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Ebening Meeting.

Monday, May 17th, 1869.

WILLIAM STIRLING LACON, Esq., in the Chair.

NAMES of MEMBERS who joined the Institution between the 3rd and 17th May, 1869.

ANNUAL.

Bannister, C. W., Major late 2nd Bombay Cavalry. 1l.

Haye, J. B., Lieut., R.N. 1l.

Whiteside, F. J. S., Capt. 11th Regt. 1l.

THE CONSTITUTION OF OUR MILITARY FORCES, AND THE CONDITIONS OF MILITARY SERVICE.

By Colonel A. CUNNINGHAM ROBERTSON, Commanding 2nd Batt., the
8th or King's Regt.

MR. PRESIDENT AND GENTLEMEN—You are aware that when the Council accepted my offer to say a few words by way of introducing this subject for discussion, they knew that I had no intention to submit for the consideration of the members of the Institution, any complete plan of my own. What I proposed to do was, to endeavour to classify and analyze what had been written and spoken on the subject of the reorganization of the Army, with the view of giving an opportunity for the discussion of those points regarding which a difference of opinion exists. At the time I offered to undertake this task, it did not appear very formidable; but since then there has been so much written and so much spoken on this subject, that I have found it rather difficult to make myself familiar with all the opinions and suggestions which I had to examine. I have, however, worked diligently in order to accomplish what I promised. I have made notes from all the pamphlets which have been written on the subject, and from the newspaper reports of all the speeches that have been made in Parliament. The result is this bulky roll of MS. which I hold in my hand. I shall not attempt to read these notes to you in their present shape, as I am sure that they would be neither interesting nor easily understood. I hope, however, to be able to submit them to the Council in a more compressed form, and should they think fit to publish them, they will, I think, be found to embody a tolerably complete

abstract of the actually existing state of opinion at this most interesting epoch in the history of our Military Institutions when, under the auspices of His Royal Highness the Duke of Cambridge, it seems likely that even greater changes will be made, and even greater improvements effected in the organization of the Army, than those changes and improvements which have rendered memorable the period during which his illustrious predecessor, the Duke of York, commanded the Army.*

The declaration of the policy of the Government made by Lord Northbrook leads me to hope that the Ministerial programme will, if adopted by Parliament, give practical effect to most of the suggestions made by Sir Charles Trevelyan. Many of these suggestions, which thirty years ago would have been irreconcilably at variance with the feelings and convictions of the Officers of the Army, are now in perfect accordance with the opinions and sympathies of most Officers who have studied the subject. Of course, however, those who undertake to introduce changes in existing institutions must always be prepared to contend with difficulties and to overcome opposition. There is always a certain inevitable amount of opposition to be encountered, which proceeds from the united forces of ignorance, of prejudice, and of adverse personal interests. To attempt to overcome opposition of that kind by reason or argument would be futile. The only practical manner of dealing with it is, to estimate its amount, and to consider whether it is most prudent to disregard it or to repress and control it by the direct intervention of authority. But there is another kind of opposition which arises, not from passion or prejudice, but from the difficulty of appreciating correctly the various conditions and circumstances which must be taken into account in estimating the effect likely to be produced by any proposed measure. A comparison of the different estimates formed by different individuals of the effects likely to be produced by the same measure; and a discussion of the grounds on which these estimates rest, must, I think, tend to modify and diminish differences of opinion. If a measure be really good and expedient, the more fully and the more frequently it is discussed, the smaller will become the minority of those who oppose it, the greater the majority of those who approve of it.

In going over the very numerous and highly important topics included in the subject of this evening's discussion, I shall therefore either altogether omit or else touch very slightly on those points concerning which all, or nearly all, who have written or spoken on the subject seem to be agreed; and shall devote the short time at my disposal, to making a few observations on those points respecting which there still exists a considerable difference of opinion.

What we want to do, stated in general terms, is this—We want so to organize our national forces and resources as to render them available for the purposes both of offensive and defensive warfare, and to provide for every requisite service being performed in the most economical manner, consistent with perfect efficiency. But although military

* Vide Appendix.

efficiency is the chief and primary object to be kept in view in organizing our Military Institutions, Sir Charles Trevelyan has pointed out that a statesman who deals with this question ought to bear in mind that these institutions exercise a permanent and constant influence over the national character, extending over periods of peace as well as over periods of war, and that the duration of periods of peace always greatly exceeds the duration of periods of war. Hence, therefore, although subsidiary and subordinate to the paramount requirements of military efficiency necessary to secure success in war, it is nevertheless an object of the greatest national interest to impress such a character on our Military Institutions as to make their operation during time of peace beneficial to the population, and to make the influence they exert, favourable to the development of the moral and intellectual, as well as to the physical energies of the labouring classes. In one of the most interesting passages of that most instructive little work which has become the text-book of all who wish to attain an accurate knowledge of what the British Army actually is, and also a distinct idea of what it ought to be and might be, and it is to be hoped will soon become, Sir Charles Trevelyan points out those particular arrangements by which the special processes of military training might be made subservient to a general scheme of popular education, so that a year's military duty might, in the education of young men of the labouring classes, produce beneficial effects analogous in kind to those which are produced by university training in the education of young men belonging to the upper classes of the community.

Sir Charles Trevelyan's views respecting this subsidiary function of Military Institutions are confirmed by the authority of General Trochu. As regards this matter, the views of the distinguished French soldier and of the distinguished English civilian are identical. On a point of that kind a complete coincidence of opinion between two such eminent, and at the same time such completely independent authorities, is conclusive; and in any future attempt to frame a scheme of national military organization, the necessity of rendering military training a means of promoting success in civil occupations will, no doubt be recognized as an essential condition of the problem.

What we mean, then, by an efficient Military Organization of our national forces is, not merely an organization which shall produce an Army thoroughly trained in military exercises, and perfectly adapted for all the purposes of war, but, further, an organization which shall render military training a powerful instrument of popular education, so that the same process which renders a young man an efficient soldier shall also improve his character, and develop his bodily and mental capacities, rendering him in every respect a more perfect man and a better citizen. I think we are all agreed that this is what we want to do, that this is the kind of organization we want to attain. I think, also, that it is very generally believed that those things which we want to do, the Prussians have actually done; and that such an Army as we want, they have got. Does it therefore follow, that to obtain the same results the best thing we can do is to make use of the same

means? Many people think so. They say no country in the world has a more efficient Army than Prussia. No country is better prepared for war. Therefore, say they, let us imitate Prussia; let us adopt Prussian institutions. It has, however, been very forcibly pointed out that in many most essential respects the circumstances of England are very different from those of Prussia, and that the conditions of security being different, that kind of organization, and those methods of defence, which are indispensable for Prussia, are by no means necessary for England, nor in any respect so suitable as are other organizations and methods. The security of Prussia altogether depends on the efficiency of its Army; but the Army is not the sole nor even the chief defence of England. We are protected by the ocean, by the floating bulwarks of our magnificent Navy, by the formidable fortifications which cover our chief arsenals and harbours. The Channel, to use the words of Lord Northbrook, is "our natural ally;" and if this is forgotten in considering how to organize our military forces, we omit from the problem the most important of the conditions which determine the method of its solution. Prussia cannot be effectively defended unless its armies are able to leave their own territories, and to assail their enemies on a foreign soil, and on battle-fields far distant from their own frontiers. For England, on the contrary, the best method of defence will generally be to await attack. By adhering to this policy, we shall be able to make our preparations for resistance under much more favourable conditions than the Prussians. We shall be able to obtain an equal, or, rather, a much greater degree of national security by means of an organization much narrower in its objects, and much less stringent in its provisions.

As regards the particular measures most suitable for the defence of England, a great variety of suggestions have been made, and some of these differ very considerably from others; but after reading a large mass of pamphlet literature, reports of parliamentary debates, and newspaper articles, what struck me most, and what I think will strike any one else who goes through the same course of reading, is, not the diversity, but the great similarity of these suggestions. As regards general principles, there is a very striking concord of opinion. As regards matters of detail, though there is considerable diversity, yet methods which differ are not always contradictory. Some suggestions which differ, are really supplementary to one another; both are capable of being usefully combined in the same scheme, *e.g.*, Colonel Baker has suggested a mode of recruiting the Militia by ballot, not as a substitute, but as a supplement to the mode of recruiting by voluntary enlistment.

The mode of enlistment is the essential point which determines the character of the military institutions of a state, and is one of those points on which absolute unanimity of opinion exists. Every one is agreed that in time of peace, to make military service *compulsory* would, in this country, be practically impossible. *Conscription* in England is certainly impossible; but is it equally certain that, if possible, it would be inexpedient? that if a statesman had it in his power to choose whether the national forces should be

raised by voluntary enlistment or by conscription, the highest interests of the nation, namely, those which affect the morality of the people, demand that he should decide for voluntary enlistment? This is what Lieut.-Colonel Bannatyne thinks. In his very able pamphlet, published in 1867, called "Our Military Forces and Reserves," after describing the Prussian system of conscription, he says:—"Every adult, able-bodied male in this population is thus made a soldier. Such a system cannot but demoralize the whole population, and unfit them for the occupations of civil life."

I wish to lay emphasis on the word "demoralize," and to contrast this opinion as to the moral effects of conscription with that of Sir John Burgoyne. Like everybody else, Sir John admits that it may be good economy to pay a large sum out of the Treasury, and to spare the industry of the nation. "Man for man," he says, "a soldier in the British Army costs much more than a soldier in the French or Prussian Army." Nevertheless, speaking economically, we may be gainers, and wise in our generation; "but," he goes on to say, "do not let us think that by paying money rather than the tribute of blood we are doing anything praiseworthy. Productive industry is not the sole source of the prosperity of a country; there are moral qualities developed in the training of a recruit which springing, as it were, from the Army as a source, permeate through the lower strata of society, and add largely to those qualities which make up the greatness of a nation." In this pregnant sentence, the noble veteran clearly indicates the real character of the motives and influences which make us prefer voluntary to compulsory military service, and which are so powerful as to render conscription in any form practically impossible in England. Why should economical considerations be considered paramount? Is it good for a nation that these interests should always prevail? Are not the interests of industry selfish interests? The private individual interests of the manufacturer, of the merchant, of the shopkeeper, always distinct from the interest of the State, sometimes contrary to them. These men shrink from the idea of being personally liable to military service; they shrink from any sacrifice of private interest to public duty. Their object is so to shape the policy of the State as to make it subservient to their own private interests. They repudiate or evade the obligation of sacrificing these interests for any object in which they have no immediate concern, however essential that object may be to the welfare of the nation and to the preservation of the virtues of the people. But was it acquiescence in such demands that made Greece great, or Rome great, or Prussia great, that, in the recent great American contest, gave victory to the North and glory to the South?

