Northern Affairs in 1724

ALLIED with Prussia under his treaty of Charlottenburg and successful in dissuading France from concluding a separate alliance with Russia,¹ George I at the beginning of the year 1724 had reason to be satisfied with his position in northern Europe. But the satisfaction was seriously disturbed towards the end of March by news of a treaty concluded between Russia and Sweden on 22 February (o.s.),² which, though in its main clauses inoffensive, carried a sting in its tail. A secret article, which was not kept secret, obliged the parties to employ their strongest offices at the Danish and other courts to obtain for the duke of Holstein-Gottorp restitution of his share of Sleswick, and, if they failed, to take counsel with the other powers interested, and particularly with the emperor, how this dispute might be ended satisfactorily and the danger to the peace of the north arising from it be removed.

The treaty was the result of Peter the Great's threats of the previous summer, combined with the refusal of George I, under the restraint of his British government, to render Sweden help against him.³ At first the Swedes had required that Great Britain should be a party, and to that end had tendered their mediation for a reconciliation between George I and Peter the Great; they had in view, in fact, a quadruple alliance between Russia, Sweden, Great Britain, and France. On George's part, in reply, was demanded as an indispensable preliminary a declaration on Peter's part that he was ready to forget the past, and it was stated that the only matter really requiring accommodation was the expulsion of Michael Bestuzhev from London in 1720, an incident for whose cause it was the king of England's right to claim satisfaction, but which he was willing to consign to oblivion.⁴ This same Bestuzhev was now the tsar's minister

¹ *Ante*, xxvi. 305-7 and xxvii. 71-8.

² Dumont, viii. ii. 78. A copy in the original German—the language, says resident Jackson, 'now used in all transactions between these two Nations'—with his dispatch of 15 April (o.s.), Record Office, Sweden 33; translations (various), with those of Finch and Jackson of March and April, *ibid.* 33, 34.

³ *Ante*, xxvii. 61, 67.

⁴ Townshend to Finch, from Hanover, 26 August 1723, Record Office, Foreign Entry Book 155 and Regencies 4.

in Sweden, and he was believed to be anxious to forward the reconciliation, in order that he might return to London. William Finch had written on the subject from Stockholm :

I shall by this acquaint your Lordship that the King of Sweden is informed of the project of an alliance with the Czar and is not displeased with it, but on the contrary very well inclined to it, provided the King be included as a principal party. I do not perceive that the King [of Sweden] has been forced into this project by the Holstein faction, or that His Majesty and the Secret Committee came into it for any other reason than to keep the Czar quiet and themselves free from apprehension of being invaded, which they believe they shall do by such an alliance, provided the King be included as a principal party.

Recounting conversations with Count Horn, whom he was specially instructed to consult and for whose eye very complimentary dispatches were written in French, Finch stated that Bestuzhev had spoken of a reconciliation, so he learnt, in terms which he could not have used without permission, and that Horn undertook to procure an address from the riksdag to the king, praying that no alliance should be made without inclusion of the king of England.⁵ Townshend replied that this was entirely approved,⁶ and that, if friendship with the tsar were re-established, the king would rather see Bestuzhev back in England than any other minister, he being personally most agreeable.⁷

But the negotiations did not proceed as was desired. To summarize the dispatches briefly, it was found that the Swedish plenipotentiaries appointed to treat with Bestuzhev were instructed only to offer their master's mediation, not to make the inclusion of the king of England in the treaty a preliminary condition. Thereupon Count Horn was informed through Finch that George I did not consider his differences with the tsar of sufficient weight to merit mediation, and Finch himself was told privately :

It is impossible the King should think of consenting to entrust any of his affairs in the hands of the Swedes ; their Government is so weak and divided, and the Czar has so great an influence among them, that they could not but be the worst Mediators we could pick out, if we wanted any.⁸

⁵ Finch, 28 August (o.s.), Record Office, Sweden 32, and further to like effect 11 September (o.s.).

⁶ ' His Majesty wou'd have you leave no stone unturned to carry the point of the Address. . . . Such an Address would be both honourable and advantageous to His Majesty, and must mortify the Czar in a very tender part, to see that after all the noise he has made, and the alarms he has given, he is so far from keeping the Kingdom of Sweden in awe, that they will prescribe their own terms in case he is desirous of making an alliance with them.'

⁷ Townshend to Finch, 23 September, Record Office, Foreign Entry Book 155.

⁸ The same, 26 October.

And though later Finch wrote of assurance that in a counter-project handed in to Bestuzhev there was nothing in the least disagreeable to King George, who would always be distinguished as the prince most friendly to Sweden, even though, for its repose and tranquillity, steps must be taken to satisfy the tsar's doubts, yet at the end of the year he had to report that, having learnt from their minister at Hanover that their mediation would not be accepted, the Swedes were disposed to obstruct a reconciliation in any other way.⁹ He was instructed in reply to let the Swedish ministers know that the king of England would not take the 'least step that is derogatory to his honour to bring about a reconciliation with the Czar'.¹⁰ And so the negotiations dropped, and the separate treaty was proceeded with.

That the duke of Holstein-Gottorp should have Sleswick back the Swedes naturally desired. But against Peter the Great's demand, that he should be declared successor to the throne, they stood out. Bestuzhev, advancing the proposition, was answered that, while the affection of the nation towards the duke might support his hopes, if he conducted himself well, the present form of government must be maintained and full liberty of election must be preserved. And when he and Bassewitz, the duke's minister, presented a formal memorial on the subject, ministers, says Finch, were not a little pleased to have in their hands a document directly contravening the treaty of Nystad; their intention, indeed, would seem to have been from the first not to grant the demand, but only to get it put forward.¹¹ And so in the secret article there was no mention of the succession, but only of the restitution of Sleswick.

The powers who felt themselves immediately threatened were Denmark and Prussia. But they did not combine for their defence; each had separate recourse to George I. The Danes, indeed, could wish to be supported by the master of so fine an army and so well-filled a treasury, and Prussia, as Holm shows, in spite of dissension on certain questions, for instance on those of the Sound tolls and of East Friesland, was on the whole more friendly to Denmark than opposed to her.¹² But Frederick William I was not prepared to make an alliance particularly offensive to Peter the Great and which promised no advantage to himself. With Sleswick, as shown below, he refused to be concerned.

Hated both in Sweden and in Russia,¹³ the Danes had watched

⁹ Finch, 27 November and 19 December (o.s.), Record Office, Sweden 32.

¹⁰ Townshend to Finch, 10 January (o.s.) 1724.

¹¹ Finch, 19 October (o.s.) 1723.

¹² See Holm, *Danmark-Norges Historie, 1780-1814*, i. 125 f.

¹³ Holm (l. 77) cites Westphalen on the tsarites Catherine's hatred of everything that was Danish, and remarks that the tsar's principal confidants, Yagushinsky and

with anxiety Bestuzhev's negotiations, and had continued to press for treaties of alliance with George I. When at the end of 1723 Lord Glenorchy returned from a visit to Hanover, surprise was expressed that he did not bring proposals with him. He had to report that Admiral Gabel was urging his advice for alliance with the tsar instead,¹⁴ and he expressed the fear that it would be hard to keep the king of Denmark in his present good disposition unless something were done to reassure him, for he seemed resolved to secure himself in one way or the other, rather than be obliged every year to equip a fleet.¹⁵ But receiving no light he was reduced to plead that the multiplicity of business at the opening of parliament prevented attention being given to other affairs. When he said that his master's help could always be depended upon, if wanted, 'the Grand Chanceller replied that he was very well satisfied of the good intentions of his Majesty, but that it would have a much greater effect if confirm'd by a Treaty,' and he noted 'a great desire of entring into stricter measures with his Majesty'.¹⁶

When there came to Copenhagen in March not only the news of the Russo-Swedish treaty but also reports that the Swedes were arming and that all the men-of-war at Carlskrona were being got ready to join the Russian fleet equipping at Cronslot and Reval, sixteen or eighteen of the line and six frigates, the Danish envoy at Stockholm was recalled and appeal was again made to George I. But while Townshend admitted to Finch at Stockholm that the secret article, with its 'strong intimations of further more effectual measures' to be taken for the recovery of Sleswick than the mere exercise of good offices, must make the Danes believe that war upon them was intended,¹⁷ yet he was careful to minimize the danger at Copenhagen, and it was only suggested to Glenorchy that, if the Danes had any offers to make for removing the difficulties which had hitherto stood in the way of a treaty, they should send some one with them to London.¹⁸ For in the first place there was no thought in England of sending men-of-war

Osterman, were of like mind. A principal cause of offence, Westphalen observed, was the refusal to match the crown prince of Denmark with the tsarevna Anne.

¹⁴ 'The Grand Chanceller tells me that Mr. Gabel takes advantage of this Treaty's not having gone on as easily as the King expected, to endeavour to perswade him to enter into measures with the Czar, telling him he may see what he is to expect from England.'

¹⁵ Glenorchy, 28 December 1723, Record Office, Denmark 46.

¹⁶ The same, 26 February 1724, *ibid.* 47.

¹⁷ Townshend to Finch, 24 March (o.s.), and similarly to Scott at Berlin, Record Office, Foreign Entry Books 155, 53.

¹⁸ To Glenorchy, 20 March (o.s.), *ibid.* 5. The king 'wonders that it should be expected at Copenhagen that your Lord^p should receive instructions to conclude that business there, when it has stuck for this great while chiefly upon two points, the one relating to the trade of his Majesty's subjects, and the other to the reciprocal obligations of the treaty' (the naval succour, that is, cf. *ante*, xxvii. 61, 62).

to the Sound, and secondly heed had to be taken of French jealousy of an alliance between Great Britain and Denmark. The duke of Newcastle, who had now succeeded Lord Carteret as secretary of state for the southern province, instructed Horatio Walpole at Paris :

the King's engagements with that Crown having been entered into jointly with France, Mons^r de Morville might be assured that His Ma^{ty} was not about entering into further engagements with that Court, but would defer all thoughts of that kind, at least for some time till He saw how the Czar would act with regard to Him.

