egypt, Copenhagen, Constantinople, and Italy; of course, we failed at times; but all our failures put together since the days of Elizabeth would not pile up such an aggregate of misery as the French campaign of 1812 in Russia alone.

THE PENINSULAR WAR.

Perhaps the neglect of our national military history could not be better illustrated than by a recent announcement by a celebrated statesman, that it was absurd to suggest that the British operations in the Peninsula had any very marked influence on the fate of Napoleon; while, in point of fact, Napoleon himself declared that "the Spanish Ulcer ruined

him." If he had had at his disposal on the Oder and the Elbe in 1813 the 170,000 men who were detained by Wellington in the Peninsula, the fate of Germany might have been very different.

If the troops of Soult and Suchet had been on the Seine and Marne in 1814 instead of being tied to Toulouse and Carcassonne, the battles of Laon and Arcis would have been very different in their result; 60,000 more troops would in all probability have driven Blücher to Belgium and Schwartzberg to Basle; as it was, Napoleon did wonders with his 100,000 in a campaign, which deserves the admiration of every student of strategy.

But while treating the memory of our brilliant antagonist with respect, we ought also to do justice to our own illustrious dead. When the population of the British Isles in 1813 is remembered, their energy appears most remarkable.

I quote Alison, Vol. X., p. 207 :—

"It will not be considered by subsequent times the least marvellous circumstance in that age of wonders that in the year 1813, the twentieth year of the war, the British Empire raised by direct taxation no less than £20,000,000, by indirect • £48,000,000 sterling; that she borrowed £39,000,000 for the current expenses of the year at a rate of less than 5½ per cent., and expended £107,000,000 on the public service; that she had 800,000 men in arms in Europe and 200,000 in Asia, all raised by voluntary enlistment; that her Navy numbered 240 ships of the line, of which 104 were actually in commission; that she carried on war successively in every quarter of the globe, and sent Wellington into France at the head of 100,000 combatants, while her subsidies to foreign Powers exceeded the immense sum of £11,000,000 sterling."

Is not this something to be proud of; is it not almost as instructive as the second Samnite war?

And yet British statesmen have not been ashamed to ridicule what they could not have taken the trouble to comprehend. Napier's remarks, Vol. I., p. 7, are not too strong :—

"Very subject to false impressions are many of the English; and being proud of their credulity, as if it were a virtue, they cling to error with a tenacity proportioned to its grossness. An ignorant contempt for the soldiery was prevalent long before the ill-success in Holland in 1794, and again in 1799 seemed to justify public prejudice; the cause of those failures was not traced; the excellent system introduced by the Duke of York was disregarded; and England at home and abroad was, in 1808, scorned as a military Power, when she possessed, without a frontier swallowing armies in its fortresses, at least 200,000 soldiers, the best disciplined, and best equipped in the universe, together with an immense recruiting establishment, and the power of drawing, through the Militia, without limit on the population. Many were necessarily employed in defence of the Colonies, yet enough remained to furnish a force greater than Napoleon had at Austerlitz, double than that with which he conquered Italy. In material resources also, the superiority of English mechanical skill was shown; and that intellectual power, which in science,

arts, and literature is nationally conspicuous, was not wanting to her generals in war."

RISKS IN THE FUTURE.

Such is a very rapid sketch of our past history. But with regard to the future : are our people likely to do as well in the future ? The result will largely depend on the proper education of our democracy. Our folk will only rise to the occasion in a crisis, if they understand our national exigencies. This depends on the national study of military history. Are we likely to do as well in 1908 or 1913 as in 1808 or in 1813 ? Our resources will probably be more ample both absolutely and relatively, but what about our spirit ? Will the democracy of the future rival the aristocracy of the past in ability and courage ?

Will our democracy live up to our traditions ? Mahan, himself a Republican, gives us a caution :—" Since 1815, and especially in our own day, the Government of England has passed very much more into the hands of the people at large. Whether her sea-power" (I may add, or her land-power) "will suffer therefrom remains to be seen. Its broad basis still remains in a great trade, large mechanical industries, and an extensive colonial system. Whether a democratic Government will have the foresight, the keen sensitiveness to national position and credit, the willingness to insure its prosperity by adequate outpouring of money in times of peace, all of which are necessary for military preparation, is yet an open question. Popular Governments are not generally favourable to military expenditure, however necessary, and there are signs that England intends to drop behind."

Fortunately the facts of 1896-97 tend to contradict this prophecy of 1889 ; but unremitting zeal on the part of our educational agencies will be necessary in order to keep our politicians up to the high standard of the past.

NECESSITY FOR A PRACTICAL EDUCATION.

The dangers of educational neglect and consequent disasters to our people are well pointed out by Alison as deductions from his references to the state of affairs in 1739 and 1756, and 1775 and 1793-96 and 1840.

