III.—PSYCHICAL PROCESS.¹

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§ 1. Two senses of 'Idea' have sometimes been contrasted, and the contrast has been used to mark off the subject-matter of Logic from that of Psychology. In order to bring the problem of the present paper into focus, it will be convenient to retrace this familiar distinction between Idea as *meaning* and Idea as *psychical fact*. A rough outline will serve.

A judgment as 'meaning,' 'significance,' or 'logical content,' is a part of knowledge—so far, at least, as it is true. This 'meaning' is something 'objective,' and common to all sane intelligences.² It is universal; independent of particular conditions of time and place, unless they are themselves included in the meaning and thus universalised; and it is freed from the 'psychical setting,' which accompanies the judging of this or that person. The judgment—in this sense of the term—is a complex content, within which we may distinguish contributory elements of meaning as its constituent portions. Any such constituent portion is an 'idea'; and, for our present purpose, may be called distinctively a '*logical idea*'. For the further reflective classification of Logic (with which we are not here concerned) every 'logical idea' falls under one or other of a few types: it is, *e.g.*, a subject or a predicate, an antecedent or a consequent, and so forth. And in the light of another classification (with which we are again not concerned, but which is sometimes ascribed to Metaphysics) every 'logical idea' is—or perhaps we should say 'stands for'—a member of some type or other within a different group. It is (or 'stands for') a substance or an accident, a quality or a relation, a cause or an effect, and so forth.

¹ For the views expressed in the following paper (which was written for the Jowett Society at Oxford during the summer of 1906) I am of course alone responsible. But I gladly take this opportunity of expressing my gratitude to Mr. F. H. Bradley, who read through the manuscript, and made many most valuable suggestions and criticisms.

² *I.e.*, if any sane intelligence thinks about the matter, it must think so about it.

But every judgment is made by some person, and is thus a *judging*. The judgment, as a judging, is a process. It is an event, or, rather, a succession of events: a section, of a certain length and breadth, taken in the conscious life of the person judging. As occurring at, and through, a determinate time, and as a process 'in' or 'of' an individual mind, it is unique or singular. And its parts or 'steps' (the plurality of succession, which analysis may distinguish within its unity), *quâ* constituents of it, are themselves unique and singular; just as the several events, which constituted the flow of Napoleon's life, are—considered as *this* actual historical process—unique and singular constituents of a unique and singular total event.

The process of judging, as 'in' or 'of' a mind, is called a *psychical* process: and its parts are called *psychical* events or facts, or (sometimes) *ideas*. An *idea*, therefore, in this sense of the term, is a unique and singular 'step' in a unique and singular process. Such 'ideas' are the several changes 'in' or 'of' the individual mind, which constitute (or contribute to constitute) that total flow of consciousness which is the judgment as a judging.

§2. For the sake of simplicity, I have spoken only of Judgment. But *mutatis mutandis* the same distinction applies, *e.g.*, to Inference, to Emotion, and to Volition. The inference, as a piece of articulate meaning, is distinct from the inferring as a psychical activity: the pain of parting, or the emotion of love, from the psychical process of experiencing the pain, or of falling and persisting in love. And the processes of volition 'in' the individual agents are distinguished from the subject of moral praise and blame, the will incarnate in character and conduct or in the laws and institutions of a people.

Problems, similar in kind to those which we are to study, arise from the application of the distinction in these regions. But it would be a mistake to extend the scope of an inquiry, which—even if restricted to Judgment—is more than enough to occupy us.

And there is a topic, which may be ruled out at once as irrelevant, however interesting it might be in another connexion. For when 'psychical process' or 'psychical fact' is distinguished as singular and unique from the universal content, the terms 'psychical process and fact' may express not one factor over against another factor within a total experience, but that total experience itself viewed on the side of its existence. Feeling, willing, judging and inferring occur and exist in time and place, and have sever-

ally, in every instance, a determinate and unique position in the complex of events which forms 'the world'. What is known is somebody's knowledge, what is felt and willed is somebody's feeling or willing: and my knowledge, emotion or purpose, whilst embodying a universal content, is also (taken in its entirety as an actual experience) a part of my history. Psychical facts in this sense of the term—like all 'facts'—occupy, each of them, their definite positions in the temporal and spatial order. And, in that sense, they are severally unique and singular, however universal their content. They are studied by the historian, by the writer of biography, and by many novelists. *What exactly* is studied, and *how* the data for the study are obtained, is an interesting and difficult problem. But we are not here concerned with it. We do not care *where* and *when* in the world-order a judgment, inference, emotion or volition 'takes place' or 'occurs': nor are we occupied with the description of these phenomena as the unfolding of a personality. We are to examine 'psychical process' in another and more dubious sense. Within the total occurring experience, we are to suppose a distinction to be drawn and a severance to be made. A judgment, as I make it, is my judging. And this, my judging, (so it is supposed) *is* or *involves* some sort of 'process,' or 'mechanism,' or 'happening' *in* or *of* my mind. To *what* does this vague description apply? *What* is this 'psychical process'?

