The First Afghan War, 1838–1842

Captain Bruce Hay p.s.c.

To cite this article: Captain Bruce Hay p.s.c. (1911) The First Afghan War, 1838–1842, Royal United Services Institution. Journal, 55:396, 195-218

To link to this article: <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/03071841109425489>

Published online: 11 Sep 2009.

Submit your article to this journal [↗](#)

Article views: 8

View related articles [↗](#)

THE FIRST AFGHAN WAR, 1838-1842.

By Captain BRUCE HAY, p.s.c., Queen's Own Corps of Guides.

AFGHANISTAN saw in the nineteenth century various English expeditions under the most diverse circumstances.

Their object was always to re-establish or to strengthen the preponderance of the influence of England in the country—the uniting, as it were, of Afghanistan to the Anglo-Indian system, which does not mean actual annexation, but the maximum of political influence and the minimum of annexation.

The country has its importance as being one which is a thoroughfare to British India. It is as such that it has been fought for at all times by the most different nations. Through it the great high road conducts to the treasures of India; on the other hand, treasures are not to be found in Afghanistan itself. The great conquerors, such as Genghis Khan in the thirteenth century, and Timur, at the end of the fourteenth century, have left behind them traces conspicuous in the country to this day of their formidable devastations in their progress to the south.

The territory of Afghanistan is somewhat larger than Austria-Hungary, and amounts to some 12,000 square miles. It is a land of mountains, a great elevated, barren plateau, some 6,000 feet above the sea, overlooked by lofty mountain ranges. The country is well watered, but has no navigable river besides the Helmand; other rivers are the Hari-Rud, the Kabul, the Kurram, and the Gomal, the latter three bursting through the Suliman Range to the River Indus, and forming the only connection with the sea.

The means of communication in 1839 were very limited. There was only one high road, namely, that from Herat to Kandahar, and thence by Ghazni to Kabul; this is the "Royal Road" marked out by Alexander the Great when he undertook an expedition to India. Other routes were little better than mere tracks.

England and Russia had for some years previously been striving for the paramount influence in Afghanistan, and in 1838 Russia made the first attempt to enter into an alliance with her, with the avowed intention of obtaining easy access to India. When the British Governor-General of India had ascertained that the then Amir, Dost Muhammad Khan, had received assistance in money from Russia, and was endeavouring

to gain over the rulers of Sind in the conflict about Herat, which had been invaded by the Persians, he, on October 1st, 1838, declared war.

In justice, however, to Dost Muhammad it must be said that he made every effort to remain on terms of friendship with us, and in this he was ably supported by Sir Alexander Burnes, our agent at that time in Kabul. But Lord Auckland (the Governor-General) would not have it. His policy was one of all "take" and no "give." He more than once severely censured Burnes, who was loyally endeavouring to carry out a policy of which he himself did not approve, and eventually at the end of April, 1838, Burnes was compelled to leave Kabul with nothing accomplished. Vickovitch, the Russian Agent, had arrived in Kabul during the last few days of 1837, and Dost Muhammad, immediately on his arrival, had gone to Burnes for his advice, actually offering to turn the Russian out if only he had the promise of sympathy from the British. Burnes, tied down to his instructions, could promise nothing, the consequence being that, in contrast to his frigid reception on first arrival, Vickovitch four months later was honoured by being publicly paraded through the streets of Kabul, he having promised the Dost everything that the latter wanted.

Thus was the Amir forced by our "do-nothing" policy, as Burnes termed it, into the Russo-Persian alliance. He saw ere long how specious were the promises of his new friends, who were unable really to assist him. A subaltern of the British Army, Eldred Pottinger, within the walls of Herat, was setting them at defiance.

As an instance of Russia's methods, it may here be mentioned what befel the unfortunate Vickovitch. When he returned to Persia in 1839, after giving a full account of his mission to the Minister at Tehran he was instructed to proceed direct to St. Petersburg. On his arrival there, full of hope—for he had discharged the duty entrusted to him with admirable address—he reported himself, after the customary formality, to Count Nesselrode; but the Minister refused to see him. Instead of a flattering welcome, the unhappy envoy was received with a crushing message to the effect that Count Nesselrode "knew no Captain Vickovitch, except a certain adventurer of that name who, it was reported, had been lately engaged in some unauthorised intrigues at Kabul and Kandahar." Vickovitch understood at once the sinister meaning of this message. He knew the character of his Government; he was aware of the recent expostulations of Great Britain, and he saw clearly that he was to be sacrificed. He went back to his hôtel, wrote a few bitter, reproachful words, burnt all his other papers, and blew out his brains.

Not until the siege of Herat by the Persians had lasted nine months did Lord Auckland, at the eleventh hour, make a

demonstration in the Persian Gulf. A battalion of Marines and several native regiments were sent from Bombay and landed on the Island of Karrak about the middle of June, 1838. This movement, small though it was, had the most surprising effect, for when the Shah of Persia learnt that unless he withdrew from before Herat it meant war with England, he raised the siege and set out homeward.

The influence of England, greatly impaired by the parsimonious system of late years, was now restored—in a large measure owing to Eldred Pottinger. Nothing was wanting but a conciliatory and liberal policy to secure the Afghan chiefs, now violently roused against Russia by the onslaught on Herat, in the English alliance.

Not only were these favourable circumstances not turned to account, but they were rather rendered a prolific source of evil by the policy of the British Government. Instead of entering into an alliance with Dost Muhammad, the ruler of the people's choice, and who by his vigour and capacity had won for himself a throne by showing he was worthy of it, they determined on dethroning that chief and placing the exiled, dis-crowned Sovereign, Shah Shujah, on the throne. The fact of his having proved incapable of ruling or maintaining himself in power and of his having been for thirty years an exile in British India, was considered of less importance than that of having a Sovereign on the throne, who owed his restoration to British interference, and was identified with our Government by present interest and past obligation.

Without going into detail, it may at once be said that the result proved that a greater and more lamentable mistake never was committed by any Government. It was to the last degree inexpedient for our Indian Empire, for instead of erecting a powerful barrier against the threatening dangers of Russian aggression, it was calculated to weaken that which did already exist, to involve the English Government in the endless maze of Afghan politics, and, instead of bringing to their support a powerful and brave ally, to encumber them by the defence of a distant dependent.

These and other considerations, which were strongly urged upon Lord Auckland by Burnes and those best versed in Afghan affairs, were entirely disregarded by him.

