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THE SUBJUNCTIVE OF PURPOSE IN RELATIVE CLAUSES IN GREEK.

PROFESSOR TARBELL'S brief notice of 'The Deliberative Subjunctive in Relative Clauses in Greek,' published in the July number of the *Review* (p. 302), informed me that I had not been a-mare's-nesting alone in a rather out-of-the-way corner of Greek syntax.

Some years ago my attention was arrested by the construction of the subjunctive in Xen. *Anab.* I. 7, 7: ὥστε οὐ τοῦτο δέδοικα μὴ οὐκ ἔχω ὁ τι δῶ ἐκάστω τῶν φίλων, ἂν εὖ γένηται, ἀλλὰ μὴ οὐκ ἔχω ἱκανοὺς οἷς δῶ, and also in the similar passage Xen. *Anab.* II. 4, 19—20: οὐδὲ γὰρ ἂν πολλὰ γέφυραι ὦσιν, ἔχομεν ἂν ὅποιοι φυγόντες ἡμεῖς σωθῶμεν. εἰ δὲ ἡμεῖς νικῶμεν, λελυμένης τῆς γεφύρας οὐχ ἔξουσιν ἐκεῖνοι ὅποιοι φύγωσιν.

The construction appeared to me then, as it still does, after comparison of other passages, one of purpose; for we might—*grammaticae causa*—write in the former passage ὅπως (ἂν) αὐτοῖς δῶ, and in the latter τόπον ἐπιτηδεῖον ὅπως (ἂν) ἐκείσε φυγόντες σωθῶμεν.

I was glad to find my view supported by so excellent an authority as Professor Goodwin. His several statements on the subject are as follows:

Gk. Moods and Tenses (ed. 7, 1879) § 65, 1, n. 1 (a) (p. 138):

'The Future Indicative is the only form regularly used in prose after the relative in in this sense' (i.e. to express purpose).

Ibid. § 65, 1, n. 3 (a) (p. 139):

'The Attic Greek allows the subjunctive in such phrases as ἔχει ὁ τι εἶπῃ, *he has something to say*; where the irregularity seems to be caused by the analogy of the common expression οὐκ ἔχει ὁ τι (or τί) εἶπῃ, equivalent to οὐκ οἶδεν ὁ τι εἶπῃ, *he knows not what he shall say*, which contains an indirect statement' (i.e. an indirect deliberative question).

Under the second of these statements, which obviously bears directly upon the point in question, we find cited as the first example Isoc. *Pan.* p. 49 C. § 44 (one of Professor Tarbell's examples): Τοιοῦτον ἔθος παρέδοσαν, ὥστε...ἐκατέρους ἔχειν ἐφ' οἷς φιλοτιμηθῶσιν, with the translation *that both may have things in which they 'may glory.'* Goodwin adds in parenthesis:

'Here there is no indirect question, for the meaning is not that *they may know in what they are to glory,*' and he cites his note appended to Felton's *Isocrates*, p. 135, which I quote here for the sake of comparison.

'The peculiar use of the subjunctive in ἔχειν ἐφ' οἷς φιλοτιμηθῶσιν may perhaps be explained by the analogy of the common construction οὐκ ἔχω τί (or ὁ τι) εἶπω, *non habeo quid dicam*, where the indirect question is obvious. The transition from οὐκ ἔχω ὁ τι εἶπω to ἔχω ὁ τι εἶπω might be easily made, although in the latter all trace of the indirect question disappears. Other similar examples are cited by Krüger (*Gr. Gr.* § 54. 7, A. 2), in all of which the leading verb is ἔχω. These are Plat. *Symp.* p. 194 D [another of Professor Tarbell's examples], εἰνὸν μόνον ἔχῃ ὅτῳ διαλέγεται, and Xen. *Oecon.* 7, 20, ἔξιν ὁ τι εἰσφέρειωσιν. In Plat. *Phaedr.* p. 255 E [one of Professor Tarbell's examples, wrongly cited as 254 E] and Lysias in *Andoc.* § 42, we have the same construction, if we accept Bekker's emendation ὁ τι λέγῃ for ὁ τι λέγει, which the sense seems to require. Compare also Plat. *Ion* p. 535 B, where we find εἰπορέας ὁ τι λέγῃς and εὐπορέας ὁ τι λέγῃς in the same sentence; here the transition is especially simple. Even if we explain εὐπορέας ὁ τι λέγῃς as an indirect question [though it seems clearly quite equivalent to ἔχεις ὁ τι λέγῃς, cf. ἵππων εὐπορήσαντες = ἵππους λαβόντες, Xen. *Hellen.* I. 35], it seems a perversion of language to apply that name to the others as Krüger does. Of course, these remarks will not apply to the doubtful example Thucyd. vii. 25, discussed in the note [i.e. in an insertion in Felton's commentary on Isocrates *Pan.*, loc. cit.], or to the cases of the optative there quoted.' The passages from Plat. *Symp.* and Xen. *Oecon.* are cited in the *Moods and Tenses* (loc. cit.).

