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OF

PSYCHOLOGY AND PHILOSOPHY

I.—RATIONALISM AND EMPIRICISM.

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THE habit of calling names is in general inclined to become unseemly, but in philosophical discussion it is peculiarly confusing and mischievous. Scarcely less so is another performance which is, however, commonly supposed to be a proof of scholarship and of acquaintance with the history of reflective thinking. I refer to the current practice of assigning different writers on philosophical subjects to so-called "schools of philosophy," or to some one of the great masters as his pupils or followers. Thus in wordy battles the rank and file of thinkers are flattered with the name of some field-marshal prominent before the public at the time. No doubt philosophers, whether of the chair or of the popular forum, do really learn something from one another; indeed, that, under the stress of ambition for a reputation for originality, they learn so little and come to so little agreement is a misfortune rather than a source of pride. No doubt, also, the great majority of would-be philosophers, as well as the unpretending multitude, must be dependent on the good few for their inspiration, their insight, and perhaps in large measure for their opinions. Otherwise there could be no continuity or real development to the reflective thinking of the race, and the many could never receive the benefits arising from the special talents or the rare genius of the few.

Much of the same objection applies to the greater proportion of the teaching of philosophy and of the history of philosophy in the college and university curricula of to-day. It inevitably results in a pretence of "knowledge about" rather than a genuine "knowledge of". An experience of

more than thirty years with hundreds of pupils has convinced the writer that dictating lecture-notes or giving out lessons in text-books, which attempt to summarise the opinions of the philosophical masterpieces and to classify their authors into schools, is not only a vain, but is a positively misleading, way of teaching the history of philosophy. There is only one way to know what a philosopher has thought, and that is the way of the unprejudiced and thoughtful study of what that same philosopher has said,—and this, of course, as much as possible in the light of its sources in preceding thought and in its own historical environment. All this is as true of the second-rate and the third-rate thinkers as it is true of the very few whom their posterity has agreed to call of the first rank.

There is probably no other subject of controversy about which, and no other word under the cover of which, there has been more of this deplorable confusion and consequent inner bitterness and outward contempt than the subjects covered by the word "rationalism". So worn-out and antiquated does all this seem to the student of history, as it was illustrated and indeed made lurid by the theological writings of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, that it could scarcely make valid claim to occupy our attention at the present time, were it not for the fact that Pragmatism has just recently renewed the confusion and stimulated an equally vain and fallacious contention under a seemingly different but essentially identical form. In those centuries Rationalism was opposed to orthodox theology; it was even considered antithetic to all religion,—in the one case, as naturalism, in the other, as either out-and-out materialism or a materialistic pantheism. It was then identified rather than contrasted with a certain form of empiricism, out of which, in fact, it sprang. The experience of man with the world of things, as this world was becoming known to modern science, was thought to contradict at least some of the dogmatic beliefs of the Christian in his use of the Scriptures or as doubtfully embodied in one or more of the creeds of Christendom. Thus a bitter controversy arose between rationalised empiricism and entrenched theological dogmatism. Singularly enough, the now current attacks on so-called rationalism seem, too often, to take the form of an unrationalised and emotional and rather dogmatic empiricism. What philosophy has been accustomed to regard as the most clearly established conclusions of the world's reflective thinking, on a basis of experience, is now assailed in the name of experience.

Strictly speaking, the words *rationalism* and *rationalistic* are properly used in philosophical terminology only as applicable to a certain *method* of exploring and ascertaining truth. Whenever they are used as applicable to the *content* of truth supposed to be thus ascertained, they are either misused or should be understood with a caution. In violation of this caution, for example, Pragmatism borrows the words, with all the opprobrium attaching to them in certain quarters, from the theological controversies of one and two generations ago, and in the name of empiricism holds up to ridicule and scorn many of the tenets of philosophy which were thought to be established on an empirical basis against the reigning dogmatism of that distant time. But rationalism is no more antithetic to empiricism than it is to idealism, or to realism, or to supernaturalism, or even to pragmatism. One might seem more justified in opposing it to scepticism; although it has almost invariably been identified with the most dangerous forms of scepticism when it has attempted to apply its method in a too unrestricted way to the problems of morals and religion. But on the one hand, one can neither theologise nor philosophise without some scepticism; and on the other hand, too much scepticism undermines all the authority and destroys all the work of reason, whether it be within the field of philosophy or theology, or even of the positive sciences.

