IV.—A CRITICISM OF DR. MACKENZIE'S PHILOSOPHY OF ORDER.

BY L. P. SAUNDERS.

BEFORE attempting to criticise Dr. Mackenzie, I should like to say that his writings are always a source of genuine pleasure. One feels that he is a very conscientious thinker, and one admires his unusual lucidity of expression. And it is really very important that Philosophers should make not merely a very strenuous effort to think clearly, but also to express their thoughts with the utmost simplicity and unambiguity possible. This is a characteristic that is far too uncommon. Often unintelligibility passes for profundity. It is, we all know, very difficult to be clear. But it is worth while to make the attempt, and not many apparently even do that. For it is really quite obvious that whether a man's ultimate object in writing is selfish or not, he cannot succeed in his aim unless his thoughts are understood, and their being understood depends almost entirely on the way in which he has expressed them.

I shall try to show that Dr. Mackenzie has really not contributed anything in the paper under discussion to the solution of Philosophic problems. He has mainly, I think, changed their names, and when he has not done this he has, I believe, confused issues. I shall discuss the various topics considered by Dr. Mackenzie in the order in which he himself has dealt with them. I begin with a quotation: "It has been my endeavour to exhibit certain fundamental conceptions as being involved even in the simplest facts of experience; and to show that reflexion on them leads us gradually to the recognition of a certain ideal order, which is at least the foundation of our moral aspirations, and may perhaps serve as a basis for an idealistic or spiritual interpretation of the Universe" (p. 216, No. 86).

As I understand him, his general position is that every thing is essentially, that is in its own nature, a member of an order or orders, with the exception perhaps of the order of orders, the Universe itself. He attempts to make out what he means by an order, and also what in particular

these orders are. And in his opinion a good many philosophic difficulties are removed by regarding things in the light of the orders in which they are contained. I pass now to detailed criticism.

In the first place it is not quite clear why he should affect to start with simple sense data. I advisedly say "affect to start" because he admits, indeed contends, that simple sense data, sense data in their simplicity, are not intuited at all—at least not at the stage of mental development when philosophic speculation becomes possible. It would have been necessary perhaps to start with pure sense data if the object in view had been to show that certain concepts apply to them. But this is not what Dr. Mackenzie set out to establish. His contention is that *every* thing is a member of an order or orders. Thus even if it were possible to show that this is true of simple sense data, this of itself would not establish the general proposition. My first criticism is, then, that there seems to be no particular reason why Dr. Mackenzie should have started with simple data of sense. Secondly, it must be pointed out that it seems plausible to urge that it is not possible to prove the general proposition in question by any appeal to sense experience. And I feel sure that Dr. Mackenzie would admit this.

Incidentally, I should like to say that I think it high time that psychologists and philosophers gave up the view that sense data, at a certain level of mental development, cannot be intuited in their simplicity. The position, I believe, involves a confusion; and the confusion seems to be due to the fact that simplicity in the sense of purity is not distinguished from simplicity in the sense of isolation. It may be perfectly correct to deny that a sense datum is never apprehended in isolation; but I am unable to attach any important meaning to the assertion that it is not possible to apprehend a sense quality in its purity. I am of course quite prepared to admit that numerically different but qualitatively similar stimulations of an identical sense organ give rise to sensations varying in either quality, or intensity, or extensity or protensity. But this, it almost seems unnecessary to point out, has nothing to do with the purity or non-purity of the apprehended sense datum.

The first two orders to which Dr. Mackenzie draws attention are *individuality* and *universality*. It is not clear that it is advantageous to speak of these as *orders*. Indeed, I think it can only lead to confusion. For it seems fair to maintain that *individuality* and *universality* are aspects of orders, and not at all orders themselves.

And this seems to be Dr. Mackenzie's own view. A sense datum, he says, is a *this*, but also a *this* that may recur again and again. Now, I think that from Dr. Mackenzie's general point of view this may be taken to mean that any one of an indefinite number of things may occupy some particular position in a given order without in any way altering its character.

But then I am not certain that I have followed Dr. Mackenzie's meaning. It is quite clear, of course, that in his opinion the concepts *individuality* and *universality* apply in some way to sense data. But where I am in doubt is here—is Dr. Mackenzie just pointing out, first, that in his language the concepts in question are *called* orders, and, in the second place, that these orders do apply in fact to sense data? Or is he concerned to show that by regarding sense data as members of *orders*, it is possible to give an intelligible meaning to the terms *individuality* and *universality*? It is quite evident, I suppose, that if the first alternative expresses his intention, that then he has not added anything so far to the solution of philosophic difficulties; and if the second expresses his aim, then it must be said that it is one he has not carried out. Taking what I regard Dr. Mackenzie's general position to be, I should be inclined to say that what he really means is, stated broadly, that some of an indefinite number of things may occupy particular positions in the case of some kinds of orders without in any way altering their intrinsic character (see p. 203). I say in the case of some *kinds* of orders, because it does not seem to be true of them all, not, for instance, in the case of the Universe. For it is specious to contend that the Universe without the numerically (!) particular colour order it contains would not be the same Universe. I say this seems plausible, as it is not certain that its force is peculiar. For it can be replied that the character of the Universe would be as such as little or as much affected by, say, the substitution of any one of its particular orders as any other order would be by the substitution of any one of its instances of qualities for other instances. The cases seem to be identical in this respect. There is, perhaps, a genuine difference, and one which may make all the difference. The substitution, in the case of the Universe, would be ideal, for there seems to be no sense in supposing that a fundamental character of the Universe could be replaced by *another* identical in kind. It might be contended that all other orders are really ideal, and that in consequence there cannot be in their case either any real substitution. However, I am not prepared to radically discuss a possible interpretation of Dr.

