The Northern Pacification of 1719-20

PART II.—THE SWEDISH TREATIES.

LORD CARTERET, ambassador extraordinary and plenipotentiary, reached Stockholm on 11 July 1719. His commission was to renew the treaty of 1700 with Great Britain, lately expired, to support Colonel Bassewitz in his negotiation for peace with Hanover, and to promote peace with Denmark and Prussia. Like Whitworth at Berlin, he was furnished with triple instructions, principal, additional, and private.¹ The first were chiefly concerned with the promotion and protection of trade. The second expressed King George's desire for a restoration of the ancient amity, so necessary for the maintenance of the Protestant religion; recalled the help formerly given by Great Britain, particularly in regard to the Neutrality Convention of 1710, 'which would have protected the Swedish possessions in Germany, if the late king had not wilfully prevented it;' ascribed what had happened since to the attacks upon commerce; and offered the mediation of Great Britain, as a neutral power, for a general peace. Queen Ulrica was to be assured of personal support and of efforts to obtain the association of her husband, the prince of Hesse, with her in the sovereignty. Damages done to trade on either side were to be assessed and balanced. There was an exposition of the advantage to Sweden in being rid of the burden of her German provinces; the recovery of losses 'towards Finland and Livonia is the only thing every true Swede should have at heart;' the friendship of the kings of Denmark, Poland, and Prussia was essential to strengthen the queen's hands against the tsar, and it could only be obtained by their being allowed to retain their acquisitions. That he should retain Finland and Livonia, the granaries and bulwarks of Sweden, and be master in the Baltic, would be fatal to her. This, Carteret, was told,

is a consideration of such importance to the commerce of Our subjects and even to their safety, which could not be so well provided for without the naval stores We draw from those ports, that you are to labour this point with the utmost dexterity and application.

¹ Record Office, King's Letters 65, of date 6 May, o.s.

The squadrons sent to the Baltic had only been intended to protect trade; if the molestation thereof were stopped, the Swedes would have no reason to be jealous of their coming; on the contrary, if the alliance were renewed, they would be employed for the interest and security of Sweden.

The private instructions I may quote in full:

We judge it to be of so great consequence to the trade and security of Our British Dominions as well as to the peace and tranquillity of Christendom that the Czar should not grow too powerfull in the Baltick, that if you find the Queen of Sweden and Prince of Hesse listen to Our proposals of their making peace and entring into a friendship and good correspondence with the kings of Denmark and Poland, the king of Prussia, and other neighbouring potentates of Germany, you shall make them an offer in Our name that if the Czar refuses to conclude a peace with Sweden upon the foot of making such restitutions to that Crown as are necessary for its security and for preserving the trade in the Baltick upon the same foot as it was before the present troubles began, besides the assistance which shall be agreed upon to be given them by Us towards recovering the same by force of arms, We will employ Our utmost credit and interest with the powers before mentioned and with Our other allys to procure supplys from them for enabling the Swedes to bring the Czar to reason.

Carteret found himself opposed by a very strong party, headed by the chancellor, Count Cronhielm, which favoured peace with Russia.² On his side were the prince of Hesse and Marshal Dücker, the heads of the army. The first difficulty was met with in Cronhielm's objection to accept Carteret's credentials, from which the queen's full titles were omitted. But she, moved by Bassewitz, waived the objection, granted an audience, and named commissioners to treat.³ Carteret found that the cession of Bremen and Verden had been promised to Bassewitz upon the condition, among others, that Great Britain, in renewing the treaty of 1700, should be obliged to render help in money, troops, and ships to recover what had been conquered by the tsar. Upon this he requested instructions.⁴ If only the tsar would give up Reval, he said, peace would certainly be made with him. He earnestly desired that the British squadron under Sir John Norris, now at Copenhagen, might be ordered up the Baltic at once, in order that the fears of a Russian invasion might be allayed.

² Proposals had been made by Peter the Great at Stockholm through Brigadier Lefort, before Carteret arrived.

³ Count Gustavus Cronhielm, president of the chancery, Count and Marshal Charles Gustavus Dücker, Count Gustavus Adam Taube, governor of Stockholm, Count Magnus de la Gardie, president of the Royal College of Commerce, all four senators, and Baron Daniel Nicholas Höpken, secretary of state. The chancellor and Höpken, a very able man, says Carteret, might be gained over by presents.

⁴ 'I never doubted but they would part with those Duchys, if the king would give more and engage himself to doe more for them, than they are worth.'

So far Carteret had written, 3 July, o.s., when Dücker and Bassewitz came in with news that the Russian troops were embarked and would land within four miles of Stockholm. If this happened, they said, the tsar's terms must be accepted. Only the king of England could help, and that by sending his fleet on. Carteret said that the conditions offered to Bassewitz could not be accepted. Dücker rejoined that if the fleet were ordered up, they would not be insisted upon. Carteret answered that he would write to request it, if the queen would declare to that effect and finish the Hanoverian treaty. To this at an audience she consented, only insisting that a footing must be preserved in Germany. Carteret urged that resolute measures should be taken; even if the news about the Russians were untrue, he said, for the fleet to come up would be no great matter.

Sir John Norris had arrived in Copenhagen roads on 3 July. His departure had been delayed pending the return of ships from the Mediterranean,⁵ for it had been necessary to defend the Channel against the threatened Spanish invasion. Even now his command included only eleven of the line and the 'Port Mahon' frigate. On the other hand, it was known that twenty-one Russian men-of-war and four frigates had been got ready at Cronslot and Réval to protect the force invading Sweden. The Swedes had only a few ill-equipped vessels to resist them. And it was believed that the Danes were acting in concert with the tsar, and might send some ships to join him. Consequently Norris was in no condition to do what was asked of him. Stanhope wrote to him on 11 July that the only commands which could be given him at present were to protect the traders and dispose his squadron as most convenient for that purpose. He was informed by Bernstorff that a reinforcement would be sent him. And he was asked, to quote his journal, 'what force of Denmark or Sweden would be sufficient to see the Russians?'⁶

Yet Stanhope was as eager as his colleagues to see the Russian

⁵ 'Capt. Hardy is at length arrived with his squadron from Port Mahon, and therefore Sir John Norris is now preparing with an expedition for his voyage to the Baltic' (Craggs to Stanhope, 29 May, o.s., Record Office, Regencies 73).

⁶ Brit. Mus., Add. MSS. 28129, 28146, 28155. Writing to Stanhope, Norris said (7 July o.s., Record Office, S.P. Dom. Naval 86): 'From what I have heard of the actions between our Country and the Dutch, or that has past to my knowledge from the happy Revolution to this time, I have not observ'd that when the force has been near equal on both sides that it has been able to make a final determination of success, and tho I would not give too much reputation to the Russians, yet in proportion to their neighbours I may be join'd with on either hand I beleive they may acquit themselves upon near an equality to them, and as the situation of the Czar's affairs is likely to be this year near his own ports, it may be conjectured that with his fleet he may have the use of a great number of gallies which in calms that attend the summer season may give him an opportunity to make an attack upon some port where it will not be in our power to prevent it.'

fleet destroyed. In a despatch home,⁷ after expressing uncertainty about a Danish reinforcement to Norris, he went on :

It were indeed extremely to be wished, that he had with him a force sufficient to put himself in the way of the Russes. I am persuaded that, if he had six English ships more than he has, he might barely by shewing himself, without striking a stroke, or even declaring himself, entirely defeat all the Czar's designs and save Sweden. By the conversation I have had with Major Finbo I have reason to believe that Sr. Jn. Norris himself is of this opinion. He is extremely satisfied with the condition and quality of the ships he has, which are very well manned. And tho I believe that even with what he has he would disengage himself without much loss from the Czar's fleet, yet the disproportion of their number is so great, that nobody can advise he should put himself in their way. And it would be a great misfortune if for want of some more ships we should lose the opportunity of awing the Czar, saving Sweden, and by giving Peace to the North, of defeating the greatest hope which is now left to Spain, that of forming a strong Alliance against us in the North. The Lords Justices will therefore consider, whether, being at present intirely free from all apprehensions at home, any reinforcements may be sent to Sr. John Norris.⁸

Carteret wrote to Norris on 4 July, o.s., desiring a copy of his instructions, as his own made it appear that the admiral was to obey his calls. 'Nothing,' he said, 'keeps these people from agreeing with the Czar, but the hopes they have that we shall protect them against any invasion he shall endeavour to make upon them.' The queen and prince both thought that if Norris would come up the Baltic, the Russians would never venture out. It was of the greatest importance that he should come as far as Gothland ; if he did so, the king would probably approve.⁹

The best thing for the Swedes to do, Stanhope advised in a despatch of 10 July, was to fit out as many ships as possible at Carlskrona in order to try to cut off supplies from coming to the Russian army. A land battle should be avoided unless success were certain. Without sustenance from the fleet the force must

⁷ To Delafaye, 1 July, o.s., Record Office, Regencies 12.

⁸ Whitworth in like strain to Norris from Hanover, 11 July, expressed the hearty wish that he had four or five ships more, and were 'gone to take the air up the Baltick, affairs being so very ticklish. . . . The sight of an English flag well accompanied would make all your mushroom seamen of the north keep their heads in.

'Where'er thy Navy spreads her canvas wings
Homage to thee and peace to all she brings.'

His own 'land-expedition,' meaning his return to Berlin, would have success proportionate to that of Norris at sea (Brit. Mus., Add. MS. 28155). On 14 July, o.s., Stanhope sent thanks for the quick despatch of the reinforcements desired : 'it was a particular pleasure to his Maj^{ty} to find their Excellencies have ordered four men-of-war to join Sr. John Norris's fleet in the Baltick' (Record Office, Regencies 12).

