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Claudiu D. Tufiș, *Learning Democracy and Market Economy in Post-Communist Romania*

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Claudiu D. TUFÎȘ

**Learning Democracy and Market Economy
in Post-Communist Romania**

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List of abbreviations

ANOVA	Analysis of Variance
APADOR-CH	Association for the Protection of Human Rights in Romania – Helsinki Committee (Asociația Pentru Apărarea Drepturilor Omului din România – Comitetul Helsinki)
APSR	American Political Science Review
BJPS	British Journal of Political Science
BOP	Public Opinion Barometer (Barometrul de Opinie Publică)
BOR	Orthodox Romanian Church (Biserica Ortodoxă Română)
CDR	Democratic Convention of Romania (Convenția Democrată Română)
CEE	Central and Eastern Europe
CFSN	Council of the National Salvation Front (Consiliul Frontului Salvării Naționale)
CNSLR – Frăția	National Confederation of the Free Trade Unions in Romania – The Brotherhood (Confederația Națională a Sindicatelor Libere din România – Frăția)
COMECON	Council for Mutual Economic Assistance
CP	Comparative Politics
CPS	Comparative Political Studies
CPUN	Provisional Council of National Unity (Consiliul Provizoriu de Uniune Națională)
CURS	Center for Urban and Regional Sociology (Centrul de Sociologie Urbană și Regională)
D+M+	Pro democracy, pro market economy
D+M-	Pro democracy, against market economy
D-M+	Against democracy, pro market economy
D-M-	Against democracy, against market economy
DSD	Diffuse support for democracy
DSDv	Diffuse support for democratic values
DSM	Diffuse support for market economy
DSMlib	Diffuse support for the liberal model of market economy
DSMsd	Diffuse support for the social democratic model of market economy
DK/NA	Don't Know / No Answer
ECHR	European Court of Human Rights
EU	European Union
EVS	European Values Survey
FDSN	National Democratic Salvation Front (Frontul Democrat al Salvării Naționale)
FSN	Front of National Salvation (Frontul Salvării Naționale)

FSU	Former Soviet Union
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
HSD	Honestly Significant Difference
ICPSR	Interuniversity Consortium for Political and Social Research
IMAS	Institute for Marketing and Polls (Institutul de Marketing și Sondaje)
IMF	International Monetary Fund
JOP	Journal of Politics
KMO	Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin
KR-20	Kuder-Richardson 20
MAR	Missing at Random
MBA	Master of Business Administration
MI	Multiple Imputation
ML	Maximum Likelihood
MMT	Metro Media Transylvania (Metro Media Transilvania)
MP	Member of Parliament
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NGO	Non-Governmental Associations
NMS	New Member States
NUTS	Nomenclature of Territorial Units for Statistics (Nomenclature des Unités Territoriales Statistiques)
OECD	Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development
OLS	Ordinary Least Squares
PD	Democratic Party (Partidul Democrat)
PDSR	Romanian Party of Social Democracy (Partidul Democrației Sociale din România)
PLD	Liberal Democrat Party (Partidul Liberal Democrat)
PR	Republican Party (Partidul Republican)
PSD	Social Democratic Party (Partidul Social Democrat)
PSDR	Romanian Social Democratic Party (Partidul Social Democrat Român)
PNL	National Liberal Party (Partidul Național Liberal)
PNTCD	Christian Democratic National Peasants' Party (Partidul Național Țărănesc Creștin și Democrat)
PRM	Greater Romania Party (Partidul România Mare)
RIQL	Research Institute for the Quality of Life (Institutul de Cercetare a Calității Vieții)
SAR	Romanian Academic Society (Societatea Academică din România)
SES	Socio-Economic Status
SIR	Sampling Importance / Resampling Algorithm
SSD	Specific support for democracy
SSM	Specific support for market economy
TARDIS	Time and Relative Dimensions in Space
TSI	Trust in the state's institutions
TTI	Trust in traditional institutions
TVR	Romanian Television (Televiziunea Română)
UB	University of Bucharest (Universitatea București)

UDMR	Democratic Union of Hungarians in Romania (Uniunea Democrată a Maghiarilor din România)
UK	United Kingdom
USA	United States of America
USIA	United States Information Agency
USSR	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
WP	World Politics
WVS	World Values Survey
ZUMA	Center for Survey Research and Methodology (Zentrum für Umfragen, Methoden und Analysen)

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Foreword

Behind a book on social change: Its social and academic framework

Romania switched from communism to capitalism, from an authoritarian regime to democracy in the beginning of 1990. Or, maybe, in December 1989, when uprisings in Timișoara and, later, in Bucharest and the rest of the country made Nicolae Ceaușescu, the communist dictator, flee by helicopter in order to avoid the fury of the masses. Or a few months later, on the 20th of May 1990, when the first free elections after 45 years of communism were held. Or later, in 1992, when the first elections under the new constitution were held. Or, maybe, when the first rightist government came to power, in 1996. Thresholds are easy to be found. More difficult is saying what their meaning is, identifying when something really starts and when it ends. The post-communist transition is a good example. It may end when market economy and democracy are fully established, when alternation to power occurs smoothly, when the second alternation to power happens, when fulfilling criteria of external recognition, such as EU accession or NATO membership (Lavigne, 2000), when some commenter see the government as not being a successor of the Communist Party (Gross and Tismăneanu, 2005), or when democratic stability is reached and the risk of backsliding is prevented (Sasse, 2005). The end point might be even more complex, involving a transformation to comprise the whole continent and its reflexive modernization process, as Ray (1997, 2009) suggests.

Landmarks are however ... simple milestones. They do not say much about the process, but rather offer anchors for describing intimate processes of social change. Social change is complex enough to be perceived rather as a diffuse transformation, continuous and mostly silent, which has different triggers and starting points, and simultaneously goes on parallel paths. Post-communist transformations initially seemed teleological. However, the continuous change of the targeted ideal society, particularly in an age when Western democracies experience syndromes of late modernity, made the end points of the transition at most loose aims. From the beginning of their project, scholars of post-communism faced a tough task to describe changes and to explain how they occur. Setting up the scene, letting the audience know exactly when everything starts or finishes was always an almost impossible challenge.

More, most post-communist citizens experience an enduring utopia to build a “society that is better than the current one” (Velikonja, 2009). This makes them no different from other human beings, but since they are in explicit transition, it might produce the impression that this never ends.

Still, it is not the exact starting point and the accurate delimiting of the ending time that actually matter, but the mechanisms which turned rigid authoritarian regimes in more democratic ones. Such a process triggers interest for understanding humans, humankind and progress. They enable scholars and decision makers to derive lessons for future development. Such mechanisms, with their subtle peculiarities and delicate implications, are in the focus of Claudiu Tufiş’ book. Political culture, that is the soft part that supports a full societal transformation, is the main scope. The first 16 years after the communist breakdown are the time span that is referred to. Romania is the geographical boundary.

This makes the book a rare endeavor. There are probably less than a dozen tomes to address the post-communist transformation in Romania not using a historic, journalistic, institutional, memoirist, or economic perspective. Sociology and political science were rather lazy in providing facts and explanations for what actually happened with the individuals in this part of the world in the 1990s and the 2000s with respect to their thinking about the political transformations of the country and the economic restructuring. The reasons for international scholars to ignore Romania are nicely detailed by Diamandouros & Larrabee (2000, 2001) and King (2000), also quoted in the introductory chapter of this book. They include low political interest of foreign governments, lack of economic power in the area, and underdevelopment of the political organization of the society. Considering the local scholars, the weak development of Romanian social sciences in the 1990s may explain the relative scarcity of academic contributions devoted to transition. Both sociology and political science were forbidden and replaced by Marxism in the last decades of communism. They tried to reestablish as disciplines in the 1990s, but they were facing significant problems, including the lack of human resources, the need to update existing knowledge, the scarcity of connections with other academic communities, and low founding.

On the other hand, there are peculiarities of the Romanian society that make it an odd example even among former communist societies. At the beginning of the communist period, the state was rather weak, due to years of authoritarian rule, deep corruption, and unpredictable outcomes of the political process. Mostly agrarian, Romania knew the highest growth immediately after the big recession, and had experienced only half a century of relative democracy. In the early 1930s, King Carol the Second set up a semi-authoritarian and corrupt regime, backed up the Nazi Iron Guard, and in 1938 banned parties and started a

personal dictatorship. Carol the Second was actually excluded from succession in 1925, when his extramarital relations turned into a scandal. In 1925, he renounced to throne in favor of his son, Mihai, to become king four years later in 1929, at age eight, when his grandfather, King Ferdinand, died. Carol returned from exile in 1930, reneged the renunciation, and was proclaimed King a day later. Then he managed to control political parties, and banned them setting up a personal party to be the only one officially allowed to exist. He was forced to resign in 1939, but the political parties were not reestablished. Pro-German Marshal Ion Antonescu established a military rule under the King Mihai, to be interrupted only by the end of the Second World War, when the soviet army occupied Romania. Soon after, the communist regime came to power, resisting until December 1989.

Romanian communist rulers promoted strong nationalism. This was an easy way to gain legitimacy, in a country that lost about a quarter of its territory after the Second World War, mainly to USSR. The new rulers negotiated the retreat of the soviet army from the national territory, tolerated the Orthodox Church, and, later, made a goal from promoting the image of a developed country (Tănase, 1998; Voicu, 2005a). Starting with 1968, when Romania refused to participate in the soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia, President Nicolae Ceaușescu became an attraction for Western leaders, being seen as a potential defector from the Communist bloc¹. This gave him the freedom to completely swamp civic rights, to fully control society, in a state based on coercion, delation, and fear. As compared to Hungary, for instance, the economy virtually lacked any private property, and central planning was supposed to regulate even the most intimate details in any company. As compared to GDR, there was no other party than the communist one. There were no mass movements like in 1956 Hungary, 1968 Czechoslovakia, or like the late 1970s-early 1980s strikes in Poland to determine the founding of Solidarnosc. The government decided to be independent from foreign creditors and paid all foreign debt. The downside was long-lasting poverty and deprivation. In the end of the 1980s, Romanian television was broadcasting only two hours every day, missing even large sport competitions. Depending on the closest border, Romanians were watching Bulgarian, Hungarian, Serbian and even Moldavian (Soviet) national television channels. It was almost impossible to travel abroad, and law formally constrained interactions with foreign tourists. Strong material deprivation added to the picture. The very few Arabian, Greek or African students were sources for Western products otherwise impossible to shop from normal stores.

¹ See Tănase (1998) and Granville (2008) for detailed descriptions of the relative independence of Romania from Soviet influence.

The December 1989 turmoil led to confusing political premises². The President was summarily and secretly judged, condemned, and quickly executed. The Communist Party simply dissolved and, following popular demands, it was banned. New leaders took over the army and the secret police. More importantly, there was no elected or negotiated power structure to legitimately lead the country. Masses got into the street and imposed laws. An ad-hoc National Salvation Front (FSN) was established. Its founders included mainly the few known dissidents, most of them former members of the top-level communist nomenclature. They undertook the power in December 1989. Parties quickly started to be established. Some involved former members of the pre-War political elite who survived communism, political imprisonment, and exile. On 28th January 1990, the newly formed political parties organized a mass manifestation to protest against the lack of legitimacy of the FSN. A counter manifestation started, with miners coming to Bucharest to “reestablish” order. Anticommunist opponents to the new government would be again violently repressed by miners, at the request of authorities, in February 1990. Despite the violence in the streets, about twenty political parties were represented in the Provisional National Union Committee, a constituent assembly that prepared the May 1990 elections. FSN maintained half of the seats in this assembly. In March 1990, in the city of Târgu Mureş, Romanian and Hungarian ethnics violently confronted in the streets, not being able to agree on local interest issues, including education provision. In May 1990 the FSN leader, Ion Iliescu, is elected president with a large majority. Next month he calls the miners to Bucharest for the third time, violent repression of protesters being again the purpose. Just one year later, the FSN government is forced to resign during the fourth incursion of miners to Bucharest. This time the miners started the action by themselves, after a labor union strike. Their actions in the early 1990s, particularly the first three, enjoyed mass support from a majority which was not interested in the opinions of the minority. The minorities, in turn, were not able to find smoother communication ways, and were not very open to negotiations and compromises.

The above historical facts might be simple manifestations of low abilities to cooperate, which are said to have been swamped by the communist rule (Sztompka, 1993). One can find even deeper historical, pre-communist roots for low participation and capacity to collaborate for providing public goods (Voicu, 2010). No matter the cause, the effect is the one that the study of political culture in the 1990s and 2000s Romania should investigate.

² The excellent books of Ştefănescu (1995, 1998, 2000) provide detailed chronologies of the 1990s events. Tănase (1999) is another good source.

Romanian recent political history is less violent, and seems to reflect a society that quickly learns how to deal with the new order. A new constitution is approved by Referendum in December 1991, free elections are held in 1992, 1996, 2000 etc. Transfer of power occurs firstly in 1996, then in 2000. The country fails to be accepted as NATO member in 1999, when Poland, Hungary and Czech Republic join the military alliance. The same happens in 2004, when other former communist states become EU members, but not Romania. Later, in 2004, respectively 2007, Romania joined both NATO, respectively European Union. Meanwhile, economic recession is deep, but recovery starts in early 2000s, and growth rates are impressive after 2004. The global economic troubles become visible in Romania after 2008. Political parties flourished to more than 100 in early 1990s, and 17 were represented in the parliament after the 1990 elections. The set-up of an electoral threshold (3% in 1992 and 1996, and 5%, starting with 2000) limited both access to Parliament and the number of parties. FSN remained the dominant party, gathering more votes than any other in all elections. It claims a social-democrat ideology, changing its name accordingly (Social-Democrat Party – PSD). It provided the prime minister between 1992 and 1996, 2000 and 2004, as well as starting with 2012. PSD was also a junior member of the cabinet in 2008-2009. Ion Iliescu, an important member of the communist party who fell in Ceaușescu's disgrace, led FSN/PSD from its beginning in 1989 until the 2000s. He won elections as Romanian president in 1990, 1992 and 2000. In 1996, Iliescu lost against Emil Constantinescu, who was supported by a large coalition, perceived as being rightist, despite the fact that it also included a social-democratic party (one that eventually merged with Ion Iliescu's party). The Christian-Democrat National Party of Peasants (PNȚ-CD) was the main party in the 1996-2000 government, but it failed to attract voters after 2000. The National Liberal Party (PNL) is a constant presence on political scene, junior member in several coalition governments, particularly during 1996-2000. During 1990s it suffered several splits and reunifications. PNL was the main party in the 2004-2008 government, and it is a junior member in the current PSD government (May 2012 – present).

The Democrat-Liberal Party is the second successor of FSN, from which it separated in 1993. Starting with the late 1990s, the party oscillated between adopting a socialist, liberal, or conservative ideology. It has been part of the cabinet between 1996 and 1998. With Traian Băsescu as leader, PDL won the 2008 elections, providing the prime minister between 2008 and 2012. Băsescu is the president since 2004. Two nationalist parties (The National Unity Party -PUNR and The Great Romania Party - PRM) were very vocal until mid-2000s. The first one was active in the 1990s, but the ascension of PRM took it out of the main political scene by 2000. They gathered between 8% and 20% in the elections, but failed to pass the electoral threshold in 2008. Their best score

was an impressive 20% of the votes obtained by PRM in 2000. As a counterpart to nationalist parties, the Democratic Union of Magyars from Romania, the ethnic party representing the Hungarian minority, constantly received 5-7% of the votes.

Summing up, if putting together the various liberal parties that existed in the 1990s and that, eventually, reunited with their origin (PNL), there are only a few important parties. However, after decades of authoritarian, single-party rule, the new order might have seemed chaotic. The increase of the electoral threshold might be a sign that both voters and politicians preferred a simpler political system. The efforts of President Bănescu (2004-present) to control Parliament and to reduce its size provide hints in the same direction. Renouncing to proportional representation (d'Hondt method) in favor of uninominal voting can also be interpreted as a sign of mistrust in political parties and as an attempt to increase accountability. At the same time, intellectual elites are reluctant to participating in the political process, and this could be noticed since early 1990s. In the first free elections, there were two lists of independent candidates, all public figures legitimated mainly through their performance in arts, literature or philosophy. They refused to join any political party and tried to set up distinct public agendas. This attitude was salient over the entire period and it manifested again in the recent (2012) local elections, when Nicușor Dan, one of the candidates for the mayor of Bucharest seat, tried to mobilize his electorate claiming that the corrupt and incompetent political elite should be replaced by the intellectual elite that he represents.

This creates the general framework in which Claudiu Tufiș' book places its story about political culture. His interest goes directly to the two most visible processes that define the post-communist transformations: democratization and marketization. Transition, as such, is not a simple process. Immediately after 1990, the two-dimension idea dominated the literature. Achieving democracy and market economy were considered as main triggers and indicators for a successful societal change. The two elements were often seen as the missing part in the East-European societies to be modern. They were also in the focus of most post-communist scholars (Kuzio, 2001; Parish and Michelson, 1996; Pickel, 2002; Przeworski, 1996; Sandu, 1999: 9; Sawka, 1999; Stark and Bruszt, 2001: 6-7). According to Kubicek (2000), four fifths of the transition papers to appear in first flow journals in the 1990s were devoted to market reform and/or to democratization. But transition is not bi-dimensional. There are compelling arguments around considering other important changes: the reorientation of the external affairs, the changes in the social structure, the value changes in a double-risk society, etc. (Goldman, 1997; Kuzio, 2001; Pickvance, 1999; Rinkevicius, 2000).

Claudiu Tufiş' book apparently follows the two-dimension stream. However, focusing on political culture, the author addresses rather what I call "the fifth transition", that is the transformation of social values (Voicu, 2005a). There is an implicit option for seeing values and attitudes as adaptive to social environment³. Facing their new institutions and material conditions, Romanians experience a process of learning democracy and market rules, which shapes (and is shaped by) their political culture. This book investigates what happens with the citizens with respect to the transformations in the two dominant spheres: the politics and the economy. Unlike most literature on post-communist transformation, Claudiu Tufiş does not consider institutional changes or the level of the political elite, but focuses on individuals and on how political culture gives flesh to the entire process.

The book is unique at least in two other different ways. First, it considers a post-communist country which is rarely discussed as a case study. Second, it looks on change using longitudinal survey evidences, and describes dynamics over a long time span (1990-2006), also providing some almost unknown data. For selected points in time, cross-sectional analysis takes stock of intimate mechanisms that lead to support for democracy and market economy, confidence in various institutions, tolerance, various models of societal redistribution of income, etc. It is difficult to find similar volumes in the Romanian social sciences. Considering the longitudinal approach, probably the closest would be the analyses of religious values provided by Mălina Voicu (2007). Considering the cross-sectional analyses, Dumitru Sandu (1996, 1999) would be the closest. Both authors treat their topics from the perspective of the individuals, in the context of the post-communist transformations. "Learning democracy and market economy..." combines the two perspectives and addresses the two dominant transition themes – marketization and democratization.

As mentioned, there are not very many academic volumes on Romanian post-communism produced in sociology or political science. Although some are in English as well, most of them are available only or mainly in Romanian language (Câmpeanu, 2003; Chiribucă, 2004; Gavrilesco, 2006; King and Sum, 2011; Matei, 2004; Pasti, 1995; Pasti et al, 1998; Rotariu and Comşa, eds., 2005; Sandu, 1996, 1999; Tismăneanu, 1999; Vlăsceanu, 2001, 2007; Voicu, 2005a; Zamfir, 2004). Many of the attempts to describe or to explain post-communism either focus on what happened with the elites and institutions, either follow a semi-academic path, completely ignoring broader theories and explanations in social science, as well as the studies that have been done elsewhere. One may also consider publications in the first two-three flows of

³ See Arts (2011), Gundelach (2004) and Welzel (2007) for discussions on how values adapt to existing social conditions.

academic journals that refer to what happened during the past two decades with individuals in Romania, and provide quantitative empirical evidences in this respect. Excluding the papers that discuss the political elites (e.g. Stoica, 2004, 2005, 2006) and the ones which are rather speculative than academic, the number of such studies (books and papers) is unlikely to include much more than two or three dozen. Focusing on political culture as a whole is almost completely new, although the theme is partially covered in other studies (Bădescu and Radu, 2010; Bădescu et al, 2004; Sandu 1996, 1999; Voicu, 2005b; Voicu and Voicu, eds., 2007).

In the beginning of his book, Claudiu Tufiş introduces four important hypotheses, which are later completed and further detailed. They structure the book, and are tested in the subsequent chapters. The four hypotheses are carefully derived using the existing literature. This is mainly the task of the introduction and of the first chapter, but the rest of the paper constantly adds flesh to the conceptual construction. For his first statement, the author notices that Romanian communism was harsher than elsewhere in Europe, leading to strong deprivation and feelings of deprivation experienced by citizens. This made communism an undesirable choice for societal organization, and left durable antipathy towards soviet-type rule. This is the basis for the first main hypothesis, which states that Romania should have been started transition with a high popular support for democracy, to remain stable for a very long time. As the second hypothesis states, the legitimacy of market economy was also high from the beginning, but it has been more sensitive to failures to provide higher well-being, which eroded it.

Claudiu Tufiş makes use of Easton's (1975) distinction between diffuse and specific legitimacy. The above-mentioned two hypotheses refer to diffuse support. They discuss about a state of mind common to most Romanians to reject communism as a system. However, defining the alternative might be a tricky task. Therefore the book pays attention to particular forms of specific support. For almost all Romanians the transition started with big hopes for societal development and increasing wealth. "It cannot be worse" was a dominant definition of the situation, and people hoped that the country, defined as a powerful one, as they learnt from communist propaganda, but also from other authoritarian rulers before communism, will soon be one of the most developed in the world. However, the high expectations had to face disappointing outcomes, uncertainty, and lack of accountability, constantly destroying confidence in institutions. This third hypothesis is related to Sztompka's (1999) discussion on how to build institutional trust in transition countries. The final main hypothesis of the book refers to the level that any type of specific support for both market economy and democracy should have. It simply says that failure to quickly improve wellbeing leads to lower levels of

specific support, and that depending on circumstances, some fluctuations may be visible.

The four main hypotheses are complemented with specifications given by the various effects of the socio-economic status. They describe and explain the evolution of political culture in post-communist Romania. Advancing into the book, the reader faces successive journeys to the land of diffuse and specific support for democracy and market economy, as well as confidence in institutions, seen as a diffuse support for the system as a whole. Twenty-nine surveys are pooled in an impressive dataset to take stock of the evolution of diffuse support for democracy and market economy, as well as for particular types of specific support. The data cover a period starting with 1990 and ending in 2006. Such a long series is impressive and valuable by itself. Descriptive statistics are extremely informative and provide empirical prove for the main four hypotheses. For many points in time, the book goes deeper and analyses the determinants of the main dependent variables. The reader learns if and how change may occur, particularly when considering the impact of education, age, gender, income, and region.

In the end, two further questions remain to be answered, with the promise of future works. First, there is the hope to find out what happens after 2006. Looking for examples from other Eastern European societies comes second. The comparative dimension might be particularly useful in a post-communist Europe that simultaneously looks for convergence and divergence (Outhwaite and Ray, 2005), and where social sciences still have a lot to study and understand (Ray, 2009).

In this rather long preface I have avoided discussing much the content of the book, preferring to set up the context in which it appears. I would let the readers discover the details during a pleasant lecture, facilitated by the author's direct style. Despite being complex, the text is written such as to be accessible not only to political science or sociology scholars, but also to students and persons interested in understanding what political culture is and how it evolved in Romania between 1990 and 2006. Overall, I am fully convinced that Claudiu Tufiş' book contributes to increasing our knowledge on human societies in general, and particularly on Romania. The richness in information would suffice in this respect, but the solid theoretical background and compelling explanations make the data description to look like a simple bonus. As a reader wanting to learn more on post-communist societies, I hope that a continuation will be soon written and published.

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1. Introduction

The end of the 1980s marked the fall of communism in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE). The countries of this region started a complex transition: it was not only a political reform, as in the case of the Latin American transitions to democracy; it was rather a holistic reform, a radical social change. The CEE countries had to structurally change the political, economic, and social domains of the society:

“First, there is the political transition, the change of the regime. This takes a relatively short time. However, it may be several years before this framework operates smoothly and appropriately, according to the norms and values of Western-type democratic states. The second process is the economic transition, the change from a command economy, controlled by the single ruling party, to a market economy operating with a money mechanism, with the absolute majority of private ownership. This is more difficult and complicated. Finally, the third process is the cultural change and the development of a civil society, which takes an even longer time” (Vitányi, 1999: 187-188).

Successfully completing the changes in all these areas is of tremendous importance because “democracy has endured only in countries with a predominantly market-economy; and it has never endured in a country with a predominantly non-market economy” (Dahl, 1998: 166). It is this “dilemma of simultaneity” that represented the main characteristic of the post-communist transitions. Excluding post-World War II Germany and Japan, where market economy and democracy have been introduced by an external power (Crawford, 1995: 3), the two systems have never been established simultaneously in any other cases (Schopflin 1994; Hall 1995; Offe 1997; Pickel and Wiesenthal 1997).

Given the record of previous attempts to simultaneously switch to democracy and market economy, scholars have been rather skeptical about the success of the post-communist transitions: “Many scholars have identified the economic decline that accompanies economic restructuring as the essential dilemma of the dual transition, arguing that if the well-being of the majority of a population is substantially harmed by reforms, popular support for democracy will erode” (Kullberg and Zimmerman, 1999: 326)⁴. Fortunately, most of these

⁴ See, for instance, Przeworski (1991), Diamond (1992), Haggard and Kaufman (1995), Nelson (1995), and Gati (1996).

grim predictions have been disproved: “amazingly little resistance from below has come to those reforms that have been instituted” (Hall, 1995: 89).

The post-communist transition literature developed around three main actors – institutions, political elites, and citizens. Studies of institutional change dominated the literature, with comparatively less attention being given to the second dimension of the transition and consolidation process – the beliefs, values, and attitudes of the post-communist citizens – or to elite interactions (Diamond 1997, 1999).⁵ The institutional change literature largely ignored the idea that democratic and market institutions, while relatively easy to create, cannot function efficiently in a hostile environment: “If democracy and capitalism are to take root in the former communist states, it is necessary not only to create the institutions and processes intrinsic to those systems, but also to foster popular attitudes that are accepting and supporting of them” (Mason and Kluegel, 2000a: 11).⁶

Popular support is not only necessary for the institutions to play their role in society: “just as macro-economic theories have no relevance to everyday life if they cannot be related to micro-economic activities of individuals, so constitutional forms are lifeless or irrelevant if they do not have the support of the people” (Rose, Mishler and Haerpfer, 1998: 8); it is one of the key defining features of democratic regimes (Easton 1965; Miller 1974; Norris 1999).

⁵ Kubicek (2000: 297), in an analysis of post-communist political studies published in the leading political science journals (APSR, BJPS, JOP, WP, CPS, and CP) between 1991 and 1998 found that 41% of the studies focused on institutions and political economy, as opposed to 24% on political culture and 15% on elite interactions.

⁶ This is an easy task by comparison to the necessity of creating a new political culture. The formation of the new institutions usually consisted of importing the complete set of democratic institutions (e.g. constitution, electoral rules, government structure, and separation of powers) from a developed democracy. Offe referred to this process as the “copying of institutions” and argued that “copied and translated institutions that lack the moral and cultural infrastructure on which the originals rely are likely to yield very different and often counter-intentional results [...] As a result, the newly founded institutions are in place but they fail to perform in the anticipated ways” (Offe, 1998:212, 217). Later in the transition, most of the post-communist countries were forced to address the problems generated by this import by modifying the institutions: new constitutions were adopted, the electoral system was changed, and the government structure was reformed. In Romania, for instance, in 2006 the society was still debating whether the Parliament should have one chamber or two, whether the President should be elected by the people or by the MPs, whether people should vote for party lists or for individual candidates in the national elections, and about the proper balance of power between the president and the prime minister.

Despite the fact that the post-communist citizens' attitudes represent an important component in the study of post-communist transitions,

“one of the most striking aspects of the literature on transition is how little we know of what it involves on a daily basis. We have quite a large amount of data and analysis of the macro side of the transition, but relatively little on the micro. We speak of adjustment as if the societies were psychiatric patients requiring a bit of therapy to return to normal. But we know very little about what that normality means or about the strategies used by the population in coping with the change” (Centeno, 1994: 140).