§ 3. If I see a red thing, or hear a chord, I do not see or hear or otherwise apprehend the processes of my seeing or hearing. Whatever those processes may be—whatever the physical and psychical mechanism of vision and hearing—at least they are not *what* I see or hear or apprehend, when I see the red thing or hear the chord. I am not aware of the image on my retina, nor of the rods and cones, nor of my organ of Corti: not aware of them, nor of any change in them, nor of any 'psychical process' (any modification of my sentience) which accompanies—or which may be supposed to accompany—these physical changes. *What* exactly I see or hear—i.e., *what* is 'for me' as the object apprehended—is a problem, which fortunately we need not here investigate further. It does not matter to us at present whether we see 'colour' and hear 'sound,' or whether, *e.g.*, we see wavelengths of the ether as colour and hear vibrations of the air as sound. All that I am maintaining is this:—When we are seeing or hearing X (colour or sound or vibrations), we do not see or hear or apprehend any process or mechanism—physical or psychical or psycho-physical—which is (or may be) involved in

our seeing or hearing X. We do not, in perceiving, perceive the processes of our own percipience. Whatever these processes may be, they are not something *through perceiving which* we perceive X: nor are they something which we perceive *along with* X. For us, *quid* perceiving X, they are nothing at all.

This seems so obvious in the case of perception, that I am ashamed to dwell upon it. And it is surely no less obvious in the case of judgment. For if I judge 'Cæsar was a great general' or 'Philosophy is full of intricate problems,' there is something (as we say) 'before' my mind. In the judgment I am analysing and synthesising, and thus apprehending, a complex real. We need not enter into the difficult question as to *what* precisely I am apprehending:—*what*, *quid* analysing and reconstructing, *quid* judging, I have 'before' me. The greatness of Cæsar as a general, or the intricacy of philosophical problems:—these may be treated for our present purpose simply as 'X,' a something real—a complex object—which is 'for me' *quid* judging. And in judging and thus apprehending X, I neither judge, nor in any way apprehend, along with X, any process of getting, or of having, X before me. The 'psychical process' of judging X is nothing *for me*, i.e. is no part of that which I apprehend in apprehending X. And if the knowledge of X—the judgment meaning X—is conditioned by a process of judging, the conditioning process itself is nothing, of which I (in judging and knowing X) am in any sense aware.

Whatever the process of judging may be, it is not something *through the awareness of which* we are aware of X: nor is it something which we apprehend *along with* the apprehension of X. For us, *quid* judging and thus apprehending X, the process of that judging is nothing at all.

§ 4. Our apprehension of the real neither includes *for us*, nor is mediated by, the apprehension of any processes of that apprehending. In perceiving or judging, we are not aware of any changes or events 'in' or 'of' our percipient or thinking mind, whether as antecedent conditions or as part-constituents of our perception or judgment. This seems to me certain, and even obvious: and I would not have dwelt upon it, if it were not sometimes forgotten. Since, however, it may be misunderstood, and through misunderstanding disputed, I will try to anticipate a possible objection here, and thus throw this obvious (and somewhat trivial) contention into relief.

"Surely," it may be said, "in the real world, as we apprehend it, there is a factor contributed by the mind. The

world which we perceive, and the world revealed and grasped in judgment and inference, is something from which we cannot eliminate the work of perception and thought. You have made things easy for yourself, by brushing aside the question '*what* is for me *quid* perceiving or *quid* judging?' For if you had investigated this problem, you would have found that the subject's psychical constitution and psychical processes—the structure and the functioning of his percipient and his judging mind—are vitally concerned in that apprehended real which you so conveniently designated as 'X'."

The reply to this criticism is, I think, simple. Whether the critic's philosophy is sound or not—and I am not saying that it is unsound—his objection is irrelevant. For *suppose* that X—*what* we apprehend *quid* perceiving or *quid* judging—is through and through conditioned and characterised by our psychical character and our psychical processes, my position is still untouched. For what I have denied is (i) that we apprehend those processes and *through our awareness of them* apprehend X: and (ii) that we are *aware of them* as part of X which we are apprehending. And this denial can still be maintained. For let us call the psychical conditions, which are supposed to contribute to X, 'Y'. Then, the objector urges "X—if you will reflect upon it—involves Y". But I am maintaining that Y—whether 'involved' in X or not—is nothing, of which the subject, *quid* apprehending X, is aware.

The irrelevance of the objection, in fact, is concealed by the vagueness of the terms. One might agree with the objector that the "structure and functioning of the percipient and judging mind are vitally concerned in the apprehended real," and yet deny that the judging and perceiving mind apprehended its own structure and functioning *as such*, in apprehending the real: just as one might admit that all clear thinking must conform to the Law of Contradiction, without holding that the thinker must be aware of that Law as a principle to guide his thinking, or as part and parcel of what he thinks.

