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Platonism *Platonism*. By Paul Elmer More. Octavo. Pp. 307. Princeton University Press, 1917. 7s. 6d. net.

R. G. Bury

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middle of the third century B.C., and therefore only a short time after Philikus, for he was a priest of Dionysus at Alexandria in the great festivities of 275/4. See Wilamowitz in *Neues von Kallimachus: Sitzb. Preuss. Akad.* 1912, 147.

2. Elegiac lines in *Berlin. klass. Texte*, V. 1, 77, to a dedicated statue: early Ptolemaic.

3. Ten elegiac lines complete, containing in address to *Συμπόλαι*, *Berlin. klass. Texte*, V. 2, 262. A Papyrus of the early third century B.C., resembling the Papyrus of Timotheus' *Persae*.

4. Epigram on Homer, from an ostrakon. Wilcken, *Ostraka*, No. 1148; *Berlin. klass. Texte*, V. 2, 62.

5. Epigram on the subject of the lame Spartan king Agesilaus from an ostrakon, published by Professor Grenfell (*Journ. Egypt. Arch.* 1918, p. 16). It is in a classical style, but with atrocious spelling, and was probably given to a class to be written out as an exercise.

6. Rhetorical school exercises, fragmentary, of the *ῥίπας ἀν εἰροὶ λόγους* type (cf. *A.P.* IX. 451 ff.). These were first published by Dr. Graves, Bishop of Limerick, in *Hermathena*, V. 237, and A. Ludwig reconstructed out of them lines which he called *Carminis Iliaci reliquiae*. He was quite wide of the mark; and the first to detect their nature, and to reconstruct some with certainty was R. Reitzenstein, in *Hermes*, XXXV. 103. This type of exercise is of the Imperial period.

7. Six sepulchral Epigrams, poor, on one Euprepis; the papyrus is perhaps of the third century A.D. Vitelli, *Papiri Greci e Latini*, Vol. I. (1912), No. 17.

8. Epigram from a wax tablet in the British Museum, Egyptian Department, No. 29527. H. Diels, *Sitzb. Preuss. Akad.* 1898, LIV. 1. The writing is of the second or third century A.D.

9. Fragments of an Epigram by an author whose name ends in *ῖππος*: Poseidippus or Hermippus (Grenfell and Hunt). *Tebtunis Papyri* I. No. 3, l. 21; about 100 B.C.

10. Fragments of an Epigram by an author whose name ends in *ῖππος*: Asclepiades or Philades (Grenfell and Hunt). *Tebtunis Papyri* I. No. 3, l. 26; about 100 B.C.

11. Portions of eighteen lines from a Hellenistic poem celebrating the simple life of men in primitive times. Its mutilated condition is regrettable. *Oxyrh. Pap.* I. No. 14; H. Weil, *Revue des Études grecques*, 1898, p. 241; Wilamowitz in *Gött. gelehrte Ans.* 1898, p. 695. Papyrus probably of second century A.D.

4. Existing poems by existing authors:

1. Fragments of an Epigram by Leonidas of Tarentum, *Oxyrh. Pap.* IV. No. 662.

2. Two fragmentary Epigrams by Antipater of Sidon, one in *Oxyrh. Pap.* IV. No. 662, the other in *Tebtunis Pap.* I. No. 3.

3. Fragments of Meleager, *A.P.* V. 151, XII. 76, 77, 78, 106; *Berlin. klass. Texte*, V. 1, 75. See Körte, *Archiv*, V. 547.

5. Epigrams from Inscriptions. Since Cougny added Epigrams from this source to the Paris edition of the *Anthology*, some Epigrams of a good period from inscriptions may be added here; but my list is probably incomplete:

1. *Bulletin de Correspondance hellénique*, XIX. 392. An Epigram of the third century B.C. found at Amphissa, probably referring to the invasion of the Gauls in 278. In the last line *ἀρνιδ' αἰπας* should be read; P. Perdizet transliterates it as *ἀρνιδά εἰπας*.

2. *Bulletin de la Soc. Archaeol.* IV. 81; Wilamowitz in *Sitzb. Preuss. Akad.* 1902, XLIX.; Herwerden, *Lexicon Graec. Suppl.* s.v. *πηγός*. An Epigram of the third century B.C. Caunus, the station of the fleet under the Ptolemies, is referred to.