Mackenzie's position. What he really has to do is to make out quite clearly what he means by an order; then to show that that meaning really applies, and to what; and finally that it affords a solution of a good many philosophic difficulties. For myself, I can only say that I am unable to see that the difficulties that ordinarily are supposed to attach to the concepts *particularity* and *universality* have in any way been elucidated by Dr. Mackenzie. Of course it may be that these difficulties are wholly imaginary, and this is a view I am inclined to adopt. The meaning given to any term is in one sense entirely arbitrary. What is never arbitrary is its application. The meaning I attach to "particularity" is indefinable; not so that to which I should attach the term "universality". The meaning Dr. Mackenzie gives to *universality* I have not understood. On page 194, Dr. Mackenzie says, with reference to a particular colour, "It is apprehended not merely as *this* colour, but as a 'his' that may recur again and again. It has thus the aspect of *universality*. It is one of the many possible instances of redness. As soon as this is recognised . . . we have at least the germ of the apprehension of what is meant by one and many, and of the abiding in the midst of change." I think all these statements are not clear, and that those that are involve confusion. To begin with, Dr. Mackenzie seems to mean by *universality* the fact of a recurrence of a "this" of, say, a particular colour; and further on it seems to be identical with substantiality. It is clear, I think, that there is some confusion. There is also some ambiguity. For does Dr. Mackenzie mean that the *same* "this," the *same* colour, can recur, or simply that there are different "thises" of the *same* quality? He speaks of *instances* of *redness*, and so I suppose he means by *universality* the fact of there being different *thises* of the *same* kind. But what does this, in the end, mean, and how far do his *orders* help him? These are the difficulties, and these, so far as I can see, he has not touched. Mr. Russell is fond of telling us that you cannot get away from universality. It is plain, he would have us think, that you cannot in consistency fall back upon similarity as an explanation, for similarity is itself a universal. I think this is a remarkably weak argument. Does not Mr. Russell notice that there is nothing plain about the matter, one way or the other, until he has defined what he means by universality? The terms *universality* and *similarity* either are or are not synonyms. If they are, then certainly if there is similarity there is universality. If they are not, then similarity may or may not have the character of universality. But until the meaning of univer-

sality is made out, there is no means of answering the question. I do not know what Mr. Russell means by the word *universality*; and what he has before his mind when he is talking about universals, I am unable to make out. There seems to be something mysterious about them. I have no doubt at all that he is quite clear himself about the matter; my point is that further elucidation is desirable. In one respect, however, I persuade myself I have perhaps understood Mr. Russell: his universals are either essentially non-temporal or not essentially temporal. In either case, his views in this respect, I must regard as differing from Dr. Mackenzie's, for I understand that *time* is, for Dr. Mackenzie, one of the orders into which all things fall.

The other orders to which Dr. Mackenzie draws attention are, *quality, kind, intensity or degree, quantity, protensity, extensity, number, time, and space*. Dr. Mackenzie's treatment of these concepts is unsatisfactory. In the first place it is not clear what he is trying to make out. Are they all characteristics of *every* thing, or *some of all things* or *some of some things* or *all of some*? And what is their relation to each other? They are not all apparently equally fundamental. We are told, for instance, that *intensity* or *degree* is a *species*¹ of quantity; and *protensity* and *extensity* are said to be *varieties*² of continuous quantity, and so too *species* of quantity. Reflective analysis, says Dr. Mackenzie, discovers, in the case of *protensity* and *extensity*, the orders of *time* and *space*. This is not clear. Does Dr. Mackenzie mean that *protensity* is *time* or a character of time? And similarly with *extensity*. In either case, what is the relation of *space* and *time* to *quantity*? Are they too *varieties* or *species* of it? It is all too loose. Is there any difficulty in speaking of *species* or *kinds* of *quantity*? And also of *kinds* of difference?—Dr. Mackenzie speaks of *modes* of difference, and of them, he gives *kind, quality, quantity, intensity* or *degree*, etc. I do not wish to quibble, and I do desire to understand. In any case, I do not want to be misled. We all agree, I suppose, that in some sense all these concepts apply, philosophers and the rest of us. And to merely affirm this hardly seems worth while. As philosophers what we want to know is their precise *meaning*, if it can be given; their mutual relationships, so far again as these can be defined; and, finally, their range of application. Now I cannot see that Dr. Mackenzie has really helped us in these matters. It is possible, of course, that in his opinion the concepts in question and their relations are not definable. But if so, why not make the statement? All one gathers in

¹ P. 195.² P. 196.

this connexion from what Dr. Mackenzie does say is that they have *some* meaning, that they are *somehow* related, and that they *do* apply, and of the things to which they apply, some are simple data of sense. And all this I must regard as philosophically trivial. It is really not enough in Philosophy to maintain, without precision, that "even our simplest apprehension is at least implicitly the apprehension of an order".

Dr. Mackenzie's criticism of Kant is, that he was wrong in not recognising that the several modes of unity are inherent in the material they unify. Kant, according to Dr. Mackenzie, supposed the modes of unity to be really foreign to the material they build up. I should like to know if Dr. Mackenzie thinks that for Kant the modes of unity were foreign to *phenomena*, to *experience*. There is no doubt, I suppose, that they are completely foreign to noumena. But however this may be, I do not quite see on what grounds Dr. Mackenzie denies constructive activity to the understanding (p. 197). Apparently he maintains this because he holds that the modes of unity or orders are inherent in the unified or ordered. If this is his reason, its cogency, I must own, escapes me. But, of course, it all depends upon what is meant by construction as applied to the understanding. The problem of the passivity or activity of the mind in knowing offers a fine source for idle verbalisms and confusions. From the time of Kant the activity of the mind in knowing has never been seriously questioned. I do not know whether Dr. Mackenzie intends to deny it, for, as I have said, it is not clear what he means when he denies construction to the understanding. He may only mean to deny that the understanding constructs the principles it actually employs in knowledge; and not at all that it is active.

And certainly it may be difficult to understand what could be meant by the supposition that the mind *constructs* the concepts or categories it in some sense *uses*. Still I am not prepared to grant that it is an insurmountable difficulty. If this is the case, then it is, philosophically, an important fact. But until it is shown to be important, I should not admit that its truth is worth considering. Of course if the question "How are *a priori* synthetic judgements possible?" is really significant, and if its only answer is, They are possible if the mind itself, to use Dr. Mackenzie's word, *orders* the given of intuition, then clearly it would be important. But then it is quite certain, I think, that Kant never establishes this. It is agreed, in these days, that there are not two kinds of judgments, synthetic and analytic. And whether

this consideration of itself affects the significance of Kant's question, depends on its meaning. If what is meant is that all judgments are synthetic, then so far the problem stands; but if what is meant is that none are, then whether or not it is modified, depends again upon what is meant. If the meaning is that all judgments are analytic, then it would remain if the distinction between *a priori* and *a posteriori* analytic judgments could still be drawn. The problem would then be worded: "How are *a priori* judgments possible?" But the problem vanishes altogether if the distinction in question is fictitious, or if the distinction, so far as it applies at all, only applies to the matter to be judged about. And I put forward the view that judgment as such is neither *a priori* nor *a posteriori*. If this is so, then we have to translate Kant's question into "How is judgment possible?" And this question, I urge, has no answer. But even if it has, the answer given by Kant is wholly irrelevant.¹

