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Further Notes on Demosthenes

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higher principle that 'virtue is good.' Here, even in this imperfect argument, is already the germ of the faculty by which the true dialectician is characterized in *Rep.* 534 B διορίσασθαι τῷ λόγῳ ἀπὸ τῶν ἄλλων ἀπάντων ἀφελὼν τὴν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἰδέαν!

Such, it seems to me, is what Plato, in the passage here defended, intends to be the first stage in the treatment of λόγοι or ὑποθέσεις. It is only in that ideal form of dialectic which is pictured in the *Republic* that all possibility of contradiction disappears.

(5) *Rep.* 533 C ἡ διαλεκτικὴ μέθοδος μόνῃ ταύτῃ πορεύεται, τὰς ὑποθέσεις ἀναιροῦσα, ἐπ' αὐτὴν τὴν ἀρχὴν, ἵνα βεβαιώσῃται.

The question I wish to raise here is merely one of words, or rather of a word—ἀναιροῦσα. For with the substance of Mr. Adam's exposition I am in entire agreement. But is it not after all a contradiction to say that the dialectician 'proceeds, by *destroying* his hypotheses, to the first principle itself, so that he may *establish* them?' For the object of βεβαιώσῃται can hardly be anything but ὑποθέσεις; and ἀναιροῦσα, if it stands, must, as Mr. Adam rightly contends, bear its full sense of 'destroying,' 'cancelling' (cf. the passages he quotes from Aristotle), so that a translation like Stallbaum's 'taking up into' for ἀναιροῦσα ἐπὶ is impossible. 'Out of the ruins of the former ὑποθέσεις we build a new and better one, which must in its turn be thoroughly tested, tried, and *perhaps overthrown*, before it can serve as a stepping-stone to one which is higher, truer, and better.' So Mr. Adam admirably describes what may be called the preparatory stage of dialectic, as amply illustrated above; but could the words I have italicized, taken by themselves, adequately express the whole of this process? Why should the negative and destructive side be brought into such unnatural prominence? For not all assumptions are refuted, and, when they are, it is in the manner of Plato's dialectic rather to modify and enlarge than

to cancel them. How much more unsuitable, then, must such a one-sided description of the treatment of hypotheses be to that crowning stage of dialectic when, as Mr. Adam says, we are supposed to be in presence of 'a number of true and irrefragable ἀρχαί, apprehended not only in their mutual coherence and interdependence, but also in their relationship to the supreme Idea.' Once more, Plato's dialectician cannot, like Shakespeare's 'climber-upward,' 'scorn the base degrees by which he did ascend'—for the very good reason that he must have something by the help of which to come down again. The passages which may furnish a clue to the meaning, if not to the word, we should expect in place of ἀναιροῦσα are: *Rep.* 511 A τῶν ὑποθέσεων ἀνωτέρω ἐκβαίνειν: ἰδ. τὰς ὑποθέσεις ποιούμενος οὐκ ἀρχὰς ἀλλὰ τῷ ὄντι ὑποθέσεις, οἷον ἐπιβάσεις τε καὶ ὁρμάς, ἵνα μέχρι τοῦ ἀνυποθέτου ἐπὶ τὴν τοῦ παντός ἀρχὴν ἴωμεν κ.τ.λ.; *Lach.* 200 B ἐγὼ δ' οἶμαι . . . εἴ τι αὐτῶν μὴ ἱκανῶς εἴρηται, ὑστερον ἐπανορθώσεσθαι . . . καὶ ἐπειδὴν βεβαιώσομαι αὐτά, διδάξω καὶ σέ; and especially *Laws* 626 D τὸν λόγον ἐπ' ἀρχὴν ὁρθῶς ἀναγαγὼν σαφέστερον ἐποίησας, and *Xen. Mem.* οὕτω δὲ τῶν λόγων ἐπαναγομένων (of Socrates's method). I do not know whether the two last passages have yet been adduced in this connection; but they are, of course, strongly confirmatory of the reading ἀνάγουσα, which is found as a correction in one MS., and has found many supporters. Nevertheless, it seems just possible that Plato might in this context have preferred a more emphatic and pictorial word; and I would propose, though without much confidence, as an alternative to ἀνάγουσα, either ἀν- or συνείρουσα: cf. *Polit.* 267 A συνείρωμεν ἐπανελθόντες ἐπὶ τὴν ἀρχὴν μέχρι τῆς τελευτῆς τὸν λόγον τοῦ ὀνόματος τῆς τοῦ πολιτικοῦ τέχνης. In any case it is an ἐπανόρθωσις, not an ἀναίρεσις τῶν ὑποθέσεων, that the context appears to me to require.

W. J. GOODRICH.

FURTHER NOTES ON DEMOSTHENES.

DE SYMMORIIS.

14 λόγον μὲν οὐδὲν' ἐβουλόμην θρασὺν οὐδ' ἔχοντα μάταιον μῆκος εὐρεῖν.

36 οὐδ' οὐδ' ἂν καταρώμενος ἦν τίς αὐτοῖς, τοσαῦτα πεπόνθασιν κακά.

The verb εὐρίσκω seems a strange one to use in either of these places. Is it not pretty plain that we should read εἰπεῖν and εἶπε? So εὔροι has been restored for εἶποι in Dion Chrys. 32. 91 ἀμαρτήματα εἶποι τις ἂν πανταχοῦ.

