MIND AND BODY

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Noteworthy in the discussion of this problem during the year is a searching, but, in result, considerably diverse attempt to define mind or consciousness. Oesterreich (28), resting his case on self-observation, which, according to him, discovers a not-further-reducible "I-moment," argues that the "I" is not a complex of phenomena which singly do not contain it but is a phenomenon of a special kind. On the contrary, Gross (17), while dissatisfied with the bundle theory of consciousness, agrees with Hume that we do not actually find the self as object. Nevertheless he holds that our introspection is accompanied by the conviction that there was something-more-than-that present in the feeling-willing-judging experience than we actually have in the object of introspection. This "more-than" we express metaphorically as "center," "focus," etc. Martius (24) rejects the substance view of mind, which Schwartzkopf (29) on the contrary, and by appealing to introspection, accepts. The latter, however, attempts to substitute a living substantiality for the static substantiality of older thought. Schwartzkopf argues that I am not the mere sum of my life experiences; they belong to me as "mine." Sichler (31), on the contrary, maintains, with Wundt, the conception of the soul as pure activity, arguing that the conception of the soul as doer of its deeds or carrier of its qualities is due to the transference of the "thing" concept to the soul. "It is asked that the act be referred back to an acting subject. But the act itself is primary. The division of act and acting subject is a play with concepts of reflection, which we first distinguish as subject and object and then proceed to separate into independent realities." He holds likewise that the introspected consciousness has not the constancy requisite for the concept of substantiality. Singer (32), too, rejects the substance view, explaining it as due to the satisfaction of treating any complex thing as an additive result. Consciousness is not something to be inferred from behavior ("an eject forever veiled and hidden in a land beyond experience"); it is behavior. Or, more accurately, our belief in consciousness is an expectation of probable behavior based on an observation of actual behavior, a belief to be confirmed or refuted by more observation, as any other belief in a fact is to be tried out. Miller (26) questions the correctness of this view. Con-

consciousness, to him, appears to be a "field," or at least "the relation of conjunction between the components of the field." "It is these pools of conjoint phenomenality that Mr. Singer completely ignores." Joseph (20) objects to the prevalent psychological manner of treating the soul or mind mechanically. "I do not say that we cannot to some extent assign the conditions psychical or physical under which [thinking and knowing] occur in the individual mind. . . . But such observations do nothing to explain the process; the whole process still remains, as something which has an intelligible nature of its own, not mechanical." Cotlarciuc (10) holds the view of the soul as a bearer of its qualities. D'Istria (12) recounts the important work of Cabanis in leading French philosophy away from Condillac's view of the self. Bergson (3, 4, 5) repudiates the notion of a substantial ego. The *moi qui dure* is ceaseless change. There is no permanent substrate. Ladd (21) rejects "the distinction between the 'phenomenal ego' and the real mind, if by the former we mean the one subject to which we attribute all the characteristics of doing and suffering that make themselves known as consciousness. . . . This subject of states is the reality." Bode (7) passes in review the newer realistic conceptions of consciousness, approving them as a protest against subjectivism and transcendentalism, but discovering in them inherent weaknesses in so far as they aim to be rival doctrines. McGilvary (25) would describe consciousness not as a relation of meaning nor as a way of appropriation of past experiences, but as a "way of being felt together." Dewey (11) maintains that as long as perceptions are "regarded as cases of knowledge, the gate is opened to the idealistic interpretation." They should be conceived as pure natural events. "Knowing is something that happens to things in the natural course of their career, not the sudden introduction of a 'unique' and non-natural type of relation."

On the question of the homogeneity or heterogeneity of the physical and the psychical, Oesterreich (28) takes firm stand for the latter alternative. All attempts, he holds, to treat the psychical processes as complexes of natural processes fail. It is the "I" character of all psychical facts which places the subject-matter of psychology in complete contrast to that of the physical world. Martius (24), although differing from Oesterreich in his view of the nature of consciousness, holds similarly that consciousness is not part of the physical series. Two facts, according to him, substantiate this: the discontinuity of physical and psychical with regard to stimulus and result; the well-nigh mechanical self-sufficiency of certain chains of

