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Bonhoeffer on the Stoic Philosophy *Epictet und die Stoa, Untersuchungen zur stoischen Philosophie*. 1890. 10 Mk. *Die Ethik des Stoikers Epictet. Anhang*. Von Adolf Bonhoeffer. Stuttgart: Enke. 1894. 10 Mk.

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σκεύους πρὸς τὴν ἰδέαν βλέπων οὕτω ποιεῖ, ὁ μὲν τὰς κλίνας κ.τ.λ. The second note is on (597 E) ὁ τραγωδοποιὸς, εἴπερ μιμητὴς ἐστὶ, τρίτος τις ἀπὸ βασιλέως καὶ τῆς ἀληθείας πεφυκώς, where we read 'God is here represented as king,' but there cannot be a doubt that the three degrees are (1) the stage king, (2) the actual king, say, Darius, (3) the idea of the king, in virtue of his resemblance to which Darius is called king. The sentence is elliptical and obscure owing to the rapid movement of the dialogue. Just before, the three sorts of makers and the three sorts of products had been separately compared (the painter: the carpenter: God :: the painted bed: the actual bed: the idea). Here what corresponds to the first term of the former series is compared with the last term of the latter, and we are left to supply the remaining terms for ourselves. Strictly speaking, the tragic poet is a maker, and as such should have

been compared with God; but, in order to make the thought more definite, Plato substitutes the divine idea of the king for God, and expects us to see in the tragic poet the form of the king embodied in his imagination. Take again the note on 353 B, 'The conception (of an ἔργον) exercised a great influence on Logic and Ethics in the ancient world, leading to the ἀγαθόν of Aristotle... Modern philosophy has moulded Ethics into another form. The favourite notion of a τὰγαθόν... has been replaced by modes of speech, such as duty, law, will, or resolved into the more concrete abstractions of utility and pleasure.' But 'duty, law, will,' are precisely the catch-words of the Stoic philosophy as pleasure is of the Epicurean. People are too fond of these sweeping generalizations in contrasting the ancient with the modern world.

J. B. MAYOR.

BONHOEFFER ON THE STOIC PHILOSOPHY.

Epictet und die Stoa, Untersuchungen zur stoischen Philosophie. 1890. 10 Mk.
Die Ethik des Stoikers Epictet. Anhang. Von ADOLF BONHOEFFER. Stuttgart: Enke. 1894. 10 Mk.

THESE two volumes are intended to investigate the Stoic system so far as presented by Epictetus. They may be regarded as a single work, and the second volume has indices to both. Their characteristic is the application of minute and laborious research to the interpretation of the *Discourses* and the *Manual*; a masterly analysis of the doctrine there laid down is followed by a minute comparison under the heads of anthropology, psychology, ethics, and (in a short appendix) pantheism with the Stoic teaching generally—before all with that of Seneca, Mithonius, and Marcus Aurelius, who stand in point of time the nearest to Epictetus. It is not a systematic exposition historically arranged that we find here, but rather a series of critical disquisitions in which various questions of psychology and ethics are examined on all sides. As a whole the execution deserves the highest possible commendation; no future student can afford to disregard it. But the nature of its peculiar merits must not blind us to its limitations. Epictetus is not exactly

the authority for Stoicism whom we should be most anxious to consult. However orthodox, he is late and addresses himself to the practical common sense of the Roman world in which he lived, not to an audience of Athenian students in the third century B.C. The strong point in his favour is that we have a faithful report of what he taught: his predecessors, with scarcely an exception, we only know at second hand, often through the distorted medium of hostile criticism. Moreover, as Mr. Bonhoeffer insists (*Epictet*, p. 33), Zeller's view that from Posidonius onward Stoicism shows an increasing approximation to Platonism, and that when we come to Epictetus the boundaries of the system are transcended, is certain to give way before the contrary opinion that the later Stoics mark a reaction against eclecticism; that this tendency can be discerned even in Seneca, and that apart from unessential deviations and developments Epictetus presents to us the purest reflection of the old Stoic theory of life and the universe. Without going quite so far as to endorse this last remark we may agree that the influence of Panaetius and Posidonius, profound as it was, was after all but temporary: the tide of Academic invasion was turned; in the limited field to which practical considerations confined the attention of the

