MIND

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OF

PSYCHOLOGY AND PHILOSOPHY

I.—THE PHILOSOPHICAL ASPECT OF FREUD'S THEORY OF DREAM INTERPRETATION.

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THE dream is at the present time the subject of investigation by a school of psychologists who find in it a revelation of the structure of the mental life, a means of discovering the nature of mental disorder, and a key to the treatment of such disorder psychologically. The theory and method of this investigation has received the name of psychoanalysis and the chief exponent of it is Dr. Sigmund Freud, Professor in the University of Vienna, whose *Traumdeutung* has recently been translated into English. My purpose is not to discuss this method of psychoanalysis, nor to illustrate its application, nor to attempt to estimate its therapeutic value in ministering to a mind diseased, but to try and put in clear terms the scheme or diagram of the mental life, the organic structure of the mind or soul, which is the basis of this interpretation of the dream. It is extremely difficult to get a clear notion of this scheme, because Freud's book is overladen with minute detail of individual analysis of particular dreams and also because his theory of the psychical reality is couched in metaphorical and sometimes very vague terminology. Indeed it seems as though with his incessant allusion to a censor with a black pencil, to a dramatisation of memory images, and to the efforts of ideas to illude this censor, that he is himself unable to escape the kind of dream imagery with which he deals. But notwithstanding all the drawbacks it seems to me that his analysis of the dream indicates facts in the mental life that are of the very first importance for a constructive theory of the nature of life and consciousness.

I am not interested in dreams, either my own or other peoples', as actual occurrences. I have never taken the trouble or had the inclination to write down a dream, much less to endeavour to analyse it in the manner illustrated by Freud. All that I am concerned with therefore is the general nature of dreams and their character as psychical realities, and not with the content of particular dreams and what they reveal of the life history of the individual.

There are certain features or characteristics of dreams that we recognise at once. First of all, in normal experience dreams occur during sleep and are more or less imperfectly recollected after waking. Sleep is a physiological condition of the bodily organism, the main conditions of which seem to be that in some way, perhaps by reason of some natural position of the body, the nervous system is relieved from its ordinary function at both terminals. The nervous system is sensorimotor, it receives impressions on sense organs at one end and it initiates movements at the other. Both these functions are in abeyance during sleep—we feel nothing and we do nothing. If, then, we dream while we sleep, our dream consciousness is not originated by influences reaching us through the sense organs, nor does it issue in muscular movements. Sometimes dream consciousness becomes powerful enough to affect the sense organs and the dream thoughts may then begin to initiate muscular movements, but in normal life the moment they do so we awake and the dream is gone.

The second thing about the dream is that it is associated with a disturbed or unhealthy condition of the body. Some suppose that we dream continually during sleep, but if we do so in normal and healthy conditions we are not conscious when we awake of what we have been dreaming, or, if we do retain a recollection, it rapidly fades away. On the other hand in disturbed conditions of the organism, particularly in derangements of the digestive tract, and probably in derangements of the sexual organs, dreams are vivid, may be horrible, and are always accompanied by more or less discomfort and weariness.

A third feature of the dream is the absurdity or incongruity of its content. If we analyse a dream by recalling it carefully as we wake up we can usually trace its origin to some recent circumstances in our experience, but these are always in the dream marked by a certain topsy-turveydom. The dream never repeats a past experience just as it happened, nor does it ever construct an experience just as it would happen in waking life. All its materials or contents are

drawn from experience, yet all, to the minutest detail, undergo transformation or deformation.

A fourth important feature of the dream is its apparent relation to insanity. An insane person seems to continue the dream into waking life, to have a consciousness which is more or less completely a dream consciousness. Whereas in all normal and healthy conditions there is a sharp distinction between the dream state and the waking state, in insanity the bodily activity appears to be accompanied by the deformation of reality that characterises dream consciousness.

