II.—HEDONIC ÆSTHETICS.

By HENRY RUTGERS MARSHALL.

IN articles published in *MIND*, N.S., Nos. 3 and 4, I have endeavoured to show that the hedonic element is all-important in the consideration of Æsthetics; a position which I think holds even if my hypothesis as to the differentiation of Æsthetics from Hedonics be rejected. If this position be correct, and if the view which I uphold as to the psychology of pleasure be a true one, it should be possible to deduce certain general laws of Æsthetic practice from a consideration of the conditions upon which Æsthetic pleasure getting depends. It should also be possible, in some cases at least, to discover the psychological bases upon which have been built the theories which we have found it necessary to reject, although taught by high authorities. If effort in this direction meet with any degree of success we shall gain not only strong corroboration of the hedonic æsthetic theory, but also an effective argument for the Pleasure-Pain theory which I have elsewhere defended.

The hedonic æsthetic theory may be succinctly stated as follows. The beautiful is that which produces effects in us that are (relatively) permanently pleasurable in revival. The ugly, on the contrary, is that which produces effects of (relatively) permanent painfulness in revival. If the production of the Artist is to be effective as an æsthetic object it must bring not only pleasure by its mere presentation, but more than that it must result in the production of pleasurable revivals, which will coalesce with that field of pleasurable revival which in reflexion we call our æsthetic field. The Artist must employ all means which lead to the attainment of immediate pleasures so far as these are compatible with the production of pleasures in revival. He may add much in the way of mere presentative pleasure which may or may not bring us pleasurable effect in revival, and all such added pleasure in presentation is a gain to the work as Art, provided it neither brings pain in revival nor swamps with resulting indifference the revivals which are pleasurable. He may even go further and add elements which give decided painfulness in the direct presentation produced by the examination of the art work, provided the result in revival is on this account made more permanently

pleasurable. Even in the mere examination of art works we must take account of revival fields; for we lose much if we restrict our attention either to the detail or to the mere totality before us. Unless we allow the play of revivals to have full sway our best enjoyment is gone. While pleasures in primary presentation therefore are important, the pleasures of revival are of pre-eminent moment in æsthetic consideration.

To some the separation of the fields of pleasurable "presentation" and revival may seem to involve confusions dangerous for Æsthetic hedonic theory. I think, however, this difficulty disappears entirely if one holds clearly to the implications of the Pleasure-Pain theory which I defend; for under that theory it matters not what is the content which is pleasurable, whether it be of primary "presentation," or of revival, the conditions of the pleasure production must always be the same. Our task, therefore, amounts simply to a consideration of the means to be adopted to produce a pleasure field of relative permanency.

The theory of pleasure-pain which I defend (see MIND, Nos. 63 and 64) may, in psychological terms, read as follows:—

A Content¹ (β) is pleasurable (or painful) when it is causal to a resultant (γ) of psychic fullness greater (or less) than that habitually produced by the appearance of the content (α) which is causal to its own (β 's) appearance.

[If we express this in physiological language we have: Pleasure is connected with the activity of an organ when the activity involves a giving out of surplus stored force, that is, of more stored force than is necessary for its habitual functioning, under the stimulus received.

Pain is connected with the activity of an organ when that activity involves inherently less outgo than is habitual under the stimulus received.]

Under this theory, in this respect corroborated I think by the argument of my previous articles, two points are clear:—

¹ It will be noted that I use here and elsewhere the word "content" in a limited sense. Strictly speaking the word might be used to cover any appearance in consciousness. Practically, however, it *most commonly* is used to refer to what, but for the awkwardness of the phrase, I would call "contents of limitation," that is, those states which show exclusive differentiation, and which, if we may judge from sensational experience, are determined by exclusive differentiation within the nervous organism. It is thus that I use it. If I were to give it the wider meaning I should be compelled to use the cumbersome phraseology above noted or coin a word for my purpose.

1st. Pain is incompatible with pleasure. With a given content, the conditions which involve pain must be absent if the conditions which involve pleasure are present.

2nd. There is a field of non-pleasure which is also not painful, *viz.* : the so-called field of indifference, which, while theoretically extremely narrow, is practically wide in extent.

It is evident that both of these fields are to be avoided before we can reach pleasure with any given set of contents. The field of pain must be entirely eliminated unless its occurrence is useful for pleasure production to follow; that of indifference must be suppressed so far as is necessary to avoid the overwhelming of the pleasurable contents by those which do not interest us.

PART I. NEGATIVE ÆSTHETIC LAWS.

It is evident from what I have just said that we may treat as the first principle of Æsthetics :—

THE EXCLUSION OF PAIN. THE ELIMINATION OF THE UGLY.

In what has preceded we have seen that there are practically two great classes of Pains. 1st. The pains produced by repression of activities, and 2nd. the pains produced by excess of active functioning.

I have already shown, I think, that in all probability the first class must be referred to the second ;—active functioning apparently being necessary to pain production of *any kind*. As a matter of experience, however, we find two means by which we may *produce* pain, *viz.* : by the repression of activities and by the hypernormal stimulation of activities. This fact, which doubtless has prevented the earlier recognition of the common basis of all pains, makes the current distinction between the two classes of pain perfectly legitimate for us who are here concerned with methods of pain *production*. We may, therefore, properly divide our first principle into two subsidiary ones. A. The avoidance of repressive pains, and B. the prevention of pains of excessive functioning.

A. *The Avoidance of Repressive Pains.*

Repressive pains are caused by the failure in consciousness of a content which would normally have appeared. This may happen as follows : 1st. Where contents habitually arise

in any rhythmical manner in answer to stimuli, repressive pain will be engendered if the stimuli fail to appear at the usual time. 2nd. Repressive pains will appear if contents arise which would normally act as stimulants to a content x , this content x failing to appear. 3rd. Where contents often appear in definite relations of succession, repressive pains will be engendered whenever the usual order of their rise is not fulfilled. 4th. It may be noted that the existence of repressive pains is an indication that the content which fails would appear pleausurably if it appeared at all.

[In terms of my physiological hypothesis, these propositions may be stated as follows : The inhibition of functioning for which an organ is very fully prepared is the basis of the pains of repression. 1st. Organs which habitually act in any sort of rhythmical manner attain a normal capacity for action at the moment of the habitual rhythmic return of the stimulus. If this stimulus be inhibited we shall have the conditions of repressive pain. 2nd. Again, if by any means the capacity for action of a given organ be brought to a maximum and the stimuli to the nutrition of the organ be continued, unless action of the organ supervenes, we shall have also the conditions of repressive pains. 3rd. Where organs or groups of organs are often called into activity in definite relations of succession, the nutritive processes, so far as we can see, must become so connected that the activity of the first element of a series will effect the readiness for activity, i.e., the nutritive condition, of the elements which have ordinarily acted in the successive order, so that as they are stimulated in their order they may be able to react effectively to the stimulus received. If this usual order of stimulation be not fulfilled, we shall have again the conditions of repressive pain. 4th. The existence of the repressive pain is a mark of a condition which will bring the fullest pleasure in case the inhibited activity is not too long delayed.]

