III.—WHAT IS A PERSON?

(*The Cornerstone of Ethics.*)

BY W. M. THORBURN.

CANON SANDAY has justly complained, on page 8 of his recent pamphlet: *Personality in Christianity and in Ourselves* (1911): "I cannot ascertain that, even among professed philosophers, there is any generally accepted doctrine of Personality. A German friend, whom I can implicitly trust, tells me that there is no monograph on the subject in German." His own contribution on (p. 13): "Personality is Spirit. But Spirit as such is indescribable": cannot be regarded as very helpful. To make Person a mere synonym of Spirit, would be a wanton waste of an indispensable word with a long distinctive history. Nor do we get any further light from the speculation on pp. 153-157 of his *Christologies Ancient and Modern* (1910), about decomposing "the conception of personality": which Mansel in his *Prolegomena Logica* (139 and 313) has declared to be ultimate, indefinable, and possibly intuitive.¹ This despairing doctrine (of Mansel) was accepted in Dr. Illingworth's otherwise rather cloudy *Personality Human and Divine*, Lecture II. But not in Canon Sanday's *Life of Christ in Recent Research* (1907), (pp. 251-268); where he demurs to the fanciful elaborate analysis of Personality, as "Reason, Will, and Love": in Dr. Moberly's *Atonement and Personality*, ch. ix., pp. 219 ff.

(b) Some light is thrown on the causes of futility in such writers as Moberly and Illingworth, by the acute remarks of Canon Bigg, in his *Christian Platonists of Alexandria*, Lecture IV., p. 171 (n. 2): "Psychology again is for another reason an exceedingly difficult subject for a Christian, because

¹ "In every act of Consciousness the ultimate object is an individual": *Pro. Log.* 11. See also Mansel's Bampton Lectures on *The Limits of Religious Thought*, III., 83 ff: "Personality, as we conceive it, is essentially a limitation and a relation," p. 84.

he cannot isolate it, because he has to regard above all things the point of junction with metaphysics, and with the (traditional) metaphysics of Revelation. . . . The same difficulty attaches to the theory of Ethics": Similar candour will be found in De Wulf's *Mediæval Philosophy* (§ 281): "The scholastics drew from the history of philosophy, . . . to furnish reasons in defence of what was regarded as the true teaching. History was not studied for its own sake; and this accounts somewhat for the uncritical attitude of the scholastics, as regards the accurate determination of the historical fact, and for their anxiety to interpret texts in favour of their theses, even at the risk of misrepresenting the testimony invoked."

2. Bishop Butler never dealt fully with the problem; and the sound incidental statement, in his *Brief Dissertation on Personal Identity*: "Consciousness is inseparable from the idea of a person or intelligent being": is not made clearer by the following words: "but does not make Personality". These are put forward in opposition to Locke's opinion, as given in his *Human Understanding*: Book II., ch. xxvii., §§ 16, 17, 23. But, if Locke had expressly explained Consciousness as *Actual or Potential*, his position would have been impregnable. For Consciousness always implies Sensation of some sort: as Bain assumes in his chapter on Consciousness (in his *Emotions and Will*), and throughout *The Senses and the Intellect*. Hume, like Butler, spoke incidentally of a "Person or thinking being:" in his *Human Nature*, II., Part 2, § 1, p. 331. Kant spoke mistily of a Person as an "End-in-himself," and elsewhere loosely identified Personality with Freedom (of the Will). His nearest approach to a useful definition is this: "A person is the subject whose actions are capable of Imputation".² But this formula is little more than Forensic in its implications; and would exclude infants, idiots, Constitutional Kings, and Consulting Counsel. Fichte shows no advance upon Kant's futility, in saying: "The rational being posits itself as a rational individual, or, as we shall say hereafter, as a person, only by ascribing exclusively to itself a sphere for its freedom".³ In Paulsen's *System of Ethics*, Personality is mentioned only once (on p. 468); and merely as a synonym of Free Will. Lotze is even mistier than Kant. To say, as he does in his *Mikrokosmos* (IX., ch. iv., § 10): "Selfhood is the essence

² Kant: Introduction to the *Metaphysic of Ethics*, iv., p. 279 in Abbott's Translation, or p. 172 in Semple's.

³ Fichte: *Science of Rights*, Book II., § 5, p. 87 in English.

of all Personality":⁴ is only to juggle with two incomprehensibles, put forward as mutual explanations. "Self has no definite meaning," says F. H. Bradley, in *Appearance and Reality*, p. 186 (second edition), and on p. 532: "For me a person is finite, or is meaningless. . . . Most of those who insist on what they call *The Personality of God* are intellectually dishonest. They desire one conclusion, and, to reach it, they argue for another." And Andrew Seth allows in *Hegelianism and Personality* (p. 4): "As regards the nature of Self or Spiritual Principle . . . the candid reader of Green is forced to admit that everything is left vague."

(b) Hume, Comte, Bain, Spencer, Martineau, Henry Sidgwick, Bergson, and even William James; although they have a good deal to say about Self; have made no serious attempt to answer our thorny question. Yet James⁵ does not seem to have undervalued its importance, in view of what he says in his *Psychology*, his *Will to Believe*, and his *Varieties of Religious Experience*. The nearest modern approach to Canon Sanday's *desideratum*, is made in Canon Rashdall's brief contribution to Sturt's *Personal Idealism* (1902). His Person is: "a conscious, permanent, self-distinguishing, individual, active being" (p. 372). His enlightenment is further shown, in declaring Personality to be (like every other quality) an affair of degree, and possibly inherent in every animal (p. 374). But towards the close (on p. 391) his traditional prepossessions are apparent in the speculations on the "Self-Limitation of God": a theologian's juggle, which must go into the same category with Kant's

⁴ Lotze's phrase will be found on p. 687 of vol. ii. in the English translation of his *Microcosmus*. That very wordy and professedly comprehensive work ignores the cardinal matter of Personality, except in a futile and mostly irrelevant chapter on the Personality of God. Hume likewise bracketed Self and Person, but in a casual, if not contemptuous manner: e.g., *H.N.*, I, p. 4, § 2; and II., p. 1, § 5. He regarded both, like Personal Identity, as mere figments of the human imagination. See *H.N.*, p. 4, § 6, pp. 251-259. In his later work on the *Principles of Morality* (s. 1), he treats Personality more seriously: founding his enquiry on an analysis of *Personal Merit*.

⁵ "The only complete category of our thinking . . . is the category of Personality, every other category being one of the abstract elements of that:" *Will to Believe*, 327. "In the world of Religion," Personality is "the one fundamental fact": *Religious Experience*, 491. Personal Consciousness: "Its meaning we know so long as no one asks us to define it, but to give an accurate account of it is the most difficult of philosophic tasks": *Principles of Psychology*, I. 225. Compare II. Spencer: *First Principles*, § 20: "The Personality of which each one is conscious . . . is yet a thing which cannot be truly known at all, knowledge of it being forbidden by the very nature of thought".

"Duty to Self,"⁶ Spinoza's "Intellectual Love," and the Augustinian Myth of Self-Murder. To confer validity on a contradiction-in-terms: "Deus non posset": as Ockham intrepidly declared in his *S. T. Logic*, i. 15, And: "Non potest Deus naturas rerum mutare": reaffirmed Francis de Vittoria (†1546), the Father of Salamanca Neo-Scholastic Theology, and the Grandfather of International "Law": *Relectiones Theologicae*, x. (De Homicidio), § 6. There is more history, and an altogether greater variety of matter, in William Wallace's posthumous essay on *Person and Personality* (1898), than is afforded by Canon Rashdall. And it begins well with a "common definition" of Person, as "the subject of rights". But it rambles and fades away into Kantian unreality.

3. Lack of Physical knowledge is one great cause, and lack of Juridical knowledge a still greater cause, of the vague and vacuous irrationality generally shown in the use of the words Person and Personality, by modern Moral Philosophers. Extreme instances of recent date are furnished by Richmond's *Essay on Personality* (1900); and Canon Holland's chapter on Property and Personality, in *Property: its Duties and Rights* (1913). It is curious, that the former piece of Turkey-carpet Philosophy (as Macaulay might have called it); though written from the traditional standpoint, in the most arbitrary spirit of the narrowest and most abstract Tommygreenery; incautiously propounds a definition of Personality, whose necessary implications would fill the framer with horror. Personality, he says on p. 21, "is capacity of fellowship". But there can be no fellowship without sensibility. Automata cannot be fellows. Nor could purely intellectual beings: if such beings were possible. And no fact is better established, than the fellowship of ants with ants, and bees with bees. Therefore they are Persons.