⁹ Brit. Mus., Add. MS. 28146 ; Record Office, S.P. Dom. Naval 86. Received by Norris 10 July, o.s.

perish of itself.¹⁰ When Carteret wrote again, 12 July, o.s., the Swedes were in the sorest straits. Twenty-two Russian men-of-war and four frigates were off the coast, 300 galleys with some 30,000 men on board had entered the river of Stockholm.¹¹ Its passages were too well defended to allow them to come up, but the troops landed at various points to burn and pillage. In the south the Danish army had crossed the frontier, Strömstad had been evacuated, Marstrand was being bombarded. It fell with its fortress Karlssten before Tordenskjold on the 26th. All the ships in the harbour, seven men-of-war of from 44 to 50 guns, two frigates and a number of smaller vessels were taken or sunk. Yet the prince of Hesse and Dücker stood out against the large majority of the senators for resistance. To defend the capital they formed a camp of 20,000 men at Tuna a few miles out.¹² The immediate effect, indeed, was the signature not of terms with Russia, but of the treaty with Hanover, under Carteret's written promise that the treaty of 1700 should be renewed in a form applicable to present circumstances, and that in the meantime an express should be sent to Norris desiring him to advance with his squadron and act according to his instructions. 'Our success,' Carteret wrote, 'is chiefly owing to the Czar, he at the gates of Stockholm has reasoned the best for us.' The prince and Dücker would rather die than accept his terms.

'Here,' Carteret resumes two days later, 'I was interrupted.' He proceeds with a graphic account of what had happened in the interval. Secretary Höpken, bringing the queen's ratification of the treaty, had said that the senate desired an explanation of the word 'applicable' in Carteret's promissory paper. Then Count Taube came in, but, as Carteret refused to discuss the matter, the two left, threatening that everything should be broken off. At another meeting in the evening a fresh document drawn up by Cronhielm and Höpken was submitted, but Carteret refused to sign it, and though the discussions continued till five in the morning, a satisfactory form could not be fixed upon. He gave the Swedes till six o'clock to hand over the ratification. As it did not come, he went straight off to camp, got there about noon, and was back by nine with a letter from the prince and Dücker expressing surprise that, *dans un tems que nous avons nos ennemis les Russes comme dans un sac*, the treaty should be delayed. Bassewitz, coming in, advised that nothing should be said about this visit to the army,

¹⁰ To Carteret, Record Office, Regencies 12.

¹¹ De Bie, the Dutch envoy, says that the Russian galleys and transports carried 26,000 men, those on the war-ships making up the number to 40,000. The fleet was chiefly employed in stopping trade to Stockholm (*Handlingar rörande Skandinaviens historia*, xxi. 384 foll.)

¹² *Ibid.* p. 384, 16 July.

as there had been great disputes and jealousies in the senate. And as Carteret learnt that that very afternoon the Russian Osterman had arrived in camp with propositions from the tsar, and as the senate would not yield, he now consented to sign a supplementary promissory paper, 'which I almost quite changed from what they offered at first, having brought it as low and made it as general and obscure as I could.' He then sent off his secretary, William Finch, to acquaint Norris with what had been done, urging him to join the Swedish fleet and advance, and the Swedes repaired to camp to confer with Osterman.

The preliminary convention with Hanover, $\frac{1}{2}\frac{1}{2}$ July, provided (1) for eternal peace and amnesty and the restoration of old friendship; (2) for the complete cession of the duchies of Bremen and Verden, as ceded to Sweden at the peace of Westphalia, with all rights and privileges appertaining; (3) that Sweden would no longer trouble British commerce, but favour and promote it as much as possible; (4) that in return the old friendship and alliance with Great Britain should be renewed; (5) that the king of England, as elector, should pay a million crowns, the first instalment, if possible, within six weeks of receipt of the ratification of the present treaty; (6) that the two contracting powers would send plenipotentiaries to the Brunswick congress as soon as possible to conclude a formal peace on the lines of the present preliminary treaty under the mediation and guarantee of the emperor, and that efforts should be made at the same time to conclude peace with Denmark and Poland; (7) that the king's ratification should be delivered within six weeks from date. There was no mention, it must be noted, of Prussia. Carteret, after his instructions were issued, had been warned not to bring Prussian interests forward and had observed the warning.¹³ That the Swedes would have to give up Stettin also, if the negotiations at Berlin were successful, was carefully concealed from them at present.

Carteret could never, he says, adequately express his obligations to Dücker. 'His way of acting has been noble, and it is to his courage and conduct that Sweden will owe its preservation.' The situation had been most critical. 'Your Lordship sees how near we were losing all in the very port.' The senate had been 'outrageous' in opposing the cession of the duchies, insisting that a mortgage would be sufficient. 'If it was not already done, it would certainly now not be done, the fear of the Czar being almost over. . . . If our fleet does not come, I don't know what I shall be able

¹³ 'Not that I shall speak openly against that Court, but only with coldness and indifference, when I hear it mention'd' (3 July, o.s.) The warning was repeated in despatches from Stanhope of 10 July (Record Office, Regencies 12) and 22 July, o.s. (*ibid.* Sweden 24).

to say, for by that promise already at once was the business done.' These despatches of Carteret reached Hanover on 5 August, nine days, that is, before the treaties were signed with Prussia.¹⁴

On the Russian side the advent of the British squadron was viewed with resentment and apprehension. Resident Veselovsky in London had protested that its despatch showed neglect and jealousy of his master, who suspected an intention to attack his fleet. Craggs in reply accused the tsar of harbouring emissaries of the Pretender and of supporting him by treaties and expectations; the only intention, he averred, was to protect trade, with which the tsar had interfered.¹⁵ A fortnight after Norris reached Copenhagen he had an interview with the Russian ambassador there, who asked whether he had instructions to interrupt the Russian operations against Sweden, and said that a British squadron was not expected this year, and that his master had given orders for a free trade. The object of his attack on Sweden was to force her to make peace.¹⁶ Four days later (20 July) three Russian frigates appeared in Kjöge Bay. Count Golovin, the commander, came with the ambassador to Norris and delivered to him a letter from their master. Premising that he was the king of England's ally in the war, but that no concert had been made for the present campaign nor notice sent of the coming of the squadron as heretofore, Peter desired from Norris, before he came near the Russian fleet or territories, a written explanation upon what account he had come and what were his orders, particularly in regard to any act of hostility or friendship. In default of an answer in writing an advance would be interpreted to mean the former, and measures would be taken accordingly. He himself, Peter declared emphatically, had never entertained any design against the king of England's interests, but only against Sweden.¹⁷ Norris was given also copies of Peter's manifesto justifying his invasion of Sweden,¹⁸ couched in terms more honest than was usual in such docu-

¹⁴ *Ante*, p. 500.

¹⁵ Craggs to Stanhope, 17 June, o.s., Record Office, Regencies 73. He accuses the Holstein minister Petkum, the 'universal spy' of all the states that would employ him, of inspiring the Russian alarm. The answer given to Veselovsky on the part of the lords justices, 26 May, o.s., was couched in threatening language: the king had always sent a squadron to the Baltic to protect his trading subjects from the violence of the Swedes; it was hoped that the tsar would not use the example of his enemies to trouble the commerce of his friends; if he did, the lords justices would not fail to represent the case to the king, in order that he might give the orders necessary to protect it (Record Office, Foreign Entrybook 254).

¹⁶ Norris, 7 July, o.s., Record Office, S.P. Dom. Naval 86.

¹⁷ Dated on board the 'Ingria' at Hango Head, 7 June, o.s. The Russian original, with an English translation, Brit. Mus., Add. MS. 28155.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, and Bacmeister III. App. xv. The origin of the war is referred to an affront given by the refusal of Charles XII. to believe the accusation that Count Dahberg, governor of Riga, had laid a plot against Peter's life.

ments, and of his last declaration of 28 June, o.s., in regard to trade.¹⁹

Veselovsky again on 10 August, o.s., enclosing a copy of the last document, complained of the reinforcement sent to Norris.²⁰ In reply Craggs wrote to him on behalf of the Lords Justices:—

Que chaque souverain est en droit d'employer ainsi qu'il trouve à propos ses troupes et ses vaisseaux, et sur ce principe on n'a point été demander au Czar quelles veues il avoit en faisant sortir de ses ports la flotte et l'armée si nombreuses qu'il a maintenant sur la Mer Baltique ; mais qu'on ne peut être surpris de cette demande de sa Majesté Czarienne après la lettre qu'Elle a écrite au Chevalier Norris, luy prescrivant les bornes jusqu'où il pouvoit s'avancer. Les Rois de la Grande Bretagne ne sont point accoutumés à recevoir des pareils complimens, et leurs Amiraux ne reçoivent point d'ordres d'aucun Prince Etranger.²¹

Norris in reply to Peter's letter said that he had himself spoken to Veselovsky about his coming with a squadron to protect trade and cultivate a good understanding with the king's allies, so that it must have been known. With the greatest submission he must express surprise at the apprehension of discord between the king his master and the tsar. He had forwarded the letter to Hanover. If the tsar would send to the king, he would be satisfied of the intention to preserve the ancient amity.²²

A notable commentary on the feeling in England towards Russia and on the part to be played by Prussia is contained in a despatch of 18 August from Bonet, the Prussian resident in London, written in answer to his master's rescript setting forth his desire to be the ally of both the king of England and the tsar, and for the unification of their interests in the northern peace.²³ Nothing, Bonet said, could be more distasteful whether to England or to Hanover than this idea. The desire was to decrease the tsar's power, not to increase it by guaranteeing to him his conquests. Guarantees by him of Bremen and Verden or of the protestant succession were neither wanted nor considered proper. The increase of his commercial power was regarded with jealousy. He was looked upon as deceitful and aggressive, as one whose friendship would be neither useful nor agreeable. In addition, he was thought to be declining in vigour and in health, his heir was an infant, the power he had raised, it was thought, might fall with him. It was not desired to reduce Sweden further. And, most important of all, it was feared that alliance with the tsar might estrange the

¹⁹ Copies, Record Office, Foreign Ministers 52, S.P. Dom. Naval 86 ; Brit. Mus. Add. MS. 28155.

²⁰ Record Office, Foreign Ministers 52, Foreign Entrybook 254.

²¹ *Ibid.* 254, 13 August, o.s. Similarly Polwarth, 22 July : 'It will be somewhat new if the British fleet must not enter the Baltick without leave from the Czar.'

²² Record Office, S.P. Dom. Naval 86.