And though he would like to concert an answer to be made to the king of Denmark, if necessary, in view of his 'daily instances', yet he 'in this as in everything else would do nothing but in concert with the Court of France'. He was glad to know that Morville thought that some expedient might be found to satisfy both the king of Denmark and the duke of Holstein-Gottorp.¹⁹ Later, when there was a report at Paris that Denmark had acceded to the treaty of Charlottenburg, Horatio Walpole gave assurance that the king was not capable of allowing such a thing after his repeated promises, and after having deferred alliance with Denmark 'purely out of regard to the instances of the French court'.²⁰

Turning to Prussia, we find that power not only on the worst of terms with Sweden,²¹ but also increasingly mistrustful of Russia, largely in consequence of the non-execution of the late Courland marriage-treaty. At the beginning of the year Frederick William I could still call the tsar his 'waarer und bester', his 'bester und sicherster' friend, assuring him that the objects of the treaty of Charlottenburg were entirely peaceful and not in the least opposed to his interest—he could not take it ill that Prussia should seek to strengthen her position by the renewal of

¹⁹ 6 April (o.s.), British Museum, Add. MS. 32738.

²⁰ H. Walpole to Newcastle, 21 June, *ibid.* 32739.

²¹ Diplomatic relations between Prussia and Sweden had been broken off in consequence of the arrest of the Swedish envoy, Count Posse, in November 1723, for debt. At the end of January 1724 Posse left Berlin without taking leave. Also there were disputes of considerable acerbity touching trade at Wolgast and the non-fulfilment by Prussia of her obligations to Pomeranian landowners under the treaty of 1720. The gravity of the Posse affair is shown by an expression of James Scott: 'S'il arrive que les Russes et les Suédois prennent ensemble des mesures contraires à la tranquillité du nord, Je croy que l'affaire du Comte Posse en sera regardé comme la cause prochaine' (15 January 1724, Record Office, Prussia 17). George I refused to interfere in these disputes because, in Townshend's words, 'the King has by experience seen that remonstrances made by his Minister [at Berlin] make but little impression and have no good effect' (to Finch, 8 February (o.s.), *ibid.*, Foreign Entry Book 155). And, says Finch of the Swedes: 'They talk very much of the King of Prussia's ill usage of them, and give hints, that this would not have happed, if something had not been concerted between the King, the King of Prussia, and the King of Denmark, when His Majesty was at Berlin; a thing which he denied positively (19 December (o.s.) 1723, *ibid.*, Sweden 32).

her ancient treaties with Great Britain—and asserting that there was nothing on foot with the imperial court but the ‘punctation’ concluded with Count Flemming²² and efforts for a reconciliation. But at the same time suspicious inquiries were made of Mardefeld at St. Petersburg about the ships equipping at Reval and about Prince Kurakin’s return to Paris, a fresh evidence, it was said, of an alliance impending between France and Russia. France, Mardefeld was told, with her far-reaching and dangerous views, was in no way to be trusted, and no doubt the growing might of Prussia was a ‘Stachel im Auge’ to her as well as to Austria. And his attention was called to the reports of an alliance between Russia and Sweden, a measure of which the tsar was thought, indeed, to be incapable, but which was dangerous alike to Prussia, England, and Denmark.²³

When the proximate conclusion of the treaty was known Mardefeld was informed that it was believed to have in view the recovery of the former possessions of Sweden in Germany, and urgent instructions were sent him, and again a month later, to get a copy communicated.²⁴ Then on 1 April Wallenrodt in London was ordered to ascertain the views of the British government on the subject. He in reply reported Townshend to say in strict confidence that it was not doubted that the treaty was directed against Denmark, now the prey of a thousand anxieties about it, nor that if Denmark were overcome by Sweden the latter would go further. Therefore the king of England would like to know what measures the king of Prussia would propose; he could not advise a Prussian guarantee of Sleswick to Denmark, for the French and English guarantees already given were sufficient, but only that measures should be taken to submit the affair to negotiation. Denmark was very anxious to make alliance with Great Britain, but nothing would be done in that until the king of Prussia’s views were known.²⁵ In answer Frederick William discussed the dangers of the situation at length, and emphasized their reality,²⁶ but meanwhile Wallenrodt

²² *Ibid.*, xxvii. 58.

²³ Rescripts to Mardefeld, 1 January to 19 February, Staatsarchiv, Berlin. In the last-named we have further: ‘So lange der Tzaar lebet, halten Wir Uns genugsam versichert, dass Wir, in keiner Occasion, es mag dieselbe beschaffen seyn wie sie will, von demselben nichts, als eine sincere Freundschaft, und alles gute, Uns zu promittiren haben; kommen aber künftigt andere Zeiten, so wird sich auch Rath dabey finden.’

²⁴ Rescripts of 26 February and 21 and 28 March, *ibid.*

²⁵ Wallenrodt, 14 April, *ibid.* Later, however, Colonel Du Bourgay, Scott’s successor at Berlin, was directed to insinuate unofficially how proper a Prussian guarantee of Sleswick, as solicited by the Danish envoy, General Löwenorn, would be. But he was forbidden to support the request openly, because the king of Prussia would certainly require some advantage from Denmark in return, and the king of England would not risk his credit by being involved in the demand (Townshend to Du Bourgay, 21 July (o.s.), Record Office, Foreign Entry Book 53).

²⁶ Rescript to Wallenrodt, 25 April, Staatsarchiv, Berlin.

was writing that he and Townshend agreed that the Swedish armaments reported were but a gasconade, the latter reaffirming his master's desire to do anything that was necessary in concert with the king of Prussia, but asserting his own disinclination to take precipitate action in so serious a matter before receiving further light.²⁷

Frederick William declined to share the optimism expressed. He was genuinely alarmed at the reports of arming in Sweden and Russia, as his rescripts to Mardefeld show,²⁸ and he was still oppressed by the fear of an alliance between Russia and France, even ascribing to French underhand intrigue the present developments.²⁹ Now he desired that a joint Prussian and Hanoverian corps should at once take the field, ready to oppose in arms the apprehended Swedish invasion. And he transmitted further advices of new Russian naval preparations, suggesting that France might act by offering her mediation between Russia, Sweden, and Denmark. Austria also, he thought, had a hand in the matter, but the king of England and himself, he said, were strong enough to hold their own, though they must be ready to act, if necessary, and must prevent France from taking sides with Sweden and the tsar.³⁰

But now reports came from Sweden of a reassuring character, for instance, of statements by Count Horn 'that the true and sincere intention of the Swedish government is to keep at peace with all the world', and that the secret article, to which Sweden was obliged to consent, should be looked upon only as words.³¹ And so Wallenrodt now wrote that Townshend did not expect any enterprise on the part of the Swedes this year, and that while the assembling of an army corps was assented to, if matters became serious, it was thought to be paying too great a compliment to them to show any disquietude as yet.³² And Chambrier,

²⁷ Wallenrodt, 18 and 25 April, and further 5 May, *ibid.*

²⁸ 25 April to 20 May, *ibid.*

²⁹ 'Das schlimmste bey diesem gantzen Werck ist dieses, dass die Crohn Frankreich, ohne allem Zweifel, mit unter der docke lieget, und an allen diesen Nordischen Affairen in faveur des Tzaaren, der Crohn Schweden, und des Hertzogs von Holstein, viel theil nimbt, in dem Abschau, dadurch sich eine solche bande im Norden zu formiren, deren Sie sich zu ihrem interesse, bey den künftigen Conjunctionen, gebrauchen, und wodurch Sie Uns, und vielleicht auch die force des Chur-Hauses Braunschweig, im Reich, alle mahl in échec halten könne' (to Wallenrodt, 11 April, *ibid.*). Townshend assured Wallenrodt that France had no hand in the affair and only desired the preservation of peace.

³⁰ Rescripts to Wallenrodt, 2 and 6 May, and similarly again 16 May, *ibid.*

³¹ Finch, 15 April (o.s.), Record Office, Sweden 34.

³² 16 and 19 May, Staatsarchiv, Berlin. Wallenrodt expressed the wish that the Swedes would undertake something, for it would give Prussia the opportunity of annexing the rest of Swedish Pomerania, seeing that the Swedes were now in favour neither in England, nor, as he noted from utterances of his French colleague Chavigny, in France.

the Prussian minister at Paris, reported a like belief there, 'non obstant le désir, que la Cour de Vienne pourroit en avoir, à fin de brouiller de nouveau les affaires dans le Nord.' It was thought, he said, that the tsar's object in insisting on the secret article was to give a touch of the spur to England, in order to hasten on the reconciliation which he so much desired, as France did also, 'parcequ'Elle ne souhaittoit point d'avoir d'autres Alliez en Allemagne, que V^{re} M^{té}, le Roy d'Angleterre, et le Tzaar, que ce seroit la plus magnifique Alliance, que la France pourroit avoir.' ³³

It seems strange to us that such real alarm of invasion should have prevailed. Power of offence on the part of Sweden was barely existent, and the bulk of Peter the Great's forces were engaged in the Caspian provinces or on the Turkish frontier. Of the 118,000 regulars, with two or three times the number of Kalmucks, Cossacks, and Tartars, which Campredon reckoned him to command, only 33,000 regulars were in the Baltic provinces.³⁴ But eyes were directed southwards as well as to the north and east, in consequence of the special mention of the emperor in the secret article.³⁵ St. Saphorin was reporting frequent conferences of the Russian and Swedish residents at Vienna with the arch-enemy of Great Britain and Prussia, Vice-Chancellor Schönborn, and himself and the French envoy treated with contemptuous neglect,³⁶ and it was believed that the emperor intended to accept the invitation given and to take up the cause of the duke of Holstein-Gottorp seriously.

The relations of George I with Austria were more strained than ever. The court of Vienna would yield no point on the contentions of the south, attacks on protestant constitutional

³³ 23 May, *ibid.*

³⁴ Campredon, 9 February, *Sbornik* of the Imperial Russian Historical Society, lii. 159.