(b) Like other Man-trumpeting disciples of Green and Caird, these writers are obsessed by an unholy craving to make out Personality as something uniquely and mysteriously magnificent: bracketing every man with God, and impiously degrading the rest of His mundane children. Another characteristic is a very sloppy and fumbling way of dealing with the all-pervading fact of Relativity in thought. Every concept indeed supposes two individual substances, but two are

⁶ "From the very notion of duty, it is impossible that I could owe myself anything": *Principles of Moral Science* (1910), p. 43; by W. Macdonald, D.D., of Maynooth.

enough. Personality of course is Relative: as even Boethius⁷ understood (*De Trinitate*, 5 and 6). But that is no peculiarity. Redness and Roughness, Loudness and Bitterness, and every other Qualitative Abstraction are likewise Relative. Personality is the Quality of being a Person; and every quality is or implies a relation, although in Logic the two are distinguished. "We think in Relations": as Herbert Spencer was always saying (*e.g.* in *F.P.*, § 47); and we cannot think otherwise. Bain was even more emphatic: "We know only Relations": he said in his *Emotions and Will* (Consciousness, § 24). He had already declared (in § 11) that Relation is: "the widest term in our vocabulary". And, "Is not *all* our knowledge relative"? said Hamilton, commenting on Reid's *Active Powers*, Essay I., p. 513.

4. Everybody fairly grounded in Jurisprudence will instinctively think of a Person, as a potential subject of wrongs and corresponding rights. He will not, however, dispute John Austin's clear pronouncement: "Mere legal persons (*Personae Juris*) are persons by a figment, and for the sake of brevity in discourse. All rights reside in, and all duties are incumbent upon, physical or natural Persons".⁸ And, if he goes behind the legal to a moral conception, he can hardly fail to see, that Ethical as well as Physical Personality is founded on capacity of feeling pain of body or mind. For, without such capacity (present or potential), no wrong is possible, and consequently no right; so far as the *Propositus* is concerned. As Bentham pungently said, in his, *Principles of Morals and Legislation* (chap. xviii., n.); "The question is not, *Can they reason?* or *Can they talk?* but *Can they suffer?*" A Moral Person therefore is first of all a sensitive being; a Feeling lump of Life; and his Personality is not destroyed by sleep, stupour, catalepsy, or anæsthesia. In Scholastic language; *Personalitas est Potentia Sensitiva*. Also: *Persona Naturalis est Suppositum Sensitivum*. And: *Omne Suppositum Sensitivum est Persona Moralis*.

(b) The philosophic student of "Natural" Science will take the same view as the scientific jurisprudent. To his mind a Poodle is a Person, a Parrot is a Person, a Pollywog

⁷ "Substantia continet unitatem, relatio multiplicet Trinitatem": *Id. Trin.*, 6.

⁸ Austin's *Lectures on Jurisprudence*, XII., p. 364 of vol. i. Compare Rudolf Sohm: *Institutes of Roman Law*, sect. 37 (n. 2): "Positive Law finds among its data, but one kind of Personality, and that is the personality of human beings, which personality is the postulate and source of all legal development". On the history of Theological and Jural Personality, see Canon Bigg's *Christian Platonists of Alexandria*, v., pp. 202-206.

is a Person ; even a Potato-beetle is a Person : in so far at least, that it is sinful to throw him into the fire. For, all Pain, not merited as a punishment, is an Evil ; and every Evil, when caused by an intelligent agent, is a Wrong ; and every Wrong is a Sin, because it pains the Divine Governor in His Sense of Harmony and Perfection. But the narrow blatant "Unlettered Physicist,"⁹ of the Schaefer-Lankester type, generally borrows his notion of Personality from popular anthropolatreian Theology : especially if he be a Vivisector hunting for a cloak of high moral humbug. He uses Person as equivalent to Human Being : tolerating an analogical extension to Invisible Spirits, on the part of his most useful allies. Dr. J. S. Haldane's *Mechanism Life and Personality*.¹⁰ (1913) indeed shows a wider range and outlook. But some self-contradictory sentences like : "In losing his individual personality in the wider personal life he realises his true personality" (p. 127) : might have come straight from the cranial haggissock of T. H. Green himself. A General Person is like Hegel's Universal Individual, impossible as well as incomprehensible. "Nusquam in universalibus persona dici potest, sed in singularibus tantum atque individuus" : said Boethius : *De Persona*, 2 ; and in this he was followed by all the Schoolmen. "Individuationem autem conveniens humanæ naturæ est personalitas" : said Thomas Aquinas : *Contra Gentiles* iv., 41. "Individuum aliquid et proprium sonat vox persona" : sums up Petavius, in his *De Trinitate*, IV., c. 11 § 8 (Index-Summary). "Every object of sense, of memory, or of consciousness is an individual object : " and "every creature which God has made, in the heavens above, or in the earth beneath, or in the

⁹ Oxford men owe this happy phrase to Mr. T. C. Snow of St. John's.

¹⁰ Compare Dr. Haldane's pp. 127 and 139, with Canon Holland's pp. 184-187, in *Property : its Duties and Rights* (1913). For a searchlight on Green's fatuity and futility, read Henry Sidgwick's masterly *Lectures on the Ethics of Green, Spencer and Martineau*. Consult also Dr. Cronin's recent (Scholastic-Aristotelian) *Science of Ethics* (Dublin, 1909), which deals with Green's Assumptions on pp. 434-438. In a note to p. 439, he maintains that the Transcendental distinction : "between the individual and the person is wholly groundless. . . . The Rational Self then is essentially individual." Like Hume and Locke, he does not clearly differentiate Self and Person ; which are at least historically distinct. I would provisionally suggest the definite use of *Self* for the continuing Subject of Reflection ; confining *Person* to the continuing Subject of Sensation. Why should either be wasted as a synonym ? *Ego*, if treated as a modern cosmopolitan word, and not as a mere Latin equivalent of Self, might be used as a summary of Self and Person : a continuing Subject of mental Experience in the widest sense. Refer to note 19 *infra*, on the Logical use of *Person*.

waters under the earth, is an individual": said Thomas Reid, the founder of the Scottish Philosophy of "Common Sense": *Intellectual Powers*, Essay V., ch. i., p. 389.

(c) To constitute and illustrate the Relation of Moral Personality, we do not need to invoke The Race, or The State, or The Nation, or The People, or Society, or The Community, or The Country, or any other elaborate metaphorical Person, as one of the *Supposita*. We do not want so much as a Football Team, nor even a family. We need nothing more than a small boy and a small dog. Each is a separate perceptible Centre of Sensation; and therefore a Person. Each can suffer pain, and each is therefore a potential subject of wrongs and consequent rights. When the boy tries to kick the dog, he is attempting a Wrong, and he therefore evokes a Right of biting in Self-Defence. If the kick be accomplished, it gives rise to a Right of Retaliating the Pain. But if, before the dog can bite his leg, he buys it off with a bun; then we have a case of Reparation, or Compensation offered and accepted. The dog has got his "boot," in the Old English sense, as well as the New American; and the balance of justice has been restored.

5. Dramatic and Forensic Persons were the only varieties distinctly known in the Ancient World. "*Persona* and our Person are not the same thing:" says Harnack, in his *History of Dogma* (iv., 117 in English). "Our modern conception of Personality": says Dean Inge of St. Paul's, in his *Personal Idealism* (1907), p. 33: "(was) alien even to Roman, much more to Greek thought. Neither the word, nor the idea of a Person has any existence in Greek, or in the theology of Greek-speaking Christians." A Person of the Trinity was originally apprehended by Tertullian¹¹ and

