MIND

A QUARTERLY REVIEW

OF

PSYCHOLOGY AND PHILOSOPHY

I.—ON RELATIONS; AND IN PARTICULAR THE COGNITIVE RELATION.

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1. *The Nature of Relations.*—Some relations seem to belong to things themselves, like the relation of paternity; others might appear to be the work of the mind in comparing or contrasting, such as likeness and unlikeness, the negative relation, etc.; with some, such as relations of time and space, the case seems doubtful. When A is said to be far from B or to be greater than B, in what sense does the relation belong to A or B? A let us say weighs a pound, and B an ounce. The pound weight belongs to A, but is not its being greater than B merely introduced by the mind which measures the two weights against one another?

This question, an epistemological one, is suggested by the diversity of experienced relations. A difficulty of a different sort is raised when we inquire into the reality of relations. On the one hand, when we keep to concrete facts, some relations seem more real or more important than their terms. For instance, the relation of sovereignty is or may be far more important than the individual who is sovereign. On the other hand relation seems to many so much infected with contradiction as to be essentially appearance, when they inquire into its metaphysical value. The argument assumes many forms, but ultimately it is of the following sort. Things which are related to each other are said to be correlatives; yet we may say that relations in turn are correlative to their terms. Consequently there is a new relation between a term and its relation, and relations seem therefore to involve the infinite regress. Let us assume that infinite regress, under

all conditions, implies absurdity. The assumption is not valid; for there is a great difference between the absurdity of the infinite process whereby the kitten chases its own tail, and the infinite divisibility of a line. But assume that infinite process condemns. Then, since, to revert to the first half of the dilemma, relations are at least as real as the terms they relate, either we must deny both to be real or we must ask, is the argument sound according to which relations involve the infinite process?

Relation is in fact the vaguest word in philosophy. It stands for any connexion between things. But while specific relations are defined, relation as such, what relation is, appears most often to be taken for granted without any attempt at determination. I do not doubt that relation is a notion so simple as to defy definition. Unless you know what a relation is, no one can explain it to you. But the same thing is true of red colour. Yet we can fix our minds upon what red colour is by describing it as the colour of blood. Any similar attempt to describe relations will but call attention to something equally obvious. But unless it is done we are likely, in speaking of relations, to be vague and to move about in the dark. At least I have found it so in my own case.

In this matter I have found the greatest help from the statement of James in his *Psychology*¹ that relations of space were themselves spaces. In one of the chapters of his *Meaning of Truth*² James describes how he was much troubled by T. H. Green's criticisms of English sensationalism and by Green's doctrine that relations are pure acts of intellect unifying our experience; and how "he well remembered the sudden relief it gave him to perceive one day that space-relations at any rate were homogeneous with the terms between which they mediated. The terms were spaces and the relations were other intervening spaces." Possibly others like myself who acknowledge with gratitude their indebtedness to Green felt the same sort of relief when they first read James's *Psychology*. In the chapter referred to James recalls a distinction drawn by Prof. Strong between 'saltatory' and 'ambulatory' relations. "For example difference is saltatory, jumping as it were immediately from one term to another, but distance in time or space is made out of intervening parts of experience through which we ambulate in succession." And James goes on to describe his own view of knowing as ambulatory. With this view of knowing I am not here concerned. Moreover the

¹ Vol. ii., pp. 148-153.

² Chap. vi., "A Word more about Truth," pp. 138 ff.

distinction of saltatory and ambulatory relations, useful and happy as it is, appears to me of secondary importance. What is really significant and important in ambulatory relations is that the relation is, whether homogeneous with its terms or not, of one texture with it, constitutes with them one integral situation. The thesis which is maintained here is that what James says of space and time and other ambulatory relations is true of all relations. They are none of them capable of abstraction from their terms, if they are represented truly. There never is a jump from term to term: the terms are parts of one continuous tissue. Whether there are many distinguishable links or few, or whether the interval is like its terms or not is a secondary matter, however striking in its effect. Difference is ultimately no more of a jump than the relation of two adjacent points of space, if we can with propriety speak of adjacence in the members of a continuous series.¹

A relation then may be described as the whole situation into which the terms which stand in the relation enter; so far, of course, as the situation concerns the relation. The situation may be one of events, as in the causal relation, or of things which are simultaneous, as the points of a line. By, the situation, is meant the real system of circumstances, which used to be called the *fundamentum relationis*, in so far as that system of circumstances brings the terms into continuous connexion with one another. This applies directly to the relation between the two ends of a line, or the interval of time which forms the relation between two points of time. The interval is the whole system of circumstances into which the two points of time enter in so far as that system connects the points. The relation of maternity is the actual history of bearing the child and the whole set of actions, including feelings, in which the mother as mother is engaged towards her child; again with the proviso, in so far as these actions establish a connexion between mother and child.² The reason of the proviso is that these actions by themselves are, as such, states of the mother; they

¹ Since I corrected this paper for the press, I discover that I have neglected to read James's paper on *The Thing and its Relations* printed as Appendix A of *A Pluralistic Universe*. What is said above and in the remainder of the section as to the continuity of the terms and their relation does not add anything to what is said by James in that paper. There is at most a difference of emphasis.

² Compare Mill's admirable description of relations, *Logic*, Bk. i., ch. ii., § 7, and particularly ch. iii., § 10, where however allowance has always to be made for Mill's prepossessions (1) in favour of idealism in metaphysics and (2) in favour of atomism in describing mental states.