Suppose, again, that we oppose rationalism to dogmatism; and, indeed, dogmatism is its most consistent and avowed opponent. Still scepticism, empiricism, liberalism, etc., may easily be just as little rational, just as truly dogmatic, and even just as stupidly irrational, as the most pronounced dogmatism in theology can be. But the perfectly indisputable claim, when fairly and generously interpreted in the light of a scientific psychology, that reason is man's only organon of knowledge in the form of scientific and philosophical truth, affords no guaranty whatever for the establishment of any particular truths as advocated by any individual group of so-called "scientists," or school of philosophers. Neither does the organon itself afford a method perfectly fixed in all its details and incapable of improvement through all time. It is not necessary to espouse the Hegelian dialectic in order to validate the confession that human reason itself is undergoing a process of development. If we must, in a sort of unholy zeal to combat certain errors masquerading in the name of rationalism, make distinctions of an opprobrious sort in rationalistic method, perhaps there is nothing better than that of a German theologian, himself an avowed rationa-

list of the old school, some seventy-five years ago. "There are now," said this German professor to a young American of inquiring mind, "three kinds of theologians at Halle—the Rationalists, the Irrationalists, and the Hurrah-tionalists." But what opponent of Rationalism, either then or now, would willingly be classed with either of the two last named?

That Rationalism is a method, indispensable for the ascertainment of truth in every sphere of human belief and knowledge, and that the verbal advocacy as well as the verbal rejection of it, the employment of it in attack or in defence of any particular system of opinions—scientific, philosophical, or religious,—is no mere squabble over the meaning of a word but a significant fact of history, might be demonstrated at any required length. Indeed, as I have already indicated, it would scarcely be worth while to call attention to the subject had not certain candidates for popular favour as affording new and easy solutions of the world-old and world-wide problems of reflective thinking, instead of showing a courteous manner toward other thinkers and a sincere willingness to place themselves upon a sound rational basis, revived the former confusion of thought and the unseemly and unprofitable practice of calling names in philosophical discussion.

It is not my purpose, however, to write an essay in the history of philosophy or of theological controversy. Reference to two or three significant facts must suffice. When Wegschneider, for example, "an acknowledged and highly respected authority on the systematic theology of the Rationalists," states its positions in terms of its doctrine of method, he says things which may need some modification or further explanation, but which can not be substantially controverted or denied. "We must," says this authority, "follow strenuously the norm of reason rightly applied, as of the highest faculty of the mind. . . . As to that which is said to be 'above reason,' the truth of which can by no means be understood, there is no possible way open to the human mind to demonstrate or affirm it." But when the same writer asserts: "The persuasion concerning the supernatural and miraculous, and at the same time immediate revelation of God, can not be reconciled with the idea of God eternal, always consistent with himself, omnipotent, omniscient, and most wise," he makes a statement which must be tested by his own method and which, as coming from an "authority" is no more necessarily true than any dogma one might choose from the most high-and-dry old-fashioned orthodoxy.

At the other end of the line, it is a curious fact that Lord Bacon spoke with contempt of the Rationalists because,

"like the spiders, they spin all out of their own bowels". Yet he proceeded at once to ask for "a philosopher who, like a bee, hath a middle faculty [*sic*], gathering from abroad, but digesting that which is gathered by its own virtue". What name shall we give to this "middle faculty"? Is it, as faculty, apart from reason, out of reason, or one form, or element, or manner of the functioning, of reason? The sensitiveness of the earlier opponents of Rationalism to being charged with a complete opposition to the use of the rationalistic method is almost ludicrously illustrated by the following quotation from a champion of orthodoxy: "Are those enthusiasts who profess to follow reason? Yes, undoubtedly, if by reason they mean only conceits. Therefore such persons are now commonly called *Reasonists* or *Rationalists* to distinguish them from true reasoners or rational inquirers." How familiar this sounds in the ears of one accustomed to the querulous tones of some of the present-day opponents of so-called Rationalism.

