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Platonica.—II

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PLATONICA.—II.

(Continued from p. 27.)

SYMPOSIUM.

The serious difficulties of the *Symposium* require fuller treatment. A few small points are taken here.

184 E δεόμενος εἰς παιδευσιν καὶ τὴν ἄλλην σοφίαν κτᾶσθαι.

Schanz ἴστασθαι. Perhaps ὀνίνασθαι, a favourite word with Plato.

185 B πᾶν ἂν παντὶ προθυμηθείη.

Can the dative stand alone? Probably some word like ὑπουργεῖν, χαρίζεσθαι has dropped out. The *Symposium* seems to have suffered from such omissions.

191 A ποθοῦν ἕκαστον τὸ ἥμισυ τῷ αὐτοῦ ξυνέιναι.

This seems another instance. 192 B and 205 E (cf. 191 D) show pretty clearly that something like τῷ αὐτοῦ <ἡμίσει> should be read. τῷ αὐτοῦ alone is hardly possible.

195 B μετὰ δὲ νέων ἀεὶ ξύνεστί τε καὶ ἔστιν.

Sauppe's ἔστιν <νέος> is not to me very satisfactory. I have thought of ξύνεστί τε καὶ <ἡδέως> ἔστιν. Cf. *Rep.* 372 B ἡδέως ξυνόντες ἀλλήλοις and on the simple ἔστιν Schanz *Novae Comm.* p. 103. But it might be anything.

199 B I do not see how ἀνομολογησάμενος παρ' αὐτοῦ can be right. Perhaps πρὸς αὐτόν.

The following explain themselves :

184 A ἀπὸ (for ὑπὸ) ταύτης τῆς αἰτίας.

194 B ἀναβάντος for ἀναβαίνοντος.

195 C τὰ δὲ παλαιὰ πράγματα <τὰ> περὶ θεούς.

200 A <τὸ> ὅπου, explaining τοῦτο.

201 E ὡς εἴη <μὲν> ὁ ἔρως μέγας θεός, εἴη δὲ τῶν θεῶν.

212 E ἵνα...τὴν τοῦ σοφωτάτου καὶ καλλίστου <ποιητοῦ> κεφαλὴν ἀναδήσω.

215 E πολὺ μου (for μοι) μᾶλλον ἢ τῶν κορυβαντιώντων ἢ καρδία πηδᾶ. Cf. *Ion*, 535 c.

217 D ἐν ᾗπερ ἐδεδειπνήκει?

PARMENIDES.

128 c Perhaps ἐπικρυπτόμενον is due to διαπραττόμενον following and should be ἐπικρύπτεσθαι.

131 D should, I think, be printed with more notes of interrogation. Besides that after ἴσον τῷ ἔσται, I would put others after ἔξει, μείζον ἔσται, and πρίν. On the other hand in 134 c the sentence beginning οὐκοῦν εἴπερ is not a question.

133 D Read ἐκείνου δοῦλος <ὁ δοῦλος> like δεσπότης ὁ δεσπότης in the next line.

134 E Read ἀποστερήσει for ἀποστερήσειε.

135 B διευκρινησάμενον ought to be διευκρινησαμένον. Mr. Waddell seems half to suggest this in his edition.

ιδ. C τοῦ τοιούτου μὲν οὖν μοι δοκεῖς καὶ μᾶλλον ἤσθησθαι.

μᾶλλον is meaningless by itself. Perhaps μᾶλλον <ἐτέρων>.

ιδ. E οὐκ εἷας ἐν τοῖς ὀρωμένοις οὐδὲ περὶ ταῦτα τὴν πλάνην ἐπισκοπεῖν.

I think τὴν πλάνην <ποιούμενον> or something similar is needed.

137 c ἐτοιμός σοι...τοῦτο needs a <ποιῆσαι> added.

140 E τί δε, πρεσβύτερον ἢ νεώτερον ἢ τὴν αὐτὴν ἡλικίαν ἔχειν τὸ ἐν δοκεῖ τῷ δυνατόν εἶναι;

As πρεσβύτερον and νεώτερον are predicates with εἶναι, which is itself governed by δυνατόν, it is clear that ἔχειν should be ἔχον to correspond. So in 141 A οὐκ ἂν εἴη νεώτερον οὐδὲ πρεσβύτερον οὐδὲ τὴν αὐτὴν ἡλικίαν ἔχον τὸ ἐν. There is nothing uncommon in a participle with εἶναι, especially if the participle is coordinate with adjectives.

141 B τὸ πρεσβύτερον ἄρα ἑαυτοῦ γιγνώμενον καὶ νεώτερον ἑαυτοῦ ἅμα γίγνεται, εἴπερ μέλλει ἔχειν ὅπου πρεσβύτερον γίγνεται.

