MIND

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OF

PSYCHOLOGY AND PHILOSOPHY

I.—REALITY AND THE CRITERION FOR THE TRUTH OF IDEAS.

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AMONG the influences that have worked in contemporary philosophy towards disintegration of intellectualism of the epistemological type, and towards the substitution of a philosophy of experience, the work of Mr. Bradley must be seriously counted. One has, for example, only to compare his metaphysics with the two fundamental contentions of T. H. Green, namely, that reality is a single, eternal and all-inclusive system of relations, and that this system of relations is essentially one with that process of relating which constitutes our thinking, to be instantly aware of a changed atmosphere, and to call to mind how much of Bradley's writings is a sustained and deliberate polemic against intellectualism of the Neo-Kantian type. When, however, we find conjoined with this criticism an equally sustained contention that the philosophic conception of reality must be wholly based on an exclusively intellectual criterion, a criterion belonging to and confined to theory, we have a situation as perplexing as it is thought-provoking. The situation grows in interest when it is remembered that there is a general and growing tendency among those who appeal in philosophy to a strictly intellectualistic method of defining reality, to insist that the reality thus reached is itself no more rational in character than it is volitional (or an affair of purpose) or than it is a case of pure and immediate sentience: or, more strictly, that the intellectual, affectional and volitional features are, in 'ultimate' reality,

qualitatively transformed by some process of mutual absorption and reciprocal fusion. This, then, is the curious character of the situation: Reality is an 'absolute experience' in which the intellectual as such is simply one transmuted moment; yet this reality is attained unto, in philosophic method, by exclusive emphasis upon the intellectual aspect of present experience and by systematic exclusion of exactly the emotional, volitional features which with respect to content are insisted upon! Under such circumstances the cynically-minded are moved to wonder whether this tremendous insistence upon one factor in present experience at the expense of others, is not because this is the only way to maintain the notion of 'Absolute Experience,' and to prevent it from collapsing into ordinary every-day experience. In any case the thesis I wish to maintain is that Mr. Bradley's Absolute Experience, resting ultimately upon a rationalistic conception of the criterion of truth, is a temporary half-way house into which travellers from the territory of Kantian epistemology may temporarily turn aside in their journey towards the land of a philosophy of every-day experience.

First let us set before ourselves the general points of Mr. Bradley's indictment of intellectualism.¹ Knowledge or judgment works by means of thought. It is predication of idea (meaning) of reality as its subject. Its final aim is to effect a complete union or harmony of existence and meaning. But it is fore-doomed to failure, for in realising its end it must employ means which contradict its own purpose. This inherent incapacity lurks in judgment with respect to subject, predicate and copula. The predicate or meaning necessary to complete the reality presented in the subject can be referred to the latter and united with it only by being itself alienated from existence. It heals the wounds or deficiencies of its own subject (and in the end all deficiencies are to Mr. Bradley discrepancies) only on condition of inflicting another wound,—only by sundering meaning from a prior union with existence in some other phase. This latter existence, therefore, is always left out in the cold. It is as if we wanted to get all the cloth in the world into one garment and our only way of accomplishing this were to tear off a portion from one piece of goods in order to patch it on to another.

The subject of the judgment, as well as the predicate,

¹ I follow chiefly chapter xv. of *Appearance and Reality*—the chapter on "Thought and Reality".

stands in the way of the judgment's fulfilling its own task. It has "sensuous infinitude" and it has "immediacy," but these two traits contradict each other. The details of the subject always go beyond itself, being indefinitely related to something beyond. "In its given content it has relations which do not terminate within that content" (*ibid.*, p. 176), but in its immediacy it presents an undivided union of existence and meaning. No subject can be mere existence any more than it can be mere meaning. It is always existent or embodied meaning. As such it claims individuality or the character of a single subsistent whole. But this indispensable claim is inconsistent with its ragged-edged character, its indefinite external reference, which is indispensable to it as subject that it may require and receive further meaning from predication.

With respect to the copula the following quotation from the *Principles of Logic* (p. 10) may serve: "Judgment proper is the act which refers the ideal content (recognised as such) to the reality beyond the act". In other words, judgment as act (and it is the act which I take it is expressed in the copula) must always fall outside of the content of knowledge as such; yet since this act certainly falls within reality, it would have to be recognised and stated by any knowledge pretending to competency with respect to reality as a whole.¹

From every point of view, then, knowledge operates under conditions, and these not externally imposed but inherent in its own nature as judgment, which render it incapable of realising its aim of complete union of existence and meaning. Granted the argument, and it is difficult to imagine a more serious indictment against the pretensions of philosophy to reach reality *via* the exclusive path of knowledge.

The presence of contradiction is Mr. Bradley's criterion for "appearance," just as its absence is his criterion for "reality". It thus goes without saying that knowledge and truth (as fulfilment of the specific function of knowledge) are matters of appearance. This is not merely a logical deduction from Mr. Bradley's position, but is expressly

¹ Possibly added interest attaches to this last dilemma because Bradley seems to conceive of this act as essentially psychical in nature. It would be interesting to have more explicit details as to just how judgment as psychical act manages to keep house with judgment as logical content. We appear to have here either the postulate of a miracle, namely that a purely psychical somewhat gets outside of itself to perform an act which takes effect entirely in the region beyond itself, or else we have a position which logically developed leads to pure subjectivism. It would be interesting to know just how Mr. Bradley conceives this result of pure scepticism to be avoided.

stated by him. "Thus the truth belongs to existence, but it does not as such exist. . . . Truth shows a dissection but never an actual life" (*Appearance and Reality*, p. 167). Again, "every truth is appearance since in it we have divorce of quality from being" (*ibid.*, p. 187). "Even absolute truth seems in the end to turn out erroneous. . . . Internal discrepancy belongs irremovably to truth's proper character. . . . Truth is one aspect of experience and is therefore made imperfect and limited by what it fails to include" (*ibid.*, pp. 544-545). Nothing could be more explicit as to the inherently contradictory character of truth, both as an ideal and as an accomplished fact; nothing more positive as to the unreality or appearance-character of truth.