¹ As employed by him, the critical method may be characterised as a procedure which asks a question that seems to be intelligible, and forthwith proceeds to answer another. Consider, for instance, his answer to the question, "How are geometrical judgments possible?" They are possible if *space* is a *form* of intuition. Now I think this is a remarkable solution. Certainly if *space* is a *form* of intuition, then it may be granted that *every* thing given in intuition will appear under that form; so that whatever relations are inherent in *space*, these same relations no doubt will obtain in the case of the content of intuition. And from this it follows—I am giving what I think Kant's argument to be—that geometrical truths apply to the given of intuition. But this "solution" is obviously no answer to what apparently was the question. The question apparently was, "Under what conditions can the truth of a geometrical judgment be entertained?" and it is no answer to this question to say, "It can only be maintained if *space* is a *form* of intuition"; for it is quite obvious, I suppose, that whether *space* be or be not a form of intuition, in neither case is the truth of any particular geometrical judgment or geometrical judgments as such guaranteed. The question that Kant really does answer is this: "Under what conditions is it possible to maintain that what is given in intuition as such is spatial?" It is an answer to this to say we could maintain it if *space* is a form of intuition. But it is not the *only* answer possible. The most straightforward one is: "If everything given in intuition is spatial". In other words if *space* is a real determination. And it is plausible to maintain that this, in the end, is Kant's answer, on the ground that the one intelligible signification to be attached to the term a "*form* of intuition" requires the assertion, or involves the position, that what is given in intuition is spatial; that, further, the only novelty in Kant is that for him the real spatiality of the given of intuition is caused by the mind apprehending. Phenomena for Kant really are in *space*. Now what does all Kant's loud profundity come to? His original question apparently was: "How is it possible for the mind to take true geometrical judgments relevant to the content or given of intuition?" And his answer is—for I think

I now pass on to Dr. Mackenzie's treatment of relations. Here, again, I think Dr. Mackenzie deludes himself into supposing that his view of orders effects a removal of standing difficulties. In the first place his language is perhaps over loose—he says in one place (p. 199): "Relations, I would urge, simply *express* the position of particular objects in the order or orders to which they belong," and then further down: "When we are dealing with some one definite order, the relations that *determine* the position of a point within that order may be called intrinsic". Is to *determine* the position of a point the same as to *express* it? In neither case can the definition be regarded as satisfactory. The position in the quality order of a particular colour is simply the fact of its being some one definite colour; the several *positions* constituting that order *are* the several colours of different quality. To say, then, that a relation expresses the position of a particular object in the order to which it belongs, comes to saying, in the case of the quality order of colours, that each colour quality is a relation. This, I think, cannot be accepted. The statement, says Dr. Mackenzie, that A is

I have shown that it comes to this—"If the given is spatial". This, I suppose, no one would deny to be first class nonsense. But it is open for some to maintain that I have misinterpreted his question. His question was not: "How is it possible for the understanding to make true geometrical judgments concerning the given of intuition?" but "What is implied in the admitted possibility of making true geometrical judgments?" Granting this to be his question all I have to say in this case is, that although his reply, namely, "That this possibility implies that space is a *form of intuition*," is some sort of an answer, yet that it is, epistemologically, an utterly trivial one. And why? His answer, I have shown, really, in the end, comes to no more than saying that the possibility of making true geometrical judgments about the given of intuition implies that the given of intuition is spatial. But this answer is trivial. You might just as well say that the possibility of making a true judgment to the effect that "X is red implies the fact of the reality of X's redness. Finally, I should like to say that although this is the only kind of question Kant, in this connexion, does in point of fact answer, yet that, at bottom, it was not the question he, in his own mind, really set out to solve. I do think, he was trying to find out how it was possible to make what he called synthetic judgments. But this question he did not answer. Nor is it surprising, for if what I have said is true, he was really asking himself this. "*How is it possible to make true judgments?*" And to this question, in one important sense, there is no answer at all. The only sort of answer is that in some cases our judgment springs directly from the apprehension of the "fact," and in others directly from the apprehension of other "judgments". I conclude, then, that the attempt to show that in order to judge truly the mind must have itself *created* or constructed the order apprehended is doomed, to failure. The point, however, as to the precise sense of mental activity in knowledge, remains. And it is a question which I invite Dr. Mackenzie to consider.

greater than B is a way of indicating the positions of A and B within the quantitative order. I must reject this account. The statement in question is *not* a way of indicating the respective positions of A and B.

The position of A is A, and of B is B. But to say that A is A and B is B, or, at least, that this entity is of quantity A, and that one of quantity B, is not to say that the one is *greater* than the other. For positions in the order of quantity are simply particular quantities; thus to say of a particular entity that it occupies position A in the quantitative order can at best be taken to mean that its quantity is of a particular amount. Hence, if the statement A is greater than B expresses the positions of A and B, it will mean that A is a quantity of a particular amount, and that B is a quantity of a particular amount. But I must deny that this is the meaning. The truth is that what is expressed is the *relation* of the positions, and *not* the positions. For these reasons I am unable to agree with Dr. Mackenzie's definition of relations. Nor am I able to accept his account of what constitutes a relation extrinsic and intrinsic. I should have thought it clear that if relations simply express *positions* in orders that then all relations must be held to be intrinsic. But even if one ignores his definition of relations, it is still impossible, I think, to regard his account of the nature of extrinsic and intrinsic relations as satisfactory. It rests upon the position that each and every thing belongs *primarily* to some one order and *secondarily* to other orders. Thus red belongs *primarily* to the *colour* order and secondarily to, for example, the order of *time*. There may be something in this view, but it is not clear how much, and certainly Dr. Mackenzie treats it too easily. What precisely is meant by something being, say, *primarily* a colour of a particular quality, and *secondarily* (or not primarily) an entity existing at a particular *time* and place? It seems plausible to argue that it is as essential for a particular colour to exist at a particular time and place as that it should be of some definite quality and degree. And, to generalise, I should have thought that whatever order a thing belongs to, it belongs to it intrinsically.