are indeed essential to the relation, but the relation involves the child as well as the mother, and is the total situation or connectedness, established by actions or passions on the part of the mother and of the child. The relation of kingship is the system of acts and the capacities of them, or passions and the capacities of them in which the king as king is concerned with his subjects, in so far as these set up a situation of king and subjects. It is a matter of subsidiary moment whether the relations are as in these examples asymmetrical, or as in the relation of equality, symmetrical. In so far as the situation of mother and child is a total situation, the two relations of mother to child and child to mother are the same situation seen from two different ends. What is action in the one case is passion in the other. Moreover if the relation is a very comprehensive one, it may not be easy, without straining of language, to describe the situation except in terms of the one side of it. Thus the filial relation comes to include active support of the mother by the child; and it may seem unnatural to describe this situation as part of the maternal relation, because we more naturally describe the relation from the point of view of actions than passions. But this is a mere matter of usage and presents no difficulty. These examples also illustrate the obvious limitation which was added above to the general description of relations, that they are the whole situation into which the terms enter, so far as the situation concerns the relation. For instance the situation of the king towards his subjects may be spatial as well as kingly: like Saul he may be a taller man than his subjects. This does not concern the kingly situation. Finally we may observe that what James (in the *Psychology*) affirms of relations of space and time is true of other relations, indeed of all other relations, that the relation may be just as substantive as its terms. It is just as much a reality as the terms and belongs to the same tissue with them; and it may thus be on occasion the centre of regard while the terms become as it were adjectives of it. The two points may be merely the ends of the line; in a constitutional monarchy the king may be an appendage or function of the constitution; the characters in a play which are related by the plot may be shadowy servants of the plot, the "fringe" may be central and the centre a "fringe".

It is not pretended that the above is anything more than a description of relations by pointing out what it is that we mean when we talk of relations. If it is obvious, its importance lies in the consequences. But so far there is no excuse for regarding relations as the work of the mind. They are

one element in empirical fact. But some account must be taken of that doubtful class of relations, such as relations of likeness or difference, identity, equality, greater or less, and the like, or even such relations as 'and,' 'but' or 'however'; all of which seem at first sight eminently to be mental. So subjective do such relations seem that attempts have been made to refer these relations to the experience of the act of attention itself by which two like or different things (to take these examples) are compared. The difference or likeness of things does not, it might be urged, belong to the things, but arises from our experience of them. Red and green are red and green; but it is we who feel them 'different'. And we might even say that one magnitude is declared greater than another because of the felt excess in the act of attention to the one over that of attention to the other. But fascinating as such a theory might seem, it is clearly circular. For the acts of attention must themselves be compared to feel their likeness or difference. The only difference between likeness in things and likeness in mental acts is that in the one case it is contemplated and in the other enjoyed.¹ This is a categorical relation. And doubtless if our principle is right the understanding of mental likeness will enable us better to understand likeness in things. But it is only the categorical character of such relations which misleads us into attributing to them a subjective origin. Even 'but' and 'still' are not subjective; they are found also in objective situations of opposition.

What then we may ask are the objective situations which constitute such relations as likeness, identity and difference? The answer could only be given by a full inquiry into universals and particulars, which I cannot here attempt. I am content to regard the relation of particular and universal as a total situation into which those terms enter, say the participation of the particular, in Platonic fashion, in the universal. Difference means a real exclusion of the differents, whatever that exclusion may be, whether from the same time and place, or from participation in the same universal. Considering the difficulty of describing the situations in question we might conveniently fall back upon a pragmatist criterion, describing by a symptom rather than by a cause. We might say that the real situation into which two things which are identical in some respect enter is such that in virtue of it one may be substituted for the other.² When we have complete substi-

¹ Compare article on 'Method of Metaphysics' in *MIND*. No. 81, Jan., 1912.

² Cp. James *Some Problems of Philosophy*, p. 103

tutability, then we have numerical identity. Likeness carries with it partially successful and partially unsuccessful capacity for substitution. There will be corresponding criteria for difference, whether numerical or only conceptual (to borrow a term of Mr. Moore's).¹ It would in my view be a mistake to identify these relations with these consequences of them, as appears to be done by pragmatism. But these tests are at any rate useful as well as legitimate as a method of describing the real situations which constitute the relations.

2 *Are Relations Internal or External?*—From this the answers to certain well-known questions follow at once. Are relations internal or external to their terms? In the strict sense, indeed, neither alternative is true. For if a relation, to be internal to the things it relates, must be a quality of them, it is clear that it is not a quality of each term separately. For that would omit from the relation the independent correlative thing. This has been already alluded to. The child is in no sense a quality or part of a quality of the mother, but the independent real existence of the child is necessary for the circumstances which make up the whole situation described as the relation of maternity. On the other hand to call the relation a quality of the two terms taken together is an abuse of thought. The relation is nothing but the connectedness of the terms, and it is not a quality. But if we mean by the internality of a relation that it cannot exist independently of its terms, then in this sense relations are internal to their terms. It seems obvious that they are not external to their terms, if we remember that the whole situation into which things enter when they are related is not an aggregate of circumstances but continuous, literally an integral situation. In so far as things enter into the relation and become its terms, it is not external to them. The relation exhibits itself in the acts or states by virtue of which the things participate in the relation. Thus paternity is not external to a father but it is external to a man before he is a father. Thus a relation can only be considered external to its terms if those terms are considered out of the relation, or rather if they *can* as in the case of paternity be so considered. But in that case there is no relation of the kind contemplated. Hence if we separate the world into terms *and* their relations, we are making an abstraction. The world consists of things *in* their relations. The notion of the externality of relations to their terms implies discontinuity between things. If they were so

¹ In his paper on "Identity," *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society*, vol. i., 1900-1.

discontinuous, there would be no total situations in the world, and consequently neither relations nor terms. For while you can explain wherein consists the continuity of elements which are taken to be relatively independent members of a continuum, you cannot explain how a continuum can be generated from elements supposed to be discontinuous and completely independent.