"Nor is the English system of education and government without an important, and what often proves a disastrous, influence on the national fortunes at the commencement and sometimes throughout the whole course of hostilities. No provision is made in schools or colleges, in general instruction, for teaching our future statesmen anything connected with their department in the direction of war. Young men too often enter the House of Lords and Commons perfectly initiated in the lives of Dido and Æneas" (in my time we knew all about both when we were twelve) "of Mars and Venus, able to construe Æschylus and write hexameter verses, perhaps skilled in forensic debate and happy in parliamentary allusions, but as ignorant of the means by which victory is to be obtained or disaster avoided in war as the child unborn. Statesmen are raised to the supreme direction of affairs often from talent in speaking or readiness in reply, rather than from any practical knowledge they possess, either of the civil or military duties, with the directions of

which they are entrusted. Power in debate differs as much from the able direction of a campaign as the skill in a tournament of Amadis de Gaul or Palmerin of England does from the consummate genius of Wellington or Napoleon." In comparing the elder and the younger Pitt, Lord Macaulay uses similar language.

I repeat that I have no prejudice against a so-called classical education; nor would I exclude Latin from any course of liberal instruction, though I certainly would make it optional for any young man of eighteen years of age; but this does not affect the contention that to give high marks for essays on the conquest by the Romans of Etruria and Cisalpine Gaul, as was the case at the November examination for Sandhurst, and not to ask a word about the Peninsular War, the Crimean War, the Mahratta Wars, or the Sepoy Mutiny, is incapable of justification.

CANT AND HYSTERIA.

Now two of the most fatal evils of democratic politics are cant and hysteria. Not only would the general dissemination of historic truth encourage our youth on the road to honour and facilitate the labours of politicians, and fill with worthy and zealous recruits the ranks of our Volunteer Army, but it would clear away cant and hysteria from our political and military life, and probably to some extent from our social life also. An aphorism of the so-called Manchester School, now happily almost defunct, was that the commercial development of European States would put an end to the rude arbitrament of the sword. The *counting-house* was to take the place of the flinty and steel couch of war; but unfortunately, next to religious fanaticism, commercial rivalry and jealousy are the most potent factors in public life. It was on all sides preached in the year 1850 that *Astræa* was again about to visit the earth, and to hover above us with her golden wings. In point of fact, the imaginary golden age was soon replaced by bronze and iron. The Crimean War, the Indian Mutiny, the Danish War, the Prusso-Austrian War, the Franco-German War, Servian and Montenegrin Wars, the Russo-Turkish War, the Armenian question, the Cretan question, have taught all Europe that the Wisdom of the Ancients is as true now as when in the supposed interests of religion Germany was devastated during the Thirty Years' War. Moreover, the delicate questions about the "race for Yunnan" in South-West China and about the partition of Africa recall the Assiento Treaty and the origin of the War of Jenkin's Ears. If men will fight for their souls they will fight also for their bodies. They will fight for their creed and they will fight for their crust.

AMERICAN FALLACIES AND FACTS, 1812 AND 1861.

Cant has been too powerful among us, but it reigned supreme in the Great American Republic about a generation ago. On the one hand was the most fulsome self-flattery about their campaigns against the British; the Spread Eagle was rampant in every school and in every journal. Citizens were told that the campaigns of 1812-14 were ignominious

reverses for the British both by sea and land; whereas, in truth this country more than held its own and reduced the States to the brink of ruin.

An American historian, Patton, thus writes of the result of the war:—

"Affairs were most desperate, the treasury exhausted, the national credit gone, the terrible law of conscription like an ominous cloud hanging over our people; civil discord ready to spring up between the States, our coasts yet subject to marauding expeditions, while the inhabitants were crying vainly for relief." The Legislature of Massachusetts, "after recapitulating the evils which war had brought on the people they represent, expressed sentiments on other wrongs, such as enlistment of minors and apprentices; the National Government assuming command of the States Militia, especially the proposed system of conscription for both Army and Navy."

Simultaneously with the promulgation of historic falsehood, the citizens of the great Republic despised the Military Powers of Europe, plumed themselves on their small Army, and held up to public reprobation such ruthless policy as Marlborough's military executions in Bavaria. But they soon learned wisdom, and how to devastate hostile territory as efficiently as Attila. The Federals would have been in Richmond, and would have terminated the war in one campaign, if they had possessed only three army corps under proper organisation, and under an intelligible system of command. Thus they would have avoided the loss of some 500,000 men killed, £1,000,000,000 sterling expended in four years (during 1864 the cost of the Northern Army was £1,000,000 a day), they would have avoided a pension list which has been an incubus ever since; they would have been spared the necessity of ruining the finest and some of the oldest States of their community. Their commerce would not have left their flag, and their humanitarians would not have been turned into laughing-stocks. Butler's proclamation to the ladies of New Orleans would never have seen the light, and thus an infamy equal to any ever perpetrated by Albigenian crusader or Kurd chieftain would not have disgraced the Stars and Stripes. "Mr." John Pope would not have issued his tirade against the people of Virginia, General Sherman would not have depopulated Atlanta; General Kilpatrick would not have lead' "bumbers" to the ruin of Georgia; the ill-omened policy of hiring negro slaves to slaughter whites would not have been conceived; and General Sheridan would not have so completely destroyed all the apparatus and the fruits of industry in the fertile valley of the Shenandoah, that "if a crow wished to live therein he must have carried his victuals on his back."