D RHOD. LIBERTATE.

15 ἐπεὶ Ῥοδίοις γε . . συγκαίρω τῶν γεγενημένων.

The construction of the genitive ought not to be pronounced impossible in prose (cf. Isocr. 18. 51: Andoc. 1. 67, &c.), but τῶ γεγενημένῳ would be a very simple change. Cf. such sentences as *Phil.* 1. 42 τοῖς γιγνομένοις . . αἰσχυρόμενος: *De C.* 291 τοῖς γεγενημένοις ἀνιαιροῖς οὐδὲν ὁμοίως ἔσχε τοῖς ἄλλοις: *Thuc.* 3. 98. 5 τοῖς πεπραγμένοις φοβούμενος τοὺς Ἀθηναίους.

27 Κῶν καὶ Ῥόδον καὶ ἄλλας ἐτέρας πόλεις Ἑλληνίδας.

For ἄλλας read πολλάς. *Cobet Misc. Crit.* p. 75 would apparently just omit ἐτέρας, but this is unsatisfactory. Goodhart's suggestion of ἄλλους for πολλούς in *Thuc.* 8. 66. 5 is very convincing.

PRO MEGALOPOLITANIS.

19 ἀλλὰ μὴν ἃ γέ φασιν πεπραχθαι . . ὑπεναντία πρὸς ἡμᾶς; ἀποπον νῦν μὲν ἐν κατηγορίας μέρει ποιείσθαι, βουλομένων δὲ γενέσθαι φίλων αὐτῶν, ἵνα τοῦναντίον εὖ ποιῶσιν ἡμᾶς, βασκαίνειν κ.τ.λ.

There is certainly no meaning in νῦν μὲν, for there is no contrast of times. Weil would omit μὲν. How would it be to insert ταῦτα before it (νῦν <ταῦτα> μὲν)?

DE FALSA LEGATIONE.

10 πρέσβεις πέμψαι τοὺς συνάξοντας δεῦρο τοὺς βουλευσομένους περὶ τοῦ . . πολέμου.

τοὺς being unusual with the future participle after πέμπειν, and the two expressions, τοὺς συνάξοντας and τοὺς βουλευσομένους, being somewhat awkward together, I think the first τοὺς may well be an accidental insertion due to the second.

12 γίγνεται τῶν πρέσβων τούτων εἰς καὶ οὗτος, οὐχ ὡς τῶν ἀποδωσομένων τὰ ὑμέτερα κ.τ.λ.

After ἀποδωσομένων insert ὧν. The cause of its loss is obvious. Cf. on *Midias* 220.

16 νόμον τε θήσειν καὶ γράψειν. θήσει καὶ γράψει?

29 δεῖ δὲ . . ἐκεῖν' ὁρᾶν ὅτι, ὄντιν' ἂν ὑμεῖς εἰς ταύτην τὴν τάξιν κατεστήσατε . . οὗτος . . τῶν ἴσων αἴτιος ἦν ἂν κακῶν.

Editors seem to acquiesce without demur in the ἂν following ὄντινα. No parallel

however is cited for it (*Goodwin M. T.* § 557) and surely its proper meaning would be 'anyone whom you would have appointed,' not 'anyone whom you had appointed.' No doubt ὄντινα κατεστήσατε, which would give the latter meaning, as is here required, might also mean 'the man that you did appoint as a matter of fact, whoever he was,' but this possible ambiguity will not justify the apparently ungrammatical use of ἂν. ὄντινα δὴ (δὴ for ἂν) is rendered somewhat unlikely by the hiatus with ὑμεῖς that would arise. It is noteworthy that ὅτι εἰ καὶ ὄντινοῖν seems to be the reading of the less good MSS.

46 'μὴ νῦν ἀφίστασ' ἀλλ' ὅπως τότε μὴ προσποιήσει.' νῆ Δι', ἣ ἀδικήσω γ' ἔφην.

If νῆ Δία (not μὰ Δία) is right, it must go in sense, though the editors do not point this out, with the imaginary verb on which ὅπως κ.τ.λ. depends, or with a vague idea like τοῦτο ποιήσω.

53 ὡς τὰ παρ' ὑμῶν ἐπύθον τ' ἐκ τῆς ἐκκλησίας. τὰς τῆς ἐκκλησίας?

61 φέρε δὴ μοι καὶ τὴν συμμαχίαν <λέγε? > τὴν τῶν Φωκίων.

178 οὐκοῦν ταῦθ' ὑπεσχόμεν ἐν ἀρχῇ, ταῦτ' ἐπέδειξα.

This repetition of ταῦτα seems quite unlike Demosthenes. *Cobet* would read ἀτθ' for the first ταῦτα. Perhaps πάνθ' ἃ or πάνθ' ὅσ'. πάντα and ταῦτα are sometimes confused. It would be natural to read ἅπερ, if we might regard ταῦθ' as an accidental anticipation of the ταῦτα coming.

193 ἤπερο . . τί δὴ μόνος οὐδὲν ἐπαγγέλλεται (asks no favour of him) ἢ τίν' ἐν αὐτῷ μικροψυχίαν ἢ πρὸς αὐτὸν ἀηδαν ἐνεορακώς.