Since the progress of modern science and modern philosophy has modified or abolished the conceptions of nature and the supernatural, reason and revelation, creation and evolution, God personal and God immanent in the World of things and souls, as pairs the members of which are wholly antithetic and reciprocally exclusive, the old bitter and often indecent controversy between theological orthodoxy and so-called Rationalism has in most quarters largely passed away. It seems a pity to revive its confusion and its temptation to bitterness in the very field from which, above all others, it should be most zealously excluded—the field of systematic philosophy. Here, indeed, if nowhere else, the rationalistic method is imperative, is the only method available, not to say fruitful of results.

Most of the more intelligent opposition to the use of the rationalistic method in philosophy has arisen from a false psychology of cognition and an imperfect epistemology or theory of knowledge. This statement, too, admits of being verified by a resort to history. Rationalists and anti-rationalists alike virtually rely on reason as the final court of appeal in the validating of knowledge and opinion; albeit each over-emphasises some one of the varied forms of its functioning to the depreciation or exclusion of the others, and is more intent upon securing ready and uncritical acceptance of the dogmas it is proclaiming *in the name of reason* than of giving itself, or securing from others, a patient and unprejudiced examination of *the particular reasons* on which these dogmas are assumed to be well founded. On the one hand, some of

the older Rationalists would have all truth, including the most mystical of alleged religious truths, tested by a process of induction from facts of general verification as facts. Among such sources of truth these reasoners were loth to admit facts of religious faith or moral ideals or spiritual intuitions. With them the world could be *rationaly* interpreted only as a mechanical system ; and for this knowledge the highest authority is sense-perception *rationalised* by logical processes. Others of the same party-name would regard reason as an organon of truth in some sort distinct from sense-perception and of higher authority. But a more haughty form of Rationalism claimed for reason the title to a faculty quite above the understanding (or, as in Coleridge's case, seemingly opposed to understanding), a place or store-house of the categories, or "elementary concepts," or "fundamental notions," from which in a demonstrative way the ultimate nature of reality might be deduced.

Now this last form of Rationalism, when its method is applied to religious truth, is very closely allied to Mysticism, one of the chief opponents of the older forms of Rationalism. The ground of this intimacy between the two is not difficult to discover. For Mysticism makes large use of the plain man's insights under the influence of emotion and the "will to believe"; and this is what modern Pragmatism is fain to do. So far as method is concerned, however, theological mysticism was, and Pragmatism is, rationalistic in a one-sided and imperfect way. But the most awkward and thoroughly culpable Rationalists of all the thinkers of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries were those very theological dogmatists who were the bitterest opponents of the theological liberals of the same day. They made use of rationalistic methods in all their most restricted and inconsequential forms, no less than three times over—and often many more. For, in the first place, only by use of reason could they establish proofs on which to repose faith in the Scriptures, so as to find in these Scriptures an infallible source of truth, whether such truth seemed reasonable to other minds or not. In the second place, only by further use of reason could they tell in any particular case what these Scriptures meant to say. In the third place, only by much more intricate and doubtful use of rationalistic methods could these same reasoners develop from the Scriptures a system of theology which, according to their claim, must be received as articles of the Christian faith. But we shall subsequently see that this is almost precisely what the modern opponent is doing in its somewhat too rash and vituperative attack on so-called Rationalism.

Now all this way of regarding the nature of the reasoning faculty in man is psychologically false, and the controversy of which it is productive can never advance the cause of philosophical truth. Reason, whether regarded as applied to phenomena by science according to its special technique, or as the process by which we gain knowledge or opinion in matters of ethical, philosophical and religious truth, is no single or simple faculty. It is a process, complex and co-operative of all the so-called faculties, in every act of its functioning and as applied to every kind of truth. Sense, imagination, memory, ratiocination or relating activity (never more than half- and scarcely ever so much as half-conscious and intentional), instinctive impulses, rational insight or intuition, vague and more pronounced emotions, partly stimulating, partly regulative, formal compliance with the categories, or general and racial principles of human cognition,—all these and yet other elementary forms of functioning can be analysed out of the simplest exercise of reason in its search for truth. None of them is unimportant; none of them is ever dispensable.

As understood in this vague and complicated but psychologically true way, it is at once evident that reason is man's *only* organon for the discovery and explication of scientific or philosophical truth. Indeed, we do not speak intelligently of it when we treat its past services in every form of truth-seeking with contempt; nor do we speak piously of it when we set its functioning in antithesis to inspiration and its deliverances touching matters of religious faith in antagonism to revelation. But the depths of misapprehension would seem to be reached when we begin to decry Rationalism in systematic philosophy as the antithesis of a reasonable Empiricism.