It may not be necessary, and if not necessary, it may not be politic to exact from Englishmen that tribute of compulsory military service which Prussians and Frenchmen are obliged to render; but it is certainly not merely politic, it is infinitely important, so to frame our institutions and so to conduct the government of the country, that every man among us may feel the obligation to sacrifice his own individual interests for those of the State.

Freedom from conscription is an advantage dearly purchased, if it cause the spirit of patriotism to decay, if it tend to strengthen the power of selfish motives, or to weaken the influence of the obligations of duty, if this immunity exists, because our statesmen believe that material prosperity should be the chief object of the exertions of individuals, and of the policy of the nation.

These are the considerations which in my opinion render a suggestion of Colonel Baker's well worthy of the attention of statesmen. He proposes to draw by lot from the population, 500,000 men, to be inscribed in a list, from which at any time when required, men might be drafted by a second ballot, to fill up vacancies in the ranks of the Militia. Under such a system, in the present state of our foreign relations, the liability of any individual to render compulsory service would, if calculated by an actuary, be found to be merely nominal. Without therefore inflicting any appreciable injury on individual interests, it would be possible, by adopting this scheme, practically to apply the principle of conscription to the constitution of our military forces. Lord Elcho, although he has not, so far as I am aware, pronounced any opinion concerning Colonel Baker's suggestion, has spoken very decidedly and forcibly in favour of its principle. He wishes that something more should be done than merely to retain in the statute-book the power to ballot. He thinks this power should be actually exercised, and that every year a certain number of men should be selected for the militia by ballot, just to keep the people in mind that military service is one of the obligations of every citizen.

God forbid that a great national disaster, or even that any formidable national danger should ever force us to adopt conscription as a necessity. Nevertheless, of two evils, it is better that a nation should occasionally suffer the calamities of war than that, during a long period of peace and prosperity, the spirit of selfishness should gain strength, and the spirit of self-sacrifice and obedience to the obligations of duty should decay.

While, therefore, I admit that, on the grounds of expediency, we must accept the principle of voluntary enlistment as the basis of the constitution of our military forces, I think that any statesman who undertakes to re-model our military institutions, should attentively consider the moral and political advantages to be derived from adopting some such suggestion as that of Colonel Baker, for recognising and giving practical effect to the principle of compulsory service.

The next point to be discussed, is "the duration of the military engagement." The weight both of argument and of authority is clearly in favour of a short term of service. Sir Charles Trevelyan's numerous admirable writings clearly demonstrate the moral advantages of a short term of enlistment, and the most able and interesting paper lately read in this Institution by Lieutenant-Colonel Leahy, demonstrates with equal, or rather let me say (since his conclusions are supported by irrefragable arithmetical calculations) with still greater cogency, its economical advantages. It is true that Lieut.-Colonel Bannatyne, who has discussed this question with his usual ability, is in favour of a long term of service. He feels strongly as a practical soldier, the difficulty of

adapting the arrangements necessary for filling vacancies in the ranks of our great Indian Army, to a short period of enlistment. But Colonel Bannatyne's pamphlet is dated 1867. At that time Colonel Leahy's paper had not been read, and Sir Charles Trevelyan's criticisms and suggestions had not been published. I shall therefore pass over the objections to short terms of service, which have been very ably stated by Colonel Bannatyne. I do so, not because I consider them unfounded, or even unimportant: I admit both their reality and their importance; but the advantages of short terms, as stated by Sir Charles Trevelyan and Lieutenant-Colonel Leahy, appear to me very much to exceed the disadvantages, as stated by Lieutenant-Colonel Bannatyne; and this seems a sufficient reason for declining to discuss an opinion formed before Colonel Leahy had spoken, or Sir C. Trevelyan had written. But there is another Officer who, although it is to be presumed that he is cognisant of all that has been said on the subject by Sir Charles Trevelyan and Lieutenant-Colonel Leahy, still maintains the same opinion as Lieutenant-Colonel Bannatyne. Sir Archibald Alison is now publishing in a separate form, two articles on "Military Organization," originally contributed by him to *Blackwood's Magazine*. The work is still in the press, but I have been favoured with a copy of the proofs, and I presume many gentlemen here present are familiar with Sir Archibald's views, as stated in the pages of *Blackwood*. I should think many of those I am addressing must, like myself, have felt astonished when they found so able and well informed an Officer arguing in favour of the expediency of long enlistments. I have a great respect for his opinion, and have read his statements and arguments very carefully. He quotes the great names of Napoleon and Wellington as conclusive authorities concerning the value of old soldiers. But if Sir Archibald will read carefully what General Trochu says about *le jeune* and *le vieux soldat*, he will learn to avoid the fallacy of confounding an old soldier and an old man. He will learn to avoid deceiving himself and his readers by quoting words spoken of young men in time of war, who had served two or three campaigns, as if they proved the expediency of binding men to serve in time of peace for 20 years in the ranks.

Both the weight of authority and the force of argument are so unequivocally in favour of short enlistments that, although Lord Northbrook did not speak very decidedly on the subject, it seems extremely probable that the thing will be tried.

The Duke of Cambridge suggests a safe mode of doing this. He says (what I think even the most sanguine promoters of the new system must feel to be true), "It is impossible for any one to feel sure if a short term of service will take with the country, if, under our voluntary system, it will prove sufficiently popular to secure as many recruits as are wanted; therefore, (says His Royal Highness), let the two systems be tried concurrently; let recruits have the option of enlisting either for a long or short period, as suits them best."

We have a corps of Guards about 6,000 strong. These troops not being liable to take their tour of foreign service, might be enlisted for a short term without inconvenience. The only thing to be considered would be, what is the most advantageous arrangement for the

performance of home duties. Suppose that the total engagement was for seven years, and that the conditions of service during this period were so arranged that each recruit enlisted should pass one year at a *dépôt*, two in the ranks, and four in the reserve. Under this arrangement one-third of the force, or 2,000 men, would annually pass into the reserve, and at the end of seven years we should have 2,000 at the *dépôt*, 4,000 in the ranks, and 8,000 in the reserve, being a total of 2,000 recruits and 12,000 trained soldiers.

As regards the interests of the State, the advantages of a short military engagement are numerous and indisputable. But as regards the interests of the recruit, I do not agree with Sir Charles Trevelyan in thinking that the effect of reducing the duration of the engagement would be to render the service more attractive. As the Army is at present constituted, one of the chief inducements which attracts recruits, is the certainty of a life-long occupation and of a provision for old age. Colonel Leahy has pointed out that the statistics of re-engagements clearly establish the fact, that the motive that induces the great majority of recruits to enlist, is the desire to obtain permanent employment; and although it is true that there are at all times in the ranks of the Army a great many soldiers who are discontented with the service, and who desire to leave it, yet this does not by any means prove, that at the time of their enlistment even these men would have considered it an advantage, if the conditions of their engagement had been such, that military service, instead of being a permanent employment, had been merely a temporary occupation for a specific term of years. It, however, deserves to be noted, that the adoption of a system restricting the period of military service to a short term of years does not by any means prevent the desire of obtaining permanent employment continuing to operate as a motive of enlistment. Under such a system, of course all non-commissioned Officers, and probably also a certain proportion of picked privates, would be permitted to re-engage. Although, therefore, only a small number of those who enlisted would actually obtain the advantage of a second engagement, yet the hope of obtaining it would be common to all, and I think it quite possible that this hope might, in many individual instances, practically have almost as powerful an influence in inducing a recruit to enlist, as the certainty of obtaining a permanent life-long occupation conferred by the present conditions of enlistment.

If, however, an advantage which was formerly offered to all who applied for it and secured by contract, be made contingent on good conduct, and if it can only be obtained by one out of many competitors, it is evident that the value of that advantage measured, not by its effect on individual minds, but by its effect on the general labour-market, must be diminished; and if the same number of labourers are required we must offer some equivalent to make up for this diminution of value. Since then the effect of a change of system which will convert military service from a permanent employment into a temporary occupation, must necessarily be to render it less attractive, and since also the number of recruits required, increases in the same proportion as the term of service is shortened, it will evidently be impossible to keep

our military establishment complete, unless some advantage is offered to soldiers which is at least equivalent to the difference in value between an offer of permanent and an offer of temporary employment.

Sir Charles Trevelyan's proposal to make military service a condition of obtaining civil employment would, if adopted, no doubt give Government a very extensive command of the labour-market, and prove a most effective means of obtaining recruits. His proposal merely refers to the lower branches of the civil service, but, both on the ground of abstract principle and of practical expediency, I think that military service of some kind should be exacted from those who seek the higher, as well as from those who seek the subordinate appointments. The treasury clerk might be selected from young gentlemen who have held commissions in a Militia regiment, or served in a Volunteer corps. Policemen and letter-carriers from soldiers who have served in regiments of the line.

To establish a connection of this kind between the military and civil services would be a benefit to both. The effect on the military service would be to attract recruits and to act as an incentive to good conduct, on the civil service to diminish the evils which spring from the abuse of patronage. I do not, however, feel at all sure that such a measure as that proposed by Sir Charles Trevelyan would of itself be sufficient to attract a supply of recruits adequate to the increased demand that would be caused by shortening the term of service. I think it would very probably be also found necessary, as suggested by Lord Elcho, to offer to soldiers, for three or four years after their discharge from the Line and transfer to the Reserve, a reduced rate of pay, say sixpence or fourpence per diem.

The next question to be discussed is that of "organization." In this respect our military institutions are singularly defective. It is admitted that we have no organization beyond that of the regiment; there is no unity of command, no machinery for the exercise of an efficient supervision and control. The Militia, the Volunteers, and the Line are each independent of the other, and quite destitute of any systematic arrangements for ensuring their combined action. The remedy for this state of things is completely in the power of the Government.

In devising a scheme of enlistment, Her Majesty's Ministers cannot calculate with certainty on the effect of the measures they adopt. They know that such and such measures will be advantageous to the State, but they cannot tell how they will affect the private interests of individuals, and unless these private interests are in accord with the public interests, recruits will not accept the terms they offer, and their measures will fail. But as soon as the men are enlisted, the manner in which they are organized is a matter which a Minister can deal with as he pleases.

Lord Northbrook has informed us that the Government have resolved to deal with this question, and that measures will be adopted for ensuring unity of command, effective control, and combined action of all our military forces.*

* *Times*, April 24, 1869.