3. W. H. D. Rouse in *Journ. Hell. Stud.* 1906, p. 178; cf. W. Crönert in *Rhein. Mus.* 1910, 636. An Epigram of the close of the Hellenistic period found at Astypalaea.

This last class however is more fitted for a continuation of Kaibel's *Epigrammata a lapidibus collecta*, a piece of work which in 1913 was contemplated by Belgian scholars at Brussels. It is to be hoped that they survive and will carry out their intention. If there are any omissions in classes 1 to 5 above, I should be glad to be informed of them. I have not included Lyric addenda, since they do not properly belong to addenda to the *Anthology*.

J. U. POWELL.

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PLATONISM.

Platonism. By PAUL ELMER MORE. Octavo. Pp. 307. Princeton University Press, 1917. 7s. 6d. net.

As Mr. More explains in his Preface, this book does not—in spite of its title

—profess to cover the whole ground of Platonic doctrine; it deals mainly (in the writer's words) with 'the ethical theme that runs through all Plato's discussions, and is certainly the main-spring of his philosophy.' And behind

it there is a definitely practical aim. In an age when 'the dogmas of religion have lost their hold, while the current philosophy of the schools has become in large measure a quibbling of specialists on technical points of minor importance, or, where serious, too commonly has surrendered to that flattery of the instinctive elements of human nature which is the very negation of mental and moral discipline,' Mr. More would recall us to the truths which Plato expounded 'in the troubled and doubting days of Greece.' It is to be hoped that his presentation of unadulterated Platonism will achieve this admirable aim and prove in some measure 'a corrective of the disintegrating forces of society.'

To explain Plato we must go behind him to Socrates, and to Socrates the first chapters of the book are devoted. In his estimate of Socrates ('historic' or 'Platonic') Mr. More expressly dissents both from Gomperz and from Professor Burnet. 'To assert that a man could write the *Republic* without a definite philosophy of his own is to run pretty close to a pedantic absurdity, and it is not much better to maintain that there was no rationalism in the teaching of Socrates than that there was no mysticism in the teaching of Plato.' The Socratic doctrine, as Mr. More contends, comprised in one three veins of thought—intellectual scepticism, spiritual positivism, and the identification of virtue and knowledge. The unique combination in one mind of rationalism and mysticism is what constitutes 'the Socratic Paradox.'

According to Mr. More's exposition, the paradox of Socrates lies at the root of the dualism of Plato. In chapters on 'The Platonic Quest,' 'The Dualism of Plato,' and 'Psychology,' he endeavours to show how both 'knowledge' and 'virtue' are terms used in two senses, and how failure to distinguish between these senses has led to misapprehension of the true Platonic position. For behind the specific virtues there is a higher 'virtue,' which is the 'moral impulsion' called 'justice' in the *Republic* and 'wisdom' in the *Laws*; while above the 'knowledge' which Socrates identified with virtue stands the knowledge

which is independent of calculation, the immediate, intuitive *gnosis* 'by which we confirm our spiritual affirmation.' Other subjects dealt with in these chapters are the problems of free-will and of evil, and the Platonic distinction between pleasure and happiness. In his discussion of the doctrine of Ideas, Mr. More rejects the assumption of 'a radical break in Plato's doctrine,' and the theory of a later Platonism of 'natural kinds.' He would distinguish two quite different categories of Ideas, the rational and the ethical; of which the latter were, for Plato, the more fundamental and important. Thus 'the true Platonic ideas' are described as 'imaginative projections of the facts of moral consciousness.' In dealing with 'Science and Cosmogony,' it is contended (against some modern interpreters) that 'the whole argument (of the *Timaeus*) is founded on a radical dualism,' and that it is quite wrong 'to reduce the Platonic Ideas to mathematical entities.' Mr. More's penultimate chapter on 'Metaphysics' is mainly concerned with that baffling dialogue, *Parmenides*. Mr. Benn argued, in a recent book, that 'Plato uses the One and the Many . . . in order to cut out the transcendental theory by the roots.' Mr. More, on the contrary, contends that 'the main intention was to bring relief to Plato's own doctrine of Ideas' by showing the limitations of rationalistic metaphysic. The well-known passage in *Soph.* 248 is held to confirm this view, and to indicate on Plato's part 'an unwavering affirmation of the reality of moral Ideas, united with an unwavering scepticism.'

