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A Passage of Pindar Reconsidered

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The Classical Quarterly / Volume 2 / Issue 01 / January 1908, pp 31 - 33

DOI: 10.1017/S0009838800025246, Published online: 11 February 2009

Link to this article: http://journals.cambridge.org/abstract_S0009838800025246

How to cite this article:

W. J. Goodrich (1908). A Passage of Pindar Reconsidered. The Classical Quarterly, 2, pp 31-33 doi:10.1017/S0009838800025246

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A PASSAGE OF PINDAR RECONSIDERED.

PINDAR *Ol.* ii. 63 ff.

θανόντων μὲν ἐνθάδ' αὐτίκ' ἀπάλαμνοι φρένες
ποιναὺς ἔτισαν, τὰ δ' ἐν τᾷδε Διὸς ἀρχῇ
ἀλιτρὰ κατὰ γᾶς δικάζει τις ἐχθρῇ
λόγον φράσαις ἀνάγκη·
ἴσαις δὲ νύκτεσσιν αἰεΐ,
ἴσαις δ' ἀμέραις ἄελιον ἔχοντες, ἀπονέστερον
ἔσλοὶ δέκονται βίοντον κτλ.

Mr. Garrod's interesting discussion (in the *Classical Quarterly* for July, 1907) of the first four lines of this famous passage raises a good many controversial points, but his central objection to what may be called the most obvious rendering (if we accept Rauchenstein's *αὐτις* for *αὐτίκ'* in the first line) is one that was certainly worth making, and in attempting to meet it the whole passage may perhaps be placed in a clearer light. I have put down a few more lines than Mr. Garrod did, because it seems to me that it is just the general connexion of thought (which the added lines give) that must first be considered, in order to see the different parts in due perspective. *Αὐτις* must of course wait for its justification until this has been done. Firstly, as to the contrast to which *μὲν* points: there is no reason to think that Mr. Garrod mistook this, or supposed it to lie in *τὰ δ' ἐν τᾷδε κτλ.*, since he translates this *δέ* by 'and': nevertheless it is a fact requiring cardinal emphasis that the contrast begins with *ἴσαις δὲ νύκτεσσιν κτλ.* Hence I conceive that a provisional outline of Pindar's meaning might be given thus: *τῶν θανόντων οἱ μὲν πονηροὶ . . . ποιναὺς τίνουσιν . . . οἱ δὲ ἔσθλοὶ ἀπονέστερον δέχονται βίοντον.* Now we come to Mr. Garrod's objection, which concerns the internal structure or arrangement of clauses in the *first* part alone of this antithesis. 'This involves an impossible inversion of the true order of ideas. It makes Pindar speak of the second punishment of guilty souls (in a new life on earth) before he says anything of their first punishment (in the world below).' For 'first punishment' it would, I think, be more accurate, as well as sufficient for the objector's purpose, to say 'judgment': for Pindar seems here to disregard the *τίσις ἐν ᾿Αϊδου* (Plato, *Laws* 870 D) so as to confine the penalty to the punishment received in a second life. Such variations of detail on a common groundwork of Orphic eschatology occur

here and there according to the writer's purpose or fancy, as may be seen by comparing the several Platonic versions among themselves and with Pindar's and Vergil's. Let us say, then, that Pindar speaks of the punishment before the judgment. True: but then this *hysteron proteron* may be justified on the same principle as in other cases (unless there are any due to mere carelessness or caprice), that is, the leading thought is placed first, and emphasis overrides chronology. Here the leading thought is supplied by the antithesis that forms the framework of the whole passage: that the bad are punished, while the good are rewarded. The manner in which the punishment is brought about, though not unimpressive, is yet secondary: thus the clause τὰ δ' ἐν τᾷδε . . . ἀνάγκη is subordinate in thought, and therefore placed second: it might almost be placed in brackets. And thus the chief difficulty disappears.