§ 5. For *whom*, then, is the 'psychical process,' which we have assumed to be involved in the making of a judgment? *Who* is aware of it, and of *what* precisely is he aware? That is the next question which must be asked, and the answer is a painful one. I believe—to put the matter at once and brutally—that no one is or can be aware of 'psychical process' in the sense of the phrase in which we have been taking it. There is no such thing: or at least if there is, it cannot be known. And though undoubtedly we are aware

of something, *that*—whatever we may choose to call it—is not what we set out to discover.

Let me try to explain.

If *I*—the judging subject—subsequently reflect upon my judgment, I may detect and disengage and bring 'before' my mind certain incidents and changes, which I take to have been the 'psychical process' of the judging. In the same way, *you*—the psychologist—may reflect on my judgment as a complex incident in my mental history: and, in studying the conditions and the constituent parts of this incident, you may suppose yourself to be studying 'the psychical process' which was 'my judging'.

You and I are, in such a case, studying a new 'real'. A new object is 'before' our apprehension and judgment, which we may call 'Q'. And our judgments, in which we apprehend Q, are, as judgments, 'psychical processes' 'in' or 'of' our minds. For the original distinction, between judgment as *universal meaning* and judging as *unique and singular psychical process*,¹ will apply to every judgment, if it applies to any. In virtue of that distinction, we looked for a 'psychical process' in the judgment meaning X: and we found a judgment meaning Q. On the same principle, we must look for a 'psychical process' in the judgment meaning Q: and we shall find a judgment meaning Z. We are in fact committed to an infinite pursuit of that which, by the very terms of its conception, cannot be caught or 'apprehended,' and refuses to stand over against us as an object of our awareness. At every step of the pursuit, the 'psychical process'—*the process of apprehending*—eludes our grasp and leaves us in possession of an *object of apprehension*. What we set out to study, was—as we imagined—the living process of a judging mind: the unique and singular series of changes which is that mind's thinking. In making this 'psychical process' an object of study, we have disengaged it from the mind whose process it was. We have removed it from the atmosphere in which it drew the breath of its life: and 'it'—the real object of our search—has ceased to be. And whilst we suppose ourselves to have it 'before us,' our study is fixed upon a lay figure, a thing of straw and stuffing, a caricature of the living process. *That* has slipped away:—only to revive, in a mocking reduplication of itself, as the process of our studying.

§ 6. There is a well-known form of self-hypnotism by which, if we ponder on even the commonest words of our

¹ Above, § 1.

vocabulary, we shall doubt their spelling, or their customary meaning, or perhaps doubt in the end whether they are significant sounds at all. Similarly, there is a kind of dialectical reflexion, which brings the most elementary distinctions—the most solid and familiar facts—into a whirlpool of movement. *There*, everything proves self-contradictory, and, turning confusedly into everything else, crumbles away into nothing.

Now this—it may be suggested—is what is happening in the present case. For ‘psychical process’ and ‘psychical fact’ may perhaps be ill-chosen expressions: but the phenomena, which they indicate, are real, and no amount of dialectical criticism can remove them from the universe. Prove that a ‘psychical process’ is, by the very terms of its conception, neither ‘for’ the subject nor ‘for’ anyone else. Prove that ‘to be itself’ is incompatible with its being known: and that ‘to be known’ conflicts with its being *that* which it is to be known as being. The contradiction lies in the confusion of your thinking, and does not touch the facts. The facts are there, solid and unyielding and unaffected by the dialectical movement. For can it be denied that there is a sense in which judgments ‘occur’? Or that their ‘occurrence’ (the judging) is a process of thinking and a functioning of the mind? Or that the phenomena thus indicated—their conditions and laws—are possible objects of systematic study, forming indeed part of the subject-matter of an actual science?

Undoubtedly the facts—*some* facts, at least—are there, and undoubtedly they are studied. But it is no empty question to ask *what* are these facts, and *what precisely* is studied? And it was against one answer to this question that we were arguing. For the ‘facts’ were characterised (in contrast to the objective and universal meanings) as unique and singular processes of the individual minds: and these—the unique flow of an individual consciousness, and its unique parts or constituent ‘ideas’—were to be the objects of study. Such a psychical process, and such ideas (we argued) are nothing: or if they are anything, at least they are not possible objects of knowledge for anyone.

“In that case,” it will be retorted, “your discussion is waste of time. You have been forcing open doors, and tilting at windmills. For the distinction itself is harmless and indisputable, if rightly understood: whilst the abuse of it, which you have been attacking, is nowhere to be found.