The next topic discussed by Dr. Mackenzie is Order and Form. This section is, in my opinion, to some extent interesting, and to a large extent confusing. It is undertaken with the main purpose of elucidating what Dr. Mackenzie means by order. I cannot regard it as a success in this respect. I am prepared to admit that the fault is mine. But whatever be its cause I must own that in discussing Form Dr. Mackenzie has not elucidated for me what he

means by Order. I shall therefore briefly confine myself to some of his more general observations. One of his main contentions is, that "Empty forms are endless, but concrete orders have their definite boundaries" (p. 202). For instance number is infinite, but the number of things finite (p. 201). He also says (p. 201) that *space* is endless; and he explains this to mean that there is nothing in the nature of space as such that could impose a limit at any point. Dr. Mackenzie regards these statements as important. They may be; but it is not evident without further amplification. Anyway, when one notices that apparently Dr. Mackenzie accepts Aristotle's view that form has no reality apart from matter, his position does not seem to be consistent. For you cannot at once hold that space is boundless, and that number is infinite, and also that neither the one nor the other is real apart from a limited content. If forms are *not* real apart from their content, and if their content is limited, what on earth can be meant by saying that *in themselves* they are limitless, when *in themselves* they are not real, and so nothing. Has nonentity any *real* properties? It would seem as if Dr. Mackenzie were urging that it is limitless! Why does Dr. Mackenzie bother to talk about *empty* forms at all? The *real*, for him, is full, and part of its filling is its form. Why then does not he say straight away that empty forms are just nothing at all? At present they seem to be something like Mr. Russell's universals, utterly suspended from nowhere at no time and place.

What Dr. Mackenzie has to say about Concepts and Judgments in section 7 and 8 seems to me important and generally acceptable. I am not certain, but at least Dr. Mackenzie's language suggests, that in judging we simply refer something to an order, or to a position in an order. If this is his view, then, say when I judge that Simpkin's face is buried in the gutter, to what order do I refer? But I may have misunderstood.

I do not feel that Dr. Mackenzie's account of Truth is of any particular value. His observations about the relations of Belief and Truth are interesting and important. Many of us have never been able to concede that a judgment could be other than true or false, that, in other words, there was no sense in speaking of degrees of Truth. But I think most would be prepared to admit that in the case of Belief, there can be degrees of acceptance.

In judging, according to Dr. Mackenzie, we attempt or seek to state some of the relations involved in an order, not in a fictitious order, but in a real or objective one. In so far

as we do so, the judgment is true; and, I gather, in so far as we do not, the judgment is false. Whether or not this view is superficial, it is certainly narrow. It is narrow in its account of judgment, and in the limits it sets to possibly true judgments. I should maintain that judgment as such is not necessarily confined to an attempt to express the relations existing in *real* orders. When, for instance, I judge that the world would be better if there were not the order of pain, I am not, clearly, expressing a judgment about any *real* order. It would be beside the mark to say that the order of nature is real; for I am merely urging that the subject of a judgment is not necessarily a member of a *real* order. I do not know whether Dr. Mackenzie confines truth to *real* judgments, because he confines, apparently, judgment to the real (see p. 205), or whether the restriction in the one case is independent of the other. It is possible, for instance, that he might allow that not all judgments are about real orders, and yet confine all possibly true judgments to judgments about such orders. This view, I am inclined to think, springs from a confusion of Truth in the sense of a property¹ of judgments and truth in the sense of the *fact* judged about or expressed; when by a fact is meant either a real order, or a member of such an order, or a relation of such an order. If it be admitted that judgments can be made that are not in this sense about facts, then I think that all such are either true or false. For it is not evident that in this case there is any reference of anything to a real order, but rather *exclusion*. Do not negative judgments present a difficulty? Are they not possibly true? We seem, also, to be left with hypothetical judgments. With reference to some imaginary mechanical system, it is possible to calculate the relative disposition and velocity of the particles at a certain time. These judgments are not about facts. And yet surely they may be true. In conclusion I think Dr. Mackenzie too easily

¹ And in this connexion I should like to draw all attention to the view that truth is eternal. Now I am not certain that I understand what is meant by this. But if at least part of its meaning or implication is, that a judgment that is once true is *always* true, then I think reservations require to be drawn. And by this I do not mean to deny that all verbally identical judgments are equally true or false if any one of them is. Such a position is clearly untenable and, in any case, I am not aware that it has ever been put forward. Nor do I intend to deny that if a judgment X is true that all other judgments only differing from it numerically are also true. I admit that if judgments X and Y have the same meaning, that one cannot be true and the other false. What I do wish to question is the possibility of *repeating* all judgments—for instance, I do not think it possible to repeat judgments of the form, X is Y *now*.

finds his orders of use. He says: "It may easily be shown, by reference to that order (that is the numerical order), the judgment that $7 + 5 = 13$ is false" (p. 206). I venture to say it is not possible at all to show that this judgment is false by reference to anything, and certainly not to his numerical order.

Dr. Mackenzie's next topic is Order and Reasoning. Here again I do not feel certain that I have understood the points made. At first, Dr. Mackenzie seems to regard reasoning as the process of *testing* the truth of judgments by reference to the orders to which they are relevant (p. 206). But then the example he gives of a reasoning seems hardly to bear out such a view. The example is: $12 > 7$, $7 > 5$, $\therefore 12 > 5$. What has been tested here? It would not be correct to say that the judgment $12 > 5$ has been so tested. Had we *started* with it we might then, in some sense, have *tested* it by reference to the judgments constituting the premisses. But in the given example the judgment $12 > 5$ is the *conclusion* of a process; and it is a process that as such might have yielded a contrary result if we had started differently, if, say, the processes had been, $7 > 12$, $5 > 7$, the result would have been $5 > 12$. Now I do not wish to be misunderstood. I am *not* questioning the importance of what, apparently, is Dr. Mackenzie's view of the nature of reasoning; I am, however, questioning the appropriateness of his example. At this juncture I may be allowed to point out that in my opinion the prevalent custom of distinguishing between judgments that are *self-evident*, *ultimate*, or *non-deduced* and that are *derived* or *deduced* is apt to lead to confusions. The fundamental fact is judgment and it is a fact that is throughout identical. My contention is that every judgment, as such, is ultimate, and by that I mean that in *every* case it is the expression of a something immediately given in intuition. In other words, what I am anxious to insist upon is that every judgment is derived from some datum, and if it is asserted at all, it is asserted as an immediate apprehension of what is contained or given in a datum. I admit that it may be possible and desirable to distinguish two kinds of data—to divide, say, data into those that are "judgmental" and those that are "factual"—but I emphatically reject the position which regards some judgments as derived or deduced, and other as not deduced. Every judgment springs *directly* from the intuition in which the datum is given. The important point is that they are all equally and in the same sense *derived* or *ultimate*. And this position, I am inclined to think, brings out the fact of the independence of the truth

of any judgment upon that of any other. But to discuss this any further, would be to go too far beyond the object of this paper.

