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THE GROWTH OF THE INCARNATION

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The purpose of this article is to study the incarnation in ethical terms. And that means to study it as an ethical process, as concerning the whole life of Jesus. It is a common tendency to identify the incarnation with the conception or the birth of Jesus, to make it an event in a moment of time. As the atonement has too often been limited to the death of Jesus, instead of being treated as the outcome of his whole atoning life, so has the incarnation too often been limited to his birth. But if we are to treat it in ethical terms, we have to deal not simply with the incarnate birth but with the incarnate life.

The necessity of so regarding the incarnation results directly from the Christian belief in God as moral or personal. The incarnation is the expression of the Christian belief about God and man and the relation between them. It must therefore be expressed and interpreted in Christian terms. And the Christian belief is that God is a personal, a moral being, and that man is made in the image of God. Therefore the incarnation must itself be understood as personal and moral if it is to be understood in accordance with the Christian thought.

Now a physical event can be expressed as taking place in a moment of time, and the results that come from it as following in accordance with physical necessity. A clock made and wound up contains already in itself the whole process of its unwinding. So if the incarnation be regarded purely in physical terms, it may be identified with the moment of conception or birth, and the resulting

life will follow by a process of physical necessity. But if the incarnation be primarily moral and personal then it cannot take place all at once. All morality, as we know it, takes the form of time. It is essentially a process. Morality must grow if it is to be morality at all. The old theory that Adam was created perfectly righteous to start with is a theory of moral contradictions. Adam could no more have been created righteous than he could have been created thirty years old. Development in time is an essential quality of righteousness.

If the incarnation is to be the expression of the relation between God and man, it must then be expressed in moral and personal terms. Only thus can it have moral significance for humanity. And it can be so expressed only if it follows the laws of all morality, only if it is regarded as a process of moral and spiritual development. The incarnation concerns the whole life of Jesus. In dealing with the incarnation, we deal with the process and development of the incarnate life.

This thought may be put in a somewhat different form. The Christian belief in God is that God is personal. If therefore He is to be revealed, He must be revealed through personality. If He is to come into contact with human life, that contact must be achieved through personal means. Apart from the Christian concept, the tendency has been to find God given in ways that are impersonal. He has been revealed in signs and omens, in the voice of the thunder, in the flight of birds, in the entrails of the sacred victims. Or if revealed through men, it has been where men have ceased to exercise their full personal powers, through dreams, through unconscious swoons. In all these methods there lurks the thought that God in Himself is impersonal and that therefore He cannot be revealed in personality. The Christian thought is just the opposite. As God is personal His means of revelation must be personal. If He is to be given to human

life, He must be given through human life at its highest, that is, in its supremely personal form. And the supreme personal expression of human life is in Jesus Christ. The incarnate Son is the revelation of God, the Word of God, in and through human life. And therefore the incarnation, which is the supreme expression and revelation of God, must be concerned with the whole person of Jesus, with all that constitutes his character, his growth, his struggle, his victory. The incarnation as a personal fact must be in the form of a personal life. It is a process that concerns the whole life of Jesus. Begun in the manger cradle, God is there manifested in the beauty of the life of the child. But a deeper manifestation is given in the boy as he finds himself at home in his Father's house. A still deeper manifestation is given in the man. And the incarnation is in its fullest sense complete when that manhood is made perfect through suffering, and when in the victory of the cross Godhood and manhood are forever joined in the risen and ascended life. Each stage manifests the divine according to its capacity. But God can be manifested only as the fullness of humanity gives divinity the fullness of expression. The incarnation is not an event in a moment of time. It is the process of the incarnate life.

This position may be misunderstood. It is not that Jesus grows merely as a human being, and that the divine life comes to him as a reward. That would be to lose the essential idea, and therefore the religious value, of the incarnation, to supplant it by an apotheosis, to think of a man becoming God instead of God becoming man. But Christian belief sees in Jesus not first the ascent of humanity to God, but first the gift of God to humanity. The incarnation is no less a gift from above because it takes place in a process rather than in a momentary event. Rather is it true that that gift can take place only in a process, for only so can spiritual gifts be given.