Moreover there is ground for holding not merely that knowledge itself is inherently discrepant and thus in the realm of 'appearance,' but that the existence anywhere of self-contradiction and thus of appearance, is always due to the process of knowing: that the burden of the very existence of appearance as distinct from reality has to be borne by the intellectual function. Speaking of thought he says: "The relational form is a compromise on which thought stands and which it develops". And all the particular antinomies which he discusses are interpreted as having their basis in the category of relation (*ibid.*, p. 180). In his section on Appearance he goes through various *de facto* aspects and distinctions of the world, such as primary and secondary qualities, the relation of substance to its properties, the matter of relation to qualitative elements, space and time, motion and change, causation, etc., pointing out irreconcilable discrepancies in them. He does not, in a *generalised* way, expressly refer them to any common source or root. But it seems to be a fair inference that it is the relational character of thought which is at the bottom of the whole trouble: so that we have in the cases mentioned realised *in concreto* precisely the same situation which is set forth *in abstracto* in the discussion of thought. The contradictions brought up are in every case resolvable into the fundamental discrepancy supposed to exist between relation and the elements which are related. In each case there is the ideal of a final unity in which relations and elements as such disappear, while in every case the elements and the relation are so related as to prevent the desired consummation. In at least one place, it is expressly declared that it is the knowledge function which is responsible for the degradation of reality to appearance. "We do not suggest that the thing always itself is an appearance. We mean its character is

such *that it becomes one as soon as we judge it*. And this character we have seen throughout our work, is ideality. Appearance consists in the looseness of content from existence. . . . And we have found that everywhere throughout the world such ideality prevails" (*ibid.*, p. 486, italics not in the original).

I have no respect for proof-text methods, and I should certainly not quote these selected passages did they not seem to be conspicuously representative of the tenor—and the fundamental difficulty—of the whole position. On the one hand, as I have said, there is a systematic discrediting of the ultimate claims of the knowledge function, and this not from external physiological or psychological reasons such as are sometimes alleged against its capacity, but on the basis of its own interior logic. But on the other hand we find the strictly logical criterion deliberately stated and employed as the fundamental and final criterion for the philosophic conception of reality. Long familiarity has not dulled my astonishment at finding exactly the same set of considerations which in the earlier portion of the book are employed to condemn reality as experienced by us to the region of Appearance, employed in the latter portion of the book to afford a triumphant demonstration of the existence and general character of Absolute Reality. The argument I shall take up first on its formal side and then with reference to material considerations.¹

The positive conception of reality is reached on the basis of the conception that "ultimate reality must be such that it does not contradict itself; here is an absolute criterion. And it is proved absolute by the fact that either in endeavouring to deny it or even in attempting to doubt it, we tacitly assume its validity" (*ibid.*, pp. 136-137). That is to say when one sets out to think one must avoid self-contradiction; this avoidance, or, put positively, the attainment of consistency, harmony, is the basic law of all thinking. Since in thinking we set out to attain reality, this implies that reality itself must be self-consistent, and that its self-consistency determines the law of thought. Or, as Mr. Bradley again puts the matter, "In order to think at all you must subject yourself to the standard, a standard which implies an absolute knowledge of reality; and while you doubt this, you accept it, and obey, while you rebel" (*ibid.*, p. 153). The absolute knowledge referred to is, of course,

¹The crux of the argument is contained in chapters xiii. and xiv., on the General Nature of Reality.

the knowledge of the thoroughly self-consistent, non-contradictory character of reality. Every reader of Mr. Bradley's book knows how he goes on from this point to supply positive content to reality ; to give an outline sketch of the characters it must possess and the way in which it must possess them in order to maintain its thoroughly self-consistent character. It is, however, only the strictly formal aspect of the matter that I am at first concerned with.

On this side we reach, I think, the heart of the matter by asking, in reference to the first quotation : *Absolute for what ?* Surely absolute for the process under consideration, that is absolute for thought. But the significance of this absolute for thought is, one may say, "absolutely" (since we are here confessedly in the realm just of thought) determined by the nature of thought itself. Now this nature has been already referred by considerations "belonging irremovably to truth's proper character," to the world of appearance and of internal discrepancy. The further observation that a method, involving inherent self-contradiction, has a certain postulate involves, logically, the self-contradictory character of that postulate. It can only sum up the contradiction scattered through concrete thinkings. Accordingly the fact that thought as such has an absolute criterion is just one proof the more of thought's zealous and unremitting activity in the cause of evolving mere ideality—disruption of meaning from existence. Yes, one may say, the criterion of thought is absolute—that is to say absolute or final for thought ; but how can one imagine that this in any way alters the essential nature and value of thought ? If knowledge works by thought, and thought institutes appearance over against reality, any further fact about thought—such as a statement of its criterion—falls in its import wholly within these limits. It is comical to suppose that a special trait of thought can be employed to alter radically the fundamental and essential nature of thought. The criterion of thought must be infected by the nature of thought, instead of being a redeeming angel which at a critical juncture can transform its fallen character.

There really seems to be ground for supposing that the whole argument turns on an ambiguity in the use of the word "absolute". Keeping strictly within the limits of the argument, it means nothing more than that thinking has a certain principle, a law of its own ; that it has an appropriate mode of procedure which must not be violated. It means, in short, finally controlling for the thought-function. But Mr. Bradley immediately takes the word to mean

absolute in the sense of describing a reality which by its very nature is totally contradistinguished from appearance—that is to say, from the realm of thought. Upon the ambiguity of a word, the systematic indictment of intellectualism becomes the corner-stone of a systematically intellectualistic method of conceiving reality!

Mr. Bradley, it may be said, has recognised this difficulty and adequately disposed of it. He takes up, for example, this question: "Why is the theoretical to be superior to the practical end? I have never said that this is so, only *here*, that is in *metaphysics*, I must be allowed to reply, we are acting theoretically. . . . The *theoretical standard within theory must surely be absolute*" (p. 153). The italics again are mine; compare with the quotation this, from p. 485: "Our attitude, however, in metaphysics must be theoretical". So, also, p. 154, "Since metaphysics is mere theory and since theory from its nature must be made by the intellect, it is here the intellect alone which is to be satisfied"). Once more, very well; but if the incapacity of theory to reach anything beyond the realm of appearance has already been established, how does the supremacy of the theoretical standard within theory, prove anything more than that the standard of thought is infected with the same self-contradictory nature that troubles thought itself? The elaborate structure of absolute experience, perfect, unchanging, all-inclusive, is, from the logical point of view, simply another example of the appearance-character of knowledge products; it simply shows how far thought can go in the perpetuation of internal discrepancies. It is quite true, as Mr. Bradley says (p. 153), that if a man sits down to play the metaphysical game, he must abide by the rules of thinking; but if thinking be already, with respect to reality, an idle and futile game, simply abiding by the rules does not give additional value to its stakes. Grant the premises as to the character of thought, and the assertion of the final character of the theoretical standard within metaphysics—since metaphysics is a form of theory—is a warning against metaphysics. If the intellect involves self-contradiction, it is either impossible that it should be satisfied, or else self-contradiction is its satisfaction.