¹¹Tertullian: *Adversus Praxeam*, 2, 4, 7, and 21. And Harnack's *History of Dogma*: vol. iv., pp. 121-123 in English; Part II., ch. i., App. *Trinitas* first occurs (circa A.D. 210) in the *De Pudicitia* of Tertullian, § 21. The nearest Greek equivalent, *Trias*, in a work of Theophilus of Antioch (circa A.D. 180): *Ad Autolyicum*, II., 15. The first clear statement of a Trinitarian Creed was the *Ekthesis* of Origen's pupil, Gregory Thaumaturgus (circa A.D. 270). The great *De Fide* of Hilary (Pictaviensis), re-titled *De Trinitate* in the Middle Ages, is only an Anti-Arian manifesto (circa 360). As Canon Watson has pointed out in his *Introduction* (p. 62), the word: "*Trinity* is almost absent, and *Person* hardly more common". And, as to the Holy Spirit: "Hilary refuses with some emphasis . . . to call Him God," p. 84. *Trinitas* appears only twice: in cc. 22 and 36 of Book I. *Persona* occurs five or six times, but only once (V. 42) with an Athanasian savour. *Personalis* occurs in VII. 39. Sorvetus (1553) appeals to the authority of Hilary (*De Trin.*, II. c. 1), as well as Irenaeus and Tertullian, in his *Christianismi Restitutio*: (*De Trin.*, I., p. 24): "*Ecce verissimam trinitatem ex prisca doctrina*:"

other Latins, as something more than Dramatic, but rather less than Forensic. He had functions, but not rights or duties. He might in short be described as a Phase (if not a Face) of Jehovah. And subsequent controversies arose mainly from successive efforts to fill out Tertullian's exiguous qualitative conception, with the nascent Moral Personality of Roman Stoic Natural Law. One rational individual substance clearly might sustain three distinct forms of *Status* or Character, as Paterfamilias, Consul, and Curator of a Prodigal: though he could not be at the same time three Physical or Ethical Persons. "Sustineo unus tres personas, mei, adversarii, Judicis:" said Cicero, in his *De Oratore* (118b). The Greeks, however, had no equivalent for the Latin Forensic Person. *Idiotes* and *Atomos* were their nearest words for Person and Individual. Their *Prosōpon* was purely Dramatic, till arbitrarily employed in the Sixth Century, by the Jurisprudent Theophilus, for translating *Persona* in the Constitutions and Compilations of Justinian.

(b) Theologically, *Prosōpon* first appears, probably as a translation of Tertullian's *Persona*, in the writings of the Semi-Montanist Hippolytus: *Contra Noetum* (circa 230), §§ 7 and 14. But he applies it only to the Father and the Son: the Holy Ghost being described as a *Dunamis* (Power) or *Oikonomia* (Function). It does not appear in the Original Nicene Creed of A.D. 325, nor in the revised Byzantine Creed of 381, which now passes under the older name. It was rejected by Athanasius, because it had been used by the Sabellians, though he tolerated the Latin *Persona*. He preferred *Hupostasis* to either, but without clearly distinguishing it from *Ousia*. Hefele says: *Councils*, i., 295, note: that the Nicene Creed uses *Ousia* and *Hupostasis* as identical. Harnack takes a similar view (*H.D.* IV., 34 and 81-85). And Canon Bigg declares in his *Christian Platonists of Alexandria*: second edition, Lecture V., pp. 202-205: that *Ousia* was Platonic; while *Hupostasis* was Stoic, much later, and very much less common. Both meant the *Idea*, or the vehicle of qualities. The prevailing Latin use was, that given in Isidore's *Etymologiae*, VII. 4 (11). *Ousia* was translated *Natura* or *Essentia*, while *Hupostasis* might be either *Persona* or *Substantia*. Further enlightenment on all these words will be found in the Lectures of Dr. Hatch on *Greek Ideas in the Christian Church*: IX., 275-278. Petavius also has discussed them historically; in his *De Trinitate* (1647), IV., c. 2, § 5; and his *De Incarnatione* (1650), V., c. 7, § 8.

6. Austin, in his *Lectures on Jurisprudence* (XII, 357, 365), argues that the Roman Classical lawyers used *Persona* in two senses: originally a legal *Status*, or character: and later, the physical or fictitious subject of that *Status*. The physical perceptible Person was, he thinks, synonymous or coextensive with Human Being: even a Slave having a *Status*, though for some purposes classified as a Thing. Within the sphere of the *Jus Sacrum*, a slave "was from the outset, and within certain limits, acknowledged as a person": says Rudolf Sohm.¹² In other relations he might be called an "Equitable Person," though he could not be a *Persona Stricti Juris*. It is very noteworthy, however, that Justinian's *Digest* contains no Title on Persons, and that the word *Persona* is not explained in the Title *De Verborum Significatione* (L. 50, T. 16). No definition is given in the brief Title of the *Institutes* (I, 3), *De Jure Personarum*; nor in the Code (VI, 48), *De Incertis Personis*. For an example of the wider use of *Persona*, see Ulpian on Noxal Actions concerning Slaves, in the *Digest*, II., Title 9, Fr. 1.

(b) Cicero frequently used *Persona* for *Homo*, especially in his Epistles and Philosophical Works. As the Father of Latin Stoic Ethics, he was a prime mover in the analogical extension of Forensic Personality from the *Jus Civile* to the *Jus Naturale*. And from this early *Suppositum* of a potential subject of "Natural" Rights and Wrongs, the modern Spirit-Person of Moral Theology and Moral Philosophy has been developed: largely through Patristic and Scholastic speculations about the Trinity, the Angels, and the Anthrope *Anima Separata*. Hobbes, the intellectual ancestor of Austin in regard to Sovereignty and other ideas, thought it enough indeed (in his *Leviathan*, I, 16), to combine the old Dramatic and Forensic notions under the wider term, Representation. His Person is a Representative. But Moral Personality he has not attempted to define, or even to discuss. A Representative indeed is not even a full Jural Person. He is not necessarily a subject of Wrongs and Rights, either in Human Positive Law, or in Divine Natural Equity.

7. The most common "modern conception" of a Moral Person corresponds roughly with Human Being; taking on, however, an analogical extension to Invisible Spirits. It is not widely divergent from a phrase ascribed to Boethius

¹² R. Sohm: *Institutes of Roman Law*, § 32, p. 166, in Ledlie's Translation (third edition). In the same section (p. 165), Sohm speaks of the Slave, as "the bearer of a natural personality". See § 30 for Persons generally; and § 37 for *Personae Juris*. Gaius, in his *Institutes* (IV., 15), writes: "De servis, eadem de ceteris quoque personis". Nowhere does he define or explain *Persona*.

(† 525), which was generally accepted in the Middle Ages : " *Persona est naturae rationalis individua substantia* ".¹³ But in regard to Persons of the Trinity, Duns Scotus,¹⁴ like the Solid and Copious Richard of Middleton († 1300), preferred the separate formula substituted by Richard of St. Victor († 1173) in his *De Trinitate* (IV., 22) : " *Intellectualis naturae incommunicabilis existentia* ". But this after all is a distinction without a difference. For, only the divisible can be communicated, even by Emanation.¹⁵ And Existence differs from Substance, only in including " *Accidents* " also ; and in not being found in the Athanasian Creed. The mystical Prior of St. Victor in Paris, as he explains in the previous chapter (21), rejected the Boethian definition as inapplicable to the Persons of the Trinity, because they cannot be individual in substance. In chapter 24 however, Richard goes on to propound a : " *Descriptio personae quae videtur soli et omni convenire* ". It is worded : " *Persona sit existens per se solum juxta singularem quemdam rationalis existentiae modum* ". This was approved by Alexander of Hales and Albertus Magnus ;¹⁶ and much re-

¹³ Boethius : *De Persona et Duabus Naturis* (Christi), cap. 3, p. 1343, in Migne's *P.L.*, 64. See also Peter Lombard's *Sententiae*, III., D. 5. And Thomas Aquinas : *S.T.*, I., Q. 29, A. 24. Locke's first description of a Person goes no further : " *A thinking intelligent being that has reason and reflection* " : *Essay on the Human Understanding*, II., c. xxvii. § 9. But in § 26 he goes on to explain that Person : " *is a forensic term appropriating actions and their merit ; and so belongs only to intelligible agents capable of a law, and happiness and misery. This personality extends itself beyond present existence to what is past, only by consciousness, . . . that which is conscious of pleasure and pain.* " It is very curious that Hume, who was a member of the Scottish Bar, should never have discussed Person as a subject of Rights.

¹⁴ Duns Scotus : *Opus Oxon.*, I., D. 23, Q. 1, N. 4. Richard of Middleton (the early Franciscan Nominalist) : *In Sententias*, I., D. 23, A. 1, Q. 1 ; and D. 25, A. 1, Q. 2. Melancthon's formula is peculiar, in treating the Boethian wording as quite consistent with the Ricardian : " *Persona est substantia individua, intelligens, et incommunicabilis* " : *Loci Theologici* (De Tribus Personis Divinitatis). Calvin also adopts " *Incommunicability* " : *Institutes*, I., c. 13, § 6, but he uses *Subsistentia* instead of *Substantia*. Hooker draws the same distinction, in his *Eccl. Polity*, V., c. 51, § 1 ; but his treatment of the matter is meagre and somewhat obscure. There is, however, a clarifying note in Bayne's recent edition of the Fifth Book. The controversial words are lucidly differentiated by F. Turretin : *Institutio Theologiae*, (1679), III., Q. 23, § 5.