The union of God and man is given from above. But that union can take place only in and through personal receptivity. God and man cannot be joined as things are joined. They can be united only in a personal life. That union becomes more and more perfectly realized in the development of the perfect life.

This thought of the process of the incarnate life has manifold advantages. It gives deeper meaning to the whole life of the Christ. His birth, his death, his resurrection are not isolated events. They receive their meaning from his life as a whole. The birth is the beginning of a process that concerns his whole life. The cross is the summing up of a process that began at birth. The resurrection and the ascension are the eternal results of a life that has won the perfect victory. These events have their meaning not in themselves but as the outcome and expression of the whole life. They are Mounts of Transfiguration, the sacramental expression of that union of divine and human which through his whole life was becoming ever more perfectly realized. They are the sacraments of the incarnate life.

This thought gives greater meaning and a deeper sanctity to the church year. We are to live over again the life of Christ. Through him we are to win for ourselves union with God. We are to make his experience our own. Day by day we are to walk the path he trod. From Advent to Ascension we are to bear within our hearts the birth, the dying, and the rising of our Lord. These events are the expression of that perfect life which was manifested that we might have life and that we might have it more abundantly.

This concept of development also casts light on the problems of the knowledge and the righteousness of Christ. To begin with his knowledge, the question is how the union of divine and human in him was compatible with the limitations of a genuinely human knowledge.

The problem is comparatively a new one in theology. The older orthodoxy mostly took it for granted that as he was divine he must have been omniscient, that even in the cradle he must have been possessed of all the knowledge of the eternal God.

This theory was evidently due to an inability to conceive that God and man could actually be united. It was a part of the Greek dualism, which believed that God and man could come together only if God ceased to be God or man ceased to be man. The thought was that if God came into human life it must be at cost of human limitations. All these must disappear at the influx of divinity. But if we believe that God and man can really come together, that God can be manifested in human life, then we shall get rid of this antagonism. We shall believe that God's life can be manifested even in the limitations of humanity. We shall not begin with a premise that prevents us from reading the New Testament as it stands, and that dehumanizes the Christ. We shall be able to ask fairly the question, What was the nature of his knowledge and what were its limitations?

It is natural that some persons should shrink from such a question. It may seem due to an irreverent curiosity, it may seem to raise questions which are beyond our knowledge and which it is unprofitable to discuss. To such objections two answers may be made.

In the first place the problem is squarely put before us in the New Testament. The limitations of his knowledge are there clearly indicated. St. Luke says that he "advanced in wisdom." He himself asks for information. And in one passage, which the most radical criticism maintains to be an authentic saying of Jesus, he declares "But of that day or that hour knoweth no one, not even the angels in heaven, neither the Son, but the Father" (Mark 13 32). We cannot avoid the question if we are to study the New Testament. To treat it as useless is to be wise above that which is written.

Secondly, it is of supreme importance that we should know "the mind of Christ." He is the heart of the New Testament. To Christian faith he is himself the Word of God. If we are rightly to understand him and his message, we must not shrink from an inquiry into his self-consciousness. We must seek to understand him as perfectly as we can. To be afraid to do so is to show lack of faith in Christ himself.

There have been two unsatisfactory methods of treating the problem. So far as the older theology showed any interest in the question, it tended to approach it on the basis of the distinction between the "two natures" of Christ. It ascribed omniscience to his divine nature and limitations to his human nature. Thus he was at once omniscient and limited. When he said that he knew not the day or the hour, he meant that he knew it not "as man." "As God" he knew everything that God knows.