The ordinary theory of the dream is that its deformation of reality is negative, a disordered riot of the imagination caused by activity in the brain cells when cut off or inhibited from their normal function during that condition of the organism which is produced by the physiological process of sleep. But a very slight examination of the facts will show that such a theory is wholly insufficient. If it were so, if the dream were the result of a partial activity of processes concerned in consciousness, if it were merely that the co-ordination of memory images was haphazard instead of being correlated with perception and movement, we should expect the dream consciousness to have a very different character from that which it has. We should expect it indeed to be fragmentary, disconnected and discontinuous, but we should also expect it to be true, that is to agree with waking consciousness as far as it went; we should expect a dream memory to represent a memory image as faithfully as an ordinary normal recollection, at least it would be surprising if it did not sometimes do so; we should expect the content of the dream to be a spontaneous revival of what we call into the present consciousness when we exercise our memory in reverie, or in day dreaming. But the very reverse is the case. The scene that enacts itself in the dream is never the simple reproduction of past experience nor is it ever a reconstruction of past experience. The persons who play a part in our dream are never true memory images of real persons, they are always incongruous, although in our dream consciousness we are never surprised at incongruity. It is when we awake that we are surprised or horrified or disgusted at the grotesque shape which our friends have assumed, or the strange words they have uttered, or the unusual deeds they have done. It is the fact that a dream is not mechanical, not a patchwork arrangement of real recollections, but something that exhibits a peculiar and definite structure, that leads to the conclusion that the dream can only be explained as a special psychical process.

This is the basis of Freud's theory. There is a psychical process at work in the dream, or manifested in it, which is distinguishable from the psychical process of waking consciousness. This process can only be explained by psychoanalysis. In Freud's view the dream is a psychical act. Its nature is wish fulfilment. Dreams are repressed or suppressed wishes seeking fulfilment. To appreciate his theory and to understand its application to the phenomena of the dream we must first understand how he conceives the actual structure of the psychical life. Whatever be the nature of psychical reality it is clear that wherever there is conscious activity there is perception and responsive movement. The movement may be incipient only, it may be arrested or inhibited, but the type of psychical process is perception consequent on external stimulation, and responsive action consequent on perception. But the real content of psychical activity is memory. Perception is instantaneous and dies as it is born, it is retained and preserved in memory. Memory is the stuff or material of psychical existence. This doctrine has received the most lucid exposition in the writings of Bergson. "All that we have felt, thought and willed from our earliest infancy is there, leaning over the present which is about to join it, pressing against the portals of consciousness that would fain leave it outside".¹ Memory exists in two forms, which we may distinguish as recognition and as repetition. The one is pure memory, the record of a past which is fixed, which can never be repeated, which happened once and can never happen again; the other is a motor habit which plays the past over again in the present. One of the arguments which Bergson has used for this existence of a pure memory which registers in all its completeness our past experience is the fact of the revival of forgotten memories in dreams. "In certain dreams and in certain somnambulistic states memories which we believed abolished reappear with striking completeness; we live over again, in all their detail, forgotten scenes of childhood; we speak languages which we no longer remember to have learnt".² But it is an entirely different aspect of the dream than its recall of the forgotten past which Freud has tried to under-

¹ *Creative Evolution*, p. 5.

² *Matter and Memory*, p. 200. At the time of writing this paper I had not seen the recently published little book by Bergson on *Dreams* (B. W. Huebach, New York, 1914). It is the translation of a lecture delivered in 1901 and in it he mentions the work of Freud, and his substantial agreement with many parts of his theory.

stand. His problem is the nature and reason of the systematic deformation which characterises the dream, and his theory attempts to give its ground. Consequently he sees in pure memory not merely the faithful register of the whole of the past but a still active psychical agency. Wishes repressed and relegated to unconsciousness are not dead imagery but actively living psychical facts which struggle, not against a mechanical and automatic impediment, but against a psychical force that holds them in restraint and which can be avoided or deceived. This is the force he names the censor and he conceives the psychic life as controlled by it. He adopts the imagery of the stage. Feelings, thoughts, wishes arise and have arisen from earliest infancy, pressing forward to play their part on the stage of consciousness, but thwarted, repulsed, held back, pressed into the unconscious by a power that acts as an individual controller.

There are accordingly in Freud's scheme three main divisions or regions of psychical life. There is first consciousness, distinguished as attention to present activity, to action in progress. Secondly, there is foreconsciousness (I have adopted throughout this paper the terminology of the English translation), the present existing field of awareness, the material of which, though not actually in consciousness, can be called up at will. It is the whole content of experience that is at our disposal and ready to be drawn upon as occasion requires. Below this there is the unconscious, which consists of active elements of our life that exist but cannot manifest themselves. It is between these unconscious and foreconscious regions that the censorship is active. And the theory of the dream is that during sleep the censorship is partially relaxed so that wishes from the unconscious get through to consciousness, but they do so only by undergoing deformation, by clothing themselves as it were with the forms they meet with in the foreconscious. So that in the dream we have wishes that have been repressed, it may be in early infancy, passing the censor and managing to play a part tricked out in the disguise of recent experience.