The first ἢ or makes no proper sense. ἢ and καί get confused, and the latter seems much more likely here. Cf. on *Androt.* 28 below.

224 ἐμέ the reading of S seems to me much better than με, which the editors usually adopt. There is a certain emphasis on the pronoun, which is heightened by the τὸν . . ἀδικοῦντα.

In the same way I would write σέ, not σε, in 244.

272 δόντων τῶν Ἑλλήνων τὰ χρήματα ταῦτα, the money for this purpose.

Weil would rather like to get rid of ταῦτα. The use is much better known in Latin, e.g.

Cic. *Mur.* 68 *si tibi istam (i.e. istius rei) rationem non possim reddere: de Am.* 3 *cum in eam ipsam mentionem incidisset: Virg. Aen.* 2. 171 *ea signa: 7. 595 has poenas: 8. 426 his manibus.* Cf. however Plat. *Rep.* 371 *ε την τιμήν ταύτην the price of this.*

295 οἱ νομίζοντες αὐτοὺς ἀξιοχρεῶς εἶναι τοῦ Φιλίππου ξένοι καὶ φίλοι προσαγορεύεσθαι.

Possibly αὐτοὺς should be omitted, but cf. note on *Phil.* 4. 49 (*C. R.* xvii. p. 149).

297 μαντείαν ἀναγνώσσομαι . . . λέγε τὰς μαντείας.

Read μαντείας in both places.

303 ἀλλὰ μὴν ὅτι ταῦτ' <οὐχ' > οὕτως ἔχει, αὐτὸς οὐχ οἷός τ' ἀντειπεῖν ἔσται.

Greek idiom surely needs the negative.

310 'καὶ τοῖς ἐκγόνοις' προσγράψαντες τὴν εἰρήνην, *having added to the peace the words κ. τ. λ.*

Most edd. follow Dindorf in inserting εἰς after the -ες of the participle. I would suggest τῇ εἰρήνῃ, nothing being commoner than this confusion of terminations. So in 87 αὐτὴν might very well be αὐτῇ. Cf. 56 προσγράψαι πρὸς τὴν εἰρήνην τὸ καὶ τοῖς ἐκγόνοις, for πρὸς is not εἰς.

329 δέδοικα μὴ . . . διοχλῶ πάλοι τοῦτ' αὐτοὺς ὑμᾶς εἰδότας.

There seems to be some authority (Shilleto) for τοὺς αὐτοὺς, and that is perhaps better. Cf. 114 τὸν αὐτὸν ὁμολογοῦντα *the man who himself admits it*, and other places.

336 μὴ λέγ' ὡς καλὸν εἰρήνην μὴδ' ὡς συμφέρον· οὐδεὶς γὰρ αἰτιατὰ σε τοῦ ποιήσασθαι τὴν πόλιν εἰρήνην (Blass τοῦ ποιῆσαι, omitting τ. π. εἰ.)· ἀλλ' ὡς οὐκ αἰσχροῦ κάπονείδιστος καὶ πόλλ' ὕστερον ἐξηπατήμεθα κ.τ.λ.

Perhaps ὡς οὐκ αἰσχροὺ κάπονείδιστον, i.e. ἐποιήσατο.

339 ὅταν μὲν ἴδῃτε δεινότητ' ἢ εὐφωρίαν ἢ τι τῶν τοιούτων ἀγαθῶν . . . , συγχαίρειν καὶ συνασκέειν πάντας δεῖ.

For συνασκέειν read συναύξειν, comparing my note on *Ol.* 3. 28 (*C.R.* xvii. p. 147).

LEPTINES.

15 τιμῶν seems to me a mistake due (as is sometimes the case) to a word that is coming in the next line, in this case τιμῇ. The coming word is already in the writer's mind. There is therefore no need for the displaced word to have resembled it closely.

20 σκεψώμεθα δὴ τί τοῦτο τῇ πόλει, ἐὰν ἅπαντες οὗτοι λητουργῶσι· φανήσεται γὰρ οὐδὲ πολλοῦ δεῖ τῆς γενησομένης ἀξίον αἰσχύνῃς.

The phrase οὐδὲ πολλοῦ δεῖ is always elsewhere preceded by another negative, which it emphasises: οὐκ . . . οὐδὲ πολλοῦ δεῖ. Is it not therefore probable that we should read φανήσεται γὰρ <οὐδὲν> οὐδὲ πολλοῦ δεῖ? Cf. Dobree's very probable ὦν <οὐδεὶς> οὐδὲν ἐκείνοις προσήκεν in 104.

24 ὡς ἄρα δεινὸν εἰ ἐν κοινῷ μὲν μὴδ' ὅτιοι ὑπάρχει τῇ πόλει, ἰδίᾳ δὲ τινες πλουτήσουσ' ἀτελείας ἐπειληγμένοι.

ὑπάρχει may very well be right; but the corruption of the future is so common that ὑπάρξει as parallel to πλουτήσουσι is worth suggesting.

93 συνίεθ' ὃν τρόπον, ὃ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, ὁ Σόλων τοὺς νόμους ὡς καλῶς κελεύει τιθέναι.