That answer creates more difficulties than it removes. It sharply separates between his divine and his human nature. It does not really hold that God and man have met together in him. The union is only what has been called a "local" or "spatial" one. There is no real personal union. This is a bit of the Nestorian heresy which tended to separate Christ into two separate persons. Even more serious is the effect of this theory on the moral character of Christ. To suppose that he said that he knew not, when all the time he knew "as God" and not "as man," is utterly contrary to the openness and simplicity of his character. It puts him in the company of those who make casuistical use of "mental reservation." This solution must be definitely abandoned.

Of more importance today is the so-called doctrine of the kenosis. The word, meaning "emptying," is of course taken from Phil. 2 7 (Cf. R.V.). The whole passage Phil. 2 5-11, is interpreted to mean that the pre-existen-

Christ in becoming man voluntarily "emptied himself" of the attributes of omniscience and omnipotence. He thus lived his human life under human conditions, and having completed his life by obedience unto the death of the cross, was then restored to the possession of the divine attributes. Thus by the act of self-emptying, or kenosis, the divine life was lived under human conditions.

The purpose of this theory is good. It recognizes that the New Testament does not represent Christ as omniscient, and it tries to give a reason for the limitations of his knowledge. But the theory, good as is its purpose, creates more difficulties than it removes. It misinterprets the meaning of "Person" in the doctrine of the Trinity. It conceives of the second "Person" as an independent personality. And if the thought is carried out to the third "Person," it represents the Trinity as consisting of three personalities, three "people" in our modern sense, and thus destroys belief in the unity of God. The theory virtually implies tritheism. It is noticeable that this theory is held by many who hold closely to the "orthodox" theology. It is difficult to see how such persons reconcile their theory with the accepted doctrine of the Trinity. They would doubtless allow, indeed insist, that the word "*persona*" in the Trinity does not mean "person" in our modern sense of an independent personality. And yet, while maintaining this, they conceive the second Person of the Trinity as acting as a separate independent personality apart from the supreme personality of God.

It is but putting the same thought in another way to say that this theory misinterprets the belief in the pre-existence of Christ. It confuses the pre-existence of the Logos, the second Person of the Trinity, with the pre-existence of the total personality of Jesus of Nazareth. It makes pre-existence apply not only to his divine but

to his human nature. It thinks of a pre-existent man. The result is logically to deny that our Lord had any real human soul or spirit. It is the old heresy of Apollinarius, that the Logos took the place of a human soul in Jesus. The theory thus destroys the real humanity of our Lord, and lands us in inextricable difficulties.

The exegetical support for the theory in the passage in Philippians is extremely slight. The kenosis with which St. Paul is dealing is an ethical kenosis rather than a metaphysical one. He is thinking of the divine life manifested in self-sacrificing service even to the death of the cross. And while in presenting this thought he starts undoubtedly from the idea of pre-existence, an idea familiar to the Hebrew mind, which ascribed pre-existence to all things that had enduring reality, yet St. Paul never thinks of interpreting that pre-existence in any such way as to destroy either the unity of God or the genuine humanity of Jesus. To build this elaborate theory of a metaphysical kenosis upon St. Paul's doctrine of the ethical "self-emptying" of Christ in loving sacrifice, is to construct a theory that has no sound exegetical basis. For both theoretical and exegetical reasons this theory of the kenosis as an attempt to explain the self-consciousness of our Lord must be abandoned.

Far simpler than either of these two attempts is the method of approach previously suggested. The difficulties largely disappear if the union of divine and human in Jesus is conceived of as progressive. First of all is to be remembered the essentially Christian thought of the union of God and man. God and man are not opposed. The divine need not cease to be divine in order to enter the human, and the human need not cease to be human in order to receive the divine. The incarnation is the expression of the divine purpose, the perfect unity of God and man. And secondly it is to

be remembered that as that union is a moral and personal one it takes place in the form of moral personality, that is, in the form of growth. The union at each stage of growth is in accordance with the possibilities of that stage.