The last γίγνεται should probably be γίγνηται, the common construction after ἔχειν.

143 A ἴθι δὴ καὶ τῇδε ἔτι <σκοπεῖ> ?

156 D 'ἄρ' οὖν ἔστι τὸ ἀτοπον τοῦτο ἐν ᾧ

τότ' ἂν εἴη ὅτε μεταβάλλει; 'τὸ ποῖον δὴ;' 'τὸ ἐξαίφνης;'

The first sentence seems devoid of meaning. Heindorf, followed by Stallbaum, thought Parmenides was going to put τὸ ἐξαίφνης at the end of his sentence, when he was interrupted by the question τὸ ποῖον δὴ. I should be inclined to read μεταβάλλει <τὸ τοῖονδε>; and to suppose that the loss was due to the great similarity between τὸ τοῖονδε and τὸ ποῖον δὴ. Just below should not ἡ ἐξαίφνης αὕτη φύσις be ἡ <τοῦ> ἐξαίφνης αὕτη φύσις?

163 c Read ὁ (for ῥ) ἂν φῶμεν with one Paris MS. (Bekker): and for πῶς οὐκ εἶναι read πῶς <μὲν> οὐκ εἶναι.

EUTHYPHRO.

5 c σὲ μὲν οὐδὲ δοκεῖ ὄραν, ἐμὲ δὲ οὕτως ὀξέως ἀτεχνῶς καὶ ῥαδίως κατείδεν ὥστε κ.τ.λ.

'Ατεχνῶς is absent from the Bodleian MS. and bracketed or omitted by recent editors. Prof. Burnet suggests that it may represent ἀτενῶς. It is not clear whether he means that in that case Plato wrote ἀτενῶς and that ὀξέως is a gloss on it. That seems unlikely. 'Ατενῶς is probably not a word that would be used to qualify καθορᾶν, when καθορᾶν is used transitively. It expresses fixity and intensity of gaze (βλέπειν εἰς, θεᾶσθαι), whereas καθορᾶν is only to see, descry, etc. Matthew Arnold could write of Sophocles that 'he saw life steadily,' but no one would say 'he saw me steadily.' ὀξέως on the other hand, which is not the same thing, is often coupled with καθορᾶν in Plato and elsewhere.

Is it possible that ἀτεχνῶς would really be in place before or after οὐδὲ δοκεῖ ὄραν? Cf. *Polit.* 288 A εἶδος...τῇ ζητουμένῃ...προσῆκον οὐδὲν ἀτεχνῶς ἐπιστήμη: *Ar. N.* 425 οὐδ' ἂν διαλεχθεῖν ἀτεχνῶς.

7 c περὶ τίνος δὲ δὴ διανεχθέντες καὶ ἐπὶ τίνα κρίσιν οὐ δυνάμενοι ἀφικέσθαι ἐχθροὶ γε ἂν ἀλλήλοις εἴμεν;

Schanz *τινα* for *τίνα*. Perhaps it should be *τίνος*. Cf. B ἡ περὶ τίνων διαφορά; 13 D ἡ ἱατροῖς ὑπηρετικῇ εἰς τίνος ἔργον ὑπηρεσίαν τυγχάνει οὕσα ὑπηρετικῇ, etc.

ibid. ἴσως οὐ πρόχειρον σοί ἐστιν, ἀλλ' ἐμοῦ λέγοντος σκόπει.

Does not a λέγειν or something like it seem needed in the first clause?

11 B The old ὑποθώμεθα, though it seems to have no MS. authority, is surely more suitable to the context than προθώμεθα. It is however not mentioned by either Schanz or Burnet.

CRITO.

45 E αἰσχύνομαι μὴ δόξῃ ἅπαν τὸ πρᾶγμα τὸ περὶ σὲ ἀνανδρία τινὶ τῇ ἡμετέρᾳ πεπράχθαι, καὶ ἡ εἰσοδος τῆς δίκης..., καὶ αὐτὸς ὁ ἀγών..., καὶ τὸ τελευταῖον δὴ τουτί, ὥστερ κατὰ γελως τῆς πράξεως, κακία τινὶ καὶ ἀνανδρία τῇ ἡμετέρᾳ διαπεφευγῆναι ἡμᾶς δοκεῖν.

In spite of the length of the sentence it is difficult to believe that Plato wrote what comes to μὴ δόξῃ τουτί δοκεῖν διαπεφευγῆναι ἡμᾶς. Δοκεῖν being intolerable, I am inclined to think that Plato wrote δόξει. Each step in the change (δόξει to δοκεῖ, δοκεῖ to δοκεῖν) is quite frequent. The future is slightly irregular but very much in Plato's manner.

APOLOGY.