Cobet brackets ὡς καλῶς: I would rather suggest that καί has been lost before ὡς, the symbols for these two words being often confused together in MSS. Wolf compares Aesch. 1. 20 ἴν' εἰδῇθ' οἷων νόμων ὑμῖν κειμένων, ὡς καλῶν καὶ σωφρόνων, κ.τ.λ. That passage is however very different in that (1) the sense is complete before we come to the ὡς clause; (2) even the ὡς καλῶν could hardly stand without the addition of καὶ σωφρόνων.

123 μὴ τοίνυν διὰ μὲν τοῦ τῶνδε κατηγορεῖν ὡς φαύλων ἐκείνους ἀφαιροῦ, δι' ἃ δ' αὖ καταλείπειν ἐκείνους φήσεις τοῦσδ' ὁ μόνον λαβόντες ἔχουσι τοῦτ' ἀφέλῃ.

Sense and symmetry alike call for διὰ μὲν τό, not τοῦ.

157 αἰσχρός, ὃ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, καὶ κακῶς ἔχων ὁ νόμος καὶ ὁμοῖος φθόνῳ τινί. αἰσχροῦς?

MIDIAS.

52 (oracle) στεφαναφορεῖν κατὰ πάτρια... ἰδίας δεξιὰς καὶ ἀριστερὰς ἀνίσχοντας.

Is it possible that the unexplained ἰδίας (ἰθείας, ὀσίας, λιτάς have been suggested) stands for λαίας (ΙΔΙΑΣ for ΛΑΙΑΣ), λαίας being a variant, and probably the original, of ἀριστεράς? It is of some significance that in *Macart.* 66 the same oracle is quoted and ἰδίας does not appear.

75 ἀκούω γὰρ αὐτὸν ἔγωγε μιᾷ μόνον ἀλῶναι ψήφῳ, καὶ ταῦτ' οὔτε κλαύσαντ' οὔτε δεηθέντα τῶν δικαστῶν οὐδενὸς οὔτε φιλάνθρωπον οὔτε μικρὸν οὔτε μέγα οὐδ' ὅτιοι πρὸς τοὺς δικαστὰς ποιήσαντα.

It would be idiomatic (cf. e.g. 129) and much more elegant to substitute οὐδέ for the οὔτε before φιλάνθρωπον. οὔτε five times over, with the fourth and fifth subordinate to the third, is far from good.

78 τὰ δ' ἔργα πάντ' ἦν καὶ τὰ πραττόμενα ὑπὸ τούτου.

Read certainly ἀπό for ὑπό, though I do not find it recorded as a variant or a conjecture. ὑπό is surely impossible with ἦν, on which the preposition must depend.

174 For τὰς πομπὰς ἡγήτο, which Cobet rightly I think condemns, ταῖς πομπαῖς (as the dative is often used, e.g. in the *Hipparchicus*) would be less change than his ἐποιεῖτο.

209 οὐκ ἂν εὐθέως εἴποιεν 'τὸν δὲ βάσκανον, τὸν δ' ὄλεθρον, τοῦτον δ' ὑβρίζειν, ἀναπνέειν δέ; ὃν εἴ τις ἐὰ ζῆν, ἀγαπᾶν δεῖ' (or ἔδει).

It is somewhat surprising that scholars have acquiesced in this use of ἀναπνέειν. Reiske indeed sought some other explanation and Wolf conjectured μέγα πνεῖν, but most scholars seem content to believe that, though everywhere else it means simply to *breathe*, or *recover breath* (cf. ἀναπνοή), here it has the sense of μέγα φρονεῖν and can be used even as a climax after ὑβρίζειν.¹ This is to me incredible and I venture to make the suggestion that follows, though not quite satisfied with it. ἀναπνέειν must somehow go with the ζῆν following, for the two words mean really the same thing. Perhaps therefore Demosthenes wrote something like τοῦτον δ' ὑβρίζειν, ἀναπνέειν (δὴ;) ὃν εἴ τις ἐὰ <καὶ> ζῆν, ἀγαπᾶν ἔδει. The place of ἀναπνέειν will be due (1) to rhetorical emphasis, and perhaps (2) to desire of escaping the sequence of short syllables in ὃν ἀναπνέειν or ὃν εἴ τις ἀναπνέειν. But I would not urge this particular conjecture: I would only maintain that the words can hardly be right as they stand.

It does not seem clear that we are to take the accusatives τὸν δὲ βάσκανον, τὸν δ' ὄλεθρον, by themselves as exclamatory. Resumed in τοῦτον, they may be the subject of ὑβρίζειν. For the δέ cf. *Aristog.* A. 91. ἐπειδὴν οὖν τις...εἴπη 'τοῦτον δὲ ταῦτα ποιεῖν;'

220 ὅταν εἰς ὁ παθὼν μὴ λάβῃ δίκην.

Probably εἰς ὁ παθὼν <ῶν>. cf. on *F.L.* 12 above.

¹ Goodwin, *Moods and Tenses*, § 787, translates 'should be thus insulting, and should draw his breath,' meaning (I suppose) 'should be allowed to live.' But with ὃν εἴ τις ἐὰ ζῆν, ἀγαπᾶν ἔδει this is clumsy in the extreme.

ANDROTION.

28 πρὸς διαιτητὴν ἐξῆν αὐτῷ λαχεῖν καὶ γράφεισθαι χρῆν.