It is only when relations are regarded as external to things that the famous argument from the infinite regress holds good. As I understand Mr. Bradley's treatment of relations and qualities, his demonstration that qualities and their relations are not reality but appearance, and that whether taken alone or together they are ultimately unintelligible, depends on abstracting or separating things from their relations, so that *in effect* the relations are external to their terms.¹ Unfortunately, we are left to conclude that relations as they really enter into experience are appearance; but such relations, not external to their terms, involve continuity, and in this case the argument from infinite regress breaks down. For in that case either we get the sort of infinite regress which is legitimate; or we fail to get the infinite regress which is invalid and circular and convicts of absurdity. If relations are considered as the total situation which makes its terms continuous with one another, we can find here as in every continuum an infinite regress, for of every continuum it is at least true that a term exists between any two terms. On the other hand, if we still understand the relation as a con-

¹ The chief business of this paper is with the cognitive relation, in its connexion with relation in general; and I have to be brief in respect of the general question; and I hope that in my brevity I shall not be understood as misrepresenting Mr. Bradley. I do not mean that he thinks relations are external to their terms. On the contrary it is perfectly clear that he does not; and in Note B of the Appendix to his later editions *A.* and *R.* this is insisted on with all detail. "The whole," he says, p. 575, "has a character which cannot be said to consist barely in mere terms and mere relations between them." "The whole that is analysed into relations and terms can fall into the background and be obscured, but it can never be dissipated," p. 573. I only mean that his arguments in chapter iii. apply to relations only as separated from the terms, with neglect of the "whole" (what I am calling the total situation). It is this neglect which Mr. Stout seeks to make good by introducing the idea of 'relatedness'. I must refer forward to the later part of this section and to what is said in the next section. Of course too the argument from the infinite regress is not put by him in the crude form which I have given to it. According to him, if you speak of qualities and relations, a quality *A* is *A*, in itself and *A*, in its relation, and consequently there is a fresh relation between *A*, and *A*. But it does not seem to me that this is different in principle from my crude version. If the quality in the relation were different from the quality in itself, then the relation is external to the quality.

tinuous situation, the invalid infinite regress does not exist. Take the argument, to show that such invalid regress exists, in the deliberately bald form in which I have above represented its essential character. The relation is itself correlative to its terms, and there is therefore a new relation between the term and its relation to the other term; and so on. It is clear that this makes the relation independent of its term and discontinuous with it. For it is the relation itself which makes the terms correlative and terms of the relation. But if there is a new relation of the relation to its term, the relation has now become a term, while pretending still to be a relation, and this is to strip it of its real character as a relation, that is, as a situation connecting its terms, and in fact makes it a term of itself. For example, suppose A is the father of B. If we assert a new relation between A and A's paternity of B, we imply that the relation in question is separable from A as A enters into the relation of paternity to B. There may of course be a relation between A's paternity of B and A, so far as A stands outside the relation; that is to say, A's other qualities may be related to his paternity of B, but this is irrelevant, for the A who is supposed to be related to A's paternity of B is the A who is the father of B.

A further question is raised by Mr. Stout's proposal¹ to distinguish, besides terms and their relations, a third element, namely the relatedness of the terms. By relatedness he means the actual element of continuous connexion which as we have seen all relation as it really exists implies. With this distinction he is able to show convincingly that the contradictions alleged by Mr. Bradley in the conception of things or qualities and their relations disappear. That is to say, if we consider real experience and consider the real relations of things as containing besides mere "relation" also relatedness, he is able to show that relations depend on qualities and qualities depend on relations, in different respects; relations depend on qualities for the character which they have, or for their very existence, but qualities depend on relations only for being related. But I think he is driving out Satan by Beelzebub. For relatedness has to be introduced in order to make good the defect of the 'relations' which in the arguments he is considering are abstracted from their terms. The real answer would seem to be that the relation so described is not a real relation. The real relation includes relatedness, which is actual entry into a relation. Now if a

¹ 'Alleged Self-contradictions in the Concept of Relation,' *Proc. Arist. Society*, vol. II., 1901-2, a paper to which I am greatly indebted.

relation means the whole relevant situation into which the terms enter, there can be no entry into the relation distinct from the relation itself. The relation once more is taken generally or in the abstract and relatedness or actual entry is required to make it particular.¹

It does not however follow that because there are no abstract relations there are no general ones. There seems to be no more reason for denying relations like paternity or kingship to be general than for denying situations to be general. But just as we are apt, because we can legitimately distinguish in things the law of their constitution from the particularities which obey the law, to think of the concept or law as something altogether separate from its particulars; so by taking relations in their generality, we are apt to set up the relation as an independent existence, as if it did not always assume in our experience the form of some situation involving particulars and therefore itself coloured thereby; and then arise the antinomies we have mentioned as to things and their relations, in which things are conceived as if they were doing nothing to each other, were unrelated, and relations as if they had nothing to relate.

3. *Categorical and Empirical Relations.*—So much for the question whether relations are in their nature internal or external. But within relations a distinction has now to be drawn, which is independent of the previous problem. Some relations, such as equal or like or different are *intrinsic* to their terms, others like paternity or kingship are *extrinsic* to them. Anything in space must as such stand in spatial relations; anything which has magnitude must be equal to or greater than some other magnitude. But a man though, to be a man, he must stand in human relations to other human beings, must for instance have a father, need not be a king or a father or a servant. It is clear from the examples that the distinction is relative. A man need not be the actual father of any one but he must be the son of some one, and the filial relation is therefore intrinsic to the type man. Thus we may distinguish properly three kinds of relations: those which are intrinsic as belonging to things necessarily, that is to anything; those which are intrinsic to a type, but not necessary to the existence of everything, and

¹ This is the ground of Prof. A. E. Taylor's criticism (in *Elements of Metaphysics*, p. 155). He urges that if my hat is not actually on my head, that is if the relatedness of the terms is not there, the relation of 'on' does not exist but only some other, more general relation, such as 'above'.

those which are extrinsic simply. The first kind of relations are categorial: they arise out of the categorial characters of things. Everything is in time or space, has quantity, has degrees of quality, has causality so far as it is in time at all and so universally, that is it stands in causal relation with something or other. On the other hand both the other kinds of relation are empirical, in the narrower sense of that term. True that a man as such has human relations, which, like relations to his kind, are intrinsic to him but they flow from his empirical characters and not from his categorial ones. The strictly extrinsic relations are still more obviously empirical. The difference of the last two classes is in fact the old difference between essential properties and accidents. A man's feeling for his kind is essential; but to have a son or a wife is an accident and may be a separable accident. The distinction of categorial and empirical relations might be expressed more accurately as that of *a priori* and *a posteriori* relations, but there is little risk of misconception of the meaning of the term empirical, as if what is described as not-empirical was not experienced.