1. Those repressive pains included in the first class above mentioned are induced only by the production of abnormal conditions, and in a search for means towards pleasure production, such as æsthetics is held to involve, we should expect to find them *naturally* avoided. No one who desired to produce an æsthetic work would think of giving it such form that its appreciation would be dependent upon the holding of one's breath or upon the existence of the mental states which we call hunger or thirst. In comparatively few cases do we deal with more than imperfect rhythms, and these are treated in this connexion under point three.

2. The second point made above in reference to repressive pains would seem to teach that the Artist must in general avoid the stimulation of cravings which cannot be satisfied, the production of desires which are impossible of fulfilment, the suggestion of lines of thoughts which cannot be completed. It is not apparent, at the first glance, that any such canon of practice is recognised by artists or critics. Indeed, on the

contrary, many works of art which we all agree to be of the highest order of excellence are distinctly felt to produce these longings of a dull and indefinite sort. When we come to consider the matter closely, however, we see why no such rule is acknowledged, for it is evident that these pains will be admissible, in a way, provided the observer's thought is thereby turned in new directions of pleasure getting. It will be admitted, I think, that it cannot be the proper aim of an artist to induce *strong* cravings,—*intense* desires,—*fierce* passion. It cannot be forgotten that as long ago as Aristotle the power of artistic work was felt to lie largely in its capacity to *dispel* the passions, to *purify* the objective through the Ideal. Those art works which evidently induce lesser unsatisfiable longings, as of love and pity, or which bring desire for what is unattained or at the moment unattainable, gain their power, it would seem, not through the pain so much as by the flow of sympathetic activity which is produced, or by the impulses which are awakened, or by the revival of old-time thoughts which in their wide reaches are ever delightful. It is in reflexion that we are most powerfully affected by these works of art. As we, in revival, view the mental state which was induced by their study, we feel the sympathetic delights which give them worth, or we see that they brought to us impulses that we hold to be of highest ethical value and which it must always give us the deepest satisfaction to feel that we have possessed. With the bitterest pains of repression, we contemplate the portrait of one whom we have loved but lost; and yet with the pains are aroused so many trains of memory which tell of joy, that we return again and again to the contemplation. We would not give up the pains, for without them were impossible the renewal of other deep delights.

3. The third class of repressive pains, to which we now return, will evidently be of not infrequent occurrence, for they depend upon combinations in varied orders which are easily alterable, and which, on the other hand, are grasped with such difficulty that we cannot expect to find repressive conflicts avoided. We should, therefore, look to find some recognition of occurrence of these pains and some general attempt at their avoidance in æsthetic theory and practice. It is these pains which make up the very usual form of Ugliness which is determined by the combinational effect of many disappointments of expectancy,¹ each painful, in too small a degree, indeed, to be emphatically presented, but for

¹ Cf. Hutcheson.

all that, helping to make up an aggregate of undefinable but emphatic disagreeableness. In one of his interesting and suggestive studies¹ Schiller tells us that "beauty can tolerate nothing abrupt nor violent". In other words, if an object is to appear beautiful to us it must not bring to us shocks of any kind. The lines — the forms — the colours — the sounds, which we find in nature, resultant as they are from the influence of cosmic forces in conjunction with growth, bring to us certain arrangements of stimuli, which, though complex beyond our powers of analysis, must mould our nervous system into preparation for the reception of stimuli in corresponding orders and arrangements; and this in psychological terms means the production of a tendency to the rise of certain special contents in special orders and relations to one another. If, then, nature presents to us, as she does with *relative infrequency*, objects which bring stimuli in relations contrary to those in accord with which our systems have been moulded, we should expect to note just such shocks of repressive pain as nature's monsters produce in us, quite apart from the active pains (of aversion or fear, *e.g.*) which they may superinduce. In our productive work, it clearly would be indicative of an intelligence far above that which we possess if we did not find ourselves too often bringing about combinations of stimuli which violate the order that nature has impressed upon us.²

4. While speaking of these pains of repression which lead to pleasures, we may appropriately bring forward the fourth point made above. If the pain of craving can finally be replaced by the pleasures of its satisfaction it is apparent that the pains of repression within limits may be encouraged by art workers, for the very sake of the after effects of pleasure to be obtained. The pains of repressed activity indicate, as we have seen, an organic condition of full preparedness, so that if action supervenes it will bring the highest degree of pleasure that can be induced by the organ's activity. These repression pains may, therefore, be taken as the index of pleasure capacity, and we may expect them within limits to be used by the artist because thereby he will gain certainty that the pleasure limits have been attained, and that a full pleasure will accompany the action

¹ *Zerstreute Beobachtungen*, p. 88.

² The reader will understand from my previous articles how it is possible for a person to gain "an acquired taste" (an acquired pleasure capacity) which will in the end make these unnatural forms not unpleasant and even enjoyable through appreciation of other values than those which are natural.

which is to follow the repressal. Dependent as such transformations from pain to pleasure are upon the succession of psychic states, we should look for notable practical exemplifications of them in arts which deal especially with phenomena of succession; in music and in literature. In music we have example in the delayed resolution of a chord which is allowable even to the point of painfulness. In literary work we have example in those every-day complications of plot which delay the consummation longed for and finally reached. Schiller, speaking of Tragedy, tells us that "the highest degree of Moral Pleasure cannot make itself felt except in conflict. It follows hence that the highest degree of pleasure must always be accompanied by pain." The principle is one of wide import in all branches of Æsthetics, and here I think we have its basis; for, as we have seen, organic rest is a most important condition of pleasure production. How are we to gain knowledge that we have reached full capacity for organic functioning unless we wait on the pain which comes after the absorption of energy has reached its maximum? We have here also the psychologic basis of many a theory of the relation of the Ugly to the Beautiful and of the value of the presentation of Ugliness as an element in the Beautiful; as instances of which we may note Schlegel's dictum that the principle of modern art can only be found if Beauty and the characteristic Ugly be indissolubly connected; and Rosenkranz's statement of the Aristotelian notion that the artistic genius finds the highest triumph of his art where he represents the Ugly objectified, and Beauty all-powerful through triumph over evil.