18 B οἱ ἡμῶν τοὺς πολλοὺς...ἐπειθὸν τε καὶ κατηγοροῦν ἐμοῦ [μᾶλλον] οὐδὲν ἀληθές, ὥς ἐστιν τις Σωκράτης σοφὸς ἀνὴρ ἰά τε μετέωρα φροντιστὴς καὶ τὰ ὑπὸ γῆς πάντα ἀνεζητηκῶς κ.τ.λ.

23 c λέγουσιν ὡς Σωκράτης τίς ἐστι μιαιώτατος καὶ διαφθείρει τοὺς νέους.

If in 23 c ἐστὶ were only the copula, could τις stand first? should it not then be μιαιώτατός τίς ἐστι? This reflection and the comparison of 18 B seem to show that it is ἐστι, not ἐστὶ; 'there is a very objectionable person named Socrates.' But then Plato can not have gone on καὶ διαφθείρει. The fact seems to be that the last letters of the adjective have absorbed a relative pronoun, and that we should read Σ. τις ἐστι μιαιώτατος, <ὅς> καὶ διαφθείρει τοὺς νέους.

For τὰ μετέωρα φροντιστὴς, which there is no sufficient reason to suspect, the best parallel is *Ar. Poet.* 4, 1448 b 34 ὥστερ δὲ καὶ τὰ σπουδαῖα μάλιστα ποιητῆς Ὅμηρος (*Vahlen ad loc.*) Another good prose parallel is *Xen. R. L.* 13, 11 ἱερεῖ μὲν τὰ πρὸς τοὺς θεοὺς εἶναι, στρατηγῷ δὲ τὰ πρὸς τοὺς ἀνθρώπους. Perhaps we might add Plato *Symp.* 196 E ποιητῆς ὁ Ἔρως ἀγαθὸς πᾶσαν ποίησιν, but there ἀγαθός may determine the construction.

I do not think Mr. Adam makes out any case for retaining μᾶλλον but putting it after οὐδέν. He fails to see that οὐδέν μᾶλλον can only be used in its idiomatic way when there are two sentences or parts of a sentence, which it brings into a sort of antithesis. You can say e.g. κατηγοροῦντες οὐδέν μᾶλλον ἐπειθὸν because the participle and verb stand more or less apart, but in κατηγοροῦν οὐδέν μᾶλλον ἀληθές the elements of an antithesis are insufficient. It is curious that 36 D presents another im-

possible μάλλον, of which Adam's defence is still more unsatisfactory. There however the probable source of the error is more obvious than it is here.

19 C καὶ οὐχ ὡς ἀτιμάζων λέγω τὴν τοιαύτην ἐπιστήμην, εἴ τις περὶ τῶν τοιούτων σοφός ἐστιν—μή πως ἐγὼ ὑπὸ Μελήτρου τοσαύτας δίκας φεύγοιμι (not φύγοιμι)—ἀλλὰ γὰρ ἐμοὶ τούτων ὧ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι οὐδὲν μέτεστιν.

I have not found anywhere, though it has probably been given, what seems to me the right explanation of *μή πως κ.τ.λ.* Setting aside the view that *μή* is here final, we take the words as expressing a wish. But what is the exact meaning of *τοσαύτας δίκας*? 'So grave a charge' (Jowett) it cannot mean, even if that made satisfactory sense under the circumstances, because *δίκη*, not *δίκαι*, is invariably used, at any rate in prose, for a single suit or action. It must then be 'so many actions.' This is sometimes explained to mean (1) an action for contempt of *ἐπιστήμη* as well as one on the charge on which Socrates is now actually arraigned. But 'so many actions as that would amount to' seems to me very feeble, when only two are meant: and there is also the objection to be stated in a moment. Then we have the view (2) indicated by Heindorf and developed by Schanz that *τοσαύτας* refers to the number of separate branches of knowledge, in this case of natural science, which he might be arraigned for slighting or insulting. Schanz adopts this explanation in his commentary (1893), but feels bound to alter *Μελήτρου* to *Μελήτρων*, a number of Meletuses or persons like Meletus. But at least three objections present themselves to this theory. First Socrates does not distinguish the various branches, so as to lead up to the plural *τοσαύτας*: he says *τὴν τοιαύτην ἐπιστήμην*. The sciences were not at that time so differentiated. Then why in such a connection should Socrates put it all upon Meletus, when he takes pains to assert that, as it was, there were other accusers representing in a way (23 E) separate professions or sets of people? (This, I suppose, is the sort of reason for which Schanz would read the plural *Μελήτρων*.) Finally what sort of verisimilitude or propriety is there in suggesting that he could ever be indicted by Meletus or anyone like him for contemning science? Need it be pointed out that no action would lie for anything of the kind, and still further that the Meletuses would according to Socrates be the last people to bring such an action, if it did lie? The

prejudice against Socrates, on which he dwells, was that he knew too much and that he busied himself too much with these scientific speculations. That is the very source (he says) of the feeling against him. And yet he is supposed to think of Meletus as actually arraigning him for not treating such speculations with due respect. This last objection seems quite fatal to any interpretation of the passage that makes contumelious treatment of science a possible charge.