¹⁵ Bishop Durand of Meaux (Durandus a Sancto Porciano) applies the word *Emanatio* to the origins of the Persons of the Son and Spirit, as distinguished from the Father ; *Nativitas* and *Processio* : *In SS.*, I. D. 10, Q. 2, § 4 ; and D. 11, Q. 2, § 23. Nobody has ever explained, how the Apostles on the day of Pentecost could all have been filled with an incommunicable Holy Ghost. This point was seen and seized by Michael Servetus, in his *Apologia ad Melancthonem* (initio), p. 677.

¹⁶ Alexander of Hales : *Univ. Theol. Summa*, I., Q. 56, M. 6. Albertus Magnus : *In Sententias*, I., D. 25, A. 1 : " *Melius dicatur existentia quam* "

sembles the simpler formula of J. H. Alsted, the German Reformed Precursor of Kant: "Persona est ens singularis, per se subsistens et intelligens". There is also a substantial similarity between the words of Alsted, and some used by Durand de St. Pourcain: the great Dominican Nominalist: "Persona non dicit solum individuum substantiam naturae rationalis, sed completam per se subsistentem". In *Sententias*, III., D. 10, Q. 1 (10).

(b) Thomas Aquinas himself concurs with Richard in regard to Persons of the Trinity, and says (*S.T.*, I., Q. 30, A. 4): "De ratione personae est, quod sit incommunicabilis". Bishop Durand likewise affirmed: In *Sententias*, I., D. 25, Q. 1, § 3: "Ratio enim personae consistit in incommunicabilitate". He shortened the phrase of Boethius into: "Suppositum naturae intellectualis" (*In SS.*, I., D. 23, Q. 1, §§ 7 and 13); which Ockham (*In SS.*, I., D. 22, Q. 1), still further contracted, as *Suppositum intellectuale*. This last was accepted by Francis Turretin, the Genevan Aquinas (1687): *Institutio Theologiae*, L. III., Q. 23, § 7. And it would not be inconsistent with the full and exact truth: *Persona (Naturalis et Moralis) est Suppositum Sensitivum*; or its valid Converse: *Omne Suppositum Sensitivum est Persona Naturalis et Moralis*. For: "Nihil est in intellectu quod non prius fuerit in sensu": an Aristotelian tradition generally accepted by the Schoolmen.¹⁷ There can be no intellection without previous sense-perception; and there is no sense-impression which does not start some ripple of intelligence. "Tota humana notitia a sensibus surgit": said Abelard.¹⁸ Even Aquinas admits: *S.T.*, I., Q. 77, A. 7 (C.): "Sensus etiam est quaedam deficiens par-

substantia". Alsted: *Cursus Philosophiae Encyclopaedia* (1620), Tom. I., p. 161; *Metaphysica*, III., 7. In his *Logic* (1614), he says briefly: "Individuum rationale est persona": IV., c. 9, p. 283.

¹⁷ For example, the "Seraphic" Bonaventura: *In SS.*, III., *Dist.* 37, *Dub.* 1. Accepted also by Hobbes (*Leviathan* I., 1), and Locke (*Human Understanding*, I., 4, § 20). Compare the Fifth Canon of Epicurus, as given in Gassendi's great *Syntagma* (*Logic*, I., 7): "Omnis, quae in mente est Anticipatio seu Praenotio, dependet a Sensibus".

¹⁸ In his *Tractatus de Intellectibus*, which is not printed by Migne. See p. 747 of vol. ii., in Cousin's edition of Abelard's *Works*. Compare Sully's *Psychology* (1884), ch. v., p. 107: "No intellectual work such as imagining and reasoning can be done till the senses have supplied the necessary materials". As Bain had pointed out in 1855 (*Senses and Intellect*, II., ch. i., § 15, p. 36 in last edition), Sensation is "the key to intellect". Aristotle had long before said: "Sensus autem cognitio quaedam est": in his *Generation of Animals*, I., 23. But, as Zeller has rightly complained, at the end of his chapter xi. (*Physica*) in his *Aristotle* (vol. ii., 134 in English): "Just as his *Metaphysic* gives no clear and consistent account of Individuality, so his *Psychology* fails with regard to Personality".

ticipatio intellectus . . . imperfectiores potentiae sunt priores in via generationis": Durand further explains (*In SS.*, II., D. 3, Q. 2) the words used in dealing with Persona: "Individuum, Suppositum, et Persona aliquo modo sunt idem, et aliquo modo differunt, quaelibet enim natura singularis in quocunque genere sit, potest dici individua. Suppositum autem non dicitur nisi natura singularis in praedicamento substantiae, nec quaecunque talis, sed solum completa. Persona dicitur illud idem in natura intellectuali solum; ergo omnis persona est suppositum, et omne suppositum est individuum. Sed non omne individuum est suppositum, nec omne suppositum est persona."

(c) Laurentius Valla, the early "Humanist," and first expositor of Constantine's mythical Donation, followed up Richard's objection, and entirely eliminated the notion of Substance from the definition of Person. His own formula: "Persona significat qualitatem, qua alius ab alio differimus": *Elegantiarum*, Liber VI., cap. 34: treats the word Person merely as a name of Relation; for Quality is only an aspect of Relation. "Relation may thus be understood to contain all the categories and forms of positive thought": according to Sir William Hamilton (*Discussions*, 603). The insufficiency of such treatment had been exposed half-a-century earlier by Durand: *In SS.*, I., D. 23, Q. 1 (*Utrum Persona significat Substantiam an Relationem*), NN. 18 and 20. He concluded (N. 20): "De quo dicitur persona non solum includit relationem, sed etiam cum relatione essentiam". In effect he says (18), Persona *importat* Relationem, sed *non signat*. And Valla would have been right, if he had said *Personalitas* instead of *Persona*. Boethius himself had elsewhere said: *De Trinitate*, 5: "Omne nomen pertinens ad Personas significat Relationem". Bellarmine (in his *De Christo*, II., 5) was very angry at Valla for saying (*loc. cit.*): "Si Persona pro Substantia accipiat, non esse in Deo Personam magis quam in Bruto". Valla went on to say: "Hanc ego diffinitionem (Boethii), ut Graeculam et ineptam derideo". In his previous chapter (iv.) the great controversial Cardinal treated as synonymous, *Persona*, *Hypostasis*, and *Suppositum*; which last had universally been denominated *Prima Substantia*, from the Age of Boethius; but in Scholastic times was also described as *Ens completum*. Bellarmine further declared *Persona* to be *fundamentum* (seu *basis*) naturae. In his *D.C.*, III., 17, he concluded his defence of Boethius against "Luther's Precursor," with a rather clumsy paraphrase: "Dicitur igitur Persona individua substantia, quia est unum subsistens, non divisum in se in ratione subsistentiae,

et divisum ab omnibus aliis". Gabriel Biel of Tübingen (†1495), Luther's instructor in Nominalism, had provided a neater alternative: "Singularis substantia ab omni alio realiter distincta."¹⁹

8. It is generally inferred from Peter Lombard's discussion of Personality in connexion with the two natures of Christ: SS., III., D. 5 (E.): that he regarded the "Anima a corpore exuta" as a Person; though it is not there expressly stated. His contemporary, Prior Hugo of St. Victor, is, however, quite explicit in his *De Sacramentis*, Book II. (Part 1), ch. xi.: "Remanet itaque separata anima a carne, eadem persona spiritus rationalis". Another contemporary, Gilbert de la Porree, took the contrary view in his Commentary on Boethius (*De Persona*, 2): Migne, P.L., 64, p. 1372. The Bishop of Poitiers denied that a disembodied human soul (Anima Separata) could be a Person, on the formal ground: "Quod nulla persona pars potest personae. "Omnis enim Persona adeo est, per se una." It does not appear, whether he fully appreciated the essential ground, that a purely intellectual Person (or being of any sort) is impossible. For intellect may be separated from visible matter, but it must have some sort of sensitive medium (if not substratum), for any sort of active or passive relation. As Stockl justly remarks (*Hist. Phil.*, § 35, 18), Aristotle's theory of God (as Pure Form) is "undoubtedly the weakest point in his system".

