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Jowett and Campbell's *Republic* Plato's *Republic*. The Greek Text, edited with notes and essays by the late B. Jowett, M.A., and Lewis Campbell, M.A., LL.D. In three volumes, £2 2 s. Oxford. 1894.

J. B. Mayor

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NATURAL HISTORY IN HOMER.

I do not know whether the following parallel passages from Homer's *Iliad* and the 'Badminton Library' on Big Game Shooting have been noticed before, but they seemed to me interesting as showing how true to nature Homer always is in his descriptions of animal life.

Il. v. 161.

ὥς δὲ λέων ἐν βοσὶ θορῶν ἐξ αὐχένος
ἄξῃ

πόρτιος ἢ βοός, ξύλοχον κάτα βοσκομενάων.

Il. xi. 174

ἄστε λέων ἐφόβησε, μόλων ἐν νυκτὸς ἀμολγῶ
πάσας· τῇ δέ τ' ἰὴ ἀναφαίνεται αἰπὺς
ὄλεθρος·
τῆς δ' ἐξ αὐχένος ἔαξε.

Big Game Shooting, vol. i., F. C. Selous,
p. 327.

'A single large male lion will kill a heavy ox or a buffalo cow without using his teeth at all by *breaking its neck* or rather causing the frightened beast to break its own neck... We will suppose a large heavy ox weighing 1000 lbs. is seized by a lion whilst grazing or walking, the attack being made from the left side. In that case the lion seizes the ox by the muzzle with its left paw putting its head in under it. At the same time with the extended claws of the right paw it holds its victim by the top of the shoulder, its hind feet being firmly planted on the ground. The ox plunges madly forward and from the position in which its head is held not seeing where it is going, and hampered by the weight of the lion, soon falls and rolling over *breaks its neck by the weight of its own body.*'

H. W. AUDEN.

NOTE ON SALLUST *IUG.* 78.

SALL. *Iug.* 78. Nam duo sunt sinus prope in extrema Africa... quorum proxima terrae praealta sunt, cetera ut fors tulit alta, alia in tempestate vadosa.

In the last part of this sentence, *ut fors tulit* answers to *vadosa*; *alia* has nothing to answer to it; and *alta* is flat after *praealta*. I suggest 'cetera ut fors tulit *alia*,

alia in tempestate vadosa.' We thus get a chiasmus, with more skilful disposition of the ideas, and the clumsiness vanishes. 'The rest is in some weathers as may happen, in other weathers shallow.'

W. H. D. ROUSE.

Rugby School.

JOWETT AND CAMPBELL'S *REPUBLIC*.

Plato's Republic. The Greek Text, edited with notes and essays by the late B. JOWETT, M.A., and LEWIS CAMPBELL, M.A., LL.D. In three volumes, £2 2s. Oxford. 1894.

It is strange how slow we English have been in providing ourselves with satisfactory editions even of the books which form the staple of classical education, as carried on in our schools and universities. How long we had to wait for decent editions of Homer and Sophocles, of Horace and Virgil and Tacitus! The best intellects in Oxford had been devoted to the study of the *Ethics*

and *Politics*, the *Rhetoric* and *Poetics* of Aristotle for many years, before Grant and Stewart touched the *Ethics*, or Cope had busied himself with the *Rhetoric*, or Butcher with the *Poetics*; while as to the *Politics*, nothing worthy of English scholarship found its way into print, till Newman and Hicks published the first portion of their editions in 1887 and 1894 respectively. The case has been even worse with the most widely known and the most generally admired of all the remains of ancient philosophy—the *Republic* of Plato. If I am not mistaken, the subject of this notice is absolutely the first complete English edition of Plato's

greatest work,—a neglect which is no doubt capable of partial explanation from the fact that for more than forty years scholars have been warned off from this province by the rumour that Jowett had marked it out for his own.