There can be no better lesson in the necessity for martial readiness under all circumstances for *internal security*, as well as against external attack, than the history of the United States, 1861-65.

We read of indignation meetings against the Turks being held in the cities of America; perhaps a study of the campaign of the Federals in Carolina and by the banks of the Chattahoochee would mitigate the

violence of the orators concerned. I don't blame Sherman or Sheridan in the least; war cannot be conducted with lamblike gentleness. Political cant and platform hysterics are not only absurd in themselves, but a danger to the national life.

IMPROVISED ARMIES.

Another fallacy was till quite recently current amongst us to the effect that the manhood of our country would instantly spring to arms, and, rushing upon the invader, annihilate him. Our Volunteers have done something to dispel this delusion among us; even the slackest corps would admit that it takes a fortnight for a private to learn company drill and musketry exercise, and that somewhat more experience is necessary for an officer. History would have taught any tyro that raw levies are useless as against trained soldiers. The generals of Napoleon had small difficulty in dealing with the Spanish insurrection till it was supported by the soldiers of Moore and Wellington. There is no example of raw recruits, under a *levée en masse*, saving a nation against a well-disciplined and resolute army of invaders. It would be amusing to listen to the threats of reverend divines and other enthusiasts to take arms themselves and rush into the field for some of their hobbies, only that such ill-considered bombast tends to engender vain confidence in the mass of the people. The multitudes of Persia went down before the Macedonian phalanx, even as the Greeks in turn fell before the Roman legion. The utter collapse of each and of all the armies which French enthusiasm put in the field after Sedan is conclusive. The credit of France was good, supplies were abundant, men thronged to the Republican standard, Gambetta was an admirable preacher of a crusade against the invader; but Faidherbe, D'Aurelle, Garibaldi, Chanzy, Bourbaki, produced no impression on the well-trained and disciplined Germans; and yet who will deny that the French acted with sublime self-denial? The mobs of Chinese could not stand for a day against the soldiers of Japan in 1895. And thus again is verified the profound philosophy of the Elizabethan sage:—

“Walled towns, stored arsenals and armories, goodly races of horse, chariots of war, elephants, and the like—all this is but a sheep in a lion's skin, except the breed and disposition of the people be stout and warlike.

“Numbers in armies importeth not much where the people are of weak courage; as Virgil says, ‘it never troubleth the wolf how many the sheep be.’ The principal point of greatness in any State is to have a race of military men. Neither is money the sinews of war where the sinews of men's arms in base and effeminate people are failing.”

THE ARBITRATION CRAZE.

I see that the new American President a few days ago made a speech on arbitration, which does much more credit to his heart than to his head; he speaks of a recent treaty as a “glorious” example of reason and peace. I am sorry to say that if the United States had always depended upon

arbitration and peace their present position would be one of subservience to France, or to England, or they would be 3 congeries of petty Republics, each of which could not have been equal to Chili or Peru. Like other Powers, the United States have proved their "doctrines" orthodox by apostolic blows and knocks. The nation that is ready to arbitrate about serious interests is lost. A trusty sword will cut Gordian knots of politics that all the international lawyers of both hemispheres could not unravel. For our part in recent years we have been more frequently beaten by legal casuists than by soldiers; I don't believe for a moment that arbitration treaties are likely to lead to fair play: their result may well be even more iniquitous than the most rash war. At any rate it is curious that some of the best lawyers during the American Civil War became soldiers—*cedant togæ armis*; that the most distinguished priests and orators of all ages and nations, men like Demosthenes, Cicero, and Burke, have in serious crises urged their people on to war. Read Burke's Letters on a Regicide Peace. The most profound philosophers have preached the doctrine that States should be ready to arm and fight on any just occasion for any fair cause. An incidental matter of dispute may possibly be referred to arbitration. No vital matter should ever be referred to arbitration. Every high-spirited nation will become as powerful as it can. How did the thirteen American Colonies come to top Appalachian range, and surmounting the utmost summits of the Rocky Mountains descend to the Pacific coast; did they refer certain territorial disputes between themselves and the Red Indians to a committee of jurisconsults of divers hues located in Denver City? How did the Yankees get from New York to the Ohio and thence to the Sacramento—how did they get Texas, and how did they crush Virginia? Surely, President McKinley in speaking of "judicial methods" in the history of his country forgets his authorities. The Empire of the United States has expanded just as our Empire has expanded from Cape Comorin to the Himalayas, and as the Prussian Empire has expanded from the Oder to the Vistula and from the Elbe across the Rhine. How? By the sword, and by the sword alone. The less said about Law the better in all three cases.

THE STRONG MAN ARMED.