“In the judgment ‘Cæsar was a great general’ there is affirmed a complex meaning. And this affirmation of mean-

ing, as common and universal, as the meeting-ground of all intelligences, as true or false, is a piece of knowledge or of error, and comes under the study of the logician. But the apprehending and affirming of the meaning is something singular and unique: and the judgment is in this sense a judging, an operation severally performed by each intelligence. If I am to judge, I must bring the complex meaning before my mind, and affirm the cohesion of its parts: and in so doing, I must pass through complicated 'psychical processes'. I must apprehend the several constituents—the 'logical ideas,' e.g., *Cæsar*, *General*, *Great*—and I must apprehend the manner of their cohesion, and affirm them in their cohesion. All this—as it *actually occurs*—is a unique and singular process, inseparable from the mind whose process it is. But it nevertheless exhibits a certain general character, conforms to certain conditions and laws, and exemplifies certain typical dispositions and functions of mind. This—the common character, the general conditions, the typical functions, involved in the singular processes—is the subject-matter of Psychology. For every science must in a sense reflect upon the singular and unique. But every science disentangles, from this material of its study, the common nature and the universal laws which are, as it were, the *substance* of the singular phenomena. In this respect the procedure of Psychology is the same in principle as that of other sciences, and is fully justified by its results. For it has analysed this singular process, whereby the individual mind transcends the limits of its singularity and grasps what is universal. It has discovered and named a world of distinctions within the seemingly simple phenomena, from which its investigation started. Thus it has distinguished different types of *ideas*, *images*, or *symbols* as constituent 'steps' in the processes of the different types of mind, or of the same mind as it thinks of different types of thing. It has laid bare the conditions which determine the 'association' of these 'ideas,' the different principles of connexion which operate in the psychical mechanism. It has distinguished, named and described the typical functions of the mind as displayed in the more complex structures—the 'set pieces'—of its self-expression, in *imagination*, *memory*, *recollection*, *inference* and so forth. And by tracing the principles of interrelation, the affiliation and evolution of the different mental functions and processes and structures, it has brought the whole to order and system."

§ 7. The above, I am well aware, is a most inadequate outline of the work achieved by Psychology in a small corner

of its field: but with that work we are not directly concerned. The appeal to it is irrelevant, or perhaps an attempt to prejudice our inquiry. However much we may admire the success of Psychology, we still have our problem to reckon with. For the magnificence of a superstructure cannot of itself guarantee the solidity of its foundations: and we do not even know that these 'psychical processes' *are* the foundations of Psychology. They may be neither the materials from which it starts, nor the foundations of its building, but confusions and misconceptions which have no place in any science. Or, if indeed some psychologists have built upon them, and they prove unstable, Psychology can be trusted to deal with the situation, to repudiate and, if necessary, to reconstruct.

Only one fresh point has been urged in the above defence of 'psychical processes,' if we eliminate the bare assertion that they are 'solid facts' and the appeal to the results of Psychology. A severance is still made between *what* the mind thinks and the process of its thinking. *What* it thinks is a logical content, true or false, knowledge or error; and is relegated to Logic. The 'solid facts,' which are to remain, are certain processes of thinking and certain 'steps' in those processes. These, *as actual*, are 'singular and unique,' and thus (in accordance with the original distinction) sharply contrasted with the universal and common meaning, the 'logical content' and 'logical ideas'. But the 'singular and unique,' we are *now* assured, is merely the starting-point of an inquiry, which (as a 'science') studies its 'substance'—its common character and typical forms, its general laws and conditions.

Now, *in what sense* are these processes 'singular and unique'? On this, as it seems to me, the whole matter turns. For there is a sense in which all phenomena are 'singular and unique'. All phenomena, we may say, as they actually occur, are severally fixed in determinate positions within a complex of relations. And each of them is particularised by reflecting, with an 'emphasis' differentiated by that position, the inexhaustible detail which constitutes their common setting.¹ But the 'psychical processes' are 'singular and unique' in a further sense. For any actual thinking is, as a 'psychical process,' inseparable from the individual mind. It is 'unique and singular' not merely or primarily because, as occupying a determinate position within a complex system, it reflects the inexhaustible variety of its

¹ Cf. above, § 2.

setting *from this and not from that* angle. Its 'unique singularity' is the privacy of the 'individual mind': a privacy of exclusive 'being-for-self,' which is assumed to constitute a mind's 'individuality,' and to cover all its inner modifications. What is 'singular and unique' in this sense cannot be 'given' or 'apprehended,' and cannot serve as the material from which a science disentangles universal laws or the typical forms of a common nature. Its very being is to be inaccessible. For no curious observer can draw the curtains of another's mind and peep at its inner workings: and not even the judging subject himself can here act the part of Paul Pry, observing the secret processes of his own judging. Such psychical process is so singular that it eludes every one's grasp and baffles all description. It is so unique, that one may doubt whether it occurs even once.