³⁵ A year and a half later Stephen Poyntz, envoy at Stockholm, sounded Count Horn on the reasons for the mention. They were strange, he said, and he forwarded them for curiosity; but the final one was that 'the Czar would have it so', and so many material alterations had been necessary that the Swedes were glad to let the compliment to the emperor stand (25 August (o.s.) 1725, Record Office, Sweden 38).

³⁶ St. Saphorin on 8 February (at great length) and 25 March, Record Office, Germany (Empire) 52. He wrote in his vexation: 'Que faire, my Lord, avec des gens, lesquels s'ils pensent, ce qu'ils font très foiblement, pensent pour se former des illusions, qui sont plus divisés entr'eux qu'ils ne l'ayent jamais été, et qui ont un Maître qui se laisse toujours dévoyer de ses sentiments pour adopter ceux que le dernier qui luy parle luy propose. Et comme le procédé qu'ils ont eu envers Mons^r. Du Bourg et moy en ne nous communiquant point le projet qu'ils avoient envoyé en France leur a en quelque manière réussi, ils prennent le soin le plus attentif de nous dévoyer de tout.' As partly the cause of this neglect he complained of boastings on the part of the Hanoverian envoy, Count Huldénberg, that the long-pending negotiation for the investiture of Bremen and Verden was now confided to him: 'je ne me suis que trop aperçu, que depuis lors on me regardoit icy comme n'y signifiant presque plus rien.'

rights in Germany continued, the investiture of Bremen and Verden was still withheld, and a further quarrel had arisen on the subject of the Ostend Company. On the side of Charles VI his ambassador, Count Conrad Starhemberg, had presented in October 1723 a long list of complaints, ranging from King George's attitude towards the religious disputes, alleged aspiration on his part to predominance in the empire, and his opposition to the Ostend Company, down to personal offence given to the count in the matter of customs, excise, and carriage of letters.³⁷ And fuel had been added to the fire by the treaty of Charlottenburg.

Prussia was in like case, in spite of the formal resumption of diplomatic intercourse. Frederick William I persisted in acts of insubordination, as they were regarded at Vienna; and in his military power Charles VI saw the principal obstacle to his own aims at autocracy in the empire: as Droysen puts it, he had to capture the Prussian position first and humble that prince who aspired to be independent.³⁸ On the other side, while Frederick William always expressed the greatest veneration for the emperor personally, his quick temper was continually being roused by decrees of the Aulic council against him, which he attributed to Austrian ill-will.³⁹ The part taken by Saxony in these affairs of the empire—for instance, the issue of imperial commissions to Augustus II to make execution in Tecklenburg and in East Friesland—made matters worse. The king of Poland was the man whom Frederick William most hated; his frontier lay but thirty miles from Berlin, and he was working against him even on the very tender point of the succession to Juliers and Berg.⁴⁰ On the Saxon side the activity and impudence of Prussian recruiting officers⁴¹ brought from Augustus the threat of raising

³⁷ See Townshend to Starhemberg, Hanover, 5 October 1723, Record Office, Foreign Entry Book 222.

³⁸ *Geschichte der preussischen Politik*, iv. ii. 367.

³⁹ See the letters of Frederick William to his friend General Seckendorf, employed in mediating between him and the court of Vienna, and the latter's reports in Förster's *Friedrich Wilhelm I., König von Preussen*, iii. 243, and Urkundenbuch ii. On 26 January Prince Eugene had written to Seckendorf that it was hardly possible to be well with the king of Prussia if he continued 'in seiner bisherigen ausserordentlichen Beträgniss und beständigen Anstößlichkeiten' (*ibid.* p. 6).

⁴⁰ See Scott's dispatches of 25 April and 6 May, Record Office, Prussia 17, and Droysen, pp. 356-7. St. Saphorin wrote on 6 May: 'Il y a déjà longtemps que j'ay marqué à Votre Excellence que les Catholiques de l'Empire n'omettent rien pour empêcher que le Roy de Prusse ne puisse remplir les vues qu'on luy attribue sur les Pais de Bergue et de Juliers, après le mort de l'Electeur Palatine' (Record Office, Germany, Empire, 52). Erdmannsdörffer observes that Frederick William I was as much preoccupied during his life by this ambition as was Charles VI by the Pragmatic Sanction (*Deutsche Geschichte*, ii. 404).

⁴¹ See Pöllnitz, *Mémoires pour servir à l'Histoire des quatre derniers Souverains de la Maison de Brandebourg Royale de Prusse*, ii. 139-46. Erdmannsdörffer (ii. 507) writes of the 'brutalen Gewaltsamkeiten und listigen Kniffen' of the officers. Not less indignation was roused in Hanover and other countries than in Saxony, and in

the 'cartel', a thing which might mean serious loss to the Prussian army by desertion.⁴² On this head Frederick William sought to calm the court of Dresden; he sent a cordial invitation to Count Flemming to come to Berlin for friendly conferences again. But an interview, which took place, only resulted in further misunderstanding.⁴³ In addition, belief in hostile intentions on the part of the emperor and the king of Poland had lately been strengthened by the report of the formation of a catholic league which should dispose of a force of 60,000 men⁴⁴—a paper array, and not one which could intimidate Prussia with her full treasury, her own larger army ready for the field, her well-stored magazines and modernized fortresses. But Frederick William did not want war unless he was forced into it.

To Austria the natural counterpoise was France, and George I now sought to obtain from the French government the same support in the north which it was faithfully rendering in the south. With this object, while at Copenhagen and Berlin, as we have seen, the cue was to allay the alarm aroused by the Russo-Swedish treaty, in order that Great Britain might not be committed to the expense of armaments, at Paris the danger was magnified. Not, care was taken to affirm, that the king of England stood in any fear of the tsar; the prosperous state of his affairs at home and the treaties made with Prussia and solicited by Denmark rendered him easy on that head; but precautions must be taken for the

Denmark a Prussian lieutenant caught would probably have been hanged, but that it was desired to exchange him for the murderer Pretorius, who had taken refuge in Prussia. Pretorius was eventually exchanged for twelve giant recruits (Scott, 22 February; Glenorchy, 19 February, 19 September, 28 October: Record Office, Prussia 17, Denmark 47).

" Thus Scott on 8 April: if the court of Dresden made further demands, 'Je vois qu'icy on sera porté à soupçonner qu'elle est instiguée à cela par la cour de Vienne, qui regarde peut-être la levée du cartel entre la cour de Saxe et celle-cy comme un moyen seur et plausible pour faire diminuer le nombre des troupes prussiennes, et pour préparer le chemin pour l'exécution de ces desseins que sa Majesté Impériale, à ce que bien des gens croyent, médite en faveur de la catholicité ou pour étendre son autorité dans l'empire.'

" Scott, 20 to 30 May. The interview took place at Luckau on the Saxon frontier between Flemming, travelling to Aix-la-Chapelle, and the Prussian ministers Ilgen and Katsch. Flemming affronted Ilgen by carrying off Katsch to discuss a private matter apart, and an open quarrel was with difficulty averted. Scott says: 'Après s'être chamaillés un peu sur les affaires de Tecklenburg et d'Ostfrie, comme aussi sur les prétentions de sa Majesté polonoise sur les Duchez de Juliers et Berg, ils se sont séparés sans venir à aucune résolution, et fort peu contents Je croy les uns des autres.' Further negotiations took place when Flemming came to Berlin late in July, and though Scott's successor, Du Bourgay, sent word that all differences were 'as good as adjusted' with him, this was by no means the case. In January 1725 the questions of East Friesland and of the cartel had become acute, and Du Bourgay then wrote that, if Flemming did no more good on a coming visit than on the last, he had better stay away (13 January 1725, Record Office, Prussia 18).

" Droysen, p. 357. The news was forwarded to London from Berlin with an expression of the desire that the British court should dissuade France from joining it (Wallenrodt, 16 May, Staatsarchiv, Berlin).

general interest of Europe and particularly for the negotiations at Cambray, 'which any diversion by new disturbances in the North at this juncture would certainly give the House of Austria an opportunity of defeating.'⁴⁵ Arguing the matter with the French secretary for foreign affairs, the Count de Morville, Horatio Walpole persuaded him, he says, to represent to the Swedish minister, Baron Gedda, 'in friendly but in very strong terms . . . the great jealousy and umbrage' which the secret article of the treaty must give to the northern powers, and its violation of that made between Sweden and Denmark in 1720 and guaranteed by Great Britain and France. Gedda, Walpole goes on, disclaimed having seen the treaty, but protested that it was defensive only and harmless.⁴⁶ According to Finch, Gedda reported home that Morville had particularly inveighed against the special mention of the emperor and the omission of any reference to the king of France, in spite of what the latter had done for Sweden; and ministers, said Finch, were seriously disquieted, some divining the pressure put upon Morville by Walpole.⁴⁷

What was decided upon was to endeavour to obtain the accession of France, and incidentally that of Holland,⁴⁸ to the treaty of Charlottenburg. Walpole, opening the proposal privately to Fleury, with whom he had established very confidential relations,⁴⁹ found him greatly in favour of it. But Morville opposed, alone almost, so Fleury stated, among the members of the council. At an interview with Morville Walpole set forth that, should the tsar 'contrary to all expectations return suddenly to Petersburg with his peace with the Turks in his

⁴⁵ See Newcastle's dispatches of April, British Museum, Add. MS. 32738.

⁴⁶ To Newcastle, 3 May, *ibid.*

⁴⁷ Finch, 13 May and 3 June (o.s.), Record Office, Sweden 34.

⁴⁸ The Dutch were being urged to increase their military forces with a view to impressing the court of Vienna: see, for instance, a long letter from Townshend of 25 February (o.s.) to his friend Van Goelingen, Record Office, Holland 280, a volume of very interesting correspondence of Townshend with various Dutch statesmen.