psychical processes. Rejecting parallelism as contrary to introspective analysis and as requiring a mass of accessory hypotheses, and the energy theory as employing a concept too narrow to include the psychical, he describes the relation between mind and body as a teleological one, in the sense that the physical world is a means to the realization of the psychical. A teleological view is necessary, he holds, by reason of the abstract one-sidedness of the sciences and the inability of the causal series to explain themselves. Schlegel (30), on the contrary, supports the view that consciousness is a form of energy. Henry (18, 19) works out in elaborate detail a description of psychical facts in terms of energy. Franken (15) approaches the problem from the point of view of the question whether a universal psychology is possible, or whether such psychology must not in fact be merely a physiology of the nervous system. In the course of his negative answer to the latter alternative, he rejects the energy concept as inadequate to express psychological processes; he likewise rejects the identity theory, showing that it is based upon a spatial metaphor—inner and outer. He asks why reality, possessing the aspects inner and outer, might not possess innumerable others. He sees no excuse for parallelism; its fear of a causal interchange, he holds, is due to a confusion of "causality" with "energy." If causality means invariable sequence, interaction (causal relation) need not mean the intrusion of energy from the psychical into the closed world of physical energy. He concludes, holding this sole legitimate meaning of causality, that the physical and psychical are related by way of interaction. The psychical is the principle of organization or equilibrium. Psychical processes are of such a nature, always, that the result is a *total* impression, a higher unity, a kind of equilibrium. Disturbances of this unity call forth processes for the restoration of the original unity or the achievement of a new one. In this sense, the psychical (*i. e.*, the totality or equilibrium principle) is prior to the parts and teleologically related to them. Becher (2) likewise finds no incompatibility between psychophysical interaction and the principle of conservation of energy. (1) Every measurement of energy transformations fails of complete agreement with the conservation principle. This discrepancy may actually be due to the intrusion of the psychical. (2) The psychical may itself be a form of energy. (3) In so far as there are even physico-chemical influxes which bespeak no increase or diminution of energy, the same may be true of psychical influxes. Mackenzie (23) attempts to remove the difficulty by finding it unnecessary "to assume that the

amount of energy in the physical system is in any way interfered with by the presence of conscious processes. It is enough if we may suppose that its *form* is in some way affected." Cohn (9), on the other hand, rejecting both interactionism and parallelism, regards the physical and the psychical as differently characterized but in fact identical processes of the one world. Singer (32) contents himself with the view that life and consciousness are aspects of a body's behavior from which other aspects may be distinguished, but which may not be regarded as separable. Sichler (31) upholds Wundt's monistic view of body and mind, declaring however that this view was for Wundt a hypothesis solely of heuristic worth. Stout (33), announcing a radical change in his view, maintains, with the new realists, that "what is existentially present in consciousness in sense-perception is matter directly apprehended as it is in itself." Only it is and is thought as being partial and fragmentary. "For thought, it signifies its own continuation and completion in a whole which transcends and includes it." Mitchell (27) holds that consciousness and material processes imply each other with logical necessity, consciousness being the inversion or reciprocal aspect of organic activity, *i. e.*, virtual, in distinction from externalized or real, activity.

On the closely related problem of the relation of life to the bodily processes, Lovejoy (22) attempts to define three possible positions of vitalism: (1) That organisms have unique laws; (2) that these laws cannot be stated in terms of the number and arrangement of the organism's physical components; (3) that there are special forces or agents as causes of these peculiar modes of action. The presumption he holds to be in favor of (2). In any case, the hypothetical "forces" or "causes" would not constitute the basis of an irreducible minimum of vitalism. Briot (8) defends a vitalistic view of biology. Driesch (14) presents a new—a logico-metaphysical—basis for vitalism. Becher (2) shows that the conflict between mechanism and vitalism is one with the conflict between parallelism and interactionism, and holds with the latter pair of alternatives.

Differing considerably from these attempts is the attitude of "interested ignorance" of Yerkes (34). "Instead of working on the presupposition that mind causes body or that body causes mind, we may more profitably admit to ourselves that we do not know whether a causal relation exists between the two sets of phenomena. Thus we should be free to work toward a solution of the problem without the encumbrance of a philosophical system or of prejudicial assump-

tions." Yerkes, like Becher, supports "psychical causality," in so far as, to him, there is as much orderliness in mental as in physical events. "What psychology needs is more extensive and accurate information concerning the sequences of its phenomena. Too long the notion has held sway that psychical events are wayward, uncaused, etc. . . . or that their true causes are not other mental events but bodily events. This last view and no other in my opinion has so retarded the development of real psychological insight and information." Hence he advises the study of (1) the facts of consciousness in their mutual relations; (2) the facts of bodily life in their relations; (3) the correlation of the two series of events.