§ 8. At the risk of insisting on the obvious, I will illustrate this distinction between the facts, which are *data* for scientific investigation, and the supposed 'facts of mind'. We are to assume—rightly or wrongly—that there is an 'individual mind' of or in which these processes are: for without this assumption the whole position vanishes. Suppose, then, the mind were an inorganic thing—a piece of iron, *e.g.*—whose behaviour under certain chemical conditions we wished to study. *This* piece of iron is unique and singular, and different from every other thing in the universe. But its unique singularity is not a being-for-itself, an inner privacy of self-feeling. Even if we imagine it to enjoy an exclusive individuality of this kind—an individuality analogous to that which we ascribe to ourselves and, with more hesitation, to the animals and perhaps to the plants—no man of science, no chemist, biologist or botanist, would regard such recesses of incommunicable being as objects of study, or regret his inability to enter into them. And if this piece of iron is 'uniquely singular,' *quid* *this* determinate reflexion of an inexhaustible setting, it is not *so* that we observe it, when we make it a starting-point of chemical inquiry, nor *as such* that Chemistry endeavours to know it. We see, or infer by the aid of experiment, a succession of changes, of displacements of constituent particles, culminating in a determinate structural rearrangement. *What* we see, may be unique and singular: but we do not see it in its unique singularity. *That* it is unique and singular, in the sense that, if the universe were exhaustively known, *it* would be exhaustively known too, and would be revealed as an individual constituent in the individual system which is the universe: this may or may not be the case, but it does not concern

our chemical inquiry. *For that* a more limited vision is sufficient. The piece of iron and its processes, as *data* for Chemistry, are a limited group of properties and changes, observed in the rough, in a general and typical form, without that minute differentiation which, as *these* unique and singular facts, they no doubt possess. We observe just so much, and just so precisely, as is required for the formulation of the law: "Iron (such and such a chemical element) under such and such conditions combines with such and such other elements to form such and such a compound: and the process in, or of, the elements is such and such a succession of displacements culminating in such and such a structural rearrangement".

And if the mind were a piece of mechanism, we should have a *datum* before us, a perceptible thing, with a typical structure and with laws of its working to be ascertained by observation and inference. Even if we had nothing before us but *this* 'unique and singular' watch, and were ignorant of the purpose determining the material, shape and adjustment of its parts, we should not necessarily be at a loss. For, if it were set going, part would be seen acting on part, and a series of displacements occurring. And if we hesitated to infer "such and such an ordered arrangement of such and such materials results in such and such a regular movement of the hands and is intended to mark the time," our hesitation would not be due to the 'unique singularity' of the *datum*. We might, in our ignorance, hesitate to infer the actualisation of such a purpose anywhere. But if we accepted it here, we should not hesitate to generalise; or rather, in accepting it, we should already have generalised.

Kant, it will be remembered, proposes¹ to 'set the mind going' in order to ascertain its 'faculties': the 'play' of the mechanism is to reveal the nature of its parts and the principles of their adjustment. But he meant that the nature of mind is manifested in what it does: that we can infer its distinctive 'powers,' only if we set it at work judging, feeling and willing, and study the results. He never supposed that the "inner psychical process" could be separated from the meaning apprehended, or from the content felt or willed, as the movements within the watch are separable from the revolution of the hands on the face. And he certainly did not suggest that by observing the mental machinery at work—by looking (so to say) at the wheels going round in

¹ Cf. e.g., *Kr. d. r. V.*, 2nd edit., p. 91; cf. also *Kr. d. Urtheilskraft*, Intro., p. xxxi.

the mind—one could formulate a theory of the typical forms and general conditions of such "psychical process".

Now, I am not here questioning whether, if we could apprehend the psychical process of any one individual mind, we should be entitled to generalise (or should perhaps already have generalised) from our *data*. I am maintaining simply that the supposed *data* are not forthcoming. The 'psychical process of an individual mind,' if such there be, is *ex vi terminorum*, not capable of being 'given' to that mind itself, or to any other mind. And if the psychologist attains to knowledge of the nature and functioning of mind, the knowledge which he acquires, and his method of acquiring it, must be other than we have been supposing.

§ 9. We talk of ideas 'occurring to us,' 'flashing through our mind,' being 'fixed in our head'. 'Trains of ideas' rush through consciousness, impressions 'crowd' upon us, and images 'jostle' one another, or are 'stored,' in our memory. We naturally lapse into the coarser and more familiar categories, and should be indignant if our metaphors were taken seriously. The mind, we are all agreed, if it is anything at all, is not an extended whole. It is not—not even from 'one point of view'—a one containing a plurality in spatial juxtaposition, nor a place successively occupied by a shifting manifold. It is one: but the unity is changing, and changing *so* that the changes are modes of the unity. It is a one-of-many: but the plurality, whether simultaneous or successive, is phases of the one, and the one is 'one' only in these its phases or 'inflexions'.