²³ Printed by Droysen, iv. ii. 379.

emperor. The treaty between Sweden and Hanover and the reinforcement of the British squadron made it probable that an attack on the tsar was seriously contemplated. The Russian fleet would probably be beaten, but the loss of a few ships would not destroy the tsar's naval power nor force him to restore his conquests. A war with him would probably be unpopular in England, trade would be interrupted, the Jacobites encouraged; it might serve the king's electoral interests, but not those of the English nation.²⁴ The present expense of naval armaments was enormous, a million and a half; the ministry, though bold and venturesome, might find itself deserted; a new one might reverse everything as in former instances. In conclusion, Bonet advised against the proposed alliance with the king of England.²⁵

Carteret's despatch reached Norris on 1 August. He received also a memorandum from Baron 'Claes' Sparre, the Swedish admiral-in-chief, stating that he had the queen's orders to place his ships under Norris's command, but had ready only four of the line and two frigates, and that provisions were very scarce. He requested Norris to send a frigate to Hanö and a boat into Carlskrona, upon which the ships would come out, and informed him of the signals which would be used.²⁶ Another letter was from Craggs (7 July o.s.), intimating that orders had with difficulty been obtained for a reinforcement of four ships to be sent him, and that one or two might be sent later. 'I hope to hear,' he wrote, 'you have joined some other squadron than your own, or that you have not met with the Czar's fleet, for fear their superiority should make them sawey.'²⁷

Meanwhile Stanhope was pressing for aid to Sweden from France. The fear, he wrote to Dubois on 31 July, was that the Swedes might give in to the Russians before Norris could come to their succour. They must be encouraged to hold out until the Russian fleet had been encountered. But they were in extreme want not only of money but of food. Assurances of succour might sustain them, particularly the promise of it from France, if only of good offices and subsidies. The concurrence of the Danes had been lost through deference to French insistence that they must restore Stralsund and Rügen. If it was a point of honour with France that Sweden should retain a footing in the empire, the stronger the reason for not looking quietly on when her total ruin was in question. While the fleet at Bornholm would protect the

²⁴ 'Elle en souffre, elle s'en lassera bientôt, elle ne respire que la paix, qui seule peut rétablir ses finances et conserver son crédit national.'

²⁵ In the autumn we have sundry fulminations of Whitworth against 'little Bonnet' as a creature of Ilgen and one whose aim had been to hinder the negotiations. But they are too spiteful to impress.

²⁶ Original, Brit. Mus., Add. MS. 28155.

²⁷ *Ibid.* 28146.

carriage of food to Sweden, the expectation of French subsidies would raise her credit. From all these considerations there had been no hesitation in informing Carteret that they were being sought for. Senneterre and he had thought it necessary to send Campredon²⁸ back to Paris on this matter; he was thoroughly instructed in their sentiments. The principal thing was for him to carry to Sweden a real succour in proportion to French means and Swedish wants. When the Prussian treaties were signed, there would be hope of raising Sweden again, even though she succumbed to the tsar.

Urged by Lord Stair, the request for a French subsidy was successful, although at first Dubois, he says, maintained that there was no money to spare from the Spanish war.²⁹ On 9 August he sent word that Campredon was returning to Hanover on his way to Sweden carrying with him gold ingots to the value of 300,000 crowns. Dubois wrote of the pleasure with which this succour was afforded, but added that Sweden could not treat with King George preferably to the tsar without the hope of regaining Stralsund and Rügen.³⁰

On 25 July, o.s., Carteret was able to report (to England) that full liberty had been granted to English ships to trade to the eastern ports without the restrictions imposed upon the Dutch. Two days later he sent to Hanover an account of what had happened in the previous fortnight. He had continually and successfully urged, he said, the equipping of as many ships as possible at Karlskrona. If orders were sent to Norris to come thither, there might yet be time to prevent the tsar from imposing terms. Osterman's ultimatum was as follows: First, the tsar to keep Reval and Viborg, all Ingria with its dependencies, and in Carelia Keksholm and its district; to buy Livonia, or hold it without payment for a term of forty years; and to restore Finland and the remainder of Carelia. Secondly, 'his good ally the king of Prussia' to receive Stettin and its district to the Peene in return for a sum of money to be agreed upon, or alternatively a mortgage of it for a term of years, at the end of which Sweden should repay for its recovery four million crowns to cover the sequestration money and the expenses of war. All other formalities were to be settled at the Åland congress. These conditions, said Carteret, had been accepted by the senate, the only persons opposing being Counts Ducker,

²⁸ Campredon had been French resident in Sweden for many years down to September 1717. There are very interesting memoirs by him on the state of Sweden in the French archives. In June 1719 he was appointed to return thither to represent France, going first to Hanover to consult (Stair, 16 and 20 June, Stanhope, 2 July, o.s.) His account of his doings there has been printed in Malmström's *Handlingar rörande Sveriges historia*, pp. 90-2.

²⁹ The regent 'ne pouvoit aller plus loin sans se noyer.'

³⁰ All this from Record Office, France 164.

Taube, and De la Gardie. The prince had thereupon threatened to throw up his command and leave the country, recommending Dücker as his successor, who however had 'answered like a brave man that people who could ever tamely come to a resolution to give up their country were not worth serving, and he would have nothing to do with them.' The queen too had shown 'the courage and firmness of her brother.' This had shamed the others, and a counter-proposal would be made, namely, in addition to the provinces offered by Lillienstedt at the Åland congress, the tsar to keep either Narva, Viborg, and Keksholm with their districts, or Narva and Esthonia with Reval; the king of Prussia's claims to be referred to the congress of Brunswick, unless he would deliver up Stettin upon payment of the 400,000 crowns advanced on the sequestration. 'This throws everything again at large, and if a fleet comes, the King may govern their peace as he thinks fit. If not, they cannot hold out long.' Then follows a further dissertation on the danger of the tsar becoming master in the Baltic. The Danes, Carteret said, would soon repent of what they had done. 'They have advanced the Czar's interest more than their own, who is not obliged to them for it, and speaks of them with contempt.' In union with the king they might have obtained what they could reasonably have pretended to, and 'the Czar, for the common good of Europe, had been reduced to reason, and nothing could have then prevented a glorious peace in the north.' The prince, dining with Carteret uninvited, had said that he would rather serve in England than consent to the tsar's conditions, and would hold firm to the last.³¹ All depended upon whether the fleet came or not.

This, then, was the situation when Stanhope, having nothing yet from Carteret but his first despatches, replied to them on 2 August. 'The doings of the Danes,' he said, 'puts us under unspeakable difficulties.' Stating the impossibility of action on the part of Norris under present circumstances and the solicitations being made at Paris in Sweden's favour, he directed Carteret to advise in the strongest manner possible peace with Denmark by the cession of Stralsund and Rügen. 'The minute they shall have secured Denmark Sir John Norris shall act with the utmost vigour for their service.' On the other hand, if peace with Russia were preferred, then, 'averse as we are to the Czar,' the king would 'equally contribute his best offices to serve them that way.' In that case the treaty must 'be so managed as to lay a foundation of enmity and jealousy betwixt the Czar and Denmark.' An article

³¹ Carteret enclosed a copy of a letter from the prince to the senate, shown him by the former, in which he argued that the tsar's insistence upon Reval furnished sufficient reason against his having it. He would be able to keep his fleet there and be master of Swedish trade. It would be much better to make alliance 'avec les Chrétiens,' especially the king of England.

should oblige him to give assistance against Denmark by sea and land. At the same time the necessity of a good defensive alliance with Great Britain must be insisted upon. No other power in Europe, excepting France, could render equal service, and Sweden was not so useful to France now as formerly. 'Against the Czar they will ever be secure in us of an active and vigorous ally,' and help could be given in ships or money, as preferred. The issue at Berlin being still uncertain, mention of Prussia must as far as possible be avoided, yet not so far as to give any just handle for complaint. The British and Hanoverian treaties should be signed, if possible, at the same time. Of course, the guarantee of Sleswick and the German provinces of Sweden, given under the treaty of 1700, could not now be renewed, but to subsidies equal to the succour therein stipulated Sweden would be entitled till the general peace.³²

The receipt of this despatch threw Carteret into consternation. 'If your Lordship is under unspeakable difficulties, what must I be in?' he asked. 'The moment a courier arrives my house is full of senators enquiring about the fleet.' They swore that their own should go out and fight by itself. When he imputed their situation to the war with Denmark, 'they said that all was owing to their reliance upon the king of England. If they had not trusted to his fleet they had made peace with the Czar before any one town had been burnt, and by this time they should have had ample revenge of the Danes. With this they left me.' Norris might join the Swedish fleet without fear. The Danes had not above five ships in the Baltic, and it was not likely that they would join the Russians. 'A good and a wise Dane is jealous of the Russian fleet, notwithstanding they fight at present against a common enemy.' To speak to the Swedes about peace with Denmark was to insult them. 'To sacrifice Pomerania is directly contrary to all their views both publick and private.' The prince, Dücker, and Taube, the two latter Livonians, would rather die than give up Reval. And so on at great length. All would be right if the fleet came. 'Our King will be the instrument of Providence to make Sweden happy in its domestick as well as foreign affairs, and the interest of Great Britain will be secured in the north.' The situation had been discussed at another conference on Sunday. Carteret had said, as instructed, that whichever way the Swedes might be constrained to make peace they might be sure of the king's friendship, and that though he preferred the one, he would not object to the other, being only anxious to draw them out of their difficulties. It was suggested that he should see Osterman, but when he explained the terms in which he would speak to him, the Swedes thought that he had better not, 'unless

³² Hanover, 22 July, o.s., Record Office, Sweden 24.