After a brief negotiation with the "Pensioner of Ludhiana," as Shah Shujah was called, a tripartite treaty was concluded at Lahore on June 26th, 1838, between the Governor-General, Ranjit Singh, and Shah Shujah, which, to the infinite astonishment of the latter, restored him to his throne.

The principal articles of the Treaty were:—

"That the British Government and the Chiefs of Lahore recognised Shah Shujah as the Sovereign of

Afghanistan, and he on his part engaged to cede Peshawar, Attock, and their dependencies to the Rajah of Lahore, the latter undertaking to despatch a body of troops to aid in re-establishing the Afghan Prince on the throne;

"That the three contracting Powers engaged mutually to defend each other in case of attack;

"That the Shah promised not to enter into any negotiations with any foreign State without the knowledge and consent of the British and Sikh Governments, and bound himself to oppose any Power invading the British and Sikh territories;

Lastly, "That Shah Shujah promised not to disturb his nephew, the Ruler of Herat, and renounced all claim of supremacy over the Amirs of Sind."

It was at first intended to assist Shah Shujah by only a small British auxiliary force, and the Governor-General issued accordingly a proclamation that the Shah should enter Afghanistan surrounded by his own troops.

With this view, 4,000 Irregulars were raised and placed under the nominal command of Prince Timur, his eldest son, but really directed by Captain Wade and other British officers, and paid entirely by the British Treasury.

To this force were to be added 6,000 Sikhs, under Ranjit Singh's generals, and the Sikh Rajah was also to station a force of 15,000 men in observation about Peshawar.

It soon transpired, however, that such troops would not suffice, and that if Shah Shujah was really to be restored it must be accomplished by a British force capable of over-running Afghanistan.

The British force destined for the expedition was known by the somewhat high-sounding title of "The Army of the Indus," after the style of Napoleon's bulletins, and was all assembled at Ferozpoor towards the latter part of November, 1838. It amounted to some 28,000 men (including but one British cavalry regiment and three British infantry battalions), with 100,000 followers and 60,000 transport animals.

The Command-in-Chief was vested in General Sir Henry Fane, the then Commander-in-Chief in India, in whom the troops had unbounded confidence.

The Sikh forces had also concentrated in the vicinity, and before any move forward was made, a series of magnificent reviews and pageants by both armies took place, lasting until the extreme end of November.

News had by this time arrived of the raising of the siege of Herat and the retreat of the Persian army. This did not

deter Lord Auckland from despatching the expedition, determined as he now was to depose Dost Muhammad; but less preparation was now deemed necessary, and a part only of the assembled force received orders to move forward.

It consisted of :—

Three brigades of infantry.

One strong brigade of cavalry.

A considerable number of siege, horse, and field guns, amounting to some 9,500 men of all arms, termed "The Bengal Army," while 6,000 more were raised as Shah Shujah's contingent.

Sir Henry Fane, on the reduction of the force, resigned the command, which passed to Sir John Keane, another Peninsula veteran, but one who was not so well known to the troops. He was at that time in command of the Bombay Army, then moving from that port by sea to Karachi, and would assume the Command-in-Chief of the expedition on the junction of the two divisions. Meanwhile Sir Willoughby Cotton commanded the Bengal Army.

Shah Shujah's contingent, under Major-General Simpson, passed through Ferozapore on December 2nd, 1838, and the Bengal Army followed on the 10th.

The route chosen ran S.W. through Bahawalpore to Bukkur, where the Indus was crossed and a north-westerly course was pursued, passing through Shikarpore, Dadur, Quetta, and the Khojak, to Kandahar. The devious route thus adopted was rendered unavoidable, as Ranjit Singh did not wish the force to pass through the Punjab, and, in addition, the Amirs of Sind had to be coerced.

The Bengal Army, moving parallel to the Sutlej, availed themselves of water-carriage, and their sick, hospital stores, and some of the supplies were sent on in boats, which were subsequently to be used in bridging the Indus.

Bahawalpore was reached on December 29th, Sind territory entered near Subzulkote on January 14th, 1839, and the Fort of Bukkur occupied on January 29th.

The enormous number of 30,000 camels and 38,000 camp followers accompanied the Bengal Army, only 9,500 fighting men strong.

Kaye comments thus on this :—

"Sir Henry Fane had exhorted the officers of the Army of the Indus not to encumber themselves with large establishments and unnecessary equipages; but there is a natural disposition on the part of Englishmen in all quarters of the globe to carry their comforts with them. It requires a vast

deal of exhortation to induce officers to move lightly equipped. The more difficult the country into which they are sent—the more barbarous the inhabitants—the more trying the climate, the greater is their anxiety to surround themselves with the comforts which remote countries and uncivilised people cannot supply, and which ungenial climates render more indispensable.”

It is on record that one officer of the 16th Lancers took with him forty servants!

The Amirs of Sind now proved somewhat refractory with regard to a war contribution levied on them, and so Cotton and Keane (who had now arrived by sea) were despatched on either bank of the Indus against Hyderabad, the capital of Sind. The two columns were entirely ignorant of each other's operations, and so thus early was the want of a proper intelligence department painfully apparent.

Shah Shujah with his contingent was now at Shikarpore, and he was there joined by Macnaghten, who had been appointed political director of the campaign. The latter looked on this movement on Hyderabad as converting the expedition for the restoration of Shah Shujah into a campaign in Sind, and arrested it. Thus began the friction between the military and political authorities, which was hereafter, as will be seen, in constant evidence.

Cotton retraced his steps to Rohri, crossed the Indus, and reached Shikarpore on February 20th.

While the Shah remained halted there with his contingent, Cotton resumed his advance on the 23rd, reaching Dadur at the mouth of the Bolan Pass, a distance of 146 miles, on March 10th. These sixteen marches were only accomplished with great difficulty, water and forage being so scarce as to entail great privations on the animals, large numbers of them dying. Cotton now had a month's supplies on his transport animals, and seeing little or no chance of collecting more, he resumed his march on the 16th, entering the Bolan.

The pass is nearly 60 miles in length, and its passage was accomplished in six days. Burnes had gone on in advance and obtained the aid of the Baluchi authorities, and though in consequence the difficulties remaining were only physical, these were far from being inconsiderable.

On March 26th, Quetta was reached. It is described as “a most miserable, mud town, with a castle on a mound, on which was a small gun on a rickety carriage”; and here again the prospect of raising supplies seemed hopeless.