At the center of this study stands the idea that democratic transition and consolidation are not possible in a society that does not accept the ideals of democracy: the stability of a democratic political system is dependent on its consistency with the political values of its people (Almond and Verba 1963; Dahl 1989; di Palma 1990; Diamond 1993; Sørensen 1993; White, Gill and Slider 1993; Hahn 1995).⁷ How people react when faced with this dramatic change is perhaps one of the most important elements during the transition: “the people are the ultimate movers of reforms” (Sztompka, 1996a: 127) and, at the same time, they are “the main obstacle to reform” (Przeworski, 1993: 185).

The literature also suggests that, in addition to this attitudinal congruence, the behavior of the citizens has a significant effect: “mass mobilization can contribute to both the founding and the consolidation of democracy” (Bunce, 2003: 170). Democracy requires the active involvement of the citizens (Dalton and Wattenberg 2000). This line of thought follows the argument that “a society in which a large proportion of the population is outside the political arena is potentially more explosive than one in which most citizens are regularly involved in activities which give them some sense of participation in decisions which affect their lives” (Lipset, 1960: 180). Active citizen participation in the political arena is “the lifeblood of representative democracy” (Norris, 2002: 215).

Starting from the assumption that a successful transition requires citizens to accept the institutions of the new political regime and the values

⁷ This argument is not without its critics. Barry (1970: 48-52) argued that democratic values are not required for a stable democracy; it is the stable democracy that generates the democratic values. Przeworski (1991), dismissing the role of the citizens' values during the democratization process, argued that all democracy needs in order to survive is a self-enforcing equilibrium. Weingast (1997a, 1997b), while working from a similar perspective, suggested that the citizens' consensus on values is necessary and that the existence of such a consensus forces the elites to reach different self-enforcing equilibriums than when a consensus does not exist.

associated with these, the main goal of this project is to identify and describe the evolution of political culture in Romania from the beginning of the transition to the present. At the most general level, the question I am asking is: How does political culture change?

Democracy needs democratic citizens. During the last days of 1989, twenty-two million *communist* comrades watched (some on the TV screens, others on the streets) how the communist regime under which they lived for more than forty years suddenly collapsed. Fifteen years later, during the last days of 2004, almost twenty-one million citizens voted in their fifth national and presidential elections, choosing their third post-communist president. They were certainly playing the democratic game. But does that make them *democratic* citizens? What are the processes that transform comrades into citizens?⁸

An answer to the previous question requires a definition of a democratic citizen. By democratic citizen I understand first of all a citizen who values democracy as a political system, who believes that despite its problems, democracy, as a form of government, is indeed better than “all those others that have been tried”. This is, however, only a minimal definition. Other qualities are usually attributed to a democratic citizen (tolerance, trust, participation) and they help define types of democratic citizens. In the context of a post-communist country an additional component seems to be relevant in defining democratic citizens: planned economy versus market economy.⁹

There are two factors that have made this distinction an important one. First, during the communist regime people have come to equate communism with planned economy and democracy with market economy. Second, the Washington Consensus, although initially designed for the Latin American context, once applied to the Central and Eastern European countries has linked democracy and market economy as two inseparable goals for the post-communist countries, suggesting that one cannot have democracy without a market economy.¹⁰ Democracy and market economy cannot be analyzed separately in the post-communist context: “one of the most delicate sets of conditions for the success and sustainability of democracy relates to socio-economic problems. Democracy cannot be treated in isolation from other social

⁸ To use Bahry’s phrase (1999).

⁹ This is particularly true in the case of Romania, where not even rudiments of a market economy were allowed to develop during the communist regime.

¹⁰ See Williamson (1990, 2000). It should be noted that the most important international financial institutions (especially the International Monetary Fund) have consistently conditioned their assistance on the implementation of the economic and fiscal reforms proposed by the Washington Consensus.

and economic processes” (Simai, 1999: 44). These countries were offered a “package” deal: either both democracy and market economy or none. As Centeno argued, “the question should not be whether a particular nation is ready for democracy or the market, but how a minimal social consensus develops about the rules involved in both. [...] less attention has been paid to the process of creating the imagined community that could manage the transition” (Centeno, 1994: 139).

This is not to say that democracy and market economy are one and the same thing, but in this particular context the political and economic transformations are so dependent upon each other that one cannot hope to understand either of them without taking them both into account.¹¹ Throughout this study I will refer to this transformation process as “transition to democracy”, when talking about the political transformations, as “transition to market economy”, when talking about the economic transformations, or as “transition” or “transition to a liberal democratic market society”, when talking about the transition as a whole process, without differentiating between the political and economic aspect.

The goals of this study are, then, to identify the patterns of political culture in Romania, and to identify and explain the trends displayed by the evolution of these patterns over time since the fall of the communist regime.¹² In doing so, the study will explain the process of political culture change in a country that evolved from being one of the most oppressive totalitarian regimes in the communist world to being a democracy.

Defining characteristics

The niche to which this study belongs can be found at the intersection of two theoretical dimensions and one methodological approach: it is a *case study* of *political culture* change during *the post-communist transition* in Romania.

Post-communist transition

This project fits within the framework of transition studies. The post-communist transition process can be interpreted as a particular case of dramatic social change, a case characterized by transition from a communist to a

¹¹ The existence of non-democratic countries with market economies should be evidence enough.

¹² These patterns are defined by attitudes toward democracy and market economy.

democratic state with a market economy.¹³ While the boundaries between the two main stages of the democratization process, democratic transition and democratic consolidation, are difficult to define, by focusing on the democratization process as a whole I eliminate this definitional problem.¹⁴ For the purposes of this project I define democratic transition as the period of time between the fall of the communist regime and the 1996 elections (1990-1996).¹⁵ Since the 1996 elections marked the first transfer of power, I consider them to indicate the existence of the minimal requirements for democracy (electoral democracy) and, thus, the end of the transition stage of the democratization process. I define democratic consolidation as the period of time between the 1996 elections and the acceptance of Romania as a member of the European Union (1997-2007).¹⁶ Placed on Schedler's *democraticness* continuum, the transition stage in Romania ends with the establishment of electoral democracy, and the consolidation phase ends with the establishment of liberal democracy. I consider the acceptance of Romania within the EU (which requires approval from all current EU members) as an indicator that Romania reached the liberal democracy stage and managed to transform its economic system into a functioning market economy.

The literature identifies different conceptualizations of democratic consolidation, each corresponding to different areas of democratization, answering different research questions, and requiring different research strategies: consolidation as the process of eliminating formal and procedural constraints imposed on democracy; as the elimination, marginalization,

¹³ Thus, at a more general level, this is a study of political culture change during a period of societal upheaval. Other instances of abrupt social changes include the 1911 Chinese Revolution, the Russian October Revolution, Germany's defeat in the Second World War, and, more recently and depending on how the situation will evolve, Iraq's transition to democracy or the Arab Spring.

¹⁴ Pridham suggested that analyses of post-communist transitions in the Balkans "should embrace the democratization process as a whole and not just the transition or the consolidation stage, if only because of the interlacing of different levels of change" (Pridham, 2000: 2).

¹⁵ The first post-communist elections in Romania were held on May 20, 1990. The new Constitution of Romania was adopted on November 21, 1991, and it was approved on December 8, 1991 through a referendum. Following the approval of the new constitution, new presidential and legislative elections were held on September 27, 1992. Alternative transition end-points could be the 1990 elections (the founding elections), the 1992 elections (the first post-communist elections for a full term), or even the 2000 elections (the second transfer of power).

¹⁶ For a more detailed discussion of democratic consolidation see O'Donnell (1996), Schedler (1998), and Munck (2004).

neutralization or democratic persuasion of politically relevant actors who could or might stall the democratic process through violence or by other means; as habituation to democratic procedures and the stabilization of such political behavior, practices and attitudes as are likely to facilitate the normal functioning of democracy; or as the comprehensive process of creating institutions and institutionalizing (Plasser, Ulram, and Waldrauch, 1998: 47-48). Following this typology, I use the third definition of consolidation (habituation to democratic procedures), understanding consolidation not just as the spread of democratic legitimacy (Linz 1990; Diamond 1994; Linz and Stepan 1996) but also as the development of a broad-based democratic political culture (Pridham 1994, 1995; Plasser and Ulram 1996).

From this perspective, democratic consolidation requires the legitimation of the new political institutions, so that the democratic rules of the game are considered as the only viable solution (Linz and Stepan 1996; Plasser, Ulram, and Waldrauch 1998; Diamond 1994, 1999).

Political culture

The political culture approach is the second defining dimension of this study. This is a political culture study in the sense described by Lane as “an approach or method analyzing, for a given group, its basic beliefs, in order to develop a model of those beliefs and their interrelations” (Lane, 1992: 364). This is not a study of Romanian political culture, but a study of the different political cultures in Romania. It is a study of the political cultures that characterize different groups within the Romanian society and of how these cultures transformed during the transition from communism to democracy.

Culture is a highly disputed concept: “the major concern of the skeptical discourse on culture is that the concept suggests boundedness, homogeneity, coherence, stability, and structure whereas social reality is characterized by variability, inconsistencies, conflict, change, and individual agency” (Brumann, 1999: S1). Despite the debates surrounding the concept, most anthropological definitions of culture focus on two main dimensions: values / beliefs / attitudes, and behavior (Harris, 1975: 144; Keesing, 1981: 68; Peoples and Bailey, 1994: 23). The concept was imported in political science without the behavioral dimension, culture being defined as “psychological orientation toward social objects” (Almond and Verba, 1963: 13), as “the system of empirical beliefs, expressive symbols, and values which defines the situation in which political action takes place” (Verba, 1965a: 513).

How well do these standard definitions of political culture fit situations characterized by significant social change? The transition from a communist to a democratic political system requires a change in citizens’ political culture.

Cohen (1985: 17) argues that “found in political beliefs and expressed through political behavior, political culture is created and continually recreated through social interaction.” Change in political culture is the result of the continuous interaction between subjective beliefs and behavior. From this perspective, political culture is defined as “historically formed patterns of political belief and behavior of the members of a political system, whether a state or a smaller group” (White, 1984: 351) or as “the attitudinal and behavioral matrix within which the political system is located” (White, 1979: 1).

Understanding political culture as resulting from the continuous interplay between beliefs and behavior leads to the issue of change: the political culture approach has been often criticized for not being able to explain political change. Eckstein and Swidler offer two complementary and particularly interesting answers to this problem.

Eckstein (1988) acknowledged that the postulates of culturalism do indeed lead to an expectation of continuity.¹⁷ However, he dismissed post-hoc accounts of political change as the solution to this problem, arguing for the necessity of developing a general culturalist theory of change. The theory he presented deals with both gradual (normal) and drastic (social discontinuity) change, each type requiring a different explanatory mechanism. In the case of gradual changes, the solution consists primarily of people adopting strategies like pattern-maintaining change, perceptual distortion, or increased flexibility. The second type of change, social discontinuity, applies directly to this study. The solution, in this case, suggests that “cognitions that make experience intelligible and normative dispositions (affect, evaluative schemes) must be learned again, and learned cumulatively [...] changes in political cultures that occur in response to social discontinuity should initially exhibit considerable formlessness” (Eckstein, 1988: 796).¹⁸

Using Merton’s types of individual adaptation (1957: 141-157), Eckstein presents the following as the set of strategies available for dealing with drastic changes: ritual conformity (ritualism in Merton’s terminology, characterized by an individual’s rejection of the cultural goals and acceptance of the norms), self-serving conformity (innovation, with accepted goals and rejected norms), retreatism (retreatism, with both goals and norms rejected), or intransigent resistance to authority (rebellion, with the goals and the norms not only rejected, but also replaced). In addition to these four strategies, Merton also indicates conformity (both the goals and the norms are accepted) as a

¹⁷ The four postulates, oriented action, orientational variability, cultural socialization, and cumulative socialization, and the ways they work together are discussed in Eckstein (1988: 790-793).

¹⁸ Lipset (1960) and Huntington (1968) developed similar arguments.

possible type of adaptation. These strategies will lead, eventually, to the formation of new culture patterns and themes. Under the postulates of culturalism, this process of political culture change should be “prolonged and socially costly” (Eckstein, 1988: 796).

Swidler, in a similar manner, argued that culture, defined as a tool kit for constructing strategies of action, has different influences in *settled* versus *unsettled* lives: culture has the role of maintaining the existing strategies of action in settled lives, while aiding in the construction of new strategies in unsettled lives.¹⁹ Strategies of action play a significant role in Swidler’s theory. They are seen as patterns of organizing action, allowing the achievement of different life goals.

In a departure from the traditional view of culture, however, Swidler argued that strategies of action are more stable than goals, the result of this being that during unsettled lives people might prefer goals for which they already have a strategy of action: “if culture provides the tools with which persons construct lines of action, then styles or strategies of action will be more persistent than the ends people seek to attain. Indeed, people will come to value ends for which their cultural equipment is well suited” (Swidler, 1986: 277).²⁰ This view may be helpful in explaining, for instance, why some groups accept the ideals of a market economy, while others reject them or accept them only after significant delays (needed for updating their strategies of action).

Ideology and tradition play different roles during *settled* and *unsettled* periods.²¹ During unsettled periods, new strategies of action need to be constructed and ideologies stand at the center of this process. Applied to the

¹⁹ The unsettled lives are periods characterized by drastic change or anomie. Following Geertz, Swidler conceptualized strategies of action as incorporating and depending on “habits, moods, sensibilities, and views of the world” (Swidler, 1986: 277).

²⁰ Swidler lists two sociological studies, Mancini (1980) and Gerson (1985), as offering empirical evidence for this proposition.

²¹ Swidler assumes the existence of a continuum from ideology to tradition to common sense. “An ‘ideology’ is a highly articulated, self-conscious belief and ritual system, aspiring to offer a unified answer to problems of social action. Ideology may be thought of as a phase in the development of a system of cultural meaning. ‘Traditions’, on the other hand, are articulated cultural beliefs and practices, but ones taken for granted so that they seem inevitable parts of life. Diverse, rather than unified, partial rather than all embracing, they do not always inspire enthusiastic assent [...] The same belief system may be held by some people as an ideology and by others as tradition; and what has been tradition may under certain historical circumstances become ideology [...] ‘Common sense’, finally, is the set of assumptions so unselfconscious as to seem a natural, transparent, undeniable part of the structure of the world” (Swidler, 1986: 277).

case of post-communist transitions, this may help in explaining the process of adopting values associated with a democratic political system and with market economy. Starting with 1990 some of the old practices which have been adopted in response to the characteristics of the communist regime (and that could be interpreted as ‘tradition’ in the sense described by Swidler) had to be changed: the old strategies of action could not function efficiently now that the game had a different set of rules.²² During this unsettled period, different ideologies compete: people may accept the values associated with the democratic ideology, they may continue to hold on to the old values, or they may direct themselves toward other existing ideologies (e.g. nationalism, socialism etc.).²³ This model leads to a series of questions in need of an answer: What values (from what ideology) become dominant in the society? If the democratic ideology wins, how is this ideology incorporated? How does the democratic ideology become tradition?

Both theories presented here suggest that changes in political culture are possible and they complement each other to indicate a likely scenario for this change. With the fall of the communist regime, most elements of the old political culture become obsolete and people need to adapt to the new social reality. The new society will replace the old goals and rules with new ones, derived from the principles of democracy and market economy, and these need to be internalized by the people for a successful democratization. This adaptation process is going to be slow and its initial stage is going to be characterized by formlessness (anomie) and by competition between different ideologies.


During the adaptation process people may use any of the strategies enumerated by Eckstein. Given the duality of the post-communist transformation, it is probable that, at the beginning of the transition, different combinations of strategies have been used, depending on the relative importance of the different goals and rules for different citizens.

Figure 1 presents the possible combinations of strategies when both democracy and market economy are taken into account. Since the data I use in this project do not distinguish between the goals and the norms of democracy and

²² Other practices not only survived the regime change, but they proved to be quite beneficial. For instance, during the communist regime managers were able to maintain their positions using a strategy that included reliance on a network of people in similar positions. After the transition it was exactly this strategy that allowed them to become the owners of the businesses they were previously only managing.

²³ The winner of this contest between competing ideologies is determined not only by political elites but also by the regular citizens.

Figure 1 Strategies of coping with change



market economy, I am forced to use only a restricted set of the strategies enumerated by Merton and Eckstein: conformity and retreatism. People have probably adopted other strategies as well, but I cannot identify them based on the available data. Based on my knowledge of the Romanian case, I can estimate that, with respect to democracy, conformity and retreatism account for almost the whole population. In the case of market economy these two strategies account for a majority of the population, but other strategies seem to have been used as well, especially innovation.

Conformity towards both democracy and market economy is the combination that probably characterized the largest part of the population. This combination can indicate either a strategy of “promotion” (this is the strategy of the activist type, a person who is a strong supporter of democracy and market economy) or a strategy of “adaptation” (the strategy of the conformist type, a person who does not have strong feelings for democracy or market economy, but is accepting them out of conformity). I labeled the combination of retreatism with respect to both democracy and market economy as “withdrawal.” This combination characterizes persons that have significant difficulties facing the new realities and their only option, for the time being, is to reduce their world to what is familiar, usually family and a small group of close friends.²⁴

²⁴ Howard (2003), in his study of civil society in East Germany and Russia, describes how, given the specifics of the communist regimes, people often created meaningful and genuine relationships in the private sphere to solve the problems associated with the public sphere. These networks created under communism survived the democratic transition and participation in such networks makes people less interested in

While the previous two strategies are consistent (they indicate either full acceptance or full rejection of the new political and economic system), the other two strategies presented in Figure 1 are strategies of partial adaptation. Democratic conformity and market retreatism (the “market refusal”) is a strategy that is most likely to be adopted by those that stand only to lose from the transition to a market economy. Unlike the nostalgic, however, the economic loser makes a clear distinction between democratization and marketization, sees some benefits in living in a democratic system, and does not blame democracy for the state of the economy. The authoritarian type is characterized by retreatism with respect to democracy and conformity with respect to market economy. While this type accepts market economy out of conformity (I expect that most of the members of this group do not have strong attachments to market economy), its opposition to democracy is based on its values.

I expect that each of the four cells contained a significant proportion of the population at the beginning of the transition. Over time, however, I expect that some of these strategies will lose their appeal and will be abandoned.²⁵ Eventually, the ideal combination for successful democratization (conformity with respect to both democracy and market economy) should become the only viable solution for most of the population. Rephrased using Swidler’s terms, we should observe a transformation of the ideology based on democracy and market economy (as one of many possible alternatives at the beginning of the transition) into a democratic tradition.

Romania as a case study

Romania is one of the post-communist countries that have been almost ignored by political scientists. Despite the clear disinterest in its transition²⁶,

participating in other types of formal organizations. This behavior, which Howard calls “civil privatism”, seems to be consistent with the strategy of double retreatism.

²⁵ People may abandon these strategies for different reasons, ranging from improvements in the economic situation to societal pressure for conformity with generally accepted ideals.

²⁶ This disinterest was explained by “(a) real international and regional concerns and political priorities in the United States, the European Union, and Germany, (b) the troubled, protracted, and uncertain democratization experiences in the region, but also (c) the persistence of powerful stereotypes concerning the cultures and societies of Southeastern Europe, very often pejoratively referred to as the Balkans, and their perceived incapacity to free themselves from their ostensible “ancient” enmities, hatreds, and conflicts. [...] the combined result of this trend has been the relegation of the study of Southeastern Europe to a sphere of relative oblivion, which effectively

Romania is an intriguing case in the group of post-communist countries in Central and Eastern Europe, a case that could be considered as representative for a certain type of transition:

“Whereas regime change in East-Central Europe broadly followed a procedural pattern familiar to transitologists, in the Balkans it has often followed a hesitant and sometimes ambiguous path. This usually satisfied formal requirements of democracy, but often cast doubt on the qualitative direction of regime change. The weakness of opposition, reflecting the lack of pre-authoritarian democratic traditions and limited civil society, was one factor here, as was the preference of ex-regime elites (e.g. in Romania) or even new democratic elites (e.g. in Albania) for authoritarian practices. [...] The outcome has been a second democratic transition in some of these countries, offering less mixed prospects than the first round of transitions in 1989-91, especially after alternation in power as in Romania, Bulgaria and Albania during 1996-7” (Pridham, 2000: 14-15).

Before the fall of the communist regime, Romania was one of the most oppressive totalitarian regimes and one of the poorest countries in the communist bloc. Looking at the “exit strategy”, Romania was again in a category all by itself: it was the only country in the region where the communist regime was replaced through a violent revolution. During the first years of transition, Romania continued to have atypical behavior: it was one of the few countries where the “reformed” communists won the founding elections, and the only one where they won the next elections as well; it was also the only country where a democratically elected government (the Roman cabinet) was overthrown under pressure from the streets; and it was the only country that avoided an inevitable open ethnic conflict (in 1990) to become, only a few years later (in 1996), a model of inter-ethnic cooperation in the region. By 1991 most external observers considered Romania as a very good example of a failed transition. All these early signs indicated a country that could not and would not become a democracy²⁷.

undermines the generation of fresh knowledge concerning the region and dampens intellectual curiosity regarding the prospects for democracy in the region” (Diamandouros and Larrabee, 1999: 4). King also discussed this disinterest: “The reason for the exclusion of these countries, it is often said, is that they have lagged behind others in terms of political and economic reform and are thus less propitious venues for testing theories of regime change, institutional design, and the political economy of transition” (King, 2000: 152).

²⁷ Yet, according to McFaul’s typology, Romania is the only country which, despite the fact that the initial balance of power was favorable to the old regime, managed to become a democracy (McFaul, 2002: 226-228).

Despite these negative expectations, comparative studies of public opinion in CEE countries often found the level of support for democracy among Romanian citizens puzzling: “the proportion of democrats is greatest where traditions of democracy have historically been weakest, Romania” (Rose and Mishler, 1994: 170); “the highest level by far of absolute support for democratic ideals is found in Romania [...] Romania once more is the outlier on the pro-democracy side” (Evans and Whitefield, 1995: 489, 496); “rejection of the old regime is strongest and most widespread in Romania” (Mishler and Rose, 1996: 560). What we have, then, in the case of Romania is a significant gap between a theoretical expectation, that of a failed transition, and an empirical observation – a population characterized by high levels of support for democracy. Viewed in these terms, Romania seems to fit the definition of a negative case (Emigh 1997) or that of a deviant case (Lijphart 1971).

By 2007 Romania has advanced enough toward being a democracy and a market economy to become a NATO member (since 2004) and to be accepted as a European Union member (since 2007). Still, compared to the other Central and Eastern European countries, Romania remains one of the least developed democracies in the region.²⁸ The studies cited above suggest that, unlike other countries in the region, Romania may be a case in which the citizens democratized before the state and forced the state to democratize as well. If this is the case, then the analysis of Romania might offer additional information about the role of political culture during the transition to democracy and market economy.²⁹ As Diamond observed,

“Romania appears as an anomaly, in that its levels of public commitment to democracy ranked it much higher among the post-communist countries than would be predicted by its relatively low freedom score in 1995 and the few preceding years. This may help to explain its embrace of a more democratic alternative in the 1996 presidential elections, and its movement during that year into the free category (followed by further improvement in 1997 to a 2.0 average freedom score). Romania’s shift raises the question of the direction of causality. Once a formal transition has occurred, does the underlying political culture play a substantial role in pressing a country toward a certain level of democracy (or as in Belarus, back to dictatorship), or (as the ‘transitions’ school maintains) do

²⁸ In 2005 Romania barely qualified as a free country according to the Freedom House criteria (a score of two on civil liberties and of three on political rights, scores that are worse than all CEE countries with the exception of Albania).

²⁹ The 2005 Ukrainian “Orange Revolution” and the prolonged protests surrounding the 2006 elections in Belarus could be interpreted as indications of additional cases in which the citizens democratized before the state did and are trying to bring the state up-to-speed.

objective conditions and institutions of democracy generate levels of appreciation for democracy that may become embedded in the political culture?" (Diamond, 1998: 42).

I interpret the shift that Diamond describes as supporting the argument that political culture plays a significant role in promoting the democratization process. Between 1990 and 1996 Romania adopted the institutions required for a democracy, but these institutions did not create a democratic environment. People voted for the democratic opposition in 1996 precisely because they were not happy with the Romanian democracy.

Previous studies

There is already an extensive literature focusing on attitudes toward democracy and market economy. What do we know so far from the previous research? Since I discuss their findings later, I present here only a very brief list.

First, we know that support for democratic values is highest among the young, well-educated urbanites (Finifter and Mickiewicz 1992; Miller, Reisinger, and Hesli 1993; Rose, Mishler, and Haerpfer 1998). We do not know, however, what happens with other societal groups, like the poorly-educated or those living in rural areas, during the consolidation process. Do they continue to reject democratic values or do they adopt them, but at a slower pace? With respect to the role of the assessment of economic conditions in determining political attitudes, some argue that there is no effect, others claim that assessments of one's personal economic condition are the most important factor, and yet others argue that assessments of the economy as a whole have a significant effect (Duch 1993; Hough 1994; Whitefield and Evans 1994; Colton 1996; Gibson 1996a; Rose and Mishler 1996; Fleron and Ahl 1998). This debate is based on survey data from the initial stage of the transition. Again, we do not know what happens later in the transition. Is this confused pattern continuing or is there some sort of convergence toward a common finding?

In terms of which types of support are crucial in the new democracies, we know only bits and pieces. Rose and Mishler (1994) used what they labeled as "the realist approach," considering that support for the current regime is important, as opposed to the "idealist approach" (McIntosh et al. 1994), which advocates for the importance of diffuse support. Evans and Whitefield (1995) chose the third strategy, analyzing both diffuse and specific support.

Summarizing, previous findings often offered support for different competing theories of political culture change. Moreover, almost everything that we know about political culture in post-communist countries is based on

data from the first years of the transition process. Do the relationships identified in these studies continue to hold over time? The existing studies cannot answer this question. There are also no studies that offer a complete image of the political culture in the region.³⁰ Most of these studies focused on only a small slice of political culture (this slice may be tolerance, or trust, or attitudes toward democracy or market economy or both). Thus, while these previous studies added to our knowledge of the political culture of the post-communist citizens, there is not yet a unified view emerging from their results.

Research on East European political culture has faced a series of criticisms over time. The first, directed at the early research in the region, was that “insufficient linguistic competence, unfamiliarity with local cultures, and a poor understanding of current processes and developments in the countries under scrutiny produce flatly descriptive or illustrative interpretations” (Plasser, Ulram, and Waldrauch, 1998: 58). The major criticism of this literature, however, is that the attitudes were analyzed using only data from a single time-point. In the absence of adequate data, these studies could not offer insights in the changes in political culture over time (Bartolini 1993; Kaase 1994).

A significant part of the literature focused on analyses of the Russian political culture (including some of the former Soviet republics, especially Ukraine and the Baltic states) using a single survey³¹, panel studies³², or two or more surveys capturing attitudes across a rather short period of time³³. A large part of the literature has also been devoted to comparative analyses. Most of these comparative analyses, however, also used only single survey data from the initial stage of the consolidation process³⁴. Few studies have used different

³⁰ The literature lacks a study similar to the *Civic Culture* or the *Beliefs in Government* projects.

³¹ See, for instance, Bahry and Silver (1990), Finifter and Mickiewicz (1992), Finifter (1996), and Bahry, Boaz, and Gordon (1997).

³² Gibson (2001) uses a survey from 1992 and a two-wave panel (1996 and 1998) to analyze issues of social capital and trust in Russia; Gibson (2002) uses the same two-wave panel (1996 and 1998) to analyze tolerance among the Russian citizens.

³³ Miller, Reisinger, and Hesli (1993) analyze three surveys from 1990 and 1991; Gibson (1996b) analyzes Russia and Ukraine with data from 1990 and 1992; Miller, Hesli, and Reisinger (1997) analyze attitudes toward democracy in Russia and Ukraine with surveys from 1992 and 1995

³⁴ Rose and Mishler (1994) and Mishler and Rose (1996) used data from 1991 in five countries; Mishler and Rose (1997) and Rose, Mishler, and Haerpfer (1998) used survey data from 1993 to analyze trust and attitudes toward democracy in nine countries; Evans and Whitefield (1995) analyzed attitudes toward democracy in eight countries using data from 1993; Whitefield and Evans (1999) used 1994 data to analyze attitudes toward democracy in the Czech Republic and Slovakia; Whitefield

methodologies in the study of attitudes toward democracy and market economy in the region.³⁵ The most data-rich study to date is Mishler and Rose (2002), who analyzed attitudes toward democracy in ten countries and five years.

