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"men of scientific training have been guilty of extravagant and sometimes absurd statements with regard to shortcomings, wastefulness and cumbersomeness of the marketing machinery."

To the removal of this misunderstanding, and the communication of the necessary knowledge of the facts and their reasons, Professor Weld's luminous and thorough essay has been most opportunely consecrated; and his great success cannot, we feel, be impugned. His book, intended primarily for American readers, will be welcomed by English students; for the odium of middlemen and the distinctive importance of selling, as contrasted with manufacture, are not, of course, peculiar to the United States. L.L.P.

10.—*Trade as a Science*. By Ernest J. P. Benn. With Introductory Preface by the Rt. Hon. Lord Burnham. 184 pp., 8vo. London: Jarrold and Sons, 1916. Price 2s. 6d. net.

The British merchant and manufacturer nowadays are not lacking in advice as to how they should proceed to obtain success in their future efforts to maintain and extend their trade. Mr. Benn's advice is "Organise!" The absence, in many trades, of organisation handicaps the British producer in his struggles against the organised competition of Germany and America. It leaves him helpless and inarticulate in face of political interference. It weakens him in his dealings with labour. It keeps him ignorant of important developments in manufacturing or business operations. It enhances working costs in many directions, or at least prevents their reduction, and it renders it difficult for the enterprising producer to gain the control of additional capital. In place of the existing competition and secretiveness between manufacturers or traders, Mr. Benn urges the establishment of a Trade Association for each important industry, charged, among other things, with the supervision and development of export business; the promotion of research; the advising of Government Departments and other authorities in matters of technical and commercial education; the collection and dissemination of statistics of trade, working costs, production, supplies, &c.; the encouragement of harmonious relations between labour and capital; and the arrangement of exhibits and advertisements of general trade interest.

The State is to find a place in the scheme through the establishment of a Ministry of Commerce, working in close contact with the Trade Associations. Indeed, it is suggested that some of the former's officials should be appointed, and half the salaries paid, by the latter bodies, an arrangement which would easily become unsatisfactory to the two masters, the Ministry and the Trade Association, and to their common servant.

Mr. Benn works out his scheme in much detail, and ably sets forth the advantages attaching to it. But he does not want too much organisation, at least on the part of the State. He desires each trade to find salvation mainly in its own efforts, and not to wait on political measures, whether tariffs or otherwise.

There is little doubt that the future will see a large extension of

co-operative action on the part of producers and traders, and Mr. Benn's book points the way. But we shall not arrive at his goal all at once, if at all. The tradition of individualism will, and political action may, see to that. A.D.W.

11.—*The Rise of Rail Power in War and Conquest, 1833–1914.* By E. A. Pratt. 405 pp., 8vo. London: P. S. King and Son, 1915. Price 7s. 6d. net.

This work may be looked on as primarily a book of the moment. On the face of it, it is not the outcome of a long study and consideration of the problems involved in the use of railways in war. It seems rather the product of a rapid compilation from many sources of facts in regard to the use of railways in past wars with excursions into the objects aimed at, and the methods employed. These are, however, arranged in no clear order.

The first stage in the use of railways in war is for the mobilization of the forces. This is almost a preliminary stage as it will usually be carried out in the last few days before the actual declaration of war. The second stage is the concentration of the armies, and even this stage may be proceeding whilst peace and war yet hang in the balance. It is typical of the book that the first problem dealt with is "Railway Destruction in War." In spite of selecting this as the subject of a chapter, Mr. Pratt only deals with railway destruction in the American Civil War, and the matter is recurred to later in the book in odd places under such headings as "Repair of Railways in "the Boer War."

No one, who understands the intricacy of railway working will hesitate to accept the view that the railway working must be in the hands of men who are technically efficient. Whilst this is the case, the differences between the working of railways in peace and war are so great, that it is not sufficient that those in charge should have a thorough acquaintance with peace-time working. Good as the work has been which our railways have done, it is easy to see how the habit of thinking of the Company as the unit has clung and hindered our railways achieving all that they might have done. For long traffics followed their old competitive routes. Waggonage has not been distributed and used with a sole eye to the carriage of a maximum traffic on the railways as a whole. Efficient control of the forwardings was not installed until considerable trouble arose. It is harmful to gloss over these shortcomings, and far better to face them and look for the remedy. They are shortcomings of which the military authorities in this country had received ample warnings.

In dealing with the Russo-Japanese War, Mr. Pratt seems to have got lost amongst the various sources of his information. A start from a wrong basis no doubt helped the confusion, for the train capacity assumed for the Trans-Siberian Railway at the outset is not more than half of what it was capable of if the working had been good. The truth is the traffic working of the line was very indifferent, and the interference with the working in Manchuria was disgraceful. If Mr. Pratt will investigate the extent of the interference and its