⁴⁹ Fleury's position was stated by Horatio Walpole in September as follows. The duke of Bourbon and Morville concerted the management of foreign affairs before they were discussed in the council, and were able to send secret orders of themselves to foreign courts; but they would venture on nothing very material without the privity of the bishop of Fréjus (Fleury), so long as he maintained his influence over the young king; he, however, was a very temperate man, and did not seek to encroach upon their authority, only 'to speak his mind with strength and freedom upon matters of consequence as they came before him' (to Newcastle, 26 September, British Museum, Add. MS. 32740). Previously Walpole had written of Fleury's discoursing to him 'a series of as good reasoning and judgement and with as great a compass relating to the whole system of Europe as I ever heard. . . . Although his proceedings are calm and soft, yet his way of thinking is strong and vigorous' (31 May, Add. MS. 32739). And Lord Peterborough, who came to Paris in August to urge enterprises against Austria of his own spirited conception, named him as 'the ablest man concerned in public affairs' (9 September, *ibid.* 32740).

pocket',⁵⁰ and should force the free passage of the Sound or otherwise disturb the tranquillity of the north, then he was afraid he should be 'considered in England as having been amused with fair and dilatory assurances instead of settling something solid and essential that might have warded and prevented the mischief'. Some method, he urged, should be concerted 'for being in a readiness to act upon the first alarm, and I endeavoured by this means to draw from him, without mentioning it myself, his sentiments about France's entering into the Alliance concluded between his Majesty and the King of Prussia'. Morville, however, maintained that there was little cause for alarm, and objected the danger of giving offence at Vienna and so breaking up the congress of Cambray. Fleury, on the other hand, 'assured me that his sentiments concurred entirely with mine, and that as he had the same way of thinking as I had with regard to the Emperour, so he had spoke to the same effect at the Council,' and had proposed that 'preliminaries or heads' should be drawn up and signed.⁵¹

Newcastle now informed Walpole of expressions used by Count Rottembourg at Cambray to the British plenipotentiaries, Lords Polwarth and Whitworth, in favour of what was proposed, not only 'for the preservation of the peace of the North and for the securing of those acquisitions of which His Maty is now so rightfully possess in those parts', but also as likely to further the alliance in negotiation with Russia; in fine, to make all the northern powers court the king's friendship. To the Dutch Newcastle thought that the first proposals should come from France, with the promise to support their opposition to the Ostend Company and to have that question brought forward at Cambray; the king, he said, would use his utmost endeavours to persuade them to comply. Yet, he concluded, if it should appear that what Rottembourg said came chiefly from himself, 'and is not much relisht where you are,' the matter must not be pressed, lest the impression should be given that the king was looking to his own advantage.⁵² Walpole replied that he believed that Rottembourg's utterances 'arose purely from his own true judgment with relation to the North',⁵³ and that Morville was strongly opposed to raising the question of the Ostend Company

⁵⁰ A prospect not at all well looked upon by George I. He thought, Newcastle had written, that France had been too hasty in promoting the peace before the tsar was reconciled to him and had renounced all views of troubling the north, at least for the present. And he had wanted instructions to be sent to the marquis de Bonao at Constantinople 'to put such rubbs in the way' as should delay the negotiation (to H. Walpole, 6 April (o.s.), Add. MS. 32738).

⁵¹ H. Walpole to Newcastle, 17 May, *ibid.*

⁵² 7 May (o.s.), *ibid.*

⁵³ 'Being very conversant and intelligent in those affairs; as also from his sincere disposition and desire that France should act in concert with His Majesty for preserving the tranquillity there.'

at Cambray and still 'very cool and backward in taking the least step towards the treaty with Prussia, untill we have a final resolution from the Czar relating to a reconciliation with His Majesty'.⁵⁴

The negotiations went on till August, Fleury consistently supporting Walpole's contentions, or professing to do so, and Morville maintaining the danger of a rupture at Cambray on the one hand, and of angering the tsar, before his real intentions were known, on the other. Walpole argued on the contrary that

it was plain to me that if the Czar out of pure caprice, or with no good design was resolved to keep at a distance with his Majesty, the only means to bring him to a better temper, or to prevent his fomenting any troubles, would be the accession of France to the treaty with Prussia.

He summed up: 'Upon the whole . . . there is a general good intention here to act in concert with his Majesty with regard to the affairs of the North as well as of the South;' and as to the present proposal Fleury was for it, Morville against, and the duke of Bourbon 'extremely doubtfull and divided in his opinion'.⁵⁵ He was ordered in reply to cease from further instances and to await the issue of the negotiations with Peter the Great.⁵⁶ Yet on 1 September Wallenrodt could report Townshend's opinion that, once the difficulties arising from the Quadruple Alliance—that is, the negotiations at Cambray—were settled, he would be able to persuade the French government to accede to the treaty of Charlottenburg and give a guarantee on the known point.⁵⁷

Frederick William of Prussia was now invited to accede to the Russo-Swedish treaty, and apparently would have liked to do so, were it made worth his while. But no advantage, Mardefeld was told, was to be hoped for from acceptance; his master preferred to keep his hands free in regard to northern affairs, and nothing would persuade the king of England to revoke his guarantee of Sleswick to Denmark. Yet he must not decline the invitation absolutely, but thank the tsar, and say that the matter was under consideration.⁵⁸ The offer and its rejection were duly imparted to George I by Wallenrodt, and pleasure was expressed in reply. It was impossible, he was told, to find an equivalent for Sleswick excepting at the hands of Denmark,

⁵⁴ 24 May, *ibid.*

⁵⁵ To Newcastle, 17 July and 9 August, Add. MS. 32739.

⁵⁶ Townshend to H. Walpole, 3 August (o.s.), Add. MS. 32740.

⁵⁷ Staatsarchiv, Berlin. Townshend still expected a successful outcome at Cambray, writing to Du Bourgay at Berlin that the main principles of settlement were agreed upon (14 August (o.s.), Record Office, Prussia 18). The 'bekandter punct' was, presumably, the succession to Juliers and Berg.

⁵⁸ Rescript to Mardefeld, 22 August, Staatsarchiv, Berlin. For Frederick William's statement of his principle, to enter into no treaty from which he did not derive considerable advantage, *see ante*, xxvii. 54 n.

and so the question must be postponed until there was opportunity for its solution. But the king was entirely of the king of Prussia's opinion that, in view of the duke of Holstein-Gottorp's expectation of the crown of Sweden, it would not be good for him to be too strong on the German side of the Baltic.⁵⁹

George's position in regard to Sleswick was that he would neither force the king of Denmark to find an equivalent, nor contribute to compensation himself. On the latter point he protested strongly against the Danish assertion, that under his treaty of 1715 he had agreed to pay the half of any such compensation; and this attitude, though its justice is difficult to understand, was consistently maintained during the ensuing years.⁶⁰ On the former, when complaint was made by the Danish minister at Paris of utterances on the subject by Campredon at St. Petersburg, his contention that France had no right to support the tsar in such a demand was strongly backed from London, it being pointed out that no such condition attached to the British and French guarantees given in 1720. Newcastle wrote emphatically: 'neither France nor England have any right to impose or even so much as recommend to Denmark their giving an equivalent for Sleswick,' to do so might stir up at Copenhagen a dangerous enmity to both crowns.⁶¹

On the Prussian side Mardefeld had been ordered at the beginning of the year to have no converse with Westphalen on Holstein affairs, for what had passed on the subject formerly was well remembered.⁶² Solov'ev says that Frederick William

* Wallenrodt, 15 September, Staatsarchiv, Berlin.

* Compare the author's *George I and the Northern War*, pp. 70, 72. The assertion now made was that the claim was only 'founded upon a declaration made, as the words of it lead you to think, at the time of the ratification of the treaty 1715. But the King never heard any mention made of it, till the year 1720, when the K. of Denmark mention'd it to L^d Polwarth as a separate article to the effect and in the manner above mention'd. If such a declaration was given, it was not only without H. Ma^{ty}'s privity or previous order, but it was neither transmitted to him, at the same time with the ratifications of the s^d treaty, nor at any time since, neither has the King yet ever seen any thing of it but a pretended copy without any date and signed by nobody' (Townshend to H. Walpole, 10 August (o.s.) 1724, British Museum, Add. MS. 32740). The article does not appear in the counterpart of the treaty of 26 June 1715 between Denmark and Hanover preserved in the Staatsarchiv at Hanover, because it was not signed till 16 July, when the king of Denmark refused to ratify the treaty without it. At the Record Office (Treaty Papers 4) is a copy of it in German as signed by Baron Eltz in the camp before Stralsund on 16 July and ratified by George I in London on 28 July. He must have forgotten this, and of course his British ministers had nothing to do with the matter, the treaty of 1715 only concerning Hanover. For the contentions on the subject in 1728 see British Museum, Add. MS. 32755, f. 563 f., where copies of the treaty are misdated 26 July.

⁶¹ To H. Walpole, 21 August (o.s.), Add. MS. 32740.