The result of this methodology (imposed, in part, by data availability issues) is that we do not have yet a comprehensive view of the structure of the post-communist political culture at the beginning of the transition and of how this structure changed over time. So far, the literature has offered, with few exceptions, only different snapshots of citizens' attitudes at the time the surveys were conducted. It seems that these studies, "while supplying us with a surfeit of data, may be telling us less than they seem. Attitudes appear to be in a great state of flux, reflecting the uncertainty of citizens and of politics more generally" (Kubicek, 2000: 300).

The temporal dimension is an important factor in interpreting empirical findings and some authors have explicitly suggested that their findings might be time-bound and that political culture might have different structures at different points in the transition / consolidation process (Rose, Mishler, and Haerpfer 1998; Hofferbert and Klingeman 1999).

Most of the existing studies could not deal with issues of political culture change in a structured way³⁶. The focus of these studies on the immediate period of time after the fall of the communist regimes (there are almost no data after 1994) is another reason why following the 'flux' from its beginning to its end was not possible. As Eckstein and Swidler suggested, political culture change requires a long period of time, more than the five-six years covered by most of the previous studies. More time is needed because "the political attitudes that would support democracy are not of a form to which one can suddenly become converted" (Verba, 1965b: 141).

While drawing on the theories and the findings of previous studies, this study goes a step beyond, by incorporating time in the analysis of political culture change.

(2002) used 1993 data to analyze political cleavages in 12 countries; Mason and Kluegel (2000b) used two surveys (1991 and 1996) in seven countries.

³⁵ See, for instance, Finkel, Humphries, and Opp (2001), who used a three-wave panel (1993, 1996, and 1998) in Leipzig (in the former East Germany), or Howard (2003), who analyzed civil society in Russia and the former East Germany using survey data, interviews, and focus groups.

³⁶ The exception, here, are Mishler and Rose (2002) and those studies that used panel data: Gibson (2001), Finkel, Humphries, and Opp (2001), and Gibson (2002).

Chapter layout

In the next chapter I present the theoretical framework I use in the analysis of public support for democracy and market economy during the post-communist transition. The discussion is structured around three main issues: defining and identifying patterns of political culture, developing a model of political culture change, and analyzing the different types of support for the objects of the system. Chapter 3 presents the methodology and the data that I use.

The following four chapters are devoted to the main components of the study. Each chapter includes theoretical discussions and presents the results of the data analysis. In Chapter 4 I focus on diffuse support for the principles of the political system (democracy and democratic values). In Chapter 5 I discuss in detail diffuse support for the principles of the economic system (market economy and its associated values) and distinguish between support for two different models of market economy: a liberal model and a social-democratic model. Chapter 6 analyzes generalized support for the structure of the political system (trust in the state's institutions), while Chapter 7 discusses specific support for the actions of the political and economic systems (satisfaction with the functioning of democracy and market economy in Romania). The last chapter, Chapter 8, puts together the results of the four empirical chapters and summarizes the main conclusions of this project.

2. Theoretical framework

This chapter lays out the theoretical framework that underlines my analysis of the evolution of public support for democracy and market economy in post-communist Romania.³⁷ In the first section of the chapter I focus on defining and identifying patterns of political culture. The tool I use for this task is a model of support for the main components of the political and economic systems, similar to the models proposed by Easton and Almond. In the second section I center on developing a model of political culture change. Finally, in the third section of the chapter I move the focus of the discussion on the different types of support for the objects of the system identified in the model developed in the first section.

Patterns of political culture

In its simplest formulation, the main assumption of this study is that legitimacy is necessary for democratic consolidation. Legitimacy is “the most vital element of political culture for democratic consolidation” (Diamond, 1998: 4). Easton’s model (1965, 1975), consisting of objects and types of support which combine to form different dimensions of support, is a fundamental tool in the study of legitimacy. The model includes three objects of support – political community, political regime, and authorities – and two types of support – diffuse support, which is long-term and unrelated to outputs, and specific support, which is short-term and output-related. The different types of support resulting from the intersection of the two dimensions have an increasingly important role in the stability of a political system as one moves from specific support to diffuse support and from support for authorities to support for the political community: “an important factor in the prospects for stable democracy in a country is the strength of the diffuse support for democratic ideas, values,

³⁷ Some of the arguments presented in this chapter have been published, in a different form, in Tufiş (2008a, 2008b, 2010a).

and practices embedded in the country's culture" (Dahl, 1996: 3).³⁸ In a revised version of the model, Morlino and Montero (1995) equated specific support with the perceived efficacy of democratic practices and argued that, in the context of consolidation research, diffuse support is composed not only of diffuse legitimacy of democracy as a general system, but also by the absence of any other preferable alternatives.³⁹ This second component may lead to "legitimacy by default." Valenzuela (1992) also indicates the absence of alternatives as a possible source of support, which he labels "inverse legitimation." In both cases the lack of preferable alternatives leads to increased support for democracy at the beginning of transition.

What does this mean for the Romanian case, faced with a simultaneous transition to both democracy and market economy? With respect to the democratization process, for both the elites and the citizens the situation was clear right from the beginning of the transition: the former communist regime was to be replaced with a democratic regime. Communism was completely discredited and there were no other alternatives to it besides democracy. Thus, democracy, its goals, and its rules benefited from the start from this type of default (or inverse) legitimation.⁴⁰

The marketization process, however, faced more difficult odds for different reasons. First of all, the public discourse at the beginning of the transition focused primarily on democratization and only later did the transition to market economy become an important issue on the public agenda. Second, during the initial stage of the transition, the command economy escaped the vilifying process that communism was subjected to. Even more, some argued that the old political system was responsible for the failures of the centralized economy. Finally, once economic reforms started to be implemented, they had an almost instantaneous and disastrous result for a large part of the population, which only helped in maintaining a nostalgic attitude toward the state-controlled economy.⁴¹ As a result, the state-controlled economy remained a valid

³⁸ See, also, Merkel (1996), who sees attitudinal consolidation as specific and diffuse support of citizens and considers it an integral component of democratic consolidation (together with structural and representative consolidation).

³⁹ Przeworski emphasized the issue of preferable alternatives over legitimacy: "What matters for the stability of any regime is not the legitimacy of this particular system of domination, but the presence or absence of preferable alternatives" (Przeworski, 1986: 51).

⁴⁰ Despite widespread acceptance of democracy as the only possible solution, Romania had a problematic transition.

⁴¹ Facing unemployment (for the first time in their life) and hyper-inflation, people forgot the chronic lack of basic goods which characterized the Romanian economy

alternative for quite a long time, so that the new market economy could not benefit from the default legitimation that characterized the democratization process.

Almond (1980: 27-28) revised the initial model presented in the *Civic Culture* to take into account Easton's formulation. The result of this was a three-by-three matrix: there are three types of political orientations – cognitive, affective, and evaluative – and three objects of political orientations – system culture (the distribution of attitudes toward the national community, the regime, and the authorities), process culture (attitudes toward the self in politics and toward other political actors), and policy culture (the distribution of preferences regarding the outputs and the outcomes of politics).

The model that I use in this study to identify patterns of political culture is presented in Table 1. I use in this model the two types of support from Easton's model, diffuse support and specific support, which correspond to affective and evaluative orientations in Almond's model. I did not include in the model cognitive orientations, defined as "knowledge of and belief about the political system, its roles and the incumbents of these roles, its inputs, and its outputs" (Almond and Verba, 1963: 14), because I assume that all people have at least minimal levels of knowledge about the political system in which they live. The fact that a person may be able to describe in detail the political system or that it may have only the most rudimentary understanding of the political system should have only a limited effect on the person's affective and evaluative orientations.⁴²

I propose in this model three objects of support which are derived from Easton's model: principle, structure, and action. I have excluded from the original model the political community as an object of support because in post-communist Romania (unlike in Yugoslavia or in some of the former Soviet republics) this object has never been seriously questioned.⁴³ I have also decided not to analyze the authorities as object of support. Although support for

during the last decade of the communist regime and remembered only the job and income security of the period.

⁴² See, also, Easton's discussion of cognitive incapacity, in which he argues that specific support "does not depend exclusively on the capacity of members to identify each output or policy action of individual authorities" (Easton, 1975: 441).

⁴³ Some might argue that the ethnic conflicts at the beginning of the transition suggest otherwise. In fact, these conflicts were actually generated by Romanian politicians, who tried to create a nationalist and extremist vote. Fortunately, most of the population (both Romanians and ethnic Hungarians) resisted these strategies. If anything, after the break of the USSR, people were hoping that soon Romania will reunite with Moldova.

incumbents plays an important role in the political system, it is also highly dependent on the incumbents' personal characteristics and, as such, it varies depending on who occupies the authority roles at a particular moment in time. This characteristic of support for incumbents was even more accentuated by the fact that Romanian politics was (and still is) highly personal⁴⁴.

Table 1 The support model

Object of support	PRINCIPLE (values / norms)	STRUCTURE (institutions)	ACTION (performance)
Type of support	Diffuse	Both diffuse and specific	Specific
Indicators	Attitudes toward democracy as political system Attitudes toward market economy as economic system Democratic values Market economy values	Institutional trust	Satisfaction with the functioning of democracy Satisfaction with the functioning of market economy
Chapter	Chapter 4 (democracy) Chapter 5 (market economy)	Chapter 6	Chapter 7

⁴⁴ As a result of this, it is quite difficult to understand what is measured by the "trust in the president" item, for instance. Taking Ion Iliescu as an example, I suspect that the item measures an opinion about Iliescu the person rather than about Iliescu the president. The answer to this item is probably determined by the image Iliescu has created for himself, by the role of Iliescu during the 1989 revolution, and less by Iliescu's actions as president.

Easton argues that the components of the third object of support, the regime, are the values, the norms, and the structure of authority.⁴⁵ In my model I have grouped the values and the norms in a single object of support that represents the principles that stand at the basis of the political system. I have maintained the third component of the regime, the structure of authority, as an object of support representing the structure, i.e. the institutions, of the political system. Finally, I have added to the model a third object of support: the action of the political system. This object is closely related to the structure of the system and it includes, to a certain degree, the incumbents in Easton's model. If the structure of the system as object of support represents the institutions as "ideals", the action as object represents these institutions "in motion". Summarizing, I use a model that analyzes support (diffuse and/or specific) for the principles, the structure, and the action of the political system.⁴⁶

A brief discussion of diffuse and specific support is necessary before moving on to a more detailed treatment on the model presented in Table 1. Although some authors have argued for the understanding of support as a unidimensional concept, Easton's distinction between diffuse and specific support has been widely accepted in the literature.⁴⁷ Diffuse support is defined as "evaluations of what an object is or represents [...] not of what it does" (Easton, 1975: 444) or as "a reservoir of favorable attitudes or good will that helps members to accept or tolerate outputs to which they are opposed or the effect of which they see as damaging to their wants" (Easton, 1965: 273). From these definitions follow the properties of diffuse support: it is directed toward all elements of the political system, it is more durable than specific support, it is generated through both socialization (including adult socialization) and direct experience, and it is expressed through trust and belief in the legitimacy of political objects.⁴⁸

⁴⁵ For a detailed discussion of the regime as an object of political support, see Easton (1965: 190-211).

⁴⁶ The model is somewhat similar to the one presented in Dalton (1999: 58). Instead of diffuse and specific support, Dalton uses affective orientations and instrumental evaluations (more similar to Almond's categories). The three objects of support I use in my model can be found in Dalton's model under the heading of regime: principles, institutions, and performance.

⁴⁷ These arguments seem to be based mainly on the measurement problems generated by treating support as multi-dimensional. See, for instance, Loewenberg (1971) and Davidson and Parker (1972).

⁴⁸ For an extended treatment of diffuse support, its definition and characteristics see Easton (1965: 267-340; 1975: 444-453).

Specific support is defined as “a consequence from some specific satisfactions obtained from the system with respect to a demand that the members make, can be expected to make, or that is made on their behalf [...] a *quid pro quo* for the fulfillment of demands” (Easton, 1965: 268). Muller extended this definition and argued that “the most useful conception of specific support is not that its distinctive characteristic is demand satisfaction, but simply that it involves members’ evaluations of the *performance* of political authorities” (Muller, 1970: 1152). Specific support is directed only toward political authorities and institutions, and it is highly variable, depending on the citizens’ perception of benefits and satisfaction. The most important consequence of distinguishing between the two types of support consists of the fact that a political system can maintain its stability for long periods of time, even when faced with low levels of specific support, as long as these are counterbalanced by satisfactory levels of diffuse support.

The distinction between diffuse and specific support can also be interpreted, following Linz (1978) in terms of legitimacy (as diffuse support) and efficacy and efficiency (as specific support). Linz argues, just like Easton, that the efficacy and effectiveness of a political system can strengthen, reinforce, maintain, or weaken the belief in legitimacy (1978: 18). In addition to this, however, Linz also allows for an effect from diffuse to specific support (which is not discussed by Easton). According to this effect, the initial level of legitimacy may affect the efficacy and effectiveness of the political system. It should be noted, however, that these are only potential effects. Linz and Stepan argued that “it is a conceptual and political mistake to presume that legitimacy and efficacy are always tightly linked” (1996: 223)

Returning to the model I propose, the first column corresponds to diffuse support for the principles of the political system. Remembering that I analyze democracy and market economy as two inter-related systems, this column represents the citizens’ attachments to the ideals of a democratic political system and of a market economy as the basic aspects of the political and economic systems. In addition to this “generalized” attachment, diffuse support for this object can also be indicated by the acceptance of values promoted by democracy and market economy, acceptance that should be indicative of the level of congruence between the citizens’ and the system’s values.

In Easton’s classification, specific support is exclusively linked to political authorities and institutions because they are the only output-generating objects. It follows then that one cannot talk about specific support for the system’s principles.⁴⁹ Easton allows, however, for a possibility for specific

⁴⁹ Dalton, equating specific support with instrumental evaluations, suggests that people are able to make such evaluations about the principles of the political system. He

support to indirectly influence other objects besides political authorities: “each kind of support will spill over to the other and influence it. Empirically, that is to say, the prolonged encouragement emerging from specific support [...] will be likely to lead to deep attachment to the various political objects in general” (Easton, 1965: 343-344). If this is true, then some specific support (positive or negative) should be translated into diffuse support. Nonetheless, the principles of the political and economic systems will benefit, primarily, from the diffuse type of support.

Support for the structure of the system (the institutions) is placed in the second column of the model. Theoretically, there is a clear distinction between diffuse and specific support for the structure of the political system. According to Easton, diffuse support for the structure of authority roles is expressed through trust as “symbolic satisfaction with the processes by which the country is run” (Easton, 1975: 447). This trust in the structure of the system, which I call institutional trust (or trust in the state’s institutions), is generated through two main processes: socialization and direct experience. In the case of Romania (or any other post-communist country), since the implementation of the new political and economic system also meant creating a new set of institutions, socialization should have, at least during the first years of the transition, a less important role in generating trust.

Conceptualizing diffuse support as trust generated through direct experiences, however, leads to a significant empirical problem: diffuse support becomes difficult to distinguish from specific support.⁵⁰ Answers to questions about the level of trust in specific institutions, for instance, confound diffuse and specific support. The available data cannot distinguish between trust generated by the political institutions by itself (e.g. the parliament as a significant component of a democratic political system) and trust generated by the political institution’s actions.⁵¹ As a result of this, while recognizing the

argues, for instance, that agreement with the statement that democracy is the best form of government is an indicator for such an instrumental evaluation of principles (Dalton, 1999: 58). This indicator, however, seems to capture not only evaluations but also affect, especially in countries that have been democracies for a long period of time, so that their citizens have never personally experienced other types of political systems.

⁵⁰ Even Easton acknowledged this problem: “we may and do encounter difficulty in empirically isolating differences between trust and specific support” (Easton, 1975: 450).

⁵¹ Previous studies have also suggested it may be difficult to empirically isolate all types of orientations. See, for instance, Loewenberg (1971), Muller and Jukam (1977), and Canache, Mondak, and Seligson (2001). Sometimes the survey items used as

theoretical distinctions between trust as diffuse support and specific support, most empirical studies use institutional trust as an indicator of generalized support, without distinguishing between the diffuse and specific types. Trust has been used as an instrumental evaluation of institutions (Dalton, 1999: 58), as “first and foremost an indicator of *specific support* [...] also of crucial importance for any analysis of *diffuse system support*” (Plasser, Ulram, and Waldrauch, 1998: 110), or as “a middle-range indicator of support, lying between support for specific social and political actors and the overarching principles of society like democracy and capitalism” (Listhaug and Wiberg, 1995: 299). Since the indicators that I use are identical to the ones used in these previous studies, in analyzing support for the structure of the political and economic systems I will use institutional trust as an indicator of generalized support.

The last column in Table 1 represents specific support for the action of the political system. Diffuse support for this object is generated, in Easton’s view, from ideological, structural, or personal legitimacy. Unfortunately, in the data that I use there are no indicators that may capture any of these sources of diffuse support. As a result, I am forced to exclude this form of support from analysis and focus only on specific support for the action of the system, which is captured through indicators related to the general performance of the political system (satisfaction with the functioning of democracy) and the general performance of the economic system (satisfaction with the functioning of market economy). As I have noted before, despite the fact that specific support for the performance of the system could be interpreted as some sort of fine tuning mechanism for the general support system, it can also have an indirect effect on diffuse support for the other objects of the political system. Prolonged periods of positive or negative specific support for the action of the system may influence the level of diffuse support for the principles and / or structure of the system. Empirical data may indicate if this indirect transfer of support does take place or if its effects are too small to capture in the real world.

Using the model I presented here, different combinations of diffuse and specific support for the principles, the structure, and the action of the political and economic systems define different patterns of political culture. These patterns range from a combination of high levels of diffuse support for the principles of both systems, high levels of generalized support for the structure of the systems, and high levels of specific support for the action of the systems, to a combination of low levels of support for all three objects of the political and economic systems. It should be noted that the distribution of the patterns in

measures for different types of support are not developed enough to make a clear distinction between types of support.

the general population cannot be random; it depends on certain characteristics of the citizens, characteristics that I will try to identify in this study.

Political culture change

The theories developed by Eckstein and Swidler indicate that political culture change is possible and that it probably takes place over a long period of time. Political culture change seems to follow a deconstruction – reconstruction pattern. The political culture developed under the communist regime cannot function efficiently under the new democratic regime. As a result of this, people start abandoning previously held values (the deconstruction phase) and they start adopting new values, consistent with the new political system (the reconstruction phase). This is a “messy” process and it leads to political culture change being characterized by formlessness and competition between ideologies. Initially, people will use different strategies (see Figure 1) but, as some will prove more successful than others, over time it is expected to observe, conditional on the performance of the new system, a migration toward the best strategy for democratic consolidation: adaptation.

Pye (2003) and Mishler and Pollack (2003) identify two dimensions of political culture that define the political process, and establish the norms for political behavior: thick culture and thin culture.⁵² The thick political culture is rooted in the socialization process, it is exogenous from ordinary politics, it focuses on fundamental values, and it includes matters of basic trust.⁵³ The thin political culture is more changeable, only partly related to the past and more rooted in recent history. It is more endogenous to politics, it involves more explicitly political identities, it focuses on values like order and freedom or individualism and collectivism, and it involves attitudes toward the current performance of the political and economic systems (Pye, 2003: 7-8).

While thick culture is internally homogenous, a coherent cluster of orientations, and durable (Mishler and Pollack, 2003: 239-240), thin culture is empirical, rational, heterogeneous, ambivalent, and dynamic (Mishler and

⁵² These two dimensions correspond to Parson’s categories of normative and rational values. The distinction between thick and thin culture can also be related to Easton’s distinction between diffuse and specific support. The two dimensions can also be interpreted as layers of the individuals’ value systems: thick culture represents the core of the value system, while thin culture represents the outer layers that surround this core.

⁵³ This view of culture is similar to the ones expressed by Geertz (1973), Eckstein (1988), Inglehart (1990), Putnam (1993), and Huntington (1996).

Pollack, 2003: 242-243). Thick culture and thin culture represent two different positions on the same conceptual continuum:

“Culture can be conceived of as a multifaceted or multilayered phenomenon, whose core attributes are relatively thick, getting progressively thinner as one moves from the core to the periphery. [...] More basic orientations, such as identities, and orientations toward more fundamental social objects, such as nation, religion, and ethnicity, would be located closer to the conceptual core, where culture tends to be thicker. Conversely, less fundamental orientations, such as attitudes, along with orientations toward less central aspects of society (such as political authorities) would be located further away from the core, where culture is relatively thinner. Social and political values (individualism vs. collectivism, materialism vs. post-materialism, order vs. freedom) would be located somewhere in between, with social values exhibiting somewhat greater centrality (and thus thickness) than political values.” (Mishler and Pollack, 2003: 245).

From this perspective, it is easy to see that different components of political culture have varying degrees of stability. Instead of focusing on which conception of culture is the correct one, now the important questions are related to the structure of culture. Understanding culture as a multilayered phenomenon eliminates the problems political culture theories have faced in analyzing change. Using the thick/thin culture model, Pollack et al (2003) identified in the post-communist transition literature two main hypotheses explaining the possible determinants of political support for the new democracies: the socialization hypothesis and the situation of life hypothesis. The socialization hypothesis views political culture as a slowly-changing phenomenon that leads to

“a prolonged process of democratic consolidation [...] in which a political culture must first develop among the successor generations, that is congruent with the structures of a liberal democracy. The process of democratization is mainly influenced by the legacy of the former Communist rule. Old values are deeply anchored and might be in conflict with newly introduced institutions, or, at the least, some old and some new values might contradict each other. Especially the former legitimacy of the socialist regime through state services, such as welfare and social security, could weaken the support for a highly competitive regime and promote demands for an anti-democratic alternative.” (Pollack et al., 2003: xv).

The situation of life hypothesis sees the individuals’ situation of life and their experiences during the transformation process as the main tools for evaluating the new political regime. According to this hypothesis,

“the political culture approach is not significant for the process of democratic

consolidation in Central and Eastern Europe, because either political culture is meaningless, or it can change fast, or, finally, an adequate political culture is already existent from the beginning of consolidation” (Pollack et al., 2003: xvi).

Empirical findings from previous studies offered support for both the socialization hypothesis (Miller, Hesli and Reisinger 1997) and for the situation of life hypothesis (Hahn 1991; Gibson, Duch and Tedin 1992; Weil 1993; Dalton 1994). Although these findings appear contradictory when they are interpreted individually, when they are interpreted from the perspective of culture as defined by Mishler and Pollack, the contradictions disappear and the findings do fit into a consistent theoretical framework.⁵⁴

Rohrschneider (1999, 2003) developed an institutional learning model (based on three core qualities of citizenship: restraint, self-reliance, and societal ideals) which offers a similar explanation for the different empirical findings in previous studies of political culture in post-communist countries: abstract liberal-democratic rights that require low democratic restraint and self-reliance and only minor revisions of socialist beliefs are accepted more quickly than democratic values (e.g. democratic ideals, political tolerance, etc.) that require high levels of democratic restraint and self-reliance and major revisions of socialist beliefs (Rohrschneider, 2003: 49-51).

I employ in my study this understanding of culture as being composed of different dimensions that are characterized by varying degrees of resistance to change. According to this model, democratic ideals and values should be placed in the conceptual core and they should have the characteristics of a thick culture. Normally, their inclusion into the conceptual core should be a slow process, but, once adopted, they should be very resistant to change. Moving away from this conceptual core, we reach thinner elements of the political culture, that are less resistant to change.


The fall of the communist regime left the people facing a new reality, characterized by significant changes. For the first time in more than 40 years Romanian citizens experienced market economy again, and for the first time in their history they experienced democracy in their own country.⁵⁵ As these new stimuli reached the people, they had to develop attitudes toward them. It is very likely that the novelty of their experiences led them, initially, to developing

⁵⁴ The lifetime learning model developed in Rose and McAllister (1990) and Mishler and Rose (1997, 2001a, 2001b) also fits this theoretical framework.

⁵⁵ After the First World War, Romania attempted to establish a democratic system but, as in all countries in the region (with the exception of Czechoslovakia) in which “embryonic democracies have given way to dictatorships” (Bunce, 1990: 401), it failed after only two years.

common attitudes toward both democracy and market economy, to interpreting them as a “whole package”. As time passed and political and economic reforms were implemented, people experienced the effects of these reforms and they started to better understand and distinguish between the political system and the economic system.

Figure 2 Political culture, support and stability



The reforms in the two areas, however, were implemented at different rhythms. Political reforms were easier to implement because they consisted mainly of creating a new institutional structure and new rules of the game. Once the new structures and rules were established, the main challenge became maintaining them and giving them substance. In the economic arena, reforms were more difficult to implement for several reasons. The economic reforms implied negative effects on the economic situation of the citizens, making the new political elites cautious about dramatic changes. As a result, the debates about the pace of economic reforms played an important role at the beginning of the transition, becoming, eventually, one of the most important and most stable cleavages on the political arena.

The change from a state-controlled economy to a market economy was also difficult due to the lack of a clear model of transition that could be adopted quickly. While for political reforms there was a model that could be borrowed

and easily implemented (free elections, party competition, separation of powers, the rule of law), in the case of the economic reforms the situation was more complex.⁵⁶ Should all sectors of industry be privatized or only some and, in the latter case, which ones should remain under the control of the state? Should the privatization process be abrupt or gradual? How should the new government deal with important issues (e.g. inflation and unemployment) that were unknown to the communist citizens? All these questions indicate difficult choices that the new political forces faced.⁵⁷

Given all these changes experienced by the citizens since the fall of the communist regime, I expect that, over time, people reconstructed their attitudinal systems and developed mechanisms of support for democracy and market economy different from the ones they had during the initial stage of the transition to democracy. This argument could be rephrased in the following hypothesis:

***Support Structure Hypothesis:** During the initial stage of the transition process, attitudes toward democracy and attitudes toward market economy had similar structures and determinants. Over time, people began evaluating democracy and market economy separate from each other, resulting in their attitudes having different structures and determinants.*

⁵⁶ During its modern history Romania has often adopted, influenced by different reformist segments of its elites, modern institutions from the West, but it almost always failed to do it successfully. The result of these attempts was often summarized as the import of empty forms, without any substance.

⁵⁷ While most scholars agreed that the neoliberal strategy was the only answer to the problem of economic transition in post-communist countries – see, for instance, Sachs (1990), Aslund (1991), Ost (1992), and Bresser Pereira (1993) – Romania debated at length about the “correct” strategy to follow. This debated started with Ion Iliescu (the leader of CPUN, the provisional governing body during the first months of the transition) who argued that, while communism failed in its political project, the economic project was still viable. For the next four or five years Romania continued looking for a model to adopt (and the models varied from the “Japanese” model to the “Swedish” model). By 1996 (following the 1996 elections that put in power a center-right coalition government and replaced Iliescu as president, and under increased pressure from international organization) the elites finally realized that the neoliberal model had to be adopted.

Political culture components

In this section I discuss each of the types of support for the objects of the political and economic systems described at the beginning of this chapter.

Before moving on, I discuss two issues relevant to the analysis of support. First, I should emphasize again that I analyze in this study transition to both democracy and market economy. As I have previously argued, the two systems are so strongly inter-related in the post-communist context that neither of the two transitions can be understood without studying both of them. The marketization component of the transition process is especially important, because it poses additional constraints on the democratization process.⁵⁸ Since non-market democracies are “difficult to find anywhere” (Rose, 1992: 374) the public acceptance of democratic values is not enough; the values of the economic system have to be adopted as well for a successful democratic consolidation⁵⁹.

Second, since the models I use in the analysis of support are based on the previous literature, I stop for a moment and briefly discuss two theories proposed by Rose and Mishler: the realist theory of political support for democracy and the lifetime of learning model. Rose and Mishler assume that

“citizens in Central and Eastern Europe have little experience with democratic theory but abundant experience with two real, if very different, regimes: one communist with highly centralized, authoritarian institutions and limited civil liberties; the other pluralist – if not democratic – with competitive elections, fledgling representative institutions, and relatively extensive civil liberties” (Mishler and Rose, 1996: 559).

Starting from this assumption, the two scholars propose a realist approach to the study of political support, in which the focus of the analysis is not on commitment to democracy and market economy as abstract ideals (what they labeled as the idealistic approach) but rather on the assessment of the previous regime and of the current regime as whole entities, and argue that the confusing results found using the idealistic approach can be explained by using the realist approach.

⁵⁸ See Przeworski (1991) for a discussion of the negative effects of marketization on democratization during simultaneous transitions. For similar arguments see also Diamond (1992), Haggard and Kaufman (1995), Nelson (1995), or Gati (1996).

⁵⁹ Previous studies have shown that this was not the case at the beginning of the transition. Political and economic reforms are distinct in the public mind and a significant percentage of the public holds mixed views (McIntosh et al, 1994: 507).