Much difference of opinion exists as to the manner in which a Reserve of discharged soldiers should be constituted, and as to the manner in which the Militia should be connected with the Line. Sir Charles Trevelyan advocates the incorporation of the Line and Militia in composite regiments having a common dépôt, and he thinks discharged soldiers should be transferred to the Militia. Colonel Leahy thinks the Militia and Line should, as at present, be entirely distinct in their organization, and that soldiers transferred to the Reserve should continue to be borne on the establishment of regiments of the Line. Colonel Bannatyne agrees with Colonel Leahy in thinking that the Militia and the Line should be kept distinct, although he admits that their regimental incorporation would be a simpler organization.

One of the most important questions connected with the subject of organization relates to the promotion and appointment of Officers. Although I have made a special study of this question, yet I feel considerable hesitation and reluctance in stating my opinions concerning it, because I regret much, that as regards this question, they are completely at variance with those of Sir Charles Trevelyan. I know, however, that Sir Charles is no less distinguished for the soundness and perspicacity than for the candour and judicial impartiality of his judgment; I trust therefore, that though others may accuse me of presumption, Sir Charles himself will not look upon me as an advocate unduly confident in his own convictions, and asserting in an unbecoming manner that a distinguished opponent is mistaken, but that he will rather regard me as a witness anxious to give evidence before a distinguished judge on a subject respecting which the witness has had some special opportunities of acquiring information. Nor is it only my own testimony for which I solicit consideration, but for that also of Colonel Baker, of Colonel Bannatyne, and last, but not least, for that of the writer of the article in *St. Paul's Magazine* of last April, who signs himself a "Private Dragoon."

Colonel Baker, who has had much experience of foreign armies, who has not only had much intercourse with the Officers serving in those armies, but also with many of the chiefs who commanded them, is surely well qualified to form a correct judgment as to the value of British Officers as compared with those of foreign armies. He says, for the command of men, the material of the British army is much better than that of any foreign army, and whatever shortcomings and deficiencies exist in the way in which British Officers perform their duties, arise from the faults of our system and from the defective way in which the material is worked up. I have no pretension to speak with the same authority as Colonel Baker. My opportunities of observation have been much fewer than his. I have, however, on several occasions seen foreign troops, and associated with foreign Officers. So recently as last year I paid a visit to the camp at Chalons, and had the advantage of a letter of introduction to the Chief of the Staff, and I am anxious to state that the impression made on my mind by what I have seen of foreign Officers, and by what I know of our own Officers, has led me to form the same estimate of their relative value as that formed by Colonel Baker.

As regards character and capacity, as regards all those moral and social endowments which confer influence and qualify for command, there is no army in the world which possesses a finer body of Officers than the British, nor do I think there is any preliminary training more suitable for the formation of Officers than that which is given at an English public school. If British Officers are sometimes ignorant of their duties, if they sometimes perform them carelessly, the defect is in the system, not in the men. The true remedy is not to change the men, but to improve the system. It is a better system, not better men, which is required; but if we wanted better men, we certainly should not get them from the ranks. To foster and develope those qualities which are required to make an efficient Officer, no training is more unsuitable than that received by a soldier serving in the ranks, none more suitable than that received by a boy at any of our great public schools. The article in *St. Paul's Magazine* ought to be read carefully; the testimony of the writer as to facts is unimpeachable, and as regards the inferences he draws from the facts he states, it appears to me that his arguments are unanswerable, and his manner of stating them quite inimitable.

The CHAIRMAN: Would you pardon me; I do not know whether you have exhausted your subject?

Colonel ROBERTSON: By no means.

The CHAIRMAN: The rule of the Institution is, that the lecturer should confine himself to an hour, with a view to discussion following. I see that it is now half-past nine. I am obliged to remind you of the rule.

Colonel ROBERTSON: I shall find it utterly impossible to say all that I wish to say within that time. Seeing how little time remains, I think I shall do well to take your hint; but it is difficult to compress a very large subject into a few words. As I before stated, I did not originally intend, when I first communicated with the Committee concerning the subject of this night's discussion, to offer any suggestions of my own. My original intention was merely to attempt to classify the suggestions of others. But on reviewing all that had been said and written respecting the selection and promotion of Officers, it appeared to me that although the present arrangements for the appointment and promotion of Officers of Militia regiments are exceedingly defective and unsatisfactory, nevertheless this subject had not received that amount of consideration which its great importance deserved. I have therefore thought it might be useful to submit for discussion certain suggestions for the improvement of these arrangements. If I read over these suggestions, make a few brief comments on them, and then conclude, I hope this will meet your wish.

The CHAIRMAN: I can only tell you what the rule is, and leave it to the meeting.

Colonel ROBERTSON: The following are the suggestions which I am desirous of submitting for the consideration of the meeting:—

I. That the tenure of command of a regiment of the line should, like that of a staff appointment, be limited to a fixed term of years (say five, six, or seven), at the expiration of which, the Colonel should retire on the full pay of his rank.

II. That the command of regiments of Militia should be conferred—
 a. On Colonels placed on full pay at the expiration of a term of five years in command of a regiment of the line.

b. On any field Officer of the line desirous of being placed on half-pay, conditionally on his undertaking to perform this duty.

III. That no Officer should be allowed to hold the appointment of Adjutant of a regiment of Militia, or of a Volunteer corps, for a longer period than three, or at the most five years.

IV. That Officers should be selected for these appointments from unmarried Captains of regiments of the Line; a preference being given to those who had formerly been Adjutants.

V. That during peace, the appointment of subalterns to regiments of Militia be discontinued, and during the annual training, their duties be performed by subalterns detached from regiments of the line.

The 1st of these suggestions has been already made by Sir A. Alison, and also, I think, by Lieut.-Colonel Leahy.

Lieut.-Colonel LEAHY: I said the Colonel on the Staff should be made a higher rank than it is at present.

Colonel ROBERTSON: To prove the utility of the suggestion, I submit the following reasons:—In time of peace, the principal and most useful function of an Army is to serve as a school of instruction. As soon, therefore, as an Officer has commanded a regiment for a sufficient time to obtain a thorough practical knowledge of the duties of this important office, it is desirable that he should be removed, so as to afford the same opportunities for perfecting the regimental training of another Officer. The object of our arrangements should be, in a given term of years to train as great a number of Commanding Officers as is consistent with the efficient training of each individual Officer included in that number. Of course this suggestion is only applicable to a period of peace. In time of war, the interests of the public require that the duration of the tenure of the command of a regiment should be regulated by the capacity of performing efficiently the duties of a Commanding Officer. The longer a good Officer holds his appointment, the better for the public; but in time of peace, precisely the reverse of this is the case. The better the Officer, the shorter should be his term of command. As soon as he has thoroughly learned his work he should be removed, to give an opportunity for training the next in succession.

AN OFFICER: What about his money?

Colonel ROBERTSON: Of course he must have compensation. I have thought about the best manner of giving it, but I cannot go into this question at present. It is a matter of detail. I have, however, stated in my 2nd suggestion how I think Colonels should be employed during the interval between their completion of the prescribed term of Regimental command, and their promotion to a vacancy on a fixed establishment of Major-Generals. I think it will be admitted that during this interval no more suitable employment could be found for a Colonel than the command of a Militia regiment, and it is also obvious, that for Militia regiments, no more efficient Commanding Officers could be found than Colonels thoroughly trained to their work by at least five years' experience in a regiment of the line.

Taken by itself, my first suggestion might be represented as equivalent to a proposal to cut short the career of an Officer and to deprive the State of his services at the very moment when his training had been completed, and when his value as an accomplished public servant had reached its maximum. But taken in connection with the second suggestion, my proposal really is to increase the supply of thoroughly trained Commanding Officers, and to assign to every Officer so trained, a duty which, without such training, cannot be efficiently performed.

The utility of my 3rd and 4th suggestions, is so obvious that they scarcely require any comment. By making Militia and Volunteer Adjutancies, Staff appointments, and restricting their tenure to a short term of years, we should effectually suppress the scandalous traffic in these appointments, which the imposition of a stringent declaration has utterly failed to check. This measure would also put an end to the flagrant abuse of allowing these important appointments to be held by men of advanced age, who take little interest in their work, and are not capable of performing their duties properly. I met at Aldershot last year a Militia Adjutant, under whom, more than twenty years before, I had served as a subaltern. He was then a very able Officer; and is so still, but what interest could he feel in the performance of subordinate duties when brought into contact with Officers formerly junior to him, now in command of Regiments and Brigades?

I look upon a young and zealous adjutant as no less essential to the sound constitution of a Militia regiment than an experienced and thoroughly efficient Commanding Officer. If an appointment be sought as a means of procuring experience and distinction, and as a stepping-stone to further advancement, its duties will be performed in a very different manner than if it be sought, I will not say as a sinecure, but as an eligible retirement, for which past merits will be accepted as a valid claim, and no promise of future exertions required.

I come now to my 5th suggestion. Under the existing system it is obvious that we cannot get subalterns for Militia regiments. Moreover, if we could get them, until sufficiently instructed to take command of a company, subalterns would be of no use. This amount of instruction could not be given them during a few weeks of training. Subalterns in a Militia regiment would, therefore, add nothing to its efficiency; they would be like apprentices bound to a master, without a shop, without tools, without any apparatus for affording them the practice necessary to acquire skill in his craft. Under the present system of short annual training, the only practicable means of obtaining the assistance of properly instructed subalterns, of subalterns who have finished their apprenticeship, and are sufficiently instructed to be employed as journeymen, is to *borrow them from the line*. One effective Officer per company is perfectly sufficient for training purposes, so that only three or four subalterns per battalion would be required in order to provide for occasional absence and casualties among the Captains. The duty would probably prove more interesting to the subalterns employed, than the ordinary routine of regimental work, and if zealously performed, would certainly be very instructive to them.

In a leading article of the *Times* of 1st May it is said that if 140,000 thoroughly good soldiers could be put in the field at a week's notice, no Army competent to face them would be likely to reach these shores. Those who believe that to be true, must, I think, accept the inference drawn by the *Times*, that if every regiment of Militia could be so constituted and trained as to render it as effective as a battalion of the line, the first and most immediate problem of Army reform would be solved. The writer in the *Times* admits that, to establish a Militia 140,000 strong, as well officered, as well equipped, as well trained, and as well organized as soldiers of the regular Army, would be no easy matter; but I agree with him in thinking that if the Government and the nation were convinced that this was the first result to be secured, its accomplishment would not be far off. The first and most important step towards the accomplishment of such a result would undoubtedly be to secure for each Militia regiment a thoroughly efficient corps of Officers, and this, I venture to think, would be effectually and easily done by the adoption of my suggestions.