But if this is what we mean by a 'mind,' a mind is not that *in* or *of* which processes are, nor that which owns variety and change as its properties. It is not a 'thing' or a 'substance,' but essentially itself a process. It is itself variety and change: but the variety and the change are the modes and inflexions of a one, which is 'one' only in its inflexions, and is *for itself* only as reflected upon itself in them. This is what we are for ourselves at the most elementary level at which we experience 'ourselves' at all:—at the level of 'self-feeling'. *There* our 'self' is a 'scale' of feelings; a unity of feeling of which the many feelings are the inflexions, and a unity which is 'one for itself' (a 'feeling of a self') as returning upon itself throughout the plurality. And here, it may be said, in this unity reflected upon itself in its inflexions, we have the type of what is called 'psychical process' and the clue to the 'psychical process' of judging. For if the 'inflexions' are modifications of a unity of awareness, if 'modes of awareness' are sub-

stituted for 'modes of feeling,' the process is the mind *quâd* judging: and we have found the object of our search. The mind in judging apprehends X: but, *quâd* judging, the mind is an awareness differentiated through many modes, and 'one' for itself by reflexion upon itself throughout these inflexions. In this differentiated and reflected unity of awareness, the mind is Y, the process of judging whereby it apprehends X. The mind, as we rightly insisted,¹ is not aware of Y as that through which it apprehends X, nor as part of X. But the mind, in apprehending X, is Y: and Y is a differentiated unity of awareness.

Before, however, we congratulate ourselves on our success, it will be as well to consider what we have discovered. An 'awareness' is essentially an awareness of something: and 'modes of awareness' are distinguished as awarenesses of different things. No doubt the expression is a vague one: and we speak, *e.g.*, of 'feeling' and 'thinking' as different 'modes of awareness'. We are then laying stress primarily on the *form* of apprehension: but even here (if we will reflect) the difference of the 'form' conditions, and is conditioned by, the difference in the 'matter' apprehended. We may feel the beauty of a work of art: and on the other hand, at a different level of experience, in a different 'form' or 'mode' of awareness, we may attain to an intelligent or 'thinking' appreciation of it. But the two experiences are different through and through. And nothing but confusion of mind and looseness of language could lead us to suppose that the object apprehended is 'the same,' and that the difference lies solely in the form of apprehending.

Nor are the 'steps' of the psychical process of judging 'modes of awareness' in this more general sense. The 'awareness' in question is a unity of thinking, and its modes are 'inflexions' of it. As such, they are different thoughts, *i.e.*, *thoughts of different things*: for thus, and thus only, is thought differentiated.

So the new phrases conceal after all no very startling discovery, and our results may be stated more simply as follows.

The mind apprehends many constituent elements as contributing to a single meaning. This single meaning, developing for the mind throughout the many constituents which it apprehends, is, in the fulness of its development, X—that which, in its judgment, the mind affirms and knows. The many constituents, through which the meaning develops,

¹ Above, §§ 3, 4.

are different objects of thought to the mind, and thus 'differences of its thought' or different 'modes' of its apprehending. And as returning upon itself through the modifications of its thought, the mind is *for itself* a judging process, i.e., is aware that it is judging and knowing X.

If we compare this account with the description with which we began¹ we may say *either* that the distinction between 'process of apprehending' and 'object apprehended' has now, to all intents and purposes, vanished: *or* that we have introduced the notion of 'process' into our conception of the 'object' apprehended. For what we are now describing as Y—the process of judging X—is X itself, with the reservation that X, in its development and in its completeness, is 'for the mind'. The reservation is made: but there is no attempt to explain or to analyse the 'apprehending' of the mind, or that aspect of X in which it is 'for' the mind. The whole emphasis is now laid on the differences within the development of X. For X is now described as the emergence of a single meaning, developing through a succession of different contributory meanings. The 'steps' in this 'process' are, in fact, 'presentations' to a mind, different objects of thought. And perhaps it is these—or some of these—which the psychologist discriminates as 'Images,' 'Ideas' or 'Symbols'. He is describing certain kinds of object which 'pass before the mind,' the differences in the order of their passing and the conditions of their grouping. And the phenomena thus described are without doubt important subjects of study. In certain experiences—e.g., in Reverie—they form perhaps *the whole* of that which we apprehend: and in many other experiences our primary and main object of apprehension is complicated by the mediation of these as contributory elements. But these Ideas, Images and Symbols, and their grouping and interrelations, *if we retain the distinction between process of apprehending and object apprehended*, fall always on the latter side of the division: and thus, in describing them, the psychologist is doing the work of the logician. He is studying a portion of the subject-matter of Logic, mapping out a few of the districts within the logician's territory. And he is doing so imperfectly, in so far as he does not recognise fully *what* he is doing. He is studying phenomena essentially subsidiary to the more complicated phenomena, which he assigns to Logic. For Reverie, Memory, Imagination, etc., are rudimentary forms of knowledge, 'modes of thinking'

¹ § 1.

in which we indirectly and imperfectly apprehend the real. And if they are to be thoroughly understood, they must be viewed as Logic would view them, *viz.*, in their relationship to the more developed forms in which the 'logical' endeavour—the endeavour to know—is more fully explicit and conscious.