Sir Willoughby Cotton acted promptly. He sent his Adjutant-General back to Sir John Keane for orders, and Burnes

was despatched to Kelat, where he was successful to a certain degree in raising some supplies. The troops were meanwhile placed on reduced rations.

The Shah and his contingent moved from Shikarpore on March 7th, followed by Sir John Keane and the Bombay Division. Headquarters were eventually established at Quetta on April 6th, and Keane assumed the supreme command.

The march was resumed next day, one brigade, under General Nott, being left to garrison Quetta. No resistance was offered during the passage of the Khojak, and the Shah and his contingent now headed the force, being joined by many chiefs and people of the neighbourhood.

Macnaghten obtained authentic information of the flight of the Kandahar sirdars towards Persia, and on April 25th Shah Shujah entered the chief city of Western Afghanistan, accompanied by the British envoy, his staff, and the principal officers of his contingent. The wearied troops now found rest and food. Their privations on the march, entirely unopposed though it was, had been enormous; 20,000 animals had perished, and their remains had for a considerable time been the principal food of the men, whose rations had been reduced to one quarter the normal quantity; while of water, so great had been the lack throughout, that historians relate that at times there was not even enough to mix the medicines of the sick.

The brief local excitement which greeted Shah Shujah on his entry into Kandahar was by no means national enthusiasm. When the first outbreak of curiosity had subsided the feeling which remained was one of sullen indifference. Murmurs were heard against the Infidels, and it was soon apparent that his throne could only be maintained by British bayonets.

Meanwhile the army of the Indus remained inactive at Kandahar. Supplies had to be collected, and in order to obtain them in sufficient quantities, it was necessary to await the ripening of the crops.

On May 9th a brigade was despatched, under Colonel Sale, to Ghirishk, 75 miles west, in pursuit of the fugitive sirdars, but no resistance was encountered, they having fled across the Persian border. Sale accordingly returned to Kandahar.

Eventually the army resumed its march on June 27th, by which time the harvest had ripened, and the transport animals gained strength, but sickness was very prevalent among the troops, and money was becoming scarce. On July 21st the army was before the fortress of Ghazni, situated 230 miles from Kandahar, and 90 from Kabul.

Dost Muhammad had thought for some time that the British intended to march from Kandahar on Herat. He now saw that

in this he was at fault, and believed that they were advancing direct on Kabul, merely masking Ghazni, *en route*.

Of his three sons, Akbar Khan was opposing the advance of the Shahzada Timur through the Khyber; Hyder Khan was in command of the garrison of Ghazni; and Afzul Khan, with a body of horsemen, was in the vicinity of that place, with instructions to operate on the flanks of the British in the open.

The Afghans had long boasted of the strength of Ghazni, and believed that it could not be taken by assault. On the other hand, Sir John Keane, in spite of the fact that a battering train had been brought to Kandahar by dint of great labour, and at great expense, and although he knew that he was approaching the strongest fortress in the country, known to be garrisoned by the enemy, and certain to be vigorously defended, still insisted on leaving his heavy guns at Kandahar, and advanced upon Ghazni with nothing but light field pieces, quite unequal to breaching the walls.

The town itself was insignificant, but the strength of the citadel—deemed impregnable throughout Asia—and its position, commanding the road from Kandahar to Kabul, made it a post of the highest military importance.

The rampart of masonry, sixty feet high, was built on a scarped mount, thirty-five feet high, rising from a wet ditch and defended by numerous towers and skilfully-constructed out-works.

To illustrate its size, it may be mentioned that within the citadel there was stabling sufficient for an entire brigade of cavalry.

Hyder Khan had walled up all the gates to prevent them being blown in, except the one on the Kabul side.

Dost Muhammad, never dreaming that the British would attempt to take the place by a "coup de main," thought they would mask it, and took up a strong position himself twenty miles from Kabul, intending that, while he engaged them in front, Hyder Khan, with part of his garrison, and Afzul Khan, with his horsemen, should fall on their rear and flanks.

His plan was foiled, for one of his own nephews, Abdul Reshed Khan, had deserted from the garrison and revealed to the Chief Engineer of the force, the weak point, where an assault might be hazarded, namely, the Kabul Gate.

Accordingly, on July 22nd, a storming party, consisting of the light companies of the four European regiments, under Colonel Dennie, of the 13th Light Infantry, was formed, while the main supporting column was composed of the other companies of these regiments under Brigadier Sale.

The night was dark and gusty, and while the storming party

and supports were forming up on the Kabul road, the attention of the defenders was attracted to the Kandahar side by heavy fire, kept up at random by the guns.

At 3 a.m. all was ready for the assault. The Afghans were now revealing themselves on the Kandahar side, ready to resist the anticipated attack from that quarter, by a row of blue lights. The stormers having meanwhile silently piled their powder-bags against the Kabul Gate, quite unobserved, Lieutenant Durand successfully exploded the charge. A column of black smoke was seen to rise, and huge masses of masonry and beams, lifted up by the force of the explosion, came down with a tremendous crash. Colonel Dennie, heading the stormers, gained the opening before the defenders could reach it. A desperate struggle then took place, the British gradually gaining ground. Sale, pressing forward in support, met an engineer officer, who, thrown to the ground and bewildered by the explosion, reported that the opening was blocked by the ruins, and that Dennie was unable to force an entry. Sale at first halted, uncertain what to do, and then began to retreat, but very soon Dennie's bugler was heard sounding "the advance," and back went the column. The Afghans had not failed to profit by the respite thus afforded them, and showed a resolute front at the gateway. A hand-to-hand fight took place, in which the Brigadier himself was cut down, but regaining his feet, he led his column into the fortress, and, other troops coming up, the capture of Ghazni was complete, and the British colours planted on the ramparts. There was still some hard fighting within the walls, but those who ceased to resist were spared, and the women respected. Hyder Khan was immediately afterwards captured with 1,600 other prisoners, and vast stores of ammunition, guns, and provisions fell into the hands of the victors, whose loss were 17 killed and 165 wounded; 18 of these were officers. 500 Afghans were buried, besides a great number who fell in the cavalry pursuit.

The fall of Ghazni was a mortal stroke to Dost Muhammad. Afzul Khan, approaching on the 22nd, prepared to fall on the "beaten invaders," was so astounded and terror struck at the sight of the British Colours waving on the citadel, that he at once abandoned his baggage, elephants, and camp stores, all of which were appropriated by the British, and fled forthwith towards Kabul.