What then do we find as the result of this long incubation? I think the general verdict will be that it has given us the best existing edition of the *Republic*, and a work not unworthy of its distinguished editors and of the University from which it proceeds. In the first place it is beautifully printed and got up. It is possible here to read Plato, as he ought to be read, with unmixed enjoyment, in a more accurate text than is to be found elsewhere, accompanied by short critical notes at the foot of the page. The reader is not embarrassed by having to grope his way through a thin margin of text, drowned in an ocean of explanatory notes, these latter being happily stowed away in the third volume, where we may consult them or not, as we please. Beside the Text, the first volume contains a Preface, giving a history of the edition, and stating how the work was distributed between the two editors, together with a photographic specimen of the Paris MS., and an Index of the rarer words.

The second volume begins with thirty-four pages by Prof. Jowett, containing three short notes on particular passages and an unfinished essay on the Text of Greek Authors and of Plato in particular. Here the late Master of Balliol appears in the character of an uncompromising champion of the MS. tradition and a determined opponent of conjectural criticism. Standing, as it does, at the head of the volume and affording plenty of scope for easy rhetoric, this essay has formed the natural prey of the 'indolent reviewer.' I shall content myself with saying that it should be compared with Prof. Campbell's later essay on the same subject, and that, as far as my experience goes, faith in the infallibility of MSS. is apt to vary inversely with faith in the principles of logic and grammar.

The remaining 356 pages of the second volume are due to Prof. Lewis Campbell. In an excellent essay of sixty-six pages on the structure of the *Republic* and its relation to other Dialogues, followed by an excursus on the place of the *Sophistes*, *Politicus*, and *Philebus* in the order of the Platonic writings, he endeavours to show by considerations, partly linguistic and partly philosophical, that the *Parmenides*, *Theaetetus*, *Sophistes*, *Politicus*, and *Philebus* form

a distinct group, which is later than the *Republic*, these being again succeeded by the final group of the *Timaeus*, *Cratylus*, and *Laws*. The next essay, consisting of nearly 100 pages, is occupied with the Text. Prof. Campbell divides the MSS. into three families, the representative of the first being the Paris A, of which he has himself made a new collation, correcting several readings which have been misquoted in all previous editions. Of the Venice II, which he takes as the representative of the second family, he gives a new collation by Prof. Castellani. These two families are the only ones recognized by Schanz, but Prof. Campbell brings forward strong evidence to show the independence of a third group of MSS., as the representative of which he takes a Cesena MS. (M), unused by any previous editor of the *Republic* but collated for this edition by Prof. E. Rostagno. The various readings given at the foot of the text in vol. i. are taken from AHM, supplemented, where their evidence was doubtful, by secondary MSS., especially the Venice MS. (Ξ) which has also been collated by Prof. Castellani for this edition. After a full account of these and other MSS., Prof. Campbell goes on to speak of textual emendation, which he illustrates by reference to the *Phaedo* papyrus discovered by Mr. Flinders Petrie. Then follows a judicious chapter on the different kinds of textual error, with examples from the *Republic*. Schneider is condemned for over-conservatism, and a list of passages (twenty-nine in number) is given, in which the present text has been restored by conjecture. Prof. Campbell is responsible for only one of these, but he gives a list of fifteen other emendations, which he has proposed in the notes without altering the text. He also gives his reasons for rejecting various plausible conjectures by Cobet, Madvig, W. H. Thompson, and others.

Essay III. deals with Plato's use of language. Beginning with some good remarks on his style it goes on to treat of peculiarities of construction, and closes with remarks on the Platonic vocabulary. There is much here that is interesting and instructive, but I notice an occasional want of precision and a certain hastiness, which seem to me to detract from the value of this essay as compared with the two which precede. To give instances: on p. 174, as an instance of a difficult optative, we have, without note, (i. 352 E), *τί δέ; ἀκούσας ἄλλω ἢ ὥσιν*; but when we read the preceding words *ἔσθ' ὅτῳ ἂν ἄλλω ἰδοίς ἢ ὀφθαλμοῖς*,