Should we not read ἦ for καί, just as in 25 δεινοὺς καὶ ἰθρασεῖς is now read for ἦ?

35 εἰ δὲ τῷ τούτῳ ποιῆσαι πλείους ἢ μυρίους τοὺς ἄλλους πολίτας βελτίους εἶναι προτρέψετε.

τοὺς ἄλλους πολίτας has all the appearance of an adscript added to explain πλείους ἢ μυρίους.

38 ἵσως ἀναβήσεται καὶ συνερεῖ τῇ βουλῇ Φίλιππος...καὶ τινες ἄλλοι, οἵπερ ἐκεῖ δι' ἑαυτῶν εἶχον μετὰ τούτου τὸ βουλευτήριον καὶ τούτων τῶν κακῶν ἦσαν αἰτιοί.

'It is agreed' remarks Mr. Wayte 'that ἐκεῖ here = τότε, a sense of which I cannot find another undoubted example.' Rather than accept anything so unlikely I suggest that we read ἐπεὶ for ἐκεῖ. οἵπερ...ἦσαν αἰτιοί is the main predication and καί means also.

76. καὶ οὐδ' ἐκείν' εἶδεν, κ.τ.λ.

οἶδεν? as in the preceding section οὕτω σκαῖός...ὥστ' οὐκ οἶδεν ἐκεῖνο ὅτι κ.τ.λ. Cf. however *Aristocr.* 123 and 135.

ARISTOCRATES.

26 τὴν βουλὴν δικάζειν ἔγραψε καὶ οὐχ ἄπερ, ἂν ἁλῶ, παθεῖν εἶπεν.

S itself has ἁλῶ εἶναι: ἁλῶ παθεῖν εἶπεν is a marginal correction often adopted by the editors and probably right. They illustrate the construction by § 53 τοῦ νόμου λέγοντος ἐφ' οἷς ἐξείναι κτεῖναι, etc. No one however seems to have noticed that ἄπερ is wrongly used. ὅς sometimes stands in an indirect question, such as εἶπεν ἃ δεῖ παθεῖν, but ὅσπερ is (I think) always relative, never in good Attic interrogative. (In late Greek ὅσπερ is thus misused, e.g. *Arrian Anab.* 1. 17. 6 σκοποῦντι...ὅπερ ἐπιτηδεύτατον χωρίον). Here, if right, it would have to be the indirect interrogative: a relative sense, *the very things which*, would be quite out of place. I would suggest that the περ be transferred to the ἂν which follows and read οὐχ ἃ, ἂνπερ ἁλῶ, παθεῖν εἶπεν, unless the hiatus is thought to forbid this.

33 λυμαίνεσθαι δέ, φησί, μὴ, μὴ δὲ ἀποινᾶν ταῦτα δ' ἐστὶ τί; τὸ μὲν δὴ μὴ λυμαίνεσθαι γνώριμον οἶδ' ὅτι πᾶσι μὴ μαστιγῶν, μὴ δύν, μὴ τὰ τοιαῦτα ποιεῖν λέγει.

So this passage is usually printed, but the construction of γνώριμον οἶδ' ὅτι πᾶσι is

then awkward: *was ohne Zweifel allen verständlich ist* says Westermann, comparing εὖ οἶδ' ὅτι, which is not really similar. Rather put a stop after πᾶσιν, ἐστὶ being understood: τὸ μὲν δὴ μὴ λ. γνώριμον οἶδ' ὅτι πᾶσιν μὴ μαστιγοῦν κ.τ.λ.

50 ἄν τις τύπτῃ τινά, φησίν, ἄρχων χειρῶν ἀδίκων, ὡς εἰ γ' ἡμύνατο οὐκ ἀδικεῖ. ἄν τις κακῶς ἀγορεύῃ, τὰ ψευδῇ προσέθηκεν, ὡς εἰ γε τάλῃθ' προσήκον.

Surely the usage of ὡς and the parallel of προσήκον show that ἀδικεῖ ought to be ἀδικῶν or, if that is to be avoided after ἀδίκων, ἀδικήσας, or ἀδικεῖν <δοκῶν>.

143 τοῦτο τοίνυν ἐπ' ἐκείνου μὲν εὖ ποιοῦν οὐ συνέβη φενακισθεῖσιν ὑμῖν αἰσχύνῃν ὀφλεῖν, ἐπὶ τούτου δὲ ἔαν ἐμοὶ πείθησθε φυλάξεσθε.

τοῦτο is variously taken as nominative, explained by αἰσχύνῃν ὀφλεῖν, and as accusative after it on the analogy of τοῦτο ἡδομαι, &c. In εὖ ποιοῦν the editors seem to find no difficulty, comparing such passages as *Ol.* 1. 28 ὑπὲρ τῶν πολλῶν ὧν εὖ ποιοῦντες ἔχουσιν: *Lept.* 110 ὑμεῖς καλῶς ποιοῦντες . . ἄμεινον ἐκείνων πράττετε: *Ar. Plut.* 863 καλῶς ποιῶν ἀπόλλυνται. But what can be said of persons cannot therefore always be said of things, and anyone who considers it carefully must see that, whatever the construction of τοῦτο, it is very extraordinary for εὖ ποιοῦν to be combined with it. I cannot myself doubt that it is a mistake for εὖ ποιοῦσιν, just as in *Plato Rep.* 434 D it still seems to me probable that ἰὼν represents ἰούσιν. There is no reason why it should not precede and be separated from the word it agrees with, as in 163 τὸν μὲν γὰρ Κότυν εὖ ποιῶν ὄντα γ' ἐχθρὸν ὑμῖν καὶ πονηρὸν ἀποκρίνυσιν ὁ Πύθων.