This then, General Maurice, in the present condition of human frailty is to all folk, whether dwelling by the Indus, the Mississippi, the Moselle or the Limpopo "the most certain oracle of time." "For Empire and greatness it comporteth most that nations do profess arms as their principal honour, study, and occupation." "No nations which do not study arms may look to have greatness fall into their mouths." Indeed, it is much more likely, if they trust to legal machinery and chicanery, that the most honest may have their Empire filched from beneath their very noses. The strong man armed is the determining factor, whether domestic order, social decency, or international comity be at issue. On both sides of the Atlantic, wise men as well as weak men fly from the wiles of the demagogue to the strength of the soldier.

But why for this moment is so much stress laid on the circulation of

military knowledge in America and the United Kingdom? Well, it would be wasteful and ridiculous excess to lay stress upon it in regard to such countries as France, Germany, and Russia, which are "nations in arms," where military service and duty are unavoidable conditions of the life of every healthy male. By the banks of the Rhine, the Danube, the Vistula, and the Don, humanitarian "cant" is unknown—generation after generation has seen what war means. Crowded ambulances have saddened their souls; hostile armies have traversed their fields and have been cantoned in their villages; cheerful industry has given place to feverish idleness; myriads of people have known the horrors of a siege. The French Dragoons at Luneville and the German Hussars at Metz have not only studied military history, but are ready to boot and saddle and to rush into the field. Prussia will not soon forget Jena and Auerstädt; France remembers Wörth and Gravelotte. I fancy the Cossacks would pay small regard to adverse arbitration, and would be delighted to hear of such disarmament among their more civilised neighbours as would give more ample scope for the display of their peculiar virtues and energy; and they would be cordially supported by the nomad races from Central Asia, which would again gladly, as in the days of the philosophic but degenerate Greek Empire, water their horses in every river from the Indus to the Bosphorus and from the Jaxartes to the Maritza.

But I have exhausted my time and the patience of my audience. I would willingly go on, for I have just touched the fringe of these Eastern questions which are romance itself. But were I to hold forth as I should wish, I should fear the correction of the Chairman.

The art of war, the history of war, the whole course of warfare in various climes and over the various topographical conditions of our globe are studies of entrancing interest. The military portion of history is the soul of history. Take it away, and the traditions and the written records of mankind are as rapid as the muscles of an effeminate man are weak. War never leaves a nation where it found the nation. Defeat is not dishonour, but degrading defeat is fatal; and defeat the result of political chicanery and paltry economy would leave a permanent stain on our escutcheon.

POETS AND PATRIOTISM.

To go back to the days of Elizabeth, Sir Philip Sydney declared that the poem of "Chevy Chase" was to him like the sound of a trumpet. Shakespeare was a keen student as well of "Plutarch's Lives" as of our own national history. He took good care that his audiences should be animated by patriotic sentiments. He "wedded" the stories of Henry V. and of the Wars of the Roses to immortal verse. He deliberately made his characters use language of resolute devotion to their country's cause, as could be easily proved by any book of familiar quotations; he strove to stimulate the national pride of his hearers. Our sage and serious poet Spenser, who, in the opinion of Milton, himself an ardent patriot and good historian as well as poet, could form a gentleman in all godly discipline better than teachers like Aquinas and Scotus, wrote an allegory of the glory of his country, just emerging again from obscurity into the light of Imperial

renown. His "Faerie Queene" was his own Queen, "the great ladye of the greatest isle, whose light like Phœbus' lampe throughout the world doth shine" (would that we now had some equally romantic genius to transmit the spirit of our age to posterity!), his "faerie land" was England, the heroes of his antique history were sailors and soldiers like Raleigh, also a historian, and "the shepherd of the ocean." Spenser thought that tales of chivalry were the foundation of manly education and a true source of pleasure in old age.

"Lo! I the man whose Muse whylome did maske,
As time her taught, in lowly shepherd's weeds,
Am now enforst, a farre unfitter taste,
For trumpets sterne to chaunge mine oaten reeds,
And sing of Knights' and ladies' gentle deeds;
Whose praises having slept in silence long,
Me, all too meane the sacred Muse arceads.
To blazen broade emongst her learned throng
Fierce warres and faithful loves shall moralize my song."

In the days of Spenser, the most formidable Military Power to which he constantly refers for examples was the Ottoman Empire, whose Sultans deserved the success which they had attained over the feeble and languid intriguers of Byzantium and Bagdad. Yet there were already signs of deterioration; indeed a sad omen of the fate of his dynasty cast a gloom over the triumph of the ever-victorious Sultan Mahomed II., and as he was entering the conquered Constantinople, 444 years ago, he repeated a prophecy of ultimate decay:—"The spider hath woven his web in the imperial palace, and the owl hath sung her wach song in the towers of Afrasiab."

Lord Byron speaking of the Mediterranean in his Address to the Ocean pointed out the fall of Assyria, Persia, Greece, Rome, Carthage, all through neglect of military efficiency; and again while calling his own country the "Ocean's Queen," he emphasised the ruin of other maritime dominions, "In the fall of Venice, think of thine, despite thy watery wall."

Mr. Chairman, ladies, and gentlemen:—

"This is the moral of all human tales,
'Tis but the same rehearsal of the past,
First freedom and then glory—when that fails
Wealth, vice, corruption, barbarism at last."