In vain Dost Muhammad endeavoured to get his army to give battle; his men, in response to his appeals, deserted to the victors: it was the counterpart of Napoleon at Fontainebleau. He had perforce on August 2nd to turn back, forsaken by all but a small band, and ride through Kabul to the far side of the Bamian, whither a small band of horsemen pursued him ineffectually for a few days.

Next day, the 3rd, the news of his flight reached the
VOL. LV. O

British, who had moved forward from Ghazni on July 30th. Dost Muhammad's guns, 22 in number, were found in position abandoned *en route*, and Kabul was reached on 7th August. Again no enthusiasm was evinced by the populace at the re-occupation of the Bala Hissar (the citadel) by Shah Shujah after an exile of thirty years.

The object of the expedition was apparently attained, and the Shah restored to what was fondly hoped to be an undisputed throne. Satisfaction was almost universal in England, and only a few, among whom was the Duke of Wellington, maintained that our difficulties were now only about to commence, and that the lesson of Moscow in 1812 should be borne in mind.

The operations of Wade's force by way of the Khyber were dwarfed by the more ostentatious ones of Sir John Keane: but it was in no small measure owing to these operations that the resistance to the main army was so slight. For a long time Dost Muhammad regarded the movement through the Khyber more anxiously than that of the Army of the Indus. Akbar Khan never met Wade in the field, but his force was drawn away from the decisive point at a time when it might have been of great use in the west, and it is in no small measure owing to this division of the Amir's military strength that he was unable to offer any effectual resistance to the British advance from Kandahar.

Wade reached Kabul on September 3rd, and brought Sir John Keane's force up to a total of 15,000 men.

It was still patent that, were the British force withdrawn, Shah Shujah would be deposed, Dost Muhammad reinstated, and that the latter, from motives of revenge, would undoubtedly ally himself with Russia. Thus not only would all objects of the expedition be lost, but the very danger it was undertaken to avert would be enhanced.

Lord Auckland decided to withdraw the major portion of the Bombay Army by way of the Bolan, and most of the cavalry and horse artillery of the Bengal Army, under Sir John Keane, *via* the Khyber, leaving troops at Jellalabad, Kabul, Ghazni, and Kandahar, besides a small detachment near the Bamian Pass to watch Dost Muhammad: the whole under the command of Sir Willoughby Cotton.

The Bombay Army started on its homeward march on September 18th, taking Kelat *en route*, on November 13th, with a loss of 32 killed and 107 wounded. Keane and his force left Kabul on October 2nd.

Afghanistan was now governed by a trinity, practically co-equal:—

Shah Shujah, the nominal ruler;
Macnaghten, the political agent; and
Cotton, the military commander;

and the evils of this system were soon felt. The various detachments did not meet with any overt opposition; but they soon discovered that most of the clans only wanted a leader and some prospect of success to break out into insurrection.

To add to this, news came to hand from Pottinger at Herat to the effect that Russia, desiring to re-assert her lost prestige in Central Asia, which had been impaired by her failure at Herat the previous year and by the progress of the British in Afghanistan, was sending a force of 6,000 men with 12 guns against Khiva. All through the winter of 1839-1840 this afforded a subject of much anxious thought, and it was not until March 13th, 1840, that it was publicly announced by the St. Petersburg newspapers what a lamentable failure this expedition had been.

It now came to light that the double-faced Vizier of Herat, Yar Muhammad, while living on British bounty, was deep in intrigue with Persia.

In the Punjab Ranjit Singh had died, and the Sikh chiefs, without his loyal guiding spirit, were by no means so well-disposed towards us.

The Ghilzaies were in open arms, and had cut the communication between Kabul and Kandahar. A detachment of all arms had to be sent against them, and a defeat of 2,000 on May 16th temporarily suppressed the insurrection in that quarter.

Quetta was meanwhile besieged, and Kelat retaken by the Baluchis on June 28th.

Added to all this, Dost Muhammad, after narrowly escaping with his life from the treacherous Khan of Bokhara, had collected a following of 6,000 Usbeks, and was advancing towards the Bamian. The Gurkha Regiment, holding two posts beyond the pass, was in an unenviable position, for the entire surrounding population was hostile, and a locally raised Afghan regiment had deserted bodily to the enemy. The Gurkhas were accordingly ordered to fall back to the Bamian.

The flame of revolt had now spread throughout the country, but an unexpected check to Dost Muhammad postponed the eventual catastrophe for a year.

On September 18th he advanced down the valley of Bamian, where he was met by two companies of sepoys, two of Gurkhas, two guns, and 400 Afghan Horse, the whole under Lieutenant Murray Mackenzie.

In spite of the great disparity of numbers, the odds being one to five, Mackenzie attacked. The Usbeks at first firmly stood their ground, but the guns coming up to closer range played on them with great effect, and they broke and fled, hotly pursued by the cavalry. The superiority of European

arms and discipline was never more clearly proved than on this occasion.

Defeated on the Hindu Kush, Dost Muhammad reappeared in Kohistan. A force under Sir Robert Sale was sent to deal with him, and took two of his fortified posts on September 29th and October 23rd respectively, the first without much difficulty, but the second only after hard fighting and a repulse. On November 2nd Dost Muhammad gained a success over Sale at Parwandarra, only fifty miles from the capital.

Two days afterwards he suddenly appeared at Kabul, unattended and alone, and surrendered himself to Sir William Macnaghten!

It appeared that after the storming of Ghazni and his defeat in the Bamian he had despaired of his cause, and had only been waiting for a success before giving himself up, in order to be able to do so with untarnished personal honour. On November 12th he was sent under strong escort to India.

The Afghan combination was now deprived of its most formidable character—unity of direction. This fact and two events which synchronised with Dost Muhammad's voluntary surrender contributed in a material degree temporarily to tranquillise the country. On November 3rd General Nott re-occupied Kelat, and on December 1st Colonel Marshall totally defeated a large body of insurgents under the son of the ex-chief of that fortress at Kotri, with a loss to them of 500 men, together with all their guns and baggage.

At the end of the year 1840 there was a renewed insurrection in the neighbourhood of Kandahar. The political direction of this province was now in the hands of Major (afterwards Sir Henry) Rawlinson of the Native Army, and the military under General Nott. The latter despatched a detachment of cavalry and guns to quell the disturbance under Captain Farrington, who came upon 1,500 of the rebel horse on January 3rd, 1841, and inflicted on them a severe defeat. Thus for a time the soldier had done his work. The more difficult task of the politician was to seek for the causes of dissatisfaction and recommend the means for putting down the spirit of revolt. Rawlinson did his work most thoroughly, but unfortunately his views did not commend themselves to the ever-optimistic Macnaghten, and his warnings were disregarded.