Goodwin's note referred to in the last quotation deserves to be given here in full, as follows:

'The subjunctive and optative are very rare in this construction in Attic Greek, the future indicative being the only regular form. In Homer, however, the subjunctive and optative are commonly used, this older construction corresponding precisely to the Latin, as the relation of the two languages would lead us to expect. Another (doubtful) Attic example of the subjunctive may be found in Thuc. vii. 25, πρέσβεις ἄγονσα, οἵπερ φράσωσιν, καὶ...ἐποτρύνωσιν. Krüger, in his note on this passage of Thuc. (2d edit., 1861), is very severe on those who retain οἵπερ with the subjunctive, for which

he substitutes *ὅπως* on the authority of a single MS. [Classen's note on the passage (2d. edit. 1884), is this: '*ὅπως* aus dem vat. st. *οὔτε* von den neueren Herausgg. aufgenommen, da das Relativpronomen mit einem Konjunktiv des Zweckes im attischen Sprachgebrauch nicht nachzuweisen ist.'] He explains *φιλομηθέωσιν*, in the present passage of Isocrates, as a subjunctive in an (indirect) dubitative question [i.e. the explanation of Professor Tarbell, following Madvig]. The following examples of the aorist optative, however, show at least that the older construction was not unknown to the Attic poets:—*ἄνδρα δ' οὐδέν' ἔντοπον, οὐδ' ὅστις ἀρκέσειεν οὐδ' ὅστις... σὺ λλάβοιτο*, Soph. *Phil.* 280; *γόνιμον δὲ ποιητὴν ἂν οὐχ εὖροις ἐτι ζητῶν ἂν, ὅστις ῥήμα γενναῖον λάκοι*, Aristoph. *Ran.* 96. In ver. 98 of the *Ran.* we find the regular Attic construction, *ὅστις φθέγγεται*, referring to precisely the same thing as *ὅστις λάκοι* above. Both these examples of the optative must be explained as relative sentences, and the subjunctive is certainly not more objectionable than the optative. Nor can the present example from Isocr. be explained as interrogative without great violence to the sense; the idea is not *that they may know what they are to glory in*; but, *that they may have things in which they may glory*. See also, *ἔφ' οὗ πεισθέντες πρόοισθε*, Dem. *Phil.* ii. § 8.

In *G. M. and T.* § 65, n. 3 (b) (ed. 7 n.) we find the statement: 'The Present or Aorist Optative very rarely occurs in Attic Greek after a past tense, but more frequently after another optative.' The examples are those given above with the addition of Plat. *Rep.* iii. 398 B, *ὅς μιμοῖτο καὶ λέγει* (depending on *χρώμεθα ἂν*). Dem. *Phil.* ii. § 8 appears as Dem. *Phil.* ii. 67, 20 (with fuller text and *προ-εἰσθε* for *πρόοισθε*).