we see that this should be classed with (ii. 382 D) ἀλλὰ δεδιὼς τοὺς ἐχθροὺς ψεύδεται; which is cited on p. 175 as an instance of a 'construction continued from a preceding sentence having the optative with *ἀν*.'¹ P. 177, among difficult uses of the infinitive, we have (i. 133 E) καὶ λαθεῖν οὗτος δεινότητος ἐμποῖσθαι, where it is said 'there is a double construction of this kind: most clever to implant, most clever to escape notice (in implanting). Schneider's emendation ἐμποιήσας saves the grammar at the expense of natural emphasis.' But the emendation is Stallbaum's, who says in his note on the passage, 'Schneiderus recte dici posse statuit λαθεῖν ἐμποιήσας, quod certe a probae Graecitatis usu abhorret. Imo refigendum est δεινότητος ἐμποιήσας.' The idea of a double construction seems to me impossible. Nor do I see anything wrong in the emphasis 'he who is most skilful in guarding against the approaches of disease, is also most skilful in the stealthy introduction of disease.' It is the converse of 'Set a thief to catch a thief.' P. 177. 'The infinitive instead of the participle, as elsewhere, sometimes follows φαίνεσθαι,' of which the example is (iv. 432 D) φαίνεται πρὸ ποδῶν ἡμῖν ἐξ ἀρχῆς κυλινδεῖσθαι 'it has manifestly been rolling at our feet all the while.' But surely it is more in harmony with the following καὶ οὐχ ἑωρῶμεν ἄρ' αὐτό, and has more of a Platonic colouring, if we translate, 'Unless I am mistaken, it has been at our feet all the while,' keeping the ordinary force of the infinitive. P. 177. 'Plato makes continual use of participial expressions for pleonastic (or expegetic) uses, see especially (iii. 397 C) ἢ τῷ ἐτέρῳ τούτων ἐπιτυγχάνουσιν... ἢ τῷ ἐτέρῳ ἢ ἐξ ἀμφοτέρων τινὶ ἐνγκερανύντες they hit on one or other of these modes or on a third, which they compound out of both.' The explanation does not seem to me to throw much light on the phrase. I should be disposed to take *ἐπι* in the sense of 'to succeed,' equivalent to εἰ μέλλει οἰκεῖν λέγεσθαι in the preceding sentence. (Compare *Meno* 97 C ὁ μὲν τὴν ἐπιστήμην ἔχων αἰεὶ ἂν ἐπιτυγχάνοι, ὁ δὲ τὴν ὀρθὴν δόξαν τότε μὲν... τότε δ' οὐ.) The last clause would be made regular either by the omission of *τινὶ* (which is the more idiomatic construction and, I think, what Plato wrote) or by changing the active participle into the passive ἐνγκεκράμεν. We may translate it literally as it stands, 'or by one derived from both, mixing them together.' But as ἐξ ἀμφοτέρων τινὶ could not

¹ In these and other quotations I have omitted the superfluous words.

stand alone, the participle cannot be described as pleonastic: it is rather an instance of the substitution of a participle active, in agreement with the subject, for the participle passive in agreement with an oblique case. In the same page we are told that 'in Plato's long sentences the participle sometimes alternates with the infinitive.' Add 'where the governing verb admits either.' P. 178 'the accusative and participle with or without *ὡς* have the effect of a reported statement.' It might be well to add, 'commonly called the accusative absolute.' The examples given are sometimes capable of a simpler explanation, e.g. (iii. 390 A) τί δέ; ποιεῖν [τὸν σοφώτατον λέγοντα κ.τ.λ.] δοκεῖ σοι ἐπιτήδειον εἶναι... ἀκούειν νέφ... ἡ Δία... ὡς... ἐπιλανθανόμενον, 'do you think it fitting that a young man should hear such a poetical description, or that he should hear Zeus described as forgetting?'² But if we look at the passage, we shall see that Δία is not governed by ἀκούειν, but by ποιεῖν, 'to represent the wisest of men using such words as these... or to represent Zeus as forgetting his resolves,—do you think this expedient for a [young man to hear?]' P. 178. 'In x. 604 B the transition from the genitive to the accusative *ὡς οὔτε δῆλον οὐτος [τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ]... οὔτε [οὐδέν] προβαίνειν [τῷ χαλεπῶς φέροντι]* is occasioned by the impersonal verb.' As the sentence is in *oratio obliqua* either gen. or acc. abs. is allowable. Stallbaum gives instances of the combination of both, which show that an impersonal verb is not required to justify the accusative, e.g. Thuc. vii. 25 ὡς Ἀθηναίων προσδοκίμων οὕτων καὶ τὸ παρὸν στράτευμα αὐτῶν διαπολεμῆσθαι. Moreover, can οὐδέν προβαίνει τῷδε be classed as impersonal? P. 179. 'the subject of an infinitive or participle following a verb is accusative even when the same with the main subject, if this happens to be considered in two aspects, e.g. x. 621 B ἰδεῖν... αὐτὸν... κείμενον ἐπὶ τῇ πυρᾷ "he saw that he himself was lying." The previous narrative referred to the disembodied soul.' But αὐτόν is the ordinary accusative of the *object*: 'he beheld himself lying.' Nor is it necessary to introduce a 'consideration under two aspects' to justify the repetition of the subject in the accusative case, where it is required for emphasis or clearness. P. 182. β. 'In the absence of a definite construction the accusative is the case usually preferred.' The only example under