I would speak more particularly and mention very strongly the fleet.' Now he could not see him, for he was not allowed to come to town, and was leaving the country next day. Stanhope's letter to Dubois, of which he had shown a copy, had been very gratefully received, especially in its regard to French subsidies, and so had his own silence about the king of Prussia. As to the exclusion of the German provinces from mention in the British treaty, 'they do no way admit that those Provinces are out of the question, but insist that they are the chief question.' The ships both at Carlskrona and at Stockholm were to go out as soon as possible. The Swedes would hold out to the last, but if the sea were not opened, they would starve. 'But if our fleet has orders to joyn the Swedish fleet, this Nation may still be rescued, and our King and Country make as high a figure as ever people did. I hope this great conjuncture will not be lost.' The prince and Dücker said that, if the fleet came, they would break off entirely with the tsar; a word from them, and 'the army will demolish the senate.'³³

But Norris stayed on in Copenhagen roads. Stanhope wrote to him that until there was greater certainty about 'the dispositions of our several northern neighbours, I think you cannot do better than to continue to act a part perfectly neutral.'³⁴ And later,³⁵ that he should reply to Sparre that it was 'no ways adviseable or indeed practical' for him to proceed until his reinforcements arrived, 'especially considering the present temper of the Danes, who might possibly intercept anything that were to follow you.'³⁶ As soon as the four ships came, he should say, he expected to receive instructions agreeable to the queen's wishes, and in the meantime Sparre had better push on his preparations with all vigour. In order to have accurate information upon the strength of the Swedes, it would be well to send an officer to Carlskrona to view and report. Bernstorff wrote that with the four ships expected and eight or ten Swedes, Norris should be strong enough to beat the Russians, and thought that there was no real danger from the Danes. He requested his private opinion, of which no one else should know, for submission to the king.³⁷

³³ 3 August, o.s. In a ciphered letter Carteret wrote: 'The machine is skrew'd up to the height and cannot hold long together, one party must get the better of the other soon, our fleet's coming or not will cast the balance. The Livonians will venture all before a cession shall be made of their country to the Czar. The prince and Count Dücker are at the head of that party and have the army at command, the prince thinks he shall succeed in all his views if the fleet comes.'

³⁴ 22 July, o.s., *ibid.*

³⁵ 11 August.

³⁶ Stanhope even warned Norris that the Danes might attempt to seize his person, 'which is the greatest blow that could happen at present to the King's service.' Norris himself feared that they might remove the buoys from the Sound, necessitating passage to the Baltic by the Belts, with whose navigation no one on board was acquainted (7 August, o.s., Record Office, S.P. Dom. Naval 86).

³⁷ Brit. Mus., Add. MSS. 28146-55.

It was indeed natural to believe that the Danes might now join forces with the Russians, for while they were still obstinate against making peace with Sweden unless their full demands were granted, the miscalculation of their own strength had become apparent. It had not been possible to follow up the success obtained at Marstrand, partly because the devastation of the country forbade an advance. The army retired from Sweden in the first week of August. Frederick indeed emphatically (and truly) denied that he had any concert with or intention of joining the Russians, but the failure of all attempts to induce him to fall in with George's present policy, and his expressed determination to continue the war at all costs, caused his assurances to be disbelieved. On the other hand, all that the Swedes offered³⁸ was to waive claims for damages done by the war and to pay 200,000 crowns, conditionally upon restoration of all that had been taken from Sweden and from the duke of Holstein-Gottorp. Carteret had written: 'When once I mentioned making some cession, it raised such a flame as is hardly to be imagined. They said they had rather give to the Czar everything than anything to Denmark,' for the former had been a generous enemy in comparison, the Danes having 'always attacked them in their distress.' To them was ascribed the loss of Riga and Livonia, of Bremen and Verden. If it were thought that they were to be helped to obtain Stralsund and Rügen, the Swedes would at once close with the tsar, if only in order to attack Denmark and beat her again.³⁹

Carteret's despatches enclosing the signed Hanoverian convention were received at Hanover on 5 August. But Stanhope waited to reply to them till the 17th, when he had news of the conclusion of the Prussian treaties.⁴⁰ Then he broke upon the Swedes the cession of Stettin, directing its stipulation in the treaty with Great Britain, and descanting on the necessity of alliance with that power and with Prussia, if the war with the tsar were to be carried on. The plea he advanced was that the place had been guaranteed to Prussia under the treaty of 1715. Orders, he said, now going to Norris to advance could not have been given had not the king been sure of Prussia, and the uncertainty which had prevailed in that direction had been the cause of the delay in replying to Carteret's despatches. He must at once solicit a passport for a Prussian minister to come to Sweden to treat, the name to be left blank. The sum to be paid for Stettin should only be stated if the Swedes

³⁸ Through Major-General Adlerfeld, at Copenhagen: Po'warth, 25 and 29 August, Record Office, Denmark 42.

³⁹ 14 July, o.s.

⁴⁰ Whitworth, as we have seen (*ante*, p. 501), persuaded the Prussians to ante-date their treaties by ten days (to 4 August), in order that they might appear to have been signed before the Swedish convention reached Hanover.

insisted, in which case two million crowns might be named. France being also a guarantor of Stettin to Prussia, as well as of the treaty with that power just concluded, it would be a pure impossibility for Sweden ever to recover the place; much better for her to accept the two million crowns. The orders to Norris, Stanhope went on in a secret despatch, were intended to facilitate Carteret's negotiation and to render to Sweden all service that was humanly possible, although the king might be involved in an immediate war with Russia and Denmark. Either the tsar would be forced to withdraw, and Sweden in consequence gain a year for negotiation, or he would give an answer which would justify to the world anything that might be undertaken in defence of Sweden. It was, as Carteret knew, much easier in England to do certain things than to make treaty engagements that they should be done. Having gone further than perhaps was prudent in order to help Sweden, the king was persuaded that his treaty would be accepted. If it were not, Bassewitz might hand over his ratification of the electoral convention, but Carteret must break off, declaring that the king would do nothing further and that the fleet would be recalled to England. The worst that could happen would be that he would save a million crowns and enjoy his acquisitions serenely under the guarantees of France and Prussia, to which those of the tsar and Denmark could be added.⁴¹

The orders to Norris were to advance to Hanö, the four ships having joined him, as soon as he learnt from Carteret that the British treaty was accepted and signed, and thence to keep in communication with the Swedish admiral, but not to join the Swedish fleet, unless the approach of the Russian should oblige him to do so. Having informed himself thoroughly of all the circumstances, including the disposition of the Danes and the probability of their fleet joining the Russian, he must thereafter use his judgment as to whether, with the Swedes, he might venture an action with prospect of success. If he thought so, he was to send a letter to the tsar offering the mediation of Great Britain and requiring a suspension of arms, under threat that, in case of refusal, the British and Swedish forces would unite.⁴² If the answer were insolent, or if,

⁴¹ In a similar spirit Robethon had reported to General Bothmer Stanhope's opinion, that it might be a good thing for Sweden to accept the tsar's terms, for the king would be in perfect security, Prussia immediately sign her treaties, Denmark be obliged to be content with what could be done for her at Brunswick; in a word, peace would be established. Whereas, if the king should make his peace with Sweden alone, he would burden himself with an ally that had no money, ships, or troops, and would incur the hostility of Russia, Denmark, and perhaps Prussia, placing himself in a very dangerous situation. Peace between Sweden and Russia, Robethon said, was therefore not looked upon as a misfortune, seeing that one with Denmark appeared to be impracticable (7 August, Add. MS. 28155, translation).

⁴² The letter was composed by Norris in accordance with the terms prescribed, but not sent (Record Office, S.P. Dom. Naval 86).

after sufficient time allowed, none were received, Norris should join the Swedish fleet and act with it as he should judge most effectual to destroy that of the tsar, 'than which a greater service cannot be done to your country.' More positive orders could not be given; the king was happy to have in command of the fleet a man who could be trusted to help out their 'lameness or imperfections.'

You know His Majesty's view, which is to save Sweden, if possible, and to destroy the Czar's fleet. You are the only judge, whether the means you have are sufficient; if you think not, you must not attempt and consequently not send the letter to the Czar. If you think you are likely to succeed, attempt in the name of God, and be sure of all the support the King can give you, even tho' the attempt should not answer your expectation.

What it was best to say to the Danes, Norris must judge. The treaty with Prussia, received that morning, 'makes us very easy on that side;' but it must be kept secret for some time. With these orders Stanhope enclosed translations of his despatches to Carteret and of the draft for the British preliminary convention.⁴³

When Carteret received these despatches on 26 August, he went at once to the prince and explained as best he could why the pretensions of Prussia had not been brought forward before, and how essential it was for Sweden to make peace with her. The prince was shocked and astounded, but yielded to persuasion. The king of England, he said, 'would obtain terms for his son-in-law, at the representations of an English ambassador, which the Czar could not obtain for him with an army of 30,000 men at their gates and a fleet of 24 men-of-war and 300 galleys at their port.' It was to be hoped that he would appreciate the value set upon his friendship, if consent were given. The junction of the fleets would be a *causa sine qua non*, and the recovery of Reval and Livonia must be guaranteed. About the cession of Stralsund and Rügen, which Stanhope urged, it would be better for Carteret never to speak again.

At his conference with the senators Carteret endeavoured to satisfy them with general expressions about Reval and Livonia; the time was not ripe, he said, for guarantees. But they were firm, saying that the king of Prussia had offered cheaper terms through Osterman, that the isles of Usedom and Wollin had not come under the sequestration and the former could not be separated from Rügen, and so on. 'I looked upon the matter as desperate,' says Carteret. At last he said, 'the short question was, would they detach the king of Prussia from the Czar, or not, and give him their provinces at the interposition of the king of Great Britain or at the interposition of the Czar.' The French guarantee was suffi-

⁴³ The whole, Brit. Mus., Add. MS. 28146, 17 August.

cient evidence that Sweden could never regain them. 'I waved the consideration of money, knowing that they might have a larger sum from the Czar, but the Czar's money was the purchase of their liberty and independency, but my master's a real disinterested supply to preserve them.' The discussions were resumed two days later, and the conference was about to break up, when there came a letter from Norris, 'so prudently and discreetly writ,' says Carteret, 'that I could shew it them. . . . This prevailed infinitely more than anything I could say, turned the ballance in my favour.' Count Sparre advised acceptance of the treaty with certain alterations, the principal ones additions to the second separate article, making the cession of Stettin conditional upon the king of Prussia's engagement not to give help to the tsar against Sweden directly or indirectly, and to the third, naming the tsar as the enemy against whom the joint forces of England and Sweden were to act, in case he refused the king of England's mediation and continued hostilities. Carteret was obliged to acquiesce, although he disputed the latter change almost to breaking off. And he was obliged also to sign a declaration to the effect that Norris should write to the tsar to offer the king's mediation, and should immediately join the Swedish fleet and be prepared to resist with it the progress of the Russians; otherwise the treaty to be null and void.⁴⁴

'Sir John Norris' prudent letter,' Carteret goes on, 'has done this business.' To him, if what was done were approved, success must be attributed. If it were not approved, Carteret would take the blame himself. 'It was as hard in this case for me to follow orders punctually as it was to your Lordship to give them. I think I have followed His Majesty's intention, and the interest of my Country.' The treaty was signed on $\frac{1}{2}$ ⁸ August, and ratified by the queen late the next night, and upon its signature Bassewitz handed over the king's ratification of the Hanoverian convention.