Roman Stoics the desire to be orthodox was strongly felt. At the same time it needs much wariness to sift the later doctrine. Epictetus has a division of philosophy, which stands for far more to him than any of the older school—that into the three *τόποι* of *ὁρεῖς*, *ὁρμή*, *συγκατάθεσις*, and our author is doubtless right in claiming this for him as original. Again it is shown in a convincing manner that Epictetus held out no expectation of a future life for the individual: but it would be erroneous to suppose that here he is entitled to speak for the whole school. On the other hand the quasi-personification of reason in man as his genius or *δαίμων*, which receives a wide development in the later Stoics, can be traced back to Chrysippus.

The Stoic psychology abounds in knotty problems, some of which come up for detailed discussion in the earlier and more important of these two volumes: *e.g.* What is the relation of the parts of the soul to the mind or 'ruling' part? What is the seat of sensation? Are the parts of the soul organs or functions? Is the Hegemonikon always active, or is it *e.g.* in perception alternately active and passive? How are we to conceive of the mechanism of sense-perception? To these questions a clear and consistent answer can generally be returned after the evidence has been carefully sifted. Thus it seems probable that feeling resides in the central soul (*ἡγεμονικόν*) alone; that the 'parts' of the soul are currents—but *πνεύματα νοερά*, be it remembered—which connect the central soul with the organs of sense. That the process of perception is two-fold; the first stage or simple apprehension of a sensible quality (*ἀντίληψις αἰσθητοῦ*) wherein the motion or change in the organ of sense conveyed by the connecting current to the central soul produces there a presentation (*φαντασία*): the further stage, in which the central soul appropriates this 'content of consciousness' as a permanent possession (*κατάληψις*) by giving assent (*συγκατάθεσις*). If so, it follows that the mind (*ἡγεμονικόν*) is passive when it receives the presentation, active when it gives assent. The difficult term for the presentation or sense impression which the Stoics made the criterion of truth because it brought irresistible conviction with it, the famous *καταληπτικὴ φαντασία*, is lucidly and convincingly explained. Like other adjectives in *-ικος* this must have an active force (English *-ive*). If the phrase suggests any doubt whether it is the perceiving mind or the perceived sensible

quality which is *apprehended*, this is not due to the adjective *καταληπτικὴ*, but to the noun *φαντασία* which has a two-fold aspect, being a modification of the Hegemonikon (*τύπωσις ἐν ψυχῇ*) and at the same time a presentation of something external. Literally interpreted then the κ. φ. is a cognitive presentation, one which either actually cognizes, or is capable of cognizing, some sensible quality: in Cicero's paraphrase, *Ac. post. i. 41*, quae propriam quandam habet declarationem earum rerum quae viderentur, distinctly setting forth its object, namely by exactly reproducing all its *ιδιώματα*. The original graphic turn in *λαμβάνειν*, to fasten, seize upon, grasp, was retained by *ἀντιλαμβάνειν*: it hardly survives in *καταλαμβάνειν*, which is technical for 'cognize' = to apprehend mentally. The difference between *κατάληψις* and *ἐπιστήμη* is that between the atom of knowledge and the structure built up out of it. Not less thorough and satisfactory is the section devoted to the classification of *φαντασίαι*. In his ordinary usage Epictetus makes the word serve for almost any sensation or idea: as Locke puts it, whatsoever is the object of the understanding when a man thinks: his thoughts about these external things and, in particular, the value he sets on them: then by a natural transition external things themselves, so that *πιθανότητες τῶν φαντασιῶν* practically stands for *πιθανότητες τῶν πραγμάτων*. A rapid survey of instances serves to convince us that the intellect (*διάνοια*) is nearly as important a source of ideas as sense itself. The current belief that the Stoics derived all knowledge from sensation must be subjected to very careful limitation before it can be endorsed, and this becomes still more apparent when *πρόληψις* has been analysed, *Epictet.* p. 187–222. Instead of thorough-going empiricism our author claims for the Stoics a rational element, and vindicates the 'inborn' character of our moral and aesthetic ideas. When the reader has got over the shock of this announcement he must be prepared to find that the Stoics defended the freedom of the will, and that their many statements respecting the emotions can be harmonized into a consistent doctrine! Both in the details and as a whole the aspect of Stoicism is considerably modified, so many received opinions are fearlessly challenged.