"History with all its volumes vast hath but one tale."

I have been honoured by your Council with the duty of trying to set forth the significance of that tale, with on the one side its beneficent and glorious aspect, and on the other side its appalling gloom. But we may hope, all things considered, that once our people realise the issues on which their destinies depend; once the learned and honourable guides of our youths are awake to the highest portions of their duty, the patriotic energy which at the close of the eighteenth century faced "a new power of a new species," and against every combination of foes maintained the integrity of the Empire, will again pervade our land.

Then the rising generation of our masterful race, to which in a few years the fortunes of a new century must be entrusted, animated by recollections of our ancient fame, will by their courage and self-sacrifice guarantee the mighty monarchy, depicted on that map of Empire, from internal discord and from foreign aggression.

Thus then, whether in the bright days of peace and commercial prosperity, or in the darkness of "danger's troubled night," the sons of our United Kingdom in every clime will be considered trustworthy by their neighbours, because they have been true to themselves.

MR. SPENSER WILKINSON :—I think I am only one of many here who must have felt, when they saw the title of this address, that it was a very fit address for the Jubilee Year. There are many, I am sure, who have long felt very deeply the necessity of a national study of the history of war, and who will rejoice that the Council of the Institution was so fortunate as to secure the ability, the large historical learning, and the fine eloquence of Dr. Miller Maguire to give us this address. I wish, with your permission, to make one or two remarks upon the subject, rather than upon the eloquent address we have heard, because I think there is hardly a word in it with which any of us will disagree. I may confess to having been a little bit astonished at one thing which fell from my friend Dr. Maguire; I think I heard him suggest that cant was a commodity confined to this country; and he enumerated a number of rivers, some of which are fairly familiar to me, as flowing through countries which are entirely free from cant. I am bound to say that my recollection of the state of feeling and the state of expression in some of the countries there referred to hardly bears out that statement; and I think, if we are not to depreciate our own country too much, we might avoid putting ourselves down as the only people in the world who are guilty of cant. A distinction might, perhaps, be drawn between the study of military history and its popular study; and as I think that the general tone of what our lecturer has said to us is rather to urge the popular study, a general spread of the study of military history, I should like to be allowed to put before you one or two remarks on what, I believe, would perhaps be better defined as the national study of the subject. By national study, we ought properly to mean a study carried on by the nation in the interests of the nation in order to throw light upon the future conduct of the nation; and I take it that, just as the ultimate value of all history is to give us political teaching for our future conduct, so the true value of military history is to enable the nation rightly to bear itself in the future. I would suggest, then, that by national study we mean an organisation of the nation for the purpose of systematising the knowledge of a particular subject. Just as in our administration we select our leaders and entrust each of them with a branch of the national affairs, so, I take it, it is desirable in regard to any subject of great national importance that we should have either official or unofficial trained students, whose business and whose special duty it should be to be pioneers in that subject, to map out its great lines, and to be the guides and leaders in that popular study which the lecturer has so admirably recommended. To the best of my knowledge this country is at present imperfectly armed with pioneers in the subject of the history of war. As far as I know, the chair of which you, Sir, for some years were the ornament, is almost the only public position the function of which is research in the history of war. I am not aware that, in regard to naval history, any such position exists, unless it be that of which the functions are so admirably performed by Professor Laughton. It seems to me a great misfortune that in any nation there should not be a very much larger organisation for the exploration of these subjects than we at present possess; and this Institution would do a great service if it could send Dr. Miller Maguire as an ambassador to our ancient Universities, and suggest that there, too, something might be done