It must be said that Carteret's success was not wholly due to the Russian invasion and to the promise of British help. Several of the Swedish senators, he had early said, could be bought, and he and Bassewitz bought them. He makes no further secret of this than to write of it in cipher. The pressing poverty of the Swedes made this method of persuasion irresistible. Bassewitz, says Carteret (12 July), had promised the commissioners 10,000 crowns apiece, and 5000 or 6000 to under-secretary Von Kochen.⁴⁵ He himself had been forced to give very broad hints of further pay-

⁴⁴ Carteret proceeds in his despatch (19 August, o.s.) with apologies and reasons for signing this, pointing out especially the value of the Swedes as allies: 'They have as good swords and as good hearts as any in Europe,' and so on.

⁴⁵ But Bassewitz expected to save King George thereby 100,000 crowns, as the Swedes would now accept ordinary rix-dollars for the payment of the million for Bremen and Verden instead of rix-dollars *de banco*.

ments, when he should come to arrange the British treaty ; 5000*l.* or 6000*l.*, he thought, expended thus would settle that as desired.⁴⁶ On 3 August, o.s., he wrote,

If the fleet does not come, the Defensive Treaty can never be settled as you would have it, without money. The like summ, vizt. of 54,000 crowns, that the king hath sent to Mons^r Bassewitz must be sent to me to be given to the same persons ; if it was not for that money he and I should pass our time very ill at present in this country. That keeps them in awe and makes them stand by. Pray represent the necessity of this to the king in the strongest terms.

Stanhope in reply authorised Carteret to make presents to the value of 10,000*l.*⁴⁷ The latter answered that he had engaged to the five plenipotentiaries on his word and honour 20,000 crowns apiece of Prussian money, and to another, not named, 6000, while the secretaries of the chancery would require 4000. On the king's account he had paid 14,000 crowns 'banco' out of his own pocket, and had promised 10,000 more, exhausting his funds.⁴⁸ Stanhope thereupon sent a letter of credit for 26,000 crowns, with copies of bills sent from Berlin to Hamburg for 110,000, payable in new 'drittels.' As this coin, he said, was lower in value than Swedish crowns 'banco' by at least 32 per cent., and as the presents were to be made in the latter species, Carteret must adjust the balance with Knyphausen when he came. If he refused to pay the higher value, the king would make the difference good, for Carteret's credit, deducting the amount later from the arrears of subsidy owing to Prussia.⁴⁹ And here we may note the complaint of the Dutch ambassador, Burmannia, that he was not provided with funds to be similarly employed. It was very annoying, he expressed it, to have to sail against the money-stream. Influential persons were interested in the privateering, and to stop it they must be compensated. Two, he said, who did not wish to be named, had come to him and intimated this.⁵⁰

The preliminary treaty thus obtained provided that the union between Great Britain and Sweden should be renewed and made yet closer for the maintenance of the protestant religion ; that damages done to trade by either side should be assessed and

⁴⁶ 'I think we may look upon it in a manner as renewed, and with the help of some presents may renew it our own way, if this government subsists two months, and Providence has not decreed the subversion of this nation.'

⁴⁷ 'I don't mean that his Maj^{ty}. stints you so exactly to that summ, but that he will allow some thousands more if you can finish and get the treaty signed as 'tis sent you' (17 August).

⁴⁸ 19 August, o.s.

⁴⁹ 11 September. 26,000 crowns were sent to allow Carteret a margin. He said however that he did not want them.

⁵⁰ Private despatch of 29 December, *Handlingar rörande Skandinaviens historia* xxi. 396.

balanced ; that instead of the succours stipulated under the treaty of 1700 Great Britain should pay an annual subsidy, the first instalment within fifteen days from signature ; that British commerce in the Baltic should at once be free and as favourably treated as ever before the troubles began ; that the king, having already urgently exhorted Sweden to make peace with one of the two powers attacking her, since their union must destroy her, should exert himself to obtain the best conditions possible, and to engage the help of all the other powers, his allies ; and that, if in consequence of the present treaty he were attacked by any power whether in Great Britain or Hanover, Sweden should not make peace with that power without him. Four separate articles followed. The first guaranteed the preliminary convention with Hanover, and in particular its clause, specially recited, ceding Bremen and Verden, which article was to have full and entire effect from this time without any alteration of it in the final treaty, it being understood that King George would satisfy the fifth article of the convention as to payment of the sum stipulated. The second ceded to Prussia Stettin and the district between Oder and Peene with the isles of Usedom and Wollin in return for a payment of two million crowns, their British and Swedish majesties agreeing to guarantee the treaty to be made with Prussia, and it being stated that the cession was only made upon condition that the king of Prussia undertook to give no help to the tsar against Sweden directly or indirectly. The third article promised that, if a treaty could be made with Denmark, King George would not be content with having helped Sweden by his good offices and by the subsidies stipulated, which stipulation was to hold good until peace was made with Denmark and with the tsar, but even if the peace with Denmark could not be made, would nevertheless be ready to join his forces with those of Sweden as auxiliaries to act against the tsar as reasons of war should demand, in case he would not accept the British mediation offered and continued hostilities against Sweden. The fourth engaged King George to use his best offices and most pressing instances with the court of France to furnish the most considerable subsidies possible until the time of the general peace.

In this form the separate articles were ratified also by George on 14 September.⁵¹ But it was not the final form. Before the treaty was signed at Stockholm, not only had a French subsidy been obtained, as above said, but also the promise of a French guarantee. Campredon arrived at Stockholm bearing this and his gold ingots on 31 August. It was thought proper, therefore, to insert mention of the guarantee and of French mediation, and, that being done, of the mediation of the emperor also, in the first

⁵¹ Record Office, Treaties 529.

and second separate articles, and to omit the fourth altogether. This is the form of these articles, ratified by the queen of Sweden, preserved at the Record office,⁵² though they bear the old date, $\frac{1}{2}$ 8 August.⁵³

The letter from Norris which had so great effect at Stockholm was written on the day ⁵⁴ that he learnt from Sparre that the latter was sailing from Carlskrona with twelve good fighting ships and others towards Landsort and the 'Swedish Skaw.' Although the lieutenant, sent as desired to Carlskrona, returned with a poor account of the Swedish fleet, and the report that the Russian had already sailed for Reval and that the galleys could not be got at among the rocks and small islands, he brought a second letter from Sparre wishing that Norris were already with him, and appointing a rendezvous at Landsort or Elsnabben, where pilots would be ready for him. Victuals, Sparre said, would not be wanting at Stockholm, 'and shall no victuals hinder us from keeping the sea.' Two men-of-war and three frigates had gone forward already to stop 'the dangerous burnings and doings of the Muscovites.'⁵⁵ The combined fleet would number thirty sail, sufficient to fight the Russians.⁵⁶ Norris therefore after a council of war, and having already received two of the ships expected, decided to sail for Hanö, 'to give a countenance to Lord Carteret's negotiations at the Court of Sweden,' as he expressed it. He sailed on the 26th. Passing the Grounds he received a despatch from Stanhope ordering him to do just what he was doing, after leaving special assurances of friendship with the court of Denmark, and saying, as with truth he could, that every despatch to Carteret had carried orders in its favour.⁵⁷ From Hanö he was directed to inform the queen of Sweden that he was instructed to obey her commands as soon as the treaty was signed. On hearing of this from Carteret, and supposing that the

⁵² Record Office, Treaties 528.

⁵³ See on this subject Stanhope's despatches of 20 and 22 August and 8 October to Stair and Dubois (*ibid.*, France 165) and of 24 August and 30 September to Carteret. The last named wrote on 27 September, o.s., that the changes had been made. They are shown in copies and drafts at the Record Office (Treaty Papers 71); one copy of the second article bears the signature of the king of Prussia.

⁵⁴ 12 August, o.s.

⁵⁵ 'Your Lord' would not nor cannot believe,' said Sparre, who wrote in English, 'what damage they have done to our country in this calmy weather that hath been all the summer over.'

⁵⁶ Brit. Mus., Add. MSS. 28129 (the journal) and 28146; the originals from Sparre, *ibid.* 28155.

⁵⁷ 10 August, o.s., *ibid.* 28146. The statement was not without truth. In a despatch to Carteret of 24 August Stanhope urged the purchase of peace with Denmark by a sum of money or the cession of Stralsund and Rügen, possessions, he once more averred, of much less importance than Livonia and Esthonia. And he wrote the same to Dubois, pointing out that, even though the Russian fleet were driven from the Baltic, the Swedes could not venture upon a land attack, unless they had previously made peace with Denmark.

Swedes had not made peace with the tsar, said Stanhope, 'you do in concert with the Swedish Admiral go look for the Russ fleet and do your best to destroy them.'

