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***Theism and Humanism. The Gifford Lectures for 1914.* A. J. Balfour. Hodder & Stoughton. 1915. Pp. 274. \\$.1.75.**

W. W. Fenn

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and in praise, the many points, a few of which have been here alluded to, that are brought forward in this brilliant essay. But it must suffice to say that every student of human nature should read it for himself. The writers who have endeavored to construct a systematic theory of life and conduct based on the introspective method have often laid themselves open to very stringent criticism; and the world owes a great deal to the empiricists and the "behaviorists" for contributions of a lasting value. The representatives of both parties have still, however, much to learn, each from the other.

JAMES J. PUTNAM.

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THEISM AND HUMANISM. THE GIFFORD LECTURES for 1914. A. J. BALFOUR. Hodder & Stoughton. 1915. Pp. 274. \$1.75.

Mr. Balfour's purpose and method are well stated in two sentences of the concluding chapter: "My desire has been to show that all we think best in human culture, whether associated with beauty, goodness, or knowledge, requires God for its support, that Humanism without Theism loses more than half its value" (p. 248): "The root principle which, by its constant recurrence in slightly different forms, binds together like an operative *leit-motif* the most diverse material, is that if we would maintain the value of our highest beliefs and emotions, we must find for them a congruous origin. Beauty must be more than an accident. The source of morality must be moral. The source of knowledge must be rational" (pp. 249-50).

Fundamental to the whole discussion is the distinction drawn between the causal and the cognitive series of beliefs, that is, between beliefs which are more or less deeply rooted in the very being of man as part of the nature of things, and hence have intuitive probability rising towards inevitableness, and others which are the outcome of an intellectual process and have only logical validity. It is not to be deemed the mere cynicism of a man versed in public affairs to hold that in the last analysis all our beliefs are reducible to the causal series — "Scratch an argument, and you find a cause" (p. 61) — for science itself inclines to a similar deterministic declaration and thus gives rise to the central question of the book: If our beliefs are grounded in the nature of things and are therefore presumably coherent with it, how must that nature be conceived — in terms of Theism or Naturalism?

This radical inquiry, however, is not at the front in the earlier chapters which deal with ethics and æsthetics, and becomes insistent only in the discussion of knowledge. It is shown that the sense

of the beautiful cannot be accounted for by selection alone, since it has little or no survival value. And even if its highest forms have some vital significance, these æsthetic feelings would be injuriously affected if it were held that art is mechanical with no artist behind it, that nature is charged with no message of intrinsic meaning, and that history is only the record of a futile and irrational process. Æsthetics, that is, demands Theism as congruous context, and must inevitably languish in a mechanical setting. In the case of Ethics, it may indeed be shown that earlier forms had survival value, but the opposite seems to be true of the later. Loyalty, for example, as a sentiment, is essential for social existence, but the higher moral ideals to which it progressively attaches itself often dictate conduct which leads to individual catastrophe and at least temporary social calamity, and so is logically indefensible on the naturalistic view of the world. The ethical principles acknowledged by the best individuals and the most highly developed communities are compatible with Theism alone and can survive in no other intellectual environment.

Thus the way is prepared for the thorough-going treatment of Knowledge. Here it is pointed out that the very fundamental postulates of science are quite incapable of verification by the method which alone science pronounces admissible. Neither the existence of an external world, which science ingenuously takes for granted, nor the principles of universal causation and conservation, can be empirically demonstrated. How can universal laws be derived from particular instances? Yet these beliefs are inevitable, and Mr. Balfour affirms their truth, but insists that they require us to believe in a rational instead of a mechanical universe — in Theism. Thus the purpose of the book is fulfilled by making explicit the necessary implications of the ideals of Truth, Goodness, and Beauty.

The argument is not novel, but it has never been presented so clearly and cogently. As might be expected in the treatment of so wide and diversified a range of topics, there are points of detail where one or another reader will demur or deny; but taken as a whole, the book urges an argument for Theism which means more than any other to men sharing present ideas and cherishing present values. It is an appeal to Humanists to consider their ways, the worth of which is unhesitatingly declared, and see what is involved in devotion to them. To show that Theism is a necessary implication of Humanism is a worthy undertaking which has been successfully and strikingly carried out.

W. W. FENN.