This distinction of categorial and empirical relations has real importance for metaphysics. It affects the answer to the question whether there can be any truth or reality short of the absolute or whole reality. The categorial characters of things and the relations in which those characters exhibit themselves are the fundamental or pervasive features of experience. Consequently any attempt to deny their reality and reduce them to the level of mere real appearance must consist, like Mr. Bradley's, in showing them to be inherently or internally contradictory. The success or insuccess of such attempts does not fall to be considered here. But it is not enough to show that these notions present difficulty. And what is more to the point it is not enough to show that they are partial and incomplete. For this consideration is only relevant to prove their ultimate unreality if it can also be shown that they are vitiated or at least altered by the addition of fresh characters. Now truths of space and time are not vitiated because things possess other than merely temporal and spatial characters. I take space and time merely as instances of categories in general. If they are the fundamental features of experience, any fresh increment of experience implies them already and cannot alter them in themselves. It is not merely that in these categorial truths we abstract from the other characters of things, a justification which is sometimes put forward for belief in such truths. A circle is a circle whether it is of bronze or chalk. It is only

abstract as the object of thought is abstract in distinction from the object of perception.¹ It is not hypothetical in itself, but necessary, in the sense of fundamental.

But when we come to empirical relations, seeing that they are *a posteriori* or empirical, the question whether a partial truth is wholly or only partially true is a very different matter and it can only be settled by empirical experience. The answer depends on whether the fresh relations into which a thing enters alter its character or not. A man may have his character as a man changed by becoming a king or a father. He may be brutalised by the possession of power or become egotistic or parochialised by the concentration of his affections. Consequently it is only so far as we can be sure that the intrinsic character is not affected by fresh empirical relations that we are justified in laying down universal propositions. Empirical propositions are thus true with a proviso which limits the conditions to a certain circle of characters. This is what gives its value to the thesis that science is only so far true as it emulates the mathematical sciences. At the same time it remains that a partial truth is not untrue because it is partial but because the addition of fresh relations may empirically alter the old ones.²

4. *The Relation of Knowing*.—The most interesting of all relations, for the discussion of which the preceding paragraphs have been written, is that between the subject and the object of cognition, the relation of knowing, or, more strictly, of contemplation, for it is clear that enjoyment is not a relation at all, but a state of the self.³ This relation of knowing an object occurs when a thing called the subject, which possesses the property of consciousness, being stirred by some means or other (of which more hereafter) into con-

¹ Bosanquet's *Logic*, vol. i., p. 249. Second edition, p. 234; and in many other passages.

² One conclusion from the above may be drawn. Consciousness itself, we may observe, is empirical. It is in no sense the foundation of the categories; it only has categorial characters like other empirical objects. Hence a statement about consciousness may be vitiated by the addition of other empirical elements as much as a statement about an empirical external thing. Thus I may fancy I am acting from a sense of duty in exposing another man's action. But I may really be doing it from malice. Thus my consciousness may be illusory as well as the objects I apprehend. I was in fact enjoying the malice as well as the duty, but I disregarded it.

For the above section I have derived much help from Mr. Stout's essay on "Error" in *Personal Idealism*.

³ I do not mean that you do not know yourself, but only that to know yourself is not a relation of yourself to yourself. On the question of knowing mental states I have written elsewhere (*Arist. Proceedings*, vol. ix., 1908-9, pp. 25 ff.) and propose to return to the subject.

sciousness of a certain 'direction' finds itself in the presence of an object, not itself, appropriate to that condition of consciousness. In the case of sensation or perception, the act of consciousness is evoked by the object itself; in other cases, those of images, memories, thoughts, the act is not evoked by the object itself through affection of the sense organs, but indirectly. Let us abstract from the manner in which the consciousness is evoked, and we have in all cases of cognition of an object the compresence of two things, the subject in a condition of apprehension, and the object revealed to the extent to which it is apprehended. The relation is thus the whole situation constituted by the togetherness of these two things, so far as it connects them. The percipient enters into the situation as the act of, say, perception; the object, as perceived, that is in the form in which it is perceived. The relation is that of this togetherness. We cannot say, as might be suggested, that the relation is the perceiving. For this is to take the perceiving as containing also the perceived. Whereas the perceiving is but the act of the subject, and the perceived is not an element in the perceiving, but distinct from it and *related* to it in the single situation which is described as their togetherness. Just as the distance of two points is the space into which the points enter and of which they are the limits, so the relation of subject and object is the connectedness of two terms which are respectively the subject as perceiving and the object as perceived.

The difficulty of describing the precise nature of this relation of togetherness is its extremely elementary character and simplicity. No proposition is more frequently heard in philosophy than the statement that the relation of subject and object in knowing is unique and incomparable with other relations. In truth, the uniqueness attributed to it does not belong to the relation itself, but to the character of consciousness which belongs to one of its terms. I feel the wind blowing against my cheek. I am together with the wind, but since the wind evokes in me a consciousness (of a certain sort, or 'direction') I apprehend or know the wind. Substitute for the conscious term of the relation a term such as a plant, which I suppose not to be conscious but only alive, and the togetherness of the living thing and the air is a vital action of respiration. It is no longer cognition, for the one term of the relation has not consciousness. Or substitute for the plant an india-rubber ball which yields to pressure of the hand and then by its elasticity regains its normal form, here again is the relation of togetherness; but there is no cog-

nitition, nor even life, but only elasticity of a material thing. Now in each case the peculiar colouring of the relation, its specific character, that which makes it unique, is derived from the nature or the degree of development of the term which enters into the relation. So far as consciousness is a unique property of certain things, the relation of knowing an object is unique. But life or colour or elasticity are in this sense equally unique, that is, they are the characteristic, specific properties of certain types of existence. But it is of course not in this sense that it is maintained that knowing is a unique relation. For that statement implies that knowing is incomparable with any other kind of relation, whereas it has now been shown to be only one form which the general relation of togetherness assumes, when the one term which enters into it happens to be of the conscious type.