Empiricism that has not been subjected to the testing and elaborating activity of reason furnishes no truth at all. An unrationalsed empiricism is not philosophy, is not science, is not ordinary knowledge. Indeed, such a mental attitude is inconceivable as a cognitive affair. The speculative insights of Neo-Platonism, the *intellectuelle Anschauung* of Schelling, the mysticism of PISTIS SOPHIA, and the vagaries of Christian Science, can no more find entrance to the self-consciousness of the one who experiences them, than can the propositions of the Euclidean geometry or the generalisations of physics and chemistry, without clothing themselves in rational forms. Their truthfulness, if by this we mean any measure or manner of conformity to reality, must somehow be rationalised, must be made acceptable to the common reason of mankind.

The same thing is an essential condition of the communication and propagation of every species of truth. It must be subjected to the processes of reason, must take on rational form, in order to be statable or communicable. But especially unseemly and even ludicrous is it to approach the discussion of controverted problems in philosophy with a denunciation of Rationalism. If any one proposes such discussion with me and begins it by way of calling me a Rationalist, what can I say better than, "You're another"? otherwise, how can we come together on common terms, not to say, meet on the same levels? To discuss this is to appeal to reason, to a reason that is common to all those who take part in the discussion. All claims to the content of truth—call this content realism or idealism, scepticism or dogmatism, orthodoxy or infidelity, empiricism, rationalism, or even pragmatism—all must appear before the same court, all must abide by the verdict of this same court. But this court is always sitting, never ready rashly to reverse its decisions, ever ready to receive new evidence in science, new views in philosophy, "new light to break forth from the Word of God".

No doubt, a large part of those impressions and activities, in the appreciation, influence, and control of which life essentially consists, do not come by the way of logical processes, and are exceedingly difficult or even impossible of statement in logical formulas. Much of what we experience transcends the comprehension of our own reasons; the sources and elements of much of this experience rarely or never rise above the threshold of consciousness. But when I discover, and also when I state, this important truth, I am rationalising *some* of the data of my complex experience in order to make up a more complete and satisfactory account of my experience *as a whole*. Doubtless, also, in social life and in the spheres of morals, art and religion, a larger allowance must be made for the play of unrecognised and unreasoned emotion, the envisagement of intuition, the wish or more definite intent to have reality construed in a certain way, somewhat too regardless of scientific proof as to what its construction actually is. And the benefits of a certain supremacy of so-called practical over more definitely theoretical interests, within these spheres of human life and conduct, may properly also be recognised. We may find ourselves justified by all this in the belief—or even, as I am quite ready on grounds of reason to maintain, in the knowledge—that it is not by scientific induction alone, but also by artistic insight, moral adjustment, and religious faith, we know what the World really is. But all this, and much more of the same

kind, does not in the least degree warrant the opposition between Rationalism and Empiricism, on which those pragmatistically inclined so much insist, and of which they are so very proud. For not one of these statements can be verified, expressed, or communicated, otherwise than by the rationalistic method and with confidence in the functioning of reason as the organon of truth. The war-whoop with which this new form of empiricism greets the ears of the rationalist can be interpreted only as a challenge from some other rationalist to come half-way and meet him on common ground. On this common ground, not Bacon's "middle faculty" but the full-orbed rational nature of man as it rises by its experience of its own failures and successes toward the likeness of Universal Reason, will decide the battle and award the prizes of victory.

The inconsequential character of the attempt to set up a principled opposition between Empiricism and Rationalism as systems of philosophy is made conspicuous the moment we attain correct notions as to the nature and aims of systematic philosophy. What philosophy expressly tries to do is just this—to bring about some unity within and over the varied fields of experience. As given or achieved at first-hand, all our experiences are individual, concrete, not coming under the category of truth in the sense of co-respondent to, or representative of, either ourselves or other selves or things. But this is not knowledge; indeed, it is not experience in the more appropriate meaning of the term. Whether we accept any conceivable theory of so-called innate ideas or categories, or deny all such theories, in either case the concrete, individual items, the elements, of cognition must be rationalised before genuine cognition can take place. The rationalising process may have been done for us by our ancestors or by nature, or it may have been done by us in the forgotten ways and times of infancy, but in any case, without the functioning of reason no knowledge comes to man. As by the growth of reason and the succession of its functions as receiver and achiever of truth, the world of ordinary and so-called practical knowledge becomes unified, so is it in still higher degree with the functioning of reason in the development of the positive sciences. This unifying work of reason culminates in the attempt to form some at least partially verifiable ideal of the World as a whole. Such an attempt we call philosophy. It can never be anything more than a well-selected, well-defined, and well-arranged system of opinions which shall interpret Reality in terms of human ideas. The method of systematic philosophy, I repeat, is therefore essentially rationalistic, and