Illustrations here crowd upon us. All of nature's lines are affected by the power of gravitation. It seems clear to me that the relative grace of the suspension bridge and of the cantilever truss is principally determined by the fact that the catenary curve in the one case presents to us nature's pendent form, while the strutted extensions of the cantilever bring to us other lines than those in accord with which she has educated us. As one's eye follows the lines of the truss, natural organic combinations bring preparation for action in certain directions. But the stimuli to these activities fail when the abrupt and rigid lines break off in directions which nature has never given us; the shocks of repressive pain which result produce that sense of discomfort which we express by calling the work ugly. One who stands by the brink of Niagara, with its ever-flowing lesson in the curves of gravity, cannot help feeling strongly that the lines of the suspension bridges are in satisfactory harmony with the scene, but that the cantilever bridge makes a blot upon the landscape as unfortunate as the rigid forms of the factories built upon the river's bank. It seems to me that the beauty of the rocket is also largely determined by the submission of its movement

to the laws of gravity. The same principle may be recognised in visible forms quite apart from their contour lines. The relations of the parts in the human figure vary in an indefinite number of small ways—but any marked disproportion of parts at once gives us the shock of ugliness. It is comparatively seldom that nature brings these positive shocks, although often the men and women we meet show little of beauty. In the creative representations of man, however, nothing is easier than to produce such misemphasis of relations, and such unnaturalness that ugliness in whole or in part is induced. Even more delicate are the relations of colours. "Is it not strange," a lover of flowers once said to me, "that nature does not give ugly combinations of flowers when it is so easy for us to combine them in an unsatisfactory manner?" This observation teaches the doctrine here discussed. Nature through the influence of the pre-historic past has been our teacher, and to nature's colourings we must go to learn what combinations to make use of in our work of re-arrangement, and, if we may so speak, of re-creation. If we break away too far from her guidance we have our punishment in the shock of perceived ugliness. When we turn to sound relations we recognise the disagreeableness of sudden changes from the habitual movements in music if, for example, some unskilled performer strikes an incorrect note in a known progression or if the development of a harmony be broken by an erroneous chord.

Here we find ourselves prepared to step away from nature's teachings to the more complex regions of mental effort which depend upon habits artificially formed, if we may so speak, in the process of development. The principle will be recognised as the same, however, whether the pain be caused by breaks away from habitual combinations produced by nature's wider and racial, or by more narrow and individual, influences. The related forms which our race through many generations of experience has learned to feel to be most satisfactory cannot be lightly disturbed without producing painful distraction. This we all feel in those lines on which practice enables us to judge with discrimination. The mere novice objects to a Gothic window in what purports to be a "classic" building. The more highly educated student at once revolts against a façade of Corinthian detail massed in Doric proportions or with Ionic intercolumniation; and this is due to the fact that he has learned by observation how these special parts have been best related by the long study of successive generations in the past. The work of one who disregards this racial experience brings to the expert a shock which for him makes æsthetic joy impossible. So it is with the purist's judgment in all Art work. Habit here, as in all of life, dominates us, and perhaps the greatest danger which the critical student has to guard against is that of the artificial creation in himself of petty standards which, when shocked, give a sense of ugliness sufficiently predominant to prevent the appreciation of wider beauties. It is worth noting here that one of the greatest obstacles to æsthetic advance is found in this capacity to form artificial standards. We "get used" to forms which are intrinsically bad; gain such habits of thought in relation to them that they shock us no longer, and thus we are led not only to tolerate what can never show us any positive beauty, but even to feel revolt against change produced by the shock which that change induces.

We are here brought to the consideration of certain negative principles of great importance, which in a number of cases we shall find have already been recognised, but erroneously, I think, as positive teachings of the contraries of

those principles which should rightly be emphasised. We are all too ready to fall into logical pitfalls connected with incorrect use of complementary opposites. Experience tells us that we must avoid *not x* if we are to produce a beautiful object ; *x* therefore is fixed upon as the basis of Beauty.

It is clear, after what has just been said, that were we to start out from a theoretical basis we should be inclined to hold that our safest course of procedure would be to *imitate nature* ; sifting out her especial beauties, or recombining her elements, so that (relatively) permanent pleasure would result for us. In fact it appears that this is what the great mass of our Artists in almost all lines of effort do to-day, and what they always have done ; and this observation doubtless led Aristotle to look at Imitation as so important a principle of Art. It is apparent, however, that it is a means to an end merely, and that it is not possible to make it fundamental for all art, as some of Aristotle's followers, upholding the principle by strained interpretations of the meaning of "Imitation," would have us believe he intended to make it. It appears to me that it is a principle of importance rather negatively than positively. It guides us in the direction in which beauty will be found, and far outside of which it cannot be found ; but that it gives us a positive basis for the production of Æsthetic result, I think untrue, as must be evident to any one who does not exclude architecture from the realm of Æsthetics as Aristotle apparently did. Other examples of the same illicit procedure and of the consequent misnaming of principles are not wanting, some of which deserve mention.

Freedom from shocks implies avoidance of inharmonious relations, and perhaps it is not surprising that the observation of this should have raised *Harmony* to the dignity of a first principle, notwithstanding that the most cursory examination must show any unprejudiced person that we are fairly enveloped in a world of harmonies, which give us no Æsthetic result at all. So again uselessness, unfitness, abnormal departure from type, must be eliminated if painful shocks are to be avoided, and without such avoidance no effect of beauty can be obtained. From this source, it seems to me, have arisen the doctrines of the relation to the Æsthetic of *Usefulness*,¹ of the importance of *Fitness*,² of the necessity of *Conformity to Type*.³ No egregious departure from our

¹ Confer Buffier, *e.g.*

² Sir Joshua Reynolds, *e.g.*

³ *e.g.*, Sir C. Bell. Ruskin also counts Beauty of Type as a notable category. Compare Leslie Stephen's *Science of Ethics*, p. 76.

typical standards, no marked unfitness in the object presented, nor any emphases of qualities which are hurtfully useless are possible without producing this pain. But it is as far as possible from the truth to hold that departures from normal types within limits are non-æsthetic; on the contrary, it is just such departures which add piquancy to much which we admire. It is equally misleading to argue that the non-useful can not be beautiful, or as is more often the case, to over-estimate the importance of the recognition of the useful in given æsthetic fields. So far as the Useful is a positive principle, it is covered by the principle of the summation of associative pleasures.

An illustration of my contention may be found in that treatment of Gracefulness, adopted by Mr. Herbert Spencer, which makes its delights dependent upon adaptation to ends. Grace without this adaptation is, of course, unattainable, but that is merely a negative description of its field. If his position were correct we should be compelled to grant the quality of gracefulness to a perfectly ordered machine, and to shut out most important elements which have no relation to fitness whatever, the delight which we gain from those flowing curves which our retentiveness pictures for us in and through movements, the sympathetic pleasures which Schiller has so well described as dependent upon "beauty of form under the influence of freedom,"¹ without appearance of the strife and conflict which willed actions entail; and we should be forced to leave out of account many other elements of associative feeling. Perceived Usefulness in like manner has been made the essential point in Architecture. Usefulness truly becomes more important in this than in other arts, not however *per se*, but through the strong emphasis of the painfulness of each useless feature which exists to the detriment of the whole. It is probable that the superior pleasure obtained out of ancient works of architecture is in some degree due to the fact that they have lost their capacity to shock through opposition to the immediate needs. The limitations of human capacity are so great that shocks of this kind are forced upon us in every newly constructed building made to serve some distinct purpose, however great be the skill of the designer. To be sure each use may add to the complex pleasures of activities associated with the use, and these associative pleasures will be cut off in disappointment pains, when the lack of this usefulness is noticed, but here again it is the non-æsthetic effect of the non-useful and not the æsthetic effect of the useful which tells, and which forms the basis of the so-called principle. Mr. Spencer also holds, as Emerson held before him, that the useful tends to become beautiful; but so far as this is true it is not because of the usefulness *per se*; it seems much more naturally explicable as one of the phenomena of habit; for, as we have seen, in a great class of cases actions which have become habitual gain for themselves pleasure capacities either directly or associatively. Another point made by Mr. Spencer seems to illustrate our contention. Style he thinks depends upon the reduction of friction to a minimum in the chosen vehicle.²

¹ *Armuth und Würde*, p. 17.