There is an opinion of Sir Charles Trevelyan's, respecting which I am anxious to offer a few observations. Sir Charles thinks that you cannot expect to get any good service out of an Officer unless he is well paid, and that gratuitous service is generally bad service. Sir Charles has not stated what grounds he has for holding this opinion, which seems neither consistent with actual experience nor with a correct appreciation of the power of pecuniary motives, as compared with the power of other motives to exertion. In all recent wars, among those Officers who have most distinguished themselves for their intelligence, their gallantry, and their zealous devotion to their duties, there has always been a fair proportion of Officers possessing sufficient means to render them independent of their pay, and who have invested in the purchase of promotion, sums so large that the interest of the money invested, would have been equivalent to the pay of the promotion purchased. It is, therefore, no exaggeration to say, that in the Guards and Cavalry there are many Officers who serve for nothing. Has it ever been found that Cavalry Officers and Officers of the Guards are inferior in courage, in intelligence, in zeal, to Officers of Infantry regiments? Does not Sir Charles believe, that no work is really first-rate unless the workman feels a pleasure in it, and is more influenced by the ambition of excellence than by the desire of profit. Why then should he think that Officers cannot be depended on to do their duty properly unless they are highly paid?

SIR CHARLES TREVELYAN: What of those who have not the means of serving for nothing?

Colonel ROBERTSON: There are, of course, many poor men who would make excellent Officers, but who are deterred from entering the Army because the pay is small, and the style of living, expensive. But there is an abundant supply of Officers who are able and willing to perform their duties for the present rates of pay, and I do not see any reason to suppose that duty would be better done if the rates were raised. On the contrary, I feel quite certain, that it would be worse done supposing the pay was high and the Army principally officered by men whose

chief object in seeking for commissions, was to realize a good income. In time of war, a rich man who prefers a life of risks and hardships to a life of ease and pleasure, proves that his heart is in his work. The presumption is that he will prove a good Officer. In time of peace a poor man, who accepts a low rate of pay, who practises great self-denial, and submits to many mortifications for the sake of obtaining military rank, also proves that his heart is in his work. Thus, whatever may be the disadvantages of the present constitution of the Army, that constitution has at least this advantage, that the terms of his service necessarily establish a presumption, that every Officer who accepts a commission, whether he be a rich man or a poor man, feels an interest in military duties, and has his heart in his work.

The CHAIRMAN: In inviting discussion I must remind you of the rule laid down by the Council, that each gentleman is allowed ten minutes.

Colonel OUVRY: I should like to make a remark upon that last observation of Colonel Robertson, concerning the "Officer who serves for nothing, who is so rich that he is able to serve for nothing, and that he makes a better Officer than others." I ask any person who has had experience of what happened in the Crimea, or in India, whether those Officers who are possessed of much money are the best Officers, whether they do not always fall off in times of trouble, and whether it is ever possible to get Officers who have money to continue to serve under circumstances of hardship and difficulty? I say they never will serve, you cannot depend upon Officers of that sort. If we had to fight a battle in Hyde Park we should never get more gallant Officers, but when they have to face hardships, with no fighting, no delicate food, no comforts, we know that generally speaking, after they learn what the discomforts and privations of war are, they apply for leave, and if that is refused, they request to sell out. I ask any person who knows anything of the past whether numbers of Officers did not do so, both in the Indian mutiny and in the Crimea? and also whether in the French army, large bodies of Officers ever send in their resignations, or send in applications to leave the army in time of war? Again, I ask those who know anything about the affairs of the Peninsular war, who were the Officers who fought and conquered in that war? Were they men of large fortunes? I recollect having a conversation with one old Captain; he told me he was tried as to whether he was a gentleman. After that war was over, a great number of Officers were brought before a committee and were questioned. They asked them "Who is your father? where does he live? what is he?" There may be Officers in this room who remember the facts, but I say, speaking from my own personal knowledge of what happened in the Crimea and in the Indian mutiny, I know that what I say is true. Officers will rush in at first, but if the war continues, you will not be able to get one. It is always the case. I have two relations, who were in the Peninsula, they were both put on half-pay after the war was over. They both of them got cadetships, and one rose high up in the service of the East India Company. I say if these men had been men of large fortunes, would they have gone into the Indian service? Certainly not. The question is whether you are to have an aristocratic or a popular army. I say that all these papers and pamphlets which we have read lately, have some excellent things in them; no doubt, the pamphlets of Sir Charles Trevelyan are most excellent, but the great mass of them go no further than tinkering and patching up. What we want is a thorough reform, and that reform is simply to popularize the Army; that is my idea of the subject.

An OFFICER: How would you popularize the Army?

Colonel OUVRY: I would do away with the purchase system, and I would thus popularize its ranks.

Sir CHARLES TREVELYAN: I am sure that we must all feel our obligation to Colonel Cunningham Robertson for the assistance he has given at the present stage of this great national controversy. While Parliament is officially discussing the Irish Church, people are thinking a great deal more about the Army, and are only

waiting till the Irish Church is got out of the way to enter upon the practical settlement of the question. In the present stage of the discussion, Colonel Robertson has performed a useful public service by comparing, with great industry and skill, all the proposals which have been made on the subject. He has not had time to tell us the whole that he had prepared, but I hope he will give it to us in print, so that we may read it at our leisure. I will only touch upon two or three of the points alluded to by him.

I do not think Colonel Robertson fully appreciates the real objection to conscription. What took place at the commencement of this century furnishes the solution of the question. When we were threatened with invasion from Boulogne, it was universally considered necessary to have, what was called in the language of the day, a levy *en masse*. The whole able-bodied force of the country was to be organized. The enrolment actually took place, parish by parish, but in the meantime it was considered desirable to try what could be done by volunteering. So, more as a supplementary arrangement than for any other purpose, Volunteers were called for, and they came forward in such great numbers, amounting soon to two, three, four hundred thousand, that the levy *en masse* was set aside, and was no more thought of. The public sentiment entirely accepts the principle that every man's service is due to his country when it is really wanted. But this is a highly organized country in an industrial point of view. Our financial, commercial, and manufacturing system is of a very complex character, and, on the simplest principle of the division of labour, it is best for all parties that those who are so circumstanced that they can easily leave home, and give themselves up to the defence of the country, should do so, and that those who are occupied in carrying on the business of the country should remain at their desks, and in their manufactories. Conceive what the result would be if the 500,000 conscripts proposed by Colonel Robertson to be enrolled, were actually called out. Who would they be? They would be taken from the public offices, railways, telegraphs, manufactories, from industrial establishments of all sorts, their withdrawal from which would throw the social and political system of the country into utter confusion. It is far better that the whole country should unite in paying whatever may be necessary to send to the front that portion of the youth of the country which can best be spared from carrying on the ordinary business of the country.

Next, I am surprised to hear Colonel Robertson object to educated, intelligent soldiers. In order to get the requisite number of soldiers, we must draw upon the educated classes. Happily for our country and for its prospects, the uneducated, reckless classes from which we have hitherto drawn our soldiers, are becoming scarce, they are becoming totally insufficient to meet the demand. So, quite irrespective of the question whether educated or uneducated men make the best soldiers, it is positively necessary, in order to get the requisite number of soldiers, that we should call to our aid the classes who have been educated in national schools, and who form the bulk of our agricultural labourers, artisans, manufacturers, as well as of the persons employed in the police, on the railways, and in various other occupations of that sort. And in order to attract these great classes, which are far more numerous than those which now fill the ranks of the Army, we must make the Army a career for them, and furnish them with adequate motives. That educated, intelligent men, like our Volunteers, are more easily disciplined and handled than uncultivated clowns, and are animated by more patriotic feelings will, I am sure, be admitted.

Colonel Robertson justly pointed to the Militia as the key to our system of national defence, and the public sentiment is settling upon this basis. Now, there are two great defects in our Militia system. The majority of the gentlemen now present are better able to judge than I am, yet I believe I am speaking the truth when I say that the great defect of our Militia is, that they are not sufficiently trained. The twenty-one days' training in each year, with the few additional days for drilling the recruits, are totally insufficient. If it is repeated year after year for twenty years, it still fails to turn out a properly trained soldier. And if this has been so hitherto, how much more now, owing to the introduction of arms of precision and rapidity, and the improvements in the exercise and manœuvres of troops—trenching—loose order, and so forth, all which require careful, continuous instruction. The twenty-

one days' training are now quite insufficient. Therefore, I propose that the whole of the regular Army,—*Militia*, as well as *Line*,—should go through at least one complete year's training.

The other great defect is, that the *Militia* is not connected in any proper relation, with the other forces of the country. From the *Volunteers*, of course, it is entirely separated. Even as regards the *line*, with which it has more in common, professing to be of the same character, yet the two forces, the *Militia* and the *Line*, are at present rival forces. They compete against each other in the recruiting market; and when the *Militia* is called upon to serve as a reserve to the *Line*, it is only by weakening the *Militia* and furnishing trained men, against the grain of the Commanding and other Officers, that it can be done. For this and other reasons, which have been fully explained in my recent pamphlets, I would combine the *Militia* with the *Line* in a regimental organization, so that they should be localized and united, by making the regiment of the *Line*, which is most connected with the district, and the local militia regiment, and also in a secondary degree, the local Volunteer regiments, battalions of the same regiments; having at the head-quarters of each district, a *depôt* battalion common to all, which should train the recruits both for the *Militia* and for the *Line*. I would make the first engagement always for one year; and at the end of the year, the young soldier should have his choice of returning to civil life, with a ten years' engagement in the *Militia*, to come out for a few days, now and then, for divisional manœuvres, or of joining the *Line* or general-service battalion of the regiment, with a seven years' engagement, returning at the end of that time to the *Militia* for a further period of ten years. In this way there would be only one machinery for supplying trained recruits to both *Line* and *Militia*, and the two forces would be combined in one organization.

But the main point of all, and the only remaining one upon which I will make any observations, is, whether, according to this system, we can get a sufficient number of recruits. In order to get recruits on the one year's engagement, I rely upon the general popularity of the military service, and upon the prestige of the military character. The young men would come at an early age, for even at the age of 18, our young men are quite old enough to be trained; and they would engage, knowing that at the end of the year, if they did not like the Army, they could return to civil life. But at the year's end the great difficulty would have been got over. As Baron Dupin observed, "the difficulty is not to induce a soldier to remain when you have once trained him, but to detach him in the first instance from his home and home associations." Therefore, I would make the first stage of the military career very short and easy. And I believe that the spirit which brings an unlimited number of young men into the *Volunteers* would, to a great extent, be diverted into this channel.