The fleet, now reinforced, was a powerful one, eighteen of the line. Anchor was cast off Hanö on 28 August. In accordance with Carteret's request, Norris sent him the letter to the tsar before mentioned, and proceeded on his voyage. On 5 September he joined the Swedish fleet, ten of the line with two frigates, a fire-ship and a bomb-vessel. Carteret wrote to him that the news of his sailing had been received 'with inexpressible joy and satisfaction ;' he had roused the prince from bed to hear it. 'I now thank God,' he went on, 'that I have prevented their making peace with the Czar. It lay heavy upon my conscience whilst I saw their misery and heard of no succours coming.'⁵⁸ Carteret, and Stanhope later,⁵⁹ advised that, as the Russian galleys were now retiring to the Åland isles and the men-of-war supposed to lie in Le-Sund harbour hard by, Norris and Sparre should not come on to Stockholm but sail directly for Hango Head to cut them off. But Sparre said he must go to Landsort ; for provisions, Norris thought. So on 6 September the fleet arrived there, having experienced great difficulties of navigation on account of sunken and other rocks. The weather turning stormy, it went on past Elsnabben and cast anchor at 'the Dollars' (Dalarö).⁶⁰ The proposed undertaking would have been futile, for the Russians were

⁵⁸ I cannot refrain from quoting from Carteret's letters to show the exalted frame of mind he was in. 'It is now in your power,' he wrote to Norris on 19 August, o.s., 'by the help of God to do the most signal piece of service to your country that any man hath done this age. The scales of the North are in your hand. You can cast the ballance as you please. The cause of Liberty and of the Protestant Religion will be served by rescuing this brave Nation, and I know by experience how true a friend you are to those interests both at home and abroad. God give you success. The goodness of the cause promises it, and if the Czar refuses the King's Mediation, as he probably will, a mark of which will be his continuing hostilities against Sweden, I hope you will by force of arms bring him to reason, and destroy that fleet, which will disturb the world, whilst it is steered by ambition and revenge.' And two days later : 'You have now a very glorious scene of action open to you, in which you will shew to the whole world what the English nation can do. 'Tis the honestest cause that ever man was engaged in. The greatest business is to intercept the Czar, that he may not get to Revel. Cut off his retreat, and we are sure of him. . . . God bless you, S^r John Norris. All honest and good men will give you just applause. Many persons will envy you, but nobody will dare say a word against you. Every Englishman will be obliged to you, if you can destroy the Czar's fleet, which I don't doubt but you will, for the Providence of God will never suffer such cruelty to go unpunished, as the Muscovites have exercised this summer in Sweden.' Stanhope was of like opinion. Norris's conduct was approved, he wrote (1 September), and there were no further instructions for him, except that 'you should have used your utmost endeavours to do all the mischief you possibly can to the Muscovite fleet, than which a greater service cannot be done to your country, and in which I wish you all possible success' (Brit. Mus., Add. MS. 28146 ; Record Office, S.P. Dom. Naval 86).

⁵⁹ 24 August, o.s., Record Office, Regencies 12.

⁶⁰ Account of this voyage in Norris to Stanhope of 29 August, o.s.

already back at Reval, whither the news of Norris's sailing had been brought by Count Golovin, who had stayed with one of his ships in Copenhagen roads to the last moment. Great alarm was caused, the batteries were armed, and all precautions taken, and panic reigned, when a fleet was sighted in the fog, until it proved to be the Russian.⁶¹

Immediately on Norris's arrival at Dalarö a council of war was held,⁶² attended by the prince of Hesse, Dücker and Carteret, and the Swedish and British admirals. It was decided that, as Le-Sund was too well defended to be attacked, and there was no place in the neighbourhood or between it and Reval where the fleets at that season of the year could lie in safety, all that could be done was to send out frigates to obtain intelligence, and in the meantime to wait at Elsnabben. News then arrived that the Russian fleet had left Le-Sund for Reval, and an attack upon that place was decided to be impracticable. Norris could not accede to the queen's wishes that he should stay the winter, but said that if she would concert measures with his master he could be back by the time the ice broke up. On the 14th the queen visited the fleet, and there were entertainments and rejoicing. Carteret in his narrative makes much of the general satisfaction.⁶³

As nothing could be done against Russia that season, Carteret and Norris resolved to offer the king's mediation to the tsar, 'hoping by that means to give our merchants time to withdraw their effects out of his country.' The queen and prince said that if he would not accept it, all negotiation should be broken off, and offers cancelled. As Campredon desired that the mediation of France should be offered also, it was so agreed. It was clear, Carteret wrote, from the withdrawal of his fleet, that the tsar would take no risk.

⁶¹ See Jefferyes from Reval, 27 August, o.s.. Record Office, Russia 9, and the report of John Dunkin, a trader, 2 September, o.s., *ibid.*, S.P. Dom. Naval 86, and Brit. Mus., Add. MS. 28129. Interesting particulars are given of the works and fortifications at Cronslot and Reval. The printed pamphlet, *Relation Vëritable du retour de la Flotte Russienne dans les Ports de Revel et de Cronslot, dressée sur des Journaux Authentiques*, Revel, 1719 (copy, Record Office, Denmark 42), gives a Russian account of what occurred subsequently to the sending of Count Golovin to Copenhagen roads. It is said that orders were sent to the fleet to withdraw to Lamland upon the return of Osterman with pressing entreaties from the queen of Sweden for a suspension of hostilities with a view to peace, and that it had sailed for Reval early on 21 August, before anything was heard of Norris's advance. the news of which was first received on its arrival at Reval.

⁶² 7 and 8 September.

⁶³ When at an audience he told the queen that 'le Bon Dieu avoit béni sa glorieuse constance et fermeté,' she replied, 'Ouy, en me donnant le bon Roy d'Angleterre pour amy.' The prince said, 'Mon Amy, ne me regardez pas comme Prince mais comme gentilhomme et officier Anglois. J'ay eu l'honneur de servir plusieurs années dans vos Troupes, et je crois que le Duc de Marlborough et tous vos officiers diront que je n'ai jamais été déserteur. A présent que je rentre dans le service je me comporterai de même, et le Bon Dieu bénira le Roy, ayant si glorieusement soutenu un de ses anciens officiers.'

'His power can never be sufficiently reduced, unless he is attacked by land and sea at once, and unless a great diversion is caused on the side of Poland and Courland.' If the Swedes had not been inspired by the hope of driving him out of the Baltic, 'they had certainly made peace with him, and it would have been their interest to have done so.' It was this consideration that had made them accept the Prussian clause, for that king's neutrality was essential.⁶⁴

The terms of the letters to the tsar⁶⁵ were greatly modified from those which Stanhope had before dictated. He was informed that the mediation of Great Britain, as a power not engaged in the war, had been accepted by the queen of Sweden, that the object of sending the fleet had been partly to protect trade, partly to give weight and support to that mediation, and that the king of England had taken measures with the king of France and his other allies, among whom the queen of Sweden was included, to procure the success which he had a right to expect and put a speedy end to the war. It was humbly requested that during the negotiation the tsar would cause all hostilities to cease. The letters were carried to the Aland isles by one Berkeley,⁶⁶ but they were neither accepted there nor allowed to be sent on to St. Petersburg. So that it was clear, Carteret wrote,⁶⁷ that the mediation would not be accepted, but the war continued. On the other hand, Peter desired the mediation of Holland to prevent a united attack upon him by Great Britain and Sweden. But Kurakin, presenting the proposal, was answered that the States General were rather inclined to use their influence in promoting a general pacification in the north. In view of the great complaints of the treatment of Dutch ships, he recommended his master to release them and their cargoes.⁶⁸

In spite of his declared intention to return at once, Norris was detained at Dalarö by the pressing instances of the Swedes till 20 October. The only operation undertaken was the sailing of Sparre with some frigates for Dantzic to drive away some Russian vessels watching that port and Königsberg. It was unsuccessful, because the Russians had notice of Sparre's coming and moved in under the fortifications of Dantzic, where they were safe.⁶⁹ Norris's

⁶⁴ 2 September, o.s.

⁶⁵ Norris, 31 August, o.s., Record Office, S.P. Dom. Naval 86; Carteret, 1 September, o.s., *ibid.* Sweden 25, and Brit. Mus., Add. MS. 28156.

⁶⁶ Eldest son of Lord Berkeley of Stratton, says Carteret, 7 September, o.s. He was back at Stockholm on 30 September.

⁶⁷ 27 September, o.s. His letter to General Bruce at Lofö, and the reply, Record Office, Sweden 25.

⁶⁸ Despatch of 10 October, Uhlenbeck, *Verslag aangaande een onderzoek in de Archieven van Rusland*. Cf. Bacmeister, III. 209.

⁶⁹ See for particulars Joshua Kenworthy from Dantzic, 11 October, Record Office, Russia 9 (cf. Jefferyes, 5 December, o.s., *ibid.*), and Sparre to Norris, 10 October, o.s., Brit. Mus., Add. MS. 28156.

ime was taken up with consultations upon the operations to be undertaken in the following year and the preparations for them.⁷⁰ As an acknowledgment of the queen's appreciation of his zeal and good-will he received a bill for 1000 ship-pounds of iron, with the further promise of 'a gallanterea,' while his son and the two rear-admirals, Hozier and Hopson, were given gold medals. Some ill-feeling was caused by an alleged statement of Norris, reported to the senate, that had he not been brought to Dalarö the Russian fleet might have been cut off. Carteret thought sufficiently seriously of the matter to get the protocol recording the statement altered. It was Sparre who was blamed. Carteret says that he had many enemies, he could not tell why, but anything against him was acceptable.⁷¹

When at length Norris did sail, he only got as far as Elmsabben, and was there detained by the south-westerly gales, in great difficulties for provisions, till 7 November. Even then he had the greatest trouble in accomplishing his journey southwards, and the whole squadron, some of the ships badly damaged, only assembled in Copenhagen roads on the 18th. As it was now too late to obey the orders he received to come to see the king at Hanover, he sailed for home, and after encountering further violent storms anchored at the Nore on 9 December. He learnt that his conduct was approved.⁷²

Carteret in the meantime had been pressing on the final or 'solemn' treaties with Hanover and Great Britain and peace with Prussia and Denmark. But to obtain the last proved impracticable, until in the following year events beyond King George's influence broke the Danish resolution. All that could be procured was an armistice for six months from 30 October by separate conventions of Denmark and Sweden with Great Britain. With the other treaties a first point was to get them concluded at Stockholm instead of at Brunswick, that is to say, without the intervention of the emperor. The chief argument in opposition was that, the emperor's mediation having been accepted, not to observe the

⁷⁰ See Brit. Mus., Add. MS. 28156, and Record Office, S.P. Dom. Naval 86.

⁷¹ 10 October, o.s., and enclosure, Brit. Mus., Add. MS. 28156. Here may be noted a commercial scheme, not well explained, of which Norris wrote to Carteret: 'Your Lord^{sh} is perfectly in the right notion to have it in the Prince's name, and such a grant for a term of years is almost an estate even to let out to others without adventure, but if this can be well digested we may all in a few years make good fortunes and leave the Prince in the method of great advantage likewise' (17 October, o.s., *ibid.*) Also a curious point of law. Lieutenant Bagnall of the 'Worcester' was murdered on an island near Dalarö by the mate of his ship. Norris found that he had no authority to try offences committed on a foreign shore even by his own seamen, and reflects thereon that the case ought to be provided for by act of parliament (Journal, 8 October, o.s.)