² Confer also Guyau, *Essais de l'Esth. Contemporaine*.

But surely this is merely a negative principle, a condition preliminary to the use of those satisfactory forms which mark a good style in whatever material the artist works.

Turning in another direction, it appears that the doctrine which makes the Expression of Truth an essential principle of Art has a similar negative basis. Untruth, in all the arts, is a source of great dissatisfaction. This is markedly the case with Architectural forms, where better education teaches the observer the natural action of constructional elements, and creates uneasiness unless there is evidence of their consideration in the building up of the masses. It is natural, therefore, that we find the principle of "Truth" constantly reiterated as an especially valuable dictum of Architectural Æsthetics. Here we may mention the demand for Repose in Architecture and the plastic Arts in general as another negative principle, founded in this case upon our appreciation of nature's law of gravity. Repose *per se* will not bring us æsthetic joy, but without it, in the cases cited, beauty cannot be reached. The building must be felt as stable, the human figure must "stand upon its feet," or be poised in a position it could occupy in nature without continued strain; but these conditions may well be fulfilled without result of æsthetic moment. Let me illustrate this general point once again. Growth is a law of nature. Everywhere around us we see forms which are of marked type indeed, but which present evidences of developing change in non-essentials. Art works which present evidence of such growth gain great power through the sympathetic harmony with nature and with our own developing selves. The evidence of this veri-similitude of life, perhaps unanalysed and not definitely recognised, probably adds much, for example, to the attractiveness of the Gothic Cathedral and emphasises the poetry of the structures of Northern Italy. Musical forms also are especially fertile in producing those living effects. Music which is mechanically produced can never be satisfactory. But surely it is not in evidence that the expression of Growth or of Life can be held to be the fundamental in Æsthetics,¹ as some would have us believe. At the most the effects produced by the representation of these qualities can be but an adjunct to other means of impression; for certain people, however, who become accustomed to look for them, they may be demanded when absent, for the

¹ Confer Guyau, *L'Art sur p. il. v. Sociologique*, p. 75, et al.

purpose of eliminating a painful need, and may thus become for them necessary to æsthetic result without showing proof that they are the essential to æsthetic effect in general. The Unities which Aristotle made so essential in the development of the drama gain their force negatively, for without such unities distractions must be felt from the line of thought in which the poet would guide his hearer. That this is true is shown by the lessened demand felt for the unities of time and place in the drama of modern times; for, through historical study, the grasp of eras has become as common to-day as that of individual lives; and, with us, movements from place to place widely separated are matters of usual occurrence.

We now come to the second division of our principle in

B. *The Avoidance of Pains of Excessive Functioning.*¹

So important is this avoidance that works of art are in all cases developed on lines in which excesses may be shunned with little difficulty. So soon as the work of the artist begins to tire us we must be able to turn away from its consideration. The stimulus given must directly or indirectly be under our control, so that we may grasp the opportunity for enjoyment when, and only when, we are in the mood for the special pleasures involved.² There is no more certain manner of destroying our appreciation of any special art work, that is, of making it non-æsthetic for us, than by compelling attention to it when we are weary in the direction of its peculiar stimulus.

As we have seen, a certain class of repressive pains are *naturally* avoided, and with pains of hypernormal activity nature aids us also very materially, for we tend automatically to prevent excess by the shifting of attention. Concentration and permanence of attention upon one subject are certain to become speedily painful; indeed, because of the reflex effort at avoidance, they are, strictly speaking, impossible, except by means of a cultivated habit, and then only through the artifice of "looking around the subject" so to speak—of allowing the various details to be viewed in the mental focus without letting go the primal theme which is held in associative trains. As avoidance of pains of this

¹ These pains, as we have seen in my former discussions, are caused by stimulation to activities for which an organ is not prepared.

² Confer Sully, *Possibility of a Science of Æsthetics*. Fechner, *Vor. d. Æs.*, vol. ii. p. 55.

type is comparatively easy and almost automatic, it is natural to find that theoretic consideration has dealt less with them than with those repressive pains not naturally avoided which are the result of unexpectedly encountered pitfalls, only to be missed by much prevision. That excesses must be shunned is taken for granted. This is the principle involved in Aristotle's emphasis of the necessity of adopting a mean between extremes.

Taking the realm of Pain as a whole we may state our principle, in psychological terms, as that of "The Avoidance of the Ugly". It is thus that the artist gains the broad background which he must win before he can realise his ideal of beauty. His results must give many a pleasurable element, and, as we shall presently see, some special points of intense interest, but he cannot hope to make the wide mental field which his work arouses altogether pleasurable; the most that he can hope for is that it shall be devoid of elements of possible painfulness. The importance of the principle will be acknowledged when it is considered that special interest in the work of art as at first presented may very easily blind one to many elements in the work. If these latter are displeasing they will become effective to cast the work out of the realm of æsthetics as soon as the intenser interests pall upon us. All men naturally follow out this maxim, and it is mainly through accumulation of such eliminations of ugliness that our standards of artistic excellence have been reached. On general lines the bad has been sifted out or allowed to fall into the background as time has passed, and the noble and beautiful has been left unaltered because it has been felt too satisfactory to require change.

Most of us are wont thoughtlessly to look back at the Architectural forms of Greece as the creation of her golden age. But it is clear to the student that those splendid achievements embody the thought of many generations, and even of diverse races, rather than that of a special era or of a few generations' continuance. Generation after generation had felt the same needs in their worship, had built and rebuilt temples as their inferior materials and workmanship, or the more actively destructive forces of nature, compelled. Each new work had made it possible to eliminate some form which had been displeasing in the last effort, to alter some unsatisfactory surface, to change some deficient shadow depth. In the final results we see the record of untold endeavour towards the attainment of beauty, mainly successful because time and experiment have effected the complete elimination of the ugly. The growth of Gothic forms, of which we have better knowledge, tells the same story of experiment and partial failure; of renewed effort with avoidance of the elements which made the last work unsatisfactory; until we reach the glory of the best Gothic, less

