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THE NECESSITY FOR AN ARMY AS WELL AS A NAVY FOR THE MAINTENANCE OF THE EMPIRE.

By Captain W. H. JAMES, late R.E.

Thursday, 27th February, 1896.

Field-Marshal VISCOUNT WOLSELEY, K.P., G.C.B., G.C.M.G.,
Commander-in-Chief, in the Chair.

A COUNTRY not secure from its natural position, nor certain of aid from friendly allied Powers, must depend entirely upon itself for safety from attack. Three months ago most of us believed that, at any rate from two nations, we might look, if not for aid, at any rate for benevolent neutrality; but recent events have shown that neither the traditions of a long-standing alliance, from which the chief benefit has certainly not been derived by this country, nor kinship of race, will avail against the political exigencies of the moment. The result has, I believe, been beneficial. The whole nation at last has begun to appreciate the fact that the maintenance of the Empire depends on our own fighting strength, and that this must be duly ordered in accordance with our requirements; while throughout the Empire a cry of loyalty has gone up which, if properly taken advantage of, will lead to such organisation of our resources as to leave no cause of doubt for the future.

At the outset I wish to define my position with regard to the relative parts to be played by the Navy and Army in the maintenance of the Empire. I should be the last to seek in any way to depreciate the part our Navy has played in the past, or to do anything which would diminish its rôle in the future. I fully agree, my lord, with what you said on a recent occasion, that if either Service has to go short we must insure that the Navy is not stinted in any way. The Navy is our first line of defence, and our existence depends on its continued efficiency. The task imposed on it is a heavy one, and one that does not tend to become lighter. New obligations, owing to enlarged territories, have increased our responsibilities, while we no longer possess the unquestioned sea supremacy which was formerly the case. For the Navy of France is now, relatively, stronger; Germany, Austria, Italy, and Russia have become important sea Powers; the United States have much increased the value of their fleet; while in Japan a new sea Power has come into existence. During the eighteenth century, and at the beginning of this, we were from time to time opposed to France, Spain, Holland, Russia, and

Denmark, on the sea; but the fleets of Germany, Austria, and Italy were non-existent, and that of Russia was an almost negligible quantity. We suffered some reverses at sea from America in 1812-14, but only in ship—not fleet—actions.

The importance of the Russian Navy is increased by the fact that the growth of the Black Sea Squadron, formerly inferior in strength to the Navy of Turkey, has placed the latter Power at her mercy, and thereby rendered it easier for the former to come into the Mediterranean. Moreover, Russia now keeps a special squadron in the latter sea. It is evident, therefore, that on the sea we may have to deal with a more formidable combination than was the case a century ago, while the enormous expense of modern ships renders the strain of keeping up a proper Navy far greater than in the days of wooden vessels.

But if we are to maintain the Empire, to support the outlying members of its body politic from attack, and secure the safety of this kingdom, which forms the centre of our vast possessions, it must be done. The *first line of defence* is the Navy, and there seems every disposition on the part of successive Governments to put it on a proper footing; and I do not, therefore, intend further to allude to it beyond saying that no mere arithmetical superiority will suffice. It must be a practical and not theoretical supremacy. At the outbreak of a war we shall have to fight for it, and it will be impossible for our country to regard herself as the Mistress of the Seas until she has swept her opponents from the ocean.

I propose to show you, however, that the Navy alone will not suffice; it must be supplemented by an efficient Army, which is the *first line of offence*, and it is necessary, for this purpose, to organise the fighting forces of the Empire into one harmonious whole. For the history of our race shows that it is only from the conjoint action of the two branches of our armed strength, combined in due proportion, that the best results have been obtained; while our records prove most clearly that the need for an efficient Army, proportionate to the tasks it may be called upon to do, has never been properly appreciated by our rulers, or by the people. Undeniably great as were the achievements of the Navy at the beginning of the century, I think we are somewhat inclined to put them at too high a value, to forget that, if the Navy saved us from invasion, there is something to be said of the folly which rendered it possible for the landing of 120,000 men to mean the conquest of the kingdom because there was no proper Army to meet them.

We are proud, and rightly proud, of naval victories in 1805, but we must remember that in that year Napoleon was only at the beginning of his great campaigns, by which he was to form an empire, the like of which has never been since the days of Charles the Great. From 1805 to 1814 we were at incessant war with him; from 1807 no organised French fleet existed. In 1811 Lord Minto announced that the French flag was nowhere to be seen flying from Cape Comorin to Cape Horn. And yet these nine years were the greatest of the Emperor's life; and from 1805 to 1812 his career was practically one of almost unchecked conquest.

Trafalgar was an event of the highest importance, but it was fought the day after Mack surrendered at Ulm.

Putting aside inborn fighting capacity, the military strength of a nation depends upon:—

1. Population.
2. Organisation.
3. Wealth.

Judging by the standard of population, we are in a very favourable position; for the white population of the British Empire, which alone numbers some 50,000,000, is larger than that of France or of the European portion of Russia, and is almost equal to the white population of America; while the total population of the Empire, about 350,000,000, is larger than the total population of Europe. It is true that of the total population 300,000,000 belong to alien races, which could not be organised on the same footing as the white population; but our position in reference to population is nevertheless favourable.

In the United Kingdom the Sovereign has the undoubted right to call on all able-bodied males between fifteen and sixty to defend the country, but no attempt has ever been made to organise them so as to render them fit to meet a foreign foe.

It is idle to imagine that we can rely merely on the numerical strength of our population, and that when the struggle comes we can organise. Within recent times we have had two striking proofs of the futility of such a policy. Take the case of the American Civil War. The reason why it lasted so long, and was so prodigiously expensive, was that neither side had any adequate military organisation; both sides at the outset were ignorant of war. The staff, as a rule, could not plan, the officers could not lead, and although they and their men were brave enough, ill-directed bravery alone can produce no decisive results; and it was not until taught by the bloody experience of the contest, that the necessity for proper organisations—in short, for an army as opposed to an armed mob—began to be appreciated. I do not hesitate to say that up to the end of the struggle the average American officer was by no means the equal in military knowledge of the average regular army officer in Europe. Had the North possessed at the outset 70,000 or 80,000 regular troops the struggle would not have lasted six months. I believe, moreover, that 100,000 regular European troops thrown into the scale in 1862 or 1863 would have at once terminated the war. Yet America raised, on the Northern side alone 2,300,000, a considerable portion of whom “were enlisted, organised, armed, equipped, and sent into the field in less than a month”! I quote this from official documents.

Again, look at the war of 1870-71. After the capitulation of Sedan, the war was carried on by the French mainly by newly-raised levies. These, badly organised, for good organisation was impossible in the time available; ill-officered, for sufficient good ones were not obtainable; armed for the most with a heterogeneous collection of weapons, with no proper train services, and directed mainly by three civilians totally devoid of all military knowledge, were led only to disaster. The men suffered

terribly, and were unable to meet anything like their own number of regular troops in the field; and although they struggled on bravely for five months, the result was no better terms than could have been obtained in the beginning of the final phase of the struggle; so that France poured out her treasure like water, and offered up life without stint, without obtaining thereby the least benefit.

Numbers then, without organisation, are useless, and serve only to give a fictitious appearance of strength without in any way adding to the real war capability of the country, and we must not rely on them. Moreover, modern war is so sudden, owing to the facility of communication, which permits the easy concentration of vast numbers; while these numbers make it so costly, as to render it essential to bring it quickly to an end by carrying on the conflict with the utmost rigour possible. A nation that cannot spring forth fully armed for a conflict is certain to be beaten. It will be given no time to construct an Army or a Navy when war has begun. The possibility of doing so saved our forefathers in the past; belief in such a possibility, if we continue in it, will be our ruin in the future. And yet I am sure that the idea still exists largely in England that, somehow or other, we should come out victorious in the long run. For it is only a few days ago that I read in an evening paper the following lines:—

“It must occasion grave misgivings to French politicians to mark the rapid increase of the populations of Germany and Great Britain, while that of France is absolutely stationary, even if there is not a retrograde movement. Frenchmen who are accustomed to depreciate the military power of England do not reckon upon the fact that the population of this country is three times as great as it was when we wrested Spain from their hands, arrested the tide of victory, and finally dealt the heaviest blow at the power of Napoleon. It is true that late Continental wars have been comparatively short, but, from our island position, were England invaded, no such speedy overthrow would be possible as that of Austria by Prussia, or France by Germany. And in six months from the declaration of war England would be able to place a force at least equal numerically to that of Germany or France in the field. Every year adds to our population, and to our wealth. In another three or four years we shall have paid off nearly half the £900,000,000, at which our debt stood at the close of the great war. Those who deem that the military strength of England can be gauged by that of its standing Army at the present moment would have a very bitter awakening, in case of war.”¹ The man who wrote this had certainly never studied the Franco-German War, and does not understand the way in which the heroic, untrained efforts of France, were slowly but certainly crushed by the organised might of Germany.

Our population is sufficient to provide a proper Army; it is our organisation which is now, and always has been, defective and inadequate to the duties required of it.

¹ *Evening Standard*, February 7th, 1896.

For, be it remembered that, from the days of Agincourt to the present time, we have never fought on the Continent without allies, *i.e.*, our military strength has never sufficed for the duties that our position in Europe has imposed on it. Where should we have been in the Peninsula without our German and Portuguese troops? Do we at all appreciate the fact that at Waterloo we had only 24,000 British troops out of the 67,000 on the field, in the Anglo-Belgian-German Army commanded by Wellington? Do we remember how hideously our military system broke down in the Crimea, and that we endeavoured to supplement our deficiencies by the miserable expedient of the Foreign Legion? Our military system never has given us the numbers we require, and statesmen never seem to have appreciated the fact that we require an Army somewhat proportionate to the task required of it.