its conclusion is necessarily some form of an Ideal. To oppose Empiricism, as respects its method, to Rationalism, or as respects its conclusions to Idealism, is entirely to mistake the nature and aim of systematic philosophy. But this is what Pragmatism persistently does.

Let us for the moment, in part at least, assume the correctness of the conception of traditional Rationalism as to the "stuff" or material out of which has been constructed the man of straw that is so vigorously attacked by the modern Empiricism. Rationalism consists of certain principles, or generalisations concerning being and knowledge, which are thought by those who advocate their truthfulness to embody the experience of great numbers, or of the entire race. But these principles are, as a matter of necessity, arrived at by use—logical or inconsequential, convincing or fanciful—of the rationalistic method only as applied to the facts of experience. They are therefore just as truly, if not as self-consciously and avowedly, empirical, in the meaning that they have their roots somewhere in some kind of experience, as the baldest kind of self-conscious and avowed empiricism can possibly be. Indeed, just as there is only one method of ascertaining the truths of science and philosophy, and this is the patient and skilful use of reason, so there is only one source of these same truths, and that is the experience of the same rational being whose reason furnishes the method.

Moreover, as has already been indicated, this experience is never given at first hand, so to say, in the form of a knowledge of laws, general forms and relations, or universally applicable principles. It is always, also of a necessity which is born of the very unalterable nature of things and of minds, some one's individual, concrete experience, with a definite when and where, and given or achieved in some one specific form. This is as true of the intellectual intuition of the Absolute, if such a fact of any one's experience is admitted ever to have taken place, as it is of my sense-perception of yonder tree or fixed star. But, on the other hand, facts of moral intuition, facts of artistic appreciation, facts of religious inspiration, facts of philosophical generalisation, facts of metaphysical belief, however vague and tenuous, have as worthy claims to form the empirical basis of man's science and philosophy as any class of facts can possibly have. Indeed, the general, if not universal prevalence and persistence of some of these facts makes them particularly noteworthy for submission to the process of rationalising in the interests of science and philosophy as well as of the improvement of the practical life.

We may go much farther than this in our exposure of the mistaken claims of the new Empiricism to represent the welfare of man on either the theoretical or the practical side, as against a barren and worn-out Rationalism.

Among all the facts of human experience there are none more important and instructive than those derived from a study of human history; and among these facts, those displayed by the development of man's reflective thinking are by no means the least important and instructive. Perhaps it is not too much to say that of all classes of generalisations in the fields of human knowledge and opinion, these have the most profound and extended empirical basis. For example, the progress of centuries of scientific investigation and of reflective thinking has evolved the conception of a Universe which has some sort of an ideal unity, a oneness of forces and laws underlying an enormous variety of individual and specific forms. And when we add to the facts from which the physico-chemical sciences make their generalisations, those other facts to which the students of ethics, æsthetics, and religion, are wont to make their appeal, we think ourselves warranted in cherishing, as rational, the belief that this same Universe is the source and embodiment of man's ethical, æsthetical and religious ideals. This conception of the World, and of Reason as immanent in the World, and of man's reason as the organon of Divine Reason, is the grandest of all conceptions that has engaged the mind of man. It has its gaps, its ragged edges, its as yet unproved assumptions, its power or powerlessness to stir some of the more temperamental sentiments, and to invoke some of the higher and least sensuous forms of intuition and of faith. It is, however, a structure of reason achieved through long stretches of experience on the part of the most thoughtful and cultured spirits of the race. It is the rationalised experience of millions of individual experiences. And what shall one say in its behalf, when it is assailed as rationalistic and contrary to a wise and carefully guarded empiricism? What better can one say than this: "I am indeed a rationalist, but I am also an empiricist. I am trying to use the reason God gave me to interpret, not only my own experience but also the experience of the race; and not only in my own behalf, but also in the behalf of the race. What, then, are you trying to accomplish; and by what method are you trying to accomplish that which you wish to accomplish? If we differ, however widely in our conclusions, let us not seek refuge under the cover of names."