It is in fact clear that the relation of togetherness between knowing subject and known object, so far from being unique, is the most general and most elementary of all relations. Abstract from the special togetherness of conscious subject and object; and we have this relation wherever in the world there is connectedness, and this is the elementary condition of there being one world. It is the fundamental relation of which all relations are the developments under more complicated conditions. This needs some further explanation. I do not mean that other relations, such as likeness, succession, causality, are specific forms of togetherness, in the mere sense in which life is a special form of togetherness, or knowing is, according to the phrase just used. For in these last cases the general relation is the same, and the special character is introduced into it by the particular empirical or a *posteriori* character of the terms. I mean that these other relations are specific types or species of togetherness in the sense that they are not mere togetherness, but togetherness under the forms of the categorial or a *priori* elements of things. Thus space and time and causality and quantity are categories of things. Spatial relations are togetherness in space; they are not bare connectedness, but connectedness in the concrete form of distances. Succession is one kind of connectedness in time. We have causality when we have a determinate event, that is an event so together with another in time and space as to be directly or indirectly continuous with it. We have the so-called relation of substance and attributes or accidents when the togetherness assumes the form of connectedness within one portion of space and continuity within a duration of time. But the category of substance raises special questions of its own with which I do not attempt to deal.

Thus the relation of togetherness which, when it subsists between an empirical thing with the empirical character of being conscious and any object contemplated, is called knowing, occurs wherever there are finite individuals in the world, relatively independent or separate, but belonging to one world. The relation is, therefore, the most universal type of relation, or is relation as such. Instead of declaring it unique, it would be truer to say that between any two individuals whatever there subsists a relation such that the one may be said to "know" the other. In this wider employment of "knowing," not only does mind know things, but life "knows" material things and one material thing "knows" another. The table knows the ink-pot which presses on it, the tuning-fork knows the tuning-fork to which it responds. Everything A knows everything else B and enjoys itself. It depends on the special nature of A, whether it is a mind or a living being or a stone or a vibration, how much of B it knows, that is how much and in what shape B is revealed to it. A only knows an aspect L of B if A first of all can be stirred to an activity appropriate to the revelation of L, and, secondly, if it actually is so stirred, by whatever means. But all togetherness (and every A is together with every B) evokes in A and B the possible and appropriate response on either side. Thus, for example, I hear the tuning-fork sounding C, but another tuning-fork which sounds along with it does not apprehend the sound as sound, but let us say it only knows a vibration of a certain rate. Hence, too, may be explained what may at first blush be a puzzle to many. Since I am together with everything in the world, why do I not apprehend these things? I apprehend in fact only a small portion, namely, those with which I am so together that I am in an appropriate act of consciousness. The rest I do not know in the way of conscious knowledge. But my body apprehends some of them in so far as it lives, and others in so far as it is merely material. Thus I am not conscious of the pressure of the air, but my body knows it, though not necessarily as pressure, and my life knows it in breathing it. When my back is turned upon the wall, I do not see the wall, and in general am not aware of it, but my material body does apprehend it.

To say that the relation of knowing is not unique, but is found as between any two finite things whatever within one world is by no means to assert that everything is a mind. The risk of this confusion makes it undesirable to put forward the proposition without the strictest reservation to this effect. There is no knowing in the proper sense unless A is

mind. Even though there is a steady progression from the lowest forms of existence to the highest, we are not justified in so emptying the word mind of its distinctive property of consciousness as to apply it where consciousness is not known to exist. As well declare all minds to be higher forms of matter. In this quandary, perhaps it would be most convenient to say that the fundamental relation of togetherness is that of subject and object and that this is knowing when the subject is a mind. Two things anyhow are to be firmly held: one, that the generic character of knowing is the most elementary of all relations; the other that it is a relation of knowing in the proper sense only when one member of the relation is a mind. Perhaps the assertion of the uniqueness of the knowing relation arises from a dim consciousness that it is in a sense a definition of relation as such. If so, to call a relation unique which is everywhere where there is any relation at all is a strange perversity. But it is almost certainly declared unique because the relation itself is confused with the empirical character of the one term which enters into it; and it was to expose this error that the above long exposition has been necessary.

5. *Experience of Togetherness in Knowing.*—All knowing being thus togetherness of the mind and its object, the question may be asked how is this relation experienced? The fundamental fact of experience is, I have repeatedly said, the fact that I and the object are compresent; and this is declared to be the deliverance of experience itself,¹ an empirical proposition, or rather let us say an experimental proposition. I have also sometimes said every experience gives us in experience two things, myself and the object and the relation between them, or in relation to one another, and it has been pointed out to me that something obscure and ambiguous remained in this statement, and I have myself been beset by the feeling that this is so. This obscurity I desire now to clear up. When I say that in perception, there are myself the subject, the object, and the relation between them, I do not mean that there is a relation of *and* or *together* over and above the terms myself enjoying and the object contemplated. To mean this would be to abstract the relation from its terms, and contemplate it by itself. But the relation is the total situation which constitutes experience. The terms of the relation are the thing enjoyed or myself, and the thing contemplated or the object. The contemplated object is the

¹ I do not mean that it is the deliverance of introspection. What is got by introspection in the experience is the I, which is enjoyed. The object contemplated is got by extrospection. And this account is true whether the object be a perceived object or an image or a thought.

object revealing or showing itself, the enjoyed thing is the mind apprehending, and the total situation is what may be called either the experiencing of the object, or the object's being experienced, according as the situation is viewed from the side of either term of it. The terms as they are thus described are the subject and object as they enter into the relation. There is therefore no "and" or "together" over and above the terms so described. We may indeed suppose the subject and object existing outside this relation and entering into it by the addition of and or together. I may of course happen not to be seeing an object and so not be together with it in so far as coloured. In this sense of special togetherness I may if I choose say that it is added to the terms so far as they are considered outside this special togetherness. But then of course the terms to which the special togetherness is added are not the terms of the special relation considered.

Consequently when I perceive a table, the table and my perception are together, and the fundamental fact of experience is these two things in the relation of together. Now how is the togetherness *experienced*? It is experienced in my enjoyment of the perceiving. In perceiving I enjoy my own act as together with the object contemplated, the table. May we not then also say that I contemplate the table as together with my enjoyment? The answer is negative. What I contemplate is the table, and in enjoying the contemplation of it I enjoy myself together with it. To contemplate the table and also its togetherness with myself would involve two errors. It would mean that I can contemplate myself, which I never can do, and which only an angel could do. And, secondly, it would mean experiencing the relation twice over. I can only contemplate the togetherness of the table with me in the sense that in contemplating the table I am together, and enjoy my togetherness, with it. For I cannot exclude my own enjoyment, and so far as that enjoyment exists the togetherness also exists. Supposing *per impossibile* that I could contemplate the table as together with myself I should be experiencing the relation from the side of both its terms at once, and counting it as I have said twice over.

