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Aristotle *Die Disposition der Aristotelischen Prinzipien*. Tatarkiewicz Von Wladyslaw. 8VO. Pp. 102. Giessen: A. Töpelmann, 1910. M. 3 Pfg. 20. *Des Aristoteles Buck übey das Steigen des Nil*. Von J. Partsch. Large 4to. Pp. 48. Leipzig: B. G. Teubner, 1909. M. 2.

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following this example, and dating his formal sovereignty as late as 305-4 B.C. It seems to us exceedingly unlikely that this is a reasonable explanation. We now know from documents found at Elephantine that he dated his royalty in Egypt from his satrapy, shortly after the death of Alexander. The well-known inscription about the gods of Pe and Tep in the Delta also speak of him as a king—*Ouro*—while Alexander IV. was yet alive. It seems most likely that as soon as this youth died he had himself formally proclaimed at Memphis as successor to the Pharaohs, but made no use of the title in the Greek world till six or seven years later. No document has, however, yet verified such a conjecture. Possibly, if some day this does happen, the critics who now repudiate the conjecture will say that of course it was perfectly obvious.

There are many other problems in this book which we should gladly discuss, but we should probably incur the charge of prolixity, from which the author is not free. As is usual with German philolo-

gists, he combines a wide and accurate knowledge of his country's literature on his subject with great ignorance of what has been written by English scholars. Such a book as Mr. Bevan's *House of Seleucus* is not, we think, once mentioned, and other studies on Hellenism and on Egyptian history, which might have served him to state things clearly, seem wholly beyond his ken. But the contempt among Germans for English philology nowadays is only equalled by the veneration among the English for German learning. It is evident that neither reads the work of the other, as is pretended. But the Englishman has to labour at the German authorities, whereas most English books are readable and easy even to a foreigner. Probably for that reason they are regarded as shallow. In any case this regrettable want of solidarity between the philologists of the great European nations is a fact worthy of notice, and directly suggested by Dr. Kaerst's able and learned book.

M.

ARISTOTLE.

Die Disposition der Aristotelischen Prinzipien.

VON WLADYSLAW TATARKIEWICZ. 8vo.

Pp. 102. Giessen: A. Töpelmann, 1910. M. 3 Pfg. 20.

AN interesting examination of the chief concepts of the Aristotelian system. The author is thoroughly familiar with his subject, and shows no little skill in tracing the connection of the leading ideas and their development out of one another, and in illustrating his meaning by well-chosen illustrations from all the relevant works of Aristotle. The book can be strongly recommended to anyone who wishes a short introduction to Aristotle's metaphysical system.

Des Aristoteles Buch über das Steigen des Nil.

VON J. PARTSCH. Large 4to. Pp. 48.

Leipzig: B. G. Teubner, 1909. M. 2.

A MOST careful and weighty inquiry into the origin of the 'liber de inundacione Nili'

which is preserved in a medieval Latin version and traditionally ascribed to Aristotle. The writer argues that the treatise is an abbreviated but only slightly altered form of a genuine work of Aristotle, which was known to Eratosthenes. The proofs offered for the early date of the treatise are as follows:

1. The literary horizon of the author includes no works later than Aristotle.

2. His geographical horizon belongs not to a time in which India was familiar ground, but to the time before Alexander's Indian expedition (327 B.C.)—a period which for its knowledge of India depended on Ctesias and on other information which reached the Greeks from the Persian Court.

3. The author knows of changes of level in the springs of the Olynthian territory, which lay desolate from the time of the destruction of Olynthus by Philip.

That the author was none other than Aristotle is argued on the following grounds:

1. We learn from two independent sources—from Lucan, and from an extract of Photius from a Greek source—that on Aristotle's suggestion Alexander sent an expedition up the Nile to investigate the causes of the annual flood.

2. A fragment of Callisthenes (the friend of Alexander) states the result of this expedition in almost verbal agreement with the treatise under discussion.

3. The text of the treatise contains a notable expression (οὐκέτι πρόβλημα ἔστι—'the Nile is settled'), which Photius' authority quotes from the abbreviated work of Aristotle that he had before him.

4. The meteorological views of the treatise agree with demonstrably Aristotelian views—

- (a) In the account of the climatic zones;
- (b) In the belief in the dependence of the floods of the Nile on the changes of the moon;
- (c) In the conception of the Etesian winds.

5. The treatise agrees with Aristotle in geographical views—

- (a) In its reserve on the question of the connection of the oceans;
- (b) In the conjecture that the Nile and the Chremetes rise in the Silver Mountains—a conjecture expressed in a form which shows the passage in the treatise not to have been borrowed from the *Meteorologica*.

6. The disparaging Aristotelian phrase 'Ἡροδότος ὁ μυθολόγος' reappears in the form 'Erodotus fabularum scriptor.'

7. Arimnestos, the name of the father of a Greek at the Persian Court about the middle of the fourth century, apparently engaged as physician to the King, and quoted as an authority in the treatise, recurs in the same generation in the genealogy of Aristotle himself.

The cumulative value of these arguments is very great. Nor is the general character

of the treatise unworthy of Aristotle. The method followed is truly Aristotelian—a careful classification of the possible views, followed by a discussion of each, coupling several of them with the names of their supporters. The explanation finally adopted, that the yearly summer inundation of the Nile is due to summer rains in the hills where the river takes its rise, is precisely that which the latest researches have confirmed.