Had we possessed an adequate Army, the career of Napoleon might have been brought to an end in 1807. This year was the second phase of Napoleon's invasion of Prussia. In 1806, he had swept all before him, and the Prussian Army had surrendered at Lübeck and Prenzlau. But in the beginning of the next year, he had to deal with the remnant of the Prussian forces, and with their Russian allies who had come up to help them. He fought the battle of Eylau on the 7th February, which, to say the least of it, was a very doubtful victory. The weather was terrible, and the French in a sorry plight. At this juncture, Russia begged us to help them in that struggle. Had we had a properly-organised Army available to aid our allies, we should, in all probability, have driven Napoleon back to the Rhine; but while we were organising and hesitating, unable to make up our minds, there came the French victory of Friedland, and our opportunity was gone. Had we been able to act, how many hundred thousands of lives would have been spared! how many millions of money have been saved!

Look at the enormous effect of the Peninsula operations on the final fate of Napoleon. Surely it is impossible to study them without seeing how largely it was—to use the Emperor's own words—the Spanish ulcer which wore him to death. Had we concentrated our whole strength on the Peninsular War, instead of frittering it away in ridiculous expeditions devoid of utility, the success or insuccess of which could have had no possible effect on the main struggle, we should have entered France at the end of 1812. Prussia would have risen. Austria must have joined, and the Emperor would have been crushed then two years earlier than he was. We were unable to do so, because we had no proper military organisation, and because our statesmen did not understand war. Again, I assert that want of knowledge cost millions of money and hundreds of thousands of lives. English statesmen require no monuments to keep before us their military achievements—the national debt is a standing reminder of their incompetency.

Let me give you one more example of what the want of proper military organisation has cost us. I refer to the American War of Independence. It began in April, 1775, when we had some 10,000 men in the country. We raised our strength to 13,000 chiefly by means of foreign

mercenaries; but I do not believe we ever had 15,000 on American soil. Now, until 1778, when France turned against us, we certainly had the command of the sea, and could, had we possessed any adequate military organisation, have put 50,000 men in the field, which would have settled the question. We did nothing of the sort, and in that year, 1778, we even took 5,000 away to conquer St. Lucia, St. Pierre, and St. Miquelon—a striking example of the fatuity of our rulers.

Of course, when we allowed the sea supremacy to fall away through want of a proper Navy, our failure was a mere question of time, and it was appropriate that the country which could not take advantage of its opportunities should have seen the last remnant of its military forces surrender at Yorktown, because the fleet was not strong enough to break the blockade of the river. We spent £100,000,000, we lost territories and prestige in that struggle, terminated after eight years by the peace of Versailles, because our statesmen were absolutely and entirely ignorant as to how they should make war, or that an Army was wanted for it.

How are we situated with regard to the third element of strength—money? We are the richest Empire on earth; year by year we are increasing our possessions or developing their resources. Time is, in this respect, on our side, and as we grow in riches the burdens necessary to ensure our independence must become relatively lighter. Are we not rich enough now to spend what is necessary for our security? I believe this point to be unworthy of discussion. Compare our wealth now with what it was a hundred years ago. Compare what we spent then with what we spend now, and see whether there is not ample margin for the purpose.

I hope I have shown you that in our past history we have needed an Army, but that our military organisation has never been adequate to our requirements, and I believe that anyone who studies the history of the Empire must agree with me.

Why have we never had sufficient military forces, and have only just woken up to the fact that a Navy is necessary? It is attributable to three reasons:—The first, that the estimates of the two great “spending departments,” as they have been foolishly called, have always formed the happy hunting ground of Chancellors of the Exchequer in search of a surplus; the second, that this country has not been engaged in a struggle for existence for eighty years; the third is the fact that the study of history is absolutely neglected in English schools.

Statesmen and voters alike are densely ignorant of the process by which the Navy and Army have built up the Empire, and of the position we hold with regard to our Continental friends—or rather enemies. The first have sought popularity by parsimony in peace, to be followed by prodigality in war; the second have had a sort of blind confidence that somehow or other the country would pull through. Neither have noticed the alteration of the conditions of existence of nations and the enormously increased military strength of possible opponents: France and Germany can now each put 3,000,000 in the field, Russia 2,500,000, Austria 1,500,000, Italy 1,000,000. The altered position on the sea I have already dealt with.

War now will be an affair of months—not years; and woe to the nation that is not ready for it.

We are now putting our naval house in order, but the foundations of our military edifice have only been partially laid, and the whole structure requires erection on a proper basis.

Our population and our wealth permit us to meet our needs in this direction, and I have now to show you what an Army is wanted for, including under this head all the land forces of the Empire.

What are their duties?¹

1. To render it impossible for an enemy to land in the United Kingdom without the certainty of defeat, thereby freeing the Navy for its proper sphere of operations—the enemy's coast line, and the routes of seaborne commerce.
2. To defend India and those Colonies which hostile forces might invade.
3. To defend our bases of operation all over the world, *i.e.*, coaling stations and important ports.
4. Expeditionary purposes.

With regard to No. 1, it may be said that, if we have enough ships, this is not necessary. To this I reply, that no living being can possibly predict that, under all circumstances and in all places, we can ever be certain of even numerical superiority; and that, granting even this, we might possibly be defeated, and thus the way to our coast opened. Moreover, there is always this additional danger: France, with her *inscription maritime*, would probably mobilise quicker than we could, while with the huge Army she keeps on foot she could within twenty-four hours put sufficient men on shipboard to cross the narrow sea, which, if landed, would, with the inefficient state of our land forces, render disaster almost certain. Proper organisation of our Army would enable us absolutely to crush any such attempt, and it cannot be said of any naval defence that this is the case.

In defending India, we have three cases to deal with:—

1. Invasion by the sea.
2. Invasion overland.
3. Internal rebellion.

Plainly, so far as the first is concerned, we have nothing to fear so long as we maintain our sea supremacy. So far as the second is concerned, it is necessary for us to rely on the Army. But I may be told that we must still require a Navy to ensure reinforcements. To which I reply, that unless you are prepared so to organise India that she can act as a base for her own operations, you had better give up the idea of holding her altogether.

If we admit, for the sake of argument, that we want 20,000 or 30,000 more white troops to fight an invader, who is there who will

¹ It must not be assumed that the relative importance of these duties is indicated by their numerical order. The first, for instance, is provided for if the other three are satisfied, *i.e.*, the numbers required for these necessarily provide sufficient for the first purpose.

dare to say that, once war is declared we might safely transmit such a force, which, even without munitions of war, would take twenty to thirty of the largest steamers to transport it by the long sea route round the Cape, for it might not be possible to use the Mediterranean?

In the case of rebellion, uncomplicated by foreign wars, there would, of course, be no difficulty in sending reinforcements; but if we are at war no large reinforcements can be sent, unless we can insure their safe arrival, and for this purpose we must have an unquestioned supremacy at sea.

While we are fighting for this purpose, India and our Colonies must rely on themselves, and hence it follows that they must in peace be so organised as to be able to repel all probable attacks which may take place at the beginning of a war, *i.e.*, we must maintain a military supremacy at these points. This remark applies chiefly to Canada and India; our other possessions are practically safe from anything but raids so long as we maintain the sea. Suppose, for instance, a large German force were to be shipped to the German sphere of influence in Africa. It could have but one object, that object, remembering Copenhagen, we should frustrate on the sea. The third duty of the Army is a comparatively light one; the garrisons of the points alluded to could be small, the fortifications not elaborate. The strength of a nation is not to be found in a multiplication of fortresses, but in the efficiency of its mobile field force.

The last duty of the Army is to carry the war into the enemy's country. This is the very root and essence of defence. No prize-fighter can win a fight by merely warding off blows, and we must possess such a force as will enable us swiftly to retaliate on the aggressor. At the present moment our expeditionary power is a Division, plus some extra details, or the First Army Corps. Neither is sufficient to represent us effectively abroad.

Before dealing with any proposed reforms or alterations, may I say a few words on our existing forces? I wish someone would explain to me why, in the Regular Army, we have 148 battalions of infantry, 31 regiments of cavalry, 108 batteries of field and horse artillery. Are they supposed to represent some of the percentage of the population required for war, or to be the exact number of each arm needed by us for our various requirements? It is perfectly well known that there is no such reason, but that they represent the utmost that years of incessant worrying on the part of the military authorities has been able to wring out of successive Cabinets. Similarly there is no reason to be given for the existence of the present number of Militia and Volunteer battalions and batteries, nor can anyone explain why, in the case of the Volunteers, the chief portion of the artillery corps should be formed in a band of country extending across England, from Lancashire to the East Coast, whereas they are chiefly required in the South. A possible reason is, that at the institution of the Volunteers no one took the trouble to see that the nature of the corps sanctioned had some connection with the requirements of the locality, or else that the authorities themselves did not appreciate the problem.

The same system, or want of system, applies to our Colonial forces. It is impossible to say why we find certain numbers in certain Colonies, but anyone who examines into our military arrangements will be at once struck with the haphazard nature of the organisation. Now, I at once admit that it is impossible to lay down one sealed pattern in accordance with which all the Colonial forces should be raised, but I do think that we may ask for uniform training and armaments. Adverting to the last point, those among us who have watched the movements of the manufacturing departments will at once exclaim that it is impossible. I am perfectly prepared to admit, with regard to the rifle, that after some years of practical trial it has been found necessary to abolish the Metford barrel, because it is unable to withstand the wear and tear of the cordite and hard-cased bullet. Of course, the mistake made was ever to introduce it. Its adoption has only been another example of the costly experiments which are occasionally indulged in in this country. While on this point, I take the opportunity of protesting against arming the Volunteers with the Enfield-Martini. If these troops are ever to be employed at all they will be employed against troops armed with magazine rifles. It would be criminal to send our Volunteers against them with a single loader.¹ I am aware that the Lee-bolt is expensive to manufacture—that this, therefore, may be a deterrent. But here again the fault lies in adopting a bolt which is no doubt efficient, but which is needlessly complicated, and which was originally devised to extract a badly-shaped cartridge. Our cartridge is well shaped, and does not require it, and any other form of bolt may be adopted so long as the cartridge is maintained.