Affairs in Herat had been steadily working up to a crisis, and on February 8th Yar Muhammad, the Vizier, when deep in intrigue with Persia against us, formulated a series of preposterous demands to Major Todd, our political agent. These the latter had no alternative but to refuse, which done, he turned his back on the place.

Nothing of much moment now occurred until early in May, 1841, when the Ghilzaies appeared in force near the fort of

Khelat-i-Ghilzaie, on the Kabul-Kandahar road, which we had commenced rebuilding preparatory to stationing in it a strong garrison to act as a curb to the adjacent tribes. Against this they forcibly protested.

Nott sent Colonel Wymer, with a mixed column about 1,200 strong with four guns, to dislodge a somewhat formidable gathering of 5,000 tribesmen. Wymer was compelled to act on the defensive, as he had a large convoy to protect. The Ghilzaies came on in three columns, attacking in front and on both flanks. The native infantry received them again and again with steady musketry fire, and the guns co-operating effectively, after a struggle of five hours the Ghilzaies gave way, having suffered heavily.

The proceedings of the Duranis, the royal clan, gave equal cause for alarm. Under a chief by name Akbar Khan, a body of 3,000 was under arms before Ghirishk, and even Macnaghten realised that it was essential to strike a blow.

Under Captain Woodburn, commanding one of the Shah's regiments, a column of 900 infantry, two guns, and a small body of Afghan horse, set out, and on July 3rd found the enemy posted on the fat side of the Helmand, now 6,000 strong and mustered in six divisions with a *Mullah* at the head of each. Woodburn tried the fords, but found none passable. This was in the early morning; at 4 p.m. the enemy commenced the passage of the river at previously known points. They made a spirited advance, but the infantry, well supported by the guns, repulsed every attack, and before daybreak the Duranis withdrew. Unfortunately the success could not be followed up, as no reliance could be placed in the Afghan horse. Woodburn pushed on to Ghirishk, and warned Macnaghten of the disturbed state of the country. Rawlinson from Kandahar again wrote in a similar strain, but the warnings were once more unheeded and denounced as idle statements by the infatuated envoy, who censured his correspondents for what he called their "unwarrantably gloomy views."

In corroboration of Rawlinson, Akbar Khan soon appeared again at the head of the insurrection in Western Afghanistan, and a force of 350 sepoy, 800 horse, and four guns, under Captain Griffin, who had been sent to reinforce Woodburn, was despatched early in August against the rebel chief. On August 17th he was encountered, strongly posted with 3,500 men in a succession of walled gardens and mud forts, from which a heavy fire was maintained against the assailants. The attack with good combination of guns and infantry was successful, and this time the cavalry, headed by the young Prince Saftar Jang, a son of Shah Shujah, charged with great effect, and the Duranis were defeated and dispersed with great slaughter. The Ghilzaies, too, had received another check, Colonel

Chambers, with a detachment of 1,500 men, having scattered a large body of them on August 5th.

These repeated successes were followed by a lull, and had the disastrous effect of inspiring false confidence in the authorities at Kabul. Sir Willoughby Cotton had been succeeded by General Elphinstone, a veteran of the Wellington school, who had commanded a regiment at Waterloo. He is described by Kaye as "a man of high connections, aristocratic influence, and agreeable manners, but entirely unacquainted with Eastern warfare; a martyr to the gout, which rendered him utterly unfit for personal activity, or even sometimes to sit on horseback, and, as the event proved, though personally brave, possessed of none of the mental energy or forethought which might supply its place." How he should have been selected for this arduous situation, when these disqualifications were common knowledge, and when such men as Pollock, Nott, and Sale were on the spot, is one of the mysteries of official conduct never likely to be cleared up, for everyone subsequently shunned the responsibility of his appointment.

The force actually in and about Kabul now consisted of one European, two Sepoy, and two Afghan infantry regiments, a regiment of native cavalry, one troop of Foot and one of Horse Artillery, and a train of mountain guns—5,000 fighting men in all, encumbered by exactly three times this number of camp followers.

Had this force been judiciously posted and properly directed, it was perfectly adequate to deal with any troops that the Afghans could have brought against it, for besides the possession of a train of artillery with ample ammunition they had the Bala Hissar, an immensely strong citadel, situated on a steep height and commanding every part of the city. But, *Quos Deus vult perdere prius dementat*, and all these advantages were voluntarily thrown away; the troops were placed in a low cantonment outside both the citadel and the walls, commanded on all sides by heights and buildings, having been withdrawn from the Bala Hissar by Macnaghten's orders to make way for 160 ladies of the harem! To crown all, the commissariat stores for the whole winter were separate again from the cantonment, with which they were connected by an undefended passage, commanded by the King's Garden, a walled enclosure, and Muhammad Sharif's Fort.

The responsibility for these measures rested entirely with Sir William Macnaghten, who sacrificed everything to a show of security. Still blind to the reiterated warnings of Burnes and Rawlinson, he persisted in writing of everything as *couleur de rose*. He had just been appointed Governor of Bombay, and was on the eve of handing over to Burnes and leaving for India, when at last the inevitable storm brewing for so long burst on November 2nd with the utmost violence.

One of the first attacks was made on the house of the unfortunate Burnes, who, though warned of the danger, refused to leave his post, the consequence being that he, with his brother, servants, and guard were murdered to a man. The Treasury was next assailed, the guard of 28 sepoy and every human being there massacred, and loot to the amount of £17,000 sterling carried off. The mob, now greatly increased, proceeded to loot, burn, and massacre indiscriminately in all parts of the city.

While these events were taking place, 5,000 British troops remained inactive in their cantonments within half-an-hour's march, and not a man was ordered out! Had the least attempt at reprisal been carried out before the mob grew in size, the Afghans themselves subsequently admitted that the insurrection must have been quashed.

Later in the day, Brigadier Shelton's brigade and four guns were moved into the Bala Hissar, but all the remaining troops were kept where they were. Shelton recommended prompt and decisive measures, but was over-ruled by Macnaghten and Elphinstone, and with them rested equally the responsibility of supineness and inactivity.

Next day the detachment from Khurd Kabul, two miles east, was recalled, and succeeded in reaching the cantonments.