for the study of the naval and military history of the British Empire. A word or two with regard to the methods of such study. No one will contest the view that the history of war is the history of national action in particular phases, and I suppose—I speak under correction from our distinguished Chairman—that we must regard as the first canon of the study of military history the view that war is a political act; that war is a portion of the conduct by the Government of the national affairs. I think, therefore, that the study of all past wars, whether by sea or land, ought to be carried on in connection with the study of the policy of the Government, and of the general situation in the world which led to that policy at that time, and that we ought in all our studies to remember that war is not an end in itself, but is a means to an end; and we ought, therefore, constantly to bear in mind what was the political purpose which caused the Government to undertake a war, offensive or defensive; and that no study of any campaign or any war ought to be thought satisfactory unless, starting from that beginning, it leads to the conclusion and enables us to judge whether, at the end of the military operations, in the peace after war was concluded, the purposes for which the war was undertaken had really been accomplished or not. So much, then, for what I believe to be one of the principles which ought to underlie the kind of study we are discussing. I may, perhaps, say one word as to what I believe would be the general results upon our national life of the kind of study which I have defined as the national study of the operations of war. I think that in this case amateurs like myself must take upon themselves to form such opinions, because we have not at present any mass of professional exposition of military history as a whole leading to the kind of general conclusions which I think must be sought; and therefore those who have to some extent busied themselves with the subject must venture to formulate some general ideas. Of course, the national study of war implies the study of war as it particularly concerns our own country, and the lessons we want for the future are lessons of how this country is to conduct its affairs in the future. I think the first lesson that history will give us is one which cannot be better put than it was by the lecturer, namely, the absolute necessity, if this nation is to retain its independence and to preserve its Empire, of the command of the sea. It is impossible, I think, to work out in a satisfactory way the meaning, the historical significance of that fact of national power, without realising at the same time this: that we cannot conceive of any war brought to a satisfactory issue without the combined efforts of both Navy and Army. Then, I think, in the long run, after tracing in that way the course of our national policy and of the co-operation of Navy and Army, at least from the time of Queen Elizabeth until our own day, we shall be led to another conclusion. This brings me to a point upon which I might differ from the lecturer, though his expressions were not minute and did not go into detail, and therefore I cannot be quite sure. It struck me that the tendency of some of his remarks at the conclusion of his address was to glorify force at the expense of right. I hope that that was not his meaning, but I thought his words were ambiguous. I do not think that that is the view which is confirmed by a close study of naval and military history. I do not believe that important wars have ever been won merely because one of the contending parties had made better naval and military preparations, or had better generals; but I think the more you work out the history of wars in connection with their origin and purpose, the more do you find that the nation which was a rising nation, and which represented a cause—a human cause, a cause likely to be approved of by subsequent generations—I say I think the tendency is to find that that was the nation which was victorious, and that the strength of its armies, the skill of its generals, were rather the result of a national spirit aiming at some great end, than the mere result of intention to appeal to force alone. I think that of great importance in the study of British history, because, indispensable as I believe the command of the sea to be to our national existence, I do not believe that it can ever be maintained by force alone. By the command of the sea, we mean the

possession of a Navy which will destroy the Navies of all our enemies. The result of that victory is a power so tremendous that it must of itself lead to a combination against the nation which exercises that power, unless it exercises it in a way which appeals to the general sense of justice and humanity; and I believe that point of view supplies the key to many episodes in our own past policy which it is well that we should recognise.

The CHAIRMAN:—One of the oldest educational reformers in the country has sent up his card—Mr. Sonnenschein—who has more experience in education on the Continent and in England than almost anybody in England.

Mr. A. SONNENSCHN :—I have listened to the discourse of the lecturer with very close attention. In opening, he spoke of the teaching of history in Germany. Now I happen to know something about that, and I can confirm every word he says. I should, however, like to add one or two things to it. There are two kinds of patriotism: one we know by the noble name of "patriotism," and the other we know by the name of "jingoism." I can assure you that jingoism is not taught in Germany. What is the distinction between patriotism and jingoism? The jingoist only looks for nobleness and noble conduct in his own country, and ignores that heroism which he meets elsewhere. That is not the case in Germany. I will bring that home to you by an illustration with which you are familiar. You know the pathetic history of the "Birkenhead." When that happened the King of Prussia had it read out to the whole of the Army everywhere as a sample of heroism, and it was spoken of in every school in Prussia and Germany. That is not jingoism; that is true and enlightened patriotism. It teaches nobleness. Only a few days ago I read the latest edition of a school geography by Prof. Kirchhoff, and I wish I had the book here to read to you some passages showing the admiration with which he speaks to German boys of England. There are certain bickerings going on between the two countries, but at bottom I am convinced they are heart and soul united. This bickering will pass away. I knew an eminent British statesman who is now dead, and I wish to speak with all reverence of him; but, nevertheless he committed a big blunder when he said of the British Lion, "The brute, I wish he were dead." We have got past that now. But there is another prominent—I will not say eminent—British statesman to whom I should like to refer. Our lecturer spoke of the folly of cant, and I will quote an example of that folly from a book on "Compromise," written by that statesman—John Morley. He uses the following phrase:—"The unfortunate valour of our ancestors has burdened us with this Empire." Supposing Mr. Morley had had ancestors who by valour and by skill had left him honours and a fortune, would he have said, "The unfortunate valour and skill of my ancestors have burdened me with these honours and this fortune"? If he were troubled with the wealth that was left him, I could easily have told him a means of relieving himself of it. If he is troubled with the wealth of the British Empire, I could suggest a few easy steps which he might take. He has only to persuade the nation to agree with him. Let him hand over South Africa to Germany; who will accept it with gratitude. Let him hand over India to Russia; who would not object. Let him hand over Canada and your American possessions to the United States; they would be quite ready to accept. And to cap it all, let him give Home Rule to Ireland. And, as all those nations would be sure to show their gratitude by hostile tariffs, I should like to know how you would put bread on to the tables of your teeming population. That is a prominent statesman of England! Happily we are not delivered over to him. With regard to one point upon which our lecturer spoke, I wish to express my warm sympathy with him—the question of education. I have been a teacher now for half a century, and I have watched the education of England very closely. I heartily agree with his remarks. He spoke of the history that should be taught, and he also mentioned geography, and I was very glad to hear it. History and geography should be taught together; you cannot separate one from the other any more than you separate soul and body. Moreover,