² The words in square brackets are omitted by Prof. Campbell, but are essential to the construction.

this extraordinary rule is Soph. *El.* 479, which need not be discussed here; but there is a reference to viii. 559 B where mention is made of an ordinary case of the attraction of a dative to an accusative with the infinitive. In grammar, as in law, it is inexpedient to make the rule wider than is required for the cases contemplated. P. 183. 'An adverbial accusative is sometimes abruptly introduced.' Among the examples we have (vi. 492 B) [ὅταν τὰ μὲν ψέγωσι τῶν λεγομένων...τὰ δὲ ἐπαινώσιν] ὑπερβαλλόντως ἑκάτερα. When the omitted words are supplied, it is evident that ἑκάτερα is the acc. pl. in apposition with τὰ μὲν...τὰ δέ. (*Symp.* 204 C) τί τῶν καλῶν ἐστὶν ὁ Ἔρως; But τί here is the nom. case, expecting such an answer as ἐνδεής or θηρευτής ἐστι. (Compare x. 597 D τί αὐτὸν κλίνης φήσεις εἶναι;...μυμητής.) P. 185. It is said that the gen. meaning 'in respect of' does not occur with other adverbs than those in *ως*. What are we to say then of the gen. with εὖ, πόρρω, ἐνταῦθα, etc.? P. 187. 'It (the dat. of manner) has the effect of an absolute clause in ix. 578 C [οὐκ οἶσθαι χρὴ τὰ τοιαῦτα ἀλλ' εὖ μάλα] τῷ τοιοῦτῳ λόγῳ [σκοπεῖν].' When the omitted words are supplied, it is plain that the dat. is simply instrumental, 'to investigate it with a discussion of this kind.' This is compared with (x. 598 D) ὑπολαμβάνειν δὲ τῷ τοιοῦτῳ, which is rightly translated by D. and V. 'we must reply to our informant,' cf. *Protag.* 320 C πολλοὶ οὖν αὐτῷ ἐπέλαβον. P. 215. 'The want of the word omitted is not felt because of another word which suggests it to the mind.' The example is (ii. 358 D) εἰ σοι βουλομένῳ ἂ λέγω, which is explained by understanding λέγω, but it is surely more natural to take it as an abbreviation of the common phrase βουλομένῳ ἐστὶ. P. 233. Under the heading Imperfect Construction, we have as an example of 'construction with the nearest word' (ii. 370 E) ἵνα οἱ τε γεωργοὶ ἐπὶ τὸ ἀροῦν ἔχοιεν βούς, οἱ τε οἰκοδόμοι πρὸς τὰς ἀγωγὰς μετὰ τῶν γεωργῶν χρῆσθαι ὑποζυγίους, which is explained ἔχοιεν ὑποζύγια ὥστε χρῆσθαι αὐτοῖς. But surely it is better to follow Stallbaum and take χρῆσθαι as governed by ἔχοιεν in the sense of δύναντο.¹

I have thought myself bound in honesty to mention what seem to me blemishes in the essay on syntax, but on the whole, when taken in connexion with what follows on diction, it will be found a very useful help to the study of Plato. Perhaps the best thing in the latter essay is the discussion of