The transition from the purely formal to the material side of the discussion is made by realising that while Mr. Bradley declares that the standard of consistency in itself is "but formal and abstract" (p. 144); that in itself it is "mere theoretical consistency" (p. 147), yet it is this "theoretical consistency" which "guarantees that reality is a self-con-

sistent system" (p. 148). The gist of the argument is that since thought demands self-consistency, absolute reality must be something in which all the discrepancies, deficiencies, loose ends, etc., of actual experience are found built into perfect unity. The argument is from the formal consistency of thinking to the material consistency of all the constituents of reality.¹

Now if we remember the prior declarations that thought is and must be self-discrepant in its workings, we find a highly suggestive situation presented to us. Reality, in Mr. Bradley's philosophy, appears twice over; it enacts different *roles*. On the one hand, it presents itself as an Absolute, ultimate reality, an eternal and all-inclusive experience; on the other hand, it presents itself as "*our* experience," as something riddled with discrepancies, everywhere at odds with itself, or as Appearance. Recall that this Jekyll-Hyde conception of reality is the result of the attempt to define reality on the basis of a purely theoretical standard, "*the intellect alone*," and the situation seems made to order as an illustration of the theory of the self-contradictory character of thought, *vis.*, the persistent alienating of existence and meaning in the very effort to unite them. What is reality in its absolute character except the meaning-function taken *in toto*, once for all? What is the appearance-character except the existence aspect taken in an equally wholesale way?

The intellectualism of Mr. Bradley's philosophy is well represented in the statement that it is "the theoretical standard which guarantees that reality is a self-consistent system" (p. 148). It is the use of a strictly theoretical criterion as a basis for ascribing in guaranteed fashion a certain character to reality which is the point at issue. But how can the fact that the criterion of thinking is consistency be employed to determine the nature of the consistency in question? Consistency in one sense, consistency of reasoning with itself, we know; but what is the nature of the consistency in reality to which this consistency refers? Thinking without doubt must be logical; but does it follow from that that the reality about which one thinks, and about which one must think consistently if one is to think to any purpose, must itself be already logical? The pivot of the argument is, of course, the old ontological argument, stripped of all theological irrelevancies and reduced to its fighting weight as a metaphysical proposition.

¹ I am relieved from dealing with this problem in itself by the thoroughness with which it has already been considered in *MIND* by Prof. Sidgwick and Mr. Knox, see Nos. 53 and 54, N.S.

Those who question this basic principle of intellectualism in all its forms will, of course, question it here. They will urge instead of consistency in reality resting on the basis of consistency in the reasoning process that the latter derives its meaning from the material consistency at which it aims. They will say that the definition of the nature of the consistency which is the end of thinking and which prescribes its technique is to be reached from inquiry into such questions as these: What sort of an activity in the concrete is thinking? what are the specific conditions which it has to fulfil? what is its use; its relevancy; its purport in present concrete experiences? They will claim that to use the requirement of non-contradiction in thought as a basis for inferring the non-contradictory nature of reality, while the character of reality is then employed in order to make thought something more than merely formal, to give it a content of its own independent of other functions of life, is to offer us a begging of the question in lieu of its solution. The more it is insisted that the theoretical standard—consistency—is final within theory, the more germane and the more urgent is the question: What then in the concrete is theory? and of what nature is the real consistency which is the test of its formal consistency?¹

With all our heart, the standard of thinking is absolute (that is final) within thinking, but what is thinking? The standard of black-smithing must be absolute within black-smithing, but what is black-smithing? No prejudice prevents acknowledging that black-smithing is one practical activity existing as a distinct and relevant member of a larger system of such activities: that it is because men use horses to transport persons and goods that horses need to be shod; and that the ultimate criterion of black-smithing is producing a good shoe. In this case, it is easily seen that the ultimate character of the end for the operation is proper evidence that the operation itself is not ultimate, but relative

¹ This suggests that many of the stock arguments against pragmatism fail to take its contention seriously enough. They proceed from the assumption that it is an account of truth which leaves untouched current notions of the nature of intelligence and of intellectual statements, positions, ideas, etc. But the essential point of pragmatism is that it bases its changed account of truth on a changed conception of the nature of intelligence, both as to its objective and its method. Now this different account of intelligence may be wrong, but controversy which leaves standing the conventionally current theories about thought and ideas and merely discusses 'truth' will not go far. Since truth is the adequate fulfilment of the function of intelligence, it is clear the whole question turns on the nature of the latter.

and instrumental. Is there anything in the logic of the case which excludes analogous ideas holding good for the function of thinking and hence for its criterion, consistency? It may be that the contradictions which, according to Mr. Bradley, inhere in thought, do not belong to it in its proper character, taken in its real connexions with other functions of experience; but are found in it because it has been looked at wrongly; because it has been made unreal by isolation.

It is then the positive object of this paper to show the interpretation to be put upon the ideas of inconsistency, harmony, etc., with respect to thought, when this is not isolated, but taken in its nature, place and workings within experience. Since the difficulty of Mr. Bradley has turned out to be that thought can be made supreme only by isolating it, and that when isolated all its processes and results are found to be infected, tainted, with self-contradictions, it would seem, even on formal grounds, to be the part of wisdom to change the point of view, the underlying hypothesis, and to see what becomes of its work and of the criterion for the well doing of that work, when thought is regarded as serviceable, and hence as organically linked with other modes of practice.

Let us then start from another supposition. Let us assume that among real objects in their values and significances, real oppositions and incompatibilities exist; that these conflicts are both troublesome in themselves, and the source of all manner of further difficulties—so much so that they may be suspected of being the source of all man's woe, of all encroachment upon and destruction of value, of the good. Suppose that thinking is, not accidentally, but essentially a way, and the only way which proves adequate, of dealing with these predicaments—that, in short, being "in a hole," in difficulties, is the fundamental 'predicament' of intelligence. Suppose that effort is made in a brute way to remove these oppositions and to secure that arrangement of things which means satisfaction, fulfilment, happiness. This state of things would clearly mean harmony. Suppose, once more, the method of brute attack, of trying directly to force warrings into peace were to fail; and there were then effort to effect the transformation by an indirect method—by inquiry into the disordered state of affairs and by framing views, conceptions, of what the situation would be like if it were reduced to harmonious order. Finally, suppose that upon this basis a plan of action to be worked out, and that this plan when carried into overt effect succeeded infinitely better than the brute method of attack in bringing about the

desired consummation. Suppose again this indirection of activity is precisely what we mean by thinking. Would it not hold that harmony is the end and the test of thinking? that observations are pertinent and ideas correct just in so far as, overtly acted upon, they succeed in removing the undesirable, the inconsistent, and in securing fulfilment?