⁶² Rescript to Mardefeld, 1 January 1724, Staatsarchiv, Berlin. It was remarked: 'Ob aber, und was der Königliche Dänische Hoff aus Tractaten, die Er, Seiner Seits, selbst nicht gehalten, sondern dehnen Er directo zuwieder gehandelt, praetendiren könne, das wird sich zu seiner Zeit zeigen.'

declared to the Russian ambassador at Berlin that he would never oppose the succession of the duke of Holstein-Gottorp in Sweden, and that he favoured the restitution of Sleswick to him, though he would not act in that matter excepting in good company ;⁶³ and it is not in dissonance with this that we find orders sent to Mardefeld in June to make the Holstein ministers understand that their master's prospects depended upon a reconciliation between the tsar and the king of England.⁶⁴ In Scott's version, as Cnyphausen informed him, Mardefeld was instructed to declare that the king of Prussia would not run counter to the British and French guarantees of Sleswick to Denmark, and that the duke had best apply himself to promote the said reconciliation, which accomplished, it might not be difficult to persuade the Danes to find him a proper equivalent.⁶⁵

France also refused to accede to the Russo-Swedish treaty. When Gedda, after putting off the requests of Prince Kurakin to join with him in soliciting the accession, received formal orders to desire it, Morville, so Walpole says, desired the matter to be deferred until a conclusion had been come to with Russia, and affirmed that no engagements would be entered into separately from the king of England.⁶⁶

In the meantime the British court had been seriously alarmed by reports of the king of Sweden's desire to abdicate. It was feared that the consequence would be the accession of the duke of Holstein-Gottorp and the complete subjection of Sweden to the tsar, who would then be able to attack Great Britain from its ports. The abdication, Townshend wrote, would be 'of fatal consequence' to the king's affairs at the present juncture, nor could it be believed that the king of Sweden was willing to act so mean a part, and one so injurious to his honour and interest. Finch was ordered to make inquiry—strictly private, lest the king and his ministers should 'by dismal representations of their wants and necessities' magnify their distress, in the hope of extracting unreasonable conditions—about the strength of the royal party and of the so-called 'Patriots', and what ground

⁶³ *Istoria Rossy*, book xviii, ch. 2.

⁶⁴ Receipts of 3 and 6 June, Staatsarchiv, Berlin.

⁶⁵ Scott, 6 June, Record Office, Prussia 17. Campredon pressed the same advice on the duke, as instructed, but says : ' Il est convenu de cette vérité avec moi, mais comme il est entièrement dévoué à la cour de Vienne, et qu'il est certain, que cette dernière le fortifie dans l'opiniâtreté de ne jamais consentir à la cession du Sleswig, on ne peut nullement compter sur les paroles du duc de Holstein, très mal disposé d'ailleurs pour la France et pour l'Angleterre. Mais comme il est sous la tutelle du Czar, il faudra bien, qu'il en passe par tout ce que ce Prince voudra, et je ne puis pas croire, non-obstant tout ce que dessus, que le Czar veuille courir la chance d'une guerre pour ses intérêts ' (26 May, *Sbornik*, lii. 224).

⁶⁶ H. Walpole to Townshend, 30 August and 22 September, British Museum, Add. MS. 32740 ; confirmed by Morville to Campredon, 7 September, *Sbornik*, lii. 284.

the Holstein faction had gained since the treaty of February.⁶⁷ And Horatio Walpole was instructed to sound the court of France on the matter, emphasizing the danger and intimating that, were the blow to fall 'at this juncture when neither the Duke nor the Czar are come to any terms of agreement with His Majesty', the last-named might be obliged 'to withdraw his attention from the affairs of the South in order to guard his own affairs from the confusion and disaster that will threaten them', and so be unable to give to France the aid she might desire, in case the negotiations at Cambray fell through. He should show the French ministers, Newcastle went on, a copy of Townshend's dispatch of 22 June (o.s.), 'concerning the King's sentiments of the affairs both in the South and North,' in order to let them see 'upon what conditions alone they may expect that assistance from the King, which perhaps they may stand so much in need of'.⁶⁸

Finch's reply was reassuring; the king's enemies, he said, were few in number, and the constitutionalists could never enjoy so much power under any other ruler: the reports, he thought, were purposely set on foot in order to obtain financial assistance.⁶⁹ And Walpole, having busied himself with obtaining from Gedda an exact account of the disposition of each Swedish senator, advised, as the result, that the neutrals, whose leader was Count Horn, might be influenced by favours shown to themselves or their families; that those opposed to the king might be bought, if only he had money; and that the army, clergy, and populace were thoroughly well disposed towards him. To Gedda's hint of the propriety of a supply of money he was well enough advised to turn a deaf ear.⁷⁰

These accounts, however, were distrusted, and rightly, as it soon appeared. It was determined to transfer Finch to the Hague and to send to Stockholm in his place Townshend's immediate subordinate at the foreign office, Stephen Poyntz,

⁶⁷ Townshend to Finch, 6 July (o.s.), Record Office, Foreign Entry Book 155.

⁶⁸ Newcastle to H. Walpole, enclosing a copy of the dispatch to Finch, 13 July (o.s.), British Museum, Add. MS. 32739. The proviso was added: 'After you have done this, the King would have you forbear for some time pressing them more upon these subjects, lest they should think that He stands so much in need of their assistance to reconcile him to the Czar, that they may impose any terms upon him, in order to gain it, or that His Maj''s affairs are upon such a foot, that without it they would be exposed to the utmost difficulty and hazard.'

⁶⁹ To Townshend, 27 July (o.s.), Record Office, Sweden 34.

⁷⁰ H. Walpole to Newcastle, 2 August, British Museum, Add. MS. 32739. Gedda's list showed six senators for the king, six neutral, of whom two were inclined towards him, and seven for the duke, a very imaginative estimate. In another dispatch, of 19 August, Walpole set forth Gedda's arguments for a subsidy from France, and his belief that 'they will do nothing in it here, but as they shall find his Majesty disposed to do'; he himself thinking the reason for refusal to be the fear of disobliging the tsar.

in whom confidence could be placed.⁷¹ He was instructed to apply himself 'with particular care and attention' to discover the party inclinations of the several senators; 'especially to cultivate a strict friendship and intimacy with Count Horn;' to be 'very well with' the Hessian envoy, General Diemar, who was so much in the king's confidence; and particularly to watch Bestuzhev,

and give constant and exact accounts of what you shall discover relating to the views and designs of the Muscovite Court, it being of the greatest importance to Our service to be well informed of all the Czar is carrying on in Sweden, that We may be the better enabled to prevent any new disturbances breaking out in the North.

In private instructions, set out in extended detail, Horn was stated to be 'the man of the greatest capacity and integrity at that Court, the best disposed towards Us and Our nation', and what Poyntz was to say and how conduct himself towards him was exactly prescribed. Whereas, it was stated, 'the main end' of sending him to Stockholm was 'to prevent the success of any attempt the Czar may make this summer for placing the Duke of Holstein on the throne of Sweden,' if his inquiries should result in finding that a sum of fifty or a hundred thousand pounds would enable the kingdom to be put in a proper state of defence, he might let it be known that such a sum could be found, in case only of an actual attempt on the part of the tsar and upon condition that he himself should direct the disbursement of the money. And further he was authorized to expend in case of absolute necessity £15,000, or £20,000 at most, in 'gratifications' to the senators, but very cautiously and 'by different and distant payments', in order to keep them in a greater dependence. And, as Count Horn was 'strongly inclined' to favour the duke's succession, 'and as we have no reason to be against the said Duke, but what arises from his relation to, and dependence upon the Czar,' Poyntz might let it be known that, were the latter dead, or the duke out of his influence, all friendly offices could be rendered to him; but he must do this very cautiously, lest the king should come to know of it. The instances, which the king and Diemar were sure to make immediately for a supply of money, must be repelled,

⁷¹ As correctly published in the *Lettres historiques*. lxi. 214, there was required 'un Ministre affidé, qui soit capable de manier avec dextérité une affaire si délicate'. Finch could not be summarily recalled, as had been Sir Luke Schaub, that other of Carteret's men, from Paris, on account of the great influence of his family; and as the post at the Hague was higher, though now of little consequence, Newcastle was able to represent the transfer to be a mark of the king's esteem (to H. Walpole, 20 July (o.s.), British Museum, Add. MS. 32739).

but 'in so soft and gentle a manner, as not to drive them into an absolute despair as to this particular'.⁷²

Poyntz reached Gothenburg on 2 October, and, as expected, was immediately approached on the king's behalf for money 'for counter-bribing the Czar'.⁷³ Into his elaborate expositions of the state of parties and of individual inclinations it would be out of place to enter.⁷⁴ He stated the real contest to be not between Hessian or Holsteiner for the throne, nor between adherence to Great Britain or to Russia, but whether the crown should govern or the senate. In their 'implacable jealousy' of the king, suspected of aiming at recovering the lost prerogatives of the crown, all, he said, seemed 'to look with an evil eye on any Foreign Power from whom they think he may receive the least personal support', and therefore were disposed 'to run blindfold into the interests of the Czar and the Duke of Holstein, though in their hearts they are afraid of them both'. Two or three senators at most were for the king, and, if he retained the crown, it would be principally through the jealousies and divisions of parties. As to his financial embarrassments, not only had he no money of his own, but was £28,000 in debt to General Diemar. But the British government was less disposed to send help now than ever. In January, discussing the question at length, Townshend expressed the concern of George I at the condition of Sweden and of its king, but also his conviction that the disorders arose from causes which no foreign power could remove; he blamed especially the weakness shown by Frederick I during his reign, as causing him to forfeit all confidence at home and deterring any one abroad from helping him.⁷⁵

We must now turn to the work of reconciliation between George I and Peter the Great. The ceaseless endeavours of Campredon at St. Petersburg were still defeated by the refusal of either to yield on the questions of Mecklenburg and Hölstein, although on those directly affecting Great Britain there was a disposition to agree. That George was desirous at least of giving no further offence to Peter is indicated by a special instruction to Colonel Du Bourgay, who was appointed in May to replace James Scott at Berlin,⁷⁶ to converse with Count Golovkin there as freely as

⁷² Instructions to Poyntz, open and private, 7 September (o.s.), Record Office, Sweden 35. The above is but a very brief indication of the contents of the twenty-four clauses of this lengthy document.

⁷³ By the king's private secretary, Törne, a long private interview with whom Poyntz, still at Gothenburg, recounts on 30 September (o.s.). He reached Stockholm on 19 October.

⁷⁴ Record Office, Sweden 35. One of them, of 4 November (o.s.), covers fifty-one pages of manuscript, rivalling the essays of St. Saphorin.