¹ I see this is given as an alternative explanation in the note on the passage.

philosophical terms, such as εἶδος and ἰδέα. In the interesting section on Plato's use of vernacular words, we might add such words as χαρίεις, ἐπαικτής, ἡδύς, εὐήθης, σοφός, δεινός, and it might be well to refer to *Equites* 1381 and *Nubes* 1172, as showing that the use of adjectives in -κός was a fashionable affectation of the time. P. 327. 'The abstract noun as well as the adjective φιλόσοφος occurs in Isocrates, but not elsewhere before Plato.' Should not reference have been made to the tradition that it was first introduced by Pythagoras?

The chief drawback to this volume, as a whole, is the absence of anything corresponding to the Introduction of 200 pages, which Jowett has prefixed to his Translation. The essays which we have been considering here are rather introductory to the study of Plato in general than to that of the *Republic* in particular. To the ordinary reader they cannot compensate for the want of the analysis and running comments and the discussions on the history of philosophy and literature, which add so much interest to Jowett's book. In fact, to make this edition complete, we must join with it the volume containing the translation.

I turn now to the third volume containing the notes. These are apparently due in the first instance to Prof. Jowett, but they were criticized and added to by Prof. Campbell, and again revised by Jowett shortly before his death. Prof. Campbell states in the Preface that he has occasionally altered this revision, adding his initials where the alteration was of any importance, or where he thought a second note required. As far as I have observed, there can be little doubt that in the case of these duplicate notes the initials L.C. mark the truer view. Compare (341 B) οὐδὲν ὂν καὶ ταῦτα, on which L.C.'s note is, "With as little effect as ever" Thrasymachus has been prophesying that Socrates will try to cheat, but without success: Socrates replies that he is not such a madman as to try and cheat Thrasymachus. The latter rejoins that he has made the attempt, though in this case, as on former occasions, unsuccessfully.' B. J. has, 'Although you make a fool of yourself at this too, i.e. at cheating Thrasymachus, as you would also have done at shaving a lion if you had attempted it.' (442 A) καὶ τοῦτω δὴ οὕτω τραφέντε...καὶ παιδευθέντε προσταγήσεων τοῦ ἐπιθυμητικοῦ. Bekker's certain conjecture προσταγήσεων for the MS. προσηύσεων is given in the text, but in a note signed B. J. we read, 'The correction is

not absolutely necessary, and therefore, like all emendations which are not absolutely necessary, should not be admitted in the text.' Probably where we find mention of alternative explanations of which only one is tenable, this is to be attributed to the double authorship, as in (336 B) *συστρέψας ἑαυτὸν ὥσπερ θηρίον ἦκεν ἐφ' ἡμᾶς*, where it is suggested as a possibility that *ἦκεν* might come from *ἦκω*, and just below the force of *ὑποκατακλινόμενοι* is similarly weakened by regarding it as a metaphor from the guest who takes a lower place in the banquet.

By way of testing the notes I have looked at some of the passages emended by Mr. Richards in the *C.R.* (330 A) *πότερον ὦν κέκτησαι τὰ πλεῖω παρέλαβες ἢ ἐπικτήσω; ποῖ ἐπεκτησάμην, ἔφη*; Here Mr. Richards is very uncompromising: 'ποῖ ἐπεκτησάμην,' he says, 'is bad grammar, and, as commonly understood, bad sense.' The note, which seems to me entirely right, is "Acquired, do you say?" This use of *ποῖος* is not necessarily derisive or ironical, but only denotes a humorous feeling of contrast between the suggestion and the fact.' (366 A) *δίκαιοι μὲν γὰρ ὄντες ἀζήμιοι ὑπὸ θεῶν ἐσόμεθα... ἄδικοι δὲ κερδανόμενοι τε καὶ λισσόμενοι ὑπερβαίνοντες καὶ ἁμαρτάνοντες πείθοντες αὐτοὺς ἀζήμιοι ἀπαλλάξομεν*. Here Mr. Richards has the plausible conjecture that *καὶ λισσόμενοι* should be placed after *ἁμαρτάνοντες*. I think however that the text is successfully defended by the note, 'the line of Homer already quoted, *λίσσόμενοι ὅτε κέν τις ὑπερβῇ καὶ ἁμάρτη*, is ingeniously turned so as to suggest the notion of sinning and praying at once.' (444 B) *τοιούτου ὄντος... οἴου πρέπειν αὐτῷ δουλεύειν*. Mr. Richards says, '*οἴου δουλεύειν* would be Greek; so would *ὥστε πρέπειν αὐτῷ δουλεύειν*. But the text as it stands is not Greek at all. *πρέπειν αὐτῷ* appears to be a gloss intended to explain *οἴου* with infinitive.' To this Prof. Campbell fairly replies (vol. ii. p. 237), 'It may stand as Platonic Greek,' i.e. it is the natural carelessness of easy conversation. A slight pause would be made before and after *πρέπειν αὐτῷ*, which is an afterthought to define and heighten the force of *οἴου*.