⁷² Journal, and Record Office, S.P. Dom. Naval 86, and Admiralty Secretary, In-Letters 3 (originals).

formalities in regard thereto would be an insult to him and of no advantage to any one; he might indeed refuse to co-operate against the tsar. Carteret was supported not only by Campredon,⁷³ who intimated 'that they have better friends in the world than the court of Vienna,' but also by Count Eric Sparre.⁷⁴ The two former said that the desire of the kings of England and Prussia to have the emperor's mediation mentioned arose from their anxiety to show their attachment and respect to him, and their arguments prevailed. The queen, Carteret wrote,⁷⁵ had agreed to finish the treaties at Stockholm, and to send to the emperor the necessary letter for the investiture of the duchies and to Hanover a formal absolution of their inhabitants from allegiance. 'These are the great points, which will meet with no difficulty as matters now stand, if Mr. Bassewitz has orders sent him to conclude speedily. The Queen, I believe, may be brought to relinquish the titles.' What remained, matters relating to the internal affairs of the duchies, Carteret thought should be settled by commissioners after the treaty was concluded.

With his despatch of 30 September, Stanhope enclosed drafts of two articles to be inserted in the British treaty, the one guaranteeing the treaties of Westphalia with the exception of places named,⁷⁶ the other binding Sweden to listen to no propositions from Spain to the prejudice of the powers engaged in the war with

⁷³ 'I doubt,' wrote Carteret of Campredon, 20 October, o.s., 'whether any of the Solemn Treaties would have been signed at Stockholm, if he had not in the name of France, heartily laboured that point.'

⁷⁴ In a memorial to the queen of 12 September, o.s., Sparre proposed a defensive alliance with Great Britain, France, and Prussia, with reciprocal guarantees, and commercial advantages as against the Dutch; an alliance which, he said, might bring about a breach between Prussia and Russia and force Denmark to make peace. He expressed his belief that the Hanoverian ministers were supporting Denmark. From the emperor, he said, nothing was to be expected but *ambages et longueurs*, and to delay the treaties for reference to Brunswick would be alike dishonourable to Sweden and inconsonant to the wishes of France and Great Britain, the two powers who must co-operate in a plan of campaign against the tsar, and who alone could control the court of Berlin, the most difficult to manage. Sparre, it seems, was distrusted both by Carteret and by the prince of Hesse. Too French, the former said, yet not of the regent's party; a man however of great quality, estate, and interest. The prince desired a hint to be given to Stanhope not to talk with the count, who was about to go on a mission to Hanover, about his private affairs (Carteret, 5 and 9 September, o.s.)

⁷⁵ 27 September, o.s. Carteret had been much hampered, he said, in his work by the illness of the prince and by Dürker's mourning for his wife, whereby he was thrown back on Cronhielm, 'who is an eloquent man, which has cost me much labour and time.' He had been forced to break in upon Dürker's 'retirement and grief, and got him to come out, or else this plain and reasonable matter had not yet been finished.' On 29 October, o.s., he wrote: 'I have got the better of Count Cronhielm in a pitched battle. He has been reprimanded by the queen and prince. I now make my court to him, and by this incident shall finish the treaty sooner.'

⁷⁶ Namely, the provinces ceded to Hanover and Prussia, and Sleswick and Wismar, whose destiny was to be decided at Brunswick.

that country. The importance of a British guarantee of the treaties of Westphalia,⁷⁷ Carteret was told, was obvious, and he might engage himself to it upon condition that the treaties with Hanover and Prussia were completed at once and without delay, though the court of Sweden and Campredon ought to be content with a verbal promise before witnesses. Privately Stanhope wrote :

Au reste, My Lord, ce que j'ay le plus fortement à vous recommander, c'est de finir les Traitez de Messrs. Bassewitz et Knyphausen ; et si pour cet effet vous étiez réduit à la nécessité de donner par écrit la promesse que vous passerez l'Article ci-joint tel que je vous l'envoie, comptez que vous ne serez pas désavoué. Il vaudroit mieux s'en dispenser, si l'on pouvoit, et par une reste de ménagement pour le Danemarck on ne voudroit point signer un tel engagement à son préjudice,⁷⁸ tant qu'il y a la moindre lueur d'espérance qu'il pourroit s'accomoder. Mais si vous ne pouviez finir autrement, donnez leur la promesse par écrit. Vous avez risqué de vous commettre pendant le cours de vôte négociation pour le service du Public, et le Bon Dieu vous a béni. Je me commets peut-être en vous écrivant ceci, mais je feray de mon mieux pour soutenir tout ce que vous ferez en conséquence.

The article, Carteret replied, gave him great consolation, it would enable him to cut short a great deal of chicanery.⁷⁹

To Dubois Stanhope wrote (8 October) that Carteret had orders to insert mention of the mediation and guarantee of France in the final British treaty, and to agree with Campredon on the manner in which this should be *énoncé*. As Dubois, he said, had objected, and justly, to France appearing to have procured and to guarantee the second article thereof, which had reference to the maintenance of the protestant religion generally, and would have a good effect in parliament, this would be omitted from the body of the treaty and inserted in a separate article, to which the mediation of France would not extend. As to the treaties of Westphalia, Dubois would see that there was offered a British guarantee of them, which neither Campredon nor the Swedes had asked for. This would serve to stop the mouths of those who objected to the French guarantees of Bremen and Verden and Stettin, on the ground that France derogated from the treaties of Westphalia thereby. For she acquired a British guarantee of the rest, whereas hitherto Great Britain had never contracted any engagement for their maintenance. As this article, Stanhope went on, would be agreeable to France and Sweden, so it would be ill-received at Vienna, and knowledge of it should be kept from that court as long as possible. Carteret was ordered to require secrecy about it at Stockholm till the treaty was signed, and Dubois would permit the same to be requested of him.

⁷⁷ 'Qui font la Base, et pour ainsi dire la Magna Carta de la Cause Protestante aussi bien que des Libertez Germaniques.'

⁷⁸ Stralsund and Rügen not being excepted.

⁷⁹ 20 October, o.s.

The reason for excepting Wismar from the confirmation of the treaties of Westphalia was, that something might be reserved to compensate the duke of Holstein-Gottorp, it being absolutely necessary to leave Sleswick, also excepted, in the hands of the king of Denmark, for otherwise all hope must be abandoned of persuading him to make peace and detach himself from the tsar.⁸⁰ And it was hoped, now that everything that the Swedes could desire had been surpassed, that they would be persuaded to facilitate on their side that peace with Denmark without which they could not put themselves in a condition to make head against the tsar. To drive him back to his old bounds, Stanhope wrote in conclusion, there were two ways—the one for Poles and Swedes to unite in driving him out of Livonia and the neighbourhood, the other for Turks and Tartars to attack him on their side. The king of Poland had already made overtures to this effect, the Turks had good cause for war in that the treaty of the Pruth had not been observed. Stanhope hoped that Bonac at Constantinople might have orders to conduct himself more in accordance with Dubois' ideas than he had hitherto done, in order that a general peace in the north might be accelerated.

Replying to a similar despatch addressed to himself, Stair expressed the regent's satisfaction with everything, and his intention to do all he could to win over Denmark and force the tsar to make peace. The orders to Bonac asked for were to be sent at once. Schleinitz, the Russian minister, having expressed the tsar's willingness to accept the second alternative of the Swedish counter-ultimatum, Stair had replied that this would not do now: the powers interested in the Baltic could not afford to allow him to keep Reval, though a good part of his conquests he might hold with the good-will of everyone.⁸¹ There were great compliments too from Dubois, who professed to regard Stanhope's success as miraculous, and lauded highly his penetration and activity. He hoped that he would now arrive *à bout de pacifier le Sud et le Nord*. Senneterre, he said, was ordered to express the regent's gratitude for the insertion of the French mediation and guarantee, for the decision come to about Stralsund and Rügen, and indeed for all that had been done. And the régent wrote to George in corresponding terms.⁸²

⁸⁰ 'Au reste, ce n'est que par une précaution surabondante que nous avons excepté ce Duché spécialement, et il ne nous paroît point qu'en le cédant au Roy de Danemarck l'on dérogeroit aux Traittés de Westphalie, dans lesquels il n'est compris qu'en termes généraux. sans mentionner à qui il doit appartenir.'

⁸¹ 18 October.

⁸² These letters, 20 October, Record Office, France 165. Stair wrote privately on the same date, noting the good effect on the malcontents at the French court: 'One that has seen the many difficulties of different kinds you had to struggle with, must own, that nothing but the skill and vigour with which these negotiations have been carried on could have brought them to perfection.'

Enclosing to Carteret an extract from the despatch to Dubois above mentioned, Luke Schaub, who was now with Stanhope at Hanover, advised him to have orders sent to Count Bielke, who had been talking unsuitably at Ratisbon and Vienna, to moderate his language.⁸³ He sent also an extract from a despatch from St. Saphorin, the British minister at Vienna:

Assure yourself they are here very jealous of us, and altho' they agree that the treaties we have made with Sweden and Prussia have been necessary, they are nevertheless displeased that the circumstances were such as would fully justify them. And altho' they reap so great an advantage from the ascendant his Majesty has acquired with the Regent, they are also very jealous of it.⁸⁴

The conclusion of the final Hanoverian treaty was still delayed. Stanhope pointed out that the apparent callousness of the Swedes in regard to it would postpone their handling the million crowns, and that if they did not hasten to complete it and the Prussian also, they would not be able to count upon the king's assistance whether in the coming winter or in the spring.⁸⁵ Had Carteret had charge of the treaty it might have been settled by the middle of October, for he wrote that he would have signed a draft given by the Swedes to Bassewitz 'without losing a moment's time, for reasons too plain to be inserted.'⁸⁶ He asked that Bassewitz might have orders to sign at once, or, if any considerable alterations were thought necessary, to say that the first third of the million crowns was waiting at Hamburg to be paid, 'which will be a bait to tempt them.' He complained bitterly of the delays caused by Hanoverian insistence on points solely of electoral interest.⁸⁷

⁸³ 11 October, Brit. Mus., Add. MS. 28156. Bielke had left Stockholm for Vienna shortly after Carteret's arrival, reaching Germany under convoy from Norris.