In truth, the new empiricism which calls itself Pragmatism

is not new in respect of any either of its denials or its positive claims. In its substantial features it is a passing phenomenon which has occurred over and over again in the history of reflective thinking. Like every movement of thought which is stimulated by defects in the dominant existing forms of thinking and is engaged in the polemical effort to replace them rather than to reform them by the quieter and more modestly rational ways, this movement is destined to be productive both of good and—it is to be feared, more abundantly—of evil results. It compels systematic philosophy to examine and validate anew its use of the rationalistic method and to correct, supplement and enlarge the conclusions it has reached by this method, so as to embrace more completely the facts of human experience. But the evils of every form of avowed and polemical empiricism are yet more apparent to the serious student of the history of reflective thinking. By its reasoning it discredits reason; it strives to build itself with fragments torn from other structures; it captivates without producing moral conviction; and having driven out the old conceptions and ideals as to the nature of Reality and as to moral and religious truth, it too often leaves the mind of its convert more empty of thoughts which are solid and enduring than it was before. Worst of all, it is apt to result in dividing reason against itself, and in breaking up experience into warring and irreconcilable elements. Under its influences, both the microcosm of mind and the macrocosm we call the Universe are found to be pluralistic rather than profoundly harmonious throughout, each with the other and each with itself.

In the early days of our era, by the debate between the Christian Apologists and the Gnostics and neo-Platonists, reason and revelation were made antithetic or irreconcilably antagonistic. A total opposition was set up between *ratio* and *pistis* or faith. This led in the mediæval philosophy to the absurd and vicious doctrine that certain deductions might be true *secundum rationem* although in flat contradiction to what is true *secundum fidem*. But genuine philosophy, like science, abhors contradictions of this sort and, although it will suspend judgment, will not admit them. Its spirit is conciliatory; it aims at unity in the interpretation of Reality and in the application of this interpretation to the conduct of life. All time is its own.

How thoroughly but inconsequentially rationalistic and impossible as the gift of a first-hand experience the new empiricism is, might be proved or illustrated at indefinite length. A single illustration will suffice for our present pur-

pose. One of the most succinct and intelligible of all its many declarations as to its nature and aims is stated in the following words:¹ "The whole function of philosophy ought to be to find out what definite difference it will make to you and me, at definite instants of our life, if this world-formula or that world-formula be the true one". Now I submit that no more stupendous "job" could possibly be conceived of, or one requiring more complicated or supremely difficult work of man's rationalising faculty, than this off-hand statement of what Pragmatism proposes for itself to do. The construction of "world-formulas" is the supreme act of reason in its historical development, whether these formulas be wholly false to the facts and principles of reality or only partially in accordance them. But with the comparison of these formulas, and the selection among them of the one which shall *work* best in the interests of a particular individual, is an equally difficult job for the most highly trained rationalising faculty; and even when that faculty is allowed indefinite time for the selection. But now, in order to be good pragmatists, you and I, and other plain men and women, must be perpetually making this choice "*at definite instants*" of our lives.

Still further, how shall we otherwise than by the complex method of induction and deduction, or by conceding verity to selected intuitions, faiths, and ideals, discover what and what amount of "definite difference" it is going to make to us or to anybody else, which one of the various world-formulas we select as best adapted to work well in any particular case? And when we are later told: "It pays for our ideas to be validated. Our obligation to seek truth is part of our general obligation to do what pays," we may assent, but we still wish to know in what kind of coin the payment is to be made.

Is, then, this new form of Empiricism likely in any important way to modify, not to say improve, the future developments of systematic philosophy? We think not. For it will inevitably—such is the very nature of man's reflective thinking—be obliged to submit to the tests of the very method it has affected to scorn, and to the confession that its empirical sources are placed in a somewhat too shallow and restricted analysis of human experience. At any rate, however it may be found to work by its devotees in certain directions, it can never work toward the establishment of a new form of systematic philosophy.

¹ The quotations are taken from *Pragmatism*, pp. 50 and 230.