This conception of thinking and its test may not be valid; that is not the point here at issue. The question is whether it is not a possible, reasonable alternative hypothesis concerning the nature, the criterion and correct procedure of thinking. Is there anything in the fact that consistency is a final criterion for thinking which renders self-contradictory such an interpretation of the meaning of consistency? Until otherwise informed, one must insist that the fact that the criterion of thinking is consistency cannot be employed to validate one special definition of consistency and to rule out another special definition.

But, it is said, the very process of thinking makes a certain assumption regarding the nature of reality; *viz.*, that reality is self-consistent. This statement, to my mind, involves a subtle confusion of two different ideas. Thinking in the concrete is certainly an assumption regarding reality; thinking in the concrete also assumes consistency as its own criterion. But why should the assumption regarding reality be other than that the specific realities with which thought is concerned are *capable of receiving* harmonisation? To say that thought must assume, in order to go on, that reality already possesses harmony is to say that thought must begin by contradicting its own direct data, and by assuming that its concrete aim is vain and illusory; it puts upon thought the onus of introducing discrepancies into reality in order just to give itself exercise in the gymnastic of removing them. The assumption which concrete thinking makes about reality is that reality in its achieved form is such that, *through activity guided by thinking*, it may *acquire* a certain character which it is excellent for it to possess; and may acquire it more liberally and effectively than by other methods. One might as well say that the blacksmith could not think to any effect concerning iron, without a Platonic archetypal horseshoe, laid up in the heavens. His thinking makes an assumption about present, given reality, to the effect that this piece of iron, through the exercise of intelligently directed activity, may be shaped into a satisfactory horseshoe. What stands out here is that the assumption is *practical*: the assumption that a specific reality may take on in a specific way a specific needed value. Moreover, the

test of this assumption is practical, consisting in acting upon it to see if it will do what it pretends it can do, namely guide the activities to the required result. The assumption about reality is not something in addition to the idea, which an idea already in existence makes; the assumption about reality is the idea and this assumption is that reality may through certain activities secure its own harmonisation.

These remarks have a two-fold purpose. They are intended to show that the fact that consistency is a criterion of thinking does not solve but poses the problem of its nature, and to suggest that recourse to the concrete facts of experience indicates that consistency is practical in nature.¹

As an illustration of the specific as distinct from the 'at large' way of defining consistency, let us take the example of the man who wishes to deny the criterion of self-consistency in thinking. Is he refuted by pointing to the 'fact' that eternal reality is eternally self-consistent? Would not his obvious answer to such a mode of refutation be: "What of it? What is the relevancy of that proposition to my procedure in thinking here and now? Doubtless absolute reality may be a great number of things, possibly very sublime and precious things; but what I am concerned with is a particular job of thinking, and until you show me the intermediate terms which link that job to the asserted self-consistent character of absolute reality, I fail to see what difference this doubtless wholly amiable trait of reality has to do with what I am here and now concerned with. You might as well quote any other irrelevant fact, such as the height of the Empress of China." We take another tack in dealing with the man in question. We call his attention to his specific aim in the situation with reference to which he is thinking, and point out the conditions that have to be observed if that aim is to fulfil itself. We show that if he does not observe the conditions which his aim imposes his thinking will go on so wildly as to defeat itself. It is con-

¹Mr. Bradley has very properly attacked the conception of 'mere practice' or "the abstraction of activity and of function from the quality of its object" (*MIND* "On Truth and Practice," vol. xiii., p. 25). Very properly, that is, if there be any one anywhere who entertains any such notion of "practice" and "practical". It appears, however, to be such a thoroughly intellectualistic construction, such an obvious abstraction, that I cannot believe any empiricist has ever entertained it. As an indication of what I understand by the term "practical," and as an indication also that I have not modified my views simply in order to meet criticism, I may venture to quote from myself: "By practical I mean only regulated change in experienced values" (*Logical Conditions of a Scientific Treatment of Morality*, p. 10).

sistency of means and end in the concrete activity that we appeal to. "Try on thinking," we tell such a man, "experiment with it, taking pains sometimes to have your reasonings consistent with one another, while at other times you deliberately introduce inconsistencies; then see what you get in the two cases and how the result reached is related to your purpose in thinking." We point out that since that purpose is always to harmonise the conflicting elements of some situation through their own reorganisation, that purpose will be defeated unless the steps of reasoning are kept consistent with one another. We do not appeal from the mere consistency of the reasoning process—the intellectual aspect of the matter—to an absolute self-consistent reality; but we appeal from the material character of the end to be reached to the character of the formal procedure necessary to accomplish it.

Consider, for example, the nature of the collision, incompatibility, etc., which, according to Mr. Bradley, supplies the immediate and empirical antecedent materials over against which thought gives us the conception of a completely harmonised reality. Mr. Bradley goes so far away from intellectualism as to put the following words into the mouth of the objector, and to accept their general import: "All axioms, as a matter of fact, are practical . . . for none of them in the end can amount to more than the impulse to behave in a certain way. And they cannot express more than this impulse, together with the impossibility of satisfaction unless it is complied with" (p. 51). After accepting this (p. 152) he goes on to say: "Take for example the law of avoiding contradiction. When two elements will not remain quietly together, but collide and struggle, we cannot rest satisfied with that state. Our impulse is to alter it and, on the theoretical side, to bring the content to such shape that the variety remains peaceably in one. And this inability to rest otherwise and this tendency to alter in a certain way and direction is, *when reflected upon and made explicit*, our axiom and our intellectual standard (p. 152; italics mine).

Now as against this pragmatic statement (which, with the exception of one phrase to which I shall momentarily return, could hardly be bettered) Mr. Bradley has seemingly nothing to offer save that the intellect is "a movement of a very special kind". "Thinking is an attempt to satisfy a special impulse, and the attempt implies an assumption about reality" (p. 153). And then comes the sentence which we have quoted above to the effect that all thinking involves the assumption of the standard of consistency which is absolute for it.