⁸⁴ 27 September, *ibid.*

⁸⁵ 29 September.

⁸⁶ 2 October, o.s.

⁸⁷ Thus in a private letter of 26 September, o.s., reporting the payment of the 110,000 crowns on Prussian account: 'if Mr. Bassewitz wou'd have ventured, I cou'd have concluded, I verily believe, the solemn treaty at the same time. That affair is now dwindled from a negotiation into a squabble, for the reasons I hint in my publick letter.' If not concluded speedily, it would infallibly be mixed up with the British treaty. Cronhielm said it would be a shame for the duchies to appear to have been sold for a million crowns only, and wanted to have all the advantages of the British treaty recited in the preamble. 'He insists on this maliciously. . . . My L^d, entreat the king to give orders that they do not insist upon trifles, otherwise, with great concern I say it, his business will never be done. . . . If I was to write to y^r L^{ty} all, it wou'd make you sick as it do's me.' And in his ordinary despatch: 'These points must be settled by Commissarys, after the solemn treaty is concluded. They can never keep pace with it, and all this proceeds from that 3rd art., which I sent your Lordship in my letter of the 2nd inst., to which Mr. Bassewitz can get the Plenipotentiarys to give no better name than chicane. Count Cronhielm, who in such matters will yield no man, has in his turn thrust in such things' as only a lawyer could adjust. Then on 2 October, o.s., Carteret sent the conditions which the Swedes now insisted upon having inserted in the body of the treaty and those which they were content to leave to be settled by Commissioners after it was signed, 'neither of which wou'd have been so fill'd, if Mr. Bassewitz had been at liberty to take my advice, & sign the Treaty as

At length the treaty and documents appertaining were signed on $\frac{2}{10}$ November. 'Your Lordship's letter of 29th October, n.s.,' Carteret wrote, 'has cleared up all difficulties.'⁸⁸ He had now taken upon himself his character of ambassador, in order to act properly as mediator of the Prussian and Danish treaties.

The complete treaty differed much from the preliminary convention. The preamble recorded the mediation and good offices of Louis XV for the latter through Campredon (an agreeable fiction). The first two clauses provided for friendship and amnesty, the third confirmed the cession of the duchies, with all rights and privileges appertaining, set out in full particularity; the next four dealt with their internal affairs, maintenance of ancient liberties, freedom of exercise of the reformed religion, redress of old grievances and preservation of old claims, restitution of confiscations due to the war, payment of debts contracted by the regency before the Danish occupation. Under clause 8 the king of England, as elector, agreed to renew former alliances and friendship and the guarantees regarding Holstein-Gottorp *sur le pied de ce qui a déjà été réglé entre les Alliés du Nord, ou qui sera ci-après réglé pour la paix future, et de diriger cette alliance selon la présente conjoncture*; also to pay the remaining two thirds of the million rix-dollars in a single payment within six weeks of the exchange of ratifications.⁸⁹ The ninth article provided that the treaties of Westphalia, so far as not *dérégés* by the present treaty or by the future pacification of the north, should remain in complete force. The tenth reserved power to seek and admit the guarantees of the emperor and others. The last two stipulated exchange of ratifications at Stockholm within two months from signature, and for duplicate copies. Three separate articles specified affairs of the duchies which were to be settled by commissioners.⁹⁰

he once could have got it. . . . They insist upon the King's renewing the Ancient Alliances, as Elector, because it shall not appear that they gave up these Provinces for a million. What those alliances are I don't know, nor does M^r Bassewitz. His orders are to answer *dilatatorie* upon that head, for which I don't know an English word. What can a minister do under such orders? These people desire a plain and positive answer. . . . Little points must ever be overlooked in transacting great business in such a ticklish conjuncture as we have here.' And again, 29 October, o.s.: 'Mr. Bernstorff is much dissatisfied with the separate article. He wrote to Schrader to desire me to suspend putting it in execution. I regarded that advice as an honest man should do, with great neglect. Schrader is an honest sensible man, and deserves well of the King for his conduct here, if he had had the *Plein-pouvoir* the treaty would have been concluded some weeks ago.'

⁸⁸ 10 November, o.s. And so to Schaub on the 8th: 'Le moment que je receus la dernière dépêche de M^r Stanhope toutes les difficultés disparurent.' He went on: 'J'espère de finir le traité d'Angleterre sans attendre le projet. J'ai tant risqué que c'est trop tard de devenir sage.'

⁸⁹ In good double marks or thirds on the Leipzig footing of 1690 at twelve silver marks to the rix-dollar current.

⁹⁰ Copy, Record Office, Treaty Papers 71.

The ratifications were delayed for nearly a month, in consequence says Carteret, of Bielke's reports from Vienna. There is much in the despatches about this, and St. Saphorin was implicated. The Austrians objected to French mediation, and insisted upon that of the emperor at Brunswick. Cronhielm and his party did their best to aggravate the uneasiness felt at Stockholm about offending him. But a letter from Prince Eugene, Carteret wrote, approving both the Hanoverian treaty and the Prussian project, had enabled him to pass off the objections as due to excess of caution on the part of St. Saphorin. He thought that the Swedish Chancery, in writing to Bielke, had confused the Hanoverian and British treaties. 'Nothing,' he said, 'gives me so much pleasure in this business as to see the good-will with which this cession is made.' The queen's titles to Bremen and Verden were still used, for formal reasons, but she had notified her intention to use in future only 'the ancient title of Queen of the Swedes, Goths and Vandals.' The British treaty he was keeping back till the Prussian was settled, for till then he could not 'adjust the guarantees.'⁹¹

But there were later formal changes in the treaty. Carteret wrote in the following year: 'I was yesterday at a conference when Mr Bassewitz delivered the king's ratification. The Swedes will alter theirs as the king desires, and use the words of the formulary, as it was sent in the king's last rescript. The Swedish ratification must be entirely writ over again, . . . till then I don't part with what I have.'⁹²

The final treaty with Great Britain, signed on 21 January, o.s., 1720, was a lengthy and detailed document.⁹³ The preamble stated the desire to renew former treaties, particularly that of 1700, under the mediation and guarantee of France. The parties undertook to discover to each other all dangers and conspiracies, to join their counsels and forces to avert and annul them, to attempt nothing damaging to each other in any way, and therefore not to harbour rebels, much less to give assistance to them, but to deal with them as traitors. There was to be a special defensive alliance for mutual advantage and safety, for the security of the protestant religion, and for protection of dominion and liberty of navigation in northern waters and in the Channel. The mutual succour to be furnished, if required, was fixed at 6000 foot, or the equivalent in munitions of war, forage, ships, &c., at the rate of 4000 imperial thalers a month for each 1000 men; if that succour were not sufficient, then more was to be given, as in the present case, when Sweden was still engaged in war with more than one power. If,

⁹¹ To Stanhope, 4 December, o.s.; to St. Saphorin, 2 December, o.s.

⁹² 17 February, o.s., 1720.

⁹³ Original, Record Office, Treaties 531. Carteret's comments on its provisions with his of 26 January, o.s.

it was said, the present efforts to end the northern war proved ineffectual, the king of England engaged to lose no further time in them, but to send to the Baltic in the coming spring a strong squadron to be at the disposition of the queen of Sweden and to assist her fleet in repelling the tsar's attack. The ports of either party were to be open to the ships of the other, and those of neutral powers were not to be molested; on the other hand the subjects of neither should be allowed to use the ports to the advantage of the enemy. Conditions for a treaty of navigation and commerce were set out in great particularity. Whereas the parties were exempted by the treaty of 1700 from sending the stipulated succours if themselves engaged in war, and therefore Great Britain had been so exempted during the war with France, but from the end of that war Sweden claimed her subsidies; and whereas satisfaction for damages to trade was demanded by both sides; now commissioners were to be appointed to assess and balance these claims and damages.

The present treaty was in no wise to impugn the sovereignty of the parties in their respective seas. The succours sent might, if desired, be considered as auxiliary, and the party sending them not take part in the war; but no peace nor truce might be agreed to by the one at war without inclusion of the other; while, if both were at war, neither was to agree to preliminaries of peace separately. The exemption to either party from sending succour to the other, if himself engaged in war, was continued, excepting however specially the present war between Great Britain and Spain; and the king of England undertook to send the stipulated ships and subsidies so long as the war with the tsar lasted, and the subsidies during that with Denmark, supposing that, as was not expected, it outlasted the other. The queen of Sweden was on no account to listen to any propositions from Spain, nor to give asylum or any assistance to the pretender or his descendants, nor to the king's rebel subjects, &c., but to maintain and guarantee the protestant succession. As it was of very great importance that the Baltic Sea should not be under the domination of the tsar, if he refused to make peace and restitution, then the king of England would not only help against him as provided, but would use his good offices with his allies to obtain their help also, to enable Sweden to reduce him. The mutual obligations as to succour, however, were not to extend to cutting off all friendship and commerce with the enemy of the other party, but the subjects of the party not at war were to have liberty to trade with such enemy excepting in contraband. Other treaties or conventions were not to be brought forward as excusing from the present obligations. The treaty was to last for eighteen years and to be made perpetual if at any time thought fit. There followed two separate articles. The first was an engagement to combine

counsels and forces in defence of the protestant religion in the empire and everywhere else. The second alleged the advisability of a peace between Sweden and Denmark in the interests of freedom of navigation and commerce in the Baltic, and for the common good of protestants, and to restrain the power of certain neighbours increasing every day ; for which reasons the king of England had not only offered his mediation, which both parties had accepted, but now promised to be security and guarantor of the engagements of all treaties of friendship made by Sweden heretofore with Great Britain and lately with Hanover and Prussia and to be made with Denmark ; and he particularly engaged himself to guarantee and maintain the treaties of Westphalia both as regarded the protestant religion and the cessions made by them to Sweden, so far as not already excepted or to be excepted in the treaty with Denmark or at the congress of Brunswick. Ratifications of the treaty were exchanged on $\frac{1}{30}$ April.

J. F. CHANCE.