I conclude with a few remarks on passages which happen to have caught my eye, where the view taken in the notes differs from that which seems to me correct. (351 C) *εἰ μὲν, ὥς σὺ ἄρτι ἔλεγες, ἔχει, <εἰ> ἢ δικαιοσύνη σοφία, κ.τ.λ.* 'The repetition of *εἰ* before *ἢ δικαιοσύνη* (a conjecture of Baiter's) is unnecessary, and also objectionable on the ground of the hiatus.' I confess that the *εἰ* appears to me essential, and its loss

is easily accounted for after *ἔχει*: but the particular point against which I would enter my protest is the use made of the fashionable doctrine of the hiatus. At the beginning of this very sentence we have *ὥς σὺ ἄρτι ἔλεγες*, and in the line before *ἔξει ἢ ἀνάγκη αὐτῇ*, not to mention that in vol. ii. p. 49, Prof. Campbell himself speaks of the rareness of the hiatus as a mark of Plato's later style. (363 A) *γίγνται... ἀρχαί τε καὶ γάμοι καὶ ὅσαπερ Γλαύκων διήλθεν*: 'the singular has a collective force which is assisted by the neuter *ὅσαπερ*.' It might have been well to state that it is only where the verb precedes the still indeterminate noun, that such a construction is usual. (372 E) *εἰ δ' αὖ βούλεσθε καὶ φλεγμαίνουσιν πόλιν θεωρήσωμεν, οὐδὲν ἀποκωλύει*. I think that here Mr. Richards is right in denying that the deliberative subjunctive can be used after *βούλεσθε* depending on a conjunction. I should therefore punctuate as he does, putting a comma after *βούλεσθε* and a colon after *θεωρήσωμεν*. (376 A) '*οὐ πᾶν* "not at all" or "certainly not," the absoluteness of the negative being used to intensify the statement.' It should have been stated that the usual meaning in Plato is not to intensify the negative, but to negative the intensity ('not quite'), the difference of meaning being probably marked by a difference of stress. (388 D) *εἰ καὶ ἐποίει αὐτῷ* 'should it ever come into his mind.' The force of *καὶ* is rather 'if it did come into his head' (implying 'we hope it won't'). (460 E) The time for man to marry is *ἐπειδὴν τὴν δευτέραν δρόμου ἀκμὴν παρῇ*, 'when his powers of running are at their highest.' I think Stallbaum is right in regarding this as a quotation, describing metaphorically the time when the violence of passion is cooling down. In any case I do not see what force is assigned to *παρῇ* by the editors. (497 D) *οὐχ ἱκανῶς ἐδηλώθη φόβῳ ὃν ὑμεῖς ἀντιλαμβανόμενοι δεδηλώκατε μακρὰν τὴν ἀπόδειξιν*: here the note is '*ὃν, sc. ἐκείνων ᾧ*,' but the genitive is required after *ἀντιλαμβάνόμενοι*.