⁷⁵ 12 January (o.s.) 1725, *ibid.*

⁷⁶ Scott's recall had been requested in a despatch to Wallenrodt of 21 December 1723 (Staatsarchiv, Berlin), on the ground that he could not be trusted to work with

with the other foreign ministers, and without entering into excuses for or vindication of what was past to hear his offers and report.⁷⁷ Frederick William of Prussia, as has been noticed, was anxious for the reconciliation, partly from the natural desire that the two powers, to whom he most looked for support, should be at one, partly from his old fear of a separate alliance between Russia and France. And if one were to be made between Great Britain, France, and Russia, he wished to be included in it. Thus Chambrier, in reply to his dispatch of 23 May cited above, was instructed that nothing could be more desirable than such a quadruple alliance, and that the king of Prussia hoped to succeed in his efforts for the reconciliation, could Campredon be ordered to act in concert with Mardefeld.⁷⁸ Further dispatches from Chambrier were encouraging; they set forth Morville's sympathy with the aim expressed and his consent to send Campredon the desired orders.⁷⁹ To which his master replied in his pleasure: 'Je seconderois, autant qu'il me sera possible, les intentions de la Cour de France, non seulement dans cette affaire, mais aussy dans toutes les autres qui se pourroient jamais présenter.'⁸⁰

Yet in London there was doubt in regard to the real intentions of the Prussian court. Du Bourgay was instructed:

We think fit more particularly to recommend to your care the hindring his Majesty from entring into any engagements with the Czar without consulting us beforehand. . . . Whenever you shall discover any transaction of such a nature going on, you should not contradict the King in what he is doing, but skilfully dissuade his Majesty from proceeding too farr without making a confidence of his views that way to Us; by shewing him how sincerely earnest We are to advance his true interests; how great an affection We have for him, and how much it is for the real service and advantage of his affairs to preserve inviolably the strict union of counsells and designs, which was so happily settled between us by the late alliance.

For his behaviour at the Prussian court Du Bourgay was recommended to apply himself particularly to obtain the good opinion and confidence of the queen of Prussia, George's daughter, to cultivate intimacy with her servants, and of the king's ministers

sincerity for a good understanding between Great Britain and Prussia. Apparently his relations with the Polish court, to which he had formerly been accredited, made him suspect. In choosing Du Bourgay respect seems to have been had to the small estimation in which Frederick William held civilians. Others proposed, says Wallenrodt, were Lord Scarborough and General Wade, but Du Bourgay was preferred to please the duke of Argyll (4 August, *ibid.*).

⁷⁷ Townshend to Du Bourgay, 11 May (o.s.), Record Office, Foreign Entry Book 53. The order had reference to the trouble between Finch and Bestuzhev at Stockholm (below, p. 504 n. 95).

⁷⁸ Rescript to Chambrier, 3 June, Staatsarchiv, Berlin.

⁷⁹ 27 June and 1 July, *ibid.*

⁸⁰ Rescript of 22 July, *ibid.*

especially with Ilgen and Cnyphausen, 'and in a more particular manner to transact Our affairs by their means and through their hands.' He was also 'to be very well' with General Grumbkow, who could be of great use to him and was so disposed to be, having broken with the prince of Anhalt 'and being thereby become ready to embrace measures more expedient for Our service'. But in this he must be very circumspect, in order not to give offence to the others, and with the prince of Anhalt and his party civil but not intimate.⁸¹

Du Bourgay arrived at Berlin on 4 July. A fortnight later, he says, the king, who had just returned from Wusterhausen, 'did me the honour to entertain me upon the methods he thought the most effectual to reconcile our Court and the Czar.' But after that other subjects held the field. Thus on 12 August: 'there is nothing talk'd of now relating to the affairs of the north,' attention being wholly devoted to the prospects of the congress of Cambray. Should a rupture between Spain and Austria take place, he was asked, what would be the king of England's attitude? To which he replied, as best he could, evasively.⁸² Complaints, too, against Hanover embarrassed him, the more annoying because they were well founded.⁸³

About the middle of August very encouraging advices were received from Mardefeld and transmitted to Chambrier and Wallenrodt.⁸⁴ But there was still distrust. Townshend, Wallenrodt reported, while desiring him to thank the king of Prussia and stating that the king of England's views upon a reconciliation were well known to the tsar, yet believed that the Russian utterances were only intended to amuse.⁸⁵ And mystery still attached to Prussian engagements with Russia.⁸⁶ To clear matters up the

⁸¹ Private and additional instructions, 11 May (o.s.), Record Office, Prussia 18. The two ministers named had all along been the principal adversaries of George I at the Prussian court. Full particulars of their quarrel are given in *Die Briefe König Friedrich Wilhelms I. an den Fürsten Leopold zu Anhalt-Dessau*, text and introduction.

⁸² 'The King of Prussia's desire for a rupture in hopes to make an advantage is beyond what can be imagined.'

⁸³ Du Bourgay, 22 July to 15 August, Record Office, Prussia 18.

⁸⁴ Rescripts of 14 and 15 August, Staatsarchiv, Berlin. In the latter: 'Haben Wir die Nachricht von dem Russischen Hofe, dass der Tzar, jetzo, sehr portiret sey, das vorige gute Vernehmen mit dem Könige in Engeland zu retabliren.'

⁸⁵ Wallenrodt, 1 September, *ibid.*

⁸⁶ 'Since the conclusion of the Czar's peace with the Turks, his Prussian Majesty having appear'd to be under some great uneasiness and anxiety, the Queen was pleas'd to let me know, that she believed it proceeded from some former engagement, that his Prussian Majesty had contrary to his interest unwarily entre'd into with the Czar, who challenged newly the performance of it, which his Prussian Majesty would gladly shift off.' This, Du Bourgay went on, was in accordance with the behaviour of Cnyphausen and Grumbkow, and no doubt the tsar was advised by the prince of Anhalt through his creature Mardefeld. Grumbkow, he said, had not so far responded to his advances, but he was certainly at utter variance with the prince, with whom none of the ministers seemed to side.

queen of Prussia counselled Du Bourgay to invite the king to dinner at the first opportunity (he was again away at Wusterhausen), and in the meantime 'to use all the art and labour I can to get a good footing in Messieurs Ilgen's and Cniphhausen's favour and confidence as the most effectual means to enable me to answer the Queen's desire'.⁸⁷ Shortly he was able to send word of orders going to Mardefeld to do all he could to further the reconciliation.⁸⁸

And now surprising and pleasurable news had been received at Paris from Campredon. From conferences with Osterman and Chancellor Golovkin he drew the conclusion that the tsar desired a reconciliation, would waive his personal 'griefs', and would consent to receive a British minister, if the king of England would promise to work for a settlement in Mecklenburg and withdraw his troops thence and make understood his willingness to join with France and Russia in compensating the duke of Holstein-Gottorp for his loss of Sleswick.⁸⁹ On these points Morville had already written that George I was not absolutely inflexible.⁹⁰ Next Campredon reported an interview with Peter the Great himself on the day that he received the instrument of his peace with Turkey, obtained for him mainly by the efforts of the French ambassador at Constantinople. Seizing the opportunity to speak of his own negotiation, Campredon was answered that orders would at once be given which would satisfy him.⁹¹ On receipt of which news Morville wrote:

Vous avez plus fait en un moment de conversation avec le Czar lui-même, que vous n'auriez pu faire en plusieurs conférences avec ses ministres; aussi faut-il dire, que le succès de l'affaire vous sera dû principalement.⁹²

In Sweden also the ministers communicated to Finch and Colonel Bassewitz, the Hanoverian minister, overtures from Bestuzhev, with an expression of belief that the tsar might now be prevailed upon to give the simple declaration which George I required, that all past incidents should be forgotten. And now as always, Finch wrote, the king of Sweden expressed himself desirous of serving his majesty to the best of his ability.⁹³ But when these dispatches reached London Swedish mediation was even less acceptable than formerly, for the news from Campredon had anticipated them. A memorandum given to Count de Broglie with copies of them, recalling its former rejection

⁸⁷ Du Bourgay, 30 August, Record Office, Prussia 18.

⁸⁸ The same, 5 September.

⁸⁹ Campredon, 22 July, *Sbornik*, lii. 266 f.

⁹⁰ 11 August, *ibid.* p. 276.

⁹¹ Campredon, 1 August, cited by Vandal, *Louis XV et Elisabeth de Russie*, pp. 72, 73.

⁹² 31 August, *Sbornik*, lii. 283.

⁹³ Bassewitz, 12 August; Finch, 19 and 26 August and 2 September, all old style, Record Office, Sweden 34.

out of consideration for France with the result that the treaty of February had been concluded, informed him that, while the present turn of affairs created great surprise, the king did not propose to avail himself of the Swedish offers, that he was still resolved to be reconciled with the tsar only through the mediation of France, and that the only answer to be given, one which it was hoped would soon be possible, was that that mediation had already been successful.⁹⁴ However, expressions of satisfaction were returned to Stockholm, Finch being instructed to render thanks for the kind offices employed and to use all civility towards Bestuzhev, giving him the same reason as before for not visiting him,⁹⁵ but assuring him of the king's readiness to receive him as minister once more, so soon as the reconciliation should be effected.⁹⁶ This, however, was but poor consolation for the rebuff administered, and both the Swedes and Bestuzhev were greatly mortified.⁹⁷

Campredon's advices having been received in London, Horatio Walpole was enabled to notify the French government that George I

consented to the reconciliation and alliance in the manner proposed by the Czar himself, with such an explanation only relating to the admission of the Dukes of Holstein and Mecklenburg as was necessary to make things plainly understood to preserve the honour and faith of the two Crowns.⁹⁸

Later he sent word that it was not expected that a British ambassador should be sent to Russia before the tsar's acceptance of the proposed treaty was known, so that he would have nothing to do but to sign it on arrival; 'so that the conclusion of this

⁹⁴ 'Sa Majesté espère avec la dernière confiance . . . qu'après toutes les concessions qu'Elle a faites, le Roy très-Chrétien la mettra en état de donner la seule réponse solide et convenable, à savoir de donner à entendre à la Suède que sa réconciliation avec le Czar est conclue par la médiation de sa Majesté très-Chrétienne. La Cour de Suède ne pourra que se réjouir de voir une si bonne œuvre amenée à sa conclusion, et applaudir à l'interposition dont le Roy mon Maître s'est servi pour cet effet. Et cet événement ne pourra manquer d'avoir des conséquences très-heureuses tant par rapport aux affaires du Nord qu'à celles du Sud, et de nous débarrasser de toutes les difficultés qui pourroient retarder le succès des négociations de Cambray' (unsigned draft, 21 September (o.s.), Record Office, Foreign Ministers 4).