Granted that intellect is a special movement or mode of practice ; granted that we are not merely acting (are we ever *merely* acting?) but are "specially occupied and therefore subject to special conditions," the problem remains *what* special kind of activity is thinking? what is its experienced differentia from other kinds? what is its commerce with them? When the problem is *what* special kind of an activity is thinking and of *what* nature is the consistency which is its criterion, somehow we do not get forward by being told that thinking is a special mode of practice and that its criterion is consistency. The unquestioned presupposition of Mr. Bradley is that thinking is such a wholly separate activity (the "*intellect alone*" which has to be satisfied), that to say it has autonomy is to say that it, and its criterion, have nothing to do with other activities ; that it is 'independent,' as to criterion, in a way which excludes interdependence in function and outcome. Unless the term "special" be interpreted in this sense, it is no more an answer to the contention that thinking is essentially a practical activity to say that it is a *special* mode of activity, than it would be to say that black-smithing is not an industrial activity because its end is the *special* one of making horseshoes. His underlying presupposition of the separate character of thought comes out in the passage last quoted. "Our impulse," he says, "is to alter the conflicting situation and, *on the theoretical side*, to bring its contents into peaceable unity." If one substitutes for the word "on" the word "through," one gets a conception of theory and of thinking, which does justice to the autonomy of the operation and yet so connects it with other activities as to give it a serious business, real purpose and concrete responsibility and hence testibility. From this point of view the theoretical activity is simply the form which certain practical activities take after colliding, as the most effective and fruitful way of securing their own harmonisation. The collision is not theoretical ; the issue in "peaceable unity" is not theoretical. But theory names the type of activity by which the transformation from war to peace is most amply and securely effected.¹

¹The same point comes out in Mr. Bradley's treatment of the way in which the practical demand for the good or satisfaction is to be taken account of in a philosophical conception of the nature of reality. He admits that it comes in ; but holds that this is not directly, but because if left outside it indirectly introduces a feature of "discontent" on the intellectual side (see p. 155). This, as an argument for the supremacy of the isolated theoretical standard, loses all its force if we cease

What is the use of insisting that thought takes its *logical* departure from resting back on reality as already an eternal, all-inclusive harmony, when at the same time it has to be asserted that thinking takes its *actual* departure from the fact that elements in our experience collide and struggle with each other? Suppose that instead of starting from a purely theoretical presumption we start from the experienced facts, namely, their collision and struggle. How is this to be understood? Is it something purely objective in either a physical or a logical sense? If so, who are the "we" who cannot rest satisfied with this state but endeavour to alter it? ("We cannot rest satisfied, *our* impulse," etc.) What has this "we" to do with the matter; how did it get implicated in a purely physical or intellectual collision? And even if it were implicated, how could it successfully interfere so as to induce peace and rest? If the collision is objective, in the physical sense, can an ego take any part in the matter? If the collision is of logical contents, is the ego also to be logically interpreted? If so, how can an extraneous logical factor interfere to any advantage? And if it is not intellectual, and the intellectual is always, logically, merely independent, how can this "we" intervene save to the undoing of the logical?

It is perhaps suggestive of caricature to suppose that the intellectualist regards the collision in question as of a physical nature—something like the eruption of Vesuvius, the explosion of a powder magazine on board ship, or the beating of hail-stones on a wheat-field. Yet the intellectualist's aversion to all change—his insistence that the temporal and transitive are not metaphysically real; his assumption that "fleeting and untrue character is perpetually forced upon our notice by the hard fact of change" (p. 460) and that "the absolute has no history of its own, for nothing perfect, nothing genuinely real can move" (pp. 499-500), seem to bear out that supposition. If such be the case, theory, of course, cannot practically intervene; it is condemned to the impotence of a merely theoretical intervention: that is, it can only proclaim the supreme reality of an Absolute Experience which we can neither experience nor employ as a criterion of specific thoughts and beliefs. It can only indulge itself in a purely metaphysical theory of what reality would be if it were totally different from what it is, consoling itself for

to conceive of the intellect as from the start an independent function, and realise that intellectual discontent is the practical conflict becoming deliberately aware of itself and of its purport as the most effective means of its own rectification.

its impotency with the reflection that this totally different reality is eternal and absolute.

If the collision be not objective in the physical sense, possibly it is such in the logical sense. But this alternative is open to grave difficulties. How can logical contents as such collide? Not as truths, for it is the very nature of truths to be consistent with each other; not as falsities, for recognised or detected falsities certainly do not collide, the fact that a certain thing is false being obviously consistent with the proposition that something else is true. Nor can falsities collide as unrecognised; if they did, we should from the start be aware of all errors and mistakes, instead of only in retrospect. Just as the "collisions" of physical things have significance for thought only as these things are so involved in a system of practical activities that their mal-adjustments mean disturbance and defeat of purpose, so theoretic collision is impossible save as the contents defined as logical lead to inconsistent and ambiguous responses. In short, on the face of the facts, the one intelligible theory about the struggles which induce theoretical activity is that they are practical; disturbances in the activities which sustain a system of values, involving disruption and instability in the experiencing of those values.¹

Reference to the concrete situation also serves to explain the nature of the consistency in which is found the test of the validity of an idea. This consistency is the agreeing together of the exact or specific elements which in their collision with one another set the problem of thinking. As attained harmony, it is proof of the value of the idea; for it proves that the idea 'knows what it is about,' that it is 'on to its job'. It is in no way a harmony at large or *überhaupt*, a miscellaneous altogether, but a harmonising of just

¹ The difficulties usually brought against this view on the ground of 'science,' have their source, I think, in the following conditions: (1) The objector puts himself at the standpoint of the final results of scientific inquiry, instead of calling up cases of the stress and strain of scientific procedure still in the throes of development; (2) he overlooks the fact that every branch of science means highly specialised and refined modes of response, associated with specific types of value which the 'plain man' does not entertain; (3) he overlooks the fact that these highly refined types of reaction mean a new sensitiveness, and hence increased awareness of disturbance, of menaced organisation, where the 'plain man' is aware only of stability—in short, that problems multiply with development of scientific aim and technique; (4) he overlooks the fact that such highly specialised recognition of discrepancy on the basis of highly specialised modes of technical reaction have a final usufruct even for the plain man in making more secure, more fruitful, and, especially, more liberal and free, his responses to the ordinary things of his experience.

the elements that is needed to be brought into agreement, a harmonising through the capacity of the idea to instigate and guide a mode of behaviour calculated to complete the incomplete. Strictly speaking, it is this reorganising capacity which is the criterion of the truth of the ideas. Since, however, that faculty is demonstrated in the final harmony achieved, this last term may be fairly enough regarded as the criterion of the worth of an idea, provided we bear in mind just what we mean.