Dr. Mackenzie's brief treatment of cause I do not find illuminating. We are told that we do not ask *commonly* why red is red, but that we do ask why a lobster, when boiled, becomes red. I would go farther than this. I would say that no person in his senses *ever* asks why red is red. And the explanation I have to offer for the fact is simply that it is recognised to be a meaningless question. And in the end, as everybody knows, we do not ask *why* a lobster, on being boiled, changes its colour. Dr. Mackenzie also seems to recognise this, for he says, that such occurrences present themselves as "magical" (p. 207). But then he goes on to say that such happenings are not *really* casual; and so I gather that in the end they are not really "magical". The meaning he attaches to the word magical in this connexion can only be gathered by his contrasting it with self-evident occurrences. Apparently it is *self-evident* that red is red. But then when he seems to say that with fuller knowledge the magical character of occurrences like lobsters turning red disappears, does he intend to imply that such happenings also become self-evident? All this to me seems wrong. There is no sense in saying that the redness of redness is *self-evident*. I think Dr. Mackenzie deludes himself too easily into imagining that certain things are self-evident. When a change is seen to arise through a continuous movement, I understand Dr. Mackenzie to think that it then becomes or is self-evident. I can only reply that to me there is nothing self-evident about continuous movement. Indeed, I go farther, and I insist that *no* change is self-evident. The sooner we all recognise that it is *not* evident why any one thing gives rise to any other the better. This recognition, I am bound to think, would put a stop to a good deal of flatulent Idealism. Even if it is true that all changes are continuous, it still remains true that no change is self-evident. The fact, if it is one, that all causes are desires, does not make the causality of any effect self-evident. The desire on the part of a monkey to scratch its head may give rise to the fact, and from the point of view of the monkey, it is fortunate that it does; but it is not self-evident why it should.

Anyway, here again I completely fail to see how far Dr. Mackenzie's *orders* have helped him. To me, he seems to be playing fast and loose with them throughout. From the way he talks one imagines that the views he put forward are somehow involved in his *orders*, and that other topics are

considerably clarified by the light they shed. Almost anything is called an order, and all difficulties are swamped by an ambiguous word.

I do not understand precisely what Dr. Mackenzie means by Subjective orders, nor what really their relations are to Objective orders. I shall not try to give possible interpretations, for life is too short and this paper is already too long. I pass on, then, to Dr. Mackenzie's treatment of value. And here I do not know whether what is being offered is Psychology or Ethics, or both. In any case, it all seems weak and over loosely expressed. Dr. Mackenzie has something to say about pleasures and pains; about likes and dislikes; about conscious and unconscious *grounds* of these: about acts of choice; something is also said about a development in the reference of something, although it is not clear what, from the bodily organism to, in the end, a super-personal order; and the meaning of Good also, we are told, gradually unfolds itself, being identified first with what is liked, and finally to stand for what has the highest value in a super-personal order. Here I think he is moving along rather too quickly. A good many of the statements made seem to be false, and few of them connected. He speaks of a stage at which we are unable to assign any ground for our attitude of liking or disliking. Has Dr. Mackenzie reached the stage at which he can tell us why he likes or dislikes anything? Do these attitudes too become *self-evident*? Of course we may come to learn more precisely *what* it is that affects us in these ways. And if this is what Dr. Mackenzie means then why does he not say so? But if he does intend to assert nothing more, then why assert so much? For it seems clearly to have nothing to do with an order of *value*—at least, not as ordinarily understood. I can suppose a baby's dislikes being first of all unREFERRED, and later on referred first, to its tongue, then, to its bottle, and then to the milk inside the bottle, and then to its nurse, and then to the milkman, and then to milkmen who dilute milk, and finally to all deceptive actions. But this is simply a history of dislikes; and at no stage in the "development" is there any increased approach in the self-evidence of the attitude. It is just as much inexplicable that a man should dislike bad eggs as that he should dislike bad philosophising. Further, our baby in finishing up with a dislike for deceptive actions does not necessarily lose its original dislike for diluted milk, and those who like sound thinking as a rule like fresh eggs. There is really no development of particular dislikes and likes. The growth that makes its appearance as a baby and

proceeds forthwith to develop into a man, may begin by taking delight in sucking its thumb, and subsequently, in an hour of heightened dignity, may stand transfixed in the presence of some liquid-eyed coquette. And yet there would be no sense in saying that the one attitude developed into the other. Again I cannot see what Dr. Mackenzie is driving at. So far as he talks psychology, I heartily disagree with him. But then I am quite willing to admit that I have quite failed to understand what he has to say.

He also seems to hold that Good has a meaning, and that it is one that develops (p. 210). One wonders if Dr. Mackenzie has even read Mr. Moore's *Principia Ethica*. Not that I think that Mr. Moore's is the last word in Ethics; still I sometimes gravely suspect that his is the first. And I am unable to see that Dr. Mackenzie has got beyond him. But again, I have to confess that I may not have understood. I can allow, however, that some of his statements are not false, and that a good many of them are not confusing.