In order to verify this, let us apply our general principle that a relation is the same whether the terms between which it subsists are two external objects or two states of myself, or myself and an external object ;¹ and consider the relation

¹ This may be regarded as a way of stating the method of metaphysics described in *MIND*, No. 81, Jan., 1912.

of togetherness which I contemplate between two contemplated objects, the table and the chair. The relation is that either the table is together with the chair or that the chair is together with the table. In apprehending the table as together with the chair I thereby also apprehend the chair as together with the table. If I say both, I am counting the experience twice over. The reason why this escapes us is because the relation of together is what is called a symmetrical one. If A is together with B, B is together with A. But if A is the father of B, it is clear enough that nothing is added to the account of the relation by saying that B is the son of A. The relation may be described in either way, but not in both ways at the same time. Similarly with the relation of cause and effect. Now in the relation A is together with B, substitute for the contemplated A the enjoyed A, then since I must enjoy the togetherness I cannot also contemplate it, except in the sense indicated above. I am together with B or B is together with me or we are both together. But while an onlooking superior being would contemplate the facts indifferently in any one of these ways, and consequently I am together with the table in precisely the same way as the table is together with the chair (and my experience itself assures me of this, assures me that is that my enjoyment and the table are together as compresent things), yet when I ask how is the relation experienced I must answer that it is enjoyed and is exhausted in the enjoyment.

6. *Experience of the Knowing Relation.*—Having endeavoured to make this clear, I may now go on to ask is the mere togetherness thus experienced the whole of what is experienced in the knowing relation? Do I not also experience myself in a temporal and in a spatial relation to the object? In asking this question, we must ask it generally, in reference to all the various ways of knowing and not merely to the particular case of sensory cognition which calls for special consideration. Do I experience the remembered table or event as not only together with me but in spatial or time relation to me? It is plain that images (and in a certain sense thoughts¹) are themselves extended in space and have

¹ There is perhaps something paradoxical here. But I am content to assume that even where thoughts are not spatial or temporal in their contents, like the thought circle or year, yet the thought is always embodied in some particular. The particular need not be an instance of the thought, but may be something quite different in kind. But my thoughts anyhow seem to need some point d'appui: they do not in Mr. Bradley's phrase 'float'. Even in the investigations of Messrs. Watt and his confrères the *Aufgabe* is not without attachment to something par-

succession and duration, that is I can contemplate in them relations of time and space. It is clear also that by reflective experience I come to learn that these images or thoughts (I do not mean the imagination or thinking of them) are related in time and space to my body, and so to bodily states which are also (or if you will are attended by) the consciousness of these images or thoughts. It is true also, as I believe, that I enjoy myself in time and space, that is in the identical place and time of certain bodily processes. But when I ask myself does any knowing on my part give me the enjoyment not only of togetherness with the object but of time and space relation to it, the answer is much more difficult. But it must be given, I believe, on the strength of observation, in the affirmative. I do enjoy time relation to the object, in the sense that I apprehend the object as belonging vaguely to one time (not to the same moment of time) with myself. The same precaution must be used to guard this statement as was used before with togetherness. I am not aware of the time relation in the sense that besides contemplating the object I contemplate the stretch of time between myself and the object. To do so would be to contemplate both myself and the object as if they were two events in time outside me ; it would be to contemplate not merely the object but its date in time in reference to my experiencing it. I enjoy the time relation to it in so far as the object occurring in time evokes in me, by one way or another, the consciousness which is called apprehending it, and that consciousness has the time-character. The same account applies to the case of space. I am aware of the object as somewhere in one space with myself, not necessarily in the same place. And again I do not contemplate the stretch of space between it and myself, which would mean being aware not merely of the object but of its distance from me. But in enjoying myself as in one space with the object I contemplate, I am in spatial relation to it in the only way possible where one term of the relation is enjoyed and not also contemplated.¹

ticular, were it only the circumstances of the experiment. Grant that thoughts subsist while images and percepts exist, yet I cannot think that this means independent subsistence of thoughts ; it is rather a means and a very valuable one of distinguishing two quite different but not independent elements in reality. However if any difficulty is felt, the text may be confined to images, though I should not myself know what to say in that case of the relation of self to its thoughts.

¹ Let any one, who at all possesses sensory imagination, test this by thinking of the lines—

The same that oft times hath
Charmed magic casements, opening on the foam
Of perilous seas, in fairy lands forlorn ;

This answer raises however a problem, not as to the fact, but of consistency and of its ultimate metaphysical bearing, which is mentioned in a note.¹

7. *Sensory Experience*.—This appears to me the report of observation, of the experience of the knowing relation in any of its forms. But even if it be denied to be true in general, yet when we ask what is the character of the relation as experienced in sensory cognition, sensation or perception, we have to say that not only is this experienced, but something more. For reflective theory there is a real difference between sensory experience and images or thoughts. A perception is provoked in us by the action of the object perceived upon the

and asking himself whether he is not conscious of the object described as somewhere in space along with himself, that is does not enjoy himself as somewhere in space along with the object. Or let him try the same experiment on

The antechapel where the statue stood
Of Newton with his prism and silent face,
The marble index of a mind for ever
Voyaging through strange seas of thought alone ;

when he will enjoy himself in space along with not only the statue of Newton but the strange seas of thought imagined as present to Newton's mind.

¹ The problem is this. Consciousness itself is the most developed empirical thing we know, and it is not surprising that conscious knowing should involve time and space relations, and as we shall see presently in the next paragraph, relations of causality. But these relations do not specially concern consciousness as such, but are categorial. But if togetherness is the most elementary of all relations, and yet we experience when we enter this relation also those of time and space, it would seem that all relation is also temporal and spatial, to say nothing of the other categories. The categories appear thus to come into existence all at once along with bare togetherness. Various questions are thus raised. May there be a unity which is below the level of relations? before there are distinguishable positions in time and space. Such a unity, if it exists, would not be the togetherness we have discussed. Further (to anticipate the next section) if sensory existence, which seems to involve causality and not merely distinction of places and times, is the simplest aspect of things and the togetherness of things implies not only time and space but also causality, must we not hold that with the distinction of times and places, there is given also the existence of things? Are then space and time (at any rate space) so immaterial as they are commonly supposed to be and not rather the simplest forms of material existence? I am not able to answer these questions at present. The last in particular, at any rate as regards space, is as old as Descartes. But perhaps the method of examining the actual contents of our experience pursued in this paper may help to the solution of them.