(b) Gilbert was followed by most of the later Schoolmen; including Ockham: In SS., I., D. 22, Q. 1. Thomas Aquinas broadly opposed the Master of the Sentences; (saying in the final words of *S.T.*, I., Q. 29, A. 1) with regard to the *Anima Separata*: "Non competit ei, neque diffinitio Personae, neque

¹⁹ Gabriel Biel: In SS., I., D. 23, Q. 1, A. 1 (*Ens completum*). The reference to Boethius (on *Prima Substantia*) is: In *Categorias Aristotelis*, I. (De Substantia). Vasquez, however (unlike Bellarmine), affirms, when discussing the Personality of Christ: In *Thomam*, III., *Disp.* 69, cap. 2, N. 9: "Persona enim inferior est hypostasi": meaning that *Persona* is a kind of *Hypostasis*. The latter he seems to equate with *Suppositum* rather than *Substantia*. Petrus Hispanus (†1277 as Pope John XXI.), whose *Summulae Logicales* came next perhaps to the Lombard Sentences in vogue as a Mediaeval textbook, did not deal directly with *Persona* or *Suppositum*. But in Tr. VII. (De Suppositionibus seu Terminorum Proprietatibus), he frequently uses *personalis* and *personaliter* with a clearly individual signification. *Personalis Suppositio* (i.e. *Personalitas*) is defined in § 4, as: "Acceptio termini communis pro suis inferioribus" (i.e. particulars or denoted individuals). As Ueberweg explains (*Hist. Phil.*, § 104): "When *supponere* is used transitively, the *termini* are the *supponentia*, and the individuals the *supposita*". John of Damascus occasionally (e.g. *Dialectica*, 42) uses *Prosōpon* to signify individual. But he never applies it to the Trinity. His word in that connexion is always *Hypostasis*: e.g., *Pistis Orthodoxos*, III., 6.

nomen". But in Q. 77, AA. 5 and 8, there are qualifying statements, which confuse the issue. While not disputing the Aristotelian principle: "Sentire non est proprium animae, neque corporis, sed conjuncti"; (*De Somno*, 1); he maintains: "Quaedam operationes sunt animae, quae exercentur sine organo corporali, ut intelligere et velle; unde potentiae, quae sunt harum operationum principia sunt in anima, sicut in subiecto". He concluded in A. 5: "Quaedam vero sentit sine corpore, id est, non existentia in corpore, sed solum in apprehensione animae, sicut enim cum sentit se tristari vel gaudere de aliquo audito". These Potencies of Joy and Sorrow, however: "sunt in anima separata, non secundum appetitum sensitivum, sed secundum appetitum intellectivum, sicut in Angelis". Scholastic *Potentia*, according to De Wulf (*Medieval Philosophy*, § 285), meant Substantial Reality.

9. The Schoolmen were too acute, not to see that the Abstract Person of Tertullian was logically incongruous with the concrete person of Boethius. The more candid of them admitted that *Persona* had more than one signification. "Nomen Persona varia significabat": Duns Scotus expressly declared (*R.P.*, D. 25, Q. 1); though he did little to clear the already dense confusion. He indeed threw down a new bone of contention: the alleged negative²⁰ character of Personality. "Per solam negationem additam naturae sit persona": *Opus Oxon.*, III., D. 1, Q. 1, Scholium 4. Scholium 6 explains this as *Negatio communicabilitatis*; which is only a roundabout way of saying that a Person, being an individual substance, must be indivisible. His editor Wadding's chief collaborator, John Ponce of Cork, copiously controverts the Scotian subtlety in a long note: pp. 135-166 of Tom. VII. From

²⁰ Possibly he took the hint from Henry of Ghent († 1293), the most Platonic of the Schoolmen: "Ratio individuationis, . . . quae est ratio constitutiva suppositi, est negatio": *Quodlibeta*, V., Q. 8, p. 246; also *Summa*, Art. 39, Q. 4, § 19 (vol. i., p. 635). The Solemn Doctor seems likewise to have anticipated, if he did not suggest, Comte's most blatant paradox: "L'homme proprement dit n'est, au fond, qu' 'une pure abstraction; il n'y a de réel que l'humanité, surtout dans ordre intellectuel et moral": *Philosophie Positive*, Leçon 58 (p. 692 of vol. vi.). Comte's meaning is perhaps more clearly, as well as concisely, expressed, in Edward Caird's sympathetic sentence: "The school of Locke had generally set aside the abstract universal in favour of the equally abstract individual": *Social Philosophy of Comte*, 61. Verily, here is a *stultiloquium*, worthy of those Hyperstoics, whom Seneca derided in his 113th Epistle; for making four new "Animals" out of the Cardinal Virtues! Is not an Individual a percept (or intuitive cognition); from which a Quality may be abstracted to form a singular concept, and be afterwards combined with other singular concepts to form a General Concept? See De Wulf on H. of G., in his *Phil. Schol. dans les Pays Bas*, ch. iii., § 5. And H. of G., *Quodlibeta*, VII., 1 and 2.

this it appears that the Thomists were followed by Durand, Ockham, and Suarez, as well as Vasquez, in taking the Common-Sense view: "Persona constituitur per aliquid positivum superadditum naturae": as expressed by Scotus himself (*loc. cit.*). Obviously the Boethian *Persona* adds the quality of Rationality (and by implication of Life) to *Suppositum*, just as *Suppositum* adds the quality of Individuality to *Substantia*.

(b) Spinoza long afterwards set out a general principle: "Demonstratio est negatio" (Epistle 50). But this was in referring to geometrical figures, and was intended only for mathematical application. In his *Intellectus Emendatio* (XIII., 96), he positively declared: "All definition must be affirmative". All limitation, whether by words or lines, or walls or cuticles, must indeed be both positive and negative. It necessarily excludes as well as includes; but in definition the inclusion is the primary purpose. The Boethian definition of Person is, after all, nearly satisfactory, if *Rationalis* be understood as implying *Sensitivae*. But it would be improved by the express substitution of the latter word. For, Sensation is sufficient without Intellection. But intellection is impossible without previous sensation; Malebranche notwithstanding.

(c) Peter Lombard (in his *SS.*, I., 22, 23, 26) tried apparently, though his language is rather loose, to get over the dogmatic difficulty, by treating the Singular and Plural of *Persona* as radically different in meaning. The former signified Substance or Essence, and the latter Relations: both the mutual relations of Father and Son, *Paternitas* and *Filiatio*; and the relations between them and the Holy Spirit (*Spiratio activa communis* on their part, and *S. passiva* on his part). The divine names were also to be considered, "relativé ad creaturam": I., D. 22, B. Durand inclines in the same direction: *In SS.*, I., D. 23, Q. 1 (18, 19, 20). But that solution was rejected by Richard of St. Victor (*De Trinitate*, IV., 9); Alexander of Hales (*U.T.S.*, Part 1, Q. 56, M. 6); and even Duns Scotus (*R.P.*, D. 26, Q. 1, Scholium 2). Scotus, however, proceeds in Scholium 3, to give other reasons for agreeing with the "Sententia Communis"; to the effect that Divine Persons are "constituted by Relations": as Durand soon afterwards said of *Supposita* generally: *In SS.*, I., D. 4, Q. 1, § 10. Thomas did not follow the Master as to the Grammatical distinction, but held: "Persona in divinis significat simul essentiam et relationem, . . . relationem in recto, et essentiam in obliquo": *S.T.*, I., Q. 29, A. 4. Durand's conclusion is similar in content, but different in

arrangement. His *Persona* designates Essence and imports Relation, as already noted in section 7c. Hales had nearly anticipated Durand's conclusion, in his *U.T.S.*, Part I., Q. 57, AA. 1, 2, 3; where *Essentia* is very fully discussed in connexion with *Persona*. Suarez distinctly pronounces: "*Divinae Personae sunt relativae Personae*"; and goes on to explain: "*Neque essentia esse potest a parte rei sine qualibet relatione, neque relatio quolibet sine essentia*". *Metaphysica*, Disputation 7, § 3, N. 27. And so does Petavius: *De Incarnatione*, VIII., c. 10, § 15; "*personalis proprietates, quae in divinis personis est relatio*". The question is fully discussed in his *De Trinitate*, IV., c. 11.