Several implications follow from choosing the realist over the idealistic approach in the study of political support. The most important in the context of this analysis is that, by using generalized evaluations, the realist approach fails to distinguish between diffuse and specific support. The explanation offered for this position is not very convincing:

“Even if citizens in incomplete democracies have meaningful attitudes about democracy, their commitment to democratic ideals may be of little value for assessing the regime as it actually is. A citizen who embraces democracy as an ideal but who opposes the current regime because it falls short of this standard would be wrongly classified as supporting the current regime. Conversely, someone who rejects democratic ideals and endorses the current regime precisely because it is not democratic would be coded as showing little regime support. In both cases the idealist measure incorrectly measures support for transitional regimes” (Mishler and Rose, 2001a: 305).

This explanation fails to take into account the theoretical distinction between the different objects and types of support. Only by conflating principle, structure, and action into a single object of support could one conclude that support for democratic ideals is the same with support for the regime. If the three objects are analyzed separately, the idealistic approach actually helps more in understanding the sources of support and its evolution over time. The paragraph cited above also suggests that Mishler and Rose view the post-communist citizens as rather unsophisticated individuals, unable to distinguish between the different aspects of the political and economic systems.⁶⁰ While this may be true at the beginning of the transition, continuous exposure to the new systems will eventually lead to a better understanding of their components at the level of the mass public. One of the assumptions that I make in my study is that people are actually able to learn from direct experience about the system that governs their lives.

This is not to say, however, that the realist theory cannot help us in understanding political support. If one is interested primarily in support for the

⁶⁰ There is some evidence that people are indeed ideological innocents – see Converse (1964, 1970) – but it is not conclusive: “closer examination reveals that the public’s lack of attitude coherence or constraint has been overstated [...] Individual political thinking on many issues is also integrated vertically, from abstract, core values and attitudes to concrete preferences” (Bahry, 1999: 844). Moreover, “the original argument, which claimed only that on some issues, because they are so abstract or peripheral, many people fail to form an attitude, has recently been transformed into the radically different claim that most people, on most issues, do not really think any particular thing” (Sniderman, Tetlock, and Elms, 2001: 255).

regime only and in its effect on the regime's survivability, then the realist approach may perform better than the idealistic approach. Moreover, there is one particular component of the realist approach that could improve our explanation of the evolution of political support: the role of the evaluations of the previous regime. Thus, while disagreeing with some of the assumptions underlying this approach, I include in my model the evaluation of the communist regime as one possible factor that may help explain support for democracy and market economy. As I have argued before, when discussing inverse legitimation, in post-communist societies the legitimacy of the new system (at least at the beginning of the transition) is influenced by the perception of the previous system.

In the post-communist context, "the theoretically important questions are about re-learning regime support; that is, *whether*, *when* and *how* citizens learn to respond to a regime radically different from that which had governed their lives previously" (Mishler and Rose, 2002: 5). Mishler and Rose proposed the lifetime of learning model as a tool for studying these questions.⁶¹ This model allows for resocialization as a result of the recent experiences of the individual. According to the model, people's attitudes are shaped not only by their past socialization, but also by their evaluations of the past and of the present. The lifetime of learning model understands the attitude system as being built on past experiences, but it also allows for the updating of the system according to more recent experiences. This model incorporates both the socialization hypothesis and the situation of life hypothesis identified by Pollack et al in the literature: most of the core values of the attitudinal system are created during childhood socialization, but they can be modified through adult socialization and through the individuals' personal experiences during the transformation process.

Diffuse support for the principles of the system

This type of diffuse support represents the citizens' affective orientations toward the principles that stand at the basis of the new political and economic system implemented in Romania after the fall of the communist regime. As indicated in Table 1, I analyze diffuse support for the principles of the political system through indicators of attitudes toward democracy as political system and of acceptance of democratic values. Similarly, diffuse support for the economic system is analyzed using indicators of attitudes toward

⁶¹ See, also, Rose and McAllister (1990) and Mishler and Rose (1997).

market economy as an economic system and of acceptance of market economy values.

At the beginning of the transition, high levels of diffuse support for democracy as political system and for market economy as economic system were observed in Romania. These findings appear to contradict what scholars would expect to find from a political culture perspective, because the usual sources of diffuse support (socialization and direct experience) cannot generate such high levels of support in such a short period of time. There are several explanations for this apparent contradiction. First, the generalized rejection of the communist system and of all things associated with it, coupled with the absence of preferable alternatives, led to high levels of legitimacy for democracy and market economy.⁶² The process at work here is similar to Valenzuela's inverse legitimation or Morlino and Montero's idea of legitimacy by default. Rose and Mishler offer a similar explanation: "the more intense and extreme the experience of Communist authoritarianism, the greater the approval for any alternative" (Rose and Mishler, 1994: 170). Second, discussing the sources of diffuse support, Easton argued:

"the special status of those in positions of authority, the rituals surrounding their selection and accession to office, the official ceremonies on formal political occasions, the symbols of office, the affirmation of faith on patriotic days, and pervasive ideological presuppositions have long been presumed to contribute in one or another way to the reservoir of more deeply rooted sentiments" (Easton, 1975: 446).

All these factors indicated above suggest the power of symbols in reinforcing diffuse support for the system. During "normal" times these symbols have a maintenance function. How would these factors operate in a society that just experienced a revolution?

In Sztompka's view, the 1989 anti-communist revolution was "a major cultural and civilizational break, a beginning of the reconstruction of the deepest cultural tissue as well as the civilizational surface of society, the slow emergence of the new post-communist culture and civilization" (Sztompka, 1996a: 120). Despite Sztompka's characterization of this process as slow and a beginning of the reconstruction, I believe that the characteristics of the Romanian revolution acted as catalysts in the generation of diffuse support,

⁶² This applies especially to democracy. In the case of market economy alternatives did exist, and this may explain why citizens supported market economy to a lesser extent than democracy.

explaining the high levels of support observed at the beginning of the transition.⁶³

A brief discussion should offer some support for this proposition. The suddenness of the revolution helped generate a feeling of empowerment within a population that did not even hope to escape a dictatorial regime. The live broadcasting of the revolution helped in spreading the revolution to all corners of the country and in generating a feeling of community in a society that has been atomized under the communist regime.⁶⁴ The violence of the revolution made people feel they paid a significant price for democracy, while the execution of Ceaușescu and his wife, despite (or, perhaps, because of) its vengefulness, helped ingrain into the popular psyche the idea of a complete and irreversible break with the past. And the creation of new symbols (the “hole in the flag” or the renaming of the state television from the Romanian Television to the Free Romanian Television, for instance) helped in promoting this idea. All these factors suggest that under the influence of such dramatic events high levels of diffuse support for the new order can be and have been generated.

Third, it is possible that certain segments of the population have never believed in the values of the communist regime but have accepted them in order to survive. This group included those people who have waited their whole life for “the Americans” to come and free them from “the Russians”, those who have organized and supported the armed resistance at the beginning of the communist regime, and the pre-communist elites who have been targeted by the communist regime. In addition to this, prior to the installation of the communist regime, communism was never a popular ideology in Romania and many Romanians have seen the communist regime as a regime imposed by the Soviets

⁶³ Dalton calls this the “critical events” model and continues: “The revolutionary changes that swept through East Germany as the Berlin Wall fell and the economy collapsed may have led to rejection of prior learning and a new-found belief in democracy as the road to political reforms. After all, what does a communist say after attending communism’s funeral? [...] democratic attitudes are at least partially a consequence of the revolution (rather than a cause).” (Dalton 1994: 481).

⁶⁴ Seeing the mass demonstrations in the capital, people felt the need to act and their actions ranged from confronting the army and the secret police in the main cities, to getting out on the streets in even the smallest towns just to express their support for the revolution, to organizing themselves just to make sure they are prepared if they needed to act, to describing the events over the phone for Radio France International while protecting from stray bullets in a bathtub (which seems to be a very efficient survival strategy, since the sociology professor who experienced the revolution in this rather domestic posture lived to tell his story).

and not as an organic development in the Romanian history.⁶⁵ Moreover, once Ceaușescu became general secretary of the Romanian Communist Party, the communist regime began distancing itself from soviet influence, adopting a new direction with emphasis on the national character internally and on Romania's independence externally.⁶⁶

Finally, a fourth explanation for this contradiction argues that “a combination of long-standing normative and material factors has eroded popular support for communism. [...] as a model of socioeconomic development [...] Western Europe represented a successful alternative order” (di Palma, 1991: 55, 68).⁶⁷ This suggests that some democratic and market economy values may have been adopted while still under the communist rule. Kolarska-Bobinska, analyzing attitudes in Poland, found empirical evidence that some market economy values were already present in the Polish society as early as 1980 and that the mechanism by which these values have been accepted was similar to the one described by di Palma.⁶⁸

“Both in 1980 and a year later, the acceptance of egalitarian principles did not preclude acceptance of nonegalitarian attitudes. The principles of both models of the social order were strongly supported as two independent elements of social justice. [...] The inability to satisfy many material needs and realize economic interests is accompanied by the change of the state's image as a social guardian and a growing conviction that the state is unable or does not want to satisfy the needs of its employees” (Kolarska-Bobinska, 1988: 132, 134).

Unfortunately, the communist regime in Romania was not as open toward sociologists or political scientists as in other communist countries, and data that could be used to test this last explanation are not available.

⁶⁵ Iosif Rangheț, one of the leaders of the Communist Party, estimated (during an official meeting of the Central Committee of the Communist Party) that at the end of the Second World War the Communist Party had 80 members in Bucharest and not more than one thousand in the whole country (Colt, 1999). Moreover, until 1944 none of the general secretaries of the Romanian Communist Party (with the exception of Gheorghe Cristescu, the first general secretary) were of Romanian ethnicity (Köblös was Hungarian, Holostenco was Ukrainian, Stefanski was Polish, Stefanov was Bulgarian, and Foriș was Hungarian). For more details, see Cioroianu (2005).

⁶⁶ See, for instance, Romania's refusal to send troops in Czechoslovakia in 1968.

⁶⁷ Similar arguments are offered in Weil (1993), Dalton (1994), Kaase and Klingeman (1994), and Finkel, Humphries, and Opp (2001).

⁶⁸ In the Russian context Bahry argues that “political liberalization and economic reform did have mass support in 1985, but the demand for change dated at least back to the post-War years” (Bahry, 1993: 549)

Nevertheless, I think that a combination of the four factors presented above offers a plausible explanation for the Romanian case: on the one hand, at least some part of the population adopted some democratic and market economy values during the communist period, and, on the other hand, the character of the Romanian revolution generated the high levels of diffuse support for the system observed at the beginning of the transition and the absence of preferable alternatives to democracy and to market economy (to a lesser extent) reinforced the already created support through inverse legitimation.⁶⁹

The existence of this diffuse support right from the beginning of the transition raises one significant question. We know, via Easton, that diffuse support is characterized by long term stability. Does this characteristic also apply to the particular form of support encountered in Romania? No studies have attempted so far to offer an answer to this question.⁷⁰ In addition to the uncertainty about the stability of this type of diffuse support, with the passing of time, the other two sources should start generating support as well, complicating things even more. While socialization requires a much longer period of time than the one covered in this study to observe its effects, the effects of direct experience with democracy and market economy should be observable much sooner.

Diffuse support for democratic principles

I have already discussed the finding that people exhibited unusually high levels of diffuse support for democracy at the beginning of the transition in most of the post-communist countries. How is diffuse support for democratic principles evolving over time? I expect it will remain at similar levels throughout the transition. In the worst case scenario, it is possible to observe a slight decreasing trend, with the majority of the population still showing high levels of diffuse support.

The reasons for this expectation are fourfold. First, as I have argued before, the experience of living under the communist regime may have given

⁶⁹ Most likely, the adoption of these values was the result of comparisons between the quality of life in Romania to the quality of life in the Western world (more often than not, inferred from cultural products of the West, especially movies).

⁷⁰ Rose, Mishler, and Haerpfer hypothesized that “the initial evaluations of a new democracy are unlikely to be final or fixed; they are the start of a feedback process in which popular demands respond to the governance that elites supply until some sort of equilibrium is reached” (Rose, Mishler, and Haerpfer, 1998: 91). Dalton questioned “whether these expressions of opinions reflect enduring cultural norms or the temporary response to traumatic political events” (Dalton, 2000: 916).

the initial levels of diffuse support enough stability to survive the pitfalls of transition. Second, the benefits associated with living in a democratic regime should also help maintaining high levels of support for democracy: “positive experiences with political institutions, such as unaccountable government giving way to accountable government and a rule of law replacing arbitrariness will solidify support for democratic values” (Brown 2003: 24). Third, to the extent that diffuse support is influenced by current conditions, it is possible that some people will support democracy to a lesser extent later in the transition. Finally, while the effects of socialization cannot be distinguished from the effects of the other sources of support, I believe it is safe to assume that socialization can only have a positive influence in a society in which democracy has become an ideal to be attained.

While empirically I cannot distinguish the separate effects of each of these processes (due to the lack of indicators), I can observe their aggregate effect. These expectations can be formally expressed in the following hypothesis:⁷¹

***DSD change hypothesis:** Throughout the transition, diffuse support for democracy remains at relatively the same high levels recorded at the beginning of the transition.*

If this hypothesis is confirmed, it will show that, contrary to expectations of rapid disappearance⁷², inverse legitimation survives the transition and is transformed into “real” legitimation. If this holds true for Romania, where the political elites lost years before implementing economic reforms and thus prolonged the negative effects of the economic transformation, it should also apply in other post-communist countries that moved more rapidly toward market economy, so that the economic situation had less time than in Romania to adversely affect diffuse support for democracy. This would suggest that ideas played an extremely important role in the Romanian post-communist transition, especially the widespread idea of returning to Europe, to the country’s rightful place that was stolen by the imposition of the communist regime and its survival for forty years.

⁷¹ I will use the following abbreviations in labeling the hypotheses: DSD – diffuse support for democracy, DSDv – diffuse support for democratic values, DSM – diffuse support for market economy, DSMlib – diffuse support for the liberal model of market economy, DSMsd – diffuse support for the social democratic model of market economy, TTI – trust in traditional institutions, TSI – trust in the state’s institutions, SSD – specific support for democracy, and SSM – specific support for market economy.

⁷² See footnote 70.

Despite the fact that a large proportion of the population shows high levels of support for democracy, there are still subgroups in the society that are opposed or indifferent to democracy. It is time then to move the discussion toward the factors that could affect the level of diffuse support for democracy. Why do some people support democracy, while others do not? During periods of societal change, the highest level of support for the new regime comes from the modernist strata of the society. These modernist strata are similar to what was labeled as vanguard groups:

“Dahl had stressed the importance of political values particularly amongst the active political stratum. Some people’s values may matter more than other’s in defining a country’s political culture. [...] The highly educated are influential either because they hold positions of power or because they contribute disproportionately towards setting the climate of opinion in which others act. Finally even if the young are not usually either active or influential in contemporary politics, and even if they are part of no contemporary ‘elite’, the future belongs to them. Together these groups might be described as vanguard groups whose values are especially important for the consolidation of any new political and economic system” (Miller, White, Heywood, 1998: 18).

Thus, a first group of factors that should have an effect on diffuse support for democracy is composed by the respondents’ demographic characteristics: gender, age, education, residence in urban / rural, religion, and development region.⁷³ Membership in the population subgroups defined by these demographic characteristics should be accompanied by different levels of diffuse support for democracy. The demographic variables can have both a direct effect and an indirect effect, mediated by attitudes and evaluations.

Since my analysis is based on survey data, it should be noted that the attitudinal and evaluative variables I am using are measured at the same time as the dependent variable (diffuse support for democracy in this case), raising questions about the temporal sequence required for causal models. Despite this methodological problem, I believe that attitudinal and evaluative variables can be used in a model explaining diffuse support for democracy for two reasons.⁷⁴ First, diffuse support for democracy is a complex, higher-order value that is developed and then maintained based on other, lower-order, values and attitudes. Second, people have begun developing real attitudes toward democracy only after the fall of the communist regime. Of course, people had some attitudes toward democracy prior to 1989 as well. I argue, however, that in

⁷³ The effects of each of these variables are described in Chapter 3.

⁷⁴ The same argument applies for the model explaining diffuse support for market economy as well.

most cases those attitudes were rather vague and based on an incomplete understanding of the meaning of democracy. It was only after 1989 that Romanians had the chance to experience democracy and this was, I believe, the moment when they started developing real attitudes toward democracy.

If this is true, then the values and attitudes underlying some of the variables that I use (i.e. the political participation variables, interpersonal trust, and evaluations of the communist regime) have been developed before attitudes toward democracy. The other variables in the model (satisfaction with life, institutional trust, and satisfaction with democracy) are primarily evaluative variables and, as such, they are less stable over time and may change after the attitudes toward democracy have been formed. I believe, however, that they may play an important role in maintaining the attitudes toward democracy. Although diffuse support for democracy is, or should be, a very stable attitude, it is possible that some people will update their attitudes toward democracy based on these evaluations.

The attitudinal and evaluative variables that I use are grouped in three categories. The first group includes different indicators of political participation: interest in politics, political participation, and voting intention. These variables will show if diffuse support for democracy is significantly influenced by the respondents' level of interest in politics and political activism. The second group includes two types of evaluations: evaluations of the communist regime (showing if diffuse support for democracy is determined by comparisons to the previous regime) and generalized evaluations (showing if diffuse support for democracy is influenced or not by evaluations of the current situation). Finally, the third group includes measures of support for the structure of the system (trust in institutions) and of specific support for the action of the system (satisfaction with democracy). These variables will test if the effects hypothesized by Easton can be observed in the Romanian case.

All these variables (and especially the demographic variables) divide the society into different groups characterized by varying levels of support for democracy. The structure of these groups, however, will not remain the same over time. I expect that, with the passing of time, the relationships between some of these variables (especially age and education) and support for democracy will become weaker. In other words, less modern groups of the society will eventually converge toward the level of support for democracy displayed by the more modern groups right from the beginning of the transition.

Diffuse support for market economy principles

The simultaneous transition to both democracy and market economy, the main characteristic of the post-communist transitions, led many scholars to

have a cautious outlook regarding the chances of successful democratization in the region. Capitalism, it was often recognized in the literature, “is fundamentally inconsistent with democracy, but capitalism is the only economic order that has so far proved to be consistent with polyarchy” (Dahl, 1996). What this meant for the post-communist countries was that the transition to democracy was complicated and prolonged by the transition to market economy.

The economic transformation was especially problematic for Romania, for various reasons, the most important probably being the structure of the economy during the communist regime. At the beginning of the transition 46% of the Romanian population lived in rural areas and 28% of the active population was employed in the agricultural sector.⁷⁵ During the communist period, after a nearly complete collectivization which was finalized in 1962, the state focused on industrialization and did not invest in the development of the agricultural sector. After 1989, the agricultural land was slowly returned to private property, a process that led to a high level of land fragmentation, not suited for efficient, mechanized agricultural production (the forced collectivization of the land also seems to have instilled the Romanian peasants with high levels of distrust for any form of collective working of the land, accentuating the fragmentation problem).⁷⁶

Industry did not perform any better. While the industrial sector experienced high levels of development during the first part of the communist regime (1950-1977),⁷⁷ during the 1980s the situation was completely different,

⁷⁵ Data from the National Institute of Statistics (2000). In 1988 the communist regime implemented a program of forced urbanization (called the systematization of localities), with the goal of eliminating small villages and moving their population to large agro-industrial centers (the program was initially proposed in 1972, but, faced with significant opposition from those living in the rural areas, it was abandoned). It is estimated that a thousand villages have been destroyed during the application of this program, reducing thus the percentage of rural population (Demekas and Khan, 1991: 13).

⁷⁶ In a qualitative study of Biertan, a relatively rich commune in central Romania (Sibiu county), we found that in some cases the land was returned to private property not in one but in two or three different plots (thus aggravating the land fragmentation problem) and widespread refusal to create agricultural associations. Those that proposed the idea of working the land collectively were accused of communism (Sandu and Tufiş, 2000).

⁷⁷ Despite these high levels of growth, Romania did not manage to catch up with the more developed countries in the region (e.g. Hungary or Czechoslovakia).

with significantly lower levels of growth.⁷⁸ In addition to industrial stagnation, Romania, being a member of the communist trade network (COMECON), oriented its industrial output toward the demands of the communist block (especially USSR), leading to the overdevelopment of the heavy industry. As a result of this, large numbers of workers were employed in huge industrial centers, characterized by low productivity and low competitiveness on the Western market.⁷⁹

With the dissolution of the trade agreements within the communist bloc, Romania was left with an industrial production that was not needed internally and that could not be sold on the Western markets. From an economic perspective, this problem could have been solved easily by shutting down these industrial centers. Given the size of these enterprises (in most areas they were the main employer and, in some, the only significant employer), closing them down would have created pockets of severe unemployment, which was considered unacceptable by the post-communist governments. The preferred solution was the gradual downsizing of the industrial centers, which helped avert the social problem but increased the cost of the economic transition. Thus, Romania started the economic transition with a large agricultural sector and with a poorly developed industrial sector, an economic structure that predetermined, to a certain extent, the path of economic reforms during the first years of the transition:

“The combination of the economic and institutional crisis and the socio-political circumstances prevailing in the country at the beginning of the transition period had three major implications for the Romanian reform process. First, the economic collapse it caused required an immediate policy response by the authorities, without allowing for a pre-reform period during which the elements and priorities of the reform program are negotiated, the population is informed and educated, and a broad consensus on the strategy is reached before any structural measures are actually introduced. Several measures intended to unblock the productive structures were introduced before a coherent reform program was formulated; as a result, many of these measures had to be modified or replaced later, making the economic reform effort a process of trial-and-error. Secondly, the release of the population’s pent-up demand for consumer goods and the dramatic decline in living standards influenced considerably the early decisions of the provisional government. Thirdly, the combination of the collapse

⁷⁸ The average annual growth during the 1980s was approximately 1.5% (Van Frausum, Gehmann, and Gross, 1994: 735).

⁷⁹ Many of these centers were built in underdeveloped areas, in an attempt to help the growth of these regions. This, however, led to an increase in production costs, mainly from higher transportation costs for the materials used in production.

in output with the policy of boosting the population's real incomes to improve the living conditions caused a rapid deterioration of the macroeconomic situation in 1990; this forced the authorities to change somewhat the priorities of their reform program in mid-course" (Demekas and Khan, 1991: 17-18).⁸⁰

In addition to the dire economic situation that characterized Romania at the beginning of the transition, a second factor that hindered the transition to a market economy was the existence of alternative economic models: a less centralized command economy (similar to the ones in Poland or Hungary before the transition), a market economy with a strong redistributive component (similar to the systems used in the Scandinavian countries), and even the previous economic system seemed viable alternatives to market economy.⁸¹

Diffuse support for market economy should then have a different trajectory over time than support for democracy. There are several factors that lead to this expectation. At the beginning of the transition citizens exhibited relatively high levels of support for market economy (lower, however, than in the case of democracy). This may be explained by an automatic rejection of the command economy which was associated with the communist regime. The idealization of market economy, based on the perceived affluence of the Western societies (an exceptionally attractive ideal for a society in which basic foods were rationed), may also explain the initial level of support.⁸² However, unlike the issue of democracy, in the case of the economic system, market economy was not the only alternative available. As a result of this, as different alternatives entered the debate on the future of the economic system, support for market economy decreased. The debate continued for several years, increasing the public's uncertainty about the development of the economic system. Once the neoliberal model was adopted, this uncertainty was eliminated and I expect the level of support for market economy to stabilize. The delay in implementing economic reforms, however, had significant negative effects on the economic

⁸⁰ The second factor is exemplified by Silviu Brucan, a significant member of FSN, who remarked during the first days of the transition: "Our ideology consists of five points: more food, more heat, more electricity and light, better transportation, and better health care" (cited in Pop-Elecheș, 1999: 120).

⁸¹ In 1993, half of the respondents considered a free market economy wrong for Romania's future, and 68% evaluated the current economic system as worse than under communism (Firebaugh and Sandu, 1998: 525).

⁸² Plasser, Ulram, and Waldrauch, analyzing data from the Central European countries, showed that "as early as 1991, system change had failed to fulfill the hopes of roughly two thirds of citizens. Another tenth had never expected anything good to come of it in the first place, and the developments then taking place confirmed their dim prognoses" (Plasser, Ulram, and Waldrauch, 1998: 185).

conditions in Romania. All these developments suggest the following hypothesis for diffuse support for market economy:

***DSM change hypothesis:** Diffuse support for market economy follows a decreasing trend during the first part of the transition, leveling at moderate to low levels in the second half of the transition.*

The model explaining diffuse support for market economy includes the same main groups of variables used in the previous model (demographic characteristics, political participation variables, evaluation variables, and variables measuring other types of support), with several modifications. First, I have added to the group of evaluation indicators two more variables that test the prospective and retrospective pocketbook hypotheses. Second, specific support for democracy is replaced by specific support for market economy. Just like in the case of diffuse support for democracy, these variables also define groups with different levels of diffuse support for market economy. There is one significant difference in this case: compared to democracy, I expect market economy to be a more divisive issue in the Romanian society. Thus, while groups with different levels of support for democracy could be characterized as leaders or laggards, in the case of market economy I expect the relationships to maintain their strength over time. With respect to market economy, the groups rather fit the opponent versus proponent dimension. The distinction between modernist and traditionalist groups in the society should be even clearer when looking at how these groups relate to market economy.

Generalized support for the structure of the system⁸³

The second object of support in the political culture matrix I use in this study is the structure of the system, i.e. the institutions of the state (see Table 1). The theoretical distinction between diffuse and specific support applies in this case as well. Easton suggests that trust is a component of diffuse support but, at the same time, he indicates that “trust may result from experience over time. Typically this is what is hoped for in newly formed systems” (Easton, 1975: 449).⁸⁴ The distinction between trust as indicator of diffuse support and trust as

⁸³ Some of the theoretical arguments presented in this section have been previously published in Tufiş (2008b).

⁸⁴ Trust in institutions has also been interpreted as a middle range indicator of support (Niemi, Mueller, and Smith, 1989: 93).

indicator of specific support rests upon the distinction between institutions and incumbents.

Unfortunately, the empirical indicators available in the surveys that I use cannot distinguish between diffuse and specific support: one can trust institutions because they are crucial institutions for the functioning of democracy (e.g. parliament, courts) and one can also trust (or not trust) these institutions depending on the perceived performance of their incumbents. Since the survey items asked the respondents only about the level of trust in different institutions, without any further specifications, I cannot identify which of the two mechanisms is responsible for the answers provided. As a result of this data limitation I analyze support for the structure of the system as a generalized form of support, without distinguishing between diffuse and specific support. The results may indicate, however, if this generalized support is more similar to the diffuse or to the specific type of support.⁸⁵

Before discussing the variables I use, I stop for a moment to discuss a series of theoretical aspects of trust. Trust is the main foundation on which democracies are built. In the absence of trust, the links between citizens and the democratic institutions are broken and the quality of democracy suffers.⁸⁶ Previous studies indicate a trust deficit in post-communist countries and offer several explanations for the low levels of trust observed in these societies: communist legacies, institutional inefficiency, or the short period of time since the beginning of the transition.⁸⁷ The issues related to trust seem to be especially important in the new European democracies. Firstly, the institutional context in the transition countries is not stable (even in the developed democracies the institutions are alive, in a continuous process of evolution, triggered by different problems raised by the societal development), but rather in a permanent and complex movement of finding the best institutional arrangement for a given society. Secondly, in the Central and Eastern European countries, the legacy of

⁸⁵ If the generalized support is driven primarily by the diffuse support component, one would expect the level of generalized support to not change very much over time. If the specific support component is more important, then generalized support should be characterized by significant fluctuations over time. Plasser, Ulram, and Waldrauch (1998) present a similar argument.

⁸⁶ It should be noted, however, that democracies require a certain level of distrust. Even more, some authors argue that democracies are built on institutionalized distrust. Braithwaite (1998) talks about the “republican architecture of trust” as institutionalized distrust. Sztompka (1998) also talks about institutionalizing distrust for the sake of trust (“the first paradox of democracy”).