⁹⁵ Finch declined to exchange visits with Bestuzhev until an affront given by the latter to Colonel Bassewitz was atoned for.

⁹⁶ Townshend to Finch, 22 September and 9 October (o.s.), Record Office, Foreign Entry Book 155.

⁹⁷ Thus Poyntz on 28 October (o.s.): 'Tho Count Horn and Secretary Høpken had art enough to conceal their resentment, yet I believe they are heartily piqued at the neglect shewn them by the Czar as well as Britain, in this affair of a reconciliation, and I am well informed, that they have already sent positive orders to their minister at Paris, to insist on being admitted to a share in finishing it.' And a week later: Bestuzhev also was greatly mortified at having no hand in the affair. (Record Office, Sweden 35.)

⁹⁸ H. Walpole, 19 September, British Museum, Add. MS. 32740.

tedious and difficult negotiation seems to have taken a lucky turn.' Also that the intimation of the king's willingness to recognize the tsar's title of emperor and to receive Bestuzhev back in England, as soon as the treaty should be finished, had given great pleasure.⁹⁹ It was decided to draw up a formal treaty to be submitted to St. Petersburg. When the draft had been presented in London Newcastle wrote of the king's satisfaction, especially with the articles concerning the two dukes, and ordered Walpole to express to the French ministers in the strongest manner his sense of obligation, though with the observation that he accepted the terms purely out of regard to France. The dispatch concluded with congratulation 'upon this great work's being brought so near a conclusion, which His Ma^{ty} cannot but look upon to be as good as finished', and with the desire that particular thanks should be rendered to Fleury.¹⁰⁰

The draft treaty was for a defensive alliance between France, Great Britain, and Russia, but provided for the accession of 'tous les rois, princes et états, qui seront mûs du même zèle pour le bien de la chrétienté'. Specified for mutual guarantee were the treaties of Utrecht and Baden, of the Hague and London (the Triple and Quadruple Alliances), those concluded by Sweden in 1719-20 with Hanover, Great Britain, and Prussia, and that of Nystad. The tsar's title of emperor was recognized, with the proviso that no new prerogatives or pre-eminence should accrue to him thereby. Other clauses provided for mutual succour, for liberty of commerce, and so on; the term was fixed at fifteen years; and Sweden and Prussia were specially named as powers whose accession was desirable. The separate and secret articles were three in number. The first stipulated full liberty of election to the crown of Poland by the republic, the second engaged the kings of France and England to use their best offices in favour of the duke of Mecklenburg-Schwerin, out of regard to the tsar, and the third obliged them to do their best to procure for the duke of Holstein-Gottorp, to whom the tsar destined one of his daughters to wife, a proper indemnity for Sleswick, though without derogating from the guarantees which they had given to Denmark.

With the draft went to St. Petersburg dispatches from Louis XV and from Morville discussing the articles in detail, and new full powers for Campredon, in which the tsar was recognized as emperor. Morville wrote:

Je suis persuadé, qu'il ne naîtra aucun obstacle au succès de la négociation, et que les premières nouvelles, que l'on recevra de vous, seront la certitude de la signature de l'alliance.¹⁰¹

⁹⁹ The same, 3 and 6 October, *ibid.*

¹⁰⁰ Newcastle to H. Walpole, 26 September (o.s.), *ibid.*

¹⁰¹ The whole under date 16 October, *Sbornik*, lii. 295-321. Morville promised the

Horatio Walpole for his part expressed himself

very sensible of the influence that this great work, when it comes to be publicly known, will have upon the affairs of Europe, and what an éclat it will give for his Majesty's honour and interest both at home and abroad.¹⁰²

And Townshend wrote to Poyntz :

As the scene of affairs is intirely changed with relation to the Czar since you left this place, the K. having all the reason in the world to think his reconciliation with that prince as good as concluded, you will not enter into any of the particular private instructions given you till you hear further from me, but will content your self with carrying your self as easily and civilly as you can to everybody, without giving any person or party any occasion of offence.¹⁰³

The progress of the affair was well looked upon at Berlin. When Wallenrodt expressed himself unable to understand the haughty attitude outwardly maintained by the British court towards the tsar, while he was certain that at heart it would gladly be reconciled with him, he was answered that he need not trouble himself thereat, the king of Prussia being quite contented that the affair was in such good train, even though he had no hand in it, and thinking that an alliance between Great Britain, France, and Russia, which he himself would gladly join, would excite great attention throughout Europe.¹⁰⁴ In further dispatches, after reporting the attention given to the affair by the Austrian and Saxon envoys in London and the sending of the draft treaty to Russia, Wallenrodt opined that France could not have succeeded so far, had she not been so instrumental in procuring for the tsar his peace with Turkey ; that her success would influence the congress of Cambray and bring the emperor¹⁰⁵ to reason ; that she desired no war, having abandoned her former principle of conquest ; and that the accomplishment of the negotiation would have good results for Prussia, as a guarantee for Juliers and Berg could be obtained : in fact, the new alliance might be regarded as founded on the treaty of Charlottenburg. But the Hanoverian ministers, he said, disposed to a good understanding with the emperor and jealous of Prussia, viewed the proceedings malevolently, and Bernstorff in particular, since he would no longer be able to play the master

immediate dispatch of 40,000 crowns for gratifications to persons at court, and did not doubt that George I would pay the 80,000 already arranged for.

¹⁰² 14 October, British Museum, Add. MS. 32741.

¹⁰³ 9 October (o.s.), Record Office, Sweden 35.

¹⁰⁴ Wallenrodt, 26 September, and rescript to him of 10 October, Staatsarchiv, Berlin. Mardefeld on 24 October was ordered again to press the said alliance with the tsar and his ministers (*ibid.*).

¹⁰⁵ 'Welcher sich gleichsam von allen Ecken belagert siehet.

in Mecklenburg. And the king appeared still to be in doubt of the tsar's sincerity.¹⁰⁶ He was instructed in reply to watch carefully what went on, in order that Prussia might not be behind-hand in guarding her own interests, and to deny absolutely and at every opportunity that Prussia had any engagements with any one, particularly with the tsar, excepting in regard to the Courland marriage-treaty, wherein Russian aid had been enlisted in order to defeat Polish intrigue; any assertion to the contrary was the false invention of the Austrian and Polish courts. And since to accede to the treaty subsequently would bring but little advantage, he must try to get Prussia included in it as a principal party. Chambrier was ordered to say to Morville :

que j'étois véritablement charmé de le voir dans de si bons sentiments par rapport à une étroite liaison entre la France, l'Angleterre, le Tzar et moy. Que j'y répondrais de mon côté avec toute la sincérité imaginable, et contribuerois tout ce qui dépendroit de moy, pour un si grand ouvrage.¹⁰⁷

These instructions were sent in full belief that the alliance would be made. Du Bourgay had written on 21 October: 'I am now positively assured by the ministers here, that the reconciliation between our Court, and the Czar, is concluded,' on the tsar's part with great cheerfulness and good resolve for the future.¹⁰⁸ And later :

Whilst I was in his Majesties closet, he sent for Count Golowkin, and desired we should embrace and congratulate each other in his presence, on the happy reconciliation of our Courts, which we did accordingly very heartily. On which his prussian Majesty expressed both in his countenance and words, all the joy and satisfaction imaginable. Among other things his Majesty said, that the Protestant interest might now truly be said to be free from any insults of its adversaries, and that he could declare with pleasure, he had contributed all in his power to this good work, which he had at heart for these two years past.¹⁰⁹

Public report attributed the supposed success to the king of Prussia's influence with the tsar, and even declared that at this interview the ratification of the treaty was actually presented by the British envoy.¹¹⁰

Of course all this roused the greatest disquietude at Copenhagen. Du Bourgay on 5 September had cited Lövenörn's

¹⁰⁶ Wallenrödt, 24 October to 14 November, *ibid.*

¹⁰⁷ Rescripts to Wallenrödt, 31 October and 28 November, and to Chambrier, 14 November, *ibid.*

¹⁰⁸ 'As he is assured, that it is the onely method, to gain credit and influence in the affairs of Europe: especially in his intended treaties of commerce with France and Spain' (Record Office, Prussia 18).

¹⁰⁹ The same, 7 November.

¹¹⁰ *Lettres historiques*, lxvi. 519; Wich from Hamburg 16 and 22 November, Record Office, Hamburg 41.

expression of fear that Denmark would have to pay. Shortly afterwards Frederick IV made fresh advances to Russia, personally drawing up instructions to Westphalen at St. Petersburg to endeavour to establish a good understanding with the tsar and with the duke of Holstein-Gottorp. He offered the duke Oldenburg and the right to redeem Delmenhorst, mortgaged to Hanover, in return for the cession of his share of Holstein to Denmark, in case he succeeded to the throne of Sweden. And he undertook to recognize the tsar's imperial title, if he would give up his claim to exemption from the Sound tolls. To help the negotiation, Westphalen was empowered to offer to Campredon and to Bassewitz, the duke's minister, a real 'reconnaissance'.¹¹¹ But nothing came of this, and Danish fears increased. Wich at Hamburg bears witness to this, saying that the Danish minister at Paris had been ordered to find out what he could.¹¹² And Glenorchy wrote on 2 December :

I find the Court is alarm'd at the reconciliation between his Majesty and the Czar, and tho the Ministers have never spoken to me on that subject, I know that the Grand Chancellor has said it would be to the prejudice of Denmark.¹¹³

Townshend advised him on 12 January (o.s.) 1725 :

Mons^r. de Söhlenthal is very uneasy here and continually teizing me about the business of His Mat^y's reconciliation with the Czar, and tho I have told him fairly how careful His Maj^{ty} has been of his engagements with His Master, . . . yet I find he is still incredulous. . . . His Majesty has been so solicitous in the progress of this affair to preserve and secure the guaranty given to the king of Denmark both by himself and France, that he thinks it the best thing that can happen for the advantage of that Kingdom that the reconciliation should go on and succeed in the method it is put.¹¹⁴

But it was not succeeding. Sanguine as were the hopes expressed, they were doomed to disappointment. Only after receipt of the draft treaty could Campredon obtain an interview with the Russian ministers even to discuss preliminaries. In interpreting as he did Peter the Great's outburst of confidence in July he must have been mistaken, for immediately afterwards Peter informed Prince Boris Kurakin, now once more accredited to Paris,¹¹⁵ that the reply to his exposition of French policy (of 13 March ¹¹⁶) must be deferred until it was seen whether there

¹¹¹ Holm, pp. 85-7.