In brief space it is impossible, of course, to do justice to the views set forth; but enough has been said to indicate that Mr. More holds very definite views regarding the kernel of Plato's Idealism, and that he has the courage of his convictions. One may suspect that he has been influenced by the teaching of his countryman, Professor Shorey, who also is a strong exponent of the continuity of Plato's thought, and a bulwark of what we may, perhaps, call the Tory side in Platonic controversy. The strength of the writer's convictions makes the book all the more readable

and interesting, and besides its *protreptic* value it undoubtedly contains much that is true and important for the student of Ancient Thought—amongst other things this: ‘the silly allusions to enigmatic teaching and the statement

that Plato never had written and never would write down his true principles are sufficient to prove the so-called Platonic Epistles a forgery’ (p. 199). It is a pity the book has no Index.

R. G. BURY.

GREEK IDEALS.

Greek Ideals: A Study in Social Life.

By C. DELISLE BURNS. One vol. Octavo. Pp. ix + 275. London: G. Bell and Sons, and Macmillan Co., 1917. 5s. net (and \$2.00).

MR. BURNS has taken for his book a subject highly attractive but hardly less elusive. For, as Mr. Lowes Dickinson once put it (in his excellent little book on *The Greek View of Life*), ‘there is nothing so misleading as generalisation, specially on the subject of the Greeks. Again and again, when we think we have laid hold of their characteristic view, we are confronted with some new aspect of their life which we cannot fit into harmony with our scheme. There is no formula which will sum up that versatile and many-sided people.’ This versatility which renders definition so difficult is fully recognised by Mr. Burns, who says in his Preface that ‘the versatility of the Greeks is more emphasised (in his book) than any single idea such as “harmony” or “beauty” to express the Greek ideal’; but the point he most emphasises and regards as most characteristic is that ‘in all their ideals what is most prominent appears to be sociability.’ By ‘Greek’ Mr. Burns means mainly Athenian, and his earlier chapters are devoted to an account of Athenian religion and the chief festivals connected with it. He teaches us once again how the *polis* is fundamentally a religious institution ‘having very close likeness to a democratic church’—a church without clergy or congregation or sacred book. We used to be taught that *Homer* was ‘the Greek Bible,’ but Mr. Burns tells us that that is ‘false,’ since ‘no one was compelled to “believe in” *Homer*.’ He does not tell us, however, what other English book can be compared more adequately with *Homer*.

After religion and politics, Mr. Burns turns mainly to philosophic literature for his illustrations of the Greek social ideal. He has useful chapters on ‘The Fifth Century’ and ‘The Old School,’ as well as on Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle; and his last chapter, entitled ‘The After-Glow,’ is mainly concerned with the views of the Stoics and Epicureans, concluding with what we may call the application of the moral to the men of to-day. As regards Socrates and Plato, it is interesting to compare and contrast the views here set forth with those expressed in Mr. P. E. More’s *Platonism*. Whereas Mr. More will have none of the Socrates limned by Professors Burnet and Taylor, or of their emasculated Plato, Mr. Burns enthusiastically accepts both. His *Socrates*, as Form-Theorist and Orphic-Pythagorean-Brother, is ‘a much greater Socrates than historians have generally supposed to exist’; while as for Plato, ‘although the new view may seem to make him less original as a thinker, it makes him much more skilful as an artist’ (p. 147). How, we wonder, would Plato appreciate this compliment! ‘All great men’ (we quote again from Mr. Burns, p. 243) ‘must be astonished at their followers: and *si quis piorum animis locus*, in some other sphere the original author must often stand aghast at what his commentators make him say’—and still more aghast, we may suppose, must stand the original author who wasn’t an author. However, Mr. Burns has the highest admiration for his bean-eschewing Socrates, as well as for his Boswellised Plato, and that, after all, is the main point. Unlike Mr. More, he says curiously little of the Socratic *daimonion*; but on the other hand he has much to say about the educational and political views of Plato.