perfect than the Greek indeed, as it expressed the demand of a race unimpelled by less unity of feeling, and as its growth was forced within the relatively short period of perhaps a thousand years. Too great difficulty of applying eliminative experiment may indeed be looked upon as a bar to development. The Egyptians, to whom the expression of permanence seems to have given the greatest satisfaction, built in such ponderous material and so durably that change of form was a matter of far greater difficulty than with the Greeks, whose materials were far less permanent and much more easily worked. This difference doubtless accounts largely for the fact that we find Greece in a relatively short time gaining possession of such a flower of Architectural Art as had failed to spring from the stem that had grown for long ages in the climes of Northern Africa. It is no little comfort to us in these restless times to see how few of our buildings are constructed to last in the future. If, with our changing needs, we have little ability to develop an architectural art, at least our descendants will not fear to sweep the greater part of our work from the face of the earth. We see the main principle enunciated, however, in our own times and in our own homes. Comparatively few of us can fill our homes with objects which remain for us, or for our friends, of permanent beauty. We may be able to have a gem here or there, but that is all. Still we may avoid "shocks," and in that avoidance lies much of the power of a cultivated mind in architect or householder. To this is surely due the beauty which *grows into* the homes of those whose culture is handed down with the building which passes from one generation of refined people to another. The inhabitants learn to brush away the "shocks". The inharmonious lines and forms are covered; the harmonious lines and forms are retained; gradually and unwittingly they mould their surroundings to relations which do not clash. In such an environment the smallest beauties tell.

In looking over other Art fields where the medium of expression has been in less permanent material, it is difficult to realise how much work has been done which has been cast aside because of inferior worth, has been allowed to deteriorate and thus has been lost. It were much more difficult did we not realise that our race is in the main not far removed from those that time has swept away before us, and did we not see this process of production and elimination going on around us to-day. Practically a vast proportion of the pictures preserved in the great galleries of Europe have been eliminated from the *Æsthetic*. We go to these vast treasuries to study a few pieces of work; all the others are passed by as if they did not exist. If we could reproduce the sudden barbaric intrusions of the past, it is easy to see that the few precious gems which time has taught us to value supremely would be hurried off to places of safety, while all else might readily be eliminated by vandal destruction or neglect.

It is evident, of course, that the attainment of an unpainful background in itself will not suffice to bring about *Æsthetic* result. Not only must the artist avoid pain in indifference, but before gaining the pleasure field he must move *beyond* this field of indifference. This brings us to our second division, which, however, we may pass over lightly, for indifference may be avoided only in the directions of pain and pleasure. Pain, as we have seen, is also to be avoided by the artist. The attainment of Pleasure is, therefore, the

only means by which we can step away from indifference in a direction that will be not unæsthetic, and we are at once brought to the consideration of the positive field of æsthetics, to which we now turn.

PART II. POSITIVE ÆSTHETIC LAWS.

The problem before us here is to discover the means necessary to *the production of a pleasure field which shall be relatively permanent*. It will be convenient in our discussion to treat separately (1st) the production of pleasure itself, before considering (2nd) the means used to the attainment of *permanency* of pleasure field.

I. In what has preceded this we have seen that all pleasure is dependent upon the rise into consciousness of contents which are coincidents of action in well-prepared organs; *i.e.*, that pleasure occurs whenever the stimulus affecting an organ occasions the *use of surplus stored force*. From this theory we may make the following deductions: Pleasure arises:—

A. When there appears in consciousness a content which has before appeared but which has been lately absent, because no stimulus to its production has arisen.

B. When a content appears after inhibition of its normal appearance.

C. When a content appears with unusual vividness after normal absence from consciousness.

[In physiological terms these propositions may be stated as follows: Storage of force is attained by rest from activity. The preparation to act effectively involves time; recuperative processes are in the main less rapid than are those involved when action takes place in answer to a stimulus from without. All organs, however, have surplus power which is not brought into activity under normal conditions, but which may be brought into use under hypernormal stimulus with only normal nutritive conditions. It appears, therefore, that the use of stored force may be reached:—

A. By the stimulation of organs, which having been long rested have gained great potential efficiency, so that a stimulus, normal or very little above the normal, will bring fully into action their stored energy.

B. By the artificial nutrition of organs which are to be called into action.

C. By a decided hypernormality of activity for a short time after merely normal rest.]

It is, of course, evident that these methods of pleasure production may be used coincidentally, but it is desirable for us here to treat them in isolation.

The pleasures of rest after labour, or relief from pain, as we have already seen, although really to be considered as a sub-class under the pleasures of activity, are in practice separable from them, because they are reached in practice by distinct methods. Unquestionably use is made of them in the arts which deal with phenomena of succession. No slight pleasure is it that we obtain in music by the introduction of a calm restful movement following upon a train of intense and vigorous passages calling for our active attention. But on the whole these pleasures do not form an element of marked importance in *Æsthetic* work, especially because they are so dependent upon the existence of and are inseparably connected with anterior pains. We may pass on, therefore, without further examination in this direction.

A. The first point made above gives us the widely recognised *æsthetic* principle of *Contrast*. Contrast in any region of mental effect involves the presence of contents which have not been in consciousness in the late past.¹

[This involves the action of organs which have not been functioning lately. Gradations in sense effect or in thought transitions are mental movements which imply the gradual coming into action of the organs which are successively the centres of activity. Contrast eliminates all gradations; it involves the action of organs, which through mere rest have become well prepared for activity, and which, therefore, produce pleasurable activity when stimulated.]

That Contrast is an important *æsthetic* principle is recognised by all; indeed it is not infrequently over-valued, *e.g.*, by Mr. Herbert Spencer, who calls it an *essential* requisite to all Beauty. But our theory would teach that contrasts are not *æsthetic essentials*, because pleasure can be reached without contrast by mere increase of vividness. Still it must be granted that the principle is of the widest application, and a most available one for the guidance of the Artist. Very strong contrasts, however, must be used with the greatest caution; they give powerful effects, but are rapidly exhaustive and, therefore, must in general be

¹ That Contrast *per se* is always pleasurable may not be granted by some who recall disagreeable "contrasts" of colour for instance; the apparent exceptions, however, are in part explicable as due to connected association with vague painful contents, but in most cases are really not to be called contrasts at all in the sense of my definition, for they cannot be shown to be shiftings to entirely new contents. Confer Rood—"Modern Chromatics"—especially chapters on Contrast and Colour Combinations.

avoided. To this we refer later under the consideration of permanency.

B. The pleasurable appearance of contents after inhibition of their normal occurrence has been already incidentally discussed in considering the repression of activities, and we need give no space here, therefore, to this means of the attainment of a full pleasure field. The principle before us becomes important, however, in another direction. If there arise by suggestion from the expressions of another, trains of thought which are normally connected with other secondary trains, but if by skilful management the arousal of these secondary trains be prevented, then we have a condition of artificial inhibition which will result in pleasure getting whenever the secondary trains are allowed to appear.

[In physiological language this may be spoken of as *artificial nutrition of organs which are to be called into action*; for the normal connexion between the primary and secondary trains implies connexions between the stimuli which bring nutrition to the organs involved in the presentation of the two trains. The temporary inhibition of the secondary trains, therefore, implies a gain of nutrition in the organs of the secondary trains without the use of the energy accumulated.]