I confess to being much at a loss to realise just what the intellectualist conceives to be the relation of truth to ideas on one side and to reality on the other. My difficulty occurs, I think, because they describe and define so little in analytical detail; in writing of truth they seem rather to be under a strong emotional influence—as if they were victims of an uncritical pragmatism—which leaves much of their thought to be guessed at. The implication of their discussions assigns three distinct values to the term “truth”. On the one hand, truth, is something which characterises ideas, theories, hypotheses, beliefs, judgments, propositions, assertions, etc.,—that is anything whatsoever so far as involving *intellectual* statement. From this standpoint a criterion of truth means the test of the worth of the intellectual intent, import or claim of any intellectual statement as intellectual. This is an intelligible and to me the only intelligible sense of the term truth. In the second place, it seems to be assumed that a certain kind of reality is already, prior to, apart from ideas or meanings, truth, and that it is *this* Truth or Reality which is the criterion of that lower and more unworthy kind of truth which can be possessed or aimed at by ideas. But we do not stop here. The conception that *all* truth must have a criterion haunts the intellectualist, so that the reality, which, as contrasted with ideas however valid, is taken to be The Truth (and the criterion of such truth as intellectual statements may aspire to) is treated as if it itself had to have support and warrant from some other Reality, lying back of it, which is *its* criterion. This, then, gives the third type of truth, *The Absolute Truth*. (Just why this process should not go on indefinitely is not clear, but the necessity of infinite regress may be emotionally prevented by always referring to this last type of truth as Absolute.) Now this scheme may be “true,” but it is not self-explanatory nor even easily apprehensible. In just what sense, common, yet different, truth is (1) that to which ideas as ideas lay claim and yet is (2) Reality which as reality is the criterion of truth of ideas, and yet again is (3) a Reality

which completely annuls and transcends all reference to ideas, is not in the least clear to me: nor, till better informed, shall I believe it is clear to any one.

In his more strictly logical discussions, Mr. Bradley sets out from the notion that truth refers to intellectual statements and positions as such. But The Truth soon becomes a sort of transcendent essence on its own account. The identification of reality and truth on page 146 may be a mere casual phrase, but the distinction drawn between validity and absolute truth (p. 362), and the discussion of Degrees of Truth and Reality, involve assumptions of an identity of truth and reality. Truth in this sense turns out to be the criterion for the truth, the truth, that is, of ideas. But, again (p. 545), a distinction is made between "Finite Truth," that is a view of reality which would completely satisfy intelligence as such, and "Absolute Truth" which is obtained only by *passing beyond intelligence*—only when intelligence is absorbed in some Absolute in which it loses its distinctive character.

It would advance the state of discussion, I am sure, if there were more explicit statements regarding the relations of "true idea," "truth," "the criterion of truth" and "reality" to one another. A more explicit exposition also of the view that is held concerning the relation of verification and truth could hardly fail to be of value. Not infrequently the intellectualist admits that the process of verification is experimental, consisting in setting on foot various activities which express the intent of the idea and confirm or refute it according to the changes effected. This seems to mean that truth is simply the tested or verified idea as such. But then a curious reservation is introduced; the experimental process *finds*, it is said, that the idea is true, while the error of the pragmatist is to take the process by which truth is *found* as one by which it is made. The claim of 'making truth' is treated as blasphemy against the very notion of truth: such are the consequences of venturing to translate the Latin "verification" into the English "making true".

If we face the bogie thus called up, it will be found that the horror is largely sentimental. Suppose we stick to the notion that truth is a character that defines an idea so far as it is tested through the action which carries to successful completion its own intent. In this case, to make an idea true is to modify and transform it until it can stand this test: until it can initiate a mode of response which in its issue realises its claim to be the intention and the method of harmonising the discrepancies of a given situation. The idea is remade by constant acting upon its meaning, and by

introducing into its content such characters as are indicated by any resulting failures to secure harmony. From this point of view verification and truth are two names for the same thing. We call it "verification" when we regard it as process; when the development of the idea is strung out and exposed to view in all that makes it true. We call it "truth" when we take it as product, as process telescoped and condensed.

Suppose the idea to be an invention, say of the telephone. In this case, is not the verification of the idea as it stood in some one's head and the construction of the device which carries out its intent one and the same? In this case, does the truth of the idea mean anything else than that the issue proves the idea can be carried into effect? There are certain intellectualists who are not of the absolutist type; who do not believe that all men's aims, designs, projects, which have to do with action, whether industrial, social or moral in scope, have been from all eternity registered as already accomplished in reality. How do such persons dispose of this problem of the truth of practical ideas?

Is not the truth of such ideas wholly an affair of *making* them true by constructing, through appropriate behaviour, the condition of affairs which satisfies the requirement of the idea? If, in this case, truth means the effective capacity of the idea 'to make good,' what is there in the logic of the case to forbid the application of analogous considerations to any idea?

I hear a noise in the street. It suggests as its meaning a street-car. To test this idea I go to the window and through listening and looking intently—the listening and the looking being modes of behaviour—organise into a single situation previously disconnected, yet *hypothetically* connected, elements of existence and meaning. In this way an idea is made true; that which was proposition or hypothesis is no longer merely a propounding or a guess. If I had not reacted in a way appropriate to the idea it would have remained a mere idea; at most a candidate for truth which, unless acted upon upon the spot, would have always remained a theory. Now in such a case—where the end to be accomplished is the discovery of a certain order of facts—would the intellectualist claim that apart from the forming and entertaining of some idea, the category of truth has either existence or meaning? Will he claim that without an original practical uneasiness introducing a practical aim of inquiry there must have been, whether or no, an idea? Must the world for some purely intellectual reason be intel-

lectually viewed and characterised in every conceivable respect from every conceivable point of view? Could not that occurrence which I now identify as a noisy street-car have so far as pure intelligence is concerned retained its unidentified status of being mere physical alteration in a vast unidentified complex of matter-in-motion? Was there any intellectual ground which compelled it to be identified as just this definite thing—namely, a noisy street-car? If so, why should it not also have to be characterised in countless millions of other ways; for example, as to its distance from some crater in the moon, or its effect upon the circulation of my blood, or upon my irascible neighbour's temper, or its bearing upon the Monroe Doctrine? In short, do not intellectual positions and statements mean a new and significant fact in the development of reality?