But, whatever answer metaphysics may have to give to these problems of the ultimate constitution of reality, it remains true that no matter what the specific forms of relation are, relation as such, or the most general form of relation, is the mere togetherness which belongs to knowing in its widest sense whether the knower is a consciousness or a material body or a point of space.

sense organs. Whereas in images or thoughts the mental action is not caused by the object contemplated (at least there is always a portion and the distinctive portion which is not so caused), but by something else, either some other mental process or some purely physical internal stimulation. When I see the table, the table affects my eyes; when I image it, I am thrown by some internal cause into the method of mental action to which the imaged table, i.e. the table as contemplated with the characteristic defects and advantages of an image, is the appropriate object. It is this circumstance which gives the percept as distinct from the image or the thought its peculiar impersonality in our experience, while in images and thoughts there is always a larger element of personality or idiosyncrasy. But this difference in the actual genesis of the perception affects, it would seem, the experience we have of the relation of knowing in this act. In perceiving, not only are we aware of our togetherness of the object, but as far as I can judge we also enjoy ourselves as the effect of the object which we contemplate. We do not contemplate the object as causing in us the perception. On that head enough has already been said when we raised the same question in the simpler matter of togetherness. To do so would be to contemplate both ourselves and the cause, as we contemplate two external things in causal relation. But in enjoying our perception as the effect of the object we contemplate, we are experiencing ourselves in a relation of causality to the object in which we are the effect. This is the enjoyment variously described as the liveliness, or vivacity, or the intrusiveness (*Eindringlichkeit*), or the sensational intensity, of a sensory experience. It may be answered, much in the spirit of Hume upon a similar occasion, that after all though the object causes in us a process of the brain, neither it nor the intervening links between the object and the brain-process are perceived, and the brain-process at any rate we may not even have heard of—without detriment to our perception of the object. But the answer would be irrelevant. For in the first place we do not contemplate the object as exercising contemplated causality upon us (this need not now be laboured further), and therefore our omission of intervening links does not enter into the question. Secondly, while it is true that we know nothing of the brain-process which has the consciousness called the perceiving (that is we do not know it so long as we are perceiving the object), our consciousness that we are the effect of the object is an enjoyment and is not the contemplation of the brain-process. Indeed the fact that we are not aware of the brain-process provoked in us

by the external object is the very consideration which most plainly leads (it was certainly this which led myself) to the conclusion that, in knowing, what we are aware of, or contemplate, is the object itself, for in all causal relations it is not the effect which the patient is aware of but the cause itself, the effect he only enjoys. Thus in every causal relation, instead of saying that the cause exhibits itself in the patient by the effect which it produces, we must say rather that the cause is revealed to the patient as whatever object it is; and the patient is not aware of the effect, but only is in a state of enjoyment to which the cause is revealed or by which the patient becomes aware of the agent. The causal relation is the one which more forcibly than any other demonstrates the relation of enjoyed and contemplated; and what is learnt from it can then be extended to all knowing.

Thus in sensory experience, as it would appear, it is true (as has often been maintained by philosophers¹) *on the basis of experience itself* that the mind is causally affected by the object which it contemplates, the perceiving act entering into relation with the perceived object as not only together with it, but as an enjoyed effect of it. And implied in the effect relation are relations of time and space.

Moreover, not only do we in perceiving enjoy ourselves as an effect of the object, but we can trace also in the tendency of our perceptual conation to reaction upon the object the reciprocal causality of the patient upon the agent. Not only is it true as a matter of fact that perceptual conation falls under the same type of reaction to stimulus as we have in physiological response to stimulation, but in the enjoyment of the perceptual conation there is contained the enjoyment of that reaction which compensates action.² In other words

¹ This has sometimes been put forward as a postulate, or at least the experiential nature of the fact has not been analysed or explained. Postulates in Metaphysics are to be regarded with the deepest suspicion. Here if anywhere we need not postulates but truths attested by experience, that is as all such truths are ultimately attested, by looking, or intuition.

² I do not mean by this that the reaction falls under the head of mechanical reaction, and is equal to the stimulus, but merely that the action of the stimulus ultimately issues in a movement of reaction, whether a practical or a speculative one; and in the second case though there is no outward bodily movement affecting the object, yet even here, however long delayed, there is in the end outward movement of some sort or other. Not that in reaction to a stimulus there is no mechanical reaction. In perceiving a book for example by sight, there is, as I understand from a physicist friend, a purely mechanical reaction of the eye to the pressure of the light upon it. But the chief business of the stimulation is to release a discharge. On the difficulties of the conception of trigger action or *Auslösung* in this connexion, see W. Ostwald's *Vorlesungen ueber Naturphilosophie* (lecture 17).

the enjoyed causality is also enjoyed reciprocity. I have tried to show elsewhere¹ that mere theoretical perception as distinct from practical perception or instinctive action is also a reaction which, instead of altering the object perceived, issues in other mental processes or in words or gestures. But this while it enables us to see that in perception we enjoy ourselves as cause as well as effect, suggests a further problem. For all knowing, even if not perceptual (imagination or thinking), is also shown to be essentially conative and the difference between so-called practical and theoretical activity to be secondary and to turn on whether the issue of the conation is to modify the object or modify the subject's body or mind. Can we then say that even in imagery and thinking, though there is no enjoyment of the effect of the contemplated object, there is enjoyment of reaction upon the object. This would be a paradoxical result. It would imply that we can enjoy causality upon the object without enjoying effect from the object. That such effect does not exist is clear. When a stimulation in a particular region of the brain makes us think of a friend, the imagination (not the image) is the effect of the internal stimulation which we do not contemplate and not of the friend whom we do contemplate. We do not enjoy ourselves as effect, for we do not contemplate the cause. But the idea of the friend may lead to the same manifestations of joy as his actual presence in perception would produce. Can we say then that we react upon an object which did not itself produce our contemplation of itself? We cannot. Strictly speaking the joyful reaction is the reaction on the stimulus which caused the idea, and this cause is not contemplated. Thus imaging involves a less intimate relation with the object than perception. It is together with its object, but we do not experience, that is we do not enjoy in respect of the object, either the character of being an effect of it or of reciprocal action upon it; though in imaging, in virtue of the bodily reaction or of the tendency which we give to our images in train, we are distinctly aware of our causality in respect of ourselves. We only become aware of causality upon the object when the image is replaced by a percept, and then we enjoy being an effect as well. The imaging conation seeks but does not find an object which shall produce the enjoyment of effect and reciprocity; and its function in knowing is thus that it serves partly, as James and the pragmatists say,² as leading up through practical preparation