⁸⁷ See, among others, Mishler and Rose (1997), Rose, Mishler, and Haerpfer (1998), Ekiert and Kubik (1999), Mishler and Rose (2001b), and Howard (2003).

the communist period is particularly unfavorable to trusting the institutions of the state – more than four decades of communism are responsible for institutionalizing a culture of distrust in the state and in all areas related to the state.⁸⁸

Giddens thought of trust as being “basic to a protective cocoon, which stands guard over the self in its dealings with everyday reality. It brackets out potential occurrences which, were the individual seriously to contemplate them, would produce a paralysis of the will [...] Trust here generates that leap into faith which practical engagement demands” (Giddens, 1991: 3). During communist rule, one of the effects of the total involvement of the state in all areas of the society has been the reduction of the risks associated with everyday life. In contrast, under the new democratic rules the state withdrew from the society and, as a result, the citizens now have to face these risks. In a society that has become increasingly complex trust is required for the good functioning of the new democratic regimes.⁸⁹

The post-communist societies need to develop new bases of cooperation and this explains in part the growing interest in trust: community depends on trust, and trust is culturally determined (Fukuyama 1995). The communist regimes in the Central and Eastern European countries have institutionalized a culture of generalized distrust, that had as objects both the institutions (institutional distrust) and, to a certain extent, the people (interpersonal distrust). The state and its institutions were generally perceived as oppressors, and the fellow citizens, with the exception of family and of the closest friends, were perceived as possible state informants.⁹⁰ The communist period was long enough to force the transition from trust to distrust. Is the change from distrust to trust possible? The low levels of trust in the institutions of the state suggest that fifteen years have not been enough to transform the post-communist citizen into a trusting citizen. If one remembers Putnam’s analysis of civic traditions in

⁸⁸ Miller, White and Heywood noted the distrust that characterized the post-communist societies at the beginning of the 1990s: “the supreme irony was that after the democratic revolutions of 1989-91, people everywhere had much lower levels of trust in their new *democratically elected* parliaments than in the old organs of power. They also had low levels of trust in their new democratic governments, prime ministers or executive presidents” (Miller, White and Heywood, 1998: 102).

⁸⁹ If people were acting as rational choice theory argues, i.e. if they were making a rational calculus for all their actions, the result would be a “paralysis of the will”.

⁹⁰ I still remember the time my parents grounded me for a week because I asked them, while they were having dinner with their friends, if I could go in the other room to listen to Voice of America. As a kid it never crossed my mind that listening to Bruce Springsteen’s *Born in the U.S.A.* could be interpreted as a subversive act with the potential of getting my family in trouble – I just liked the song.

Italy then the failure of the post-communist citizens to trust the institutions of the state should not surprise anyone.

Trust is frequently linked to the concept of social capital: “during recent years, the concept of social capital has become one of the most popular exports from sociological theory into everyday language. [...] social capital has evolved into something of a cure-all for the maladies affecting society at home and abroad” (Portes, 1998: 2). While I do not focus here on social capital, its definitions are significant because they all identify significant relationships between trust and social capital. Discussing the importance of social capital as a resource for individuals, Coleman argued, “social capital depends on two elements: trustworthiness of the social environment, which means that obligations will be repaid, and the actual extent of obligations held” (Coleman, 1999: 20). Coleman, however, assumes that the macrolevel and the microlevel are independent of each other; he does not give an explanation for the influence that the different types of organizations have on trust. Putnam defines social capital in a very similar manner: “social capital here refers to features of social organization, such as trust, norms, and networks, that can improve the efficiency of society by facilitating coordinated actions” (Putnam, 1993: 167). In Putnam’s view, trust is one component of social capital.⁹¹ Similar views can be observed at other authors too: “social capital is a capability that arises from the prevalence of trust in a society or in certain parts of it” (Fukuyama, 1995: 17); “social capital is a culture of trust and tolerance, in which extensive networks of voluntary associations emerge” (Inglehart, 1997: 188); “trust has important functions, not only for partners, but also for wider communities (groups, associations, communities, etc.) within which it prevails. First of all, it encourages sociability, participation with others in various forms of association, and in this way enriches the network of interpersonal ties, enlarges the field of interactions, and allows for greater intimacy of interpersonal contacts” (Sztompka, 1999: 105).

There is widespread agreement that trust is one of the factors that facilitate the creation of social capital, but little attention is given to the second part of the relation between the two phenomena. Trust is required for the extension of social capital to higher dimensions: social capital exists, at one level, in large families and, more generally, in any form of organization that is funded on kinship, but for the extension to other forms of organization based on other types of “social glue”, trust is a necessary component.⁹² Nevertheless, once a certain level of social capital is reached, the relation between trust and

⁹¹ See also Newton (1997) and Ostrom and Ahn (2001).

⁹² For an analysis of the relationship between interpersonal trust and NGO membership in Romania, see Bădescu (2003).

social capital becomes circular: trust promotes social capital and social capital eases the formation of new trust relations. Beyond a certain point, the relation between trust and social capital becomes a virtuous circle.

The relationship between interpersonal and institutional trust also received a lot of attention in the literature: “trust among persons and agencies is interconnected. If your trust in the enforcement agency falters, you will not trust persons to fulfill their terms of an agreement, and thus will not enter into that agreement. [...] you will not trust the enforcement agency to do on balance what is expected of it if you do not trust that it will be thrown out of power if it does not do on balance what is expected of it. It is this interconnectedness which makes trust such a fragile commodity. If it erodes in any part of the mosaic it brings down an awful lot with it” (Dasgupta, 1988: 50). The level of institutional trust influences the level of interpersonal trust, but not all types. It is safe to assume for instance that the relations of trust established in the family will not depend on the level of institutional trust. Trust in an institution will be extended to the incumbents of that institution and, by mechanisms of generalization and to a certain extent, to the groups to which the incumbents belong.

Trust seems thus to be a multifaceted phenomenon, with different sources, of multiple types, and related to other concepts (e.g. risk and social capital), leading to the question of the definition of trust. Seligman defines trust as “some sort of belief in the goodwill of the other, given the opaqueness of other’s intentions and calculations. The opaqueness rests precisely on that aspect of alter’s behavior that is beyond the calculable attributes of role fulfillment” (Seligman, 1997: 43). The opaqueness present in this definition represents the risk element that is related to the problem of trust. Sztompka gives a more general definition of trust: “a bet about the future contingent actions of others” (Sztompka, 1999: 25). It should be noted that the two definitions view trust independent of the object of trust. Do they, in this case, cover trust in the institutions of the state?

Both definitions emphasize the importance that the uncertainty plays in determining trust. But to speak about uncertainty in the context of the institutions of the state is somehow problematic. The role of the state is to serve its citizens and Seligman’s statement that the trust is a belief in the goodwill of the other does not hold: the citizens do not have to believe in the goodwill of the state institutions, since this is an assumption, a part of the institutions’ design.⁹³ The same problem affects Sztompka’s definition: in the case of the state institutions we cannot make bets about their future uncertain, free actions,

⁹³ Seligman (1997) actually discusses this point, arguing that the relationships between individuals and the institutions of the state are based on legal grounds rather than trust.

because the actions of the state institutions are neither uncertain, nor free. There is no uncertainty related to the actions of an institution: the institution will react to any request that comes from a citizen following predefined channels of access. The set of possible actions that the institutions might perform is restricted by the internal and external rules they have to respect. Theoretically, the intentions and the calculations of the institutions of the state are characterized by high visibility: their functions, their limitations, and their procedures can be known by any person that is interested in knowing them.

While the arguments presented here suggest that the definitions offered by Sztompka and Seligman might not be suitable for the study of political trust in developed democracies, the characteristics of the institutions of the state in post-communist countries (they are newly established and they are still in the process of defining their roles and a coherent institutional culture) define the interactions between the citizens and the state's institutions in terms of uncertainty.⁹⁴

The uncertainty of the interactions between the citizens and the institutions of the state has multiple sources.⁹⁵ The citizens do not completely know the roles of the new institutions and this generates uncertainty. The new institutions also need time to fine tune their performance.⁹⁶ Hardin argued that trust in the state institutions requires “a micro-level account of how government works at the macro level. This will largely be an account of rational expectations of what government and its agents are likely to do. [...] Citizens' expectations must also be rational in the sense of depending on the rational commitments of officials. Rationally grounded trust in officials requires that the officials be responsive to popular needs and desires” (Hardin, 1998: 12). The distinction between institutions and their incumbents plays thus an important role in establishing trust.

⁹⁴ The judicial system in post-communist Romania is probably the best example of the risks associated with betting on the goodwill of a state institution: there are numerous cases in which there seems to be no relation between a crime and its punishment (if one categorizes the Romanian police inspectors as either Javert or Cattani, it seems that the Cattani population is just a really small minority).

⁹⁵ Beck argues that in modern societies the citizens are increasingly dependent “upon institutions and actors who may well be – and arguably are increasingly – alien, obscure, and inaccessible” (Beck, 1992: 4).

⁹⁶ Moisés argued that “trust in institutions depends upon how much administrators are able to translate to citizens, through its practical functioning, the basic idea or value that founds and articulates each specific institution; the citizens' complaisance or concordance in face of rules emanated from the actions of the institutions' administrators would depend upon this discursive capacity of institutions” (Moisés, 2006: 610).

People interact with the institutions of the state through two main forms: primary contact, when a person has a personal experience with the institution, and secondary contact, understood as a description of others' personal experiences with the institution (often those who describe to a person their primary contacts are friends, relatives, or, at a more general level, the mass-media).

The distinction between primary and secondary contacts is similar to Sztompka's distinction between primary and secondary targets of trust (Sztompka, 1999: 41-51). The interactions between the people and the institutions are thus mediated by the incumbents of the institutions, and the evaluations of these interactions are extended from the incumbents to the institutions. Any contact with the police for instance is mediated through an officer from a police station. Since the officer is an employee of the police department, the citizen's experience with the police will be interpreted in the light of the interaction with that officer. This generalization is based on the assumptions that the institution established a set of rules that have to be followed by all employees and that the institution will verify that its incumbents respect these rules. Thus, the interactions with the incumbents will be generalized to describe the interactions with the institutions.

Uncertainty is also related to the perceived efficiency of the institution. As Luhmann argued, "trust is only possible in a situation where the possible damage may be greater than the advantage you seek" (Luhmann, 1988: 98). In the case of institutional trust, the efficiency of the institutions is used in assessing the possible damage (or cost). To the extent that the citizens' demands follow the official channels and satisfy all the requirements, one can be sure that the institutions of the state will engage in a series of activities triggered by one's demand: there is no uncertainty related to the existence/nonexistence of a certain action. The uncertainty stems from the way in which the action will be performed by the institution (i.e. by the incumbents of the different roles of authority).

Gambetta incorporates many of these elements in his definition of trust as "a particular level of the subjective probability with which an agent assesses that another agent or group of agents will perform a particular action, both before he can monitor such action and in a context in which it affects his own action" (Gambetta, 1988: 217). Trust is thus a variable (*a particular level*) depending on certain personal and cultural factors (*of the subjective probability*); it is applicable to both interpersonal (*another agent*) and institutional (*group of agents*) trust; it states that the trust relation has three components – the truster, the trustee, and the event (*perform a particular action*); it recognizes the role of trust in reducing complexity (*before he can monitor such action*); and it also recognizes the close relation between trust and

risk (*in a context in which it affects his own actions*). The only element missing from this definition is the efficiency of the object of trust.

Based on the previous definitions, I define trust as a context-dependent belief that an agent will perform a particular action that will correspond to the truster's current expectations. Trust is a belief, i.e. it depends on the psychological and cultural characteristics of the truster. At the same time, this belief is context-dependent, i.e. it is influenced by the current situation that requires establishing a trust relation. People have different positions on the trust–distrust continuum, positions that could be explained by a series of personal and cultural factors that form together the set of internal determinants of trust. The position on this continuum, however, is not fixed. It can be influenced by context-dependent factors or the external determinants of trust. These factors are the modifiers that make possible that a usually trusting person will not trust a certain agent in a certain context.

I analyze support for the structure of the system starting from the definition presented above. The dependent variable is trust in the state's institutions, measured as an index built from a series of indicators of trust in different institutions of the state.⁹⁷ The institutions included in the surveys can be grouped in three categories. Presidency, parliament, cabinet, political parties, civil servants, police, courts, and city hall form the group of state institutions. In addition to this group, which represents the main focus of the analysis, I also analyze, for comparison purposes, two more groups. The second group is represented by the traditional institutions (church and army). I include these institutions in analysis because they have a particular significance in the Romanian history (they are seen as symbols of nation) and because they are characterized by hierarchical structures that are not congruent with a democratic society. The third group of institutions is represented by the institutions of the civil society: voluntary organizations, trade unions, newspapers, and TV.⁹⁸ I have included this group in analysis following the interpretation of the civil society as one of the five areas required for a successful democratization process (Linz and Stepan 1996). It should be noted that the list of institutions presented here does not include institutions that deal directly with the economic domain.⁹⁹ As a result of this, the analysis in this section refers only to

⁹⁷ Respondents were asked how much trust they have in different institutions, on a four point scale.

⁹⁸ The newspapers and the TV are not institutions of the civil society per se, but in their relationship with the state's institutions they have similar functions to those of voluntary organizations.

⁹⁹ It should be noted, however, that, excluding the traditional institutions, all other institutions have indirect effects on the economic domain.

generalized support for the structure of the political system and not for the structure of the economic system.¹⁰⁰

In terms of the evolution of trust in the state's institutions over time, Romania, like most of the post-communist countries, started the transition with relatively high levels of distrust in the institutions of the state.¹⁰¹ The difficulties inherent in the transition process have done little to increase the level of institutional trust.¹⁰² Moreover, "it appears that citizen distrust of government is associated with high expectations. Given that economic performance is critical to overall public support of government, it may be that some citizens expect more from the government than is realistic" (Miller and Listhaug, 1999: 216).¹⁰³ All these factors can be summarized in the following hypothesis about the evolution of institutional trust:

***TSI change hypothesis:** Institutional trust starts at relatively low levels and decreases slowly during the transition process.*

¹⁰⁰ As I have already argued before, the new political and economic systems are inseparable in the context of the Romanian transition. While I do not differentiate between the two systems here, the analyses of support for the principles and the actions of the system do make this distinction.

¹⁰¹ Thinking about the decrease in institutional trust observed in developed democracies in the last decades, and observing that the new economic and political systems in the post-communist countries have been imported (with minor changes) from the developed democracies, one might wonder if the post-communist citizens have not imported the distrust for the institutions at the same time they imported the institutions themselves.

¹⁰² Park and Shin (2006) show that institutional trust has decreased in South Korea since its transition to democracy. Moisés (2006) finds a similar trend in Brazil. It seems, thus, that the trend of decreasing institutional trust is characterizing not only the developed democracies, but also post-communist and post-authoritarian countries.

¹⁰³ This may explain why post-communist citizens started the transition with so little trust in the institutions of the state. In addition to this explanation, if one accepts the arguments presented in Anderson et al (2005), the decrease in institutional trust (especially for the political institutions: presidency, parliament, political parties, cabinet) can be explained by the decrease in the number of people who voted for the winners in the elections. From 1990 to 2004 the number of people who voted for the winning president decreased from 12.2 million to 5.1 million, while the number of people who voted for the governing party (or coalition) decreased from 9.1 to 3.8 million.

A first set of factors that might have an effect on institutional trust is represented by the socio-economic characteristics of the respondents: these are the variables that define the initial position of the person on the trust-distrust continuum. Interest in politics and voting intention are also included in the model. The third group of variables that might influence the level of institutional trust is represented by different types of evaluations: evaluation of the communist regime, general satisfaction, and subjective perceptions of economic situation. These variables will show if institutional trust is primarily a measure of diffuse support or of specific support. In addition to the variables presented above, I also include in this model the two dependent variables from the next section (specific support for the action of the political system and for the action of the economic system) as control variables. We know that specific support for one object has the potential to affect the other types of support for the other objects in the system but we do not know when its effect is going to become significant. These two variables should have then a positive effect on the level of institutional trust, but only the results will show if their effect is going to achieve significance or not.

Specific support for the action of the system

The last object of support I analyze in this project is represented by the actions of the political and economic systems (the last column in Table 1). Specific support is evaluative in nature; it depends on people's evaluations of the performance of the components of the political and economic systems. Given its different nature, specific support is more susceptible to change than diffuse support.

Easton identified two sources of specific support: evaluations of the perceived outputs of the political objects to citizens' articulated demands, and the perceived general performance of political objects. In this project I take into account only the second source of support (based on evaluations of general performance) which I believe to play a much more important role than the evaluations of responses to specific demands.¹⁰⁴

Specific support is much more likely to vary, depending on contextual variables. Current political, economic, and social conditions have a distinct effect on the level of specific support: corruption scandals, changes in the taxation system, and even seasonal factors (during winter Romanians are less

¹⁰⁴ This may be determined by the novelty of the democratic and economic institutions, which makes it difficult for the citizens to compare the responses received from the institutions to their demands. Also, Romanians are not particularly active in terms of contacting these institutions with specific demands.

satisfied with the actions of the political and economic systems, mainly because of the high utilities costs) affect the level of specific support. As long as diffuse support for democracy and market economy stays at high levels, however, temporary changes in the levels of specific support are less important. Problems may appear only when specific support stays at very low levels for long periods of time and this starts to affect the level of diffuse support.¹⁰⁵

While I expect specific support to have lower levels than diffuse support, given the multiple sources of specific support for the actions of the political system I expect that its evolution over time will not exhibit a clear trend:

***SSD change hypothesis:** Specific support for the actions of the political system is characterized by significant variation over time.*

In the case of specific support for market economy, if specific support is indeed determined primarily by evaluations, then the evolution of the economy should indicate the evolution of specific support.¹⁰⁶ From the beginning of the transition the Romanian economy suffered a series of consecutive shocks and the first signs of increase appeared only in 2000. These signs, however, were present only in macro-economic indicators. At the individual level, the first year in which the real wage index increase was higher than the increase in the consumer price index was 2004.¹⁰⁷ Based on these data, the evolution of specific support for the actions of the economic system should follow this trend:

***SSM change hypothesis:** Specific support for the actions of the economic system varies over time but it remains at relatively low levels for most part of the transition and increases at the end of the period under study due to improvements in the economy.*

Determining the structure of specific support and the changes in this structure becomes then more important than analyzing changes in the level of

¹⁰⁵ Theoretically, it is not clear what a long period of time means. It is also not clear whether this period of time varies within societies or across societies. All these suggest that specific support for the action of the political system should be included as a control variable in the equation for diffuse support for the principles of the political system.

¹⁰⁶ This argument is based on the assumption that people are able to evaluate the state of the economy.

¹⁰⁷ Even then, however, the index was only 76% of the value of the index at the beginning of the transition (Institutul Național de Statistică, 2005).

specific support. This structure (for both the political and economic systems) is determined primarily by socio-economic status variables: gender, age, education, nationality, religion, and rural/urban. While in the case of diffuse support there are clear expectations about the effect of these variables (mostly determined by modernity-traditionalism and availability of resources) in the case of specific support I expect their effect to be less important and rather intermediated by evaluation variables. The effects should have the same signs as in the case of diffuse support but I expect that many of the variables will fail to achieve significance. Since the main source of specific support is based on evaluations, the most important variables in the models explaining specific support for democracy and market economy are the evaluation variables: generalized evaluations, evaluations by comparison to the previous regime, evaluations of the political outputs (only in the model for specific support for democracy), and evaluations of the economic context.

Summing up the discussion presented in this section, the three models corresponding to the three columns in Table 1 have a common structure. The support for the three objects is determined initially by the respondents' demographic characteristics. In addition to their direct effects, however, these variables can also have indirect effects, which are mediated by attitudinal and evaluative variables. The first group of attitudinal variables includes items that measure the political activism of the respondent, testing the hypothesis that the transition to democracy and market economy benefits from the existence of an active population. The group of evaluation variables includes evaluations of the communist regime, which the literature identifies as having a significant effect (especially at the beginning of the transition), and a set of more or less general evaluation variables (depending on the dependent variable), which, according to the literature, should have a non-existent (or very weak) effect on diffuse support, a medium effect on support for the structure of the system, and a very strong effect on specific support. Finally, in order to test some of the relationships identified by Easton, generalized support for the structure of the system and specific support are used as independent variables in the model explaining diffuse support, while specific support is used in the model explaining generalized support for the structure of the system.

Summary

I have presented here the theoretical framework I use in my analysis of the evolution of public support for democracy and market economy in post-communist Romania. In the first section of the chapter I have discussed issues related to defining and identifying different patterns of political culture using a

model of support for the main components of the political and economic systems, similar to the models proposed by Easton and Almond. In the second section I presented a model of political culture change. In the third section I presented a detailed discussion of the different types of support for the objects of the system identified in the model developed in the first section. In the next chapter I present the datasets, the variables, and the methods I use in the statistical models discussed starting with Chapter 4.

3. Data and methodology

In the first section of this chapter I describe the datasets I use in analyzing support for democracy and market economy in post-communist Romania. In the second section I discuss one of the most important problems affecting survey data – incomplete data – and the solution I adopt for this problem. The third section discusses the problems associated with analyzing multiple datasets coming from multiple sources (including a different type of missing data) and the selection of the datasets used in analysis. I end the chapter by presenting the statistical methods I use for estimating the parameters of interest.

Data

I use in my analyses data from three series of surveys conducted in Romania from 1990 to 2006: Barometrul de Opinie Publică (1998 – 2006), World Values Survey / European Values Survey (1993, 1997, 1999, and 2005), and a series of surveys commissioned by the Research Office of the United States Information Agency (1990 – 1994 and 1999). In addition to these datasets, I also used two surveys conducted by the Sociology Department of the University of Bucharest: COMALP 1995 and MECELEC 1996.

*Barometrul de Opinie Publică – BOP.*¹⁰⁸ BOP is a research project funded by the Open Society Foundation – Romania.¹⁰⁹ The first BOP survey was conducted in September 1994. Between 1995 and 1997 the survey was conducted four times a year. Between 1998 and 2008, the survey was conducted twice every year (in May – June and October – November) and the same standard sampling scheme was used in all surveys. All BOP surveys use stratified, probabilistic, multi-stage samples. The samples use the following stratification criteria: 18 cultural areas grouped by historical provinces, urban versus rural, four types of urban localities (by size), and three types of rural localities (by development level). These criteria combined lead to 126

¹⁰⁸ Public Opinion Barometer.

¹⁰⁹ The Soros Foundation for an Open Society was founded in Bucharest in 1990. In 1997 the NGO reorganized its structure, becoming The Open Society Foundation – Romania and, later, the Soros Foundation Romania.

theoretical strata (7 types of localities by 18 cultural areas). The sample is built by probabilistically selecting localities (at the first stage), voting sections (at the second stage), and persons (at the third stage). The selection of the respondents is based on electoral lists that are updated every four years. All samples are representative for the adult, non-institutionalized population of Romania. All interviews were conducted face-to-face. The datasets and questionnaires can be obtained from the Soros Foundation Romania.

World Values Survey / European Values Survey – WVS/EVS. The 1993 WVS survey was conducted by the Research Institute for Quality of Life on a sample of 1103 respondents. The 1997 WVS survey was conducted by the Research Institute for Quality of Life and the Sociology Department of University of Bucharest on a sample of 1000 respondents. The 1999 EVS survey was conducted by the Research Institute for Quality of Life and the Sociology Department of University of Bucharest in collaboration with the European Values Study Group on a sample of 1146 respondents.¹¹⁰ The 2005 WVS survey was conducted by the Gallup Organization Romania on a sample of 1776 respondents. All WVS/EVS surveys have been funded by Consiliul Național de Cercetare Științifică Universitară.¹¹¹ The WVS/EVS surveys used a sampling scheme similar to the one used in the BOP surveys. All surveys are representative for the adult, non-institutionalized population of Romania. All interviews were conducted face-to-face. The datasets and questionnaires are available online.¹¹²

United States Information Agency – USIA. For the first five years of the transition I use a series of surveys commissioned by the Research Office of the United States Information Agency and conducted by Sociobit, a Romanian survey research firm.¹¹³ Two surveys are available for 1990, one for 1991, two for 1992, one for 1993, one for 1994, and one for 1999. The surveys have used a sampling scheme similar to the ones used in the BOP and WVS/EVS surveys. All surveys are representative for the adult, non-institutionalized population of Romania. All interviews were conducted face-to-face.

¹¹⁰ The 1999 survey was also funded by the European Values Study Group.

¹¹¹ The National University Research Council.

¹¹² Available at <http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/> and at <http://www.europeanvaluesstudy.eu>.

¹¹³ I would like to thank Dr. Dumitru Sandu for allowing me to use these datasets. Analyses from these surveys have been previously reported in Sandu (1993), McIntosh et al (1994, 1995) and Firebaugh and Sandu (1998).

Treatment of incomplete data

One of the most significant problems affecting all surveys is the existence of incomplete data. The treatment of the missing values may have significant effects on the inferences drawn from the results, ranging from incorrect estimates to selection bias.¹¹⁴

Until recently, the most common methods of dealing with incomplete data were case deletion (either listwise or pairwise) and single imputation (usually mean substitution or hot deck methods). While these solutions have the advantage of being easy to implement, they fail to account for the uncertainty that surrounds the missing value for a case, producing underestimated standard errors and overestimated test statistics. “All the common methods for salvaging information from cases with missing data make things worse” (Allison, 2002: 12). Maximum likelihood (ML) estimation represents an alternative to case deletion and single imputation, but it requires a model for the joint distribution of the variables with missing data and thus its applicability is restricted.¹¹⁵

Recent computational advances have made the use of multiple imputation (MI) a feasible solution that can be applied in a wide range of cases for dealing with the incomplete data problem.¹¹⁶ This approach “produces estimates that are consistent, asymptotically efficient, and asymptotically normal when the data are MAR. Unlike ML, multiple imputation can be used with virtually any kind of data and any kind of model, and the analysis can be done with unmodified, conventional software” (Allison, 2002: 27). Given the advantages of multiple imputation, this is the solution I use for the problem of missing data.¹¹⁷

The MI method I use is based on two main assumptions: the data are missing at random (MAR) and a multivariate normal model. According to the MAR assumption, the probability of missingness does not depend on the value of the missing data after controlling for other variables in analysis. If this assumption is correct, then the missing data can be predicted using the other variables in the model. The assumption of a multivariate normal model has been

¹¹⁴ For a detailed treatment of the issues related to incomplete data see Schafer (1997) and Little and Rubin (2002). For a more accessible discussion of these issues see Allison (2002). See, also, Tufiş (2008c).

¹¹⁵ In addition to this, with the exception of the simplest models, ML models for missing data require the use of specialized software, which implies more costs associated with learning a new tool.

¹¹⁶ While statisticians have proposed this solution for more than 20 years, social scientists warmed up to it only recently.

¹¹⁷ All opinion items that I use in analysis have missing data.

proven to work even when some of the variables have distributions that are not normal (Schafer 1997; Allison 2002).¹¹⁸ I use for multiple imputation the *Norm* software, developed by Schafer (2000), which uses a data augmentation algorithm.¹¹⁹ Following the guidelines proposed in the literature (see, for instance, King et al 2001, Allison 2002), for each incomplete dataset I imputed five complete datasets. I have also included in the imputation model more information than in the estimation model (variables not used in analysis but that might help in the imputation stage), in order to make the MAR assumption more realistic.

The analysis algorithm I use is composed of the following steps: (1) verify the original data (recoding, declaring missing values, transforming variables); (2) use *Norm* to compute five complete datasets for each original dataset; (3) verify the imputed data (re-transform variables, create new variables using factor analysis); (4) run analyses on each of the five complete datasets, resulting in five sets of results (for this step I use *SPSS*); (5) combine the five sets of results into a single final set using the formulas proposed in Rubin (1987);¹²⁰ and, finally, (6) report the results.

Table A-2 in the appendix presents for each dataset I use the average percentage of missing values, the maximum percentage of missing values, and the percentage of missing values for the voting intention variable.¹²¹ The demographic variables are not affected by missing data (with minor exceptions, most of them recorded for the religion and education variables). The attitudinal and evaluation variables are affected by moderate to low rates of missingness,

¹¹⁸ Allison suggests that the performance of the normal model for imputing nonnormal variables can be improved by transforming the variables to reduce the skewness, by rounding the imputed values to the values of the ordinal scale for ordinal variables, and by recoding categorical variables as groups of dummy variables (2002: 39-40).

¹¹⁹ An alternative to *Norm* is the *Amelia II* software, developed by Honacker, King, and Blackwell (2005), which uses a sampling importance / resampling algorithm. Allison argued that “Both algorithms have some theoretical justification. Proponents of SIR claim that it requires far less computer time. However, the relative superiority of these two methods is far from settled” (Allison, 2002: 34). I have estimated three datasets using both programs and then I compared descriptive statistics for the complete datasets. The results were consistent in all cases, suggesting that the results are not influenced by the choice of software used for imputation. Both *Amelia II* and *Norm* are freeware programs.

¹²⁰ Thanks are due to Paula Tufiş for allowing me to use an Excel macro she wrote that significantly reduces the time required for this step.