Excepting then where the situation itself suggests some aim or intent beyond itself as existence, is there ever an idea? Is it just existence as existence which determines the further presence of ideas, or is it the occurrence and maintenance of an end transcending the already existent? And even if it be supposed that all existences in all their inconceivable complexity *have* to mirror themselves in ideas, what is truth? Is it reality apart from its ideational version? If so, what has truth to do with ideas and ideas with truth? Or if it is a property of ideas in relation to reality, is it their property so far as mirroring? Or does it belong to them with respect to changes they intend introducing into reality? Is not truth something to be achieved by an idea and something which can be achieved only through an activity which is neither a part of reality already existent nor a part of the idea conceived merely as intellectual?

It is perhaps dangerous to attempt to follow the inner workings of the processes by which truth is first identified with some superior type of Reality, and then this Truth is taken as the criterion of the truth of ideas; while all the time it is held that truth is something already possessed by ideas as purely intellectual. But there seems to be some ground for believing that this identification is due to a two-fold confusion, one having to do with idea, and the other with reality. As to the first point: After an idea is made true, we naturally say, in retrospect, 'it *was* true all the time'. Now this truism is quite innocuous as a truism, being just a restatement of the fact that the idea has, as matter of fact, worked successfully. But it may be regarded not as a truism but as furnishing some additional knowledge, as if it were, indeed, the dawning of a revelation regarding

truth. Then it is said that the idea worked or was verified because it was already inherently, just as idea, the truth, the pragmatist, so it is said, making the error of supposing that it is true because it works. If one remembers that what the experimentalist means is that the effective working of an idea and its truth are one and the same thing—this working being neither the cause nor the evidence of truth but its nature—it is hard to see the point of this statement. A man under peculiarly precarious circumstances has been rescued from drowning. A by-stander remarks that now he is a saved man. "Yes," replies some one, "but he was a saved man all the time, and the process of rescuing, while it gives evidence of that fact, does not constitute it." Now even such a statement, as pure tautology, as characterising the entire process in terms of its issue, is objectionable only in the fact that, like all tautology, it seems to say something but does not. But if it were regarded as revealing the earlier condition of affairs, apart from the active process by which it was carried to a happy conclusion, such interpretation would be monstrously false; and would declare its falsity in the fact that, acted upon, the man would have been left to drown. In like fashion, to say, *after the event*, that a given idea was true all the time, is to lose sight of what makes an idea an idea, its hypothetical character; and thereby deliberately to transform it into brute dogma—something to which no canon of verification can ever be applied. The intellectualist almost always treats the pragmatic account as if it were, from the standpoint of the pragmatist as well as from his own, a denial of the reality of truth, while it is nothing but a statement of its nature. When the intellectualist realises this, he will, I hope, ask himself: What then on the pragmatic basis is meant by the proposition that an idea is true all the time? If the statement that an idea was true all the time has no meaning except that the idea was one which as matter of fact succeeded through action in achieving its intent, mere reiteration that the idea was true all the time or it would not have succeeded, does not take us far. The conception may be false, but it cannot be refuted by manipulation of phraseology.¹

¹ Such a statement as, for example, Mr. Bradley's (*MIND*, vol. xiii, No. 51, N.S., p. 3, article on Truth and Practice) "The idea works . . . but is able to work because I have chosen the right idea" surely loses any argumentative force it may seem to have, when it is recalled that, upon the theory argued against, ability to work and rightness are one and the same thing. If the wording is changed to read "The idea is able to work because I have chosen an idea which is able to work" the question-begging character of the implied criterion is evident. The change of

Such tautology is the argument by which the intellectualist persuades himself that truth is a character of ideas just as ideas—apart from the practical necessity they are under to issue in behaviour. On the other hand, there is the argument by which *reality* is identified with truth; so that on the principle that two things which are equal to the same thing are equal to each other, truth as idea and truth as reality are taken to be one and the same thing. Wherever there is an improved or tested idea, an idea which has made good, there is a concrete reality in the way of a completed or harmonised situation. The same activity which proves the idea constructs an inherently satisfied situation out of an inherently dissentient one,—for it is precisely the capacity of the idea as an aim and method of action to determine this transformation which is the criterion of its truth. Now unless all the elements in the situation are held steadily in view, the specific way in which the harmonised reality affords the criterion of truth (namely, through its function of being the last term of a process of active determination) is lost from sight; and the achieved reality in its merely existent character, apart from its practical or fulfilment character, is treated as The Truth. But when the reality is thus separated from the process by which it is achieved, when it is taken just as given, it is neither truth nor a criterion of truth. It is a state of facts like any other. The achieved telephone is a criterion of the validity of a certain prior idea in so far as it is the fulfilment of activities which set forth the nature of that idea, but just as telephone, as a machine actually in existence, it is no more truth nor criterion of truth than is a crack in the wall or a cobble-stone on the street.

The intervening term that mediates and completes the confusion of truth with ideas on one hand and reality on the other, is, I think, the fact that ideas after they have been tested in action are employed in the development and grounding of further ideas. There are cases in which an idea ceases to exist as idea as soon as it is made true; this is so as matter of fact and it is impossible to conceive any reason why it should not be so in point of theory. Such is the case, I take it, with a large part—possibly the major portion—of the ideas which mediate the smaller and transient crises of daily practice. I cannot imagine the situation in which the truth to which I have referred above—the verification of a

phraseology also may suggest the crucial and pregnant question: How does any one know that an idea is able to work excepting by setting it at work?

certain idea about a certain noise—would ever function again as truth—save as I have given it this function in this paper by using it as a corroboration of the truth of a certain theory. Such ideas mostly cease, giving way to a matter-of-fact status: say, the perception of the noisy street-car. One at the time may say "My idea regarding that noise was a true idea"; or one may not even go so far as that, he may just stop with the eventual perception. But the tested idea need never recur as a factor of proof in any other problem. Such, however, is conspicuously not the case with our scientific ideas. In its first value, the idea or hypothesis of gravitation entertained by Newton, stood, when verified, on exactly the same level as the hypothesis regarding the noise in the street. Theoretically, that case might have been so isolated that its truth character would disappear from thought as soon as a certain factual condition was ascertained. But practically quite the opposite has happened. The idea operates in many other inquiries, and operates no longer as mere idea, but as proved idea. Such truths get an "eternal" status—one irrespective of application just now and here, because there are so many nows and heres in which they are useful. Just as to say an idea was true all the time is a way of saying *in retrospect* that it has come out in a certain fashion, so to say that an idea is "eternally true" is to indicate *prospective* modes of application which are indefinitely anticipated. Its meaning, therefore is strictly pragmatic. It does not indicate a property inherent in the idea as intellectualised existence, but denotes a property of use and employment.