What explanation then remains? I think simply this. 'I don't speak thus by way of casting any reflection upon such knowledge, if anyone really has it. I hope Meletus may never bring actions against me enough to make me do that.' If accused of science, a man might in self-defence not only disclaim it, but court the goodwill of his judges by speaking of it with a cowardly affectation of contempt.

22 A δεῖ δὴ ὑμῖν τὴν ἐμὴν πλάνην ἐπιδείξαι ὥσπερ πόνοους τινὰς πονοῦντος, ἵνα μοι καὶ ἀνέλεγκτος ἢ μαντεία γένοιτο.

I think those critics are right who from Stephanus downwards have wished to insert a *μή* in the final clause, reading *ἵνα μή μοι κ.τ.λ.* and whose proposal now gains support from the old Armenian version. Without this insertion the words mean: 'that the oracle might be made irrefutable.' It is perhaps questionable whether you can properly be said to make a thing irrefutable by unsuccessful attempts to refute it. *Γένοιτο* is not quite the same thing as *φανείη οὖσα*. Moreover this hardly represents Socrates' real state of mind, as he describes it. He was perplexed by the oracle and set to work, not to prove its truth—that was not his direct object—but to test its truth and ascertain its exact meaning. He thought it must be true (21 B), but he wanted to make sure. His object was to verify (in the proper sense of that word) and to understand, not to demonstrate. He therefore began with an instance which was likely, if any, to upset the proposition that the god had laid down: 21 B ἦλθον ἐπὶ τινα τῶν δοκούντων σοφῶν εἶναι, ὡς ἐνταῦθα εἶπερ που ἐλέγξων τὸ μαντεῖον καὶ ἀποφανῶν τῷ χρησμῷ ὅτι οὐτοσὶ ἐμοὶ σοφώτερός ἐστι, σὺ δ' ἐμὲ ἐφησθα. In other words his object was, not directly ἐλέγχειν τὸ μαντεῖον in the sense of refuting or exposing it, but to test it and thus possibly refute it. Though ἐλέγχειν means both *test* and *refute*, εἶπερ που shows clearly that *refute* is the meaning here. Having then started according to his own statement

with the idea of possibly refuting the oracle, not indeed expecting to do so but contemplating it as a thing that might happen, how can he describe himself as labouring to make or prove the oracle irrefutable? It is true that presently he speaks of himself as *βοηθῶν τῷ θεῷ* (23 B) in exposing the pretence of knowledge. But this is at a much later time, when he has long found out the meaning of the oracle and is perfectly satisfied as to its truth. *Ἐλέγχων* refers to his first immediate perplexity, *βοηθεῖν* to the settled conviction of his after-life.

We are then to read *ἵνα μή* for *ἵνα* and understand that he set out on his labours in order that he might not leave the truth of the oracle untested, that he might not too readily take it for granted as true in its first and most obvious sense. His labours were rewarded by the discovery that it was true but not in this sense, and he had therefore good ground for rejoicing that he had not left it unexamined and untested.

This view seems fully confirmed by a passage in the *Philebus*, which as far as I know has not been quoted in this connection and which is really my justification for this long note. In 41 B we read *τοῦτο δὲ τὸ δόγμα, ἕως ἂν κέηται παρ' ἡμῖν, ἀδύνατον ἀνέλεγκτον δήπου γίγνεσθαι*, and I will add Badham's words; 'the sense of the passage thus becomes plain: *But until this judgment (of mine) is approved and established in us both, it is impossible for it to escape (or become exempt from) examination*. I have endeavoured to give the force of the word *γίγνεσθαι*, which, as will be seen, signifies a great deal more than *εἶναι*.'

23 A *ὄνομα δὲ τοῦτο λέγεσθαι σοφός εἶναι* is condemned both by the bad grammar of the nominative *σοφός* and by the bad sense of making a name for wisdom the consequence of unpopularity. Schanz is therefore probably right in reading (1893) *λέγομαι*. The infinitive will be due to the mistake of a scribe who connected the clause with *ὥστε* ... *γεγονέναι* preceding.