10. Modern discussion, for the most part, has only darkened further what was dark enough before. Orthodox Western writers have been fettered or intimidated by the mysterious and incomprehensible "Athanasian Creed"; which happily has never been accepted by the Eastern Churches; and has been abandoned by many of the Protestant, including the Episcopal Church in the United States of America. It has never had a syllable of Scriptural or Oecumenical authority; and, as Harnack remarks in his *History of Dogma*,²¹ nobody knows exactly how, or when, it came to secure general recognition in the Mediæval Latin Office of Prime. The most outstanding relevant events are; the issue of a Diocesan Capitulary by Bishop Hatto of Basel in 822, enjoining the repetition of the *Fides Sancti Athanasii* on Sundays at Prime;²² and the extension of this direction in 856 to all the Frankish clergy by the *Capitula Ecclesiastica*²³ of the Emperor Lewis II. Dr. Lumby has told us, in his *History of the Creeds* (1873), ch. v., p. 260; that the Athanasian Canticle (nearly in its present form) is found in the Prayerbook of Charles the Bald, compiled circa 870. But Canon Swainson says in his work on *The Creeds* (1875), ch. xxxv., § 2, p. 507: "I cannot find that the Church of Rome has ever formally accepted the document" (*Quicunque*). On his title-page and elsewhere, he follows Hinkmar of Rheims (circa 858) in calling it a "Sermon on the Faith". It was ignored by the Council of Trent, and in the Roman Catechism founded on that Council's decrees. Only in England was it ever in daily use: before it was confined to the six great Festivals in the Prayerbook of 1549.

²¹ Harnack: *H.D.*, Part II., Book II., ch. vi., § 2: note 5 to p. 304 of vol. v. in English.

²² Mansi: *Acta Conciliorum*, XIV., 395: *Capitulare* (4) of Bishop Hatto of Basel, A.D. 822.

²³ *Monumenta Germaniae Historica* (G. H. Pertz), *Legum*, Tom. I., p. 439: *Cap. Eccl.*, 4 (A.D. 856).

(b) The Gallic compilers of these imposingly antithetic "Sacred Paradoxes" had taken a lesson from Tertullian's Bar-bluff in another field of controversy: "Bene impudens et felicitur stultus":²⁴ and gloried in the shame of their own systematic self-contradiction. As Harnack says of Augustine (*H.D.*, IV., 130), they "revelled in the incomprehensible". Just so did Anselm bludgeon the critics of his arbitrary unreason, with his paralysing: "Credo ut intelligam".²⁵ Mystery and "Profundity" have always been the mask and the cloak of Imposture. The truthful teacher seeks above all things to be intelligible to all men. Candour and Clarity must be the accepted keynotes of True Religion, as they are of True Science and True Philosophy. If a Philosopher cannot make his meaning clear to a classically educated man of moderate intellect, the fair presumption is: either he wishes to befog some cherished *Contradictio-in-adjecto*: or, he has no meaning worth the trouble of unravelling.

11. Let us now recapitulate. The word Person has so many customary and more or less legitimate meanings, not to mention imposing verbal juggles, that it ought never to be used in controversy or exposition without some limiting prefix or affix. When this precaution is neglected, we may fairly assume that an Ethical Person is meant: that is, a sensitive living being, considered as the potential subject of Natural Wrongs and Rights, in the light of Divine Ideal Justice. All the tolerably candid and lucid argumentative uses of the word may be grouped under six heads in a roughly historical order. All of them, metaphorical as well as material, spring from the Latin word *Persona*, which has never been defined in Roman Law, nor in any philosophical work not principally concerned with Christian Theology. The first definition, by any authoritative writer, is that given in ch. 3 of the *De Persona et Duabus Naturis* (Christi); generally (though doubtfully) ascribed to Boethius, who died in A.D. 525: "*Persona est naturae rationalis individua substantia*". It was sometimes expressed by later writers: "*rationabilis naturae individua subsistentia*". Or, "*individuum rationalis substantiae*": as by Hugo of St. Victor († 1141) in his *De Sacramentis*, II., Part 1, ch. 11.

(A) DRAMATIC. *Persona* (like the Greek *Prosōpon*) was originally a very simple concrete object of perception: a

²⁴ Tertullian: *De Carne Christi*, 5. His notions about Personality and the Trinity may be gathered from his *Adversus Praxeam*, especially chaps. 7-12.

²⁵ Anselm of Canterbury: *Proslogion*, cap. 1 (finis). Compare Augustine (*Sermo*, 43, § 7): "Ut intelligas, crede".

Mask. It soon came to mean a Face, or the General Appearance of a Body; and then the Actor who wore the Mask, or the man whose words or appearance the Actor sought to reproduce. Lastly, by metonymy, it expressed the Actor's function of Representation, and the General Character or some conspicuous Quality of the Man, Beast, or Demon thus represented. The word *Larva*, originally another expression of Mask, underwent a parallel development through Scarecrow and Goblin into Ghost or Spirit. Linnæus was the first to use *Larva* in Zoology.

(B) FORENSIC or JURAL. *Persona* in Rome (unlike *Pro-sōpon* in Greece) passed by analogy from the Stage to the Forum: to describe the concrete subject of a legal relation or *plexus* of relations, and his abstract *Status*, Function, or Dignity. By successive extensions from the *Jus Civile* to the *Jus Gentium*, and the Ideal *Jus Naturale*, it became practically synonymous with Freeman, and then with Human Being. It next became a man's body as opposed to his property: a Somatic or Corporal Person, as we might say. And at last it degenerated into a convenient double-gendered part of common speech: a Colloquial or Grammatical Person,²⁶ without any legal or controversial significance. This elimination of the jural content, from the shell of the legal term, made possible the genesis of the Physical or Natural Person.

(C) FICTITIOUS or METAPHORICAL. This was a very special variety of the Jural Person, deserving a separate position in classification, on account of its far-reaching Historical effectiveness, in mystifying Ethical, Political, and Theological Controversy. Parallel with the normal Jural Person, there had grown up a lateral metaphorical use of the

²⁶ It is an open question, however, whether the Grammatical Person ought not to be treated separately from the Colloquial, and derived directly from the Dramatic. Abelard used the Grammatical Person to illustrate the Theological Person of the Trinity: *Introductio ad Theologiam*, II., 12, 13: "Idem homo et prima sit persona secundum quod loquitur, et secunda secundum quod ad eum aliquis loquitur, et tertia secundum quod de ipso inter aliquos sermo est. Et prima quidem persona, ceterarum principium est quoddam et origo seu causa. . . . Sicut autem juxta Grammaticos persona sub disjunctione facilius describitur hoc modo: Persona est qui loquitur, sive ad quem loquitur, vel de quo tanquam diverso loquitur, ita et divinae personae sub disjunctione patentius describi, hoc modo videntur." See also ch. 13 of his *Epitome Theologiae Christianae*: supposed by some to have been compiled by his disciples, and to be the groundwork of the Lombard Sentences. The parallel cannot be deemed very close, unless Abelard's real notion of the Trinity was like Tertullian's: three mutually related phases or functions of the divine Individual Substance.

term; to express the legal relations of a definite noun of multitude (*Collegium*), a personified machine like the *Fiscus*, or a mere conceptual *Suppositum* like the *Haereditas jacens*: the tangle of rights and obligations forming a derelict or undetermined heritage. These were the *Personae Juris* which Austin calls: "Persons by a figment and for the sake of brevity in discourse". Such Persons in English Law are The Crown, and any Corporation. The invention of them has powerfully stimulated the vicious intellectual habits of materiating metaphor; and of personifying nouns of multitude, or machinery of collective action, or even formulas of qualitative Abstraction. And nothing has done more to foster hypocritical Tyranny and Dishonesty, than the fraudulent conversion of jural and other fictitious persons, into natural and moral persons endowed with imaginary Rights Divine. *Semper et ubique: Dolus latet in generalibus*. In the trenchant language of the English Pragmatist leader: "The idolatry of Concepts deludes us into thinking that Man was made for Ideas": F. C. S. Schiller: *Studies in Humanism*, 43-44 (From Plato to Protagoras). Metaphor is the modern substitute for Magic. The old illiterate idolater worshipped the work of his own hands. The new semiliterate idolater worships the tool of his own brains.

(D) PHYSICAL or NATURAL. The germ of this concept, as we have seen under (B), grew upon the Colloquial or Grammatical Person, who had resulted from the diversion and partial decomposition of the Jural Person in his greatest extension. Physical Natural Persons are Individual Substances or portions of matter; each containing a Centre of Sensation,²⁷ and being therefore capable of experiencing Pain. This was the kind of Person whom Boethius had in his mind, and his definition would have been sufficient, if he had used the term *Sensitiva* instead of *Rationalis*: of which indeed it ought to be held an implied presupposition. For, "Nihil est in intellectu, quod non prius fuerit in sensu". And this, too, coincided nearly with the substratum of the normal Person in Roman Law, excluding merely fictitious *Personae Juris*. In Christian Theology this concept of Natural Rational Personality embraced not only all Living

²⁷ Foreshadowed perhaps in the Aristotelian *Mesôtês* and the Platonic *To Mesomphaion*. Plants differed from Animals in lacking such a *Mesôtês*; whose seat was the heart, according to Aristotle's *History of Animals*, VIII., 1. See also his *Parts of Animals*, III., 4. In his *De Vita et Morte* (3), the heart is called "pantôn tôn aisthêtêrion koinon aisthêtêrion": (omnium sensoriorum commune sensorium). A Physiologist might prefer to say: an Isolated and Self-contained Sensory Circuit: rather than a Centre of Sensation.