Ethische Werte bei Aristoteles. Von MAX HEINZE. Large 4to. Pp. 31. Leipzig: B. G. Teubner. 1909. M. 1 Pfg. 20.

THIS is a sound account of the main lines of Aristotle's ethical theory. The writer for the most part contents himself with stating Aristotle's views very much in Aristotle's own language; little is attempted in the way of interpretation or of criticism. But one or two attempts in these directions may be noted. (1) A contradiction is pointed out between Aristotle's treatment of the state as higher than the individual and his treatment of the intellectual life as the highest. The state as such, it is argued (pp. 17, 18), has no intellectual life; it has only the intellectual life of its individual members. The self-sufficient life of the state which has no relation with other states (*Pol.* vii. 3) is only externally similar to the self-sufficient life of the individual thinker. (2) The writer argues that the virtues are not treated by Aristotle as altruistic, since their end is described as being not the good of others but τὸ καλόν (*Eth. Nic.* 1115^b12, 1120^a23, 1122^b6); and other phrases indicating an egoistic element in Aristotle's conception of virtue (*ibid.* 1124^b14, 1159^a12, ix. 8 *passim*) are quoted and emphasised. Aristotle's doctrine that the virtuous act must be done τοῦ καλοῦ ἕνεκα is, in truth, perplexingly ambiguous. It might mean that the end aimed at must be conceived *sub specie boni*, and this would be compatible with the view that the end thus conceived as good is in point of fact the good of others. Thus the end of courage is described both as τὸ καλόν and as the safety of the state; and one might quite consistently hold that the safety of

the state is the noble object aimed at in an act of courage. But elsewhere Aristotle speaks as if the object of a good action were simply the doing of a good action; and if he adopts this view, he leaves himself without any answer to the question why any particular action is considered by a man to be his duty rather than any other; the matter of right action cannot be spun out of the mere form of rightness. This is the fundamental error of Kantian ethics; but Aristotle combines with it a further error. Thinking of the fineness of the action as its end, he goes on to think of fineness as if it were a good capable of being appropriated, as pleasure or money is (ὁ σπουδαῖος φαίνεται ἐαυτῷ τοῦ καλοῦ πλέον νέμων, *ibid.* 1169^a35). Such a sentence certainly indicates a strong dash of egoism in Aristotle's view.

(3) The writer argues that Aristotle's eudaemonism is really hedonism. But here he seems to dwell too much on isolated passages and to ignore the general trend of the *Ethics*, which certainly implies that pleasure is not the end of life, though necessarily connected with the end. He

lays stress on the word τέλος in the statement that pleasure is ἐπιγινόμενον τι τέλος (*ibid.* x. 1174^b33), and argues that pleasure must be the end aimed at. But one of the main points of Bk. X. is just to *distinguish* pleasure from the ἐνέργεια which is aimed at; and τέλος must be interpreted in the light of the whole context as meaning that pleasure as it were crowns the activity, though it was not the object of the activity. Pleasure is no doubt an end (*ibid.* viii. 1155^b20), but it is not *the* end. It is true that in Bk. VII. (1153^b12) Aristotle says, εἴη ἂν τις ἡδονὴ τὸ ἀριστον; but (1) this means, 'so far as these arguments go, the best thing might be a pleasure,' and (2) the effect of Bk. X. is to improve upon Bk. VII. by drawing a distinction which that book does not draw. The end, we have known all along from the first book, is an ἐνέργεια; and pleasure, the tenth book shows, is not identical with unimpeded activity, but is its accompaniment. It is therefore the accompaniment of εὐδαιμονία, not εὐδαιμονία itself.

W. D. Ross.

LA DÉFINITION DE L'ÊTRE ET LA NATURE DES IDÉES DANS LE SOPHISTE DE PLATON.

La Définition de l'Être et la Nature des Idées dans le Sophiste de Platon. Par A. DIÈS, docteur ès lettres. 8vo. 1 vol. Pp. 137. Paris: Félix Alcan, éditeur. 1909. 4 fr.

M. DIÈS has undertaken an entirely revolutionary task. He has decided to break away from quite a number of leading critics, including Lutoslawski, Apelt, Horn, Zeller, Ritter, Gomperz, Campbell, and Jackson, and he refuses to regard the *Sophist* as prophesying a crisis in the Platonic doctrine of Ideas. The *Sophist*, he says, does *not* introduce a new development of the Ideal Theory; it does *not* reveal the Ideas in the character of souls or animated forces, nor does it describe mutual relations between the Ideas founded on this notion of them as souls. As for the definition of οὐσία as δύναμις τοῦ ποιεῖν ἢ

πάσχειν, it has no philosophical significance at all.

According to M. Diès, the scheme of the dialogue is simply this. In order to define the *Sophist* it is absolutely essential to prove the existence of Not-Being, *i.e.*, to show it up in its character of Otherness. This necessitates the existence of two contradictory terms, each of which can be shown to exist and yet be different from the other. With a view to fixing on two terms which will be conceded by all those concerned in the argument, the Eleate persuades both Materialists and Idealists, almost against their will, to agree to a definition of Being as ἡ δύναμις τοῦ ποιεῖν ἢ πάσχειν. They thereby concede the existence of Motion, and they are immediately led to allow the existence of Rest as well. Thence the argument can proceed to the final result, which is the