No doubt, too, our Colonies would be considerably exercised in the choice of a field gun. In twenty-five years, we have had a 9-pounder, 12-pounder, 13-pounder, 14-pounder, 15-pounder, and 16-pounder. Even in the last "Changes in Warlike Stores" (February, 1896) we find the 15-lb. shell introduced for the 12-pounder gun, although the Secretary of State for War stated some little time ago that the shell would be only 14 lbs., the reason I believe, being that the 15-lb. shell "wobbles"—a captious critic might say like the minds of those engaged in devising the field gun for the British Army. If the heavy 12-pounders cannot be bored up to carry a shell equal to those they would have to deal with in the field, they had better be melted up or sold for old metal. Certainly our batteries should be armed with a weapon better suited to meet the field guns of foreign Powers. A similar fate might be meted out to the 16-pounders, the 20-pounders, and the 40-pounders of the Volunteer position batteries. Imagine the anxiety of the artillery officer in charge of an ammunition column with eighteen types of projectiles to serve out, *i.e.*, three for each of the six varieties of gun with which our Army in England would take the field! I include, of course, the new 50-pounder howitzer. In Germany there are two field guns, the 9-centimetre and the howitzer.

¹ Since my Lecture it has been announced that the Volunteers are to have the Lee-Enfield.

Let me now deal with the numbers we require for the various duties of the Army.

We have in England sufficient infantry battalions to furnish three army-corps, if each territorial regiment has one battalion at home and the King's Royal Rifles and Rifle Brigade two each. As a practical fact, we have sixty-five at home to seventy-six abroad. The numbers might be equalised if the foreign establishments of each battalion were raised by seventy men each. We have sufficient field and horse artillery to give each army-corps 102 guns and sufficient cavalry. The question is, Are these three army-corps sufficient? I think not. It is inconceivable that an enemy would dream of invasion unless he could throw over 100,000 men and follow them up by another force of like amount. Now, behind these three army-corps of some 35,000 men each, we have no organisation whatever, nothing but a collection of battalions of Militia and Volunteers, some of them organised in brigades, but with no field artillery. For it cannot be seriously argued that the Volunteer position batteries, armed with a miscellaneous collection of obsolete weapons, are in any way capable of taking the place of Regular field batteries. Moreover, our second line is absolutely deficient in train services. Only two of our three army-corps have a bridge train. If invaded, the salvation of the country would depend on the mobile field force being strong enough to crush the enemy at once. We have no organisation which would in any way be adequate for the purpose. The case is really even worse than I have put it. For of our three army-corps one at least would have to be left in Ireland, so that we should really only have two available to defend London—the objective of the enemy. We require at least six, while Ireland should have not less than two, or eight in all, *i.e.*, some 280,000 men. Behind these, moreover, it would be necessary to have further reserves to supply losses in the field.

Look at the length of coast-line we have to defend. Our troops cannot be ubiquitous, and they must be sufficiently strong at all important points to ensure crushing the enemy the moment he has landed.

Now, we have a total at home of 531,000, composed as follows:—

Regulars	..	..	190,000 (including Reserves)
Militia	..	..	108,000 enrolled,
Yeomanry	..	..	9,000 who trained in 1895,
Volunteers	..	..	224,000 efficient at last returns.

Of the Regulars we should certainly have to deduct 15 per cent. for untrained and unfit men from the troops serving with regiments, and at least 10 per cent. from the Reserves.

This would give us available at home:—

	With the Colours.	Reserves.	Total.
Infantry	.. 55,000	53,600	108,600
Cavalry	.. 10,000	6,600	16,600
Artillery	{ 10 horse 41 field batteries }	—	306 guns
Engineers	.. 4,500	2,000	6,500

Even if there were sufficient cadres, which there are not, these would only suffice to furnish four army-corps, and the latter would be deficient in guns, in engineer field companies and other details, and in train services. No one can believe that as at present trained the Militia and Volunteers could be fit to take their place in the field army to meet the trained soldiers of any foreign foe.

It is plain; therefore, that only two alternatives lie open to us: either to train a portion of our Auxiliary forces so that they may be fit for use, or else largely to increase our Regular Army. At one point there is no doubt. The Regular Army must have some considerable increase made to it.

Assuming our field army to consist of eight army-corps, all of Regular troops, and two cavalry divisions, we should require:—

- 192 Battalions Infantry without the corps battalions,
- 22 Regiments of Cavalry as a minimum,
- 132 Batteries of Artillery (96 guns per army-corps),
- 32 Field Companies Royal Engineers,
- 8 Pontoon Troops,
- 4 Telegraph Battalions,
- 8 Field Parks,

besides ammunition columns and train services.

Supposing the eight army-corps to have each one division formed from Militia, there would still be required, if the Cameron Highlanders were brought up to two battalions, and 71 battalions of the Territorial Regiments were always kept at home, and the whole of them put into the Field Army:—

- 51 Infantry Battalions,
- 1 Regiment Cavalry,
- 81 Batteries of Artillery,
- 24 Field Companies, R.E.,
- 6 Pontoon Troops,
- 3 Telegraph Battalions,
- 6 Field Parks,

besides ammunition columns and train services.

Even then behind the Field Army the rest of our forces would be without field artillery and the other services which go to make them mobile, and here further additions will be necessary.

Taking the Regular troops only of the above eight army-corps for expeditionary purposes we should have, with the proposed organisation, only 150,000 of all arms—certainly none too many for what we should require of them.

I am not asking for anything enormous, or for what we have not done before. In 1809 we had in arms 400,000 Regular troops abroad in Europe, the Colonies and India, while at home were 400,000 Regulars, Militia, and Volunteers. In 1813 the total had risen to 1,000,000—double our present numbers.

Lord Castlereagh thought that we required for Navy and Marines 150,000; Regular Army and Militia, 350,000; Volunteers, 100,000;

Sedentary Militia, 300,000 ; trained men, 400,000 ; a total of 1,300,000. Those liable to service under the Defence Act, 2,000,000 ; the whole 3,300,000, *i.e.*, one-fourth of the then population. What we could do then with a third of our present numbers and wealth, we can most certainly do now if need be. But you will observe I only ask for a much smaller proportion, although I want it organised in peace-time, and protest against waiting till war breaks out to do so.

This lecture is not intended to deal in detail with questions of organisation, but I feel obliged to draw your attention by these figures to the absolute inadequacy of our present organisation. I cannot help pointing out that if we only adopted the foreign plan of localising our Regular troops, it would much facilitate the training of our Auxiliary forces. For then to them could be attached for additional instruction men of the Militia or Volunteers specially entitled as Reserve men and drawn from the same locality. Moreover, the local feeling which already exists in many regiments would largely be intensified. I know that in the case of two regiments with which I am acquainted the experiment of quartering the regiment at its headquarters has been an unqualified success. It tends to bring home the Army to the hearts of the people, to make them look upon "their regiment" as part of themselves. Were not many of the most distinguished regiments of the Peninsular War strictly local regiments ?

Moreover, look how this plan would facilitate mobilisation : all the stores being with their regiment where the Reservists would join. Let me give you a few examples to show what I mean. Take the Princess of Wales' Own (Yorkshire Regiment), depôt Richmond, station the Curragh ; the Northamptonshire Regiment, depôt Northampton, station Jersey ; Royal Irish Rifles, depôt Belfast, station Brighton.

While on this subject, may I pay a passing tribute to the magnificent audacity of the Clothing Department, which proposes, on mobilisation, to pack up and send off some hundred and eighty thousand packages of clothing and necessaries, and ensure that they will all arrive in time at the depôts and places of mobilisation ? If we are to mobilise quickly—and we must do so, unless we keep a standing Army equal to our neighbours—there must be absolute localisation of everything and everybody, so that the troops may be ready to move to the place of concentration in three or four days.¹ In France and Germany the mobilisation period is seven days. We have to remember that France has over 400,000 men under arms in peace, and that in the event of war it would be a blow and a word—not the word before the blow.

Another blot in our present system is the fact that the Yeomanry and Volunteers are not liable for service in Ireland. All our Auxiliaries should be available for service anywhere in the United Kingdom, and the Militia for service in Europe or North Africa. As to the garrisons for fortresses, I believe we have sufficient men. Obviously, every endeavour should be made to provide for these locally by Volunteers.

¹ I understand that in future it is probable this will be done.

Some Volunteer corps, such as that furnished by the men of the Royal Arsenal, Woolwich, are evidently useless. They could not be spared from their own work in war-time. Again, it must be impressed on all that war on any large scale means the simultaneous mobilisation of all the military forces. Unless this be done, the least trained portions could not be got ready for the field. Moreover, the total numbers we have are no more than sufficient, and they, as I have said, want re-arranging—augmenting in some parts, perhaps diminished in others. But until this be done, and all alike are organised and equipped to take the field, our organisation is a sham. Our Army, I fully admit, is better than it ever was, but it is insufficient for the task imposed on it. Decentralise and organise in field units, brigades, divisions, and army-corps. Supposing it cost £20,000,000 to do this—I do not say it must—it would not be a recurring expense, and would form a very cheap insurance on the wealth we have to defend.