145 πολλὰ γινώσκοντες ὀρθῶς ὑμεῖς οὐ διὰ τέλους αὐτοῖς χρήσθε. οἶον τί λέγω; εἰ τις ὑμᾶς ἔροιτο κ.τ.λ.

No precise parallel to οἶον τί λέγω is quoted, nor are the editors agreed how it should be explained. Perhaps Demosthenes wrote ποῖον τί λέγω; This use of ποῖος is very common in Plato, when a man is asked to explain himself.

TIMOCRATES.

41 ὅλος μὲν γάρ ἐστιν ἅπασιν ἐναντίος τοῖς οὔσι (νόμοις ὁ νόμος), μάλιστα δὲ τούτῳ.

Should not ὅλος be ὅλος? There is little or no point in ὅλος, for the idiom mentioned in *Rehdantz Index s.v.* seems not to apply; whereas ὅλος will go with ἅπασιν or contrast with μάλιστα.

53 εἴ τις ἔροιθ' ὑμᾶς ποτέρους μᾶλλον ἂν εἰκότως ποιήσαιθ' ὀτιοῦν, τοῖς δεομένοις ἢ τοῖς ἐπιτάττουσιν, οἶδ' ὅτι φήσαιθ' ἂν τοῖς δεομένοις: τὸ μὲν γὰρ χρηστῶν, τὸ δ' ἀνάνδρων ἀνθρώπων ἔργον ἐστίν.

It is surprising that not merely Wayte but also Blass should adhere to ἀνάνδρων, which is utterly inappropriate, and should not even mention Cobet's convincing conjecture ἀναυδῶν, a word that meets us again and again in Demosthenes' denunciations.

61 εἰ περὶ πάντων ἐρῶ, ἐξωσθήσομαι περὶ τοῦ μηδ' ἐπιτήδειον ὅλως ὑμῖν εἶναι τὸν νόμον εἰπεῖν.

Surely the second περὶ is an accidental repetition of the first. ἐξωθεῖσθαι τινός is Greek; ἐξωθεῖσθαι περὶ τίνος is not.

105 If the Greek of the alleged νόμος is worth correcting, I would suggest that in ὁ τι ἂν τις ἀπολέσῃ, ἔαν μὲν αὐτὸ λάβῃ we should read ἀπολάβῃ for αὐτὸ λάβῃ. We do not need αὐτό, and λάβῃ alone is insufficient.

141 ἡγούμενος ἀβίωτον αὐτῷ εἶναι τὸν βίον τοῦτο παθόντι.

Insert ἂν before αὐτῷ or εἶναι. The meaning is that, *if* he lost his one eye, life *would not* be worth living.

171 The ἦθος of the city is not τοὺς μὲν πολλοὺς ὡμῶς μεταχειρίζεσθαι, κολακεύειν δὲ τὸν αἰεὶ τι δύνασθαι δοκοῦντα. ὁ σὺ ποιεῖς, ὦ Τιμόκρατες: δι' αὐτὸ πολλῶ μᾶλλον ἂν εἰκότως μὴ ἐβελήσαντες ἀκούσασθαι σου θάνατον καταψηφίσαισινθ' οὗτοι ἢ δι' Ἀνδροτίων' ἀφείησαν.

As the sentence stands, μὴ with ἐβελήσαντες seems impossible. It could only be conditional and a conditional sense is inappropriate. In 'they would condemn you unheard,' there is no place for a condition and for μὴ. It would seem therefore that μὴ is probably due to the relative αὐτὸ being generic, *such things as would make them*, in which case μὴ would be right. But we cannot give αὐτὸ this sense without some change or addition, which it is impossible to specify with any certainty, e.g. <ἐπιτηδεύων> or <τοιαῦτα γὰρ πράττεις> δι' αὐτὸ. A very slight change, which may I think be right, would be to read οὐ σὺ ποιεῖς . . δι' αὐτὸ as a question.

ARISTOGEITON A.

13 οὐ γὰρ ἡγνόουν ὅτι ὁ ποιήσας τι τοιοῦτον παρ' ὑμῖν καὶ παθὼν ἀπέρχεται.

Reiske remarks on παθὼν *subaudi a communi* τι, and so Weil. But in this case

should we not have to understand τοιούτον too? τ is so like π that it sometimes disappears before it, and it may have done so here. Cf. 95.

16 οἱ δὲ νόμοι τὸ δίκαιον κ.τ.λ.

Blass certainly seems right in demurring to νόμοι. I would only notice (1) that it is due to νόμος coming both before and afterwards and already occupying the writer's mind; (2) that therefore the original word need not resemble νόμοι, though very probably it was disyllabic (cf. on Lept. 15 above). Blass suggests λοιποί or ἄλλοι, but πολλοί, χρηστοί, and many other words are about equally likely.

25 διαλογισάμενος ταῦθ' ἄπερ οὗτος, ὅτι ἔξεστι κ.τ.λ.