geography is in itself a grand study, quite independent of any collateral advantages that may come from it. Anyone who knows the geography of the British Empire knows the geography of the globe. If any nation has a bounden duty to teach geography, it is England. Our lecturer has asked this question: If this is bad, why not change? I say, why indeed not change? But it is a very difficult matter to change. The difficulties are numerous. First of all there is the difficulty of school books. It has been lately my lot to read through some twenty geography books, some of them very large editions. I entered the tunnel on one side and came out alive on the other side; how I did it I do not know. Put these books side by side with German school books. After all, you can judge of the education of a country by its school books better than by anything else. The school books of the two countries cannot be mentioned in the same breath. I wish there was a committee before whom I could place the facts. How is it that the school books of the two different nations cannot be compared with one another? It is because in Germany the leading men of the land—men like Kirchhoff, men like Curtius, men like Zumpt, etc., etc.—do not shrink from writing elementary books for schools. We have men in England as eminent as they are; how is it they do not write books? There I must refer you to the Education Office; there lies the kernel of the question. Sir John Gorst and Sir George Kekewich are enlightened and eminent men, and they are, I am confident, doing all that is humanly possible for them to do. But they have behind them such a long string of faulty traditions—to use a moderate expression. How different from the traditions of the Prussian Office! Such men as Wilhelm von Humboldt and Schleiermacher established precedents; but here we have the precedent of Robert Lowe. Put the two side by side. How are we to find the remedy? It is all very well to say, "Let us support these good men now in office," but that is not all. They cannot work without strong pressure, or public opinion behind them to support them. Is it impossible for some gentlemen in this room to combine together to form an association, whose aim should be, after careful investigation, to propose measures by which this crying evil could be remedied? It is not only in geography and in history, it is in every elementary study. By way of conclusion, I will give you one incident of what happened to me a few weeks ago in a country town. I was asked to give an arithmetic lesson to a number of School Board boys of the higher standards. I said to the teacher, "Where are these children?" and he told me they were at fractions. I gave them an easy problem in fractions to be worked, and the boys worked it out quite correctly at once. Every one of them was correct. I said, "Why do you do that?" "Please, sir," was the reply, "that is the rule." "The rule! the rule? Who made the rule? Did the Queen make it? Did Parliament make it? Is it in the Bible? Who made the rule?" Up went one hand, "If you please, sir, the inspector made it." That is a proof of the practical teaching that is given. If history and geography were taught mechanically we should be no better than we were before; there must be a genuine spirit of patriotism, and then intelligence and enlightenment will go through the whole. That is the great aim to be set before us.

MR. ANNESLEY A. SOMERVILLE:—My remarks, Sir, will be very brief. My friend Dr. Maguire has drawn up a formidable indictment against public schools and schoolmasters, of which he gave me notice some few days ago; and I came up from Eton, where I have charge of boys preparing for the Army, to stand the fire. I should like to say that some of the public schools are quite conscious of their deficiencies in this respect, and are doing their best to remedy them. Quite recently, at Eton we re-organised English history teaching, and we hope for good results in the future. The last speaker referred to the fact that in Germany elementary books are written by distinguished men, and that in England such is not the case. I had the good fortune to read lately one English geography book written by a not undistinguished Englishman, Sir George Grove, which is recommended by the Board of Admiralty for the entrance examination of naval

cadets ; and that is an instance of a book which teaches geography, to a large extent, as it ought to be taught. I would also venture to say that the public schools are not the only offenders in the treatment of the subject of history. It is hardly necessary for me to ask the distinguished military gentlemen here how much military history they learned at Sandhurst and Woolwich. How much military history is taught at Sandhurst and Woolwich ? I had occasion to speak to some of my former pupils recently at Sandhurst on this subject, and their impression was that there was very little thought-producing work done at the Royal Military College ; in fact, one very shrewd cadet said, "At Sandhurst a dolt has as good a chance as a clever fellow." That is not the sort of thing that ought to be said about our military schools. The subjects taught in them ought to be more thought-producing. I fully agree with Dr. Maguire as to the relative importance of the study of the second Samnite war, and the war of the Spanish Succession, for example. I think every English boy ought to be stimulated to become thoroughly acquainted with the history of the British Navy and Army, and their deeds all over the world. I can conceive of nothing more beneficial to our youth ; but I would suggest that it would be well that the authorities who arrange examinations should give more encouragement to the teaching of history.

