a state of "elective irritability" of the same, and the action of a pathological stimulus travelling by paths other than the ordinary associative ones to the association centres, and thence by the ordinary association paths to the other centres in the brain. He says that the transformation and refining of a direct stimulus of "extra-associative" origin, and its admission into the state of consciousness, is easy of verification in the case of the association, but not of the sensory, centres. In "demenza paranoide," like stimuli of "extra-associative" origin, and a state of irritability of a certain system of cortical neurons, can be verified. In cases of katatonia, and also of general paralysis, which presents many of the symptoms of dementia præcox (*viz.*, motor impulses, muticism, negativism, pseudo-hallucinations), and also in climacteric melancholia, he has found marked alteration or destruction of the lowest layer of cortical cells, the polymorphous layer, with accumulation of neuroglia. By exclusion can be attributed to this layer of cells those functions which are injured in dementia præcox.

Finally, he makes a summary of his conclusions. Most of these have been noted before. He holds that pseudo-hallucinations, forced actions, and hallucinations in part, as well as the thought expressed aloud, compelled speech with suggestion, and epigastric voices, probably all depend on an internal cerebral irritation which acts independently of the ordinary mechanism of association. That true hallucinations have their seat in the sensory, pseudo-hallucinations in the association, centres. To explain the origin of complicated true hallucinations the centres of association must also enter into play. Pseudo-hallucinations, while frequent in the paranoid and præcox forms of dementia, are also met with in climacteric and senile insanity, and at times in general paralysis. The characteristic mental disturbance in dementia præcox, which is manifested in a pure and isolated form in certain cases of paranoid dementia, consists in the disturbance of the elaboration of the motives of action, of the will and conduct. The affective insensibility, the motiveless emotions, impulses, katatonia, etc., are dependent on this disturbance, and pseudo-hallucinations are probably its immediate associative effect. It is probable that this disturbance depends on an elective and systematised lesion of special cortical neurons. This system engaged cannot be either sensory or motor, because sensation and motion are unimpaired; nor can it be that destined for the association of images, for memory and ideation are intact. The lesion, then, must involve a system of neurons which holds the supreme coordinating power between representations, the corresponding emotions, and the execution of the acts. From the data to hand Lugaro is inclined to the idea that the system injured is contained in the deep layer of the cortex, the stratum of polymorphous cells.

A. J. EADES.

A Contribution to the Doctrine of Paranoia [*Ein Beitrag zur Lehre von der Paranoia*]. (*Allgem. Zeits. f. Psychiat.*, Bd. lx, S. 65.)
Schneider, H.

An old-standing case of paranoia is described at great length. It is the case which forms the subject of Kraepelin's fifteenth lecture (see that author's *Einführung in die psychiatrische Klinik*, 1901,

page 147), where it is described as a type of paranoia. Schneider subsequently studied the case at Emmendingen Asylum, and this paper details the results. The history and symptoms are described in very full detail, and then follow considerations as to the nature and origin of paranoia. The author, who keeps closely to the classificatory views of Kraepelin, dwells upon a certain clouding of judgment (*Urtheilstrübung*) as being a necessary antecedent to the formation of paranoia. The writer of this notice has insisted upon the weakening of judgment which is involved in the acceptance of delusion in his article on delusional insanity in Clifford Allbutt's *System of Medicine*. The recognition of this failure of judgment, the highest quality of the mind, in paranoia is, in fact, the reason why all modern authors reject the notion of monomania. Schneider questions how this impairment of judgment comes about. One origin is increased action of the affective side of the mind, an unstable emotional state occurring in persons of degenerative predisposition, in psychopaths. That this is merely placing the elephant on the tortoise Schneider seems to see, for he tells us that where we say the judgment is obscured because the emotional state is heightened, we introduce a causal nexus where we are only entitled to speak of co-ordination. He points out that the delusion of jealousy of the alcoholic is a true paranoia. As the passion of jealousy cannot be said to cause the delusion, or *vice versa*, inasmuch as they are both dependent on a common cause, the poisonous effect of alcohol upon the nerve-cells, so in other forms of paranoia a deeper and truer cause underlies in common the emotional and the delusive states. However, it is important to distinguish this condition arising in psychopaths, which is curable, from the second form of the disease, which arises from weak-mindedness, the product of a more acute affection that has run its course, leaving a certain defect. This primary trouble is most often precocious dementia. The second form of paranoia thus brought about is, of course, incurable. On the whole, Schneider seems to be of opinion that we should relinquish paranoia altogether as a primary condition, placing some of its varieties among the psychopathic degenerative states, and others among the sequelæ of precocious dementia, just as alcoholic delusional insanity has long found its proper place under the head of alcohol, and not under the head of paranoia. [Of course, the justice of this judgment depends upon whether the psychopathic degenerative states on the one hand, and precocious dementia on the other, are distinct diseases, as alcoholism is.]

CONOLLY NORMAN.

Stirner's Ideas in a System of Paranoiac Delusion [*Stirner'sche Ideen in einem paranoischen Wahnsystem*]. (*Arch. f. Psychiat.*, Band xxxvi, S. 793.) Schultze, E.

The author of this paper tells us that the metaphysician, Max Stirner, who flourished in the beginning of the last century, has become popular within the last few years because Reclam has brought him out in a cheap edition, because he suits the Nietzsche fashion of to-day, and because he likewise tones in with anarchism, a cult which has a certain following. The best of these reasons is no doubt the first, yet it might