With these thoughts we approach the problem of the self-consciousness and especially of the knowledge of our Lord. And in accordance with them we shall expect to find that his knowledge is progressive and takes place along the lines of his human development. We shall expect to find each stage perfect in its kind, but we shall not expect to find a perfection beyond that which each stage demands. His knowledge is no less divine because it comes to him along the lines of human development. His knowledge has the limits of his human experience, but of an experience that is perfect in its kind. He learns in the family, in the synagogue, through the reading of the Scriptures. In all ordinary things his knowledge was that which was possible to the conditions of his time. We shall not expect to find in him an infallibility with regard to matters of history or science. We shall expect to find divine insight coming to him ever more perfectly as the union of God and man in him is ever more perfectly accomplished. When that perfect union is fully won, then shall the limitations of knowledge be done away. It is said even of us that then shall we know even as we have been known (1 Cor. 13 12). That full knowledge is the ultimate possession of him in whom the union of God and man was finally accomplished through the process of the incarnate life. But we shall not expect to find omniscience in those stages at which the complete union was not yet accomplished.

Does this thought of a development rule out his authority in moral and spiritual matters? Two things are to be said. In the first place, even in ordinary matters we know little of the limits that would belong to a life

perfect at every stage, untouched by sin. Sin is constantly a disturbing factor that vitiates our knowledge. Even in earthly matters there are depths unguessed by us. And we doubtless see in his relation to things of human experience a depth of perception and a reach of knowledge from which sin shuts us out.

And secondly, this is supremely true of spiritual things. His life in every stage is perfect in that stage. No sin blots his consciousness of God. The growing expression of the divine in him, unvexed by human failure, makes him the supreme possessor of moral and spiritual insight. No moral or spiritual error could have entered the life whose very source was the eternal and revealing Word of God. There are things he did not know, but in moral and spiritual matters he could never have supposed that he did know when he did not. Such error is due to sin. In that perfect life, progressive though it be, no sin interferes with the perfect expression of the divine character. In all moral and spiritual truth we go with confidence to him who revealed the very mind and heart of God. He that hath seen him hath seen the Father.

Viewed in this way the whole life of Christ becomes a perfectly real life. If he were without our limitations, he could have known no genuine human struggle. He could not have lived the life of faith. Prayer would have been unnecessary and unreal. Even the cross could not have been the supreme victory of faith, triumphing by reliance on the divine will. It would have been at the most the endurance of a few hours of suffering. All this unreality is brought into his life unless the divine in him were realized in genuine human form. The limitations of his knowledge, due to the progressive development of the incarnate life, were absolutely necessary if the incarnation was to have moral and spiritual significance. Only thus could there have been in him

the supreme victory of faith, only thus could there have been won the perfect righteousness of his sinless life.

Thus from the subject of his knowledge we are brought directly to the subject of his righteousness. How was that righteousness realized, and what was its relation to struggle and temptation?

The guide to the discussion must be found in the two thoughts already emphasized. In the first place, divine and human actually meet in Jesus. Therefore the divine does not set aside the human. The Christ is no less divine because the divine is realized under the forms of human experience. And in the second place, that realization must be progressive. Divine and human can meet only in moral personality, and the form of moral personality is growth.

This element of growth has especial application to the righteousness of Christ. Righteousness by its very nature must develop. It cannot be given perfectly at the beginning. It must be won through struggle and victory. At the beginning there can at most be innocence, sinlessness. Orthodox Christian theology has always held that this sinlessness was given to Jesus as a native endowment. This view rightly expresses the thought that we cannot regard Jesus as the mere product of the race with all its sinful antecedents. We see in him a new beginning of humanity, in the strictest sense a new birth from above. Yet such a native endowment is wrongly interpreted if it is thought to exclude the need of struggle and temptation in the attainment of his positive righteousness. To make that righteousness a necessary result of his sinless endowment would be to unmoralize his life. And it would contradict the New Testament, which declares that "though he was a Son, yet learned he obedience by the things which he suffered" (Heb. 5 8). It was thus that he was "made perfect." If his righteousness is to have creative power

over us, it must be won in conflict. "It behoved him in all things to be made like unto his brethren, that he might be a merciful and faithful high priest in things pertaining to God" (Heb. 2 17). The incarnate life must be realized through a moral process. Only thus can it bring to us the saving life of God. The problem with which we have to deal is not simply the sinlessness but the positive righteousness of Christ.