I have already dealt with India, I do not think that there we want much increase. I think that with our present organisation we could give a good account of any foe who attempted to invade us overland.

And now I come to the Colonies. I belong to that school which thinks that they have not done what they might fairly be expected to do. The Army Book states, that "what is required is a sufficient garrison to man the coast defences, maintain internal order, and meet the minor land attacks, which alone seem probable." But in the case of Canada, something considerably more might be expected, and until we could come to their aid they must hold their own. Yet Canada with a population of 5,000,000 has only 1,000 in the permanent corps, and only 32,000 partly-trained Militia to back them.

It is doubtless quite right, again to quote the Army Book, that "the conditions of enrolment of these (local) forces should be the subject of ordinances passed by the local legislatures, and be those most suited to the conditions of the colony"; but there can surely be no reason why the military experts of the Mother Country should not point out to our brethren beyond the seas what is really required of them. They are as patriotic as we are, and as desirous of maintaining the Empire as any citizen of these realms; but their patriotism is somewhat unordered and ill-directed. Is it to be wondered at? If we at home have never properly appreciated the character of the problem, how can we expect those who are far removed from those political centres, whence wars usually originate, to do so? Moreover, we must remember that our Colonies have grown up since we were engaged in conflict with a power capable of inflicting damage on them.

I do not forget, however, the gallant efforts of Canada at the beginning of this century. But times have changed, and what sufficed then is insufficient now. And yet, if Canadian preparations are incomplete, the rest of our Colonies are more so. The total military forces raised among a population of some 10,000,000, is 91,000, of whom Canada alone furnishes 32,000 men. This total includes permanent local troops, Militia, Volunteers and armed police, and the training of a considerable

part of these forces leaves a good deal to be desired. Now, what I urge is, that not only should the Colonies be prepared to maintain, when rich enough, the whole of the local defences, but that they should also keep up, in accordance with their abilities, a mobile field force. What they have chiefly to guard against (Canada excepted) is raids; these would be impossible if the military arrangements were adequate. Moreover, they should be prepared to furnish troops—few in number may be, but vastly important, as showing the solidarity of the Empire to aid the Mother Country in war, if needed.

These suggestions postulate three principles:—

1. Careful enquiry into the military requirements and capabilities of all the Colonies.
2. A conference at which these should be laid before Colonial representatives, and the best means of carrying them out discussed.
3. The formation of a permanent War Committee for the Empire, the nucleus of which might be the Defence Committee of the Cabinet, supplemented by delegates from the various Colonies, and certainly including the Commander-in-Chief and two or three other superior officers.

We should endeavour to establish in all the more important Colonies such as Australia, Canada, New Zealand and the Cape, arsenals capable, at any rate, of repairing arms and manufacturing ammunition. I go further, and say that if the proposal to localise the forces in the United Kingdom be adopted, that the troops raised in the Colonies might well be affiliated with our own. Thus Canadian regiments might be associated with one division, Australian with another, and so on.

Lastly, I will say a few words on the necessity for foreign expeditions. This is not the place for politics, but I cannot help feeling that in the history of the last twenty years there have been occasions on which the feebleness of our foreign policy, the hesitancy which we have shown in asserting our rights, the squeezability we have displayed in negotiations with foreign Powers have been largely due to the fact that our rulers have felt that the military strength of the nation—I use the term in its broadest sense—has not been sufficient to allow words being backed with deeds. There is no doubt that in European opinion we are doubtful friends and feeble foes. But if it were known that besides our Navy we possessed an Army of 150,000 capable of being moved at a week's notice, we should stand higher in Continental estimation. Each of the two great camps into which Europe is divided would be eager for our support, and we might preserve the peace of the world indefinitely. But such an object, however noble, is not the sole reason why we want an Army for expeditionary purposes. We want it to lead against any enemy with whom we may be at war, or to aid our allies in a struggle. It is to the combined action of the Navy and Army we must look to teach our foes that we are still the nation we were, and this we cannot do unless we possess military forces proportionate to the tasks imposed on them.

I constantly see put forward the idea that we should have to send reinforcements to the outlying portions of the Empire, at the commencement of a war. The proposition is ridiculous. How should we dare to send large bodies of troops across the seas, until we had actual and undoubted supremacy on the ocean? Outside England we must always be ready for war, Imperial troops must be reinforced by local organisations, and the forces in the United Kingdom must be capable of mobilisation in three or four days.

Minor details, but yet important, are changes in our system which would free our officers from much of the routine they now suffer from. The British officer might be described as a return-making animal. I don't know to a few hundreds how many Army Forms there may be—I believe about 2,000. I am sure that many might be simplified and many abolished. I should like to see a committee go through them all and ruthlessly cut out all not absolutely necessary. The introduction of the Naval system of pay and accounts would be an enormous boon to company officers. I think I hear someone say "Not suited to detachments." Precisely, therefore abolish detachments; they are the curse of the Service and ruin the proper tactical training of the soldier. What useful aim can twenty men in the Isle of Man fulfil? Do away with all extra-regimental employment; have these duties carried out by Reservists. Similarly use these men for many things now done by the serving soldier, and try above all to build up round each regimental headquarters a family of time-expired men and their wives for tailoring, carpentering, barrack repairs, care of the stores and equipment required on mobilisation, and leave the soldier to soldier and nothing else—a vast difference to the existing state of things, but infinitely more practical.

Our railway stock, again, is not suited for military work. To take horses in horse-boxes would double the length of trains required. Our wagons are not suited to move military vehicles or guns. It cannot pass the wit of man to devise stock suitable for both civil and military use. What we need above all is an authoritative declaration, not by civilians, but by military experts, of our wants. This declaration must come straight to the people who are the ultimate judges. I have never yet heard it proposed at any hospital that the lay governors should interfere in the wards or decide whether a patient should be operated on or not, but this is the system—I hardly like to use such a word to describe the process—on which we, shall I say, manage, our defensive Services. The time has come when it must cease.

I do not want to interfere with the present constitutional checks, but I do look for some means by which we may know what, in the opinion of those whose experience makes their opinion worth knowing, are our requirements, and these must be once and for all fixed by definite legislation. Time was when a standing Army was thought to be dangerous to our liberties; the danger now lies in not having one. I cannot see that this need affect in any way the present chain of responsibility.

Much more might be said, and, indeed, the detail arrangements of what is necessary could not be adequately treated in a single lecture.

I have endeavoured to put briefly before you the reasons why an Army is wanted, and still more briefly to suggest how it may be obtained.

Of this I am certain, that we live in times big with the future of the Empire. What this future may be depends on ourselves, and on ourselves alone. Conscious as we are of the rectitude of our policy, we are apt to lay too much stress on the protestations of other nations, or on the treaties which exist between us. We forget that, with some, protestations and treaties alike, are but halting places along the steadfast path of progress which is leading them to their ultimate goal—points of vantage, from which fresh assaults may be made against our policy or our possessions.

Weakness invites aggression, inability to adequately defend our Empire will assuredly not save us from attack. Let it not be said of us that we required a Jena or Sedan to make us recognise what our plain duties are. I cannot, and will not, believe that so terrible a lesson is necessary. Remember that in our case there would be no recovery from defeat. For, if it come, the price we shall have to pay would be the dismemberment of the Empire, the transfer of our trade, the ruin of our race. The once proud position we held among nations would know us no more. The flag we have taken to the four quarters of the world would wave only over ruined manufactories and empty homes, while the diminished population left to inhabit these islands could only lament their departed glories, their position rendered doubly bitter by the reflection, that they, the heirs of a glorious inheritance, had lost their patrimony through their own folly and their own blindness.

The CHAIRMAN: I have now to invite discussion upon the lecture which we have all listened to with so much pleasure. It is a lecture which embraces so many points and so many topics, that I think there can be very few here who would not like to say something upon it.

Sir JOHN C. R. COLOMB, K.C.M.G., M.P., late Captain R.M.A. : This is a very important occasion, and a discussion on a subject which embraces the use and application of both Services I think is opportune. But, my Lord, as a student of Imperial defence I say the title of this lecture strikes me with some degree of comicality. I think I may illustrate it shortly without wasting a word by a parallel illustration, a supposition that the Medical Society of England assembled in solemn conclave to discuss the necessity of drink as well as food for the maintenance of the human being. I cannot conceive the attitude of mind of anyone who would dispute, or could dispute, that we are powerless without an Army, though we may have a powerful Navy, or that military power is not a necessity. Having said that, I am bound to offer, as briefly as I can, one or two criticisms as my contribution to the discussion. It must be borne in mind that in a constitutional country you are governed by public opinion, and the misfortune is that public opinion has a tendency to run in only one groove at a time, and, therefore, we have had our military fever when the Navy has been ignored; and we have had our naval fever when the Army has been ignored; and, above all, we have had our civil fevers when both have been ignored. At present, I think we are showing symptoms of the naval fever, and I rejoice, therefore, that this subject is considered, because I think it will pull down the naval temperature of the country and make it contemplate facts; just as when the military fever raged after 1870, some of us used our best exertions to get the country to use a little common sense and, at all events, not to ignore the Navy entirely. Having said that, I