Goodwin, however, is hardly consistent in his treatment; for under *G. M. and T.* § 71 (ed. 7th): 'when a question in the direct form would be expressed by an *interrogative Subjunctive*, indirect questions after primary tenses retain the Subjunctive; after secondary tenses the Subjunctive may be either changed to the same tense of the Optative or retained in its original form,' we find not only Aesch. *P.* 471 (Professor Tarbell's first example), but also (albeit with the qualification that it 'may be explained on this principle as an interrogative, or by § 65, 1, n. 3 [see above], as a relative clause') Xen. *Anab.* i. 7, 7, which clearly belongs to the other class of passages; and this incon-

sistency will be found in the revised edition (1890) of the *G. M. and T.*

In this new edition we find the first statement cited above from the old edition unchanged in §§ 572—3. The examples of the optative under § 573 comprise (besides Soph. *Phil.* 281 of Professor Tarbell's list) Soph. *Tr.* 903, *κρύψας' ἐαυτὴν ἔνθα μή τις εἰσίδοι, βρυχάτο* (a verse which does not well suit the context as it stands, and which I suspect to be corrupt), and Plat. *Rep.* 578 E, *εἴ τις θεῶν ἄνδρα θέῃ εἰς ἐρημίαν, ὅπου αὐτῷ μηδεὶς μέλλοι βοηθήσει*, in which latter, however, the optative is merely an ordinary instance of attraction of mood, the idea of purpose being contained in *μέλλειν* without regard to the mood. (Goodwin's remark in parenthesis 'this may be purely conditional' is a good example of the mental bias which has led him to drag in a 'condition' at every turn to the great detriment of a valuable work.)

As will be seen by the quotations I have made, more than one-half of Professor Tarbell's examples—'of the phenomenon which had not been recognized by any previous grammarian'—have been examined and discussed by Krüger and Goodwin.

It seems to me now that τὰ πολλὰ προκόψας, οὐ πολλοῦ πόνου με δεῖ in setting in clear light the source of the error into which Professor Tarbell and others have fallen in discussing the construction in hand. The trouble, I believe, lies entirely in the ambiguity of *ἔχω* = 1. 'I have,' 2. 'I know' = *οἶδα* (cf. *κατέχω* in Romaic), 3. 'I am able' = *δύναμαι*, and of *ὅστις* = 1. an indefinite or general relative, (2) *τίς* introducing an indirect question. To *ἔχω*¹ answers *ἔστι* with a personal pronoun in the dative expressed or understood, and the definite or particular relative may, as we have seen above, be used as well as the indefinite or general, though this is less common.

It remains for me, before enumerating and commenting upon some examples which I have collected from my own reading, to examine the three examples which Professor Tarbell gives of a so-called deliberative clause after other verbs than *ἔχω* and *ἔστι*.

Soph. *Phil.* 938: *ὑμῖν τὰδ', οὐ γὰρ ἄλλον οἶδ' ὅτῳ λέγω* may be paraphrased *οὐ γὰρ ἄλλον ἔχω, καθὰ οἶδα, ὅτῳ λέγω*. The fact that the antecedent is here expressed seems enough to show that there is no relation with an indirect question. So Isocr. xxi. 1: *Οὐ προφάσεως ἀπορῶ, δι' ἣντινα λέγω ὑπὲρ Νικίου τουτουῖ = ἔχω πρόφασιν κτέ*, where also the antecedent is expressed.

In Soph. *Phil.* 279 sqq. *ὁρῶντα μὲν ναῦς, ἄς*

ἔχων ἑναυστόλουν, | πάσας βεβώσας, ἄνδρα δ' οὐδέν' ἔντοτον, | οὐχ (ἄνδρα) ὅστις ἀρκέσειεν, οὐδ' (ἄνδρα) ὅστις νόσον | κύμνοντι σὺ λλάβοιτο, the object of ὁρῶντα is not ναῦς but ναῦς βεβώσας (the fact of their departure), and it does no violence to the thought to supply ἔχοντα governing ἄνδρα. At all events, the expression is but a short step beyond the customary.

In the first of my examples from the *Anabasis* (vid. supra) ἔχω is evidently ἔχω¹ and the sentence is to be explained like that in Isocr. *Pan.* In Romainic one would say δέ(ν) φοβοῦμαι (φοβᾶμαι) να μὴν ἔχω τίποτε να δῶσω (δώκω), an additional proof, as I believe, that the explanation of such a construction as one of purpose is in accordance with the genius of the Greek language. In my second example, although I am inclined to take ἔχω as ἔχω¹, it may be understood as ἔχω² and the dependent clause will then contain a deliberative subjunctive. In Xen. *Hellen.* I. 3. 21 and I. 4. 15 there is a like possible ambiguity.