Such it seems to me is the process in the delicate play of wit. In what is usually called the "ludicrous" we use this means, although much of the effect in such cases is dependent upon sudden transitions in the lines of ordinary association from mental processes which involve effort to more habitual processes where the same energy will produce greater effects, i.e., hypernormal stimulation.

It is, of course, impossible here to argue this point at length. While other sources of pleasure getting are made use of in various ways together with the action above described, I think it can be shown that this is the characteristic movement in what is usually called the Ludicrous, and that it serves well to harmonise the oppositions of the many thinkers who have attempted analysis of this mental state. Those cases of the ludicrous which seem to involve little except surprise are explicable on the ground that the surprise involves attention and expectation of important outcome. When the unimportance of the object or action is perceived the relaxation of attention results in the same powerful overflow into the channels of ordinary activity. The easy and marked "step from the sublime to the ridiculous" is also thus explicable.

It cannot be claimed that all such transitions as are above described are ludicrous, for thought trains of discovery and invention are not infrequently of this nature and to them surely the word ludicrous cannot be applied. Introspection seems to tell me, however, that the psychoses in the two cases are very closely allied. We have a tendency under such circumstances to laugh, or at least to smile, under the pleasurable excite-

ment, and we occasionally speak of the resultant as a "happy thought". I am inclined to think that the difference, at first one of degree rather than of kind, has become marked because the more emphatic and fuller state produced in us by what we term the "ludicrous" has become indissolubly connected with what Kant describes as "the sudden transformation of a tense expectation into nothing".

Wit and the ludicrous are seldom separated in practice. The wit, properly speaking, plays around his subject, avoiding the more usual outcome of the train of his thought but leading that of his hearer close to this normal resultant, until, when it may be supposed that all the organs connected with the normal outcome are fully prepared for action, he turns the thought train in the direction which is effective for pleasure. The stimulation of the well-nourished organs, which is thus involved, is followed by the burst of pleasure-giving activity which irradiates the system and expands its surplus energy in the pleasurable exercise of laughter.¹ The wit and he who deals with the ludicrous, however, tread on dangerous ground. The clown perchance may not cause laughter, but may disappoint us so painfully that irritation results. Apart from the danger that the witticism may cut too deep there is the danger that the repressed activity may force itself upon the attention of the hearer before it is designed to appear. In this case the course of thought which is intended to lead up to the latter becomes obstructive, and the result is wearisome: this is exemplified, for instance, in the "flatness" of old jokes. Further, there is the danger that the play around the subject may develop trains of so much interest that the change of thought will produce a shock powerful and painful enough to overbalance the pleasure led up to. We all realise how dangerous it is to treat lightly subjects which may be of sacred interest to others.

Our third minor division relates to :—

C. Pleasures which accompany vividness of presentation.

[In physiological terms these pleasures may be described as due to hypernormal activity of a normally efficient organ.]

Vividness of impression is a well-recognised means of producing æsthetic result in its cruder forms. Barbaric art shows this distinctly, and the art of the masses, even in our

¹ The exercises of laughter are pleasurable in such cases because they involve the action of rested organs. The more serious aspect of things from which we turn to the perception of the ludicrous involves partial if not total quiescence in all those organs which are notably active when we laugh. Laughter is not always pleasurable, as all know who attempt to force it.

day, makes use of the same means. Vivid colouring and contrasts, startling forms and combinations, vivacious rhythms, loudness of sound as in martial music, all are common tools of the popular artist. But we here tread on ground dangerous to permanency—for hypernormal activity, as we have seen, is the basis of pain as well as of pleasure, and pleasure which is determined by this alone must be of a very ephemeral character. So in the higher art this crude means of producing æsthetic effect is not prominent. In a more delicate form, however, we do find it of service to higher art in the stimulation by varied means of the same activities at the same time. The principle here involved is that of "The Unification of the Manifold," which is widely recognised as of the highest importance in Æsthetics.

[In hedonic language it may be stated thus: Two or more elements act simultaneously as stimuli to the activity of some new element, the resulting psychosis being one in which the original elements stand in the background, the focus of the field consisting of this new element which, being stimulated from more than one source, appears in a pleasurable condition of hypernormality.]

If this principle were not over-emphasised by high authorities¹ it would be unnecessary perhaps to call attention to the fact that, although wide in its bearings, it cannot be universal as the cause of all beauty. Fechner, who certainly makes as much of the Unity of the Manifold as is legitimate, acknowledges this; see p. 42 of his *Vorschule*, where he gives several instances which it is not possible to give this explanation. We are evidently surrounded by appearances of unity in manifoldness that do not impress us with sufficient pleasurable quality to give the objects producing them the quality of beauty, the slight pleasure which they give being overwhelmed. On the other hand, many beautiful objects appeal to us in which we can trace no distinct element of this unification. Æsthetic effect, indeed, as we shall see, implies more than the vague gentle pleasure which the Unity of the Manifold, as it usually appears, can produce.

I think it must be granted that the mass of æsthetic pleasures is reached by slightly vivid presentations in varied directions, but, as we have so often noted, it is vividness also which leads to Pain.

¹ Confer, e.g., Lotze, *Microcosmus*, bk. viii. chap. v., "As we derive æsthetic satisfaction only from a plurality which may be apprehended as a clearly discerned unity".

[If hypernormal activity be continued after the force stored up in an organ has been exhausted, pain results; hence if this unusual activity be continued for any great length of time, we will have the conditions productive of pain.]

It becomes necessary then for us to consider the means to be adopted to bring about *permanency* of pleasure field, and this brings us to the second division proposed in the beginning of this part.

II. Our problem here is to define the conditions which make possible the attainment of permanence of pleasure (that is, permanence of hypernormal activity in well-prepared organs).

We have already seen (1st) that absence of a content from consciousness for an unusual time suffices to make it pleasurable when it appears; also (2nd) that vividness of impression is an important source of pleasure getting; but (3rd) that the avoidance of continuity of vivid presentation of any one set of contents is a necessity if pain is to be avoided.

[In physiological terms: Rest from action before action in a given organ is one of the conditions to pleasure getting from the content which appears with such activity, or else hypernormality of action in the organ; but the avoidance of continuity of hypernormal action in any one set of organs is also a necessity if pleasure be sought; for such continuity uses up all surplus energy and leads directly to the physiological conditions which involve pain production.]

If, then, a permanent pleasure field is to be reached, a focus is important in our field of consciousness (see 2nd above), but it must shift from element to element (see 3rd above), and this shifting involves new means of pleasure getting (see 1st above). In general, therefore, we may say that the conditions of pleasure *permanence* are the shifting of a focus in consciousness over a wide pleasure field. Let us consider each of these divisions more fully, in reverse order.