would just take the synopsis. I see the lecturer, like a good many others, speaks of the Navy as the "first line of defence." I wish to enter my protest against that phrase; it is your only line of defence in a sea empire for the protection of the oceans and seas in the world. There is no other, there can be no other. The Army is the complement of the Navy; it never can be the supplement. Now, following that line, I see the lecturer says that the "supremacy at sea must be fought for at the beginning of war." I again join issue with him, and I say that means contemplating a peril which to those who consider the economic circumstances of this country may well be appalling. My ground, and I submit it to the consideration of those who are going to take part in the discussion, is not that the supremacy at sea must be fought for at the beginning of war, but England's supremacy at sea must be assured before going to war. Looking at it from a purely military point of view, what is the use for one moment of talking of military expeditions over sea if you have not got that supremacy? How can you move a drummer boy, how can you move a military force beyond your shores if you have not yet got that supremacy at sea? Therefore, to give force and effect and reality to your Army as your striking power the first condition is supremacy at sea. But it is because—and this is my point—the British public and the British Empire, thank God, is at last beginning to understand that main principle, that it is necessary to remind the British public throughout the country that, having grasped supremacy at sea, you can strike no blows, you cannot exhaust the Power against you and terminate the war, unless you have an Army capable of doing it. I also wish to observe this: The Press seem to treat this problem as if the question, as raised by this lecture, was one of professional rivalry—a question of Army interests as against Navy interests. I am sure no such impression can be held; the only rivalry I know of is to accept and do the duty, whatever Service men belong to, which the country calls them to do, and to rival one another in the fulness of the discharge of the obligation. Therefore, it is from that broad point I come to pass to another and it is this: I am not going to discuss this, but I cannot help making this observation when you are asked to contemplate what might have happened from a military point of view in 1807, you cannot do so as an abstract question, but you must go back to 1805, because it was the battle of Trafalgar which made the Peninsular and your whole military enterprises possible. There is only one other point I will touch upon. In my humble judgment we have on paper a large number of military units. I agree with the lecturer completely about the want of organisation. I agree with him absolutely in his observations upon the military condition of our Colonies, but I point out this: that as your Lordship has recently stated very plainly, and I think it will take good effect, you cannot look, under the present economic condition of the Colonies and their population, to their furnishing such a thing as an army-corps or any considerable Imperial force for general service; but you can call upon them, and ought to call upon them, to do their share of maintaining that necessary preliminary to military strength, the supremacy of the sea, which is as dear and as necessary to them as to the mother country. The mother country would thus be relieved of a portion of the burden, and, so relieved, if the mother country is sensible, more could be done for the Army. But, my Lord, I care nothing at all for the arguments as to our invasion based upon the military power on the Continent. I see in the synopsis it says that: "The increased strength of foreign Armies must be taken into consideration." Yes, it must; but in what way? The Armies on the Continent may grow as they like, but the real question of invasion is not to be measured by the strength of those Armies, but it is to be measured by their naval force, and by their mercantile marine; and, if the reduction of any possible Continental Armies resulted in the production of a bigger mercantile marine, I should say our danger of invasion was increased. Another point is, that the growth of Continental Armies and the burden of these military forces upon Europe are, I think, contributing to our

safety, and not to our damage. The burden and the weight of these armaments cripple the power of those same countries either to increase their mercantile marine, or to largely increase their naval power. Therefore, I am one of those who think that after all the great and burning question of this minute is not invasion. The longer I live, and the more I study it, the more I am convinced that a great invasion of this country, unless we have absolutely lost supremacy of the sea, is impossible; and I go further and say that, even assuming that we have lost it, that invasion is wholly unnecessary. Such is the economic condition of this country, living as it does entirely and absolutely upon the margin of profit between importing raw material and exporting manufactured material, that if that is checked—checked even by moral effect upon your commerce, extinguishing your margin of profit, it is not necessary to land a single soldier in this country, because you are ruined and destroyed. Therefore, I come back to emphasise that, in my humble judgment, the real military question as regards military reform at this moment is the organisation of the Army to do what the Empire will require in war—that is, to attack and worry the enemy wherever you can get at him by military expeditions. I regret that the public mind is confused; and, I say it with all submission, but I fear that the general tone of the lecture will confuse the public mind, and divert it at this opportune moment from throwing all its military energy and all its military efforts into increasing the striking power of the British Army.

Admiral F. A. CLOSE: I wish to express regret that the lecturer has missed one important point, the burning question of the day, *i.e.*, of what use is the Army of this country if there is no food for the men? We know perfectly well at the outbreak of war there will be a panic on the Corn Exchange, and that the working-man's loaf will go up to 2s. 6d.; and though the military authorities may say that the Government will always be rich enough to buy food for the troops, what is the use of the Army, I ask, if we have 50,000,000 behind them who are starving? We acknowledge that the German Army is one of the most perfect military machines in the world, and they have always on hand six or nine months' food for the Army. Also, Germany is a corn-growing country, and is in touch with Russia, which is a great corn-exporting country. We do not grow any corn, to speak of, and we have no magazines of food whatever. Under those circumstances, I think this is a question which the lecturer should touch upon, because without it I maintain that the Army of this country can be of no avail as a defensive force. As a naval man, of course, I cannot criticise military matters; but, as a naval man, I maintain that in case of war with any Naval Power all the cruisers in the world could not protect the vessels necessary to bring us our enormous food supply, and until you get over that difficulty of food I maintain that this Army of ours which is ready to fight for us is not in a position to do so.

Admiral of the Fleet Sir J. E. COMMERELL, V.C., G.C.B.: I heartily concur in the excellent lecture that we have heard. I entirely agree that because you insist upon having a good Navy, and I hope you will so insist, that therefore we are not to neglect our second line of defence. I believe one means of strengthening the hands of the first line of defence will be the knowledge that they have a heavy backing behind them. The idea has crept up of late years—I do not know why, but I think it is a very erroneous idea—that come what may there is no possibility of England being invaded. Now, sir, that appears to me to be the key of the whole principle; if there is no fear of England being invaded, there is no necessity for having an Army, except for those expeditions which Captain James speaks of. But there are other things which are absolutely necessary for the sustenance of the Navy, *viz.*, that we should have a powerful Army to garrison our ports where the Navy get their supplies of all sorts. Without those supplies, especially of coal, the Navy, however large or magnificent, however powerful the ships may be, will be as naught. It would be the greatest possible advantage for the Navy to feel that when they leave their

coaling ports, when they leave the ports of England, that when they come back again they will find them in the position and state in which they left them; that they shall have ports thoroughly garrisoned, thoroughly looked after, so that after a long cruise, tedious not only to body but far more tedious to mind, they shall be able to recruit and recuperate their wearied minds and bodies in peace and comfort. That you cannot do without a good Army. I believe myself the whole Service through, with the exception of a few, that the Navy desire that the Army should be dealt within a fair and generous spirit. We know perfectly well in the Army it is acknowledged that on account of the insular position of England, in consequence of the geographical position of all her Colonies, it is absolutely necessary to have a Navy as the first line of defence, and the primary object of the Navy must be the defence of our coasts, trade routes, and Colonies; but having done that, I for one must strongly deprecate any question arising of "pull devil pull baker" between the Army and the Navy. United we stand, divided we fall. Let us all feel this. At the present time I think we have an excellent opportunity and chance of seeing that the Navy will be thoroughly looked after. Let us see that that is done, and that our Army is also put into a proper state of efficiency fully able to resist invasion, so that we may be able to meet our enemy in the gate.

Vice-Admiral P. H. COLOMB:—I am afraid that we are running very much into naval lines on a military lecture. I am sorry, my Lord, that no military officer has spoken, for, although my brother is a soldier, I must count him also as a sailor. I should like to have heard some military officer on the lecture before I spoke myself, but I wish to devote a few minutes to the fundamental question which lies under the lecturer's paper. I noted a passage early in his lecture in which he says: "The history of our race shows that it is only from the conjoint action of the two branches of our armed strength combined in due proportion that the best results have been obtained." Now, the whole question, as I understand it, put forward in the lecture is, what is the due proportion, not in numbers, but in function, in which these forces should be combined? I do not know of any way in which we can get to the bottom of this question but by such discussions as the lecturer has been good enough to raise amongst us here to-day. We have had many of them in this Institution. I am sure that, as between soldiers and sailors as a consequence, the agreement grows closer and closer every month. I do not know that there is any way of settling it except by open, fair and free discussion, in order that we may each get to understand one another and see what our position really is. My brother took a great deal of the wind out of my sails in speaking of his objections to the title. I wish the lecturer had taken a title that I think he has used before, namely, "The respective functions of the Army and Navy in defence." We could discuss it more clearly on such a title. The title chosen would rather seem to suggest that there is somewhere an authoritative party that would put the Army on one side. I have never met such a party, nor have I met any individual who professed to belong to such a party. But unquestionably there is great difficulty in a clear understanding as to the relative positions of the Army and Navy in defence. It is very like bi-metallism; the difficulty, as Lord Farrer tells us, is the difficulty of establishing the ratio, and that difficulty exists between the Army and the Navy. We have not fixed the defensive ratio yet. I myself in years gone by have been strangely misunderstood. It has been over and over again said that I was one of those who wish, as it were, to put the Army behind the Navy. It has never been so with me, my thought has always been that we wanted 100,000 men—the lecturer put it at 150,000, and I will be quite ready to agree with him,—that we could send anywhere out of this country in six weeks. I have thought that that is the least that we could do. The lecturer falls back on that very misleading expression, speaking of the Navy as a "line of defence." I cannot hear anyone using that expression—and I am sorry my gallant friend who spoke last has used it—without thinking that the user was not fully conversant with all the conditions of the