The only effort against the insurgents was made by three companies and two Horse Artillery guns. So weak a detachment against an enemy now swelled to thousands and excited by the *Mullahs* to a high pitch of fanaticism, was foredoomed to failure. Fortunately it retired in good time.

The next disaster was the seizure of the little detached commissariat fort with all its stores on November 4th. Ensign Warren, in command of its garrison of 80 men, sent repeated messages for help, but obtained none, and at last, recognising that resistance there was futile, fought his way to the cantonment.

The same day a similar and scarcely less serious catastrophe occurred. Macnaghten had insisted some time previously on the removal of about 600 tons of ground wheat from the Bala Hissar to some camel sheds on the outskirts of the city: here Captain Colin Mackenzie, commanding the small guard, was attacked on November 2nd, and after holding out for two days, was compelled to adopt a similar course to that of Warren. The enemy then proceeded to occupy the remaining forts round the cantonment.

It was now evident to every man on both sides that it was out of the question for the British to maintain themselves in the capital throughout the winter, for they had lost all their supplies, and it was impossible, with the ground under snow and with every village in the hands of the Afghans, to attempt to collect enough to last them; moreover, even could reinforcements from

India force their way to Kabul at that time of year, they would only add to the number of mouths to be fed.

Nothing was done for two days, during which time the Afghans were permitted to carry away supplies looted from us, within 400 yards of the cantonment.

At length, on 6th November, in response to the unanimous clamour of the men, a storming party carried an outlying fort, and various minor, but decisive, successes were gained, showing that had the troops been properly directed, and a general battle brought on, the enemy undoubtedly would have been defeated.

The commissariat officers, too, had shown enterprise, and had procured some supplies from neighbouring villages on payment, so that, the troops being placed on half rations, the pressing difficulty of subsistence had been surmounted.

General Elphinstone now became alarmed about ammunition, although there was a full two months' supply, and, refusing to listen to any active measures, counselled only a capitulation. His health had become so bad that Brigadier Shelton was sent out from the Citadel to help him. Elphinstone's jealousy, however, thwarted him, orders were given and countermanded, plans discussed and their decision deferred, and it soon transpired that, from the disunion of their chiefs, the troops were in a more parlous plight than ever.

The Rikabashi Fort, situated at the north-east angle of the cantonment, was taken with some difficulty on November 10th, Elphinstone refusing to allow our cavalry to co-operate, in spite of the troops being twice charged in flank by the Afghan Horse, who nearly turned the day in their favour. This success afforded a further breathing space to the commissariat officers, who again turned it to good account.

On November 13th there was an action on the Bamaru Heights, north-west of the cantonment, where the enemy had appeared in force and fired with two guns into the cantonment itself. Brigadier Shelton was sent out with four squadrons of cavalry, two guns, and sixteen companies to dislodge them. After some trouble the enemy were driven away and the guns taken, and one, a four-pounder, brought in; but the other was spiked and abandoned.

This was the last success achieved, and nothing but a list of blunders and disasters remains to be recorded.

The enemy remained quiet for some days, and urgent messages were sent by Macnaghten to McGregor and Rawlinson, the political agents at Jellalabad and Kandahar, to send their whole disposable forces.

The requisitions placed these officers in a great dilemma: the envoy's orders ought to be obeyed and the very existence of the troops in the capital might depend on instant relief being afforded, while, on the other hand, affairs in Kabul were so

desperate from the scarcity of supplies, that any additional mouths would court certain destruction of the whole.

After great deliberation McGregor and Sale resolved to disobey the order, and keep their troops at Jellalabad, and although Rawlinson and Nott despatched a force from Kandahar, the draught cattle perished so rapidly, that, after a few days, it was forced to retrace its steps.

A further calamity now befel the British in the total annihilation of the Gurkha Regiment in Kohistan, on November 13th, after a most gallant stand against overwhelming odds, the sole survivors being one officer, one Gurkha, and Eldred Pottinger, who reached Kabul half-dead with wounds.

The only practical course now open was to move every man available with all the provisions that could be obtained into the Bala Hissar: this was favoured by Shah Shujah, while the engineers had counselled it from the first.

It is interesting to note that in Lord Stanhope's book, "Conversations with the Duke of Wellington," the Duke is recorded to have observed that the opinion he had formed on reading all accounts was, that, "if on the day after Burnes' murder, the troops had occupied the Bala Hissar and removed thither all their stores, they would have been perfectly secure, but that three weeks later, if even an angel had come down from Heaven, he could not then have saved them."

Elphinstone had no opinion to offer on the subject of the move, and Macnaghten, unfortunately, yielded to Shelton's vehement arguments against such a course, as being, in his opinion, dangerous and discreditable.

Akbar Khan, Dost Muhammad's son, and the force which had cut up the Gurkhas in Kohistan, arrived at this juncture to augment the Afghan numbers.

Correspondence with a view to capitulation was opened, but before terms could be agreed upon a most disastrous action was fought, which hastened the crisis.

For the first three weeks of November, in spite of the blockade, the commissaries had managed to obtain a certain quantity of grain, chiefly from the village of Bemaru; the Afghans determined to close this source of supply, and posted troops accordingly.

Macnaghten urged an immediate attack, and a feeble attempt was made on November 22nd, but the enterprise miscarried.

Next day the attack was renewed with five companies of British and twelve of native infantry, three squadrons of native cavalry, 100 sappers, and a single Horse Artillery gun. (Why one gun only was taken when there were plenty available does not transpire.) Swarms of Afghans from the city swelled the numbers of the enemy, and Shelton drew up his 1,400 men in

two squares, with the gun in front and the cavalry in rear. The Afghans had the great advantage that their matchlocks out-ranged the British muskets, and they used this to the full. Shelton's ammunition ran out, and so demoralised were the troops that when called upon to use their bayonets, not a musket was brought down to the charge, even in the English companies.

The Afghans, in bravado, planted a standard within thirty paces of the British ranks: not a man advanced to take it. The officers did their utmost, and for lack of ammunition stood in front and hurled stones at the enemy. A sudden rush captured the gun, which had been well served, but it was soon retaken, the enemy driven back in confusion, and their leader killed.

This was the crisis of the day, and had General Elphinstone acceded to Macnaghten's request to send out reinforcements, all might have been restored. The former, however, gave a flat refusal, saying that it was a wild scheme.