¹²¹ I report the percentage for this variable separate from the rest of the variables because the voting intention variable is known to generate a higher rate of missing data.

common for survey data. Among these variables, higher missingness rates are recorded for the variable that asks the respondents to evaluate their situation in the future and for the variables measuring acceptance of democratic values.

The use of multiple imputations for dealing with missing data in this study is another improvement on the previous literature. Out of all the studies cited in the previous chapter that used survey data from Central and Eastern Europe, only two discuss their treatment of missing data explicitly: Gibson (1996) indicates in a footnote to Table 1 that pairwise deletion was used, while Rose, Mishler, and Haerpfer (1998) indicate in Appendix A they used mean imputation. The remaining studies do not address this issue explicitly. In some cases, comparisons of reported N's suggest listwise or pairwise deletion was used. For those studies that did not report the N's for separate analyses it is a safe bet that cases with missing data were either deleted or replaced with the mean.

King et al (2001) illustrate the advantages of the multiple imputation method over listwise deletion by replicating an analysis presented in Colton (2000) on vote choice in Russia's 1995 parliamentary elections. The results of the replication showed "substantively important changes in fully one-third of the estimates. Ten changed in importance as judged by traditional standards (from 'statistically significant' to not, or the reverse, plus some substantively meaningful difference), and roughly five others increased or decreased significantly to alter the substantive interpretation of their effects" (King et al, 2001: 63).

Analyzing multiple surveys

I started working on this project by collecting the datasets I was planning to use.¹²² After I managed to obtain all 29 datasets, as I was getting ready to start analyzing the data, I realized that the datasets were in a very raw format.¹²³ Each of the seven companies that collected and entered the data had different views about how a final dataset should look like: some datasets had

¹²² A list of all the surveys used in analysis, indicating the data collection agency, the data collection date, the final sample size, and the missingness rate is presented in Table A-2 in the appendix.

¹²³ Unfortunately, Romania does not have a well-developed data dissemination program similar to ICPSR (in the U.S.A.) or ZUMA (in Europe). The Romanian Social Data Archive, although created in 2001, is still in an early stage of development. Moreover, data dissemination is not a very important topic in the Romanian social sciences.

variable labels, others not; some datasets had value labels, others not; the codes for DK/NA were different not only from company to company, but also from year to year. Thus, for several months I cleaned and standardized the datasets so that they could be used without any problems: adding variable and value labels, making sure that the items were coded in a similar way in all datasets, making sure that the missing data were coded consistently across datasets, and, more generally, creating a set of clean datasets that could be used without having to consult the questionnaires.

The next step, equally tedious, was identifying which datasets contained the items I was planning to use in analysis. Table A-3 in the appendix shows the availability of the dependent variables in the 29 datasets.¹²⁴ This was, in the end, the most important criterion for selecting the datasets I used in the analyses presented here. Although I would have preferred to have the same items measured in all datasets so that I could select the same years for all dependent variables, my choice was restricted from the start to only those years with available data.¹²⁵ The availability of the independent variables added more restrictions on the datasets I could use, but these restrictions were less important because I could select a dataset even if an independent variable was missing and then estimate additional models in years with complete data to test for the stability of the results in the absence of that particular variable. In those rare cases where I had a choice, I selected the datasets so that they represented different stages in the Romanian transition.

Variables used in analysis

I start this section by discussing the dependent variables I use in analysis and then I focus on the independent variables used in the models, discussing the effects identified by previous studies and developing the hypotheses I will test in the empirical chapters.¹²⁶

¹²⁴ I also created a similar table indicating the availability of the independent variables. Since the resulting table is too large to fit comfortably even in an appendix, it is not included here but it is available upon request.

¹²⁵ As an example, in the analysis of diffuse support for democracy the only years that I could use in analysis were 1990, 1997, 1999, 2002, and 2005. In the ideal situation with data available in all years my preference would have been for a set of years measuring diffuse support for democracy at more or less equal intervals throughout the transition (for instance, 1990, 1994, 1998, 2002, and 2006).

¹²⁶ Secondary data analysis of multiple surveys conducted by different organizations suffers from a significant problem: the items of interest are not always present in the

Dependent variables

Diffuse support for democracy.¹²⁷ I measure diffuse support for democracy as political system using the “democracy as a form of government” indicator (respondents were asked to answer to the following question: “What form of government do you think is the best for Romania?” with democracy being the category of interest). This indicator has been often used in the literature, in different forms, as an indicator of diffuse support (see, among others, Maravall 1997, Plasser, Ulram, and Waldrauch 1998, Fuchs, Guidorossi, and Svensson 1999, Klingeman 1999, and Hofferbert and Klingeman 2001).

Diffuse support for democratic values.¹²⁸ Acceptance of democratic values is captured using an index composed of three indicators measuring agreement/disagreement with the following statements: it is better to have a single strong political party rather than more, weaker parties (indicating acceptance of political competition)¹²⁹, the state should intervene in the activity of mass-media (indicating acceptance of a free press, freedom of expression),¹³⁰ and the state should intervene in the activity of political parties (another indicator of acceptance of political competition).¹³¹

These three indicators represent acceptance of two of the basic components of democracy: freedom of expression and political competition. In an ideal world, scientists would have access to measures of all components of democracy (or, at least, to measures of both competition and participation, the two main dimensions of democracy identified by Dahl). Unfortunately, the harsh realities of social science rarely conform to one’s wishes. In this particular

surveys, and even when they are, sometimes their wording is different, leading to (more or less) serious comparability issues. In my analysis I tried as much as possible to use the same items over time and, where this was not possible, I discussed in the text the source of the comparability problem and its possible effect.

¹²⁷ For a theoretical discussion of the different measures of support for democracy, see Linde and Ekman (2003).

¹²⁸ Statistical details about the construction of the index are presented in Chapter 4.

¹²⁹ Similar measures are used in Hahn (1991), Gibson, Duch, and Tedin (1992), McIntosh et al (1994), Gibson (1996b), Miller, Hesli, and Reisinger (1997), Miller, White, and Heywood (1998), and Plasser, Ulram, and Waldrauch (1998).

¹³⁰ This measure was also used in Waldron-Moore (1999).

¹³¹ It could be argued, with respect to the last two indicators presented here, that the state is always intervening (by regulating) in the activities of the mass media and political parties. I believe that, in answering these questions, the respondents do not focus on this type of intervention, but rather on what the indicators are intended to measure – support for the ideas of free mass media and political parties. In Chapter 4 I offer some evidence that supports this argument.

case I have multiple indicators measuring only the competition dimension of democracy.

Diffuse support for market economy. Diffuse support for market economy as an economic system is indicated by the answers to the question: “Do you believe that a market economy in Romania, with little state control, is a good thing or a bad thing for the future of the country?”¹³² As it can be seen from its wording (little state control), the question directs the respondent to the neoliberal model of market economy favored by the international community for the post-communist transitions. Those who offer a negative answer to this question reject this type of economic system, but it may be possible that they support a different variant of market economy, one that is characterized by stronger state involvement in the economy. These differences should be captured by the next two dependent variables, which indicate diffuse support for different models of market economy.

Diffuse support for the liberal model of market economy.¹³³ Support for this model is captured using an index composed of two variables that measure the respondents’ attitudes toward two main components of the liberal model: competition and private property. The competition item takes values from 1 (representing agreement with the statement that competition is bad) to 10 (agreement with the statement that competition is good). The private property item ranges from 1 (agreement with the statement that state property should expand) to 10 (agreement with the statement that private property should expand).

Diffuse support for the social democratic model of market economy. Support for the social democratic model is indicated by two variables measuring attitudes toward responsibility for individual welfare and toward income differentiation. The individual welfare item varies from 1 (agreement with the statement that individuals should be responsible for their own welfare) to 10 (agreement with the statement that the state should be responsible for everyone’s welfare). The income differentiation item takes values from 1 (agreement with the statement that income differences should be increased) to

¹³² A similar indicator was used in McIntosh et al (1994), Firebaugh and Sandu (1998), and Plasser, Ulram, and Waldrauch (1998), although it should be noted that previous analyses of support for market economy usually did not distinguish between diffuse support and specific support; they analyzed a generalized form of support for market economy or for market reforms.

¹³³ Statistical details about the construction of this index and the next one are presented in Chapter 5.

10 (agreement with the statement that income differences should be reduced).¹³⁴ The two items are combined into an index of support for the social democratic model.

Trust in the state's institutions.¹³⁵ The dependent variable is institutional trust (or trust in state's institutions), measured as an additive index built from a series of indicators of trust in different institutions of the state.¹³⁶ I included in this index both central institutions of the state (presidency, parliament, cabinet, and political parties) and local institutions (police, judiciary, and local administration).

Specific support for democracy. This type of support is measured by a variable asking the respondents about their level of satisfaction with the way democracy is working. Different surveys use slightly different versions of this item, asking about satisfaction with the way democracy is working, developing, or functioning in Romania. All three versions of this item, however, probe the respondents about their evaluations of democracy as a process, eliminating thus any possible comparability problems.

Linde and Ekman, discussing different measures of support of democracy, argue that “‘satisfaction with the way democracy works’ is not an indicator of support for the principles of democracy. Rather, it is an item that taps the level of support for how the democratic regime works in practice” (Linde and Ekman, 2003: 405). Anderson offers a similar argument: “satisfaction with democracy measures system support at a low level of abstraction. It does not refer to democracy as a set of norms, but to the functioning of the democratic political system. Thus, it gauges people’s responses to the process of democratic governance” (Anderson, 1998: 583).¹³⁷

Canache, Mondak, and Seligson (2001) offer a detailed analysis of previous uses of this indicator and of the problems associated with its use. Using data from a small survey in Cluj-Napoca (a Transylvanian city) they conclude that this indicator “means different things to different people. When asked about ‘satisfaction with the way democracy works in Romania,’ respondents based their answers on a broad range of considerations, including

¹³⁴ These indicators of support for the liberal model and for the social-democratic model have been previously used in Finifter and Mickiewicz (1992), Duch (1993), McIntosh et al (1994), Miller, Hesli, and Reisinger (1994), Gibson (1996b), Firebaugh and Sandu (1998), and Hofferbert and Klingemann (1999).

¹³⁵ Statistical details about the construction of the index are presented in Chapter 6.

¹³⁶ Respondents were asked how much trust they have in different institutions, on a four point scale.

¹³⁷ This variable is also used in Maravall (1997), Plasser, Ulram, and Waldrauch (1998), Klingemann (1999), and Rohrschneider (2003).

general features of democracy (e.g., freedom of speech), aspects of Romania's political structure (e.g., inefficiency in the judicial system), the performance of specific political leaders, and an array of issue-based concerns" (Canache, Mondak, and Seligson, 2001: 518). Based on these results, the authors conclude that the indicator is useless and should be avoided, despite the fact that it has been used in the literature for more than twenty years.¹³⁸ Taking into account, however, the reasons the respondents offered for their level of satisfaction or dissatisfaction, it can be observed that most of them are in fact evaluations of the actions of the political system, performed by different actors and at different levels. As such, satisfaction with the way democracy works seems to measure exactly what Linde and Ekman and Anderson suggested it does: support for how the democratic regime works in practice.

Specific support for market economy. The variable that I use in this case is the level of satisfaction with the way market economy is working.¹³⁹ The arguments presented above apply in this case as well: this is an indicator of support for how the market economy works in practice.

Independent variables

In this section I discuss the independent variables I use in the models explaining diffuse/specific support for democracy and market economy and trust in institutions. For each variable I present the effects identified in previous studies, I discuss the possible effects on the dependent variables in the Romanian case, and I develop hypotheses that are tested in the empirical chapters.¹⁴⁰

¹³⁸ They also base their conclusions on the fact that this item is weakly correlated with other indicators of support for democracy, showing that it does not capture the same dimension. Casper and Tufiş (2003) showed that even highly correlated measures of democracy can still capture different dimensions of the same phenomenon.

¹³⁹ In the earlier years of the transition (when Romania did not have a market economy) the item was asking about satisfaction with the progress of economic reforms. Given the fact that politicians and mass media always referred to economic reforms as reforms toward market economy, I believe that the two forms of the item are comparable. The item "support for economic reforms" has also been used in Finifter and Mickiewicz (1992), Duch (1993), Miller, Hesli, and Reisinger (1994), and Przeworski (1996). Gibson (1996) used a variable of support for market based institutions and processes, which included support for privatization, price liberalization, and free labor market.

¹⁴⁰ The hypotheses presented in this section are summarized in Table A-1 in the appendix.

Gender. Gender is used as a dummy variable with value 1 for men and 0 for women. Previous studies have found that gender has, in some cases, a significant effect on support for democracy, while in other cases it fails to achieve significance.¹⁴¹ The studies that have found a significant effect are all studies of Russian political culture at the beginning of the transition and they all have found evidence that women are less likely than men to support democracy and / or market economy. While women in Romania are more religious than men (which may be interpreted as an indicator of traditionalism), I do not expect gender to have a significant effect in the Romanian case.¹⁴² I include gender in the analysis of support for democratic principles only as a control, not as an explanatory variable.

While I do not expect gender to have a significant effect on diffuse support for democracy, in the case of diffuse support for market economy gender may have a significant effect. During the communist regime the idea of equality between men and women was supported to a certain extent by high levels of women participation on the labor market and by small gender-based income differences.¹⁴³ The transition to market economy however proved to be especially damaging for the economic situation of women.¹⁴⁴ Previous studies have also found that women have lower levels of support for market economy.¹⁴⁵ Thus, I expect gender to have the following effects on diffuse support for market economy:

¹⁴¹ See Finifter and Mickiewicz (1992: 869), Gibson, Duch, and Tedin (1992: 359), McIntosh et al (1994: 504), or Miller, Hesli, and Reisinger (1994: 403) for significant effects. See Dalton (1994: 484), McIntosh et al (1994: 504), Gibson (1996b: 968), Mishler and Rose (2002: 18) for effects without significance.

¹⁴² Even if there was such an effect, I expect it was rather weak, confined to the beginning of the transition only, and highly dependent on model specification.

¹⁴³ In 1989 approximately 87% of the working age men and 81% of the working age women were employed (Ciobanu and Pârçiog, 1999: 21).

¹⁴⁴ Women were more likely to become (and stay) unemployed, to be underemployed, and to receive a lower income: throughout the 1990s the female unemployment rate was, on average, 1.2% higher than the male unemployment rate; by the end of the 1990s women were paid, on average, 80% of the men's income (although some of this difference is explained by higher rates of female employment in economic sectors with lower income like education and health) and they were underrepresented in the highest income groups (National Institute of Statistics, 2000).

¹⁴⁵ See McIntosh et al (1994: 504), Miller, Hesli, and Reisinger (1994: 403), and Gibson (1996b: 968).

Gender – DSM hypothesis: *Men have higher levels of support for market economy.*

Gender – DSMlib hypothesis: *Men have higher levels of support for the liberal model of market economy.*

Gender – DSMsd hypothesis: *Men have lower levels of support for the social democratic model of market economy.*

I expect these effects to be stronger at the beginning of the transition and to become weaker or even lose its significance later in the transition (when the unemployment gap between women and men seems to have been closed).

With respect to trust in the state's institutions, gender is a control variable – there are no reasons to expect significant differences in the level of institutional trust between men and women. Gender is a control variable in the case of specific support for democracy and market economy as well: I do not expect to find significant gender based differences in the evaluation of the functioning of the two systems in Romania.

Age. I use age as a set of three dummy variables: under 30, between 31 and 60, and over 61. Age is, first and foremost, an indicator for different socialization experiences.¹⁴⁶ A person who was 60 year old at the beginning of the transition has lived long enough to experience during its early adulthood the initial positive effects of communism (especially the rapid urbanization and economic development that characterized the 1950-1970 period). A 40 year old person had a different experience at its entry into adulthood: rather than observing economic development, it observed the communist regime distancing from the soviet communism and a relative (and short-lived) opening toward the West.¹⁴⁷ Finally, a 20 year old person's experience of communism is based only

¹⁴⁶ Age could also be interpreted as an indicator of different positions in the life course. I believe that this interpretation, however, has only a very small effect on the dependent variables analyzed in this project. The only variable that could be affected by the respondent's position in the life course is diffuse support for market economy. It could be argued, in this case, that as people advance in life (especially as they exit the labor force and their income is limited only to the state pension) they might demand more social protection. Even in this case I still believe that the effect of socialization is much stronger.

¹⁴⁷ This opening included some moments that the communist propaganda framed as international legitimization for the communist regime. See Nixon's visit to Romania on August 3rd, 1969, when he declared: "Now this is not my first visit to your country. It is the first visit of a president of the United States to Romania, the first state visit of an American president to a socialist country or to this region of the continent of Europe. Să trăiască prietenia Română-Americană" (Long live the

on the chronic shortage of basic goods that characterized the last decade of the communist regime. Different experiences and different values characterize these three persons, and this will influence their acceptance of democratic values.

In addition to living under the communist regime for a shorter period of time, younger people also have more resources to successfully adapt to the new political system and I expect that they will support democracy to a higher extent than older people. The elders are likely to be less enthusiastic about the new political system: their resources are more limited, and the difficulty of changing one's attitudinal system increases with age. Previous studies have found that age either does not have an effect on support for democracy, or it has a weak negative effect.¹⁴⁸ All these factors suggest:

Age – DSD hypothesis: Support for democracy declines with the age of the respondent.

Age – DSDval hypothesis: Acceptance of democratic values declines with age.

If these hypotheses are confirmed, they will bring additional support to the socialization hypothesis identified in the literature.

Age should also create a significant distinction between winners and losers during the economic transition. Changes in the structure of the economy require adaptation through re-training, which becomes more difficult with age. Financially, retired persons were especially disadvantaged during the economic transition: while income generally failed to keep-up with the inflation, this was particularly true for retired persons.¹⁴⁹ In addition, although official data do not indicate unemployment as a significant problem for the older population, this is

Romanian-American friendship). A recording of this clip is available at <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=m3DwpQWoY-Q>. See also Ceaușescu's state visit to Great Britain, when Margaret Thatcher was quoted as saying she was "impressed by the personality of President Ceausescu" and "left with particular impressions about him as the leader of Romania, a country willing to develop her cooperation with other nations" (Lovatt, 1999). In 1983 Vice-President George Bush was referring to Ceaușescu as one of Eastern Europe's good communists (Georgescu, 1987: 69).

¹⁴⁸ See Mishler and Rose (1999: 91), or Delhey and Tobsch (2003: 125) for effects that failed to achieve significance. See Finifter and Mickiewicz (1992: 865), Gibson (1996b: 968), Bahry (1997: 497), or Jacobs, Müller, and Pickel (2003: 106) for negative effects.

¹⁴⁹ In 1998 approximately 60% of the pensioners households lived below the poverty threshold, compared to "only" 30% of employed households and 25% of the unemployed households (United Nations Development Programme, 2002: 112).

only the result of artificially reducing unemployment in this age group by reducing the retirement age.¹⁵⁰ All these factors suggest that economic losses during transition are associated with age. Previous studies have found a significant negative relationship between age and support for market economy.¹⁵¹ The age hypotheses are then:

Age – DSM hypothesis: Diffuse support for market economy decreases with age.

Age – DSMlib hypothesis: Diffuse support for the liberal model of market economy decreases with age.

Age – DSMsd hypothesis: Diffuse support for the social democratic model of market economy increases with age.

With respect to trust in the state's institutions, younger persons tend to be less obedient than older persons in their relationship with authority. Moreover, older persons have experienced both the communist and the democratic regimes and they probably value more the benefits associated with the new institutions.¹⁵² It is also possible that those who lived most of their life under the communist regime have been "reeducated" to distrust the institutions of the state and this distrust may have been passed on to the younger generations. Analyzing data from the New Democracies Barometer, Mishler and Rose found that age had no significant effect in 1994 (1997: 439) but they found a weak positive effect in 1998 (2001b: 51). Using data from 2001, Uslaner and Bădescu (2003: 229) found a significant positive effect of age on institutional trust in Romania and Moldova, effect that was most visible for the pre-communist cohorts. Taking all these factors into account:

Age – TSI hypothesis: Trust in the state's institutions increases with age.

¹⁵⁰ The government not only reduced the retirement age, but it also facilitated early retirement, in an attempt to control unemployment. As a result, the number of retired persons increased between 1990 and 1999 by 65%. In 2000, facing a crisis of the pension system, the government started increasing the retirement age.

¹⁵¹ See McIntosh et al (1994: 504), Miller, Hesli, and Reisinger (1994: 403), Firebaugh and Sandu (1998: 533), and Gibson (1996b: 968).

¹⁵² Mishler and Rose explain the age effect also by the fact that "people who have lived 40 years or longer under a Communist command economy have learned patience. Most are prepared to wait a long while for government to deliver on these promises" (Mishler and Rose, 2001b: 56).

Education. Education is a second variable of socio-economic status that may have an effect on diffuse support for democratic principles. The literature discusses the effects of education from two main perspectives. The first argues that highly educated people are less likely to lose during transition, they are more modern than less educated people, and they have higher resources to adapt to the new system. According to the modernity theory, highly educated people should support the new political system. Most of the literature found empirical support for either a significant positive influence of education or for the lack of any effects.¹⁵³

The second perspective accentuates the values that are obtained during the educational process. From this perspective it has been argued that non-democratic regimes use the educational system as a tool for spreading non-democratic values. While there may be some truth to this argument, I believe that the communist regime failed to generate non-democratic values.¹⁵⁴ Moreover, the general effect of education (interpreted as both knowledge and a way of thinking) should outweigh the possible acquisition of any non-democratic values. Thus:

Education – DSD hypothesis: Diffuse support for democracy increases with education level.

Education – DSDval hypothesis: Acceptance of democratic values increases with education.

Given the widespread access to education promoted by the communist regime, if these hypotheses are confirmed by the data they will show that Romania (and other post-communist countries as well) had a significant structural advantage at the beginning of the transition, which increased the chances of successful democratization (this case should be contrasted with other countries that attempted a transition to democracy, especially from Latin America).¹⁵⁵

¹⁵³ For positive effects see, among others, Hahn (1991: 418), Finifter and Mickiewicz (1992: 869), Gibson, Duch, and Tedin (1992: 359), McIntosh et al (1994: 504), or Bahry (1997: 497). For non-significant effects, see Dalton (1994: 484), or Mishler and Rose (2001: 311).

¹⁵⁴ During the communist regime students in the primary and secondary educational systems were taught highly censored versions of history, while seventh grade students were forced to study the constitution of the republic.

¹⁵⁵ This was characteristic for all countries in the communist bloc, not only for Romania.

Previous studies have generally found a positive relationship between education and support for market economy.¹⁵⁶ This can be explained by the fact that as education increases people have a better set of tools that can help them cope with changes in the economic structure.¹⁵⁷ In addition to being able to adapt more rapidly to the demands on the new economic system, education is also positively linked to income, with the income of highly educated people staying ahead of the inflation, while poorly educated people experienced a significant reduction of their real income over the years. All these factors lead to the following hypotheses:

***Education – DSM hypothesis:** Support for market economy increases with education level.*

***Education – DSMlib hypothesis:** Support for the liberal model of market economy increases with education level.*

***Education – DSMsd hypothesis:** Support for the social democratic model of market economy decreases with education level.*

The respondent's education level should have a negative influence on the level of trust in the state's institutions: higher education offers the possibility to understand better not only the actions of the political institutions, but also the alternatives to these actions, being thus responsible for the more critical attitudes of the higher educated respondents. Using the New Democracies Barometer data to analyze institutional trust in former communist countries, Mishler and Rose (1997, 1999, 2001b) conclude that education does not have a significant effect. McAllister (1999) found a significant negative effect in the new democracies and no significant effect in the old democracies.

***Education – TSI hypothesis:** Trust in the state's institutions decreases with education.*

Residence in rural / urban. The rural/urban dimension has always been one of the main conflict lines in the Romanian society at the attitudinal level, an indicator of the distinction between traditionalism and modernity.

¹⁵⁶ See Duch (1993: 600), McIntosh et al (1994: 504), Miller, Hesli, and Reisinger (1994: 403), Firebaugh and Sandu (1998: 533), Gibson (1996: 968).

¹⁵⁷ In 1997 the employment rate by educational level was 84% for higher education, 68% for secondary education, and only 53% for primary education (Ciobanu and Pârçioi, 1999: 17).

Rural areas in Romania have high levels of traditionalism, lower levels of education, higher levels of poverty, and an aged population, all factors that create a cultural context resistant to change. Given the high proportion of the Romanian population living in rural areas, and given the definition of the rural (advocated by some parts of the cultural elite, especially the nationalistic one) as the repository of the real national character of Romanians, it could be expected that residence in the rural areas may have a negative effect on support for democracy¹⁵⁸:

***Residence – DSD hypothesis:** Diffuse support for democracy is higher in urban areas than in rural areas.*

***Residence – DSDval hypothesis:** Acceptance of democratic values is higher in urban areas than in rural areas.*

A positive finding for these hypotheses will strengthen the view of modernist strata in society as democratizing agents. If, in the case of education, the communist legacy was conducive to democratic consolidation, in this case the high percentage of people living in rural areas is a factor that might delay democratic consolidation.¹⁵⁹

The transition to market economy had mixed effects for those living in rural areas. The most important of these, with significant consequences for the political life, was the returning of the nationalized land to private property.¹⁶⁰

¹⁵⁸ Many previous studies have offered empirical support for this hypothesis. See Finifter and Mickiewicz (1992: 869), McIntosh et al (1994: 504), and Bahry (1997: 497). In addition to urban – rural differences it is possible that some differences also exist depending on the size of the locality of residence. Unfortunately this variable is not measured consistently in the surveys that I use (in some surveys it does not exist, while in others it is measured using different categories).

¹⁵⁹ Greskovits has a different interpretation, arguing that low urbanization is a factor that helped democratization by lowering the risk to political stability associated with violent collective action (Greskovits, 1997: 201).

¹⁶⁰ Throughout its modern history Romania has always had to deal with the “agrarian problem”. The Romanian peasants became land owners for the first time through the land reform of 1864. Even after this reform, most of the arable land was grouped in a relatively small number of estates: at the beginning of the twentieth century 4171 estates (with more than 100 ha of land) owned more than 75% of the land (Cernea 2003). A similar reform was applied in 1921, reducing the percentage of land owned by the big estates to 20% (Scurtu, Stănescu-Stanciu, and Scurtu 2002). Another

The Romanian peasant has always been a strong believer in the myth of land ownership (Frunză and Voicu, 1997), in which land represents the symbol of independence for the rural households: the land is sacred. From the moment the peasants defined the Social Democrat Party (PSD) as the party that gave them back their land, a special bond was created between PSD and the Romanian peasantry, a bond that may explain the good results PSD registered in the rural areas in all post-communist elections.

While the state succeeded in implementing the restitution of the land, it utterly failed in providing the technology required for working the land, repeating the mistakes done by the previous land reforms.¹⁶¹ As a result of this, while the peasants owned the land again, they could not work it: they did not have the modern tools required for working the land, they did not have the financial resources to buy the tools, and the costs associated with working the land increased to the extent that working the land individually was not profitable at all.¹⁶² Thus, the peasants either stopped working their land (and focused their efforts on working a small garden that allowed them to survive) or leased it to richer persons. Surprisingly enough, the peasants did not blame PSD for its failures in implementing the land reform; they blamed the economic system.¹⁶³ I expect then that diffuse support is lower in rural areas. All these factors lead to the following hypotheses:

reform was planned for 1946 but it was replaced by the collectivization process in which most peasants lost all of their land.

¹⁶¹ Verdery (2003) argues that the problems were generated not only by a reform that was poorly designed, but also by the actions of the local authorities responsible with implementing the reform.

¹⁶² The lack of technology was inherited from the communist regime. Georgescu notices that at the end of the 1980s “the party press is constantly appealing to the farmers to replace mechanical with manual work and to use carts and horses instead of trucks and tractors” (1987: 80).

¹⁶³ Mihăieș relates a discussion with his relatives living in a Romanian village and their explanations for giving their vote in 1992 to the PSD leaders: “‘But why?’ I ask with amazement, ‘have you still not realized, even after two years, whom you are dealing with?’ The answer comes like thunder: ‘It suits us!’ ‘How do you mean?’ ‘Iliescu won’t dismiss us from our jobs, and that suits us. With him, we have peace. You saw the Peasant Party leader, Rațiu, how he showed up at the voting, wearing a peasant’s coat and bow-tie. Are we to expect justice from him? Or maybe from the King, in fact the ex-King, who wants to divide the country among his flock of daughters?’ ‘Well, but what has Rațiu’s bow-tie got to do with democracy and justice?’ I almost shout, indignant at all these sartorial aesthetics on the mind of the Romanian peasant. ‘We even liked it with the Communists’, my aunt intervenes. ‘We fended very well for ourselves. We had everything we needed. And now, Iliescu gave us

Residence – DSM hypothesis: Diffuse support for market economy is higher in urban areas.