The Ideal for Dr. Mackenzie is, I think, the actual Universe. The Universe is, for him, some kind of a whole, it is the order of orders, it is temporal, and each stage in its realisation is of absolute value (p. 212). To me this view is interesting, and if he could get there, I think it would be a fine philosophic achievement. And in justice to Dr. Mackenzie, it must be said that his paper is not regarded by him as even supplying the outline of a logical proof of it. Few are more keenly aware than he of the profound difficulty of such a task. Indeed, I think I do not misinterpret him when I say that in his opinion proof, in the strict sense, is, in such cases, unattainable. And this is an attitude that seems to be gaining ground. A good many of us can find much interest and some real encouragement in the views of cultured minds, entirely apart from any proofs they may think it worth while to offer. I shall have been misunderstood then, if it is thought that my aim has been to show that Dr. Mackenzie has not proved his final view. My object, whatever may have been its measure of success, has been merely to criticise certain statements made by Dr. Mackenzie, in some cases because I have thought them inaccurate and in others because they have seemed to me confused. And with this task I proceed. My final concern will be with the Order of Values and the Ideal. In the first place, I do not understand clearly the relation that Dr. Mackenzie holds to obtain between the order of values and the Ideal. The Ideal is, for him, the actual Universe, and the Universe is a changing whole. Now if the different stages in its "realisation," of its "unfolding,"

were of different value, you might then get an order of values, and it might be an ascending or descending one; but it also might be neither one nor the other. Such a position, however, whatever be its intrinsic cogency, is not that of Dr. Mackenzie. For him, the Universe, in all its stages, is perfect (p. 212). Before, however, going any farther, I think it advisable to consider the very conception itself of an order of value; for until we get clear on this point, it seems futile to attempt anything else. Now I suppose it is justifiable to distinguish *value* from *values*, that is to say, the character in question and the thing or things possessing it. If so, one must be careful not to confuse an order of *values* with an order of *value*; for statements about the one may or may not be true about the other. Thus it may be true that there is an order of value, but *no* order of values. This could be taken to mean either that there was nothing real of any kind of value or else that the real things that were valuable formed no order. Of course it is only too plain that such-like statements cannot be taken seriously until one has made out clearly what one intends to designate by the terms *order* and *value*. Fortunately for my purpose this is a task I need not fully undertake. For what I am anxious to insist upon is the untenability, in *any* important sense, of the conception of an order of *value*. And if it is true that the conception is devoid of any significance, there will be no necessity to distinguish between it and an *order of values*. I deny that there is any sense in the conception. But to make my contention good, I must state what it is that I understand the position to involve, and then show that it is invalid. The position I am referring to is common enough, indeed I believe it has been maintained, implicitly and explicitly, by perhaps every Philosopher. I refer to the view implied, for instance, in the judgments, "A is good, but B is *higher* good than A,"—it is implied in all judgments of the kind, "A is a *higher* or a *lower* good than B". The implied position is that there is a kind of goodness that is of the lowest kind, and another that is of the highest, and between these there are a number of other intermediate kinds. This position, I urge, is either nonsense or else not ethical. My point, in brief, is this,—if the predicates *higher* and *lower* apply to goodness, they are not ethical characteristics, and so from that point of view, are irrelevant. But I should *also* deny that they do apply. And the only way to show that this is the case, is to try to see what could be meant by the judgment, say, A is a *higher* good than B. What is the standard of comparison here? It is *not* goodness, for, *ex hypothesi*, both A and B are good.

And I suppose it would not be allowed that what is meant is that A is *lesser* good than B ; but if it were then there would not be any theoretical difficulty—the standard in such a case would be some assigned *amount* or *quantity* of goodness. Now although this is not, I gather, what is intended to be asserted, yet I think it must be conceded that in the end nothing else can be meant. The case is different when it is affirmed that “A is of higher value than B,” for this might be taken to mean that A is good and B is not, or that it more nearly approximates to a good thing than B. But no meaning, I repeat, other than quantitative,¹ can be attached to the assertion when both the things compared are good. The same considerations apply in the case of all assertions of the form “Good thing A is better (or worse) than good thing B”. Of course I admit that meanings can be given to these expressions. All I have to say is that these possible meanings are not apparently what is intended. Thus you might mean that A is good intrinsically *and* extrinsically ; B being simply, say, good intrinsically. I conclude, then, that no sense can be attached to the conception of an order of values, so long as such a conception involves the applicability of the terms *higher* and *lower*, *better* and *worse*. Value itself may fall within the order of *quantity*. But this too I think is doubtful.

The question we began with as to the relation of the Ideal and the order of values is now answered—they bear no relation. And this in the end is really Dr. Mackenzie's position, since according to him the Universe is perfect and so cannot, in any sense, be *progressing* ; it is simply *changing*. The changing Universe is the Ideal. I do not mean to say that Dr. Mackenzie does not make a good many statements that are inconsistent and irrelevant so far as this position goes. I think he does. The whole of his discussion of the order of value is irrelevant. And what seems to me quite inconsistent is his belief in the reality of human progress ; for I am unable to see that parts of a perfect whole can, in what I think is his sense of the word, progress. I am prepared to admit that the perfection of the Universe is unaffected by any imperfection of its parts—these may not only be imperfect, but even perhaps evil. The only way in which I could allow any meaning to the position that the Universe is perfect and that its parts are progressing is if it were possible to suppose

¹ I should myself be inclined to reject that view that goodness falls within the quantitative order. If this is true, and if it is also true that there are not *higher* and *lower* goods, *better* and *worse* ones, I need hardly say that the recognition of these facts would have a far-reaching effect upon Ethical speculation or theory.

that there are degrees of perfection. But it is not possible, I think, to entertain such a view. If Dr. Mackenzie would be content to regard the Universe as *good*, and not as *perfect*, then the case would be different. You would then have progress, progress in the direction of perfection. And this would mean change in the direction of the highest degree of goodness, when by highest degree is intended greatest amount. However, if goodness is not amenable to quantitative determination, if there are *not amounts or quantities* of it, if, in Dr. Mackenzie's language it does not fall within the order of quantity, then this position also would have to be rejected.