This is less perhaps the case with the ethical doctrine. Our author emphasizes the eudaemonistic and optimistic character of Stoic ethics: from the latter he infers, as others have done, its genuine idealism.

He defends the obstinacy with which Epictetus adheres to that shibboleth of the system, the tenet that virtue, apart from external goods, suffices for wellbeing:—I dare not say Happiness, for that term, like *Glück*, is a very misleading translation of *εὐδαιμονία*. The development of the various formulae for the *τέλος* is carefully traced and the attitude of the heterodox Middle Stoa thus described: they made the rational choice of things according to nature the one end of man; to Epicurus this is one department of morality, complemented by others. The predominant theism of Epictetus is ascribed to his practical bent. At the same time we are reminded that if complete works of Zeno and Cleanthes had been preserved, they might, like the Hymn of the latter, have reflected the theistic as well as the pantheistic interpretation of the system. But when the admission is made that Epictetus' religion is a mixture of theism with pantheism and polytheism, it is hardly worth while to claim him as a representative Stoic on the matter. The opinion is expressed that his tendency to cynicism has been exaggerated: he certainly upheld the claims and practice of logic against the Cynics as well as the vulgar.

Of the higher or ultimate ethical problems the origin of evil is the most fascinating. Was it due to *πιθανότης τῶν πραγμάτων*? How can this be in a world where all is designed for the best? Or to inherited depravity—which after all only removes the difficulty a stage further back? It is here that Mr. Bonhoeffer discerns the doctrine of free will, which he holds to be necessarily implied in the fundamental thought of Stoic ethics, that every man can attain Happiness (*εὐδαιμονία*), and that this Happiness is independent of all that is external and fortuitous. While on the other side, if virtue rests on knowledge there can be no such thing as free agency: all right conduct is strictly determined. But this is an antinomy which no ingenuity has yet been able to remove.

We have only space to notice the treatment of *καθήκον*, one of the most perplexing of Stoic terms (*Ethik*, p. 193-233). The result is to reject the widespread but er-

roneous belief that *καθήκον* denotes a subordinate morality, legality as contrasted with the higher morality of the *κατόρθωμα*. Further, that *ἀεὶ καθήκοντα* cannot stand for unconditional duty, as opposed to *οὐκ ἀεὶ καθήκοντα*, duties binding on us in certain conditions. For, as is pertinently remarked, life is a series of actions, every one of which is *οὐκ ἀεὶ κ.* in the sense that it is sometimes a duty, sometimes not. But when this *οὐκ ἀεὶ κ.* is our duty it is so in no conditional or imperfect sense: in a given case it may become the only course open to us, and, if so, a *κατόρθωμα*. It is proposed then in place of 'conditional' and 'unconditional' to divide duties into chronic (*ἀεὶ καθήκοντα*), temporary (*οὐκ ἀεὶ κ.*), occasional (*περιστατικά*), and regular (*ἀνεν περιστάσεως*). For the further difficulty of *μέσον* and *τέλειον καθήκον* a solution is provided by calling in a distinction between *λόγος* and *ὁρθὸς λόγος*. The *μέσα* will then be actions dictated by instinctive or egoistic choice of 'things according to nature' of the lower kind, and in the observance of the elementary rules of universal obligation. This solution is possibly provisional: at any rate it does not carry with it the same authority as other parts of the author's work.

It was inevitable that a controversial tone should be introduced into a subject so difficult and so much discussed. If this, the latest exposition of Stoicism, although from its design necessarily imperfect, is at the same time the best, this is because the writer stands on the shoulders of his predecessors and has begun where they left off. Yet it is precisely those to whom he is under the greatest obligation, Zeller, Hirzel, and Stein, who come in for the sharpest criticism, much of which, it might be urged, in the earlier volume at any rate, wears the aspect of captious verbal quibbling. Yet after all deductions have been made the author may be congratulated on the success with which he has cleared up so much that was before obscure or doubtful, and established on a surer basis our knowledge of a great school of thought.

R. D. HICKS.