§ 10. "But after all," it will be said, "we *do* think 'in' words, or ideas, or images, 'in' symbols or schemata of some kind. If we recall an absent friend, or if we think of a universal meaning, images unique and detailed pass before our mind, and mediate our thought. The succession of such unique images 'in'—or, if you prefer it, 'before'—our mind, is the process of recollecting or conceiving: and the laws of their succession and association, together with the principles of their representation of the 'meaning,' are the subject-matter of Psychology. Psychical processes and functions—Reverie, *e.g.*, Recollection, Conceiving and Judging—doubtless present problems to Logic, and Psychology cannot exhaust their whole significance. But Psychology studies a determinate aspect of such facts, and its description possesses a determinate and independent value."

Now the statement that we think 'in' ideas or images or symbols is ambiguous. (1) We should all agree that thought is inseparably one with its determinate inner expression: that it is embodied and incarnate, and that 'pure thought'—thought *absolutely* unexpressed and indeterminate—is nonsense. But this truth, or truism, is irrelevant: nor is it well expressed in the statement that "we think *in* ideas". For that invites misunderstanding. It suggests the absurdity of a naked and shivering thought, waiting to select (from the wardrobe of the mind) the clothes, in which it may make a decent appearance. We do not 'think in ideas'. Ideas are nothing unless quick with thought: and *thus*, they are the incarnate life, the besouled body, which is our thought. (2) And if it is meant that always—or, at least, often—we apprehend our main object mediately through the apprehension of something else, the statement, however true, is nothing to the point. For if we study the secondary or 'mediating' object, we are still not studying the *process of apprehending* in any distinctive sense, which would entitle us to assign our work to a distinct science. We are studying one kind and one level of thought, *i.e.*, of 'meaning' for a mind—and our study is part and parcel of Logic. There need be no quarrel about names: and provided we recognise the character of the science, and that it is *one*, we need not dispute whether it should be *called* Logic or Psychology.

And though we cannot here profess to explain the character of the science, we may indicate it by saying that it studies the developing and developed meaning which is significant thought, and does *not* study 'process of apprehending' or 'object apprehended' in severance from one another.

(3) But the statement that we 'think in ideas' means, we may suspect, neither that our thought is concrete and incarnate, nor that in some experiences ideas and images are the objects apprehended. It means that we apprehend the real through a veil of our own ideas. And this veil has an inner and an outer side, and fulfils a double function. For the ideas, images, or symbols are *both* states of our mind, modes of our own apprehending consciousness, and so unique and singular : *and also* objects apprehended, symbolic of objects other than our own states, presentative or mediative of the 'real'.

But the veil on its outer side (the ideas as objects apprehended) clearly belongs to Logic : and on its inner side (the ideas as modes of consciousness) it is *possibly* 'for' the thinker himself, but *assuredly* 'for' no other mind.

The whole theory, indeed, if I have rightly understood it, is radically false, and even dangerous. For we have a succession of modes of consciousness, the unique and singular steps in the unique and singular process which is our apprehending. The phases of this process, as phases of apprehending, are reflected on themselves : *i.e.*, the process is, through and through, an awareness with itself for its object. Its 'steps' are at one stroke phases of awareness, and that of which those phases are aware. And if this be so, by what possible method are we ever to get beyond our own self-feeling? *What* we are aware of, is, and remains to all eternity, a phase of our own awareness ; and it cannot even be awareness of something *as our own awareness*, for that would imply distinction from something not our own, not a phase of our self.

On the other hand, if we emphasise the other moment in the see-saw of the theory, we have a succession of ideas, which, *quâ* objects apprehended, are over against, and distinct from, the apprehending. The apprehending is the pure white light of inner vision, before which the variegated show of 'images' is displayed. The process of judging is the procession of changing objects passing before the unchanging 'eye' of the mind. And yet this procession is somehow *also* a series of mental states. It passes 'through' the mind, perhaps, or occurs 'within' it, and its members are 'ideas' or 'psychical facts'. The name, aided by the

magic of this 'through' and 'within,' completes our delusion. We suppose that 'objects,' which *as ideas* pass 'through' the mind or *as psychical facts* occur 'within' it, are more akin to thinking than 'the real,' the 'X,' the apprehending of which was to be explained. But if our awareness of X requires explanation, the interposition of an 'idea' between X and the mind is of no assistance. For if the 'idea' is apprehended, *its* apprehension is no whit more intelligible than that of X. Whilst if the 'idea' is not an object apprehended, but a phase of apprehending, it is the idea which apprehends X; and *that* has to be explained. And if, finally, the idea is *both* apprehending *and* apprehended, we are fairly committed to a theory destructive of all knowledge and all reality—to subjective Idealism in its purest and most paradoxical form.

§ 11. Let me briefly recapitulate. I began by setting out a common distinction between 'logical content' as universal and objective, and 'psychical process' as unique and singular and peculiar to the individual mind (§ 1).