So stated the theory may sound fantastic, but it merits very serious examination for the following reasons. First it draws attention to profound problems in the psychology of memory. Secondly it conceives the order which characterises normal healthy life as not a passive and negative order but an order imposed by an active psychic agency which is selective. Thirdly it points to the nature of mental disorder and may therefore have immense practical importance.

Let us now turn to the theory itself. The dream is a

psychic act. Whatever the physical or physiological conditions are that accompany, or are the occasion of, this psychic act, its existence and meaning are not to be explained by these conditions. It is not a physical or physiological reality but a psychical or psychological reality. The dream is not a bodily act nor a meaningless act, it is a psychical act whose meaning must be traced out in the association of ideas. Every form that it assumes, every element that enters into its constitution, has its reason or ground in a psychical antecedent. It is very important to understand clearly what is implied in this distinction between physical and psychical reality. The distinction seems to me unnecessarily confused when terms like force and energy are used indifferently to describe any kind of activity physical or psychical. It is hopeless perhaps to expect that those who make frequent use of the word force will clearly define what they mean by it, but ambiguity in the term energy is inexcusable for the term has a strict and technical application. The doctrine of energy (its convertibility and degradation, the conception of entropy, etc.), is so essential a part of the scientific conception of physical reality that its use to denote mental activity is only justifiable if the intention is to assert the identity of mental and physical activity, identity in the sense of interchangeableness. The most extreme interactionist would, I imagine, hesitate to assert this. Energy in physical science is the conception of something that is measurable, something that undergoes change of form with quantitative identity. To apply such a conception to mental activity literally is plainly impossible and to apply it metaphorically is only confusing. In what sense, for instance, is the memory that forms part of my subconscious psychical life a latent energy and what is this energy converted into when some association brings it to consciousness? Whether physical reality is ultimately a form of psychical reality is another question, what is clear is that the reality we study in psychics is a reality of a different order to the reality we study in physics. The whole point of Freud's theory is that the dream pertains to this psychical order.

How does the dream consciousness differ from the waking consciousness? It takes its origin in a lower stratum of psychical reality than that to which the waking consciousness can penetrate, and it finds expression by clothing itself or even by disguising itself in the stratum of psychical reality upon which the waking consciousness draws. These two strata of psychical reality Freud names respectively the unconscious and the foreconscious. Between these two strata of the

psychical life there is a control. This he names the censor, or sometimes impersonally, the censure or the censorship. It is this control that constitutes the order and rationality of the character of intelligently ordered conscious existence.

The type of ordinary conscious experience is a process, at one end of which is perception, and at the other, movement. Between these two terminals when the activity is not reflex or automatic but conscious and voluntary there is memory. At the perceptive end the organism is in relation with the environment, receiving stimulation from external influences resulting in internal sensations. But at this perceptive end there is also another process continuous and persistent throughout the whole psychical life, a process which goes on unconsciously and without effort—the formation of memory. In actual experience no perception is pure, in theory it arises and perishes as the moment during which it exists arises and perishes, but in fact it continues to exist in memory. We are accustomed to think of memory as a kind of inscription on a register. Perceptions seem to leave an impression or trace of themselves behind them and this register seems to be open to our inspection and the effort we are conscious of in trying to remember the past is like the unrolling of a scroll in which that past lies written out in the order and with the circumstances of its occurrence. At all events we picture to ourselves the preservation of the past in memory as a purely passive or receptive process by which the experience that actually takes place leaves a trace or record of itself as a memory image. The psychical reality of our life seems indeed composed of this record of the past which remains at the service of our present activity to guide, enlighten and interpret the present. Freud conceives this memory quite differently, for him it is not composed of the dead pictures or traces of an actual past but of all the active elements of our nature which retain their activity undiminished, and are always present and acting, but held in control. Every feeling, thought or desire, every conscious or unconscious wish, survives and forms part of our psychical nature.