The 'general remarks on philosophy and life' are said to be 'almost without exception the Master's own.' They are always interesting, but sometimes a little indefinite, and not always, I think, entirely accurate. E.g. in p. 444 we have two notes on the ideas: in the former note (597 C) we read, 'It may be asked whether the third bed is the idea of a bed. We may reply it is not distinguished from it, neither does Plato identify them.' But surely he has identified them in 596 B *ὁ δημιουργὸς ἑκατέρου τοῦ*

σκεύους πρὸς τὴν ἰδέαν βλέπων οὕτω ποιεῖ, ὁ μὲν τὰς κλῖνας κ.τ.λ. The second note is on (597 E) ὁ τραγωδοποιὸς, εἴπερ μιμητὴς ἐστὶ, τρίτος τις ἀπὸ βασιλέως καὶ τῆς ἀληθείας πεφυκώς, where we read 'God is here represented as king,' but there cannot be a doubt that the three degrees are (1) the stage king, (2) the actual king, say, Darius, (3) the idea of the king, in virtue of his resemblance to which Darius is called king. The sentence is elliptical and obscure owing to the rapid movement of the dialogue. Just before, the three sorts of makers and the three sorts of products had been separately compared (the painter: the carpenter: God :: the painted bed: the actual bed: the idea). Here what corresponds to the first term of the former series is compared with the last term of the latter, and we are left to supply the remaining terms for ourselves. Strictly speaking, the tragic poet is a maker, and as such should have

been compared with God; but, in order to make the thought more definite, Plato substitutes the divine idea of the king for God, and expects us to see in the tragic poet the form of the king embodied in his imagination. Take again the note on 353 B, 'The conception (of an ἔργον) exercised a great influence on Logic and Ethics in the ancient world, leading to the ἀγαθόν of Aristotle... Modern philosophy has moulded Ethics into another form. The favourite notion of a τὰγαθόν... has been replaced by modes of speech, such as duty, law, will, or resolved into the more concrete abstractions of utility and pleasure.' But 'duty, law, will,' are precisely the catch-words of the Stoic philosophy as pleasure is of the Epicurean. People are too fond of these sweeping generalizations in contrasting the ancient with the modern world.

J. B. MAYOR.

BONHOEFFER ON THE STOIC PHILOSOPHY.

Epictet und die Stoa, Untersuchungen zur stoischen Philosophie. 1890. 10 Mk.
Die Ethik des Stoikers Epictet. Anhang. Von ADOLF BONHOEFFER. Stuttgart: Enke. 1894. 10 Mk.

THESE two volumes are intended to investigate the Stoic system so far as presented by Epictetus. They may be regarded as a single work, and the second volume has indices to both. Their characteristic is the application of minute and laborious research to the interpretation of the *Discourses* and the *Manual*; a masterly analysis of the doctrine there laid down is followed by a minute comparison under the heads of anthropology, psychology, ethics, and (in a short appendix) pantheism with the Stoic teaching generally—before all with that of Seneca, Mithonius, and Marcus Aurelius, who stand in point of time the nearest to Epictetus. It is not a systematic exposition historically arranged that we find here, but rather a series of critical disquisitions in which various questions of psychology and ethics are examined on all sides. As a whole the execution deserves the highest possible commendation; no future student can afford to disregard it. But the nature of its peculiar merits must not blind us to its limitations. Epictetus is not exactly

the authority for Stoicism whom we should be most anxious to consult. However orthodox, he is late and addresses himself to the practical common sense of the Roman world in which he lived, not to an audience of Athenian students in the third century B.C. The strong point in his favour is that we have a faithful report of what he taught: his predecessors, with scarcely an exception, we only know at second hand, often through the distorted medium of hostile criticism. Moreover, as Mr. Bonhoeffer insists (*Epictet*, p. 33), Zeller's view that from Posidonius onward Stoicism shows an increasing approximation to Platonism, and that when we come to Epictetus the boundaries of the system are transcended, is certain to give way before the contrary opinion that the later Stoics mark a reaction against eclecticism; that this tendency can be discerned even in Seneca, and that apart from unessential deviations and developments Epictetus presents to us the purest reflection of the old Stoic theory of life and the universe. Without going quite so far as to endorse this last remark we may agree that the influence of Panaetius and Posidonius, profound as it was, was after all but temporary: the tide of Academic invasion was turned; in the limited field to which practical considerations confined the attention of the