problem. If you had an island self-sustaining and self-contained, with an Army and a Navy, it would be quite right to speak of that Navy as the "first line of defence," because the island we may suppose could not be got at till the first line had been penetrated, and then might be defended on shore. But if you look at a group of islands with an Army and Navy, the Army distributed in the islands, and the Navy guarding the seas surrounding them, you lose at once the idea of "first line of defence." The enemy is in possession of the waters surrounding it, that group of islands, as a group, is broken up, the communication between them is destroyed, and they cease to be a government as a whole. That is the great difference which you must keep constantly in mind in speaking of "lines of defence." There was a very gallant and a somewhat eccentric admiral who at a City dinner, protesting against the expression the "first line of defence" as applied to the Navy, said the Navy was "the first line of defence, the second line of defence, and the third line of defence." Now to my mind that latter expression is just as misleading as the former. If you apply it again to the single island, and suppose that that island had no Army to defend it, but only a surrounding Navy, if that is broken through by a small force, there is nothing whatever to prevent the conquest of the island within the naval line. If you got a group of islands and had no armies in them, it would be the same thing, each island might be conquered by a small force which broke through the naval line. The defence of the group is consequently a joint business. There is first the Navy to protect the waters surrounding the islands, and to preserve the communications between them, and there must be in every island a garrison large enough to make sure that that island cannot be conquered by any force which might be able to evade the watch of the Navy. The preparation for the attack by the enemy in sufficient force must give the Navy notice in time; but when you have got a sufficient garrison for that purpose you have a complete defence between the Army and the Navy, not that the Army is behind the Navy in any way, but that it is acting with it and beside it. This, of course, limits military defence considerably, and it is that limit which, I think, if we rightly understood it, would enable us to have the satisfactory Army which the lecturer pleads for. Now, differences of opinion will exist upon that question of invasion, but it is for the Army a fundamental one. It is not so for the Navy. The Navy—although there are, as we have noticed just now, differences of opinion—the Navy as a whole is quite clear that being in sufficient strength it makes invasion impossible unless it is carried out by a force small enough to escape the notice of the Navy. But if you keep your Army for defensive purposes down to its minimum, you immediately free yourself to have a large Army for sending abroad at any moment that you require it. Therefore the military defence—the part the military take in defence—though absolutely necessary, is logically a minor part: it is one which the Army need not trouble very much with; it is one on which it may consult the Navy, and adopt the naval view, and if the Navy tells it distinctly and clearly that such and such a position is not likely to be attacked, unless it can be successfully attacked with a certain small body of men, then you need not put more garrisons or more works into that point than is necessary to protect against that minor raid. I agree generally with the lecturer's history, but I think, while we take his history as it stands, and while the naval and military defence must be laid down on the lines I have ventured to put forward, this Empire requires more. We have the great land frontier in Asia, which we recognise and prepare to defend, and which the lecturer thinks we are in a good condition to defend. We have recently been strongly reminded of that tremendous frontier in America, which, I understand him to say, we are not prepared to defend, and which I think we ought to be prepared to defend.

Captain JAMES: Certainly not! I said the existing forces are not adequate to defend it. That is a very different proposition to saying I did not propose to defend it.

Vice-Admiral COLOMB: I thought you said we were not ready—not organised to defend it; and I understand you to say so still.

Captain JAMES: That is no doubt so.

Vice-Admiral COLOMB: Well, we have felt most strongly in this recent crisis that everything might have depended upon the possibility of our putting 100,000 men in Canada in a few weeks. I do not know myself, but I am told that we could not put 30,000 men in Canada in a few weeks, and I say, if it is so, there is the real military problem. But I part, of course, with the lecturer when he comes to define his position. He takes it, he says, that the object of the Army is to render it impossible for an enemy to land in the United Kingdom without the certainty of defeat, and—this is the cream of it—thereby freeing the Navy for its proper sphere of operations, the enemy's coast line, and to attack his seaborne commerce. We constantly hear the expression used of how the Navy is to be "freed" to do something which is not defending. The lecturer seems to have it in his mind—he has confused himself with the use of the term "first line of defence"—he seems to have it in his mind that if there was no Army in this country it would necessarily withdraw the fleet from the enemy's coasts. But it is evident to every naval man, and I should think it must be to everyone in this theatre, that if there was no Army in this country, then all the more reason for the fleet being away watching the enemy's forces, and frustrating their advance upon this country. That "freeing the Navy" is a fallacious idea which has stepped into the lecturer's mind and coloured the greater part of his lecture. I am warned, my Lord, that time goes on, but the fact of the matter is that these fundamental questions must be debated and must be got to the bottom of, or you cannot get the Army into its proper condition. If you determine to have a great Army in this country for the defence of the United Kingdom, then I hold it impossible that you can get an efficient Army to send abroad, such as you might have wanted to send the other day.

Lieut.-Colonel T. MYLES SANDYS, M.P., 3rd Bn. Loyal North Lancashire Regiment: I came here to-day without any fixed intention of speaking, but seeing that no other military officer has got up to take part in the discussion, I venture, as a Member of Parliament who has taken, and takes, great interest in the defence of the country, and as an old soldier, and commanding at the present time a Militia regiment, to offer a few remarks on the lecture we have heard. The lecture, I think, we must all have agreed, is a most admirable one, dealing with a subject which is of overwhelming importance, not only to the Service, but to the nation at large. I take it also that we in this room are thoroughly agreed upon the necessity of there being an efficient Army, capable of undertaking in the field in the face of any enemy duties which may be laid upon it in any war. That I take to be a proposition in which we are all agreed. The lecturer speaks practically in this room to an assemblage of experts. Most of us here do not require to be convinced of the necessity for a sufficient Army, but the nation does require to be convinced of it. Now, the practical point to look at is, how are we to turn meetings of this kind to such effective account as shall cause the nation—the ultimate court of appeal—to bring such pressure to bear upon the Government of the day as shall compel them to concede what is needed for our military necessities? That, I take it, is also a point we are all agreed upon. Some time ago, I said in a debate in the House of Commons, no Government in this country, no matter which side it sits upon, has had the courage to tell the nation its military needs, or to ask Parliament to provide the funds necessary to give us a proper Army. I at the same time said that I did not believe and that I was not aware that up to the present time any standard had been fixed for our military requirements in reference to the object for which our Army is intended. The War Minister at that time said that such a standard for the Army had been fixed. But all I can say is that it is some years ago, and up to the present time I am still unconvinced; and from a statement that the lecturer has made to us to-day, I think we may take it the objects intended to be achieved by

our Army at home and abroad, and the strength necessary for carrying them out up to the time, still remain in the clouds. As the lecturer has said, the length of time devoted to his lecture was not sufficient for him to deal with the whole subject. Far be it from me to inflict any further details upon you to-day; but I will say this, that I thoroughly agree with him when he said that we have no second line of defence. Worse than that, with regard to our Militia, which is the true support of the Army, the commanding officers of the Militia were told by His Royal Highness, who recently laid down the reins as Commander-in-Chief, that in the event of war we must make up our minds to have the Reserve men taken out of the Militia forces to bring the first line up to its fighting standard, though he was very sorry to say so, and he knew we should be sorry to lose them, because it would leave our regiments shorn of their best men; yet we must make up our minds to it, as it was for the benefit of the country. I maintain that this is a faulty system, and that if the Militia is to do its work, which it is only too ready to do, its best men should not be taken away in war-time. One other point I emphasise is this: We have at the present time, as we have been told by the lecturer, at least six different patterns of field-guns in use in this Army. The sooner that number is cut down to two patterns the better, and for that purpose I maintain that we ought to have an Ordnance Committee, composed of experts, responsible not to the War Office, but to Parliament for the efficiency of the ordnance of the country. That is a technical question which has many sides to it, and might, perhaps, be thrashed out with advantage at another lecture of this kind. I feel sure that meetings of the kind held to-day, and lectures such as have been given to us by Captain James, cannot fail to be of advantage to the cause which we all have at heart; and I trust that all those whom I have the honour of addressing will do their utmost individually among their friends, and especially in bringing Members of Parliament to influence the Government to give us the Army we need.

General Sir W. OLPHERTS, V.C., K.C.B., R.A. (late Bengal): It is some years, my Lord, since I have been in the walls of this Institution, or rather that which represented this Institution not long ago. I think on the last occasion I was present your Lordship was in the chair, and you were kind enough to say you would be very glad on every future occasion when you presided to welcome your old friend and comrade who is now speaking. I have come here not like the last speaker with a fixed determination not to speak; on the contrary, I came here with a fixed determination to speak, if I could find any fitting occasion for doing so; consequently, I not only listened with great attention to what the lecturer said, but I read through the whole of his lecture. I may say I could not find in it any point that I wish to criticise. I think it is a very moderate exposition of the state of the Army, and puts before you in a very modest way the fact, and no one will deny it, that the Army, although as the lecturer truly said it was never in a better condition, still requires strengthening, if not quite so much as the Navy, yet in proportion to the Navy, at least to bring it up to what is required in this country. Now, I could see nothing in the lecture, as I said, that would provoke me to get on my feet, but then came Sir John Colomb, a Member of Parliament, who spoke in such an authoritative manner, and in such aggressive tones—though I really could not make out whether he was attacking the Army or the Navy—that I was induced to send up my card. Having done so, I was fully re-assured by Sir Edmund Commerell's eloquent and impressive speech. He completely took the wind out of the sails of his predecessor. I have not much exception to take with what Admiral Colomb who addressed you said, only as he took rather more than ten minutes, I trust I may be pardoned if I inadvertently exceed the limited time accorded to each speaker. Now, as to the subject of the lecture, I really do not think there can be two opinions in this meeting—that the Army does require strengthening—and I hope it will have it. The Army is as necessary for the existence of this country, as a great country, as the Navy. Supposing we had no Army at all, and that the Navy were defeated, are we to sit down here in this

country doing nothing? I recollect hearing a little anecdote which, on the last occasion when I spoke before Lord Wolseley, I gave as an illustration of my meaning, and which I think made a favourable impression on the meeting referred to. On the present occasion I will give you another anecdote, or illustration. Some years ago, in the days of the old East India Company, an officer was coming home in one of the P. and O. steamers. He got into discussion with one of the officers of that steamer, and somehow or other he must have rubbed him up the wrong way, for the P. and O. officer turned upon him and said, "Who are you? What are you? You only belong to a company. We are a company the same as you. We have got a Navy the same as you, and all we want is an Army to be as good as you!" That was the sentiment of the P. and O. officer, and I think you will agree with him that he was quite right, that he did want an Army to be as good as the East India Company; and that every nation requires an Army—not only a mere handful of men, but a good honest Army—ready to defend the country, and to attack their enemies where necessary. I wish you success in your efforts to increase the strength of the Army.