What is the nature of this control? It is a familiar fact of experience that there are thoughts, feelings and desires to which we do not give expression and which we vigorously repress if they assert themselves in our ordinary intercourse. Some of these we regard as harmless enough in themselves but the indulgence or intrusion of them in consciousness causes a feeling of shame, and there are others of which we even stand in fear, which it is our very nature to repress

and the formal habit of continual repression of which is our character itself. It is also a common enough fact of experience that when by reason of a sudden shock or unexpected pain we are taken off our guard, our feelings find vent in expressions which are quite involuntary and which are not only not habitual but surprise us in their unnatural strangeness. Freud supposes that a control is part of the psychical reality of every conscious being, it is a control that is not conscious and voluntary, but essential and natural to psychical life. It is conceived as a necessary part of a psychical existence or rather of a psychical individuality. It operates by selection, but the choice it exercises is not merely passive, and it is not a selection of what shall or shall not find conscious expression, but a selection of what shall and what shall not pass into the region of foreconscious experience upon which consciousness draws. It selects what shall and what shall not form the background of our voluntary activity. What it rejects it does not simply exclude, it suppresses it in the unconscious. While the control is maintained, as it is in all sane, normal and healthy conditions of the consciousness, these active elements of our psychical nature or suppressed wishes cannot emerge into consciousness nor can consciousness penetrate to them.

There is another fact of common experience that is significant in this connexion. Consciousness of anything in the sense of actual present awareness is directly continuous with unconsciousness. We never know how much of the content of our awareness is actual present experience and how much is inferred from what is present. Only a part of what at any moment we perceive or remember is at that moment actually in consciousness. Consciousness seems to throw light on whatever is the object of our attention, but there is always a choice of what we will attend to, and this is a choice among things that, though we are actually unconscious of them, are in a sense within our consciousness. A slight bodily movement will alter the whole content of present perception, and an association of ideas will bring into consciousness whole realms of memory. So much is this the case that no one without very careful analysis could say what does and what does not form part of consciousness at any present moment. It is a familiar police-court difficulty in appreciating evidence, that people firmly believe they have seen what they know was there to be seen. The consciousness then that accompanies each moment of actual experience is a moving focus, a centre without any sharply defined circumference, and surrounding this focus is what

can only be described as a consciousness of which we are unconscious. The paradox is only apparent, we cannot call it the unconscious, for we can bring it into consciousness. Freud names this the foreconscious.

Another fact is also quite clear, the foreconscious does not exhaust the whole of our nature. There are actions that we cannot trace to any conscious experience, actions that we call instinctive, just because they seem to have their origin in a nature formed before conscious experience began and unaffected by conscious experience. They are what we sometimes call the natural man. They are the basis of our human nature on which conscious experience has been superposed. They lie in a region distinguished from the foreconscious as the unconscious.

We may now understand Freud's scheme. The type of psychical reality is the wish. Our fundamental psychical nature consists of wishes which seek fulfilment. Their only means of obtaining fulfilment is by using the bodily organism. Our rational nature consists in a control of wishes and this is affected by a selection. A strong control is maintained from early life, a control which grows in strength as individual character develops and the effect of which is to cut off wishes from fulfilment by preventing them from entering the region of perception and memory and so becoming the conscious ends of action.

The notion of reason as controlling our lower nature is familiar enough, but the distinctive feature of Freud's doctrine is the place in the psychical life which he assigns to this control. It is not exercised by what we ordinarily call the reasoning faculty, the power of discursive thought, the understanding that arranges reality in concepts; it is placed by Freud below and not above the intellectual life. It regulates the selection of the material with which the rational or conscious life deals. Just as the sense organs may be said to select the influences which reach the brain and are perceived, so this "censor" selects among the desires, conations and wishes that are the active elements of living experience those that shall enter the foreconscious in which they seek fulfilment. Consequently not only are our sense impressions and our memory a selection, but the wishes that embody themselves in action are a selection also. The foreconscious has not only a vast physical reality of spatial and temporal elements excluded from it, but also a vast psychical reality of personal wishes which can be repressed but not destroyed, they continue to exist but are ineffective because they are relegated by the censor to the

unconscious. This unconscious is not a part of our experience which we have forgotten but can by association revive,—the action of the censor is to place it beyond recall. It can only reach consciousness through the fore-conscious and there it must undergo change. The fore-conscious is the last memory system at the motor end of the psychical apparatus. Exciting processes within it reach consciousness without further detention whenever the conditions of attention are fulfilled. Such is the general scheme or diagram of the psychical life that Freud adopts as the basis of his theory of the nature and interpretation of the dream.