Men, but Angels and Devils; sometimes also Disembodied Human Souls; and even the One Divine Substance: who must be sensitive in some way, because He is always conceived as capable of experiencing Joy and Sorrow.²⁸ But Bentham was the first effective thinker, who extended the quality of Personality to all of God's sensitive creatures, in proportion to their degrees of sensibility. To him the only test-question was: "Can they suffer?" Pain was "the only evil": *Principles of Morals and Legislation*, ch. x. Pain is indeed the most certain and positive thing in the Universe. And Freedom from (severe unmerited) Pain is the one indispensable condition of any life worth living.

(E) ETHICAL or MORAL. This is a Physical Person, or Sensitive Substance, considered as the subject of Wrongs and Rights under Divine or Ideal Equity: apart from any system of Human Positive Law. And this, like the Physical Person, was not expressly treated by the philosophers of Greece and Rome, though often consciously or unconsciously assumed. The nearest Greek equivalents for Individual and Person were *Atomos* and *Idiotēs*. Mundane Moral Personality has long been impiously restricted to the Genus *Homo*, by the exclusive arrogance of self-exalting Anthropologists, who call themselves Christians. But there is now a growing moral assent to the Personality of all God's children, on the basis and in the degree of their capacity of suffering.²⁹ The One True God, although a Sensitive Substance to whom Sin causes Pain, cannot be an Ethical Person, because a supreme lawgiver cannot in strict language be the subject of Wrongs and Rights. And a Person of the Trinity cannot be an Ethical Person, because he is Abstract, has no Substance, and therefore can have no feelings. A supposed concrete person, who is not an individual substance, can be nothing but a verbal juggle. A Metaphorical Person likewise cannot be an Ethical Person. It may have a Legal Right. But it can never have any Right in Natural Equity. For, it has no feelings, and therefore can suffer no Wrong.

²⁸ "God must be thought of as feeling pleasure—yes and (as far as I can see) pain also, or something like pain": Canon Rashdall on *Personality*, in *Personal Idealism* (Oxford Essays, edited by H. Sturt), p. 387. *Divinus* was the Classical Latin equivalent of our modern Ethical word *Ideal*.

²⁹ May we not infer such assent on the part of William James, from what he says on p. 69 of his Lecture on *Human Immortality*: "If any creature lives for ever, why not all?—why not the patient brutes"? Locke seems to have entertained a similar opinion: *Human Understanding*, II., ch. xxix., §§ 5-8. And Bishop Butler allowed it to be probable: *Analogy*, I, chap. i., § 21. See also Canon Rashdall in *Personal Idealism*, p. 374.

(F) (1) THEOLOGICAL. Some would bestow this name on the Ethical Person, considered as a potential subject of blissful or baneful immortality. But the only strictly Theological Person is a Person of the Trinity: a merely abstract person in origin and intelligible validity, but practically the weightiest of all persons in History and Controversy; and second only to the Fictitious Person, as the most fertile source of deception and confusion in Moral and Political Philosophy. As conceived by his originator Tertullian, he was essentially Dramatic, with a savour of Jural Personality in its earliest form: the notion of legal *Status* or Function. And that is the only rational self-consistent meaning which he can ever sustain. But he has been distorted, obscured, and turned into impossible nonsense, by the stupid or disingenuous attempts of subsequent dogmatic tinkers, to cram the connotations of Physical and Ethical Personality into Tertullian's rudimentary concept of Relation in Phase and Function. Controversy very soon began, because the word was ambiguous from the beginning. Tertullian's use was only Abstract, and intended to describe the most prominent Qualities, Relations, Phases, Active Modes, or Modal Accidents of the Substance, Jehovah. As Harnack explains (*H.D.*, IV., 121); he regarded Son and Spirit as: "Subordinate to the Father; in fact transitory manifestations". His God was a concrete *Ens Reale*, an Essence, an Existence: but also a rational individual substance, and therefore a Person as afterwards defined by Boethius.

(F) (2) The One true God, as a Person, does not, however, come under this heading. He is a Natural Physical Person: (*Natura Naturans*,³⁰ according to Aquinas, *S.T.*, I.-II., Q. 85, A. 6): and a Sensitive Substance. Nor does it include the *Persona Ecclesiae*: Bishop, Chapter, or Rector. That is a special variety of the Jural Person, as a subject of positive legal rights. He was the sort of Person appearing most frequently in the *Corpus* of the Canon Law; where his Dignity is spoken of as his *Personatus*. It notices also the *Persona Miserabilis* (Pauper Suitor), *Persona principalis* (as distinguished from his advocate or procurator), and some other varieties of the Jural Person. But it makes no allusion to anything like a Physical or Ethical Person. Even Reiffenstuel and Van Espen, the great critical and expository Canonists of the early eighteenth century, make no attempt at any general or Ethical definition of Person or Personality. The

³⁰ See Vincent of Beauvais; *Speculum Doctrinale*, XV., 4. And Spinoza: *Ethics*, I. (Concerning God), Proposition 29 (note).

Canonical Sin of *Acceptio Personarum*, mischievously mis-rendered "Respect of Persons" in our English Bible, is the sin of an unjust Judge in favour of one party against the other and better-deserving. And we shall do well, before leaving the subject-matter of Personality, to explode the poisonous vulgar error, which has grown out of that ambiguous translation.

12. The Greek word *Prosōpolēpsia*, so unhappily mis-translated Respect of Persons in our Jacobean Bible, was not understood in the modern popular sense of the English words, by Peter and James, or even by Luke and Paul. To them it meant Judicial Partiality: especially the kind of partiality which judged hastily on first impression of superficial appearance: in vulgar English, "Taking a man at his face-value"; and jumping to conclusions without a full and fairly-balanced enquiry. *Prosōpon*, like *Persona*, meant first of all a *mask*, and afterwards also a *face*. And Face is likewise the meaning of the Hebrew *Pānim*, in the parallel passages of the Old Testament, to which we must trace the origin or suggestion of the more notorious phrases of the New. The most enlightening of these sentences is the command in *Leviticus* xix., 15: "Non consideres personam pauperis, nec honores vultum potentis. Juste judica proximo tuo." There have always been class-hating or butter-hunting judges, who systematically favour the poorer or otherwise inferior party: e.g., Coleridge, "The Poacher's Judge" of an Early Victorian Lincolnshire ballad; Monahan, C.J., in Mid-Victorian Ireland; and Gorrie, C.J., in Later Victorian Fiji and Trinidad.

(b) *Respectus Personarum* is Canine Latin: neither Classical, nor Jural, nor Patristic, nor even Scholastic. The Vulgate always uses *Acceptio*; but in modern editions (from 1624) *Respectus* appears in the headlines of the second chapter in the *Epistle of James*, as well as the nineteenth chapter of *Leviticus*. It seems to have been borrowed from the *Notationes in Scripturam* of the Casuist Emmanuel Saa (1598), which are appended to the chapters of the Antwerp (Plantin) Vulgate of 1624. His use of the word, however, is not honorific. The division into chapters and verses is itself no older than Archbishop Stephen Langton (†1228). *Respectus* does not appear in the many elaborate Indices of Migne's *Patrologia Latina*; ³¹ and the only reference there

³¹ See, however, vol. cxix., p. 518: "Reddite potius Deo vota vestra, xxx in quo absque respectu dignitatum aut personarum, unusquisque recipiet quod meretur". It occurs in Epistle 53 of Abbot Servatus Lupus (†862), the ally of Gottschalk in regard to Predestination of Damnation; and was addressed to the Emperor Charles the Bald.

given is one to Augustine: *Contra Duas Epistolas Pelagianorum*, II., 7 (13). Augustine's words closely resemble those of the Levitical command. *Acceptio* is likewise the word used by Thomas Aquinas, late in the Thirteenth Century: *S.T.*, I.-II., Q. 97, A. 4, and II.-II., Q. 63, A. 1. His discussion of the matter may be studied by the English reader in Rickaby's *Aquinas Ethicus* (I., 299-300, and II., 34-38). The modern Jesuit translator of the Angelic Doctor has adopted the English Protestant mistranslation of *Acceptio*, probably because it has become part of the current English language. Compare Duns Scotus: "Personarum acceptio non est, nisi adsit ratio debiti:" *Opus Oxon.*, I., D. 41, Q. 1 (14).