Fresh swarms of the enemy appeared on the scene, and the British were losing heavily, yet nothing would induce them to close with the Afghans, so thorough was their demoralisation. An unexpected flank attack completed their discomfort, and a panic seized the whole force; the gunners gallantly endeavoured to save their gun, but failed, every one of them being killed or wounded. All order was lost, and the whole force, led by the British companies, rushed helter-skelter for cantonments. The Afghans failed to follow up their success, or the cantonments themselves must have been taken.

This disastrous defeat, in which we lost 178 killed and 55 wounded, put an end to military operations, and made it imperative to arrange the best terms of capitulation possible.

On December 11th negotiations with the enemy were opened, and on the 13th the Bala Hissar was evacuated under a treaty, which also provided for a safe conduct of the troops to India and for provision of carriage and supplies. Shah Shujah was to return to India, Dost Muhammad to be restored to Kabul, and the Afghans were not to contract any alliance without our consent.

The Afghans made no attempt to keep their part of the agreement, and on December 23rd Macnaghten, on going un-escorted to a conference with their chiefs, was treacherously murdered by Akbar Khan, who used a pistol that Macnaghten himself had given him the previous day.

Though the spot where this occurred was not a quarter of a mile from the cantonment, no attempt at rescue or reprisal was made, or, indeed, even considered. The body was left lying on the plain, whence it was finally carried off, hacked to pieces, to the bazaar, there to be exhibited to an applauding multitude. It seems incredible that British troops and British generals

could have sunk to such depths of demoralisation and degradation as to remain inactive on such an occasion.

After the murder of Macnaghten, Major Pottinger undertook the political duties of the mission, and met the chiefs in conference. Some fresh conditions were imposed, chief of which was the surrender of all but six of the guns.

On January 6th, 1842, though neither of the terms as to transport or escort had been fulfilled by the Afghan chiefs, the retreat was commenced.

690 European troops;

970 native cavalry; and

2,840 native infantry;

in all, 4,500 fighting men, with 12,000 camp followers besides women and children, left the cantonment.

The horrors of this march have been graphically described by Kaye, Alison, and Lady Sale.

From the time that the rearguard filed out on the 6th, until the 13th, when the last survivors (except Dr. Brydon, who managed to struggle alone to Jellalabad), perished at Gandamak, a continuous fire was kept up by swarms of tribesmen on either flank, added to which intense suffering was caused by cold and snow. The widows, married people, and children were given up to Akbar Khan on the 9th, and General Elphinstone, Brigadier Shelton, and Captain Johnson were forcibly detained after a conference at Jagdalak on the 12th. Elphinstone died in captivity on April 25th; Shah Shujah was murdered on the 5th of that month.

Space does not permit of the recital of Sale's and Nott's gallant defence of Jellalabad and Kandahar respectively, or of Pollock's passage of the Khyber and his subsequent victorious march from Jellalabad on Kabul, which he reached on September 15th, 1842; while Nott advanced on the capital from Kandahar, but in conclusion we may briefly examine the causes of the British disasters, and consider the lessons to be drawn from them.

Firstly : The injustice of overturning the reigning power in an independent State, and the forcing of a hated dynasty on a reluctant people.

For a trifling sum Dost Muhammad, the ruler of the people's choice, was willing to shut his gates against Russia and to enter into the British alliance. Instead of closing with his proposals we decided to dethrone him, and place a king on the throne to be a mere puppet in our hands.

A mistake in policy, and a crime in morality.

Secondly : The errors in the conception of the expedition, which was thrown forward 1,000 miles from its base of operations through a desert and mountainous country, peopled by barbarous and hostile tribes, bring to mind the Moscow Cam-

paign of 1812; but the Indian Government did not, like Napoleon, endeavour to repair its error by moving up strong bodies to keep up communications with the rear.

Thirdly : The force employed was inadequate and out of proportion to the object in view, and the stiffening of British troops insufficient. Moreover, when British reinforcements were sent, they largely consisted of raw recruits.

It was the old story of England having disbanded a veteran force on a peace being declared, and trusting to making a civilian into a soldier by putting arms into his hands and a uniform on his back. Present-day politicians would do well to lay this lesson to heart.

Fourthly : The lack of harmony and intimate co-operation between the political and military authorities from start to finish.

This was unfortunately for many years only too common a feature of Indian Frontier Campaigns.

Fifthly : The extreme errors in the military arrangements; the neglect to occupy and hold the Bala Hissar; the mistake in placing the troops in exposed and ill-fortified cantonments with magazines and commissariat separate again; the want of decision on the part of the General; these and other fatal errors conduced to the demoralisation of the troops, who failed at critical moments as British troops seldom do.

Lastly : The ill-considered appointment by a Whig Cabinet of a man, totally unfitted for command, ignorant of the country, people, and language, when better men, well versed in the local conditions and experienced in the type of warfare, were available on the spot.

APPENDIX I.

DETAIL OF THE ARMY OF THE INDUS.

General Sir Henry Fane, G.C.B., Commander-in-Chief in India,
Commander-in-Chief.

BENGAL COLUMN.

Cavalry Brigade.	{ 16th Lancers. 2nd Light Cavalry. 3rd Light Cavalry. 4th Local Horse; and Det. Skinner's Horse.	
Colonel Arnold, 16th Lancers, Brigadier.		
Artillery.		{ 2nd Troop, 2nd Brigade, H.A... Capt. G. Grant.
Brigadier Graham.		{ 4th Co., 2nd Bn., Ben. A. ... Capt. Garbett. Camel Battery Capt. A. Abbott

(BENGAL) INFANTRY DIVISION.

Major-General Sir Willoughby Cotton, K.C.B., K.C.H.

(Captain Havelock, 13th Light Infantry, one of A.D.C.)

1st Brigade.	{ 13th Light Inf.	4th Brigade (1st Europeans).
Colonel Sale, 13th.	{ 16th Native „	Lt.-Col. Roberts (35th Native Inf.)
	{ 48th „ „	1st Europeans (37th Native Inf.)
2nd Brigade.	{ 31st Native Inf.	Bengal Sappers and Miners
Major-Gen. Nott.	{ 42nd „	(Two companies).
	{ 43rd „	

RESERVE FORCE AT FEROPPORE.

Major-General Duncan.

Artillery ..	.. { 3rd Troop, 2nd Batt. H.A.	Cavalry { Skinner's
	{ 3rd Co., 2nd Bengal Art.	{ Local Horse
	(12 guns and 200 men.)	(600 men.)
3rd Inf. Brigade.	{ 3rd Buffs	5th Infantry Brigade.
Colonel Dennie.	{ 2nd N.I.	Colonel Worsley.
	{ 27th N.I.	{ 5th N.I.
		{ 20th N.I.
		{ 53rd N.I.