In Soph. *Antig.* 270 sqq. : οὐ γὰρ εἴχομεν | οὐτ' ἀντιφωνεῖν οὐθ' ὅπως δρῶντες καλῶς | πράξαιμεν, the infinitive in the first member seems to prove (as Professor Jebb thinks who cites as parallel *Al.* 428, cf. his note *ad loc.*) that ἔχω here is ἔχω².

Eur. *Orest.* 722 sq. : κοῦκέρ' εἰσὶν ἐλπίδες, | ὅποι τραπόμενος θάνατον Ἀργείων φύγω is another instance of the purpose-construction.

Eur. *Alc.* 120 sq. : οὐκ ἔχω ἐπὶ τίνα | μηλοθύταν πορευθῶ κτεί. seems clearly an instance of ἔχω² as shown by the interrogative pronoun.

Aesch. *Ag.* 1530 sqq. : ἀμχανῶ φροντίδος στερηθεῖς—ὅπα τράπωμαι is again an example of the indirect deliberative. Notice that here the phrase ἀμχανῶ φροντίδος στερηθεῖς is a strong οὐκ οἶδα.

A good example of the purpose-construction from a later writer is Plut. *Caes.* c. 5 : οὕτω διέθηκε τὸν δῆμον, ὥς καινὰς μὲν ἀρχὰς, καινὰς δὲ τιμὰς ζητεῖν ἕκαστον, αἷς αὐτὸν ἀμείψαιεντο, unless this be deemed a Latinism.

If the MSS. are to be trusted, we sometimes have the optative of purpose, instead of the subjunctive, after primary tenses. Cf. Eur. *Alc.* 112—117 : ἀλλ' οὐδὲ ναυκληρίαν | ἔσθ' ὅποι τις—παράλυσαι (MSS. -λύσαι, Nauck -λύσει), Aesch. *Prom.* 291 sq. οὐκ ἔστιν ὅτῳ | μείζονα μοῖραν νείμαιμι ἢ σοί (cited by Jerram, *ad Eur. Alc. loc. cit.*), Aesch. *Cho.* 172 : οὐκ ἔστιν ὅστις πλὴν ἐμοῦ κείραιτό νιν (*M.* κείρετό νείν). Other examples of this construction, some emendable to the subjunctive, are given, along with instances of the optative without αἶν in direct questions, in Mr. Sidgwick's valuable Appendix I. of his edition of the *Choephoroe*.

In conclusion I add one example (there are doubtless others in Attic writers) of the relative clause of purpose after δίδωμι—Hes. *Op.* 57 sq. : τοῖς δ' ἐγὼ ἀντὶ πυρὸς δώσω κακὸν ᾧ κεν ἅπαντες—τέρπωνται κατὰ θυμὸν ἔδν κακὸν ἀμφαγαπῶντες.

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THE Ἀθηναίων Πολιτεία AND THE CHRONOLOGY OF THE YEARS 462—445.

OF the many novelties provided for us by Mr. Kenyon's papyrus, not the least startling is the assertion, that in the archonship of Conon, B.C. 462—1, Themistocles was still in Athens, awaiting his trial on a charge of medism. It has been pointed out, alike by Rühl (*Rhein. Mus.* 46, p. 426 ff.) and by Bauer (*Forschungen zu Aristoteles Ἀθηναίων πολιτεία*), that Themistocles' presence in Athens in the year 462—1 is quite irreconcilable with the received chronology of this period of Greek history; and in Bauer's work we have an elaborate attempt to revise the dates hitherto assigned to the events of the years 462—445. I observe that Mr. Kenyon, while accepting without hesitation

the statements of ch. 25 of the Ἀθηναίων πολιτεία, adheres throughout his notes to the customary dates. He puts, for instance, the battle of the Eurymedon in 466, and the reduction of Thasos in 463; he has apparently not noticed that it can be proved from Thucydides that both these events followed the ostracism of Themistocles, and must therefore be placed after 462, if we are to admit the authority of the Ἀθηναίων πολιτεία.

That the presence of Themistocles in Athens in 462 cannot be reconciled with the usual chronology will not, I imagine, be seriously disputed. It is quite another question, and a far more interesting one,