A. WIDTH OF FIELD. Pleasure in any one direction being essentially ephemeral, the only means by which we are able to insure *permanency* of pleasure is by having open before us wide opportunities to change the content of our thought. As we have already seen, it is first of all essential that the fulness of our complex mental states should be non-painful; it then becomes important to see that many elements of the complex are capable of developing pleasure. This is important not only because we are thus enabled to shift the focus of attention, but especially because a multiplicity of simultaneous effects thus becomes possible. Lotze, as he

views his consciousness, tells us that the æsthetic effect "is notably (but not exclusively) bound to simultaneousness and multiplicity of impression". It is thus that the Artist groups together as large a number of means of pleasurable stimulation as he can combine without conflict. He endeavours to use at the same time arts of ear and of sight and those which depict more directly the activities of men. The difficulty of such wide combination, however, is very great, and he more often deals with narrower fields; but always does he use every device which may draw into the field of suggestion all associative factors which are not inharmonious and which may add one more to the pleasures given. He does not disdain any element, however likely to pall, if he is able to leave our thought free to turn elsewhere as soon as the pleasurable effect is gone. The suggestion of sense pleasures he uses—but avoids the actual sense-stimulus under conditions that may lead to excess or bring painful results in revival. He aims to bring into play the imagination which carries one on from height to height in pleasure-giving flight. It is this direction of effort which leads Lessing to call for an incompletion of detail in the artist's work that the imagination may have room in which to work its expansive effects. We look thus for a fulness of non-fulfilment of exact detail; for an avoidance of strictness of realism—for type portrayal. The artist, moreover, aims to stir up those vague regions of psychic life, the content of which we can scarcely grasp; the regions usually termed Emotional. He produces in his observer an æsthetic horizon which Guyau has interpreted as the essential characteristic of æsthetic pleasure: that "irradiation" which seems to have a centre in some sense impression but which works effects in all mental regions connected with it; effects of so small intensity, of such rapidly shifting content, that there is little of it but the vagueness of an aurora. The artist cannot undervalue even the effects of admiration of his own skill, for though the pleasure gained thus is for a few and perhaps only for his fellow-workers, for them it is not a small pleasure-giving element, and if he holds the admirer by this means but a moment longer, so much the more is his work effective.

Breadth of field without the emphasis of foci implies a widely divided attention which is important. The recognition of the existence of a field in the percipient lacking in definiteness of attention has indeed not infrequently led to over-emphasis of the receptive state—of the passive conditions—for art effect; too little account being taken of

the reactive elements involved. These latter, however, do in fact make up a large part of the æsthetic complex, as our later æstheticians, Sully, Guyau and others, do not fail to recognise distinctly. Guyau, in fact, in his zeal to force the recognition of his view, makes himself appear, some will doubtless think, to take an extreme view on the other side; to over-emphasise the active element.¹ Any work of art which tends to raise a marked attention in one line necessarily excludes pleasurable feeling in other lines, in that it lowers the effect of these other presentations or revivals as components of consciousness at the time. A work of art which can so balance its elements that the observer is kept in a state of nicely divided and still of constantly shifting pleasurable attention, will produce the most widespread, the most voluminous, although not the most vivid, pleasure.

The power of music is often clearly aided by its indefiniteness—its “dreaminess” as we call it, and it seems to me that the great strength of the masters of music has lain in their ability to widen the field of pleasure by the means under discussion. In such a complex art as the opera the difficulty of reaching this balance is very great. An operatic composer of inferior power will not be able to prevent a frequent diversion of attention with consequent loss of fulness. Now one finds oneself watching the stage effects to the exclusion of the music, and again listening to the music with closed eyes, with no thought of the action. In the impression obtained from the best work, Wagner’s for instance, I find myself on the other hand very often lost in the totality; all particulars seem to be forgotten in the general effect; the stage actions are not separately emphatic; the suggestion to note distinctly the “motifs” is an intrusion. The crudeness in respect to finer play of thought and emotion which the *plot* itself in his operas show, is probably a necessary element of their power. The development of “plot interest” would doubtless act as a detriment to the totality.

It is perhaps the unconscious recognition of this principle of diffusion of Attention which leads to the popular opinion that the critical spirit is fatal to æsthetic receptivity, and in one sense this is true; although I am free to confess to the belief that what is lost in width of field by the concentration of the critical view is largely gained in the region of intellectual play, and to the critic who knows well his subject this actually prevents his satiety; overcomes the danger of distaste for work with which he must be over-familiar: communication of his thought to others less well equipped, however, is very likely to mar their pleasure.

But width of field has its dangers too, for it makes easy the shifting of one’s thought upon lines of pain-giving.*

¹ Confer Grant Allen’s *Physiological Aesthetics*, p. 87, and Guyau’s *Problèmes de l’Esthétique Contemporaine*.

*An example of this has already been given in another connexion, where I called attention to the fact that the tone of voice or anything which indicates the animus of the describer or critic will frequently change an æsthetic into a non-æsthetic object for the listener, and *vice versa*.

Æsthetics, although largely a matter of the complex summation of vague pleasures, needs more than this. To perfection of Art there must be a decided centre of interest fitting more or less lightly over this vaguer field. To the consideration of this point we now turn :—

B. THE SHIFTING FOCUS. In *Amiel's Journal*, 23rd May, 1863, we read: "All that is diffused and indistinct without form or sex or accent is antagonistic to beauty, for the mind's first need is light; light means order, and order means, in the first place, the distinction of the parts, in the second, their regular action. Beauty is based on Reason." Although we have seen that exclusively Rationalistic views of Æsthetics are not tenable we cannot help agreeing that an object which presents no *virile* interests but merely a field of moderate pleasures soon cloy; it becomes "sweet," as they say in the studio. It is the recognition of this fact, probably, which led Lotze to the theory that Beauty requires the grasp of the ideal through some *definite object*, and Volkmann to separate the Art field from the field of Æsthetics on the ground that the former strikes a definite chord above the merely hedonic field of Æsthetics. For Volkmann this definiteness which most emphatically takes its object out of its environment is the direction in which the Art of the Ancients showed its highest superiority.¹ But if art work must impress us by its force of attention, its centres of interest, these points of intenser activity are points of danger: all pleasures are ephemeral, the more so as they are vivid, and the *shifting* of these centres of interest is of as great importance as their existence. I think we shall find this recognised in certain general principles. First, we may look to find means adopted to retain pleasure in one special direction by arranging to shift attention away from the special field before pain or complete indifference occurs, and back again at the moment when pleasurable recurrence of the content is again possible. This brings before us the great principle of Rhythm.

[Because processes of nutrition are relatively regular the times required for complete recovery after full use remain approximately equal in the same set of organs, and it thus happens that we learn to act at recurrent regular intervals, being thus enabled to hold to a special subject matter for a long time, not only without fatigue, but, if the rhythm be properly timed, with marked pleasure.]

¹ *Lehrbuch d. Psychologie*, vol. ii. p. 857. Confer also Herbert's notion that Beauty is a matter of the relation of the presented thoughts and has nothing to do with such characteristics as Loveliness, Pathos, Laughableness, which are mixed with Beauty in order to give an element of interest.

Accurate rhythms are most notable in music and poetry, but what may be termed inaccurate rhythms are the very ordinary tools of the artist in other lines also. The power of order, in architecture, for example, the value of symmetries¹ generally depend largely upon such rhythms. Instances will be recalled by the reader in all the arts without special example.