I have gone from the very general considerations which occupied us in the earlier portions of this article to matters which relatively at least are specific, and which to some will doubtless seem irrelevant or trivial. I conclude then with a summary in the hope that it may bind together the earlier and the later parts of this paper.

1. The condition which antecedes and provokes any particular exercise of reflective knowing is always one of discrepancies, struggle, "collision". This condition is practical, for it involves the habits and interests of the organism, an agent. This does not mean that the struggle is merely personal, nor subjective, nor psychological. The agent or individual is one factor in the situation—not the situation something subsisting in the individual. The individual has to be identified in the situation, before any situation can be referred—as in psychology—to the individual. But the discrepancy calls out and controls reflective knowing only as the fortunes of an agent are implicated in the crisis.

Certain elements stand out as obstacles, as interferences, as deficiencies—in short as unsatisfactory and as requiring something for their completion. Other elements stand out as wanted—as required, as a satisfaction which does not exist. This clash, an accompaniment of all desire, between the given and the wanted, between the present and the absent, is at once the root and the type of that peculiar paradoxical relation between existence and meaning which Bradley insists upon as the essence of judgment. Taken on its own merits it is not irrational—a proof that we are dealing with mere appearance not with genuine reality; but it is non-rational—an evidence that we are dealing with a practical reality.

2. The intellectual or reflective and logical is a *statement* of this conflict: an attempt to describe and define it. It is, as it were, the practical clash held off at arm's length for inspection and investigation. In this way brute blind reaction against the unsatisfactoriness of the situation is suspended. It is turned into the channel of observing, of inferring, of reasoning, or defining means and end. It is this change in the quality of activity, from directly overt, to indirect, or inquiring with view to stating, which constitutes the *specific* nature of reflective practice to which Mr. Bradley calls attention. The discovery of the nature of the conflict supplies materials for the fact or existence side of the judgment. The conception or projection of the nature of the object in which the conflict would be terminated furnishes the material for the meaning side of the judgment. It is ideal because anticipatory, just as the subject side is existential, because reminiscent or recording. Hence the two are necessarily both distinguished from and yet referred to each other: only through location of a problem can a solution be conceived; only in reference to the intent of finding a solution can the elements of the problem be selected and interpreted. In origin and in destiny, this correlative determination of existence and meaning is tentative and experimental. The aim of the subject of the judgment is not to include all possible reality, but to select those elements of reality which are useful in locating the source and nature of the difficulty in hand. The aim of the predicate is not to bunch all possible meaning and refer it in one final act indiscriminately to all existence, but to state the standpoint and method from which the difficulty of the particular situation may most effectively be dealt with. The selection of what is relevant to the characterisation of the problem and the projection of the method of dealing with it are theoretic,

hypothetic, intellectual:—that is, they are tentative ways of viewing the matter for the sake of guiding, economising and freeing the activities through which it may *really* be dealt with.

3. The criterion of the worth of the idea is thus the capacity of the idea (as a definition of the end or outcome sought in a way likely to be serviceable as a method) to operate in fulfilling the object for the sake of which it was projected. Capacity of operation in this fashion is the test, measure, or criterion of truth. Hence the criterion is practical in the most overt sense of that term. We may, if we choose, regard the reality in which the idea terminates through its use in guiding action, as the criterion; but if we do so choose, it is at our peril that we forget that this reality serves as criterion in its capacity of fulfilment of plan through relevant response, and not as sheer objectively present reality.

4. Difficulties overlap; problems recur which resemble each other in the kind of resource they seem to demand for solution. Various modes of activity with their respective ends, going on at some time more or less independently, get organised into single comprehensive systems of behaviour. The solution of one problem is found to create difficulties elsewhere; or the truth which is made in the solution of one problem is found to afford an effective method of dealing with questions arising apparently from unallied sources. Thus certain tested ideas in performing a constant or recurrent function secure a certain permanent status. The prospective use of such truths, the satisfaction which we anticipate in their employ, the assurance of control which we feel in their possession, becomes relatively much more important than the circumstances under which they were first made true. In becoming permanent resources, such tested ideas get a generalised energy of position. They are truths in general, truths "in themselves" or in the abstract, truths to which positive value is assigned on their own account. Such truths are the "eternal truths" of current discussion. They naturally and properly add to their intellectual and to their practical worth a certain æsthetic quality. They are interesting to contemplate, and their contemplation arouses emotions of admiration and reverence. To make these emotions the basis of assigning peculiar inherent sanctity to them, apart from their warrant in use, is simply to give way to that mood which in primitive man is the cause of attributing magical efficacy to physical things. Æsthetically such truths are more than instrumentalities. But to ignore both the instrumental and the æsthetic

aspect, and to ascribe values which are due to an instrumental and æsthetic character, to some interior and *a priori* constitution of truth is to make fetishes of them.

We must not exaggerate the permanence and stability of such truths with respect to their recurring and prospective use. It is only relatively speaking that they are unchanging. When applied to new cases, as resources for coping with new difficulties, the oldest of truths are to some extent remade. Indeed it is only through such application and such remaking that truths retain their freshness and vitality. Otherwise they are relegated to faint reminiscences of an antique tradition. Even the truth that two and two make four has gained a new meaning, has had its truth in some degree remade, in the development of the modern theory of number. If we put ourselves in the attitude of a scientific inquirer in asking what is the meaning of truth *per se*, there spring up before us those ideas which are actively employed in the mastery of new fields, in the organisation of new materials. This is the essential difference between truth and dogma; between the living and the dead and decaying. Above all, it is in the region of moral truth that this stands out. Moral truths which are not recreated in application to the urgencies of the passing hour, no matter how true in the place and time of their origin, are pernicious and misleading, *i.e.*, false. And it is perhaps through emphasising this fact, embodied in one form or another in every system of morals and in every religion of moral import, that one most readily realises the real character of truth.