¹¹² 8 October, Record Office, Hamburg 41. The minister in question, Wederkop, was Wich's brother-in-law.

¹¹³ Record Office, Denmark 47.

¹¹⁴ Record Office, Foreign Entry Book 5.

¹¹⁵ He had returned thither at the beginning of January, and later received formal credentials of date 13 February (o.s.), *Kurakin Archives*, ii. 158.

¹¹⁶ *Ibid.* iii. 243, cf. *ante*, xxvi. 308.

was not some change of view at the French court, for written obligations would not be entered into with England.¹¹⁷ In any case Peter's attention was almost wholly taken up by his domestic affairs, particularly by the Mons scandal, which so gravely affected him, while the illness which was soon to prove fatal was increasing upon him. Moreover, the clauses concerning his two client dukes were not to his content, and he had lately received a fresh rebuff to his great ambition, to marry his daughter Elizabeth into the royal house of France.

In the first week of December took place the betrothal of the duke of Holstein-Gottorp to the eldest tsarevna Anne, and Campredon had word of a secret treaty attaching thereto, which guaranteed to the duke the succession in Sweden, promised either to recover for him his lost estates or to indemnify him by others yielding an equal revenue, and engaged the succession in Russia for whichever of his sons should be most fit.¹¹⁸ And though on 16 December he could still write, after an interview with Count Tolstoi, 'Je ne désespère point . . . que la négociation n'ait un heureux succès,' he had next to report that excuses were still made, and on 9 January Osterman's definite statement that, while the tsar still wished to ally himself with France, he would only admit the king of England subsequently, nor form alliance with him previously to a reconciliation. He concluded: 'il est certain que le Czar ne se serait point porté aux avances, qu'il a faites, touchant sa réconciliation, s'il n'y avait pas trouvé son avantage, le seul motif, qui le détermine.'¹¹⁹

Meanwhile Morville could not bring himself to believe the truth of Campredon's accounts,¹²⁰ and Horatio Walpole consoled himself by writing: 'I must own I do not like the appearances of this affair at present, . . . but at all events we may depend upon it, that this Court will not enter into any alliance with the Czar exclusive of us.'¹²¹ Yet Du Bourgay learnt at Berlin that 'I might depend the treaty was in so great forwardness that it would soone be perfected, in the manner the french would have it, and to the King's entire satisfaction',¹²² and even at the

¹¹⁷ *Ibid.* i. 34.

¹¹⁸ Campredon, 1 and 9 December, *Sbornik*, lii. 348, 357.

¹¹⁹ *Ibid.* pp. 366, 378, 385.

¹²⁰ 'Je ne puis pas croire, qu'après que le Czar a consenté à admettre un ambassadeur d'Angleterre, qu'il a obtenu du roi de la Grande-Bretagne l'admission du S^r Bestougeff et sur les intérêts des ducs de Holstein et de Mecklembourg une stipulation aussi étendue, que les engagements antérieurs du roi d'Angleterre ont pu lui promettre, il veuille se retracter, renoncer à tant d'avantages différents et compromettre le nom du roi. . . . Éclaircissez, s'il vous plaît, ce mystère et mettez-moi en état de savoir, sur quoi l'on peut compter, lorsque l'on voit une variation si marquée au moment, qu'on a lieu d'espérer une fin prochaine, qui en effet n'est suspendue par rien de la part du roi et du roi d'Angleterre' (Morville to Campredon, 7 December, *Sbornik*, lii. 355).

¹²¹ 26 December, British Museum, Add. MS. 32741.

¹²² 6 January 1725, Record Office, Prussia 18.

end of January Walpole reported Morville to say that 'he did not find, by anything that Mr. Campredon had wrote, the least reason to apprehend that this affair would miscarry', and the duke of Bourbon to think that 'the dilatoriness of the Czar' was rather due to preoccupation by his domestic concerns 'than out of any backwardness or aversion to the thing itself'.¹²³

On 1 February Bourbon expressed to Campredon his extreme impatience to know the truth, seeing that it was necessary to take, one way or another, steps to secure the tranquillity of the north.¹²⁴ Seven days later Peter the Great died. His widow and successor was credited with a hatred of Hanover even greater than his¹²⁵ and with a special affection for the duke of Holstein-Gottorp. And so, on receipt of the news of her successful usurpation, Campredon, on request from London, was ordered to suspend negotiations until he should be further instructed.

Nor did greater success attend another consequence of the new situation created in September, the resumption of negotiations for the accession of France to the treaty of Charlottenburg. Morville, his chief objection being removed, was now found to favour the proposal, but Fleury, strangely, to oppose it.¹²⁶ To meet his objections, presumably, the idea of a simple accession was given up and a new treaty was drafted, modelled on that of Charlottenburg but containing alterations suited to France becoming a party.¹²⁷ There was a strong desire at Paris, Walpole wrote, for taking Prussia 'into a strict union', but it was thought that the article regarding Juliers and Berg would prove a stumbling-block in the way of the accession of the Dutch.¹²⁸ Newcastle,

¹²³ 27 and 30 January, British Museum, Add. MS. 32742.

¹²⁴ *Sbornik*, lii. 416.

¹²⁵ 'La Czarine ayant été personnellement traitée avec peu d'égards, lorsqu'elle passa par l'électorat de Hanovre, elle aura conservé contre le roi de la Grande-Bretagne un mécontentement plus difficile à surmonter, que n'avoit été celui du Czar, dont l'éloignement étoit contrebalancé par des projets et des vœux, que la Czarine ne serait peut-être pas en volonté, ni en pouvoir, de poursuivre' (Bourbon to Campredon, 8 March, *ibid.* 451).

¹²⁶ H. Walpole, 4 November, Add. MS. 32741. He could only conjecture Fleury's motives, suggesting that, as a bigoted catholic, he might object to Juliers and Berg falling into the hands of a protestant power. To the duke of Bourbon, who sided with Morville, he ascribed the possible hope of acquiring, as the price of his assent, the sovereignty of Neuchâtel. Later (24 February 1725) he retracted his conjecture about Fleury: 'I must do him this justice to say, that in the many conferences I have had with him, he has often made this distinction, of being a thorough Roman Catholic, and for supporting that religion in the highest degree in France, and at the same time a good Protestant in the alliances to be made by this Crown abroad' (Add. MS. 32742).

¹²⁷ For instance, 'the omitting to mention the protestant religion in the preamble, and the inserting of the necessary clauses with relation to the cases in which His Majesty and the King of Prussia as Princes of the Empire are, or are not to pay their contingent, should a war happen between the Empire and France.'

¹²⁸ H. Walpole, 14 November, Add. MS. 32741. He had previously suggested (4 November) that the Dutch might be satisfied by an agreement on the Orange succession and by obtaining the upper quarter of Guelders and the Elector Palatine's seignory of 'Raveteyn' (Ravenstein).

for his part, intimated the king's pleasure at seeing a disposition on the part of France to come into the treaty, while not thinking it so necessary as formerly ; on the very delicate question of the succession to Juliers and Berg he was loth to enter into further engagements, and did not think that the king of Prussia would have cause to be disobliged if Walpole answered, if approached on the subject in form, that it was not considered advisable at this juncture to alter their nature ; only he must beware of giving any explanations which might not be very agreeable to the king of Prussia.¹²⁹ The draft having been presented by Count de Broglie in London, Newcastle wrote that George I entirely approved of it, and only desired the insertion among the treaties to be guaranteed of that of 1720 between Great Britain and Sweden, to which, though objected to in the case of the proposed Russian treaty, 'as containing some engagements which, thô at an end, might have been disagreeable' to the tsar, there was no such objection in this case.¹³⁰ And he desired Walpole to express to the duke of Bourbon and the other French ministers

in the strongest manner the sense His Majesty has of this new mark of their zeal for strengthening and improving the union and harmony between the two Crowns, by France's becoming a party to a treaty of such importance to the preservation of the publick tranquillity both in the North and South.¹³¹

The negotiations went on during the winter, but not with the easy course expected, Prussia advancing demands reasonable enough from her point of view but from the other inadmissible. They were suspended when at the beginning of March 1725 news arrived not only of the death of Peter the Great but also of the secret work which Ripperdà was doing at Vienna, on behalf of Spain, behind the backs of the mediators at Cambray. How Great Britain, France, and Prussia eventually entered into alliance under a political situation greatly altered belongs to the story of the treaty of Hanover of the following September.

J. F. CHANCE.

¹²⁹ Newcastle to H. Walpole, 2 November (o.s.), *ibid.*

¹³⁰ To meet the difficulty of the reference to the protestant religion in this treaty, it was proposed to add to the mention of it the words, 'Sa Majesté Très Chrétienne se remettant en tout ce qui regarde la Religion au Traité de Westphalie.'

¹³¹ Newcastle to H. Walpole, 12 November (o.s.), *ibid.*