Lieut.-General F. W. TRAILL BURROUGHS, C.B. : I think we are all agreed we want an Army, and I think we are all agreed we want a Navy. The difficulty appears to be how to get men, both for the Army and Navy. Conscription we are told is very unpopular, and if one mentions the word conscription we are always told the people in this country will not stand it. The only alternative that occurs to me is, that we must then take a back seat in the affairs of the world. Every other great Power in Europe, and even Japan, has conscription. It is said to be a very unpopular word even if you call it general service. I think something, however, must be done in that line, and I think the best way would be, as the lecturer has told us in his most excellent lecture, that as the Queen has the power to call her subjects to serve in the Army and Navy, that we should have a Naval and Military Militia—say, 200,000 men for the Navy, and 300,000 for the Army—on whom the minister of the day could lay his hands and order them to any part of the world on the shortest notice. Until we have such power we shall never be able to hold our own in the councils of the world. For our orators may make speeches, and Parliament may make laws, but without means of enforcing them decrees are of no avail, and as a nation we are despised and flouted by our neighbours. If the conscripts were enlisted—say, for a year at a time—I would not remove them from their daily occupation. I would leave them all in their homes and utilise the machinery of the Volunteers and Naval Coast Reserves to train them; and for, say, a fortnight yearly, the soldiers should go and join the Army autumn manœuvres, and the naval men should go and serve in the Channel Squadron, and be exercised in the defence of our shores, both classes being paid only on the days they drilled or were embodied. I do not think it would do them any harm, in fact, having commanded a brigade of Artillery Volunteers for seven years, I believe they all enjoyed their work very much, and I do not think it would be unpopular. The conscripts might be engaged for one year at a time, and during that year they ought to be liable in cases of emergency to be sent to any part of the world where their services were required to supplement the efforts of the Regular Army and Navy. Without something of that sort I do not know how we shall get on. For in these days the press-gang can no longer be resorted to to fill our ships. And all who served in the Crimea and Indian Mutiny wars will remember how, on both occasions, it was just touch and go with our Army for want of men. Wars nowadays are declared on small pretext, and on very short warning, and they last but a short time. The last great war in Europe was a seven weeks' war. The next may be a seven days' war, and in that short time, if we are caught unprepared, the ruin of the British Empire may be accomplished. It behoves us, therefore, to be prepared, both by sea and land, and if prepared, the prospects of our being attacked are greatly diminished; whereas, if caught

unprepared and attacked by any great Power, our fate will be that of China when attacked by Japan.

Captain W. H. JAMES, in reply: I do not know that there is very much for me to say in reply to the discussion. I, first of all, would deal with Sir John Colomb, who said that no one disputes the necessity for an Army. My answer to that is, the present state of the Army. It is idle to say that the necessity for an Army is admitted, when you see the present state of our military forces, and know what they really ought to be. The reply to Sir John Colomb is, that the nation at large does not understand the problem, and what we who do understand more or less about it have got to do is to educate the citizens of this country into fully acknowledging what their responsibilities are. Now, I have to deal with two members of the Colomb family to-day: both attack me because I use the words "first line of defence." They form a convenient method of expression, which is not meant to be an exact definition; but I do venture to say that the true solution of the problem we are all considering, which is a conjoint one of the Navy and Army, is not to be found in haggling over words or hair-splitting definitions, but in looking to the real facts we are dealing with. There is a point on which I must also join issue with Sir John Colomb when he said that the naval supremacy must be ensured before the war takes place. How in the name of common sense is that possible? No mere number of ships will give you naval supremacy. If the proposition be true, you have only to send over to France and say, "We have ten more ships than you have—you must not fight." At the beginning of every war that takes place we shall have to *fight* to establish naval supremacy, and the postulate of all subsequent operations is that we win in the fight. Admiral Colomb shakes his head. May I ask how we are going to get naval supremacy without fighting? Of course, I do not expect the Colonies to furnish army-corps, and I do not think there is anything in my lecture which would lead anybody to suppose that I did; but I do say the assistance which was given when Australia sent her men to Suakin was exceedingly valuable. It shows solidarity between the various portions of the Empire, and it shows that our brethren beyond the seas are anxious and eager and glad to take part in any struggle in which the mother country may be involved. Again, Sir John Colomb says, under certain conditions, invasion would not only be impossible, but would be unnecessary. That is a point on which I do not propose to offer an opinion. I think it is a point which cannot be settled by Sir John Colomb or any other Englishman, Irishman, or Scotchman; it is much more likely to be settled by a foreigner. If that poor, ignorant foreigner thought, in the event of our losing our sea supremacy, and not having an efficient Army, that it was desirable to invade this country, I am afraid no theories whatever we might here put forward in peace-time would stop him doing so. I confess I do not quite follow Sir John Colomb's argument about foreign mercantile marines. He rather talked of it as if the mercantile marine abroad was organised like the Army and Navy as part of the taxation of the nation, and I do not see how the use of national funds for maintaining an Army and Navy can keep down the mercantile marine of any country if there be profitable means of employing its ships—*i.e.*, the mercantile navy is a growth due to certain economic conditions. If those economic conditions exist you will have a good mercantile navy, in spite of having the biggest Army and biggest Navy in existence. Take our own case: the conditions are favourable to us, and our mercantile navy is the largest in the world. We have seen the growth of the mercantile navies of foreign Powers, notwithstanding the fact that they expend an enormous sum on the Army and on the Navy. I hope the fear expressed by the gallant Member will not be realised. He is afraid that my lecture may divert the public from the necessity for an Army. If this be the case, all I can say is I must have expressed myself very badly; but I fancy from the audible expression of our feelings that this is not the case. Admiral Close asked me how I proposed to feed the Army—that is a point I am going to leave to the

Navy to settle. I am a free-trader; therefore, it is rather a delicate question to put to me. I certainly do not see any means which are likely to be adopted by which we can grow sufficient bread stuffs in this country, and as long as we do not do so we have certainly got to insure their coming from abroad. I must thank my friend Sir Edmund Commerell for all he said. I think it is most important to get an expression of opinion of the nature that he has favoured us with this afternoon from an admiral of his distinction and long service. Now, I come to my old friend Admiral Colomb, who wishes to know what I meant by conjoint expeditions, and what ought to be the respective parts played by the Navy and Army in them.

I am going to give some instances which, I think, carry strong conviction with them, where the Army was ridiculously incompetent for the purpose. Take those expeditions against the French coast. We burnt Cherbourg—what was the effect of that? Practically nothing. If we had been able to land a large army and do something in France, then the result would have been great. We made two attempts on St. Malo—one successful, the other unsuccessful. I do not see that they produced any particular result on the war. But, mark you, these are successful ones: what about the numerous unsuccessful operations in which we have failed in France? What about the Quiberon expedition, in which we failed, simply because we had no proper military organisation to put there? Whenever we have had these joint small expeditions, in nine cases out of ten they have been made by a ridiculous military force, and have produced no result whatever on the course of the war. I always find on occasions like this, when I venture to talk of this particular subject, we have the good old bogey put up to be knocked down, that there is no party which deprecates the Army. There is no one who does not want an Army. It is a very remarkable fact if this be the case, if there be such an enormous consensus of opinion in favour of an Army, why have we not got one? There must be some reason. I leave that to my friends who say nobody has kept down the Army to answer. I take it that the admiral, of whom Admiral Colomb spoke, who said the Navy was the first line and the second line and the third line, was one of those who did not think much of the Army in the defensive arrangements of the Empire. I have dealt with the question and the use of the words "line of defence," but I venture to say anybody who has read my lecture must admit that, when I spoke of the Navy as the first line of defence, I used it in a very aggressive sense, for I distinctly stated that its sphere of operations was on the enemy's coast, and in raids on his seaborne commerce. I do not rest entirely on the Army for defending this country or the Empire, and I really cannot admit that anything I have said justifies anybody in saying that I do so. I have stated that the enemy's frontier is the sphere of operations of the Navy, and when I say this I venture to think that to enable the Navy to do this, to follow out what Sir Edmund Commerell said, it is necessary to have an Army to free your Navy for the defensive-offensive operations. It is not for me to speak of what I do not know. I am in the same position as you all are, I know nothing that we do not hear from the most public sources; but I venture to say there is one point on which perhaps a little naval organisation might be required, and it is this: While we might with an effort be able to put 70,000 men in line for shipping abroad, I am not at all prepared to admit that all the arrangements by which these troops can be transported are in a forward state of preparation. I do not say, and I do not suppose, the non-existence of an Army would render it necessary to withdraw the Navy from the offensive position, I think it should always hold with regard to the enemy's fleet. It seems to me absurd not to see that the best way of defeating your enemy is to hit him as hard as you can. To do that, we do not want the Navy kept at home to defend the coasts. But I am quite sure that as long as public opinion does not give us an adequate Army, so long will public opinion require, when war breaks out, the hampering of the action of the Navy by keeping a large portion of it on our coasts. I do not believe any Cabinet in