In conclusion, I shall consider Dr. Mackenzie's treatment of the validity of the Ideal. He says: "Now, if it be admitted that there is a real Universe—i.e., if such a scepticism as that of Gorgias is set aside—it would certainly not be easy to form any conception of such a Universe except as a perfect whole, more or less of the kind that has already been characterised" (p. 213). And he adds: "This seems to me to be the only kind of proof of which such a hypothesis is susceptible, unless the place of the subsidiary orders could be definitely determined as falling within a larger whole" (p. 213). Now I wish first of all to say that it is one thing to prove that there is a Universe, and another to prove that the Universe is perfect. And this is so because a Universe is one thing and a *perfect* Universe another. There may be a Universe, and it may be perfect. But, as ordinarily understood, there is no inconsistency in entertaining the one belief, and rejecting the other. And yet (supposing Dr. Mackenzie's language adequately to express his thoughts) it does seem that Dr. Mackenzie does not sufficiently realise this. I do not mean that Dr. Mackenzie thinks he has *proved* the perfection of the Universe, in proving that there is some one comprehensive order; for I am fully aware, as I have already said, that he is quite conscious of the fact that he has not, in strictness, *proved* anything of the kind. What I am criticising is his apparently direct transition from his belief in an Order of Orders to a belief in its *perfection*. This, if it is a fact, I must regard as illegitimate. I reject, then, the contention that it is certainly not easy to form any conception of an Order of Orders except as a perfect whole (To me it is just as easy or as hard to suppose that the supreme or all-comprehensive order should be Evil as that it should be Good. Indeed, to maintain the reverse, seems to me so remarkable, that I am inclined to disbelieve that it is really Dr. Mackenzie's position—I must suppose that he has expressed himself loosely.

In conclusion, Dr. Mackenzie examines the contention that it is impossible to hold that the Universe is perfect if it is admitted that it contains evil. Dr. Mackenzie does not admit the finality of this argument. He allows that there is evil, and he holds that this does not detract from the perfection of the Universe. The principle underlying his position is not unfamiliar,—it is, stated broadly, that the ethical character of a whole is unaffected by the ethical character of its parts. A whole may be good and some of its parts bad; and it may, similarly, be bad and some of its parts good. Accepting this, it seems plausible to contend that the goodness or badness of the Universe as a whole is not determinable, on the ground that it is not in its entirety cognisable. If this is valid, and it seems plausible, all that can be said is that it is not legitimate to deny that it is good because it undeniably contains evil; nor, conversely, is it valid to deny that it is evil because it contains some good. Accepting, then, the principle in question, it becomes clear that it is not possible to establish empirically the goodness or evil of the Universe. And I very gravely doubt the ability of 'meta-physics' to resolve the problem.

In this connexion I should like to draw attention to certain logical distinctions. One has to distinguish between good *on the whole* and good *as a whole*. The Universe may be good as a whole, but not on the whole, or, conversely, good on the whole and not as a whole. But in drawing the distinction it is very important not to misinterpret the expression "good on the whole": There can be no question of any real *subtraction* of evil from goodness, leaving a "balance" in favour of the latter. To suppose this is nonsense. By being good on the whole is not meant, then, that there is a real balance in favour of goodness. Nor can it be intended that numerically the *amount* of goodness is greater than the *amount* of evil. That there can be no real cancelling out, is, I suppose, quite obvious. That there can be no *numerical* subtractions becomes apparent when one realises that there is no possible common standard of measurement. Theoretically¹ you can have a unit of goodness, and also one of evil. But it is impossible to establish any relation between them. All that can be meant, it seem to me, is that the number of good *things* is greater than the number of bad things. And what I wish to insist upon is that it is much more important psychologically, that is from the standpoint of human beings, that the Universe should be good on the whole than good as

¹ Assuming, of course, that Goodness and Evil do fall within the order of quantity.

a whole. Of course, this would not be the case if the parts of a good whole are themselves good. But a good Universe that involves evil is compatible with any degree of pessimism. For it is clear, I suppose, that neither the fact, if it is one, of the Universe's goodness in this sense, nor the knowledge of the fact, could in any way affect human satisfaction. A Universe that includes essentially all the horror, misery and frightful disease that is experienced in human lives, may be good. But it would also be a brutal and damnable business, with the heart torn out of it, and bleeding everywhere, utterly alien and repulsive to all genuine human endeavour and inspiration. I reject the whole thing, and I am amazed that one, like Dr. Mackenzie, who looks so intently into life for the meaning of goodness, should have the intellectual effrontery to ignore so fully what is there given in utterance loud and unmistakable. When you tell me that love is good, I look at you; but when you tell me that this ugly ulcerated thing is good, I look past you. In the one case, I could believe that you were saying something; in the other I should feel no doubt that you had fooled me. I sometimes gravely entertain the conjecture that Ethics is utter jargon, foreign and destitute of all meaning. And if I needed any further encouragement, I could find it to repletion in these high-sounding extravagances.

But what, in the end, is all this talk about? I have assumed, hitherto, that to ask if the Universe is good is a significant question. And, in some sense, I hardly dare doubt that it is, seeing that thoughtful men so long have set themselves to answer it. Certainly to all appearances it is a straightforward question. And the answer, I should have thought, stands out clear enough. Is there, I ask, any goodness anywhere? If so, the Universe is good. And is there any evil? If so, it is also evil. But this, it may be said, is childish and irrelevant; for the question is whether the Universe is good *as such*. And with this counter-criticism, my head begins to buzz. For what, in the name of clearness, does it mean? I tell you, say, that the roses in the bowl before me are white. Are you going to ask me if they are white *as such*? I suppose not. Then why ask me if the Universe is good *as such*? Is it a different kind of question? Then what is its peculiarity? But to revert, with academic propriety, to the point, what I have to say is just this. If there is a Universe, then all qualities and relations are either its qualities and relations or they are not. If they are not, then either every quality or relation is possibly a character of the Universe or its Parts, but not both, or every quality

and relation is possibly a character of both, or only some qualities and relations are possible characters of both, the rest being qualities and relations of the one or the other, the Universe of its Parts, but not of both. Now for Dr. Mackenzie Good and Evil are possible predicates of both the Universe and its Parts; and he denies, by implication, that the goodness or evil of the Parts involves the Goodness or Evil of the Universe. If this were not his position there would be no significance in his attempt to show that the Universe is good, having already admitted the goodness of some of its parts. The question then arises whether the epistemological (I suppose this is the correct word) position implied in Dr. Mackenzie's Ethics is tenable. All I am going to do is to invite him critically to amplify and consider the implications of it. The case with Dr. McTaggart is different. I am not certain whether his denial that the Universe is good is put forward as an ultimate judgment or whether it is an inference. Still, whether the position is the expression of an ultimate judgment or not, at least this much is implied in either case, namely, that not all predicates are predicates of the Universe, and that a predicate of a Part is not necessarily a predicate of the whole of which it is a part—for he allows, we know that some things are good, but denies that the Universe is good. In consistency, then, he is not entitled to affirm that the Universe is evil, on the ground that some of its Parts are. His assertion, therefore, that the Universe is *not* good, must not be taken to mean that it is *evil*. In other words, with respect to Dr. McTaggart's position, all I wish to insist upon is this—that it must maintain both that the Universe is not good, and that it is not evil, that it is neither intrinsically good nor intrinsically evil.