What follows contains perhaps the hardest thing in the *Apology*: *τὸ δὲ κινδυνεύει, ὧ ἄνδρες, τῷ ὄντι ὁ θεὸς σοφός εἶναι, καὶ ἐν τῷ χρησμῷ τοῦτω τοῦτο λέγειν, ὅτι ἡ ἀνθρωπίνη σοφία ὀλίγου τινὸς ἀξία ἐστὶν καὶ οὐδενός· καὶ φαίνεται τοῦτον λέγειν τὸν Σωκράτη, προσκεχρησθαι δὲ τῷ ἐμῷ ὀνόματι, ἐμὲ παράδειγμα ποιούμενος, ὥσπερ ἂν <εἰ> εἶποι κ.τ.λ.*

Τοῦτον is admittedly wrong, and either *τοῦτο* or *τοῦτ' οὐ* is usually read for it. But neither is at all satisfactory. (1) *τοῦτο*, if read, means that human knowledge is a

mere pretence. But it is quite untrue to say that the oracle *appears* to say this of Socrates, and, if *φαίνεται* means *is found in reality*, it is also untrue that the oracle really said this of Socrates. The oracle did not even *mean* it (*λέγειν* in another sense) of Socrates: it meant it of all mankind, Socrates of course included. (2) *τοῦτ' οὐ* is equally unsatisfactory. *Τοῦτο* is now explained to mean and must mean the being wise or possessed of genuine knowledge (*τὸ σοφὸν εἶναι*). But it is most unlikely that *τοῦτο* in *τοῦτ' οὐ λέγειν* should be something quite different from the *τοῦτο* in *τοῦτο λέγειν* just before: the *σοφὸν εἶναι* is not in reality quite obvious to supply; and the very repetition of the phrase *τοῦτο λέγειν* is inartistic. *τοῦτο* in this case cannot be the unreality of knowledge, because *φαίνεται οὐ λέγειν*, meaning *turns out not to say*, would imply that at first sight it seemed to say, which it did not. It would certainly seem that the sense required is 'the oracle does: not really mean that Socrates has knowledge,' and I do not see how to get this without rather larger change. Two possible lines of emendation occur to me, but I do not mention them with any confidence. One would be *καὶ φαίνεται τοιοῦτον λέγειν τὸν Σ., προσκέχρηται δὲ κ.τ.λ.* 'The god seems to call Socrates wise, but really he has just made use of my name.' The corruption of *προσκέχρηται* to *προσκεχρησθαι* would be like that of *λέγομαι* (?) to *λέγεσθαι* above, and due to the same cause, an infinitive preceding. Or we might read something like *τοιοῦτον οὐ λέγειν...προσκεχρησθαι δὲ...ἰ.ε.* 'it appears that he does not really call Socrates wise, but has only made use,' etc. Another possible form of sentence would be *κινδυνεύει...σοφός εἶναι καὶ...τοῦτο λέγειν ὅτι ἡ ἀνθρωπίνη σοφία ὀλίγου τινὸς ἀξία ἐστὶν καὶ οὐδενός, καὶ ἂν φαίνηται* (or *εἰ καὶ φαίνεται*) *τοιοῦτον λέγειν τὸν Σωκράτη, προσκεχρησθαι δὲ κ.τ.λ.* In this latter form *προσκεχρησθαι* would depend on *κινδυνεύει*. It may be noticed that an *εἰ* has obviously fallen out two lines lower before *εἶποι*.

26 D *Ἀναξαγόρου οἶε κατηγορεῖν κ.τ.λ.*

I cannot see any sufficient reason for doubting, with Schanz and others, the correctness of *Ἀναξαγόρου*, though it must be admitted that Socrates' meaning is not expressed as clearly as it might have been. Possibly the want of clearness is intentional, for, beautiful as the *Apology* is, any logical reader must detect in it certain defects of reasoning which, if Gorgias or Protagoras

were the speaker, might be called sophistry. But the meaning appears to be this. Meletus taxes Socrates with irreligious ideas about the sun and the moon. Socrates rejoins that in the *first* place he does not hold any such views and Meletus must be confounding him with Anaxagoras who did, and that in the *second* it would be absurd to tax him with having propounded such ideas as original views of his own, when everybody knew that they had been put forward fifty years ago by Anaxagoras. (It will be observed that Meletus is not made to charge Socrates with propounding them as original. Socrates is ridiculing an accusation that Meletus had not brought). The want of clearness consists in the fact that the two points are not put markedly enough as distinct. 'I don't hold any such opinions, and, if I did, I certainly should not claim originality for them.' But it is the first point which is really important, though more space is given for the moment to the second. The main thing is that he does not hold the opinions in question. Now the omission of 'Ἀναξαγόρου' (Schanz) or the substitution of Σωκράτους (Baiter) would drop the first and important point altogether. Meletus would say 'he thinks the sun is only stone,' and Socrates would answer 'well, there is nothing new in that.' But, if he does not deny the charge here, he does not deny it at all, for the argument beginning in 26 Ε ἀλλ', ὃ πρὸς Διὸς κ.τ.λ. has no reference to this charge specifically. He may believe even in gods and yet hold this offensive theory about the sun. (It might be thought that 'Ἀναξαγόρου' is likely to be wrong because of the addition of τοῦ Κλαζομενίου to 'Ἀναξαγόρου' immediately afterwards. Cf. however the *Clouds*, where Chaerephon is mentioned just by his name in 144 and then in 156, as though not already mentioned, referred to as X. ὁ Σφήγτιος.) This argument, if sound, will show that καί is right as well as 'Ἀναξαγόρου' and not to be altered to ἤ. All three main clauses are to be made interrogative, and not with Schanz affirmative.