Although this article is dealing with an interpretation of Christian belief rather than with the apologetic approach to that belief, it may nevertheless not be out of place to indicate that it is far easier to approach the question of belief in Christ on the basis of his positive righteousness rather than on the basis of his negative sinlessness. It is the hardest of all things to prove a universal negative. To do so requires a complete knowledge of every possible contingency. And apart from belief in Christ, as a basis for that belief, to attempt to prove his absolute sinlessness is to meet with the difficulty that attends the proof of every universal negative. We know very little of the life of Jesus, and from the little that we do know to prove to an unbeliever the fact of his complete sinlessness is practically impossible. The belief in the sinlessness of Christ is the expression of an antecedent belief in him; it cannot be made the basis of that belief. The starting-point must rather be made with his positive righteousness. That positive righteousness stands written clearly before us. It sets a new standard for the world's righteousness. From him comes a new ideal of righteousness which dominates the world's history. We cannot independently of him construct a standard of righteousness and then condescendingly apply it to him, and ask whether he comes up to it. He applies to us a standard far higher than we could have created without him. We do not judge him. He judges us. All judgment is committed unto

him because he is the Son of man. As the supreme expression of humanity, he is the standard which commends itself to the conscience of mankind. His positive righteousness sets a new standard for the world. On the basis of that new ideal of righteousness we can win belief in him, and hence we can believe in his sinlessness. We must first emphasize his positive righteousness rather than first his negative sinlessness.

With this thought in mind, we return then to our special subject. How was that righteousness related to temptation and struggle? How is temptation possible to a perfect life? Are not our temptations the result of the sin that doth so easily beset us? If Christ was perfect, must he not have been above temptation?

So it has been maintained. It has been held that temptation implies sin, for without sin there is nothing to which temptation can appeal. Consequently if Christ were sinless, he could have had no possibility either of temptation or of sin. To be capable either of sinning or of being tempted is to have at least the beginning of an evil impulse. Christ was then by his very nature incapable of sinning, and he stood above the reach of all temptation.

Let us look first at the consequences and then at the logic of this view. As to consequences, it is first to be noted that such a theory is absolutely untrue to the New Testament. Jesus is there represented as undergoing genuine human experience. His ministry begins with a struggle against temptation. The Epistle to the Hebrews says that he was "in all points tempted like as we are, yet without sin" (Heb. 4 15). The same Epistle says, "For in that he himself hath suffered being tempted, he is able to succour them that are tempted" (2 18). He who holds the previous view definitely departs from the teaching of the New Testament. And secondly, this view makes the moral life of Jesus unreal. He is removed

from such a struggle as we have to endure. His life is therefore without moral significance for humanity.

As to the logic of the theory, it rests on a double fallacy. In the first place, it confuses temptation with sin. Temptation is a good. It is essential to the moral life. Only by the struggle against temptation can true righteousness be achieved. To yield to temptation is sin. To feel temptation and to struggle against it is a mark of all morality. It was the Spirit by which Jesus was driven into the wilderness to be tempted of the devil. The capacity of being tempted came not from an evil impulse but from the presence of the Holy Spirit. It is false logic to confuse temptation with sin.