In conclusion, Dr. Mackenzie suggests that Dr. McTaggart might paint for us the rose without the thorn. The good we know, Dr. Mackenzie urges, is essentially correlated with evil; and therefore, the argument is, no conception of a Perfect Universe that does not contain evil is really in the end intelligible. He says: "Can it be really held that we know of any other kind of goodness than that which we discover through our interaction with the world? It would seem that the most perfect ideals that we can form are only our world lit up. . . . Now, if the only good that we know in our actual experience is a good that stands over against evil, and this is realised through progress, it is hard to see how any one can give a coherent account of a non-progressive system in which anything equally good would be possible.

A world without progress would indeed deserve to be stigmatised as a 'block universe!' (pp. 214, 215). It seems to me that when Dr. Mackenzie says "that the most perfect ideals we can form are only our world lit up" he expresses most strongly in one beautiful sentence his main contention. But it also, I presume to think, most clearly shows its weakness; and it is, I further believe, inconsistent with what he had said elsewhere.

It brings out very clearly the view that the *ideal* must be regarded as some possible state of the *real*. And as a counter-criticism against the view that the ideal is intrinsically beyond and above the real, I regard it as a wholesome protest. None the less, I believe that both these positions are incorrect. The *ideal* is neither intrinsically some possible state of the real nor intrinsically beyond and above the real. The truth is, I think, that the *ideal* is neither intrinsically *realisable* nor *unrealisable*. It doesn't make any difference if you say its realisation is dependent upon the nature of the *real* or if you say it is dependent upon the nature of the *ideal*. I am using the term *ideal* as equivalent to *good*. The Ideal (with a capital I) is, however, some real state.

The Ideal is a legitimate concept if it is true either (i.) that goodness falls within the order of *quantity*, or (ii.) within the order of *number*. In the one case the Ideal would be the *greatest amount* of goodness possible, and in the other the *greatest number* of good things possible. Now on either of these views, the Ideal is at any time the Real at that time, for all things that are then *possible things are*, and so all possible good things must exist as well. And if this is what Dr. Mackenzie means, I am prepared to assent. But in any case it is not *all* he means, nor, indeed, am I certain that it is even part of his meaning. I really do not think he has considered the matter in this way at all. He, like practically all writers on ethics, has not really tried to examine clearly and fundamentally the meanings or relations of the terms *good*, *ideal*, *Ideal*, *ought*, *right*, etc., etc. Mr. Moore has done so more thoroughly than any other writer that I know of. But even he has left untouched very many radical questions. I have already briefly discussed the qualifications "*higher*" and "*better*". There are others, but I cannot consider them here.

With this brief aberration, I return to the question under discussion. The *Ideal*, as so far interpreted, is real. But there is yet another important meaning which can be given to the term. You may mean by the Ideal some particular state or condition of *ideal* or *good* things; and this state

might, in fact, be incompatible with Reality. In this sense, it is not necessarily understood either as the greatest amount of goodness possible or as the greatest possible number of good things. So defined the Ideal is certainly not, as such, the Real. And it may or may not be realisable. Now is it against some such interpretation of the Ideal that Dr. Mackenzie is contending? It is plausible to suppose that this is at least part of what he means when he says that the most perfect ideals we can form are our world lit up. The Ideal as last interpreted might require for its realisation not only lighting up all round, but also a good deal of burning up—wholesale eradication. And it is just this that Dr. Mackenzie is unwilling to allow. His argument seems to me to be as follows: The good that we know is essentially bound up with evil; and any other kind of good is necessarily inconceivable; therefore the Ideal must contain evil; and on this account all refutations of the Ideality of the Universe based upon the actuality of evil must be rejected as unsound. And for Dr. Mackenzie the Universe is the Ideal. Now whatever Dr. Mackenzie may mean by regarding the Universe as the Ideal, it is certain, of course, that nothing that he has adduced proves it to be so. He would himself, I believe, be the first to admit this. It would be interesting to know, however, precisely what he means when he maintains that the Universe is the Ideal¹. As I have already pointed out, in at least two plausible senses, the Universe is the Ideal. I also considered a third meaning, and as so interpreted the Universe, we saw, is not necessarily the Ideal. And, thus interpreted, each man's conception of the Ideal is ultimate. Now either Dr. Mackenzie so interprets the Ideal or he does not. If he does, then in maintaining that the Universe is the Ideal we must understand him to mean that in his opinion the Universe corresponds with his conception of the Ideal. If this is the case it seems justifiable to say that either his conception is very meagre or else he is not entitled to the assurance that there is any such coincidence. On the other hand, if Dr. Mackenzie does not so interpret the Ideal, but in one or other of the two other ways mentioned, then it seems fair to say that his statement that the Universe is the Ideal is of no value. But it is just possible that he would not define the Ideal in either of these ways. In any case, it is up to him to explain precisely what he does mean.

In conclusion, I should like to say that I do not think it

¹ As far as I am aware he does actually say that the Universe is the Ideal; he speaks of it as perfect. I have assumed that he would not distinguished the two. But, if he does, then I have merely to point out that all I have said would apply with equal force.

would be a fair criticism of Dr. Mackenzie's view to contend that it rests upon a confusion of what is good intrinsically and what is good extrinsically, what is good in itself and what is a cause of what is good in itself. I have no doubt at all that Dr. Mackenzie is as fully aware of this distinction as anybody else. His point, I think, is that the only kind of good we know anything about is *intrinsically* connected with evil—at least, most of it. Now it is no answer to such a question to say that that evil that is extrinsically good is being confused with what is intrinsically good. It would be a reply if it could be shown either (i.) that Dr. Mackenzie's contention is meaningless or (ii.) that, whether meaningless or not, it does not in fact apply. As I am not at all prepared to maintain that his contention is meaningless, I may be allowed to invite him to more fully expound it.