Residence – DSMlib hypothesis: Diffuse support for the liberal model of market economy is higher in urban areas.

Residence – DSMsd hypothesis: Diffuse support for the social democratic model of market economy is lower in urban areas.

Since the situation of the peasants did not change significantly over time, I expect these relationships to remain strong throughout the transition.

Residents in urban areas should also exhibit lower levels of support in the state institutions. Using data from the New Democracies Barometer, Mishler and Rose (1997, 2001b) found a significant negative effect of town size on institutional trust. The larger the city, the more frequent the personal encounters with these institutions, which may lead to a more critical attitude toward them. Moreover, people residing in rural areas have a rather peculiar view of the structure of the state: it is not the institutions that have responsibilities for solving problems but the people that represent them. In rural areas people tend to think that all of their problems could be solved by only five or six people (the mayor, the policeman, the doctor, the teacher, the priest, and, eventually, the postman). In contrast, people residing in urban areas have a better understanding of the responsibilities of the different institutions and they can assign the blame accordingly.

Residence – TSI hypothesis: Institutional trust is lower in urban areas.

Nationality and religion. Nationality is a dummy variable with values 1 (for Romanians) and 0 (for other nationalities). Religion is a dummy variable with values 1 (for Christian-Orthodox) and 0 (for other religion). These variables are used as controls in the models explaining diffuse / specific support for democracy and market economy, but I expect them to have a significant effect on institutional trust. These two variables indicate membership to the

land as well. It was better at the cooperative farm, though.' No, there is not a trace of surrealism in these dialogues. I transcribed them as exactly as I could. But their truth is horrifying. For a large part of the Romanians, the idea of civil society does not exist. The only thing that matters is the small personal arrangement, the small, barely warm spot. Passivity and living with evil have defeated any kind of vitality." (Mihăieș, 1999: 254).

majority groups in the population (people of Romanian nationality and people of orthodox religion).

Institutional trust may be influenced by these two variables: people belonging to the minority groups in the population may be less attached to the institutions of the state because they feel that these institutions do not adequately represent their interests.¹⁶⁴ Dowley and Silver (2003) used World Values Survey data to analyze support for democracy in post-communist countries, focusing on the effect of ethnic minorities. Depending on the institutions analyzed and on the ethnic group, they found either a significant negative effect or no significant effect. Rothstein and Stolle (2002) use citizenship as an independent variable in their study on Sweden. The two hypotheses are:

***Nationality – TSI hypothesis:** Romanians have higher levels of institutional trust compared to other ethnic groups.*

***Religion – TSI hypothesis:** People belonging to the orthodox church have higher levels of institutional trust compared to people of other religions.*

Religiosity.¹⁶⁵ I measure religiosity using an indicator of frequency of church attendance (with values 1 – at most once a year, 2 – at least on religious holidays and at most several times a month, and three – at least once a week). I use religiosity as an indicator of traditionalism, which is associated with an uncritical acceptance of authority. Analyzing the impact of religion on trust in government, Gabriel concluded: “distance from organized religion often goes

¹⁶⁴ Post-communist Romania has suffered at the beginning at the transition significant ethnic conflicts between Romanians and Hungarians (the largest ethnic minority). Later in the transition UDMR (the main political party representing the Hungarian population) has become a member of the coalition government, but its most important demands (e.g. education in Hungarian and autonomy) continue to be ignored by the government. The Roma population has always suffered and continues to suffer widespread discrimination. The Catholic Church is still fighting for the retrocession of its properties that were confiscated by the communist government.

¹⁶⁵ Depending on the years and the models used for analysis, Mishler and Rose (1997, 1999, 2001b) found that church attendance has either a significant positive effect or no significant effect on institutional trust. Rohrschneider and Schmitt-Beck (2003: 51) found a significant positive effect in East Germany.

along with critical attitudes toward the government” (Gabriel, 1995: 379). As such, religiosity should have a positive effect on trust.¹⁶⁶

Religiosity – TSI hypothesis: Institutional trust increases with religiosity.

Since Romania is a very religious country, if this hypothesis is confirmed the institutions of the state might benefit from this, although the support generated by religiosity is a type of support characteristic to a parochial person.¹⁶⁷

Given my interpretation of religiosity as an indicator of traditionalism, I expect it will also have significant effect on diffuse support for democracy, but not of diffuse support for market economy, or on specific support for democracy and market economy. In the case of diffuse support for democracy, the effect should be positive, indicating uncritical acceptance of the political system. In the case of diffuse support for democratic values, however, I expect a negative effect, generated by the influence of the church.

¹⁶⁶ It should be noted that there are significant differences between Romania and most of the other post-communist countries. First, Romania is overwhelmingly Orthodox. Second, the Romanian church did not oppose the communist regime and, during the first years of transition, it openly supported the government, having an important role in influencing how people voted in elections, especially in the rural areas. This effect may be added to the traditionalism that characterizes highly religious people.

¹⁶⁷ Romanians seem to have become more and more religious over time (probably as a reaction to the communist era when the state was actively promoting atheism). Riding the bus through Bucharest one may notice a rather strange behavior: every time the bus goes by a church, a significant proportion of the passengers (regardless of gender or age) face the church and make the sign of the cross. Another indicator of the importance of religion in Romanians' life is the abundance of politicians who make a show of going to church for the big religious holidays and sit in the front row so that the cameras will have a good shot of their Christianity (there are cases, however, when this strategy fails to convey the message to the public, especially if the politician is dressed in a tracksuit or if he talks on the phone during the sermon). Yet another indicator is the fact that religion (the orthodox religion, to be more precise) has become a compulsory object of study in the Romanian educational system (students of other religions are allowed to require attending a class on their religion, but there are some difficulties in implementing this part of the law). The Romanian poet Mircea Dinescu remarked during a talk-show that Romania is a country in which showing your religiosity has become a national sport.

Religiosity – DSD hypothesis: *Diffuse support for democracy increases with religiosity.*

Religiosity – DSDval hypothesis: *Acceptance of democratic values decreases with religiosity.*

Development region. I also use in the models a set of dummy variables indicating development regions. Romania is divided into eight development regions defined on the basis of economic, cultural, and geographic criteria: North East, South East, South, South West, West, North West, Center, and Bucharest. A map of the development regions is presented in Figure A-1. These development regions correspond roughly to the historical regions of Romania: Moldova (the North East region and the Western part of the South East region), Dobrogea (the Eastern part of the South East region), Muntenia (the South region), Oltenia (the South West region), and Transilvania (the West, North West, and Center regions).

The excluded category for this set of variables is Bucharest, the capital city. Since Bucharest is different from the other development regions (it has a higher urbanization rate, it is more developed economically, it has a more educated population, it is the political, economic, and cultural center of the country), by using it as the reference category, the coefficients for the other development regions have a meaningful interpretation, showing their distance from what is actually the more modern region in the country.¹⁶⁸ At the same time, given these differences, using Bucharest as the reference category might have an effect on the coefficients for the other variables in the model. Comparing the coefficients obtained in the SES model and in the region model to those obtained in the SES and region model will show if this is indeed the case.

It should be noted that I use the set of development region dummies mainly as controls in the regression models. While theoretically there are some expectations that residence in other development regions will have a significant effect on the dependent variables (positive on TSI and DSMsd and negative on the other variables) I am less interested in testing these hypotheses. I will discuss, however, significant differences that are indicated by the coefficients of these variables in the regression models.

Voting intentions. This variable is recoded from the item “If elections would be held next Sunday, which political party would you vote for?” so that a code of 1 corresponds to voting intention for a party that is in power at the date of the survey and a code of 0 corresponds to voting intention for a party that is

¹⁶⁸ If South, for instance, would be used as the reference category, the coefficients of the other development regions would be more difficult to interpret (comparing North West to South does not have a clear interpretation key).

in opposition. Following the effects identified in the literature, voting intention should have the following effects¹⁶⁹:

***Vote – DSD hypothesis:** Diffuse support for democracy is higher among the supporters of the governing party.*

***Vote – TSI hypothesis:** Trust in the state's institutions is higher among the supporters of the governing party.*

***Vote – SSD hypothesis:** Specific support for democracy is higher among the supporters of the governing party.*

***Vote – SSM hypothesis:** Specific support for market economy is higher among the supporters of the governing party.*

Interest in politics. I use interest in politics as an additive index composed of two items, both measured on four-point scales: interest in politics (How interested are you in politics?) and frequency of discussing politics (How often do you discuss about politics with your friends?).¹⁷⁰ Interest in politics has been interpreted as “an indicator of citizens’ cognitive involvement in the political process” (Plasser, Ulram, and Waldrauch, 1998: 130). It also seems to be related to attitude formation and to political participation (van Deth 1990; Niedermayer 1990; Maravall 1997). From a theoretical perspective, “it is a central tenet of classical democratic theory that, if popular sovereignty is to have meaning, citizens should be informed about the issues confronting society and should care about their resolution. [...] The complete absence [of interest and knowledge about politics] would seem to be more compatible with an authoritarian regime than with a democratic one: some minimal levels of interest, knowledge and participation would appear to be essential” (Hahn,

¹⁶⁹ Anderson and Tverdova (2003) found a positive effect on support for democratic institutions while Anderson, Mendes, and Tverdova (2004) found a positive effect on perceptions of the economy.

¹⁷⁰ These are the standard measures of interest in politics that have been used in previous studies. See Gabriel and van Deth (1995: 396), Plasser, Ulram, and Waldrauch (1998: 132), and Martin (2003). Mishler and Rose (2001: 311) reported a significant positive effect of interest in politics on idealist support for democracy. Welzen, Inglehart, and Deursch (2005) use watching TV and following news, in addition to discussing politics, as indicators of interest in public life, but these indicators are not available in the datasets that I use.

1991: 415). This view is consistent with Almond and Verba's understanding of the different types of political culture: "A participant is assumed to be aware of and informed about the political system in both its governmental and political aspects. A subject tends to be cognitively oriented primarily to the output side of government: the executive, bureaucracy, and judiciary. The parochial tends to be unaware, or only dimly aware, of the political system in all its aspects" (Almond and Verba, 1963: 45). The views of these different authors, coupled with the idea of interest in politics as a characteristic of the modernist strata in the society, suggest the following hypotheses:

Interest – DSD hypothesis: Diffuse support for democracy increases with interest in politics.

Interest – DSDval hypothesis: Acceptance of democratic values increases with interest in politics.

If the two hypotheses will not be rejected, they will offer some support to my view of the Romanian case as a country in which the citizens democratized before the state. Respondents characterized by high levels of interest in politics may have acted as guardians of democracy during the initial stage of the transition.

The previous arguments should also apply in the case of diffuse support for market economy, leading to the following hypotheses:

Interest – DSM hypothesis: Diffuse support for market economy increases with interest in politics.

Interest – DSMLib hypothesis: Diffuse support for the liberal model of market economy increases with interest in politics.

Interest – DSMsd hypothesis: Diffuse support for the social democratic model of market economy decreases with interest in politics.

Interest in politics should also have a significant effect on institutional trust. An indirect argument for using this variable is offered by Gibson, Caldeira, and Baird (1998). In analyzing the legitimacy of national high courts in a sample of old and new democracies, they discover that awareness of national high courts (which increases with interest in politics) has a significant positive effect on the perceptions of this institution. Dowley and Silver (2003: 115) found a significant positive effect of interest in politics on trust in legal system and in parliament in post-communist countries.

Interest – TSI hypothesis: Institutional trust increases with interest in politics.

It is not clear if interest in politics should have a significant effect on specific support for democracy and market economy. If a significant effect exists, it should be positive in both cases:

Interest – SSD hypothesis: Specific support for democracy increases with interest in politics.

Interest – SSM hypothesis: Specific support for market economy increases with interest in politics.

Political participation. This variable is measured as an additive index composed of two indicators of protest behavior: respondent has signed a petition and respondent has participated to a protest or public demonstration. In a developed democracy citizens have a series of access points to the political leadership. They can put forward their demands and they can express their interests through different mechanisms: voting, membership in a political party, membership in civil society organizations, lobby groups, etc. The post-communist citizen, however, is less fortunate from this perspective. In the Romanian case, political parties are among the least trusted institutions and they are perceived as not representing the interest of the society. While political parties refuse to disclose membership numbers, estimates from survey data indicate that less than five percent of the population belongs to a political party. Moreover, the Romanian political parties are highly centralized, most of the important decisions being taken by the leadership, with little to no impact from the party members. Thus, people cannot use political parties as a tool for influencing the decisions that affect their life.

Membership in voluntary organizations is also at low levels. In addition to the fact that the Romanian civil society is underdeveloped (Carothers 1996; Verdery 1996; Rupnik 1997; Tismaneanu 1998), most of the civil society organizations are organized from the top, rarely reaching the bottom. Civil society can be described as representing, at most, an instrument of the upper class.¹⁷¹ Regular citizens fail to organize themselves in order to protect and

¹⁷¹ It is interesting to note that important political figures entered the political arena coming from civil society. The most significant examples include: Emil Constantinescu (president between 1996 and 2000 and former founding member of the Civic Alliance); Victor Ciorbea (prime-minister between 1996-1998 and former leader of one of the main Romanian trade unions – CNSLR Frăția between 1990 and 1996); Miron Mitrea (cabinet member between 2000-2004, former leader of CNSLR

promote their own interests.¹⁷² Thus, out of all the possible ways of influencing politics in a developed democracy, only two are really available to the Romanian citizens: voting and protest activities.

As both Almond and Verba (1963) and Hahn (1991) argued, democracies require some levels of interest and participation from their citizens. While observing active participants to the political life is an easy task, discovering the sources of their propensity to become active may be a more difficult task: some may act because they support democracy and are not happy with the progress that is being made towards democracy, while others may suffer from the economic transition and may act in an attempt to stop further economic reforms. Since political participation is an indicator of an active citizen, I believe that even in cases when the decision to be active rests on dissatisfaction the effect on diffuse support for democracy should still be positive:

***Participation – DSD hypothesis:** Diffuse support for democracy increases with political participation.*

***Participation – DSDval hypothesis:** Acceptance of democratic values increases with political participation.*

Interpersonal trust. This is a dummy variable, with value 1 for those who believe most people can be trusted. Democracy is built on trust relationships: not only between citizens and institutions, but also among citizens. Interpersonal trust is then an attitude that is part of a larger complex of attitudes indicating a democratic citizen, and should have a significant positive effect on diffuse support:

***Trust – DSD hypothesis:** Diffuse support for democracy increases with interpersonal trust.*

***Trust – DSM hypothesis:** Diffuse support for market economy increases with trust.*

The relationship between interpersonal and institutional trust is still debated in the literature, on both theoretical and empirical grounds. Previous

Frăția); Monica Macovei (minister of justice between 2004-2007, former president of the Romanian Helsinki Committee).

¹⁷² Howard (2003) suggests that the post-communist citizens refuse to become active members of the civil society due to their experiences under the communist regime, when “voluntary” membership in different organizations was compulsory.

studies have found different effects between interpersonal and institutional trust.¹⁷³ Despite these conflicting results, I believe that respondents who have trust in other people have a certain psychological predisposition of being more open toward other actors. If this is true, then the following hypothesis should be confirmed by the data:

***Trust – TSI hypothesis:** Trust in the state's institutions increases with interpersonal trust.*

Evaluation of communist regime. This variable is measured as a dummy variable, with value 1 for those who believe the communist regime was bad and 0 for the others. From the realist theory of support proposed by Mishler and Rose I use in analysis the evaluation of the communist regime. This variable should have a significant effect on support for democracy: “support for the new regime should vary inversely with current evaluations of the old regime. In time, memories of the old regime should fade, and current performance evaluations and the cumulative impact of the new regime should take precedence. But early in the transition, the negative legacy of the old regime should provide a measure of positive support for the new or transitional regime” (Mishler and Rose, 2001a: 309).

***Communism – DSD hypothesis:** Diffuse support for democracy increases with negative evaluations of the communist regime.*

***Communism – DSDval hypothesis:** Acceptance of democratic values increases with negative evaluation of the communist regime.*

¹⁷³ Using a 2SLS model, Mishler and Rose concluded: “interpersonal trust does not spill up to create institutional trust, and institutional trust does not trickle down” (Mishler and Rose, 2001b: 54). Brehm and Rahn (1997), using GSS data, found significant effects both ways, with institutional trust having a larger effect. Kaase (1999) found a significant but weak positive relationship between interpersonal trust and institutional trust in Western European countries. Newton (1999) found a significant but weak negative correlation between the two types of trust. Rohrschneider and Schmitt-Beck (2003) found a significant positive effect in West Germany but not in East Germany. Dowley and Silver (2003), using World Values Survey data, found a significant positive effect in post-communist countries for trust in legal system and parliament.

While the effect of this variable should be very strong during the first years of transition, its importance should decrease over time and, eventually, lose its statistical significance.¹⁷⁴ This decrease can be explained through generational replacement and through democracy as a form of government winning over other alternatives.

The characteristics of the communist regime made distinguishing between the political and the economic system very difficult, leading to the expectation that the evaluations of the communist regime have a significant effect on diffuse support for market economy. The state controlled economy continues to be attractive to parts of the population, especially to the losers of the economic transition.¹⁷⁵ Those that suffered the blunt force of the transition have no reason to believe in market economy: under the centralized economy they did not have to fear of unemployment or inflation and, although they acknowledge the chronic shortage of goods, they cannot avoid noticing that everybody was affected by it, not only them. Seeing the abundance of goods under the new economic system and not being able to afford most of them makes the market economy even less attractive.

Communism – DSM hypothesis: Diffuse support for market economy increases with negative evaluations of the communist regime.

While in the case of support for democracy I expect the effect of this variable to decrease over time, in this case I expect that comparisons with the economic system under the communist regime will continue to affect the levels of diffuse support for market economy throughout the transition.¹⁷⁶ In evaluating the communist regime, most people use either political or economic criteria. I do not believe, however, that they include institutions in their evaluations. As a result of this, I do not expect evaluations of the communist regime to have a significant effect on trust in the state's institutions.

¹⁷⁴ “The past can remain salient as long as a new regime is still struggling to become a complete democracy and can successfully blame persisting problems on its communist legacy” (Rose, Mishler, and Haerpfer, 1998: 207). Evans and Whitefield offer a similar argument: “so long as democracy remains an ideal to be implemented, and while the old regime remains in the public’s memory, very high levels of democratic commitment are likely” (Evans and Whitefield, 1995: 508).

¹⁷⁵ See Bruszt (1998: 177) and Rose, Mishler, and Haerpfer (1998: 157).

¹⁷⁶ Due to data availability issues I do not use this variable in the models explaining support for the liberal or the social democratic models of market economy.

Given the economic evolution during post-communism, especially inflation and unemployment, I expect evaluations of the communist regime to have a significant effect on specific support both for the political and the economic system, and possibly higher than its effect on diffuse support. I also expect its effect will be stronger for support for the economic system than for the political system. While this variable might have a strong effect during the first post-communist years, in time its effect should reduce, due to generational replacement and psychological factors.

Communism – SSD hypothesis: *Specific support for democracy increases with negative evaluations of the communist regime.*

Communism – SSM hypothesis: *Specific support for market economy increases with negative evaluations of the communist regime.*

Satisfaction with life. This variable measures (on a four-point scale) a generalized form of evaluation. While the evaluation variables I discuss next ask for specific evaluations, the satisfaction with life variable does not offer a referent for the evaluation. I believe this variable will capture in an indirect way the subconscious evaluations of the current situation in the country.¹⁷⁷ Based on the definitions of diffuse and specific support, satisfaction with life should have no effect on diffuse support for democracy and for market economy and it should have the following effects on the other dependent variables:

Satisfaction – DSMlib hypothesis: *Diffuse support for the liberal model of market economy increases with satisfaction with life.*

Satisfaction – DSMsd hypothesis: *Diffuse support for the social democratic model of market economy decreases with satisfaction with life.*

Satisfaction – TSI hypothesis: *If institutional trust is a measure of specific support then it should increase with satisfaction with life; if it is a measure of diffuse*

¹⁷⁷ Listhaug and Wiberg used life satisfaction in explaining institutional trust in Western democracies, arguing that “there exists a positive spill-over from personal life satisfaction to institutions such that dissatisfied individuals become less confident in institutions; for example, by blaming them for their own problems” (Listhaug and Wiberg, 1995: 315). Rothstein and Stolle (2002) also found a significant positive effect of life satisfaction on institutional trust.

support then it should not be influenced by satisfaction with life.

Satisfaction – SSD hypothesis: *Specific support for democracy increases with satisfaction with life.*

Satisfaction – SSM hypothesis: *Specific support for market economy increases with satisfaction with life.*

Subjective perceptions of economy. The way people perceive the economic situation is considered to be one of the most important determinants of support (McAllister 1999; Miller and Listhaug 1999, Mishler and Rose 1997, 2001b; Rohrschneider 1999). Previous studies have indicated that specific support for democracy and market economy is often influenced by economic context.¹⁷⁸ This indicates that people see economic performance not only as output of the economic system, but as output of the political system as well. This should not be surprising at all, given that the post-communist citizens lived almost all of their lives under a regime that had total control over the economy.

Most of the existing literature has imported theories of voting developed in the context of the US society and has applied them to the post-communist context under the assumption that the decision of the post-communist citizen whether to support or not democracy and market economy is similar to the decision of the Western citizen to give the vote to a political party.¹⁷⁹

When people are personally experiencing a difficult economic situation it is less likely that they will support the new economic system and it may be possible that they will also blame the new political system for their situation. An alternative framework suggests, however, that retrospective voting does not seem to work very well in the new democracies that implement significant economic reforms. Reforms, while beneficial in the long term, have predictable negative short- and medium-term effects. Thus, according to the claims of prospective voting, people should vote against the reformers, leading to an unexpected conclusion: under democracy, people reject reforms that are good for them in the long term.¹⁸⁰ This logical consequence is contradicted by empirical studies, who find that, compared to non-democratic regimes,

¹⁷⁸ See, for instance, McIntosh and MacIver (1992), Kaase (1994), Toka (1995), and Mishler and Rose (1996).

¹⁷⁹ For a discussion of the sociotropic theory and of the personal experiences versus the national assessment hypotheses, see Fiorina (1981), Kiewiet (1983), Lewis-Beck (1988), Markus (1988), and MacKuen, Erikson, and Stimson (1992).

¹⁸⁰ This was, in fact, the reasoning that led many observers to be skeptical about the chances of successful democratization in the region at the beginning of the transition.

democracies are not less likely to implement economic reforms (Haggard and Kaufman 1989; Remmer 1990).

Based on the previous literature, I use four indicators of evaluations of economic outputs that use different referents for comparison: current personal situation compared to the previous year (retrospective pocketbook evaluations), current personal situation a year from now (prospective pocketbook evaluations), current situation of people in the respondent's town compared to previous year (sociotropic evaluations at local level), and current situation of Romanians compared to previous year (sociotropic evaluations at national level).¹⁸¹ It is likely that not all four variables will achieve significance and it is not clear a priori what referent Romanians use in their evaluations.¹⁸² For all four variables, however, the effects on specific support should be positive:

***Economy – DSMLib hypothesis:** Diffuse support for the liberal model of market economy increases with positive evaluations of economy.*

***Economy – DSMsd hypothesis:** Diffuse support for the social democratic model of market economy decreases with positive evaluations of economy.*

***Economy – TSI hypothesis:** If institutional trust is a measure of specific support then it should increase with positive evaluations of the economy; if it is a measure of diffuse support then it should not be influenced by evaluations of the economy.*

***Economy – SSD hypothesis:** Specific support for democracy increases with positive evaluations of the economy.*

***Economy – SSM hypothesis:** Specific support for market economy increases with positive evaluations of the economy.*

Evaluations of political outputs. Previous empirical findings suggest that evaluations of the political output are more important in influencing specific support for democracy than evaluations of the economic output (Rose, Mishler, and Haerpfer 1998 and Hofferbert and Klingemann 1999). To account

¹⁸¹ Retrospective versus prospective, pocketbook versus sociotropic, and local versus national.

¹⁸² Given the atomization and the individualism that characterizes the Romanian society, it is possible that the pocketbook theory will receive more support than the sociotropic theory.

for this, I include in the model explaining specific support for democracy two variables of evaluation of the responsiveness of the political system: “people like me can influence important decisions taken at the local level” and “people like me can influence important decisions taken at the national level”. While the two indicators refer only to one type of political output, the responsiveness of the political system at local and national level, this output is among the most important benefits offered by the new political system. Thus, these variables have the power to affect the level of specific support for democracy:

***Political – SSD hypothesis:** Specific support for democracy increases with positive evaluations of political outputs.*

Other types of support. Easton argues that, in time, it is possible to observe an effect from one type of support to another. Diffuse support for an object can be influenced by specific support for the same object or by diffuse or specific support for other objects in the support model. In his discussion of these effects, however, Easton touches only briefly on the temporal dimension of the relationship, saying only that the effects can appear after long periods of time, and leaving open to discussion a series of important questions: do all levels of specific support have an effect on diffuse support at the same time, do high levels reinforce diffuse support faster than low levels diminish it, or are low levels more quick to act?¹⁸³ I test for the existence of these effects in the Romanian case using the set of tentative hypotheses presented below. It should be noted that, in all cases, I expect the relationships to be nonsignificant at the beginning of the transition and to become significant over time.

***TSI – DSD hypothesis:** Diffuse support for democracy increases with institutional trust.*

***TSI – DSDval hypothesis:** Diffuse support for democratic values increases with institutional trust.*

***TSI – DSM hypothesis:** Diffuse support for market economy increases with institutional trust.*

***TSI – DSMLib hypothesis:** Diffuse support for the liberal model of market economy increases with institutional trust.*

¹⁸³ Both Easton (specific versus diffuse support) and Linz (efficacy versus legitimacy) suggest the existence of a positive relationship, but they do not discuss the temporal dimension of the relationship.

TSI – DSMsd hypothesis: Diffuse support for the social democratic model of market economy increases with institutional trust.

SSD – DSD hypothesis: Diffuse support for democracy increases with specific support for democracy.

SSD – TSI hypothesis: Institutional trust increases with specific support for democracy.

SSM – DSMLib hypothesis: Diffuse support for the liberal model of market economy increases with specific support for market economy.

SSM – DSDsd hypothesis: Diffuse support for the social democratic model of market economy decreases with specific support for market economy.

SSM – TSI hypothesis: Institutional trust increases with specific support for market economy.

Data analysis

Constructing indices. Throughout this study I use multiple indicators for a single dimension of interest. When this is the case, the multiple indicators are used to construct a single index, using the following strategy. First, I run a principal components factor analysis and a maximum-likelihood factor analysis with oblimin rotation to verify if the theoretical expectation that the multiple indicators measure the same dimension receives support from the data.¹⁸⁴ If the factor analysis extracts a single factor, a factor score is saved as a new variable. If the factor analysis extracts multiple factors I use the correlations between the factors to decide the number of factors to be extracted and I save a factor score for each factor.

Second, I check the unidimensionality of the factors identified in the first step using Cronbach's alpha or the KR-20 coefficients, depending on the data type.¹⁸⁵ Third, I construct each index as an additive index composed of the multiple indicators and I compute the correlation between the factor score and

¹⁸⁴ To assess the adequacy of factor analysis as a data reduction method, I use a cut-off point of 0.70 for the KMO measure of sampling adequacy (see Keiser 1974 for more details about KMO).

¹⁸⁵ I use the generally accepted cut-off point of 0.70 (see Nunnally 1978) in deciding if the items can be used to construct a scale. For more details about Cronbach's alpha coefficient, see Cronbach (1951).

the additive index. If all these tests are consistent, I use in further analyses the additive index rather than the factor score, mainly because the values of the additive index are easier to interpret and understand than the standardized values offered by the factor scores.

Descriptive analyses. A large part of the data I use is presented in graphical or tabular form, based on frequencies and cross-tabulations. These will prove especially useful in following the evolution of different indicators over time. In the case of cross-tabulations, if I am interested not only in the distribution of the respondents but also in finding which groups are overrepresented and which are underrepresented, I use adjusted standardized residuals to compute significance levels (see, for instance, Table A-23 in the appendix).