It remains to be seen whether the details of phraseology can be harmonized with this general view. The verbal points may be taken in order. The reasons in favour of αὐτίς for αὐτίκα are now plain enough: as Plato says (*l. c.*) καὶ πάλιν ἀφικομένοις δεῦρο ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι τὴν κατὰ φύσιν δίκην ἐκτίσαι (I quote this passage as the simplest and most concise exposition I know of the doctrines in question, referred to by him as generally accepted from οἱ ἐν ταῖς τελεταῖς περὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα ἐσπουδακότες). As for ἀπάλαμνοι, the general meaning suggested for this by our antithesis is certainly 'the wicked.' Mr. Garrod questions whether this sense (or 'sinful') is Pindaric or anywhere well established. Such a derivative meaning is not without parallel. Terms denoting moral unsatisfactoriness are apt to be allusive and euphemistic in their origin: in the course of usage they gather vituperative energy: cf. σχέτλιος, πονηρός, ῥαδιουργός, froward, caitiff, etc., etc. When Mr. Pickwick called Mr. Tupman a 'fellow' he was unconsciously illustrating this linguistic tendency. And so ἀπάλαμνος, originally 'unhandy,' might acquire a sterner sense. In Solon *Fr.* 27 (3) 12 (man in the 'sixth age') οὐδ' ἔρδειν ἔθ' ὅμως ἔργ' ἀπάλαμνα θέλει, Theogn. 281 δειλῶ γάρ τ' ἀπάλαμνα βροτῶ πάρα πόλλ' ἀνελέσθαι | παρ ποδός, ἡγεῖσθαι θ' ὡς καλὰ πάντα τιθεῖ (quoted by Fennell) the meanings may be respectively 'reckless' and 'shameful,' 'dastardly' (orig.=sluggish), but that of 'wickedness' is not far off. To the next clause Mr. Garrod would give an entirely new turn by applying the verb to the defendant not the judge: δικάζει τις with acc., 'a man must plead his cause' for his misdeeds, cf. Eur. *Orest.* 580 φόνον δικάζων. The latter seems to be an isolated use for δικάζεσθαι with gen. On the other hand he questions δικάζειν τι for 'to judge an offence.' I would point out (1) that the verb is used for deciding a case, or point at issue (in the acc.) in Aesch. *Eum.* 471, 601; (2) δικάζειν (absolute) expresses the function of the judges in the underworld in several places: *Gorg.* 524 A οὗτοι οὖν—δικάσουσιν ἐν τῷ λειμῶνι, *Rep.* 614 C ἐπειδὴ διαδικάσειαν (cf. the mid. διαδικασαμένους, of the judged, *Phaedo* 107 D); (3) but the most obvious and tempting parallel is Aesch. *Supp.* 230

κάκει δικάζει τὰμπλακήμαθ', ὡς λόγος,
Ζεὺς ἄλλος ἐν καμῶσιν ὑστάτας δίκας—

because here the same word is used in the same connexion by a poet under the same Orphic or Pythagorean influences. The proposal to waive this analogy on the ground that (a) the true construction is perhaps *δικάζειν* . . . *δίκας*, (b) the reading (of *τάμπλακήμαθ'*) is uncertain, surely makes too much of accidents. At any rate the verb means 'to judge': and, granted that it has a cognate acc. *δίκας*, the probabilities are greatly in favour of its having also a direct object *τάμπλακήματα*, which is a fairly convincing correction of the jumble in M. The same passage suggests that our *τις* is practically equivalent to *Ζεὺς ἄλλος* (i.e. *χθόνιος*), though more indefinite. The idea of 'dread indefiniteness' I should be prepared, with others, to accept, though one may suspect that two collateral influences are here at work: the need of reticence in alluding to chthonian powers (cf. *ἄς τρέμομεν λέγειν κτλ.* Soph. *O.C.* 129) and the divergences of tradition respecting the judge or judges in Hades, divergences of which *τις* is perhaps a stately avoidance (cf. the anonymous *δικασταί* in the Myth of Er). Lastly, the question of *ἐχθρᾷ λόγον φράσαις ἀνάγκη* is already largely prejudged by the foregoing considerations, and although these words are no doubt quite capable of Mr. Garrod's interpretation, they hardly offer difficulty from the other point of view. *Λόγον φράσαι* might mean 'to pronounce sentence,' cf. the *λόγος Ἀνάγκης* in the final scene of the Myth of Er, but more probably 'to enjoin, or demand, a reckoning,' as the converse of *λόγον διδόναι*—a sense of the verb arising out of that of 'declaring authoritatively' and found with the inf., and perhaps with an acc. object in Aesch. *Persae* 173 *μή σε δις φράσαι μήτ' ἔπος μήτ' ἔργον*. Putting these results together, and reading *αὐτίς* in the first line, we may render the whole not too preposterously: 'After death the souls of the unrighteous do penance here once more—the wrongs done in this realm of Zeus one judgeth in the world below who demandeth a reckoning under bitter constraint—but the righteous, where their sun ever maketh day tally with night and night with day, reap a life untroubled, etc.'

W. J. GOODRICH.