What then is the dream? It is an unfulfilled wish that owing to its character has been suppressed by the "censor" and is therefore unable to reach the higher levels of consciousness, but availing itself of the partial suspension of "psychic censorship" during sleep it is able by means of certain mechanisms of distortion to come to a kind of consciousness and effect a kind of fulfilment. The mechanisms of distortion that Freud distinguishes are four. The first is that which brings about the displacement that is a familiar feature of dreams. In the dream material one idea is substituted for another, one word for another, the substitution is always linked with or depends upon some association. The second is condensation. Incompatible material is compressed together in the dream into one intense presentation. The third is dramatisation. This is the expression of the dream material in the form of mental pictures of acted reality. The fourth is elaboration, the elaboration of a rational and intelligible exterior in the dream structure. Psychoanalysis, the method of dream interpretation, consists in discovering the latent content, the real wish, beneath the dream thoughts which make it objective and represent it as a scene which we believe we experience. The pronounced characters of the dream are its representation as a present situation and the transformation of thought into visual pictures and speech. These are what constitute the regressive character of the dream as compared with normal waking experience. The direction of the activity is from thought to sense perception, and not as in waking life from sense perception to thought.

I will now put forward some general considerations which concern the philosophical rather than the psychological interest of this theory. The idea that our healthy normal waking experience depends on the active exercise of a censorship seems to me to throw valuable light on the facts of conscious experience. Our character not only as social

and moral beings in relation to one another, but as natural living creatures with a clearly defined zone of activity, consists in the selection exercised by our nature over the multitudinous psychical elements which seek expression in us. This nature is a psychical activity which marks out the direction of our life, forms our social relations and organises our animality into rational conduct. In Freud's analysis of dreams the original source of the dream, the wish that has made good its escape from the unconscious is almost always discovered to be sexual, and this has been much criticised. Sexuality is but a small part of our whole nature, in healthy waking life it does not stand out as an interest or relation of prime importance, why should it preponderate to so disproportionate an extent in the dream life? Why again, if it does, should it be necessary to disguise it so completely in the dream that only careful psychoanalysis reveals it? But is not this just what we should expect if Freud's theory of the censorship is true? Our sexual nature and the desires and strivings and tendencies that have their origin in it are, it is true, only a part, and not perhaps the most considerable part of our nature, but it is the exercise of the censorship over this part of our nature that has produced the type of our social organisation. The *libido*, the longing or lusting that is repressed by the censorship into unconsciousness is largely composed of sexual desire just because in the evolution of human nature, for some vital reason no doubt, the instinct to repress this instinct has been evolved. Repression of sex instinct is the type of our social character, a type which does not seem to belong to any other animal species, so far as we know, and it might have been otherwise with us. If for example the instinct common in some of the carnivora to eat only in solitude had been developed in us, the censorship would have formed in us a social convention which would have regarded the taking of food as disgusting, and the sociality of meals would have been non-existent. We should have had to recognise the need of food, but it would have been good manners to have pretended that we had no desire for it. We have a striking instance of what seems to be the exactly opposite instinct to our own in the animal man has chosen as his companion and taught to share his life. The dog is naturally unsocial at meals. It has a disinclination to be overlooked at its feeding whether by man or by its fellows, whereas natural functions that are disgusting to us are to it the bond of sociality. Again consider the experience we call falling in love, it arises from natural physiological processes and has

its ground in the performance of organic functions, yet it is a well-known psychological fact that the feeling of being in love cannot tolerate the thought of the sexual act and is offended by the expression of anything sensual in the love relation either in word or thought. Freud's theory of the censorship throws great light on these facts of our nature and shows that though the repression of our sexual instincts is a convention, it is not, as is so often supposed, a purely artificial convention, but one that has arisen in the evolution of our psychical nature.