existence would dare, at the present moment, to send its fleets away to do what is their proper and right duty, because it would feel a certain amount of difficulty would arise from the fact that they have not got adequate military forces to free them. I hope Colonel Sandys will do what I think a great many other Members of Parliament ought to do, that is to say, endeavour to put these points before the Members of the Government and enlighten them a little on what is really required. I always think a Cabinet Minister is much in the same position as a barrister. A barrister is nearly always an eloquent man, and is always capable of talking more or less reasonably and well on almost any subject you can give him. So it is with regard to a Cabinet Minister. A Cabinet Minister is an orator of long practice, not always a great orator, but always fairly fluent, and always prepared to talk on any subject; and in nine cases out of ten when you come to technical questions like military and naval, his talk on the subject is equally worth listening to, whatever particular branch he may take up. I am very pleased to see Sir William Olpherts here once more among us. We always know that he is amusing, and also we know that amid the amusement he affords us he always wraps up some good sterling common sense. General Burroughs touched upon a very thorny subject, the question of conscription. We in England, I believe, hold that it is a magnificent thing that every one of our men is a Volunteer: so it is, if you get enough of them; but if our people do not volunteer, you will have to take other very drastic means to raise the Army. But I am not at all prepared to admit that at the present moment we have come to an end of the Volunteer Forces of the nation. I think we have dealt with them on certain old lines, and we have continued in the same groove, but I venture to think if we frankly discuss the situation and determine what is required of us, there is no reason to doubt we should get it by voluntary efforts, and I say so for this reason, I believe the English are the most pugnacious, but least military, nation in existence. They are always wanting to fight somebody. At the bottom of every Englishman's heart lies that sentiment that "those foreigners want their heads punched." That is very fine, but it is not sufficient. We want to organise our resources to put us really in a proper position to maintain the Empire of which we are the custodians.

The CHAIRMAN (Lord Wolseley): I shall not detain you very long, for I have little to say, and I shall confine myself to a few words upon the general subject as it has been laid before us this evening, without venturing upon anything like a full discussion of the subsidiary topics brought before us. I should like in the first place to remark that, as you may well imagine, whilst holding the position I do at present, it would be impossible for me to enter upon any minute examination of the subject Captain James has brought before us. Upon the great national question as to whether we require an Army or not, I think we are all agreed; but upon such questions as those of conscription and of universal service, you may well understand it would be impossible for me to say anything. There have been in the course of the discussion many statements made which were not exactly accurate, and yet I do not feel privileged to specify them. I refer to statements made as to our present power of offence and defence, and as to our military forces generally at this present moment, which would represent us as being in an inferior position to that which we really occupy. Above all things, I think that in a discussion of this nature it is very desirable we should start, as the lecturer started, with a determination to discuss the question under consideration in the best possible good humour. There is no intention that I know of on the part of the lecturer, nor do I know of any on the part of those who have listened to him, to attack either the Army or the Navy. I think it is most desirable we should approach the subject under discussion, feeling that the Army and Navy, as has been so well said by that distinguished Admiral, Sir Edmund Commerell, are sister Services, between whom exist the strongest bonds of union, reliance, and affection. That this is so, I know to be universally accepted in the Army. I am

sure I speak in the name of the Army generally when I say that all thinking soldiers are fully alive to the fact that the Navy must be first considered, that, with all due deference to Admiral Colomb, it is our first line of defence, and that consequently, there must be no question of its strength, as compared with any other Navy in the world. Now, the question whether the expressions of "first line of defence," and "second line of defence," are, or are not, accurate, matters very little indeed. But, I think, in denouncing that expression—and it was quite open to anyone to denounce it—due allowance was not made to-day for a fact which occurs to most people when discussing the military and naval power of this country: I mean, that the first object for which our Army and Navy exist is the defence of this United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland. All will admit that the first brunt of the battle must fall upon the fleets in the Channel and elsewhere round these coasts. In other words, the first line of defence for these two Islands is undoubtedly the Navy, which is intended to protect us from invasion, and the second is the Army, which, in the event of a great naval disaster—and our past history warns us that such a misfortune must be calculated for—is intended to fight the enemy when he has landed on our shores. One of the greatest national misfortunes we can imagine would be such a defeat of our Navy at sea as would leave the Channel open to the enemy and so allow his land forces to invade this country. We require an Army—we must always have an Army—to meet any such possible contingency. With all due respect to the naval enthusiast who may honestly think that a Navy only is necessary, and feeling as I do the greatest love for and pride in our Navy: believing it to be the finest Navy in the world, and that the glories which surround it exceed those of any other Service, be it the Army or Navy of any other country, I cannot help remembering how unsafe and unstable an element the sea is. I cannot help remembering the disasters which from time to time overtake our greatest ships, even during peace manœuvres, in calm waters. We have seen ships run into one another and sometimes sink one another upon such occasions. Does not history tell us of fleets being almost destroyed by one violent storm? And may we not have the same condition of things again? Surely some disasters may overtake us at sea in the future as they have done in the past. Where is the man who, when going into action with our Army, or with any Army in the world, would be fool enough to say that he knew with absolute certainty that he was going to win, and that there was no risk of defeat? And yet we fight upon a stable element like the earth! The man who would speak in similarly confident terms about any fleet would, to state it mildly, far exceed, I think, what he ought to say. We feel the greatest confidence in our Navy, and do most firmly believe that if any English fleet ever meets any other fleet in battle, we shall win; but to assert that such a result is a certainty would, it appears to me, amount to madness. Therefore, as it is impossible to lay down as a certainty that this Navy of ours is always certain to win, I say we must have—pardon me for using the expression—a second line of defence—that is, the Army on shore. There is a point that has been referred to by Admiral Close which I must not pass by, because it is one which I see frequently dwelt upon in newspapers and by gentlemen who write naval essays in magazines—I mean the question of our food supply in this country. I have no wish to enter into statistics as to whether we have three, four, eight, or nine months' provision always in this country for the mouths to be fed. The average, as far as I remember, is from eight to three months, according to the season of the year; that is, of grain supply. I am not talking of cattle, but the actual amount of flour in the country, as far as I remember, is from eight to three months' supply, three months being the minimum. But I take up the position that it matters very little whether we have three or eight months' supply. I look round these two Islands and I see them indented with harbours on every side, harbours where ships can run in and be unloaded; and knowing how impossible it is for a fleet, even for our fleet, the greatest fleet in the world, to close one

harbour or two harbours, I do not believe that all the fleets in the world could effectually blockade all our coasts or keep foreign ships, especially ships from our cousins on the other side of the Atlantic, who are always looking for the main chance, determined to make money where they can, from running their cargoes of wheat into some of the many harbours which stud our coasts. I think that of all the fallacies which have been palmed off upon us of late, this is the worst, for it is the most misleading. I remember well all the circumstances of the time when, some years ago, a demand arose for a great augmentation of our fleet. And may I say, in parenthesis, that no one took a greater interest in it than I did, and in my humble way I do not think many men worked harder in order to have our fleet increased than I did at that time. But I regretted extremely when I saw some of my naval friends then conjure up this bogey of the food supply for our people as an extra reason why we should build more ships of war. I thought the move unworthy of the great question we were contending for; I thought it unworthy of the cause we advocated, because I knew myself that it was utterly impossible to cut this country off from the supplies of wheat which we require from abroad. I do not mean to say that flour would not be dearer after a great naval disaster, or that wheat would not be more costly if we lost command of the sea, and if the enemy were able to cruise wherever they liked about the Atlantic; but, remember, the coasts of Ireland and England are not places, certainly on the Atlantic side, where ships can coal at sea; and fleets blockading the harbours on the West coast of these Islands would have to go back to their own ports before they could coal again. I think people who know our Western coasts as well as I do will be convinced of that. I would also add that if one lesson was taught us by our early naval manœuvres, it was certainly the fact of how impossible it was to keep ships inside a harbour from coming out, or those outside from getting in. I see my friend, Admiral Colomb, shakes his head, and, as the question of blockade is a naval one, I ought, perhaps, to apologise for having touched upon it. But as regards the food supply, that is not a naval point. It is open to any man to take up a map and look at the harbours round these two Islands, and to see for himself how impossible it would be, even after we had suffered the most serious defeat at sea, for any one fleet, or for all the fleets in the world combined, to keep out the supply of corn we should require for our population. As regards many of the various points dealt with by the lecturer, I feel more at liberty to pitch into him than I may be into others. But I have no intention of doing so, because I listened to his lecture with the greatest interest; and, in the main, I agree with its conclusions, although I do not agree with a number of things he said, evidently with the intention of making his lecture more amusing. I shall pass over what he told us of the shortcomings of the Army Clothing Department. I am sorry to say that his statements did hold good some years ago; they do not hold good at the present moment. They were very amusing, however, and served to enliven his lecture. He also told us a great deal about the Martini-Henry rifle and the bore and bolt of the new magazine arm. He said it was settled upon very hastily; he pointed out the great number of guns of different calibres in use in our Army, and he pictured the unfortunate condition of the man who was to be held responsible for supplying ammunition to those arms and guns when in action. I should agree with him if we were in the position that he referred to. However, I am not prepared to say that we have not more than one bore for our guns. I regret very much that we have several bores, but we are doing the best we can in our small, humble way to rectify the various points he has found fault with. I have now merely to wind up our interesting proceedings to-day by thanking Captain James for having given us a very admirable lecture. Whether we agree with the designation of it or not, we must all agree that he has brought before us, in a very pleasant and agreeable manner, a most interesting topic; and whether you agree with his conclusions or not, you are still, I feel sure, grateful to him for having come here to-day to inform us of them.