Perhaps ταῦθ' would be better, though not necessary.

31 μὴ γὰρ, ὦ Ζεῦ καὶ θεοί, τοσαύτη σπάνις ἀνδρῶν γένοιτο τῇ πόλει, ὥστε παρ' Ἀριστογέιτονος τῶν καλῶν τι ποιήσασθαι.

ποιήσασθαι is supposed to mean *procure* or *get done*, but ποιείσθαι παρά τινος cannot be Greek. Cobet conjectures πορίσασθαι, Naber αἰτήσασθαι. The latter seems to me the better in sense, but αἰτήσασθαι could hardly have got so changed. Perhaps for ποιήσασθαι, i.e. ποιήσασθαι, we should read δεήσασθαι, which comes very near. Cf. the necessary correction of ψήφισμα . . . μετανοήσαι in *Aristog. B. 17* to μεταποιήσαι or μεταποήσαι (*De Cor. 121 νόμους μεταποιῶν*).

57 τὴν τοιαύτ' εὐεργετήσαν αὐτόν.

τοσαύτ'? The mistake is not uncommon.

66 τίς ἐστιν ὁ τὴν πρὸς τοὺς γονέας εὐνοίαν ὁρῶν προδεδωκότα τοῦτον ἢν πρὸς τὸν δῆμον νῦν ἔχειν ὑπισχνείται πιστεύων.

There is no occasion for any large change like Cobet's ἦν . . . ὑποκρίνεται ἀληθῆ εἶναι πιστεύων, nor does Weil's ὑπισχνείται ἔχειν for ἔχειν ὑπισχνείται seem as likely as Reiske's simple and easy ἦ for ἦν. But the two present participles ὁρῶν and πιστεύων are awkward. Keeping the first, as it is, subordinate to the second, I would act on the very common confusion of futures with presents and read πιστεύσων. Had Demosthenes written ὁρῶν and πιστεύων, would he not have used μέν and δέ?

100 τί φήσετε; ἀρέσκειν τοῦτον ὑμῖν; καὶ τίς ὁ τοῦτο τολμήσων εἰπεῖν; τίς ὁ τῆς τούτου πονηρίας μετ' ἀρᾶς καὶ κακῆς δόξης κληρονομεῖν βουλησόμενος; ἀλλ' οὐκ αὐτὸς ἕκαστος ἀποψη-

φίσασθαι; οὐκοῦν καταράσεσθε τοῖς ἀπειψφισμένοις τοῦτο τὸ πιστὸν ἕκαστος διδοὺς ὥς οὐκ αὐτὸς οὗτός ἐστι.

It is difficult to make sense of ἀλλ' οὐκ . . . ἀποψηφίσασθαι, which Weil after Reiske prints as a statement (οὐκ = οὐ φήσετε you *will deny*) but prefers to omit, a somewhat desperate remedy when the words are not of an explanatory nature. There is slight authority for καταψηφίσασθαι, which perhaps may be regarded as a correction. I would suggest the loss of an οὐ (no infrequent event and here the easier because there is already one οὐ in the clause), reading ἀλλ' οὐκ αὐτὸς ἕκαστος <οὐκ> ἀποψηφίσασθαι; *will not each of you say that he did not acquit?* or the simple change ἀλλ' αὐτὸς ἕκαστος οὐκ ἀποψηφίσασθαι.

The οὗτος at the end may seem strange and possibly we should read τοιοῦτος. But I think it is right. In any case I take the word as referring not to τοῖς ἀπειψφισμένοις (Reiske with Weil's concurrence makes it = ὁ ἀπειψφισμένος, as though only one man had done the acquitting), but to τῆς τούτου πονηρίας κληρονομεῖν above.

ARISTOGEITON B.

4 διὸ καὶ τὰς τιμωρίας ὁ Σόλων τοῖς μὲν ιδιώταις βραδείας ἐποίησε, ταῖς δ' ἀρχαῖς καὶ τοῖς δημαγωγοῖς ταχείας. ὑπολαμβάνων τοῖς μὲν ἐνδέχεσθαι καὶ παρὰ τὸν χρόνον τὸ δίκαιον λαβεῖν, τοῖς δ' οὐκ ἐνεῖναι περιμεῖναι.

τοῖς μὲν and τοῖς δέ are certainly difficult. Reiske read τοὺς δέ without touching the equal difficulty of τοῖς μὲν. Schäfer calls them *dativè incommodi*. Weil's note leaves it obscure how he really explains them. He says that the phrase is equivalent to παρ' ἐκείνων μὲν . . . λαβεῖν ἐνδέχεσθαι, and '*le demonstratif est construit avec ἐνδέχεσθαι, et plus bas avec ἐνεῖναι, au lieu d' être construit avec λαβεῖν et περιμεῖναι, adding παρὰ τὸν χρόνον est singulièrement dit.* (Some at least of the earlier editors seem to think παρά means, or should be changed to, μετά.)