This distinction may be used in a sense with which I have no quarrel, or with which at least I am not at present concerned. For it may be meant merely that the apprehended meaning *as a whole* is, from one point of view, some individual subject's experience, and considered *thus* is 'psychical process'; whilst, taken in abstraction from this its occurrence, it is 'logical content'. That there is 'psychical process' in this sense is no doubt true: the real *quâ* known is known by somebody, and may so far be considered as part of that somebody's history. The same applies, *mutatis mutandis*, to the real *quâ* willed and *quâ* felt. Many novelists (Balzac, *e.g.*, or Henry James), many historians and writers of biography may be said to study and describe 'psychical processes' and 'psychical facts' in this sense of the term. Exactly what they are describing, and how they get their *data*, are interesting and difficult problems: but I am not here attempting to raise them, and I ruled out this sense of 'psychical process' in § 2.

The distinction, however, which was set out in § 1, may be used in a totally different way. It may mean to sever, *within my knowing X*, the *X known* from my *knowing*. And I proceeded to inquire what a 'psychical process of judging,' characterised in terms of the distinction *thus* used, could be. I concluded that if, within my knowing X, the process of knowing is severed from the content known: and if the 'psychical process,' which the distinction contrasts with the logical content, is such a severed process of knowing:—then

'psychical process' is either nothing at all, or at any rate nothing which I or anybody else can study (§§ 3-5).

In § 6 we reviewed the situation. We supposed the severance between object known and process of knowing still to be maintained. But it was suggested that nevertheless such 'psychical processes' might be the *data* of a scientific inquiry. All sciences, it was urged, start from facts which are singular and unique: and the psychologist might use these uniquely-singular 'psychical processes' as the *data* from which to begin his investigations.

We examined this defence in §§ 7, 8. We endeavoured to explain in what sense the facts of science are singular and unique, and why *their* 'unique singularity' does not interfere with the scientific study of them: whilst, on the other hand, the 'unique singularity,' which was supposed to characterise 'psychical processes,' would effectually prevent any apprehension of them as *data* for a science. 'Psychical facts,' we might say, as so interpreted, are a contradiction in terms: for *quid* 'psychical' they cannot be 'facts,' and *quid* 'facts' they have lost the characteristic in virtue of which they were 'psychical'.

In § 9 we tried to develop the contrast between 'perceptible things' and a 'mind' (a contrast sometimes obscured by the metaphors of popular phraseology), and, on the basis of this contrast, we suggested a new description of the 'process of judging'. But we found that, in this new way of looking at the matter, the distinction between 'psychical process of judging' and 'content judged' vanishes altogether: or, if it is in any sense retained, the whole subject-matter of study falls on the side of content. And in place of two sciences, we have but one—a more concrete science of Logic.

Finally, in § 10, we considered an appeal to our common sense, the appeal that "clearly we *do* think in ideas". We exposed the ambiguity of the phrase; and we showed that it does not express any facts, which would support the conception of psychical process attacked in our preceding arguments.

§ 12 This paper has moved within very narrow limits, and its upshot is 'much cry and little wool'. It has criticised conceptions, which few people seriously hold, and which perhaps no one would willingly acknowledge. Yet these 'conceptions'—if confusions of this kind deserve the name—seem to me to lurk in much current philosophy, and to wander at large in popular thought. And if here I am mistaken, and am judging others by the frailties which I detect in my own thinking: if no one but myself is ever in

danger of sinking into this swamp of confusion: at least I may hope to provoke discussion, and to be lifted by criticism into the purer air and on to the firmer ground, where more fortunate thinkers are accustomed to move.

Let me, in conclusion, venture to make a suggestion. It has sometimes been supposed, to speak broadly and in the rough, that the psychologist studies the processes and functions of consciousness, the elements of mind and the laws of its mechanism. He reflects upon his own thinking, feeling and willing, upon that of other persons, and, so far as it is possible, upon that of the animals. And he may thus attain to a systematic exposition of the general nature of mind, and of the stages through which it necessarily passes in the course of its evolution. Sometimes (if report is to be believed) the prospect of this attainment has proved too much for the sanity of the psychologist: and Psychology, no longer content with the position of a 'special science,' expands into the *scientia scientiarum*, which subordinates to itself all philosophy. For ideals of art and conduct, religious beliefs and metaphysical theories: what are these but inevitable products of the mechanism of mind at certain levels of its development? And so, in this nightmare of a theory, philosophy and all its branches—and, I presume, science as well, and psychological science into the bargain—will appear 'in their right place' as corollaries and applications of Psychology.

Now I would suggest that Psychology should begin, so to say, at the other end, following the example which Plato set in the *Republic*, and which Hegel fulfilled. The personality of the moral agent is revealed in the moral system, in the social fabric, which it makes and sustains. The personality of the thinker—the nature and functions of mind as cognitive—is 'writ large' in knowledge. And mind as emotional is broadly expressed in art and religion. In Art and Morality, in Religion and Knowledge, the nature and functions of mind are plain to read: and from the study of them, the study of mind should start. Such a Psychology would be essentially part of Metaphysics. For its subject-matter would be the most developed and most significant manifestations of the real:—mind incarnate in the universe at the level and in the forms of its self-conscious expression.