Passing to the consideration of the shifting of attention beyond the same field, from field to field, we obtain the well-recognised canon of Variety. Monotony of stimulations gives us first indifference and then the positive pains of fatigue. If the content of consciousness be constantly changed, however, the chances of pleasure gain are greatly increased; if a Unity be recognised in the Variety, on the principles already discussed, we have an added pleasure to that gained by the shifting of the centre of interest. Variety, however, like all the means of pleasure stimulation, is likely to be carried too far. Variety of pleasurable exhaustive stimulation will eventually aggravate the trouble we attempt to correct through variety, by making painful *every* activity in our field. An example of this we may all recall in the craving for total rest experienced after a visit to some great exhibition where competitors vie with each other to attract attention to their wares by varied devices looking to pleasure giving. We often find people remarking that they enjoy an art work (especially is this true in Architectural criticism), because it is *simple*. The distracting elements in the varied objects which they have examined in the hope of gaining pleasurable effects have disappeared, and have left a quiet delight not far removed from the so-called pleasures of rest.

Contrasts, already discussed, also gain their effects through change of region of stimulation. Where notable, however, they depend upon vividness (hypernormality of action) for their results, and must be used with care lest they act exhaustively.² The same thing may be said of those vivid

¹ Symmetries also may be held to produce effect through the hyper-normal stimulus involved in the recognition of the Unity of the Manifest. It may be well here to remark that the search for symmetry in theoretical form which has led many a metaphysician astray has probably had its basis in the æsthetic demand of his nature.

² The mechanism of this may not improbably be something like this. If attention be turned in one direction for a time, automatically the systemic activities tend to bring nourishment especially to those organs which are active, and those not active become well prepared indeed (from such nutrition as is not called for elsewhere), but only through failure of stimulation and *notwithstanding* the calling off of the nourishment supply in other directions. When those second-element

elements of novelty which give the value to what we call the Picturesque. We cannot use these means to gain æsthetic result unless we are able to turn ourselves away from their stimulation as soon as we begin to be weary. Hence, we must avoid the use of the picturesque in our homes and must deal most carefully with strong contrasts in the decoration of rooms in which we wish to live, or in buildings which we are compelled to view constantly.

On the whole it appears that the safest means of producing lasting æsthetic results will be reached if we choose that succession of contents, each of which is naturally led up to by those which have preceded.

[In physiological language : we will gain our result best if we choose such successive impressions as will stimulate organs that have been best and fully prepared for action by the associative nutrition (if I may so speak) connected with the previously stimulated activities.]

From this we may argue to a wide æsthetic law which may perhaps be called the *principle of the satisfaction of Expectancies*; a legitimate description of the means of gaining æsthetic result here touched upon as all such movements of thought appear in retrospect to be expectation phases which are fulfilled.¹ That this canon, however, although of wide application, is not a universal one for Æsthetics, is apparent when we consider that our normal, indifferent, scarcely conscious life is largely made up of these fulfilments of expectation, not recognised as such to be sure, unless their legitimacy is questioned in one way or another, and unrecognised because the ordinary reaction is immediate and thus not involving any marked transformation of surplus potential into actual energy, *i.e.*, not involving pleasure.

In general it appears, then, that the great artist is one who is able to make use of the principles above enumerated.

organs which have been inactive are stimulated in *contrast* they answer with pleasure, and their action tends to withdraw the nutritive supplies from the set of organs which had given the first elements of the contrast, so that these first-element organs get less than their normal nutriment; and if we stimulate them again in turning back to the first element, we find a set of organs in some degree prepared, to be sure; but less well prepared for activity than were the second-element organs.

¹ Confer Bergman, *Ueber das Schöne*, p. 182, where the value of arousing expectation and allowing its satisfaction is discussed and carried out to the explanation of the delight obtained in curves, &c., &c. The same argument suffices to explain the pleasures reached by the contemplation of *nuances* of all kinds.

Having avoided pains, having created his wide field of non-pain, he strives to produce a wide summation of pleasurable contents. Further, he so arranges the shifting of attention that as one impression fails in pleasure giving, another equally enjoyable appears through natural connexion to supply the place of that pleasure which is fading away. Moreover, by compelling a judicious recurrence of a special interest he marks a Unity of the Manifold, which Unity gives to his work its distinctive character.

I have already named the great works of Wagner in illustration of the poise of attention ; but Wagner's power goes beyond this ; wherever we break away from width of effect and allow our attention to concentrate upon details we there find a gem of melody, a delicious progression, a richness of harmony or a masterful bit of orchestration ; and if we turn from the music we are still thrilled with emotion or impressed by some profundity of thought. But withal, these details are not allowed to efface the value of the special marked development of the work. Shakespeare's wonderful drama, to take another example, shows us great width of interest, yet always some figures of *special* interest from one to the other of which our attention is artfully shifted without loss of that background of delight which is felt apart from the specially forceful impressions. His genius manifests itself further in the ability to preserve a proper balance, so that using wealth of subordinate elements, no one of them is allowed to rise to sufficiently great importance to mar the general movement of the drama, to detract from the importance of the character whose action is to thrill our souls. The great painter treats his subject in like manner ; he gives us a wide, vague, pleasurable background in impression or associative revival trains ; a wide field of more marked pleasures over which the centre of interest shifts ; without loss of the prominence of the central motif to which especially he would compel our recurrence.

In closing, I think it desirable to take a retrospective view once more. It has been shown in this article, I think, that the principles of practical æsthetics are in harmony with the hedonic æsthetic theory which I defend ; and more than that, in accordance with the theory of Pleasure-Pain which I have elsewhere explained. The sketch of æsthetic principles which we have been considering, incomplete and inadequate though it may appear, has thus at least served to accumulate evidence in corroboration of that Pleasure-Pain theory. Nor can this be counted as a small gain ; for a theory which on its physical side must be expressed in terms of necessarily vague physiology, and which is difficult to put to the test of experiment, must gain its acceptance, if it is to gain it all, by cumulative evidence such as I have here given ; for if it be claimed that the evidence presented is not crucial, at least it must be acknowledged that the value of the theory is vouched for in no inconsiderable degree

by the fact that in pushing it to its conclusions, serious oppositions have not been developed.

Again, I wish to say, however, that I consider the physiological theory of less moment than the purely psychological. I have shown, it seems to me, at all events that the physical basis of pleasure and of pain is determined by relations of a very general character which may belong to any organic activity, and that Pleasure and Pain must therefore be treated, psychologically, as qualities of a very general nature which may under proper conditions belong to any content, as appears also from purely psychological evidence; that they are, therefore, not to be looked upon as the outcome of any special and peculiar mentality, that they are not *sui generis* among psychic phenomena, that they are grasped mentally very much as other qualities of a general character are grasped. We recognise that a Content has Pleasure-Pain quality, much as we recognise that a Content has Intensity; in one and the same general manner all qualities in our psychic stream gain recognition.