And secondly, this theory confuses a moral process with a moral result. It is true that the highest moral result is given when temptation is so conquered that it can be resisted without a struggle. But such a result must be the outcome and not the beginning of a moral process. There is the greatest difference between one who has never felt temptation and one to whom temptation has ceased to appeal because it has been overcome. Such a development is not sin, but is necessary to any character that is to be one of positive righteousness. This theory then overlooks all moral development in Christ, confuses the result with the process by which that result is reached, and essentially denies his positive righteousness. The theory must be abandoned. The temptation and struggle of Jesus must be regarded as real, and as a necessary part of his perfect righteousness.

But just there comes the difficulty. In our own experience temptation and struggle are so bound up with sin and moral failure that it is hard for us to conceive what temptation would have been in a life apart from sin. How was it that the sinless life of Jesus could have known any moral struggle and temptation comparable to our own?

No doubt the mystery cannot be perfectly solved. But there are certain considerations that are helpful in the approach to it. In the first place, it is to be emphasized again that we are dealing with the positive righteousness of Christ and not simply with a negative sinlessness or innocence. Mere innocence might exist apart from struggle and therefore apart from contact with the world. But positive righteousness must be achieved through struggle. It will lead us to think of Christ as having a positive work to do in the actual world of human experience.

Secondly, it is to be remembered that although Christ was perfect he did not live in a perfect world. He lived in a world in which there was sin, and in which sin involved its consequences of suffering and misery. We have not to ask the theoretical question, What would be a perfect character in a perfect world? That question might lead us merely to theoretical abstractions. We have to ask the definite question, What was the perfect character in the world of sin? We have to deal with the historic fact of the perfect righteousness manifested in sinful conditions.

With these two considerations in mind, we may then ask this question, As a character becomes more perfect, does it feel more or less keenly the sin of the world? The answer is easy. True righteousness feels the pressures and power of sin as the weak sinning character can never feel it. Because St. Paul is himself strong, he writes, "Who is weak and I am not weak?" His strength means that he must bear the weakness of others. In the same way righteousness feels the presence of sin. The text, "To the pure all things are pure," is sometimes wrongly interpreted. It is equally true that to the impure nothing is felt as impure. It is only purity that feels the burning horror of the impure. Thomas Hobbes said, "*Adeo sentire semper idem, et non sentire, ad idem*

recidunt." It is only differences that are perceived. Those who live within the roar of Niagara are said to be unconscious of its presence. If they leave it, then they feel the difference. So is it true of the tumult of sin. They who live in the very midst of it, yielding to it and living according to it, are unconscious of its presence. The more perfect a man is, the more does he feel the fact of sin, the more fully does he realize its destructive power.

And that sin cannot be escaped by turning one's back on it and trying to forget its presence. In no such way can righteousness be won. Sin cannot be bounded spatially. No man can say, Sin is there and I am here, free from its presence. To run away from it is to be partaker of it. The more perfect a man is, the more fully must he feel the fact of sin, the more fully must he feel his duty and responsibility concerning it. There is no righteousness but missionary righteousness. A selfish righteousness is a contradiction in terms. To flee to the desert and there to seek righteousness is to turn one's back on the only road in which righteousness can be won. The righteousness of the righteous man can be found only in relation to the sin of the world.

There are two ideals of righteousness in the New Testament. The one is the Pharisaic ideal. The word "Pharisee" means "separatist." The Pharisaic righteousness was to be won by separation from all that was sinful. Righteousness was conceived of almost as a quantum, a certain amount of it in the world, and not enough to go around. "The more there is of mine, the less there is of yours" might well have been the Pharisaic motto. The more righteousness a man had, the more was he separate from those who did not have that righteousness. Sin was conceived of almost in spatial terms. I can escape it by getting away from it. It can exist there without affecting me here. That Pharisaic ideal led to an iso-

lated self-culture, to the seeking of righteousness in selfish seclusion.