The military spirit of the country now finds its vent in the *Volunteering* system. I believe that if a system such as I have sketched, were established, the same spirit would bring large numbers of young men into the *Depôt Battalions* at the County towns. It would not be a strange community into which they would be introduced. On the contrary, the local *Depôt Battalion* would be filled with their own relations and friends. It would also be filled with men who had seen foreign service, and were holding comfortable and respectable positions in the *depôt battalion* as instructors. The young men would also have before them the example of numerous persons from the neighbourhood, and probably from their own village, and from among their own relations, who had risen to respectable positions, both in the military and civil service. As Colonel Robertson has remarked, seven years' general service at home and abroad, the performance of this share of hard national service, should entitle men to some positive advantages. First of all, there would be the advantage of returning to the *cadre* of the regiment, the *depôt battalion*, and becoming instructors to the regiment. Then, there would be, according to my view—I will not now enter upon the argument, except to say that military promotion must always be taken in connection with the new motives by which new and better educated classes are proposed to be attracted into the Army—a certain fixed proportion of military commissions in each regiment appropriated to the most deserving and best qualified of the young men. But, above all, the whole of our great Civil Service should be

thrown open to the extent to which the men might qualify themselves for it. That element alone would accomplish the object. If our Customs, Excise, Post-office, Police, and all the other departments, were thrown into the scale, that alone would make the Army a popular profession.

Captain VAUGHAN: Would Colonel Robertson kindly allow me to put a question with regard to appointing subalterns from the line to fill the place of subalterns in the Militia? The Captains would remain in the Militia as at present, and no more subalterns would be appointed, but subalterns would be sent from the Line?

Colonel ROBERTSON: Only for the training for a month.

Captain VAUGHAN: The question I wish to put upon that is, would you offer an inducement to these Officers to go to the Militia, or would you order them to go?

Colonel ROBERTSON: I would order them to go. If there was any little expense incurred in moving, I would pay for that, but I would order them to go.

Captain VAUGHAN: I was inclined to dispute that part of the question.

Colonel ROBERTSON: I would not put them to that expense.

Captain VAUGHAN: But I think very few subalterns from the Army would be willing to serve under Officers of far less experience than themselves, as the Captains of Militia would be. There is one more point I would allude to, in fact two points. One is that the Militia, during the Crimean war and elsewhere, were insufficient to fill up the battalions of the Line, or be of any use beyond garrisoning the Mediterranean stations. As proof of that I may adduce the fact, that at that time we were obliged to recruit for mercenaries throughout Germany. There is another grand objection to the Militia, and that is, it is liable for service in England only, and not for service abroad.

Lieutenant-General LORD TEMPLETOWN: On the question of conscription I wish to say a very few words. I do not agree with the Officer who has addressed us this evening, nor do I disagree with him. But to explain myself, I will say that for a defensive army I would have conscription, but not for an Army of action out of the country. I should hardly have thought it worth while to address you upon this subject, had I not rather strong authority. I may say with Horace,—*Non meus hic sermo est*. But my preceptor was no ignoble one, for the opinion which I have just given you I heard from a personage whose loss we all deeply regret, and whose character we all highly value. I mean the late Prince Consort. I was in attendance upon him on duty once at Aldershot, and had the honour of accompanying him in his ride; and his Royal Highness made that remark which I thought most valuable:—I think the country may well demand of every patriotic man his services in case his country is attacked, and I think it might be carried out by conscription; but as to the general services of the Army in our colonies and elsewhere, although they uphold and carry forward the honour of our country, yet I do not think the conscription is so essential in that respect. I am quite sure you will think it worth while that I should have communicated to you this opinion, which must have value in your judgment of the matter under discussion.

Colonel ROBERTSON: Lord Elcho and Colonel Baker only advocate conscription for the defensive army, the same as Prince Albert. It is merely the principle they want to establish.

Lieutenant-Colonel LEAHY, R.E.: I will first refer to what Lord Templetown has just said as conveying the views of Prince Albert; with respect thereto, I would observe that I do not think it would be found in the history of this kingdom, that the people of England have ever failed to come forward for the defence of the nation against invasion. The difficulty in recruiting our forces has arisen in respect of our offensive and colonial Army, and not of our defensive Army. I think, therefore, with Colonel Robertson and others, that conscription may be set aside as a necessary part of our organization. Nobody proposes it for the offensive Army, and for the defensive Army, we do not want it. I, therefore, consider that any scheme of organization should be based upon the volunteer system.

There is another part of our military system, which, so far as I know, has never failed; that is the regimental system. I therefore think that in plans for the organization of our offensive forces, we should adhere to the regimental system, and attempt to expand it. I think the manner in which we now fail is, that we have got

regimental *cadres*, varying in strength from 500 to 1,000 men, the number of men being altered according to the views of the Cabinet of the day, but we have no machinery, or men in reserve, and easily made available to raise the regiments to their maximum strength. I think that these reserves ought to be under the control of the Commander-in-Chief, as distinguished from the civil control, to which the Militia and Volunteers are subject. I have felt great diffidence in giving opinions on this subject, but struck by the admirable arguments of Lord Grey before the Recruiting Commission, I could not help putting forward (early in 1867), the details of a system by which I thought the reserves of the offensive forces might be tacked on to the present regiments. I think there are many reasons in favour of this plan. My reason for not proposing to attach regiments of the Line to regiments of Militia, was that the Recruiting Commissioners reported that it would not be "a desirable or expedient course" to localize regiments. I do not now see how you are to carry out the localization of regiments, especially in the case of regiments recruited in Ireland, and in the present mood of that country. I think our system ought to provide for establishing local connections, without localizing regiments. One of the advantages of the system which I proposed is, that regiments could have local connections in different parts of the country without being necessarily quartered in these localities for any length of time.

I now pass to the question of length of service. We want to get more men, and I think it is admitted by all that short service is the way by which we are to get more men, and that by means of short service we shall popularize the military service, and have a larger proportion of men trained to arms. That the proposition is economical I have attempted to prove in my paper, and I do not think the calculations have been controverted. A short service man, when you take into consideration the pension, costs half of what a long service man does. I do not advocate the payment of bounty, but as a matter of economy it would be cheaper to pay a short service man £200 bounty, than to re-engage an old soldier. That is the financial view of the question.

An OFFICER: Particularly if he deserted next day.

Colonel LEAHY: I do not suppose either to desert. I entirely agree with what Sir Charles Trevelyan has now said, that the first stage must be made very short and very easy; anything that lengthens the term of enlistment beyond what is necessary for training, will destroy the benefit of the system of short service. Seven years is neither one thing nor the other. In enlisting the soldier I would give him every facility for returning to civil life, subject to service in the reserves. All we should require is, that he should serve continuously until he qualifies as a soldier. And even that I would not insist upon, if, as in Prussia, he was allowed to pay his own way. In the Prussian service, young men may volunteer to serve for one year without pay, and at the end of that year, they may go. I would introduce the same system. If a man wished to go after one year, and paid his expenses, I would let him do so.

If a soldier wished to stay after the short-service period, and was required for service abroad, or for colonial service (the length of that colonial service in my opinion is more a medical question than any other, and depends on the number of years for which men can serve, without special detriment to health, in the climate to which they are detached; in India this, I believe, is from seven to ten years), I would add the period of colonial on to the first period of service, and thus make up the long service. After that, I would make continuance in the Army dependent upon the utility and good conduct of the individual. I think the system of deferred pensions should also be kept up, because I do not think the vacancies in the civil service would afford sufficient inducement to service in the reserves. I would, therefore, hold out deferred pensions at the end of fifty or sixty years of age. I think you will have to retain some such inducement to get the number of reserve men you want. I would add a few words with regard to the article in the *Times* to-day. The writer gives people who have written on the subject of Army reform credit for having thought of it from one point of view. He says one person takes up fortification, another the Navy, another the organization of the forces. I think we ought not to get the credit of looking upon the subject from such small points of view. It is utterly im-

possible in a paper read in this Institution to take up everything, and, while dealing with one point, we ought not to get credit for having overlooked the others.

Captain COLOMB, R.M.A. : With your permission I will make a few remarks with reference to what has fallen from Colonel Leachy in connection with the paper before us. I allude to the question of localization and to the question of colonial service. Colonel Leachy has mentioned the fact that in a paper read in this Institution, it is impossible to go into the whole question of what is necessary to be done for our Fleets and Armies. Still, I think his remarks have a bearing upon the question of colonial service. One of the objections I gather from Colonel Leachy's observations is, that it is impossible to localize troops on account of the requirements of colonial service. After all it comes back to the question, what do you expect your Army to do for the colonies? If you expect your Army to hold all the British possessions abroad, well and good. Then, localization is impossible. But it appears to me that the colonies in time of peace have very little to do with the Army.

Colonel LEACHY : I did not put it upon that ground. I said you could not localize regiments in Ireland.

Captain COLOMB : I beg your pardon. It just shows the danger that we are liable to fall into by taking up too limited a part of the question. It appears to me that to consider and discuss the question of the organization of the Army off-hand, without first considering upon what that organization is to rest, is a mistake. I think it was Sir Charles Napier who said that success in war mainly depended upon two great principles; which were, "to be in the right place at the right time." Now, it is the business of distribution to determine what is "the right place," and it is the function of organization to secure "the right place" being filled "at the right time." Now, there are many representatives of particular schemes of organization in this room, and if we all gave our opinions we might agree in some things, and we might disagree in others. But I believe the key of the whole question of military organization rests really upon a question of distribution. Any person who disputes Sir Charles Trevelyan's arguments with reference to localization, must immediately fall back upon the ground that localization is impossible, owing to the duties that our armies have to perform in the colonies. If you can remove that part of the question, put the colonial service aside, the question will be very much simplified. I will not go into the arguments about the colonies, but I will say this, that there is plenty of ground and plenty of authority on the side of those who advocate that the foreign service of our active embodied Army in time of peace should be limited to India and the road to India. Having once established that principle, a great number of the difficulties of organization vanish. Well, supposing the foreign service of our Army in time of peace to be limited to India, the next question is, in time of war, what would you require your Army to do? Because upon that depends the strength of your Army. You must estimate its strength by what that army will be required to do in time of war. It would be impossible to go into the whole question of what effect an American war would produce, or a Russian war would produce, or a French war would produce. It is sufficient to say that we should require a very large Army; and that we should require an army of reserve to reinforce and become part of the active Army, available for service not only in England, but wherever they might be wanted. I will now come to the question with regard to localization. That distribution would admit of localization; therefore the difficulties, resting upon the ground of distribution in opposition to the possibility of localization, cease. And if localization is possible on the ground of distribution, I think it will appear, upon consideration, that it is a principle which is necessary to be incorporated with our army system, if short service, as it must be, is introduced. It would be impossible to give all the reasons for this. At all events, we are all agreed upon one thing, that it is necessary to offer all the inducements we can to men to enlist, whether for short or for long service. Now, take the case of a non-localized service, take the case of a non-localized corps with long colonial service; what are the inducements you offer to men to come into it? They appear to me to be these, and they are easily gathered from Sir Charles Trevelyan's pamphlet, which I have summarized. You offer a man, as an inducement with this long colonial service, expatriation to begin with. Then, he is to remain a single man, or he is to exist in a state of married