BOMBAY COLUMN.

Lieut.-General Sir John Keane, G.C.B., K.C.H.

(Captain Outram, extra A.D.C.)

Cavalry Brigade.	{ Wing, 4th Light Dragoons.
Lieut.-Colonel J. Scott,	{ 1st Light Cavalry.
4th Light Dragoons.	{ Poona Local Horse, unattached.
Artillery.	{ 3rd Troop H.A. .. Captain Martin.
Lieut.-Colonel Stevenson.	{ 4th Troop H.A. .. Captain Cotgrave.
	{ Horse Field Battery .. Captain Lloyd.

INFANTRY DIVISION.

Major-General Willshire, C.B.

2nd Queen's	1st Grenadier N.I.
17th Regiment.	5th N.I.
19th N.I.	23rd N.I.
Siege Guns ..	{ Two 18-pounders.
	{ Four 9- „

RESERVE AT KARACHI (Bombay Troops).

Brigadier Valiant.

Artillery {	3rd Co., 1st Bn. Art.	Infantry {	40th Regiment.
	5th Golandaz Batt.		2nd Grenadiers.
	(200 men).		22nd N.I.
	Pioneers, 100 men.		26th N.I.

STRENGTH OF THE DIFFERENT CORPS, ETC., ON MARCHING INTO
AFGHANISTAN.

<i>Bengal.</i>		<i>Bombay.</i>	
Park ..	Mortars, 8-inch ..	2	
	„ 5½-inch ..	2	
	Howitzers, 24-prs.	1	
	„ 12-prs.	—	
	Guns, 18-prs. ..	4	2
	„ 9-prs. ..	2	
	Field guns, 6-prs.	2	4
	Guns ..	13	6
Field Artillery	1 Tr., five 6-pr. & 1 how.	6	2 Troops ..
	1 Co. ft. „ „	6	2 Field Batteries (one of these drawn by mules, was left at Quetta.) ..
	Camel Battery, 9-prs.	6	12
	Guns ..	18	24
Artillery Horse and Foot ..		200	400
Cavalry	Europn. 16th Lncrs	4480	Wing 4th Light Dragoons ..
	2 N.C. Regiments	950	1 Native Regiment ..
	Local H. & Ditchmts	1000	Local Horse ..
Infantry	2 Eurpn. Bns. ..	1080	2 European Battalions ..
	7 Native I. ...	5000	4 Native „ ..
Sappers and Miners	Native ..	250	Sappers and Miners ..
Pioneers	„ ..	240	Pioneers ..
	Men	9200	Men ..

SHAH SHUJAH-UL-MULK'S FORCE.

6,070 Men.

Maj.-Gen. F. H. Simpson.

Cavalry Brigade Capt. Christie 3 Bn. Cav. ..	1st Rgt. Cavalry	Artillery Capt. W. Anderson Beng. H. A.	1st Troop.
	2nd Rgt. Cavalry		2nd Troop.
Infantry Brigade (5 battalions.)	1st Regt.	..	Capt. Bean.
	2nd „	..	Capt. Macan.
	3rd „	..	Capt. Craigie.
	4th Light Infantry	..	Capt. Hay.
	5th Regt.	..	Capt. Woodburn.

SHAHZADA TIMUR'S FORCE.

Under Lt.-Col. Wade.

Artillery { Two 24-pounder howitzers and two 6-pounders, with 20 swivels, under Lt. Maule, Bengal Artillery.

Cavalry .. 1,000 Musulmans, armed with swords, shields and matchlocks.

Infantry { Regulars 3 battalions 2,040 men } With 4 companies of
 { Irregulars 1 battalion 820 men } British Native Infantry
 { Jazailchis 320 men } (320 men).

Making the total of Timur's force about 4,500 men of all sorts, with four guns.

 RANJIT SINGH'S CONTINGENT

consisted of.

12 guns with 100 men.

Infantry 4,800 ..

Cavalry 1,050 ..

 About 6,000 ..

One Howitzer One Mortar Eight 6-pounders Two 9-pounders

 THE SIKH CONTINGENT

was also under Col. Wade's direction, who therefore disposed of 10,500 men with 16 guns of various descriptions.

 SUMMARY OF AVAILABLE TROOPS BEFORE THE REDUCTION OF THE FORCE.

Bengal Column	9,500
Reserve at Ferozpore	4,250
Shah Shujah's Contingent	6,000
The Bombay Column	5,800
Bombay Reserve at Karachi	3,000

 28,550

The Shahzada Timur's force	4,800
Sikh Contingent	6,000

 10,800

Sikh Army of Observation at Peshawar ..	15,000
---	--------

APPENDIX II.

DISTRIBUTION OF BRITISH FORCE IN AFGHANISTAN.

October 1839.

Kabul	{	No. 6 Field Battery, 3 guns.
Lieut.-Col. Dennie	{	13th Light Infantry.
	{	35th N. I.
Shah's 1st Cavalry. Some Artillery.		
Jellalabad	{	No. 6 Field Battery, 3 guns.
Lieut.-Col. Roberts	{	2nd Light Cavalry.
	{	1st Europeans.
	{	37th N. I.
	{	48th N. I.
	{	Detachment Sappers and Miners.
	{	Skinner's Horse, 1 Risala.
Ghazni	{	16th N. I.
Major MacLaren	{	Skinner's Horse, 1 Risala.
Kandahar	{	4th Company, 2nd Brigade Artillery.
Major-Gen. Nott	{	42nd N.I.
	{	43rd N.I.
Dadar	{	4th Local Horse, 1 Risala.
	{	31st N.I.
	{	4th Local Horse, 2 Risala.
Sakkar	{	1st N.I.
2nd Bombay Brigade	{	5th N.I.
	{	23rd N.I.

APPENDIX III.

MARCHES AND DISTANCES BETWEEN FEROPPORE
AND KABUL.

Miles.	1838.	Marches.
454	Ferozpoore to Sakkar	10th December to 24th January 38
171	Sakkar to Dadar	16th February to 10th March 25
86	Dadar to Shalcot	16th March to 26th March 8
148	Shalcot to Kandahar	7th April to 26th April 14
230	Kandahar to Ghazni	27th June to 21st July 22
88	Ghazni to Kabul	30th July to 6th August 7
1177		114

Ferozpoore to Kabul, 239 days. Average distance *per diem* just under 5 miles