Dr. MILLER MAGUIRE, in reply, said :—My duties in reply will be very slight indeed. Mr. Wilkinson's remarks were more complimentary than critical. I can only say that praise from an authority like Mr. Wilkinson, whose attainments and judgment are so well known to you all, is praise indeed. He thought there should be a national school of history, the result of Government action, operating on the masses below from wisdom placed above, as well as the dissemination of historic truth below ; but, I fancy, once the people are awakened to the glory of the past, when they can appreciate the benefits to themselves from the operations marked on those maps in red (on which are marked not one-third of the actions of our people since the time of Queen Elizabeth)—I say, once our people become thoroughly alive to the significance of the career of our Navy and Army over every sea and land, they will very soon compel the authorities to take proper action in the direction so ably indicated by Mr. Wilkinson. As I was asked to speak on this matter I thought it would be better to make the discourse more popular than detailed, appealing more to general opinion than to instructed and trained thought. I have no doubt other gentlemen will follow up the matter. My friend Colonel Lonsdale Hale is going to do so with regard to professional military history, and others may do so with regard to constitutional and political history. My object was to try to prove that military history is good as a training for soldiers and politicians, and that the neglect of our own national history is serious discredit to our educational system, whatever be the cause. I certainly congratulate Eton on the possession of my friend Mr. Somerville. I know that he does all he can. With my protest against the present system of instruction I hope the majority of those present will agree. Mr. Sonnenschein's remarks were valuable indeed. He worked out some of our methods of instruction to a *reductio ad absurdum*, but I trust that he does not think for a moment that I forget the great services rendered to the literature and history of mankind by Germany. I should be very glad indeed that British boys should learn great exploits, wheresoever performed, whether in Rome, Greece, France, Germany, or elsewhere ; but I am for our own records in the first place here, just as German records hold the first place in Germany. I deprecate a narrow and insular spirit in teaching national history or any other branch of learning, and I compliment Germany on the fine tone of the authority who caused the record of the loss of the "Birkenhead" to be circulated among German troops as an example of discipline. I am glad to say there was another example of similar discipline in the "Warren Hastings" only a short time ago. I agree with every word Mr. Somerville said ; practically with every word Mr. Wilkinson said, even when I was corrected ; and entirely with every word that Mr. Sonnen-

schein said; and therefore I see no reason in the world for detaining you with any further discussion of the remarks of my critics, who have been so very considerate, and for whose courtesy I am most grateful.

The CHAIRMAN (Major-General Maurice):—I think I may say that I have the same reason as the lecturer for taking up your time as little as possible in summing up the discussion now that that duty devolves upon me. There is one point as to which I should like to clear up a possible misunderstanding. Mr. Sonnenschein, as far as I realise his purpose, was in very close *rapproch* with the lecturer. He did not in the least intend to criticise the system of English education with any German prejudice. His standpoint was a much larger one. It was as to the broad principles of the whole nature of education that Mr. Sonnenschein spoke. It was in order to do as much service to England as he could that he quoted his examples of sound methods wherever he has found them. He presented to us certain principles of education which are true anywhere, whether in Germany or England. The point, as I understand it, which he was specially making is one of the greatest national importance. It is one towards which, I think, the Council of our Institution, in selecting for treatment the subject on which the lecturer has spoken so eloquently, has led up with the greatest possible advantage. That point turns on the question whether the purpose of education is to obtain a certain number of accurate results in the form of answers to questions set in examinations, or whether it is its purpose to educate mind, spirit, and character, and build up the English citizen. Now, if an English citizen is to be built up by means of our national education, surely it must be the purpose of that education to appeal to the great deeds of the past, and, by making known the great examples of those who have done noble things, develop mind and character by the lessons which they alone supply. That, as I understand it, is the point towards which the lecturer is leading. Obviously there is an altogether other value in the training supplied by military history. As a mere lesson for soldiers it is excessively important in itself from a professional point of view. That is altogether subsidiary to that national question of which Dr. Maguire has been speaking to-day. At the Staff College my special business, to which Mr. Spenser Wilkinson referred, was not national education such as Dr. Maguire has been dealing with, but simply the instruction which is to be derived from military history for the purpose of the training of officers. Moreover, there I had to do with mature men, officers engaged in studying their own particular business; therefore the two things are pretty markedly distinct. We do not need to go to soldiers or to anyone who may be said to be prejudiced in that matter to learn the real cause to which I think the lecturer incidentally alluded, of the differences between us and foreign nations in that matter of national education. The cause is simply that we had so complete a protection in our surrounding seas during all the time when Europe was at war, that we were able to abandon swords for ledgers. Now, a great poet has told us:—

“How soon ennobling thoughts depart
When men change swords for ledgers.”

I think that that is in a measure true, because, quite apart from any glorification of the military or naval professions, a nation, when it gets so perfectly safe, and so perfectly able to deliver itself over to mere money-making, tends to degenerate. Unless circumstances occur to rouse and awaken it, there is the greatest possible danger lest the great deeds of the past shall be forgotten, and lest we shall cease to look upon their reproduction as the essential thing to be regarded in the education of future generations. I am sure that in England, with the enterprise and go which have carried Englishmen to all the ends of the earth, that spirit of neglect of the glories of the past and indifference to their reproduction in the future has not yet come upon us; but we have that tremendous danger before us. Jena made Prussia recover herself. Moscow made a nation of Russia. France passed through the fires of the Revolution, and now again has recovered from the tremendous blows which she received in 1870; thanks partly to the terrible lessons

which she received for her vanity and frivolity in those days. We have to thank God that we have not yet gone through such an experience; but we have to keep up the glories of our ancestors in their type and their character, or we shall have some such experience quickly enough, whatever defending seas we have around us. I am sure, therefore, that I may, in your name, tender hearty thanks to the lecturer who has so admirably carried out the excellent idea of the Council in warning us against it.