misery. The next thing you offer him is severance from his family, and from his local and civil connections. And the last thing you offer him is idleness, which is the root of all mischief. Take the case of a localized service; there is no hindrance to a man getting married. If your periods in the Army are short, your periods on foreign service must be short. Therefore, it is no hardship to a man to be separated from his wife for a short time; the expense of removing the wife does not enter into the question, therefore a man may marry when he chooses without the military authorities exercising any control. Short service, of course, does away with expatriation. Thirdly, with short service you offer a man a fixed home. Fourthly, you afford him the opportunity of adding to his soldier's pay by working at a trade, both for his own benefit and for the benefit of the State. Everybody knows what a non-localized service is, what its inducements are, and what the life is. A localized service is not so well understood, because there are few instances of the kind. I will therefore briefly wind up by describing a service of about 3,000 men, half of whom are perpetually abroad. Their period of service abroad averages three years and a half, Officers and men. Therefore, you have about 1,500 continually at home. You may call it one battalion abroad, and one battalion at home, if you like. The men at home by being fixed, and having families, and keeping up their local connection, are enabled to make all the articles of clothing, except boots, and could make all the boots and appointments of the whole regiment at a considerably reduced cost. That is an advantage to the Government, and it is a considerable advantage to the men. And not only that, but by localization you have the power of employing your men at trades, and of utilizing their labour under the control of the Government for the purposes of the State. I do feel this—the more the question is ventilated, the more the whole subject is gone into—that localization and short service are in reality the two fundamental principles in Army Reform, which must be carried out.

The CHAIRMAN: Now, Colonel Robertson, perhaps you would like to reply.

Captain BURGESS: I should like to ask one question. Colonel Robertson says, "that during peace the appointment of subalterns to regiments of Militia be discontinued, and during the annual training their duties be performed by subalterns detached from regiments of the Line." I should like to know whence he is to get subalterns for the Militia regiments, when war breaks out?

Colonel ROBERTSON: I am not prepared at present to offer any suggestion as to the best means of providing subalterns for Militia regiments when embodied for actual service. My observations merely referred to the existing state of things. I look at the Army list, and where lists of subalterns of Militia ought to be, I find nothing but asterisks. I ask the reason, and am told that properly qualified persons cannot be found to accept these commissions. But I feel persuaded that the prospect of a war would cause this difficulty to vanish—there would be an abundance of applicants, and four months' training would suffice to convert those selected into excellent Officers. In time of peace not only is it practically impossible to find properly qualified persons who will accept subaltern's commissions, but if this difficulty were overcome, we should have a still greater difficulty to contend with. In time of peace we have not the means of instructing militia subalterns in their professional duties. I therefore do not see any means of obtaining the services of well-trained subalterns in time of peace, when Militia regiments are assembled for the purposes of instruction, excepting by borrowing them from line regiments. I think it will be admitted that this expedient is better than the present state of things; but of course if means can be found to induce gentlemen to serve in Militia regiments as subalterns on the same terms as the Captains serve, and to attach themselves to regiments of the Line, until properly instructed, this will be better still. As regards Colonel Ouvry's remarks concerning the derelictions of duty with which he charges those Officers who invest money in the purchase of promotion, I do not know that I can make a better answer than to appeal to his own personal experience.

Colonel OUVRY: Do you dispute the facts?

Colonel ROBERTSON: I do not dispute the facts, but the answer I wish to make is, that I do not think they establish the inference you draw from them. I shall mention the names of two Officers, both personally known to Colonel Ouvry, as

well as to myself. One of them, Colonel ———, served in my own regiment, the 8th, through the whole of the Indian mutiny; the other, Colonel ———, served in Colonel Oury's regiment, the 9th Lancers, and was killed at the siege of Delhi. Both of these Officers, as Colonel Oury well knows, had expended large sums of money in the purchase of their commissions. I ask him if he ever knew, if he believes that in the whole Army it would be possible to find Officers who were more zealous and assiduous in the performance of their duties, more devotedly attached to the service than the two I have named? Both had strong inducements to leave the Army, one of them had sufficient private fortune to enable him, had he wished to do so, to live a life of ease and pleasure at home. The other had invested nearly the whole of his means in the purchase of promotion, and he had a wife and children for whom, if the money so invested were lost, he could make no adequate provision. But did either of these Officers desert his post?

Colonel OURY: Hundreds did so.

Colonel ROBERTSON: Hundreds may have done so, but if, after a brief experience of the fatigues and dangers of a campaign, there are always a good many rich Officers who desert their posts by selling out, are there not always a good many poor Officers who would be glad to follow their example if they had the means of doing so; and of these unwilling soldiers, are there not always a few who under various pretences manage to evade their duty quite as disreputably to themselves and much more injuriously to the Service, than if they had sold their commissions? In time of war an Officer is worth nothing unless his heart is in his work, and it is extremely probable that the proportion of poor Officers who serve unwillingly, and only because necessity compels them to do so, is quite as great as the proportion of rich Officers who sell out because they prefer safety and ease to hardships and duty. Do not therefore let us suppose that the quality of our Officers would be improved if we could devise some arrangement which should render every Officer dependent on his pay, and prevent any Officer from leaving the Service, however inconsistent he might find it with his domestic duties and private interests to remain in it. As to the general question, how are we to get good Officers? Do not suppose that any method of selection, any rate of pay, or any system of training will make, I do not say all, or the majority, but more than a small minority, really good Officers. Sir Charles Trevelyan's plans all hinge on the idea that it is possible, by means of selection and training, to get a body of Officers, each of whom shall be thoroughly efficient, and to all of whom it is desirable to offer such advantages as will make it the interest of every individual Officer to devote his life to the performance of military duties. A certain proportion he would promote from the ranks, and the remainder he would take from the public schools, and have them specially trained at military colleges, so as to make them professional soldiers. Now I think that this method of constituting a corps of Officers is erroneous in principle. In order to get a really efficient body of Officers, you must regulate the duration of their term of service in the same manner that Sir Charles Trevelyan recommends you to regulate the term of service of private soldiers. Inducements to prolonged service must be offered only to the select few; the duration of the service of the remainder must be limited to as short a term as circumstances will admit of. Supposing it to be practicable, the best possible arrangement for the interests of the State would be to limit the first commission of an Officer, like the first engagement of a recruit, to a short term of years, at the expiration of that term, to pick out a sufficient number of the best, to provide for vacancies in the command of regiments, to grant those picked men new commissions, and to discharge the remainder. But if considerations of economy, or the adverse interests of individuals, rendered it impossible to secure for the State the option of discharging Officers after a short term of service, care ought at least to be taken so to regulate our Military Institutions as to provide motives which favour voluntary retirement, and to eliminate motives which favour prolonged service. Although I am strongly opposed to the purchase system, yet I think that by facilitating early retirements, it is more beneficial to the interests of the State than such a system would be as that proposed by Sir Charles Trevelyan, which makes it the interest of every Officer to devote his life to the Service. If Officers, instead of being promoted by seniority or by purchase, were selected for the command of regiments on account of their possessing

special qualifications for command, this mode of promotion, besides securing picked men for performing the important duties of the superior regimental ranks, would also have the effect of driving off the chaff. It would be even more efficacious in promoting early retirements than the purchase system.

Colonel OUVRY: You do away with purchase, then?

Colonel ROBERTSON: Undoubtedly I should like to see purchase done away with, but only on this condition, that the system of promotion substituted in its place provided some effectual means for selecting picked men for the command of regiments. This I consider the essential and indispensable condition of any real improvement in our regimental organization. I would rather a thousand times have purchase than seniority. The Artillery, in which promotion goes entirely by seniority, I consider a dead and lifeless service. It is slower, and has less vitality than the Line. I am an uncompromising opponent of purchase, but there is no scheme proposed as a substitute which I consider so much better as to be worth the inconveniences of a change of system.

Sir CHARLES TREVELYAN: I would train our Officers and I would pay our Officers as if they were to follow the profession to the end of their days; but I have that reliance on the military spirit of our people, and upon the habit that our young aristocracy have formed of pursuing the military profession during their early leisure years, that I am confident that practice will go on even more than ever; and in proportion as we raise the standard of our Officers' qualifications, we shall get a better supply from that class.

Colonel ROBERTSON: As far as I know, I do not know any one that is in favour of purchase. Colonel Baker is dead against it.

Sir CHARLES TREVELYAN: You were speaking of selection, and I did not see how you squared it, hence my remark.

Colonel ROBERTSON: No one defends purchase, but many who disapprove of it confess that they have nothing better to propose. The only scheme that came before the Royal Commission of 1857, which had any pretension to deal adequately with the difficulties of the subject, was that proposed by Sir Charles Trevelyan. If that scheme had been adopted, it is true we should have got rid of purchase, but what should we have got in its stead? We should have got seniority, which I think more pernicious than purchase, and we should also have got promotion from the ranks, which I think still more pernicious than seniority. After carefully reading Sir Charles's scheme, I said to myself in despair, if the only choice is between this scheme and the old system, for God's sake let the old system remain. Subsequent consideration of the subject has, however, strongly impressed me with the idea that it is quite possible to relieve the Army from the evils of the purchase system, without inflicting upon it the worse evils of a seniority system, combined with a system of promotion from the ranks, and also without adding a single sixpence to the Army Estimates. How this may be done, I have endeavoured to explain, in a paper on "The Appointment and Promotion of Regimental Officers," published in the twelfth volume of the Journal of this Institution. The great difficulty is to find some means of abolishing purchase without causing a stagnation of promotion. Without purchase, how are you to secure tolerably rapid promotion?