(c) The first appearance of the phrase in English was due to Bishop Coverdale in 1535. He translated *Proverbs* xxiv. 23: "It is not good to have respect of any persoune in judgement: (Cognoscere personam in iudicio non est bonum)". In the Great Bible of 1539 we find: "There is no respect of parsones with God": *Romans* ii. 11. Tyndale in 1526 had more faithfully rendered the sense of the similar passage in *Acts* x. 34: "Non est personarum acceptor Deus": by "God is not parciall". But there is no reason to suppose that Coverdale, any more than the subsequent "Authorised" Translators, intended anything like the modern Democratic refusal of honour to whom honour is due. That began with a Puritan perversion of their meaning. They used *Respect*, not in the honorific sense, but in the primary simple perceptive sense, surviving in such prepositional forms, as *respecting*, and *in respect of*, and *with respect to*. The envious abuse of *Respectus Personarum* was unknown to Ducange; as well as to Gratian of Bologna and other compilers of the Canon Law. The twelfth of the *Regulae Juris* appended to the *L. Sexti Decret.*, V., Title 12, runs thus: "In iudicio non est acceptio personarum habenda"; and there is no other reference to the matter in the *C. J. Canonici*. The Casuists use the same (or some similar) formula. See in particular Laymann: *Theol. Mor.*, IV., 15 (6): "Peccatum acceptionis personarum non committitur, nisi antecedit aliquod debitum iustitiae". And compare Hobbes (*Leviathan*, I., 15) on *Acception of Persons*, as the conduct of an Arbitrator, who is "partiall in judgement": and who acts on first appearance instead of final probability.

(d) *Respectus* (honoris causa) is not to be found in the *Corpus Juris Civilis*;²² which gives no countenance to the

²² The prepositional *Respectu Personarum* occurs: e.g., *Digest*, XVI., T. 3, Fr. 31, § 1. It was also a common Scholastic phrase, meaning

fustian of the Old Bailey. On the contrary we find approval of *Reverentia personarum* in the *Digest*, under the Title *De Testibus* (XXII., 5, Fr. 3, §§ 5 and 6, Callistratus). The *condicio* of the witness must be "explored," and the *Decurio* must outweigh the *Plebeius*. "*Testimonia non sunt numeranda sed ponderanda*," by every court that knows its business and does its duty. As any just judge would say in the Twentieth Century: "The word of Lord Roberts must count for more, than the oaths of all the canteen-sergeants who ever took tips from an Army-Contractor". The Canon Law was identical with the Roman Civil in doctrine and practice. Innocent III. declared, A.D. 1205: "*Ad multitudinem tantum respicere non oportet, sed ad testium qualitatem*": *Decretal.* (Greg. IX.), II., Tit. 28 (*De Testibus*), cap. 32. And Reiffenstuel, commenting on this chapter, closely follows the words of the *Digest* to which he refers: "*Judex ex officio suo debat inquirere de conditione testium. . . . Interrogatoria generalia, statum et conditionem ipsorum concernentia*": *Jus Canonicum Universum* (1700), Tom. II., p. 264. But Van Espen strangely ignores the matter in his *Jus Ecclesiasticum Universum* (also A.D. 1700): except for a slight allusion in Part III., Title 7, ch. VI., § 51.

13. If Personality be a matter of Degree, as Canon Rashdall admits (in *Personal Idealism*, 374), Respect of Persons (*honoris causa*) must be an indispensable condition of Righteousness in every department of legislation, adjudication, and administration. To assert the justice of equality in credit, courtesy, and other matters of consideration; except when all the circumstances of the two persons (or two cases) are substantially equal; is logically, to break the First Commandment. If every man be not a God; the equal of Jehovah: men must be unequal *inter se*; like the individuals of every other genus of Jehovah's creatures, from ants to angels. Nobody ever says that all dogs are equal, or that one horse is as good as another. Any dealer, who did so, would soon have no customers but expectant cheats. And yet, their differences are far slighter than the difference between the highest man and the lowest.

(b) "Equality before the Law" of Man is an obvious systematic outrage on the Equity of God. For, if equals be added to unequals, the wholes are unequal. "*Personarum acceptio*": said Melancthon (*Ep. Coloss. Arg.*): "*est dare*

"Concerning Persons": e.g., Durand, *In SS.*, I., D. 34 (3). Henry of Ghent regularly uses the phrase: "*Relatio sive Respectus*": in his *Quodlibeta*, VII., Q. 2.

inaequalia aequalibus, *aut aequalia inaequalibus*". Ulpian said, "Suum cuique," not *idem cuique*; because everybody's (divine ideal) due is different from that of everybody else. No two *Individua sensitiva*, and no two cases of practical controversy, can be exactly alike to the eye of Omniscience. Man's use of the General Concept and other brain-tools is not a stamp of dignity, but a consequence of limitations. Anthropomorphism never ran riot more absurdly than in the topsy-turvy phantasy of Averroes and Avicenna, that Allah knows nothing but Universals, and takes no cognition of Particulars.³³ God has no need of principles, though framing some for our guidance. We, with our feeble and uncertain intellectual penetration, cannot always reach the divine ideal of Justice on the Case; and are forced to classify, in order to get a fair tale of work done within our limits of time and strength. But that incapacity is no excuse for not trying to get as near as we can; by supplementing well-tested, progressively improved, and mutually corrective standards of grouping, with keen individual observation, whenever the equities of time and cost will permit.

(c) Perfect equality, as Hume has pointed out (*Human Nature*, I., 2, § 4): "is a mere fiction of the mind, and useless as well as incomprehensible". And "we can never say, except at a risk, that two actual things are equivalent": declares Alfred Sidgwick; the most penetrating and clarifying writer on Logic since William of Ockham; in his *Use of Words in Reasoning*, 22. "The single cells, which make up the organs of the individuals of a species, have a different position and

³³ Plato seems to affiliate this wind-egg on Parmenides. See his *Parmenides*, 134. Moses Maimonides adopted the Arabian ineptitude, with a modification in favour of particulars of the Universal *Homo*: *Guide to the Perplexed*, Part III., ch. xvii., p. 236, in Friedlander's Translation. For Avicenna and Averroes, see Stockl's *History of Philosophy*, § 83 (24), and § 84 (10). In § 127 (2 and 3) he notes the very similar view of Henry of Ghent, who will not admit any distinct idea of an individual in the mind of God: the *Species Specialissima* (or *Infima*) being His lowest object of cognition: *Quodlibeta*, VII., Q. 1, foot of folio 386d. Compare De Wulf's *Medieval Philosophy*, § 324; and *Philosophie Scholastique dans les Pays Bas*, ch. iii., § 5 (p. 204) and § 6 (p. 236). For the Pragmatic view, see Schiller's *Humanism*, ch. vii. (Reality and Idealism), p. 126: "If we are to hazard any assertions concerning Omniscience, is it not clear that it could have no use for universals". And compare Hamilton's successor: A. C. Fraser, in his *Biographia Philosophica*, v. 201: "Evolution of conclusions from premises . . . was a mark of limited intelligence and experience. . . . Divine Intelligence does not need to syllogise or generalise". In this matter at least, both are Occamists. "Non intelligit Deus aliquem se per ideas, quod ideae nec movent intellectum divinum, nec sunt intellectus ipse, nec objectum medium inter Deum et alia se cognita" wrote the Singular and Invincible Doctor: *In Sententias*, I., D 35, Q 5 (*Conclusio* 7).

size in each individual": says the exact and Empeiric Hans Driesch, in his *Problem of Individuality* (65). No two men, as a matter of fact, ever have been, or ever will be exactly equal; and the difference between (let us say) a typical Canon of Christchurch, and a typical Jingo Bully, is far greater than the difference between the Jingo and a Blue-nosed Baboon. All Justice is a matter of Proportion and Degree: as Aristotle forever established in his *N. Ethics* (V., 6 and 7). But Equality is the negative of Proportion as well as Gradation. And therefore, in a world of multiform actual inequalities, Equality is the greatest enemy of Equity, if not the very Essence of Iniquity. Roman *Aequitas*, like the Greek *Epieikeia*, did not mean forced uniformity, but the restoration of a disturbed balance of established Proportion. The Puritan Sham-Sin of "Respect of Persons" is only the latter-day trap-cant, of the primal and primatial Sin of Anthropolatry. The Lust of Equality, not the love of money, is the taproot of evil. Eve and Adam were not tempted with gold, or gems, or any pleasure of sense. "Ye shall be as Gods": said the Serpent; and the bait was swallowed.