The other ideal is that of the righteousness of Christ. His righteousness drives him into contact with the sinful world. In him the sin-consciousness was at its highest point, and just for that reason he was the friend of publicans and sinners. Simon the Pharisee said of him, "This man, if he were a prophet, would have perceived who and what manner of woman this is which toucheth him, that she is a sinner." But he knew her sin far better than Simon did. And because he knew it, therefore he suffered her to touch him. His life must come into contact with sin, whatever its depth and vileness. His own purity could be maintained only if it became a purifying power to the world. St. Paul in almost paradoxical form sums up the secret of the righteousness of Christ, when he says that him who knew no sin God made to be sin on our behalf. His very perfection can be won only by making himself to be sin for others. The absolute righteousness of his life demands the deepest contact with the sin of the world. That righteousness can be maintained only as it is a saving power against sin.

Hence his temptation. His temptation was to seek some other ideal of righteousness than that which could be won through the saving and cleansing contact with sin, a contact which should be at once the means of cleansing others and the only way in which his own life could be kept clean. When the Pharisee heard the cry "Unclean," he kept himself aloof. But Jesus touched alike the physical and the moral leper. His own cleanliness could be preserved only by touching the life of the unclean. Because he knew no sin he must indeed be made sin for us. What must that fact have meant to him whose inner life was perfectly pure, who felt the horror of sin most deeply because of his own perfection? Yet that very repulsion from sin drove him into contact with it. He

must meet it with all its consequences. He must treat it as though it were his own. Only by giving himself for others could his own righteousness be won. Must he not often have echoed the wish of the Psalmist, "Oh that I had wings like a dove! Then would I fly away and be at rest"? But not so can he do his task and win his righteousness. His wearied feet must walk through the crowded streets, until finally they tread the way of the cross.

The upbuilding of that perfect righteousness must have meant a struggle against sin far keener than we can know. The higher the righteousness, the more intense the struggle, the stronger the temptation to flee from contact with sin and to win righteousness in seclusion. Perfection is tempted more than imperfection, for it makes its own temptation. Only perfection can know the horror of the contact with sin, the contact without which perfection itself cannot be attained. The righteous Christ must bear others' burdens, until, making them his own, he conquers in the fight for his own righteousness and for the righteousness of the world.

The conflict between these two ideals of righteousness is the conflict between two ideals of what it is to be the Christ. As the Christ, Jesus is called to be the founder of the kingdom of God. What is that kingdom and what are the forces by which it is to be established? They are not physical forces. To command that stones be made bread, to trust in the divine power for support against material downfall, to bow the knee to Satan in compromise, these seem to be the way of strength. But not so is the Christ called to walk. He must tread the path that leads to human failure, he must walk the way of the cross. The leader of the twelve brings before him the temptation of his life: "Be it far from thee, Lord; this shall never be unto thee. But he turned and said unto Peter, Get thee behind me, Satan; thou art a stumbling block

unto me; for thou mindest not the things of God, but the things of men." The divine way is the way of sacrificing love, of identity with human weakness and sin. And that way must be trod in faith. "O my Father, if it be possible, let this cup pass away from me! nevertheless, not as I will, but as thou wilt." The divine way is the way of self-sacrificing righteousness, the way that to man's judgment seems so weak. And that way ends in the cross, a human failure and a divine victory. Therein is the Christ made perfect through suffering, therein does he win his own perfect righteousness. And that perfect righteousness achieved in sacrifice becomes the creative source of a new world. "Him who knew no sin he made to be sin on our behalf; that we might become the righteousness of God in him." The kingdom of God is established, and the law of that kingdom is self-sacrificing love.

The person of Jesus will always be infinitely deeper than we can understand. But this much we know. In him we see God manifested in human life. If we are sure that God is thus truly manifested, we shall not be afraid to see the Man. We shall see him in the limitations of his knowledge and in the struggles of his will. Only thus does the divine enter the human. In those limitations and in that struggle "God was in Christ reconciling the world unto himself." In those limitations we see the victory of faith, in that struggle we see the perfect righteousness. In him who "advanced in wisdom and stature, and in favor with God and men" we see the presence and the power of the Incarnate Life.