Colonel OUVRY: By compulsory retirement.*

Colonel ROBERTSON: Compulsory retirement would be expensive; and to

* [These further remarks are added at Colonel Ouvry's request.—ED.]—I am further of opinion that promotion from the ranks is the only proper mode of officering the Army, but not from the class which now prevails in them—indeed any Commanding Officer would tell you that he has very great difficulty in finding Non-commissioned Officers. Of course to think of promoting men from the ranks as now constituted, would be simply absurd. But if it were known that the ranks were a certain stepping-stone to a higher position, the sons of clergymen, county gentlemen, and others would enlist, and thus the character of the whole Army would be raised; a few educated men in the ranks would leaven the whole mass, and we should have, if not so rich, certainly a more efficient body, who, depending on the Army as a profession, would have no inducement to fall away in the time of difficulty and privation.

make it worth the money it would cost, you must combine it with a system of selection. It is not sufficient that the Commanding Officer of a regiment should be young. He should also be a picked man. He should be zealous, energetic, intelligent, and thoroughly trained. Compulsory retirement will create vacancies, but it will not help you to fill them up. It is only by means of a system of selection, such as that which I had last year the honour of submitting to the members of this Royal Institution, that the State can make sure that any money which may be spent to create vacancies will secure the promotion of Officers worth the outlay—of Officers to whom, on account of their natural capacity and the special training they have received, it is for the public interest that the command of regiments should be given at an early age. It is admitted to be essential to the efficiency of a regiment that the adjutant and the sergeant-major should be picked men. It is surely still more essential that he who selects and controls the adjutant and sergeant-major, should be himself a man of more than average ability; that he should be one of those men endowed with a special aptitude for command, who even when placed in a subordinate position, practically control and direct their superiors. Superficially considered, promotion from the ranks might be believed to be a system based on the principle of selection, but in reality it is diametrically opposed to it. Officers promoted from the ranks are no doubt the best men of their class. They are excellent soldiers; but to suppose that an excellent soldier possesses the qualifications requisite to make a good Officer, is an error of the same kind as to suppose that an excellent attorney's clerk possesses the qualifications requisite to make a good judge.

The CHAIRMAN: I am sure that you will allow me to return your thanks to Colonel Robertson for his very valuable address.

APPENDIX.—Vide p. 478.

Classified Summary of Suggestions made by various Writers and Speakers for the Improvement of our Military Institutions.

A. ENLISTMENT.

- I. Suggestions relative to mode of enlistment.
- II. Suggestions relative to duration of the Military engagement.
- III. Suggestions relative to inducements to voluntary enlistment and to increasing attractions of military service.

B. ORGANIZATION.

- I. Suggestions relative to command and superintendence.
- II. Suggestions relative to the constitution and mutual relations of the tactical and administrative divisions of the forces.
- III. Suggestions relative to the appointment and promotion of Officers.
- IV. Suggestions relative to territorial distribution of troops.

C. TRAINING.

Suggestions relative to military training, individual and collective.

A I. ENLISTMENT. *Suggestions relative to the Mode of Enlistment.*

GENERAL CONSENT. All writers and speakers consider that, in time of peace, voluntary enlistment is the only practicable mode of recruiting the regular Army.

The advantages of voluntary enlistment are well and briefly stated by Colonel Baker at p. 26 of his pamphlet on Army Reform.

Lord ELCHO suggests that 5,000 young men in their twentieth year should be selected by ballot for five years' Militia service.—(Report of Debate, *Times*, 11th June, 1869.)

Colonel BAKER suggests that 500,000 men should be drawn by ballot from a list including the whole male population between eighteen and thirty, and that each of these 500,000 men, unless he provide a substitute within twelve months, should be liable to a second ballot, to supply vacancies in Militia regiments.—(Army Reform, p. 41.)

Sir J. BURGONNE points out that the formation of a strong Reserve of trained soldiers is incompatible with a system of voluntary enlistment.—(Our Defensive Forces, p. 17.)

Lieutenant-Colonel BANNATYNE thinks that the Army, as at present constituted, is composed of that class of the population best adapted for military service. The Militia, he thinks, should be exclusively composed of agricultural labourers and town artisans, and married should be preferred to single men.—(Our Military Forces and Reserves, by Lieutenant-Colonel J. Millar Bannatyne, 1867, pp. 5—19.)

Mr. CARDWELL disapproves of ballot.—(Debate in *Times*, 11th June, 1869.)

A II. ENLISTMENT. *Suggestions relative to Duration of Military Engagement.*

Mr. CARDWELL thinks it desirable that the military engagement should be long; that it should be divided into two periods; the first in the line should be as short as possible, the remainder in the reserve.—(Debate reported in *Times*, 11th June, 1869.)

II. COLF, Esq., C.B. Soldiers required for permanent military duty in India to be enlisted for seven years. Men required for permanent military duty at home to be enlisted for twelve months, and then returned to civil occupations.—(Report of Meeting of Society for the Encouragement of Arts, Manufactures, and Commerce, 17th February, 1869.)

Sir A. ALISON, Bart. Twelve years, with right to re-engage for term necessary to complete total of twenty-one years. Soldiers of not less than seven, or more than ten years' service to be permitted to volunteer for five years' service in reserve.—(Army Organization, pp. 34 and 40.)

Lieutenant-Colonel BANNATYNE. Twelve years, with right to re-engage for term necessary to complete total of twenty-one years' service, but that practically the total compulsory service with the colours

should be reduced to about fifteen years, by means of a scheme for a Reserve force, which he indicates.—(Our Military Forces, &c., pp. 71, 73.)

Sir J. BURGOTNE. Six years for home service; twelve years for East Indies and the Colonies.—(Our Defensive Forces, p. 16.)

Colonel BAKER. Maximum fourteen years, minimum four years. None excepting non-commissioned Officers to be permitted to re-engage.

The Militia engagement to impose liability to be drafted into line regiments in time of war.—(Army Reform, pp. 29 and 38.)

Lord ELCHO (approved by Sir HOPE GRANT). Twenty-one years, divided into three periods of seven years each:—

1st Period. Continuous military duties either at home or abroad.

2nd Period. During peace, periodical training; during war, liability to continuous service, either at home or abroad.

3rd Period. During peace, training to be limited to a few days in the year; during war, exemption from liability to foreign service.—(Letter in *Times* 16th February, 1869.)

Lord MOXCK. Twenty-one years, at the end of second year; each recruit to have the option of completing the remainder of his term of service, either in the Line or in the Militia. During war, all Militiamen to be liable to general service.—(Report of Debate, *Times*, 24th April.)

Lord NORTHBROOK. Twelve years; five continuous, and seven in reserve, or *vice versa*.—(Report of Debate, *Times*, 24th April, 1869.)

Lord GREY. Engagement to include a short term of service in the Regular Army, followed by a second term in Reserve.—(Appendix to Report of Recruiting Commissioners, 23rd August, 1866.)

Sir CHARLES TREVELYAN. After one year's continuous training at a dépôt, recruits to have the option of seven years' service in the Line, or of ten years' service in the Militia, terminable at six months' notice.—(British Army in 1868, p. 62.)

Lieutenant-Colonel LEAHY, R.E. Three years, this followed by twenty-seven years' service in Reserve, to give a right to a permanent pension.—(Journal of the Royal United Service Institution, vol. xii, No. 50.)

The Duke of CAMBRIDGE recommends that the systems of long and of short engagements be tried concurrently, the recruit being allowed the option of enlisting for a long or for a short term of years.—(Report of Debate, *Times*, 24th April, 1869.)

Lord NORREYS. Certain Militia regiments to be induced to volunteer for liability to foreign service, these regiments to receive extra pay and to be bound for a longer period.

A III. ENLISTMENT. *Suggestions Relative to Inducements to Voluntary Enlistment, and to Increasing Attractions of Military Service.*

Sir CHARLES TREVELYAN. Reduction of terms of engagement from twelve to seven years.

2. Abolition of the purchase system. Improvement of terms of

service of Officers, and promotion from the ranks of a certain proportion of the regimental establishment of Commissioned Officers.

3. Permission to Non-commissioned Officers, and a certain proportion of picked men, to re-engage and serve until superannuated on a permanent pension.

4. Rendering military service an indispensable condition for obtaining appointments in certain branches of the administrative departments of the Army, and of the Civil Service.—(Standing, or a popular Army, p. 14.)

Lord ELCHO. Soldiers who engage for a second period of seven years' Reserve service to receive pay at the rate of 3d. or 4d. a-day; those who engage for a third period of seven years' reserve service to receive 6d. or 8d. a-day, and at conclusion of period, a pension of same amount for life.—(Report of Debate, *Times*, 11th June, 1869.)

Lieutenant-Colonel BANNATYNE. Soldiers who re-engage in Reserve, to receive £6 per annum, permission to marry, and rations, and an allowance of 3d. per diem for wife, and 1½d. for each child when on permanent duty.

Pension to be granted after twenty-one years' service. Serving in Reserve to reckon not less than half Line-service, and a deduction to be made for each year's service abroad.

Soldiers in Line regiments to receive classified rates of pay, regulated according to proficiency.

Rates of pay to be increased when any rise takes place in the value of labour.

Sir A. ALISON. Soldiers of seven years' service, who engage for five years' service in Reserve, to receive pay at the rate of 6d. a-day.

Soldiers of fifteen years' service, who engage in Reserve, to receive pay at 6d. a-day, and after six years' service a permanent pension of same amount.—(Army Organization, pp. 34 and 41.)

Lieutenant-Colonel LEAHY. Soldiers who re-engage for Reserve-service to receive £8 per annum, and on completion of thirty years' service (of which three years are to be in a Line regiment) a permanent pension.—(Journal of Royal United Service Institution, vol. xii, No. 50.)

Lord MONCK. Abolition of purchase and substitution of Sir C. Trevelyan's scheme.

Reserve soldiers to be remunerated by small annual retaining fee (amount not specified).—(Report of Debate, *Times*, 24th April, 1869.)

Lord NORTHBROOK. Soldiers to be taught trades. Vacancies in certain departments of the Civil Service to be filled by men who have completed a term of military service.—(Report of Debate, *Times*, 24th April, 1869.)

Lieutenant-Colonel BAKER estimates that a bounty of £5 would be sufficient to induce men to enlist in the Militia for a period of five years, subject to the condition of liability to be drafted into the Line in time of war.—(Army Reform, p. 59.)

The DUKE OF CAMBRIDGE thinks that the promise of pension is the chief inducement which attracts recruits.—(Report of Debate, *Times*, 24th April.)

Mr. CARDWELL. 1. Pensions to be granted to Non-commissioned Officers and a certain proportion of picked men.

2. Civil patronage to be made subservient to procuring recruits.—(Report of Debate, *Times*, 11th June, 1869.)

II. COLE, Esq., C.B. When lads leave school, every inducement to be given them to elect between joining the Militia or becoming Volunteers. A certificate of having served well in the Line, Militia, or Volunteers to be a necessary qualification for obtaining civil employment.