¹ "Foundation and Sketch Plan of a Conational Psychology," *Brit. Journ. of Psych.*, vol. iv., pp. 239 ff.

² In saying so I am not accepting the pragmatist account of knowing, that it consists in the ambulatory relation between the idea and the per-

for the direct contact with perceived reality ; partly as a step towards thinking.

The case of thinking proper is more complicated, and I am able to touch it only in the slightest fashion. So far as it contains, and it always does contain, ideal elements, it shares that defect with imaging, though its ideas are of quite a different order from images. Since it is speculative willing (a statement for which I must refer to another paper ¹) it involves in a higher degree than imagery the enjoyment of the causality of the thinker. And its result is far different from that of imaging. Imaging finds merely its image. But the office of judging is to establish the connexion of the predicate with the subject of the proposition, to realise the predicate in the subject. Hence judging gives to the ideal predicate the same order of dignity as the subject possesses. If the subject is already presented in sense, as in a judgment of perception, the connexion of the predicate is as real as sense. If the proposition is a universal (The lion is carnivorous) the universal predicate forms part of the reality of the universal subject. The same thing is true if the subject judged is a mere idea of fancy (This fairy had a wreath of roses), or one of memory in any sense of that word (*Paradise Lost* is in iambic measure ; he wore a top-hat when I saw him last). Judging, though unlike practical willing, it does not create its propositions, but finds them, yet does thus bring into view the predicate as an element in the subject. And since the act is one of will, and believing is its *fiat*, it is an act of the whole person, and correspondingly the proposition judged is, in being judged, related to the whole world of reality as entertained by that person, which includes all objects of its experience, sensible as well as ideal. Thus, while imaging leaves us with a mere idea, gropes for a sensory object and does not find it, thinking directly or indirectly brings us back into touch with sensible reality. This is true even where our judgment is dramatic, as where we judge the objects of fancy.

cept. If I have not misunderstood, this is the most illuminating way in which the pragmatist conception has been expressed. But this ambulation cannot be knowing, for in having the idea with which the relation begins the cognitive relation is already contained. The ambulation from idea to percept is not cognition in general, but the special case of passing from an imperfect cognition of the object to a completer one. I imagine that this has been overlooked, if it has been overlooked, because of the realistic assumption which pragmatism makes. But if realism instead of being assumed is justified the need for pragmatism disappears. I hope to return to this subject later in connexion with the general problem of knowledge.

¹ *British Journal of Psychology*, vol. iv., p. 262, "Conational Psychology," § 10.

We thus enjoy in thinking our own causality. We do not enjoy effect from the proposition we discover, as we enjoy effect from sensation; but ultimately our object is related to sense.

The Place of Sensation in Knowledge.—The above throws light on the place of perception or, better, of sensation in knowledge. But as the matter lies outside the direct subject of the paper, I mention it in a note. To some extent I shall be repeating in another form what has been said above. In sensory experience alone have we complete enjoyment of action from without and reaction upon it, enjoyed as effect of the object and causality upon the object. Sensory action is causal reciprocity between individuals. It is not merely that sense constrains us. For our concepts constrain us too; the concept triangle compels us to believe its angles equal to two right angles. But concepts do not act upon our bodies, or rather they only do so through their individual instances. Compare ideation with perception: the image does not affect our bodies, and our response to the image, even if it is an image of memory or expectation, is always frustrate. It is in fact the frustration of the conation in virtue of which the object is ideal and not sensory. *Per contra* ideas have advantages denied to percepts. Being in a higher degree selective, they may omit the special features of a percept, and it is a corollary from this that they are more diagrammatic, and nearer to the comprehensiveness of thought. Now contrast both with thought. A judgment may be about a particular, and there may be as in sensation causality from the object judged about. But this is accidental, and the causality from the object about which the judgment is made is causality from a percept and not from a proposition which is the real object of the judging. But the essence of the judgment lies in the success of its ideal conation whereby the object judged is seen in a universal light. From this point of view judgment is higher than sensation, though it lacks, *qua* judgment, the direct causal action from the subject of the proposition, which may be a universal. Thinking is further away from sense than image, which is always particular. But it brings us nearer to sense again. For imaging is eminently personal and thought eminently impersonal. The concepts which thought handles might seem at first sight to be the creations of the mind in a higher degree than images. In fact, images are always vitiated by the personality of the mind. The concepts which thought thinks are the comprehensive laws of things, as it were the immortal individuals of which particulars are but the perishing acts. Thus thinking brings us nearer to the heart of things than images, but needs sense for its completion.

But in all alike we are dealing with things objective to the mind and in that sense real. We may distinguish two senses of real: as actual or true and as merely objective. Now images are just as objective as percepts. Moreover, there is not a single feature in an image which is not the appearance of some actual things. But imagery sees partially and sees confusedly, combining different actualities into the same incongruous picture. Sensations are actual but insignificant. It is thought which supplies them with significance. And in its turn thought finds the completion of its objectivity into actuality in sense.

Why it is that sense has this privileged position that being humblest it is most indispensable is a matter for metaphysical inquiry. It is like the food without which a man cannot live, though if he lived only for food he would not get even food. Certain it is we penetrate farther into the nature of things by thought, but the elementary acts of things, which are *sensa*, remain fundamental.