I should like to add a remark on the much disputed words ἃ ἔξεστιν ἐνίοτε, εἰ πάνυ πολλοῦ, δραχμῆς ἐκ τῆς ὀρχήστρας πριαμένοις Σωκράτους καταγελᾶν. The use of ἐνίοτε has been turned against the bookselling theory of the passage. The use is indeed somewhat odd, at any rate at first sight, but as far as I can see it is equally a difficulty on either interpretation; or rather perhaps, when examined, it is more of a difficulty on the old view. If we take the words as uttered, so to speak, in a breath, *sometimes*

is certainly hard to understand; *doctrines which you can sometimes buy for a drachma at most*. We should rather say *which you can buy any day, always*. But ἐνίοτε... δραχμῆς is a sort of little parenthesis or semi-detached group of words: *which it is open to you—sometimes, if unusually dear, they may cost you a drachma—to buy in the orchestra*. Leaving out of sight the fact, which we may really regard as established, that there were no drachma seats in the theatre of Dionysus, I hardly see what would be the point of saying that a man might possibly have to give as much as a drachma for a seat. There were undoubtedly plenty of two-ohol seats, even if there were also dearer ones. But for a book on a stall, if he wanted it, a man might very well have to give a drachma.

27 Ε ὅπως δὲ σύ τινα πείθεις ἂν καὶ σμικρὸν νοῦν ἔχοντα ἄνθρωπον, ὡς οὐ τοῦ αὐτοῦ ἐστὶν καὶ δαιμόνια καὶ θεῖα ἡγεῖσθαι, καὶ αὖ τοῦ αὐτοῦ μῆτε δαίμονας μῆτε θεοὺς μῆτε ἥρωας, οὐδεμίᾳ μηχανῇ ἐστὶν.

Schanz in his commentary completely alters this sentence by insertions and omissions. In his text of 1877 he had inserted nothing but omitted the second τοῦ αὐτοῦ and μῆτε ἥρωας. Even Mr. Adam would make insertions here, though not the same, and Burnet follows Rieckher in omitting οὐ τοῦ αὐτοῦ. Μῆτε ἥρωας is unimportant, and for the rest it is clear that any change is necessary! 'You will never persuade anybody that the same man will not believe in both δαιμόνια and θεῖα,' (that is, a man must believe in θεῖα, if he believes in δαιμόνια): 'or again that the same man will not disbelieve in both δαίμονες and θεοί,' (that is, he must disbelieve in δαίμονες, if he disbelieves in θεοί). There is a slight objection to the *form* of the latter clause, as μῆτε θεοὺς μῆτε δαίμονας would seem the more logical order. It is possible that Plato really wrote the words so, and μῆτε ἥρωας would then come in better, in immediate sequence on δαίμονας. But, even if he did not, the meaning may fairly be got from the words, when we know from the context what it is. There is also a slight objection to the *substance* of the former clause, for, though Socrates seems here to be recapitulating, he has not previously argued directly from δαιμόνια to θεῖα, only from δαιμόνια to δαίμονες and from δαίμονες to θεοί. But the slipping in of the θεῖα is very easy and the point is virtually implied in the parallel inference of θεοί from δαίμονες.

In the sentence almost immediately pre-

ceding this those scholars are, I think, equally wrong who would omit τοὺς ἡμιόνους, necessary as it is not exactly to the logical justice of the illustration but to its artistic finish. Just as the offspring of gods are not gods but δαίμονες, so the offspring of horses are not horses but mules. On the other hand the contention that in this case Plato ought to have mentioned a possible denial of nymphs, to balance exactly the supposed denial of donkeys, seems to ask for too much. This is a small point that the reader can easily supply, and after all it is the gods who are in question. The nymphs do not matter.

I am not even sure that in εἴ τις ἵππων μὲν παῖδας ἡγοῖτο ἢ καὶ ὄνων, τοὺς ἡμιόνους, we need omit ἢ. A man may be thinking or speaking of mules as offspring of horses or as offspring of donkeys. We may call them offspring of horses, as Simonides did when it was made worth his while. We may also call them offspring of donkeys. It is only when we want to be exact that we need specify both parents. But ἢ and καί are often confused, and one may very well have grown out of the other.