Becher (2) notes the tacit assumption of many scientists that causality has no place in the psychical sphere, but is present solely in the sphere of the physico-chemical. To this unwarranted assumption, he holds, is largely traceable their unwillingness to permit any manner of psychophysical interaction.

Except for Franken's (15) rather obscure view of the psychical as "equilibrium principle," the one view which departs in a marked manner from the conventional modes of treatment of the problem is that of Bergson (3, 4, 5, 6). The novelty of his view is due to his thought of perception as a means, not to knowledge, but to action. Hence the initial separation ordinarily made between a subjective knower and an objective known is not permitted. Perceptual activity is essentially the activity of an object in and with the world of objects. It differs from other activity solely in degree. All life is reactive. Perceptive life is distinguished simply by a greater power to postpone reaction and by a larger range of reactive possibilities. Matter is the totality of images; perception is a selection from matter, a selection necessitated by motor needs. The reactive organism cannot respond to the total world; its selected world of response therefore is matter transformed into perception. Perception, in this sense, is not a "looking at" a world outside; it is simply a selective mode of activity in and upon the world. "Whereas matter is the whole sum of images, such portions of the latter as are related to the possible actions of my body constitute perception, which is then a selected portion of matter."

Such selective activity, which divides the world into mutually exclusive images, Bergson regards as due to the arrest of the vital impulse. "Matter is . . . an inverse motion which runs counter to the vital impulse, or, what is declared to be the same thing, an interruption of the latter. The creation of matter is a simple arrest of

the action which generates life, just as an interruption of the act of creating a poem spreads it out into sentences and words. As a result we have matter and intellect, always correlatives, which thus are both a checking of the vital impulse, a constrained pause in its spontaneous flow. The tension of duration is relieved, and quality becomes quantity" (13). "Apparently," says Dolson, "not only is the inverse motion equally primitive with that which it opposes, but matter and intellect, though neither is founded upon the other, yet become progressively so adapted to each other, that they sometimes seem like different aspects of the same thing." In his Birmingham address, Bergson casts further light upon the function of matter: "When setting one against the other, we examine consciousness and matter in their mutual reactions, we have the impression that matter plays at first the part of an instrument that cuts it up in order to bring about a greater precision. A thought only becomes precise when it is divided into words"—a process which costs effort. "Now this effort would not have been put forth without matter, which by the unique nature of the persistence it opposes and the unique nature of the docility to which it can be brought, plays at one and the same time the rôle of obstacle and stimulus, causes us to feel our force and also to succeed in intensifying it." Finally he relates consciousness and matter to duration as follows: "Sensation, which is the point at which consciousness touches matter, is . . . the condensation . . . of a history which in itself—in the world of matter—is something infinitely diluted and which occupies enormous periods of what might be called the duration of things. On the one hand, matter subject to necessity, a kind of immense machine, without memory, or at least having only just sufficient memory to bridge the interval between one instant and the next, each of the states of the material world being capable, or almost so, of mathematical deduction from the preceding state, and consequently adding nothing thereto; on the other hand consciousness—that is to say, on the contrary, a force essentially free and essentially memory, a force whose very character is to pile up the past on the past, like a rolling snowball, and at every instant of duration to organize with this past something new which is a real creation. That these two forms of existence, matter and consciousness, have indeed a common origin, seems to me probable. I believe that the first is a reversal of the second, that while consciousness is action that continually creates and multiplies, matter is action which continually unmakes itself and wears out." The view stated in the last sentence is one developed with some poetic power by Auerbach (1).

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CONSCIOUSNESS AND THE UNCONSCIOUS

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Of recent books dealing with the problems of consciousness those by the following authors may be noted. McCabe (16) attempts to synthesize data from a group of related sciences in such a way as to give a history of the development of mind. Consciousness is not present everywhere in the animal series, but first appears when a certain degree of nervous complexity is reached, surely in the mammal, perhaps before. As to the exact moment of its appearance, all proposed criteria are inadequate; the answer must be deferred until we know more of the nervous system than at present.

Fite, in his "Individualism" (8), sets an ethical problem which requires for its solution a theory of consciousness. For the author, the true nature of consciousness is unity in diversity. From the mechanical point of view, the universe shows irreconcilable oppositions, which it is the function of consciousness to resolve through higher syntheses. Just in proportion as action is fully conscious, it harmonizes opposing phases of experience. The relation between the self and the object is always present in consciousness, self- and object-consciousness developing together in the individual.

Oesterreich (23) postulates the existence of a permanent ego as