I think it is impossible that the words can mean anything but 'the one set of people may even be helped to justice by lapse of time, while the other cannot afford to wait,' and I should explain τοῖς μὲν and τοῖς δέ as referring by a certain brevity and confusion of expression, not to the ιδιώται and ἀρχαί themselves, but to the persons who have had to do with them respectively and have been injured by them. τοῖς μὲν = people in the one case, τοῖς δέ people in the other. Such a reference is irregular but not, I think, im-

possible, though we should look for it usually in a more compressed style, such as that of Aristotle. *Anal. Post.* i. 24, 86A 12 for instance illustrates it: ὁ δὲ τὴν καθόλου (ἀποδείξιν) ἔχων οἶδε καὶ τὸ κατὰ μέρος· οὗτος δὲ τὸ καθόλου οὐκ οἶδεν, where οὗτος means the man who has to do with (in this case the man who knows) τὸ κατὰ μέρος, and does not refer to τὸ κατὰ μέρος itself. The meaning

of *παρὰ τὸν χρόνον* is that time may bring facts to light, calm angry feelings, &c.

16 Should *ὄν* be added to help the construction of *παροπτεόν*? I should incline to αὐτὸν <ὄν>.

23 Should *δῶτε* be *δώσετε* (after *παραφυλάξετε ὅπως*)?

HERBERT RICHARDS.

ARISTOTLE *ETHICS* I. 6.

THE passage in *Eth. Nic.* A 6 which mentions τὸ πρότερον καὶ ὕστερον presents a well-known difficulty in interpretation because of its seeming contradiction to a passage in *Met.* M 6. The texts are these:—

E.N. A 6. 1096^a 17 οἱ δὲ κομίσαντες τὴν δόξαν ταύτην οὐκ ἐποίουν ιδέας ἐν οἷς τὸ πρότερον καὶ ὕστερον ἔλεγον, διόπερ οὐδὲ τῶν ἀριθμῶν ιδέαν κατεσκεύαζον.

Met. M 6. 1080^b 11 οἱ μὲν οὖν ἀμφοτέρους φασὶν εἶναι τοὺς ἀριθμούς, τὸν μὲν ἔχοντα τὸ πρότερον καὶ ὕστερον τὰς ιδέας, τὸν δὲ μαθηματικὸν παρὰ τὰς ιδέας καὶ τὰ αἰσθητά, καὶ χωριστοὺς ἀμφοτέρους τῶν αἰσθητῶν.

Various methods of reconciling these statements have been suggested, as may be seen in the full discussions of Zeller and Sussemihl. Now that Bonitz and others have clearly proved that the 'Before and After' was a technical term in the Ideal arithmetic to indicate the relation of the factor (τὸ γεννῶν) to the product (τὸ γεννώμενον), the *metaphysics* passage by itself is quite explicable and does not require emendation, as Trendelenburg supposed. The difficulty lies rather in the *Ethics*. Three methods of solution have been proposed: (1) Trendelenburg and Brandis hold that the sense of τὸ πρότερον καὶ ὕστερον in *E.N.* A is different from that in *Met.* M, viz., numerical, not notional, order. (2) Sussemihl and Bonitz (on *Met.* B 3) hold that the sense of the phrase in *E.N.* is wider and less definite than in *Met.* M. (3) Zeller maintains that the sense is the same in both passages, viz. to denote Ideal, logical sequence. The only important discussion of the point by an English scholar is, so far as I know, that by Mr. Stewart ('*Ethics*' *ad loc.*). He sides against Zeller. 'I agree with Bonitz and Schwegler that the μαθηματικοὶ ἀριθμοὶ are intended in *Met.* B 3. 999^a 6. If so the presumption is strong that they are intended in *E.E.* i. 8. 1218^a 1, and if in the

latter passage then in *E.N.* i. 6. 2.' And as to the use of the term in *Met.* M 6, he remarks: 'When the εἰδητικοὶ ἀριθμοὶ equally with the μαθηματικοὶ ἀρ. are described as involving πρότερον καὶ ὕστερον (*Met.* M 6. 1080^b 12) the description is to be taken as one awkwardly transferred from the ἀριθμητικοὶ ἀριθμοὶ, which are not independent entities, to entities which, though called ἀριθμοὶ, are yet regarded as independent of one another.' Burnet (*ad loc.*) also appears to agree with the view that it is the 'priority and posteriority' of numerical series which is meant. To this interpretation I cannot assent. I have no doubt that Zeller is right in interpreting the phrase in all these places as belonging to the Ideal arithmetic and denoting the γέννησις of Ideal Numbers. The *Ethics* passage, as Stewart and others have observed, cannot be dissociated from that in *Met.* B 999^a 1 ff. Into the discussion of the latter passage I cannot here enter; but my belief is that, rightly interpreted, it proves τὸ πρότερον καὶ ὕστερον to refer to logical (κατ' εἶδος) production and sequence. The view there stated is, as I understand it, that so long as the process (γέννησις) which involves πρ. κ. ὕστερον is going on we have not yet arrived at an εἶδος proper: this we do only when that process comes to its term in ἀπομόν τι. Ἀριθμός, e.g., is divisible into a variety of εἶδη, and hence does not constitute in itself an ἰδέα.

Accordingly the sense of our passage, *E.N.* A 6, will be: 'The Idealists did not view the higher (logically soluble) genera as Ideas, wherefore they formed no (single, generic) Idea of the numbers' (i.e. of the εἶδη-ἀριθμοὶ). This is similar in effect to Zeller's explanation, but he appears to construe the argument in *Met.* B somewhat differently.

R. G. BURY.

C