28 A αὐτὸ δὲ καὶ ἄλλους πολλοὺς καὶ ἀγαθοὺς ἄνδρας ἤρηκεν, οἶμαι δὲ καὶ αἰρήσει· οὐδὲν δὲ δεῶν μὴ ἐν ἐμοὶ στή.

After οὐδὲν I should prefer γάρ to δέ. The two words are apt to get interchanged.

29 C ὥστ' οὐδ' εἰ με νῦν ἀφίετε..., εἰ μοι πρὸς ταῦτα εἴποιτε..., εἰ οὖν με, ὥσπερ εἶπον, ἀφίετε, εἴποιμι' ἂν ὑμῖν κ.τ.λ.

Was not Stephanus right in wishing to change ἀφίετε to the optative? Be it remembered that, though εἰν ἀφήτε can refer and usually does refer to future time, εἰ ἀφίετε cannot. It is not like our *if you acquit*, i.e. *if you shall acquit*, but it would ordinarily mean *if you are now acquitting*. It can only stand here, if at all, in the sense *if you are feeling inclined to acquit*, which is not really very suitable. What is really wanted is *if you were to feel inclined, were to propose, to acquit*, and that is εἰ ἀφίετε.

31 D φωνή τις γιγνομένη ἢ ὅταν γένηται αἰεὶ ἀποτρέπει με.

Read γίγνηται for γένηται, which would mean 'after its occurrence.' Cf. the note on *Phaedr.* 256 E. In *Phil.* 26 E τὰ γιγνόμενα διὰ τιν' αἰτίαν γίγνεσθαι and *Laws* 687 C τὸ κατὰ τὴν τῆς αὐτοῦ ψυχῆς ἐπίταξιν τὰ γιγνόμενα γίγνεσθαι we might just as well read γινόμενα as keep γένηται here. Cf. *Meno* 100 A and B (παραγιγνομένη... παραγίγνηται). In

the parallel passage *Theages* 128 D the same change should be made twice, as the present tense ἀνακρινώται helps to show.

34 A νῦν παρασχέσθω—ἐγὼ παραχωρῶ—καὶ λεγέτω.

Perhaps ἐγὼ <γὰρ> παραχωρῶ. γὰρ and παρ are almost undistinguishable.

36 B ἀμελήσας ὦνπερ οἱ πολλοί.

It is certain that the sense required is *disregarding what most men regard*. I should call it equally certain that by Greek usage the idea to be supplied with ὦνπερ is the idea which precedes it. For instance in ἐπιθυμῶ ὦνπερ οἱ ἄλλοι we can only understand ἐπιθυμοῦσιν. I should therefore feel quite certain that some such word as φροντίζουσι (not οὐ, as Schanz thinks) had been omitted here by accident, if it did not seem just possible that ἀμελήσας might be resolved into οὐδὲν ἐπιμεληθείς. οὐδὲν μέλει μοι ὦνπερ τοῖς ἄλλοις would be unimpeachable, and possibly ἀμελήσας might be regarded only as an equivalent. Is there any example of a positive word, verb, substantive, or adjective, being thus as it were supplied out of the privative compound? I do not think the common cases where πᾶς is supplied to a new clause from οὐδεῖς, φησί from οὐ φησί, etc., help us much, especially as the clauses are always antithetic in form.

37 B ἀντὶ τούτου δὲ ἔλωμαι ὦν εὖ οἶδ' ὅτι κακῶν ὄντων, τούτου τιμησάμενος; πότερον δεσμοῦ;... ἀλλὰ χρημάτων καὶ δεδέσθαι;

Schanz and Burnet seem right in following Baumann and reading τι for ὅτι with one inferior MS. Adam reads ἔχωμαι but (1) this would be a misuse of ἔχεσθαι, which is not to *take hold*, but to *keep hold*; (2) ὦν εὖ οἶδ' ὅτι κακῶν ὄντων is impossible Greek. The parenthetic use of οἶδ' ὅτι is nothing to the point, for it is parenthetic and can be removed without affecting the construction, e.g. πάντων [οἶδ' ὅτι] φησάντων ἂν (Mr. Adam's instance), whereas here κακῶν ὄντων would be governed by it. The Greek expression would be ὦν εὖ οἶδ' ὅτι κακά ἐστι. Cf. *Rep.* 465 D διὰ σμικρὸν μέρος ὦν τοῖσι τοῖσι ὑπάρχει; Herod. 1, 78 οὐδὲν κω εἰδότες τῶν ἡν περὶ Σάρδεις; Thuc. 7, 67 ἀφ' ὧν ἡμῖν παρεσκεύασται; Ar. *Rhet.* 1, 5, 1361 b 14 τὸ μηδὲν ἔχειν ὦν τὸ γῆρας λωβάται; *C.I.A.* ii. 281. 12 περὶ πάντων ὦν γέγονε. In *Hipp. Min.* 363 D ὅτι ἂν τις βούληται ὦν ἂν μοι εἰς ἐπιδείξιν παρεσκευασμένον ἢ I do not see how anything but παρεσκευασμένα ἢ could be right, like παρεσκεύασται in Thucydides; Stallbaum's παρεσκευασμένων would be as bad as ὅτι κακῶν ὄντων here.