But I find a difficulty in the description of the dream material as wishes, and of the dream itself as wish fulfilment. A wish is not a vague desire, it is not a conation, it is not a tendency, it is all these but it is something more, it is a definitely formed desire with a particular embodiment. So Freud understands it, and in his analysis he finds the motive power of a dream in an embodied wish, a hatred of or love of some particular individual, or a longing for some particular gratification, that may have occurred years before, even in infancy, indeed perhaps before infancy. The *libido* has not merely a general nature of conation but is formed of wishes as particular as the definite aims and purposes of our waking life. It is not a merely verbal question, it is a question of fact and it is to fact that Freud makes appeal. Perhaps it will be said that as the facts are elicited by psychoanalysis only those who actually undertake this work are qualified to judge of the proof of the theory. But I demur. I think there is an *a priori* objection to the possibility of proving the theory by such facts alone as this method can elicit, quite apart from the amount of evidence that would be required to carry conviction. Let me explain by an example of the kind of interpretation that is offered of a dream. A patient, let us suppose, sees in his dream a person above the ordinary stature who is addressed by the strange and unfamiliar name Yram. The analyst finds out that this person in early childhood had a nurse called Mary. I am not taking an actual case, only endeavouring to get a simple example of the type of interpretation, no caricature is intended. If the analyst is satisfied that the fact of childhood is the ground of the dream he sees in the tallness of the dream person the circumstance that the child was little and in the name an obvious expedient to disguise identity. Now what sort of evidence would be required to bring conviction that the dream is a repressed wish of childhood now, after years of unconscious existence, gaining fulfilment? No accumulation of facts of what happened in infancy would bring conviction to any one who had

not already formed the theory, because it seems at once evident that we could find in childhood as many such facts as we chose to look for. What however seems to me in the highest degree incredible and fantastic is to suppose that the unconscious consists of wishes, which are not only particular, in the sense that they have existed in actual experience, but are individual and have preserved in the unconscious their original setting. I understand the censor repressing a conation and so preventing it taking form and embodying itself in a definite wish, but I recognise nothing in my experience that leads me to suppose that my consciously formed but unfulfilled wishes are forced back and repressed in unconsciousness.

A still greater difficulty meets me in Freud's idea of wish fulfilment. There seems to me to be a confusion between what I should distinguish as wish indulgence and wish fulfilment. When a wish is fulfilled there is an end of it so far as it is a wish, equally there is an end of it if circumstances render its fulfilment impossible. In what sense then is the emergence of a long-suppressed wish in a dream, supposing that this is what takes place, a fulfilment of the wish? Does its activity there and then end? Is the wish now satisfied? If the wish was my longing for the nurse of my infancy, can it be said to be possible of fulfilment when I am no longer an infant and have no nurse?

I suggest that as a doctrine of psychical activity, Freud's theory is profoundly suggestive, but it requires complete re-statement. The distinction between the unconscious and the foreconscious cannot, it seems to me, be a difference between memories that can be recalled and memories that cannot, it does not lie in a selection of memories. The whole of experience, in so far as by experience we mean whatever has been the object of attentive consciousness or distinct awareness, is preserved in memory. I hold that all of this forms what Freud calls the foreconscious, what others call the subconscious, no part of it is prevented coming to consciousness as memory by the censor. But this attentive consciousness is itself determined by a selection from a larger psychical reality and it is this selection that is worked by the censor. It consists in resistance to conations that are striving to express themselves in wishes.

The theory interpreted literally would make the unconscious consist of what had originally been conscious experience, of what had shaped itself into distinctly conceived ideas and images and purposes, in fact of exactly the same material as that which composes the foreconscious, and the work of

the censor a repression and resistance which, so long as it remained active, would render the suppressed memories incapable of recall. According to the theory I am unconscious of memories suppressed by the censor, not in the sense that they are not in the focus of attention, this is the unconsciousness of the foreconscious, but in the absolute sense that they are placed beyond my power of recall. If this were so it seems to me that loss of memory and symptoms known as maladies of memory would be normal and not abnormal conditions. Speaking as an ordinary individual and appealing to common experience I challenge the fact that it is possible, or that there is within us any psychical control that will enable us, to suppress the memory of an experience that has actually formed part of our consciousness. We have undoubtedly the power of diverting our attention, and in doing so of avoiding the eruption into present consciousness of distressing or unpleasant memories. Undoubtedly also we can develop habits designed to exclude troublesome conation, but that we have an absolute power of forgetting seems to me entirely at variance with fact. Stating this objection in the terms of the theory I should say that in my view the censorship is a reality, that it lies below conscious experience, that it divides the foreconscious from the unconscious, but that it is not exercised over anything that has once formed part of the foreconscious itself.