Payment and pensions of troops required for permanent service, to be liberal in time of war; in peace to be regulated by rate of wages and necessities of case.—(Report of Meeting of Society for Encouragement of Arts, Manufactures, and Commerce, 17th February, 1869.)

B I. ORGANIZATION. *Suggestions relative to Command and Superintendence.*

Lord NORTHBROOK declared that it was the policy of the Government to establish a uniform system of command, administration, and supply for all branches of our military forces.—(Report of Debate, *Times*, 4th April, 1869.)

Mr. CARDWELL stated that the regular Army, Militia, Yeomanry, Volunteers, and every other description of military force, would be placed under the control and superintendence of the same Staff.—(Report of Debate, *Times*, 11th June, 1869.)

Sir A. ALISON suggests that every description of military force should be placed under the direct command of the Commander-in-Chief, acting through Generals and Staff Officers appointed by him.—(Army Organization, p. 57.)

Lieutenant-Colonel BANNATYNE considers unity of command and administrative simplicity to be a necessity, and suggests that the Militia should be placed under the effective superintendence of General Officers commanding districts.—(Our Military Forces and Reserves, p. 59.)

Lord ELCHO suggests that special Inspectors should be abolished, and that the Militia and Volunteers be placed under the supervision of the General Officer in command of districts.—(Debate reported, *Times*, 11th June, 1869.)

Lord MONCK suggests that all descriptions of military forces should be placed under the same executive control, and the supply services of all descriptions of troops should be managed by the same administrative Staff.—(Debate reported *Times*, 24th April, 1869.)

B II. ORGANIZATION. *Suggestions relative to the Constitution and Mutual Relations of the Tactical and Administrative Divisions of the Forces.*

Sir C. TREVELYAN. Regulars, Militia, and Volunteers to be tactically incorporated and organized as battalions of composite county regiments.—(A Standing or a Popular Army, p. 14.)

Sir A. ALISON. Regulars re-engaging in reserve to be incorporated with regiments of the line and local corps of Pensioners.

A local Indian Army of 40,000 men to be formed.

Battalions on peace establishment to be complete in Officers and in non-commissioned Officers. Strength of privates to be reduced one-half.

Militia and Volunteers never to serve in same brigade.—(Army Organization, chap. ii.)

Colonel BAKER. Peace establishment of a battalion to consist of 500 privates, with full complement of Officers and non-commissioned Officers.

Militia to be incorporated with Line battalions for training during an annual autumn concentration in camps for field manœuvres.—(Army Reform, chap. v.)

Lieutenant-Colonel BANNATYNE. Soldiers re-engaging for Reserve to be organized as a distinct force, separate from Militia, having a contingent of reserve attached to it, &c.

Mr. CARDWELL. The Army to be small; the Reserve large. Troops of the Line, Militia, and Volunteers to be welded together and consolidated.

The Reserve of the Line to be distinct from the Militia. To be trained with the Line in peace, and incorporated with it in war.

A large number of weak battalions preferable to a smaller number of strong.

Complete *cadres* better than strong establishments.

Disapproves of a separate establishment for India.—(Debate reported in *Times*, 11th June, 1869.)

H. COLE, Esq., C.B. India to have a distinct Army. Home establishment to consist of one *corps d'armée* of 16,000 men, organized on Prussian principle, supported by a reserve of Staff Officers, Engineers, Artillerymen, Marines, Hospital Staff, &c., the strength of which is estimated at 30,000 men.—(Report of Meeting of Society for Encouragement of Arts, &c., 17th February.)

Lord ELCHO. Volunteer brigades to be kept separate, and to be commanded by Volunteer Brigadiers.—(Letter to *Times*, 12th February, 1869.)

Lord MOXLEY. Regiments for home service to consist of one service battalion of 500 men, with complete *cadre* of Officers and non-commissioned Officers, and a second or *dépôt* battalion of 400 men. A sufficient reserve of trained soldiers to be borne on the books of each service battalion to raise its strength to 1,000 men.

Militia in case of war to be liable to be embodied for general service.—(Debate reported *Times*, 24th April, 1869.)

Lieutenant-Colonel LEAHY. Soldiers who re-engage to be incorporated and drilled with regiments of the Line.

A regiment of the line to consist of one service battalion and one home battalion, having a contingent of reserve attached to it and borne on its muster rolls.—(Journal of the Royal United Service Institution, vol. xii, No. 50.)

Volunteers to be brigaded separately.

B III. ORGANIZATION. *Suggestions relative to the Appointment and Promotion of Officers.*

Sir C. TREVELYAN suggests that purchase should be abolished; that a certain proportion of all vacant commissions should be filled by promotion from the ranks; the remainder, by selection from the pupils of military schools.—(The British Army in 1868, p. 9.)

Sir A. ALISON. Purchase to be abolished above the rank of Captain. No Officer who had not purchased, to be allowed to sell. Command of a battalion to be limited to six years, after which Colonel to have the option of retiring on full-pay or of receiving capitalised value of pay.

Militia volunteers and pensioners to be officered from half-pay list.

Disapproves of promotion from ranks.—(Army Organization, p. 68.)

Lieutenant-Colonel BAKER. Purchase above rank of Captain to be abolished. Field Officers to be selected by a military board.

Disapproves of promotion from the ranks.—(Army Reform, p. 52.)

Lieutenant-Colonel BANNATYNE thinks it practically impossible to substitute for the purchase system a system of promotion that will work better.

Suggests that Militia should be officered from retired and full-pay lists.

That specially qualified men should be enlisted for appointment as Non-commissioned Officers, after one year's service in the ranks, with right to claim discharge at any time if deprived of their non-commissioned rank.—(Our Military Forces and Reserves, pp. 29, 40, 28.)

Lord ELCHO. Volunteer Officers to be required to qualify for appointment and promotion, by a term of service with a line regiment.

Half-pay Officers unsuitable for command of Volunteers, local influence requisite as well as military knowledge.—(Letter to *Times*, 12th February, 1869.)

Lord MONCK. Purchase system to be abolished.—(Debate reported in *Times*, 24th April, 1869.)

Lieutenant-Colonel LEAHY. Purchase system to be abolished. Battalions to be commanded by Officers specially selected from a general list of Field Officers.—(Journal of the Royal United Service Institution, vol. xii, No. 50.)

Colonel ROBERTSON. Purchase of promotion to be abolished. A certain proportion of first commissions to be disposed of for a regulated price, not subject to condition of repayment on purchaser leaving the Service.

The remainder to be filled by competitive examination among candidates possessing certain qualifications defined by regulation.

Field Officers to be promoted by seniority from classified lists of Captains possessing one or more special qualifications defined by regulation. Changes of position to be permitted between Officers of the same rank, and Officers to be permitted to accept money as an inducement to retire or exchange.

The command of regiments of the line to be limited to a certain term of years.

The command of regiments of Militia to be given 1st, to Colonels of the Line who have completed their term of command of a Line battalion; 2nd, to Field Officers of the Line selected from the half-pay list.

Adjutants of the Militia and Volunteers to be selected from unmarried Captains of the Line, a preference being given to old Adjutants, and the duration of the appointment being limited to three or five years.—(Journal of the Royal United Service Institution, vol. xii, No. 49.)

Mr. CARDWELL. Patronage of Militia regiments to be local, and purchase of Militia adjutancies to be prevented.—(Debate reported in *Times*, 11th June, 1869.)

B IV. ORGANIZATION. *Suggestions relative to Territorial Distribution of Troops.*

Mr. CARDWELL. Country to be divided into military districts, and all troops serving in the district to be under one chief, assisted by one set of executive and administrative Staff Officers.—(Debate reported in *Times*, 11th June, 1869.)

Sir C. TREVELYAN. A separate complete military establishment, consisting of troops of the Line, Militia, and Volunteers, united by a regimental organization to be allotted to each county or military district.—(A Standing or a Popular Army, p. 14.)

Lord ELCHO. Line regiments to be attached to particular localities.

Lieutenant-Colonel LEAHY. Permanent Head-quarters to be assigned to each regiment.—(Journal of the Royal United Service Institution, vol. xii, No. 50.)*

Lord MONCK. Each Line regiment to have a second battalion, having permanent head-quarters in a particular locality.—(Debate reported in *Times*, 24th April, 1869.)

C. TRAINING. *Suggestions relative to Military Training, Individual and Collective.*

Mr. CARDWELL. Training of soldiers transferred to Reserve, to be of the same character as that of Volunteers. Militia recruits to be trained by Officers of the Line. Yeomanry to be trained as mounted rifles.—(Debate reported, *Times*, 11th June, 1869.)

Sir C. TREVELYAN. Soldiers' training to include school work as well as drill and gymnastic and military exercises.

Recruits for Line and Militia regiments to be trained together at the same dépôt.

Officers of Militia and Volunteers to go through a prescribed course of instruction at head-quarters of Line regiments.—(A Standing or a Popular Army, p. 14.)

* See also papers by Captain Colomb, R.M.A., and Lieut.-Col. Malet, Gren. Gds., vol. xiii, pp. 37, 160.—ED.

Sir A. ALISON. Each year all forces in one military district selected by lot, to be called out by telegraph to be assembled at a given point and distributed in garrisons and strategic positions.—(Army Organization, chap. ii.)

Lieutenant-Colonel BAKER suggests appointment of regimental Officer-instructors; one or more divisions to be assembled annually in the autumn under canvas, and manœuvred over an extensive tract of country (at least 30 miles by 20).—(Army Reform, p. 36.)

Lieutenant-Colonel BANNATYNE suggests that in towns it might be convenient to conduct the greater part of Militia training by companies in the vicinity of their homes on Saturday afternoons, in the same manner as the Volunteers are trained.—(Our Military Forces and Reserves, p. 22.)

Lord ELCHO. All the military forces of each district to be assembled for annual training under the General of the division. Supply and administrative services of the whole force to be performed by permanent Staff.

He also suggests simplification of drill, and that trades should be taught in addition to military exercises.—(Letter in *Times*, 12th and 16th February, 1869.)

Lord NORTHBROOK. Officers of Line regiments to be attached to Militia during annual course of instruction to assist in training.—(Debate reported in *Times*, 24th April, 1869.)

II. COLE, Esq., C.B. Compulsory drill to form part of the national system of education, to commence at ten years of age. Military pensioners to be attached to all schools as drill instructors.—(Report of Meeting of Society for Encouragement of Arts, Manufactures, and Commerce. 17th February. 1869.)