Possibly Meiser's τοῦ for τούτου, whereby τοῦ τιμησάμενος becomes a distinct question, like τί δέσας above, is to be preferred. It accounts better for the genitives δεσμοῦ and χρημάτων, which might be expected otherwise rather to follow the construction of τι, if τι is right, after ἔλωμαι.

The omission of the article before δεδέσθαι is very unusual, nor do I know anything in prose quite like it. It may be due, if right, to there being no article with χρημάτων. Cf. however Ar. *Ach.* 196-7, where μὴ 'πιτηρεῖν represents a genitive, unless 197 and 198 are to change places.

38 D ἀπορία μὲν ἐάλωκα, οὐ μέντοι λόγων, ἀλλὰ τόλμης καὶ ἀναισχυντίας καὶ τοῦ μὴ ἐθέλειν λέγειν κ.τ.λ.

μὴ T Arm.: om. B' Burnet, who retains it. It can hardly be right. No

doubt Thucydides 2, 49 has ἡ ἀπορία τοῦ μὴ ἡσυχάζειν, where μὴ is superfluous, but the interposition of τόλμης καὶ ἀναισχυντίας here entirely alters the case. Anything added further must be as positive as they are. I do not however feel sure that τῷ ἐθέλειν, parallel to ἀπορία, may not be what Plato wrote.

39 B καὶ νῦν ἐγὼ μὲν ἀπειμι...καὶ ἐγὼ τε τῷ τιμήματι ἐμμένω καὶ οὗτοι.

Ἐμμένω will be better both in sense and in conformity to ἀπειμι. He does not mean that he and they are now abiding or disposed to abide by the judgment, but that in the future they will have to accept it and acquiesce. In *Crito* 50 c ἐμμενεῖν is now read for ἐμμένειν.

HERBERT RICHARDS.

TRAVERSARIUS AND CODEX V OF CATULLUS.

GEORG VOIGT says in his *Wiederbelebung des Classischen Alterthums* (3d. ed., Vol. I., p. 439), 'Als Traversari die alte Dombibliothek und die von S. Zenone durchstöberte, fand er nichts darin, was seine Aufmerksamkeit gefesselt hätte. Aus jener Sammlung waren klassische Schätze wie die Briefe Cicero's an Giangaleazzo von Mailand geschenkt worden; der berühmte Catullus war verschollen.' This statement by Voigt seems also to have been copied by others.

Failing to find a copy of the *Hodoepoericon* of Traversarius in any one of the larger libraries of the United States that I consulted, I rested for several years under the impression drawn from the words of Voigt that Traversarius distinctly stated that no MS. of Catullus existed in the chapter-library at Verona at the time he inspected it. A few months ago the matter recurred to my mind in Venice, and examination showed that neither Traversarius himself nor his biographer, Laurentius Mehus, makes any distinct mention of Catullus at all, nor is there any evidence that I can find to show clearly that *codex V* was not still among the treasures of the chapter-library in 1433 A.D. The facts appear to be as follows: Ambrosius Traversarius had recently been appointed general of the monastic order of the Camaldulenses, and being a good disciplinarian as well as a pious man, he determined to make a general visitation of the houses of

the order in northern Italy, with a view to the correction of certain abuses and scandals that had been reported as existing among them. In the course of this journey, the journal of which constitutes his *Hodoepoericon*, he managed to combine with his official duties the pleasure of an inspection of as many libraries as fell in his way. His main question in these libraries was after MSS. of works previously unknown, at least to him. Discoveries of this sort he chronicles carefully, while of other libraries he records briefly that he found there nothing except works already known to him. He began his journey from Florence on the first day of May 1433, and arrived in Verona 'quarto ac decimo kalendas Augusti.' From this point I quote his own words (*Hodoep.* p. 34); 'Postridie a Praefecto urbis data opera (nam ita inter nos conuenerat) Ecclesiae maioris Bibliothecam (erat autem celeberrima) uidimus. Plurima ibi erant uolumina mirae uetustatis quae singulatim discussimus omnia; nihil tamen fere praeter quam consueueramus inuenimus.' Nor does his biographer know anything more than Traversarius himself recorded; cf. *Ambrosii Traversarii gen. Camald. . . . Latinae Epistolae . . . Accedit eiusdem Ambrosii uita . . . a Laurentio Mehus* (Florentiae . . . MDCLIX), Vol. II., p. ccccx. 'Euoluit deinde Bibliothecam Monasterii S. Zenonis sacris abundantem codicibus, tum alteram illam cele-