Macrolevel indicators. In analyzing the evolution of the societal pattern of political culture over time, I also take into account context variables that describe the state of the Romanian economy. While even the simplest statistical models are difficult to use with so few data points, comparisons with the trends displayed by these context variables might suggest possible relationships that may be adequately tested when enough data will be available. Due to data limitations, this last part of the analysis is purely descriptive. Fortunately, the Romanian transition, both in terms of implementing democracy and in terms of implementing market economy, was characterized by high levels of variation: economic indicators dropped dramatically during the first years of transition and then started to slowly increase, while indicators of democratization show a slow but constant progress towards democracy.¹⁸⁶

Previous studies suggest that economic performance has a significant effect on support for democracy and market economy. The different aspect of economic performance can be evaluated using the following indicators: unemployment, inflation, economic growth, and GDP per capita. Unemployment and inflation might prove to be especially damaging since they were almost unknown to the population during the communist regime. Economy, however, is not the only criterion the citizens use: “government performance is not simply gauged by material standards or economic conditions. Citizens also expect the government to follow procedures that are unbiased, and to produce outcomes that neither advantage nor disadvantage particular groups unfairly” (Miller and Listhaug, 1999: 216). Additional indicators should then be taken

¹⁸⁶ While the situation may be fortunate for those studying Romania; a Romanian citizen might have a completely different view on this subject. As a member of both these groups I must confess I have mixed feelings about the use of the word ‘fortunately’ in this context.

into account. The level of corruption¹⁸⁷ might have negative effects on both support for democracy and institutional trust. Corruption is seen as one of the most significant problems affecting post-communist societies (Holmes 1993; Bručan 1998; World Bank 2000; Rose 2001; Sandholtz and Taagepera 2005) and it is especially problematic because high levels of perceived corruption have the potential to generate corrupt behavior.¹⁸⁸ The citizens' preference for fairness in governmental output suggests that the evolution of inequality might also have an effect.

Analysis of variance (ANOVA). For each dependent variable I use ANOVA models to compare the average levels of the dependent variable across population groups defined by demographic variables and differences within the population groups across time. I estimate these models using SPSS. The algorithm I use for these analyses is the following: I test the assumption of homogeneity of variances using the Levene statistic. If this assumption is not rejected, I used Tukey's HSD test to determine whether the group differences are significant or not (this is a very conservative pairwise test, which reduces the likelihood of Type I errors). If the assumption is violated, I test for significant differences using the Games-Howell GH test (the most conservative post-hoc test available in SPSS). If the comparison involves only two groups (e.g. men versus women), I test the significance of the differences using the Brown-Forsythe F test of equality of means, a test that does not require homogeneity of variances and that is robust to violations of the normality assumption.

Regression analyses. The theoretical models I described in the previous chapter are estimated using regression analysis. Since most of the dependent variables I use are either measured on a four- or five-point Likert scale or constructed from multiple indicators of this type, they can be treated as interval

¹⁸⁷ For a brief discussion of corruption measures see Holmes (2003).

¹⁸⁸ See Rose-Ackerman, who argues: "People are more likely to comply with the rules set down by the state if they think the rules will be enforced in an evenhandedly way. However, compliance is also enhanced by the belief the others are also obeying the rules. These two factors can create positive feedbacks in which the trustworthiness of government encourages widespread compliance with the rules. In the next iteration, even more people comply because they are influenced by the widespread compliance of others. Unfortunately, some of the countries in Central and Eastern Europe appear to be at the opposite extreme where widespread non-compliance and lack of government credibility create self-reinforcing patterns of behavior in spite of people's expressions of distaste for the present situation" (Rose-Ackerman, 2001: 425).

variables and analyzed using ordinary least squares (OLS) regression.¹⁸⁹ One dependent variable (diffuse support for market economy) is measured as a dichotomous variable and, in this case, the models are estimated using logistic regression.

For each dependent variable I estimate a SES model (which includes only the demographic variables), a region model (which includes only the development region variables), a SES and region model (which combines the previous two models), an attitudinal model (which includes only the attitudinal and evaluative variables), and a full model (which includes all variables from the previous models). This allows comparing the relative importance of the different groups of variables in influencing the dependent variables. If an independent variable is missing from one of the years used in analysis, I check the stability of the results by estimating additional models in the years with full data and by comparing the results of the models with and without that particular independent variable. The interpretation of the regression analyses' results represents the core of this study. This will allow identifying the factors that have significant effects on the dependent variables, discussing how these factors are structured at a particular point in time, and discussing how this structure changes over time.

Starting with the next chapter, I move the focus of this study from the theoretical and methodological issues to presenting, interpreting, and discussing the results of the empirical analyses.

¹⁸⁹ Technically, being constructed from Likert items with four or five values, they are ordinal variables, but it is a commonly accepted practice in social sciences to treat these variables as interval variables.

4. Diffuse support for the principles of the political system

I discuss in this chapter the results of the analyses of diffuse support for democracy and for democratic values.¹⁹⁰ Both dependent variables are indicators of diffuse support for the principles of the system, indicators of values that should be found at the core of the respondents' attitudinal systems. Based on the theoretical discussion in the first two chapters, and given the fact that the period of time I analyze is characterized by the transition from communism to democracy, diffuse support for democracy should follow a very specific pattern over time. At the beginning of the transition, following Eckstein and Swidler, one would expect to find a population that is divided with respect to the principles of the new political system. In time, more and more people should become attached to the ideals of democracy, so that by the end of the transition diffuse support for democracy will be stable, as described by Easton and by Mishler and Pollack.

I will show in this chapter that when diffuse support for democracy is measured using a single, general measure (democracy is the best system) the Romanian public presents a very high level of support right from the beginning of the transition, and, with minor exceptions, this high level of support is maintained throughout the transition. Moreover, education is the only demographic variable that influences the respondents' diffuse support for democracy, suggesting that, at this level, democracy is not a contested ideal. This part of the analysis offers support for the models developed by Easton and by Mishler and Pollack, but contradicts the expectation of a slowly changing political culture.

If diffuse support for democracy is measured using a series of variables that indicate acceptance of democratic values, this more detailed measure of

¹⁹⁰ Throughout the discussion I try to place the results of the statistical analyses into a more general context, by describing the political and economic developments in Romania, and, where data are available, I offer additional results that help for a better understanding of the findings.

diffuse support for democratic values follows over time the evolution pattern described by Eckstein and Swidler: during the first half of the transition the percentage of the population accepting these values is rather low and the values are contested, as indicated by the significant coefficients of the demographic variables included in analysis. Over time, more and more people accept these ideals and the effects of the demographic variables are reduced, so that by the end of the transition diffuse support for democratic values becomes similar to diffuse support for democracy.

The last days of December 1989 marked the fall of the communist regime in Romania and the beginning of the post-communist transition. The euphoria generated by these events, however, was rapidly lost, for Romania did not seem to make the complete break with the communist regime that people had been expecting. No later than December 26, 1989 – the first day in which gunfire stopped in Bucharest – an anti-communist demonstration was organized, demanding, among other things, the outlawing of the Romanian Communist Party and the replacement of the communist constitution with the 1923 Constitution (the first democratic constitution of Romania). The leadership of the provisional governing authority, CFSN – the Council of the National Salvation Front, used the public television and radio stations to denounce this demonstration as a diversion organized by terrorists and asked the population not to attend it. This was followed on January 12, 1990 by another demonstration in which the protesters asked for the replacement of Ion Iliescu, the leader of CFSN, because he was a former elite member of the Communist Party.

On January 23, 1990 CFSN announced its intention to participate in the first post-communist elections, a decision that led to daily protests in Bucharest.¹⁹¹ The most significant of these, on January 28, 1990, was organized

¹⁹¹ Public demonstrations were legalized through the Decree-Law No.2 (January 3, 1990) regarding the organization of public demonstrations, who stated that “public demonstrations are authorized, as a manifestation of the freedom of opinion and expression, and as a way of organizing citizens’ participation to the public life.” This article was changed by the Decree-Law No. 39 (January 24, 1990) regarding some measures related to the organizations of public demonstrations, who tried to restrict the right to protest. According to Article 1 in the new decree-law, “public demonstrations can be organized, usually, during non-working days or outside the work hours.” Article 2 stated that “in Bucharest, public demonstrations will be organized, usually, in Libertății Park, Tineretului Park, Opera Română Park, and

by the newly formed historical parties (PNL – the National Liberal Party and PNTCD – the Christian Democratic National Peasants’ Party). The leaders of CFSN brought workers from the main factories in Bucharest to a counter-demonstration held only several hundred yards from the one organized by the opposition parties. After several hours of facing one another, clashes between the two groups of demonstrators were reported and, in the chaos that ensued, the Government’s headquarters were attacked.¹⁹² The public television, which was controlled by CFSN, broadcasted interviews with workers who had been beaten and blamed the opponents of CFSN for all the violence, prompting more workers to join the counter-demonstration. Ion Iliescu used these events as an excuse to appear on public television and radio stations and ask the workers to come and defend democracy and CFSN against the opposition. The following morning, 5000 miners from the Jiu Valley (some 240 miles from the capital) came to Bucharest responding to Iliescu’s call for help and attacked the headquarters of the opposition parties, helped by workers from the factories in Bucharest. Two of the slogans used by the supporters of CFSN during these protests (“Death to the intellectuals!” and “We are working, not thinking!”) were the first signs of a deep division line that was created within the Romanian population and that continued to be significant for several years: workers vs. intellectuals. The only positive result of this first post-communist clash was that CFSN agreed to create CPUN – the Provisional Council of National Unity, in which the opposition parties were also represented.

A second dividing line, that, as the results will show, still continues to be significant, was already manifest in these initial protests, but it was clearly stated on March 11, 1990, in the Proclamation of Timișoara.¹⁹³ The eighth point of the proclamation proposed a clean break with the communist past by not allowing any activist of the communist party or former member of the security forces the right to be elected in public office for three electoral cycles (i.e. for at least 10 years), arguing that “their presence in the political life is the principal source for the unrest and suspicion that plague the Romanian society.” The

Titan Park.” All the locations listed in this article are parks located miles away from the main government buildings.

¹⁹² Although it is still unclear who initiated the attack, the events that followed it suggest this was a strategic move that allowed CFSN to ask for help. It is also interesting to note that some of the workers came to the counter-demonstration armed with clubs and crowbars, while none of the CFSN opponents were armed.

¹⁹³ Large city in Western Romania, where the 1989 revolution started (December 16, 1989).

lustration proposed by “Point 8” was never implemented in Romania, and, as a result of this, even in the present day a part of the population still feels that Romania is led by former communists. This division between those who wanted a complete break from the communist past and those who gave little importance to this issue reinforced, to some extent, the division between the intellectuals and the workers.

The FSN and Ion Iliescu won the first post-communist elections (May 20, 1990) by a landslide (66% for FSN and 85% for Iliescu).¹⁹⁴ Encouraged by this victory, Iliescu decided to put an end to a month-long anti-communist demonstration in University Square by asking again for the help of the miners. The events of June 13-15, 1990, with miners coming to Bucharest for the third time in only six months to “defend democracy” and protect Iliescu against the slogans of the opposition were clear proof that Romania was not making any significant advances toward democracy.¹⁹⁵

All these examples show that Romania had a shaky start in the transition to democracy. After the violent conflicts between Romanians and Hungarians in Târgu Mureş (March 19-20, 1990) and the violent end of the University Square demonstration, most foreign analysts were ready to place Romania in the group of failed transitions. Yet, by 2007 Romania has become democratic enough to be accepted as a full member in the European Union. I believe that part of the explanation for this “miraculous” recovery of Romania resides in the fact that a significant part of the population has adopted right from the beginning of the transition the ideals of democracy and has constantly

¹⁹⁴ It is generally accepted that the May 1990 elections were neither completely fair nor fully democratic.


¹⁹⁵ Although the truth about these events is not fully known, Iliescu’s own speech during his meetings with the miners shows clearly that he preferred using the miners rather than the police to put a stop to the demonstration: “Dear miners, I am addressing you, thanking you for your answer of working class solidarity that you gave to our call this time as well. The miners’ delegation, led by Mr. Cozma, will go to University Square which we want to be reoccupied by you. As you have seen, this time we are dealing with fascist elements, organized groups of inciting elements, many of them under the influence of drugs.” After the protesters were beaten by the miners and arrested by the police, Iliescu thanked the miners for their help in restoring democracy, wished them all the best, and asked them to return to Jiu Valley. Later Iliescu argued that the intervention of the miners was necessary, and mentioned as positive examples of the miners’ intervention restoring order in Bucharest, reopening the University Square to the traffic, and replanting the flower beds that were destroyed by the protesters who lived for a month in the square.

reminded the political actors that nothing short of a full transition to democracy will be accepted. The results I present in the following section offer some support for this belief.

Diffuse support for democracy

I discuss in this section diffuse support for democracy, measured through attitudes towards democracy as a political system. After presenting the evolution of this indicator over time I analyze the relationship between diffuse support for democracy and demographic variables, focusing on differences among different population subgroups and on differences across time within these population subgroups. In the remaining of the section I analyze the effects of demographic, regional, and attitudinal variables on diffuse support for democracy in a multivariate context.

Figure 3 Diffuse support for democracy and democratic values (%positive support)



One of the most puzzling results for the few political scientists that have analyzed the Romanian transition to democracy has been the high level of support for democracy exhibited by the Romanian public, a finding that was clearly contradicting the theoretical expectations (see, for instance, Mishler and Rose, 1996: 560). Previous studies have tried to explain this contradiction either by suggesting that it was a form of inverse legitimation (democracy seemed a very attractive alternative after forty years of living under a particularly brutal dictatorial regime – see, for instance, Rose and Mishler, 1994: 170) or by arguing that Romania showed high levels of democratic commitment precisely because of its slow transition to democracy (Evans and Whitefield, 1995: 508). Both arguments suggest that, eventually, the level of diffuse support for democracy should decrease over time, either because people stop using the communist experience as a reference point, or because of significant advances to democracy.

The data presented in Figure 3 show the evolution of diffuse support for democracy and democratic values in Romania from 1990 to 2005. I focus in this section only on diffuse support for democracy, measured on a four-point scale of agreement-disagreement with the statement that “Democracy is the best political system”.¹⁹⁶ The data in the graph represent the percentage of respondents who either agreed or strongly agreed with this statement. At the beginning of the transition, nine out of ten Romanians considered that democracy is indeed the best political system and by 1997 this proportion did not change significantly. From 1997 to 1999 the percentage of people who agreed with this statement dropped from 90% to 75% and then started to increase, reaching again, by 2005, the 90% mark. The variation recorded after 1997 may be explained by the political situation in Romania at the time.¹⁹⁷ The 1996 elections marked the first transfer of power after the beginning of the transition. A center-right coalition of parties – the Democratic Convention of Romania, CDR, in which the Christian Democrats and the Liberals were joined by four minor parties – managed to win a plurality of votes in the 1996 elections and was able to form a post-electoral alliance with the Social Democratic Union (a coalition of two center-left parties) and the Democratic Union of Magyars in

¹⁹⁶ The evolution of diffuse support for democratic values, measured by the other variables, is discussed in section *Diffuse support for democratic values*.

¹⁹⁷ Since the economy did not fare worse than it did during the first years of the transition and there were no significant social problems, the political system is the most likely explanation.

Romania that gave them the majority in both houses of the parliament.¹⁹⁸ After six years of ruling the country, PDSR was replaced by the democratic opposition and president Ion Iliescu was replaced by the CDR's candidate, Emil Constantinescu.

This transfer of power gave new hope to a population that was tired of the economic problems of the transition. Unfortunately, the promises made by CDR in the electoral campaign could not be fulfilled, which led to an even greater disappointment: if the former opposition was no better than those it has replaced, then there was little hope left for an improvement in the economic situation.¹⁹⁹ In addition to the failure to improve the economic conditions, the governing coalition was also too busy arguing about the distribution of minor offices to the coalition members to govern the country efficiently, leading the population to see the CDR as a political failure as well.²⁰⁰ In retrospect, it seems

¹⁹⁸ Like in most of the former communist countries, the Romanian political parties had a complex evolution during the first years of the transition. Only three of the main parties kept the same name and avoided internal splits: PNTCD (the Christian Democrats), PRM (the ultra-nationalist Greater Romania Party), and UDMR (the Democratic Union of Magyars in Romania). The liberals experienced a series of splits that led to the existence of several liberal parties (PNL, PNL-Câmpeanu, PNL-Brătianu, and PNL-The Young Wing) who later united into PNL (the National Liberal Party). In 2007, however, another dissident group left PNL to form PLD (the Liberal Democratic Party). On the left side of the political spectrum, FSN (the National Salvation Front) split into FSN (the reformist wing) and FDSN (the Democratic National Salvation Front). Later FSN became PD (the Democratic Party), while FDSN became PSDR (the Party of Social Democracy in Romania) and then changed its name to PSD (the Social Democratic Party). Other minor parties survived for only short period of times, until they either disappeared or were absorbed by one of the main parties. PSD, for instance, absorbed PDSR (the Socialist Democratic Party of Romania), PR (the Republican Party), PC (the Cooperative Party), and PSDR (the Romanian Social Democratic Party). In addition to these movements at the party level, inter-party migration was also a widespread phenomenon, to the extent that it is quite common to find MPs who in only 15 years have been members of four or five different political parties.

¹⁹⁹ CDR won the 1996 elections on a platform labeled *The Contract with Romania*, which “actually positioned the CDR to the left of the PDSR platform, for the latter did not conceal the truth that further economic sacrifices were expected from a population that seemed to have lost its patience with the ruling party” (Shafir, 1997: 146).

²⁰⁰ And, to a certain extent, this was true. At the following elections (in 2000) president Emil Constantinescu decided not to run for a second term, CDR dissolved, the

that CDR had an impossible mission: it was too inexperienced in governing the country, it suffered from the problems that characterize all coalition governments that are composed of too many and too ideologically diverse parties, and it inherited an economic situation that forced it to implement a series of unpopular economic reforms which, ironically enough, proved beneficial for the economy, but only after 2000, when the country was governed again by PSD.

It should be noted that, following Easton's definition of the concept, diffuse support should not exhibit significant variation in short periods of time. The popular disappointment with the performance of CDR seems, however, to have been strong enough to convince some of the weak supporters of democracy that all political parties are the same and that democracy is, after all, not perfect. The support that was lost during these years has been regained by 2005. The evolution of diffuse support for democracy presented in Figure 3 supports the *DSD change* hypothesis presented in Chapter 2, suggesting that the high levels observed at the beginning of the transition were not a form of inverse legitimation but real diffuse support. Sztompka's interpretation of the post-communist revolution as a major cultural and civilizational break seems more appropriate than the legitimacy by default thesis: the fall of communism was such a significant event that it has filled the reservoir of support almost to the top, making democracy an ideal accepted by the vast majority of the population right from the beginning of the transition. The fact that the state's institutions have failed so far to gain the trust of the public (as shown in Chapter 6) indicates that democratic experiences could not have increased the level of diffuse support, offering additional evidence to the conclusion presented here.

After looking at the evolution of diffuse support for democracy at the level of the whole population, I move the focus of the analysis to differences in the average level of diffuse support for democracy in population subgroups defined by gender, age, education, residence area, religion, and voting intention.

leading party in CDR, the Christian Democrats, failed to win any seats in the parliament, and PSD returned to power.

²⁰¹ The dependent variable in this section was measured only in five years: 1990, 1997, 1999, 2002, and 2005. These are the years I analyze in this section. I excluded the 2002 dataset from the ANOVAs because in that year the dependent variable was measured as a dichotomous variable.

Table 2 Differences in the average level of diffuse support for democracy

	1990	1997	1999	2005	90 - 97	90 - 99	90 - 05	97 - 99	97 - 05	99 - 05
Men vs. women	x	▲	▲	▲	▲	▲	▲	▲	▼	▼
				Men						
				Women						
Under 30 vs. 31 - 60	x	▲	▲	x	▲	▲	▲	▲	▼	▼
Under 30 vs. over 61	x	▲	▲	x	▲	▲	▲	▲	▼	▼
31 - 60 vs. over 61	x	x	▲	x	▲	▲	▲	▲	▼	▼
4 grades or less vs. 5 - 8 grades	x	x	▼	x	▲	▲	▲	▲	▼	▼
4 grades or less vs. 9 - 11 grades	x	x	▼	x	▲	▲	▲	▲	▼	▼
4 grades or less vs. high school plus	x	▼	▼	x	▲	▲	▲	▲	▼	▼
4 grades or less vs. university plus	▼	▼	▼	▼	▲	▲	▲	x	▼	▼
5 - 8 grades vs. 9 - 11 grades	x	x	x	x	▲	▲	▲	x	x	▼
5 - 8 grades vs. high school plus	▼	▼	▼	▼	▲	▲	▲	▲	▼	▼
5 - 8 grades vs. university plus	▼	▼	▼	▼	▲	▲	▲	▲	▼	▼
9 - 11 grades vs. high school plus	x	▼	▼	x	▲	▲	▲	▲	▼	▼
9 - 11 grades vs. university plus	x	▼	▼	▼	▲	▲	▲	▲	▼	▼
High school plus vs. university plus	▼	▼	▼	▼	▲	▲	▲	▲	▼	▼
Urban vs. rural	x	▲	▲	▲	▲	▲	▲	▲	▼	▼
				Urban						
				Rural						
Orthodox vs. non-orthodox	x	x	▼	x	▲	▲	▲	▲	▼	▼
				Orthodox						
				Non-orthodox				x	▼	▼
Vote power vs. vote opposition	x	▲	▲	x	▲	▲	▲	x	▼	▼
				Vote power						
				Vote opposition				▲	▼	▼
N	1565	1000	1146	1776						

Note: x indicates no significant differences. ▲ indicates that the first group in the compared pair has a significantly higher average score (p<.05). ▼ indicates that the first group in the compared pair has a significantly lower average score (p<.05). Data sources: USIA 1990, WVS 1997, WVS 1999, BOP / WVS 2005.

Table 2 presents ANOVA results in a simplified format (the mean differences are presented in Table A-4 in the Appendix).²⁰¹ In the left panel the population subgroups defined by the variables listed above are compared to one another within each of the four years included in analysis, while the right panel presents the changes in the level of support for each subgroup over time.

Looking at the left panel first, we can see that starting with 1997 men have a significantly higher level of diffuse support for democracy compared to women. The same pattern is observed for the subgroups defined by residence, with those who live in urban areas having a higher level of diffuse support for democracy compared to those living in rural areas. Significant differences also exist during the middle of the transition for the three age groups analyzed here. It is interesting to note that the group of those between 31 and 60 years was not different from the group of those over 61 year in 1997, but it became different in 1999. Since 1997 – 1999 was the period when the level of diffuse support for democracy dropped from 90% to 75%, this indicates that the decrease of support was more accentuated in the group of people over 61 years.

The education comparisons indicate a consistent positive relationship between education and diffuse support for democracy, with 1999 being the year when the association was the strongest. Some of the differences are significant in all years, with those with higher education being consistently more supportive of democracy than all the other subgroups. Finally, the difference between supporters of the governing party and supporters of the opposition shows that in 1997 and 1999 the supporters of the governing party (the CDR coalition) had a higher level of support for democracy.

The results in the left panel of Table 2 indicate the groups which are responsible for the drop in the level of diffuse support for democracy observed after 1997. It seems that most of the observed decrease can be explained by lower levels of diffuse support for democracy among women, older respondents, people with a lower level of education, people residing in the rural areas, and supporters of PSD and its associate political parties. In all these cases the differences between the population subgroups become significant in 1997, they increase in 1999, and, in most cases, they are also maintained in 2005 (although significantly reduced).²⁰² Based on these results it can be concluded that these population subgroups have a weaker attachment to democracy as a political system.

The right panel presents the results for the tests for the significance of the differences in the level of diffuse support for democracy within each group over time. Comparing the results in the right panel with Figure 3 it can be seen

²⁰² See Table A-4 in the Appendix for the exact values of these differences over time.

that while the percentage of people who support democracy remained constant from 1990 to 1997 and then dropped significantly from 1997 to 1999, the average score of support for democracy decreased from 1990 to 1997 as well. This suggests that from 1990 to 1997 a significant number of people moved from "strong agreement" with the statement that democracy is the best system to the "agreement" category, while from 1997 to 1999 the change was generated by people moving from the "agreement" to the "disagreement" category. While most of the groups follow the evolution recorded for the whole population, there are two significant differences. First, among the education groups, those that have at least a high school diploma seem to have kept the same average level of support for democracy between 1997 and 1999, when the average decreased within the whole population. Second, supporters of the governing party also seem to have maintained the same level of support for democracy from 1997 to 1999 (the first three years of the CDR-led government).

The results in Table 2 show significant differences in the level of diffuse support for democracy between population subgroups defined by gender, age, education, residence area, and party preference. Are these differences maintained in the multivariate context, when the effects of all these variables are considered simultaneously?

After looking at the evolution of diffuse support for democracy both within the population as a whole and within different population subgroups, the results presented in Table A-6, Table A-7, and Table 3 move the analysis forward, by focusing on the factors that affect this type of support.²⁰³

Table A-6 presents three initial regression models: the first one takes into account only the effects of the demographic variables (the SES model), the second one takes into account only the effects of the development region variables (the Region model), while the last one brings together the demographic and regional variables (the SES and region model). The SES model explains less than one percent of the variance in diffuse support for democracy in 1990, when most of the population was supporting democracy. Once democracy began losing some of its supporters, the demographic variables in the SES model increased their power, explaining 7% of the variance in 1997

²⁰³ The regression models were estimated using SPSS. The dependent variable in 2002 was measured as a dichotomous variable (democracy is / is not the best system), making it inappropriate for linear regression. I have estimated both a logistic regression and a linear regression model for 2002 and I compared their results. Since the only difference between the two models was a higher significance for the age and urban coefficients in the logistic regression model, I decided to present in these tables the results of the linear regression model in order to make the tables easier to read.

and 11% in 1999. During the last part of the transition (2002 and 2005), when diffuse support for democracy was recovering from the 1997-1999 drop, the explanatory power of the demographic variables dropped again, the SES model explaining only 2-3% of the variance.

It should be noted that when the demographic variables are analyzed in the multivariate context, education is the only variable that has a significant effect throughout the transition. The strength of this effect varies over time: the effect of education increases until 1999, when it is seven times larger than in 1990, and then it decreases until 2005, when it is still three times larger than in 1990, but more than twice weaker than in 1999. Gender is significant only in 1997 and 1999, but the differences between men and women with respect to diffuse support for democracy are minor. Age and residence in urban areas, while significant in the ANOVAs, lose their significance in the multivariate context.²⁰⁴ Religion has a significant negative effect in 1999, showing that people of orthodox religion have lower levels of support for democracy (it is the strongest effect in 1999 after the effect of education). Finally, with the exception of 2002, the effect of church attendance is increasing over time, so that by 2005 its coefficient becomes significant.

The Region model explains less than 1% of the variance in diffuse support for democracy, with the exception of 1999, when it explains 3.5% of the variance. The coefficients in the Region model indicate the difference in the average level of diffuse support for democracy between the development regions and Bucharest.²⁰⁵ At the beginning of the transition the North East region (the poorest, least developed region of Romania) was the only region significantly less supportive of democracy. In 1997 and 1999, when diffuse support for democracy was decreasing, the North West region is the only one that continued having a similar level of support as Bucharest; in all other regions the level of support was significantly lower.²⁰⁶ As the economic situation of the country improved, the differences between Bucharest and the development regions reduced, so that by 2005 no coefficients are significant.

It should be noted that the excluded category in the Region model is Bucharest. While this is the logical choice for the excluded category (Bucharest

²⁰⁴ The effect of age is probably captured by the strong effect of education.

²⁰⁵ A map of the Romanian development regions is presented in Figure A-1 in the Appendix.

²⁰⁶ Since the coefficient for the Center region is significant only in 1997 and the coefficient for the West region is significant only in 1999, I think it can be said that the level of support for democracy in Transylvania, which overlaps the North West, West, and Center regions, was similar to the level of support for democracy in Bucharest.

is the political, economic, and cultural center of the country), the differences between Bucharest and the other development regions might affect the coefficients for other variables in the model, especially residence and education.²⁰⁷

Comparing the coefficients in the SES and the SES and region models, however, it seems that the addition of the development region variables does not change the coefficients for any of the SES variables in a significant manner. The variables that had significant coefficients in the SES model have maintained their significance even after the development region variables were added to the model. The coefficient for religion in 1999 is the only one that changes significantly: its effect is reduced by roughly a third by the addition of the region variables. The explanation for this change resides in the fact that three of the development regions (West, North West, and Center) have a higher proportion of people of other religions compared to Bucharest.

The multiple determination coefficients show that, compared to the development region variables, the demographic variables explain a higher proportion of the variance in the dependent variable. Moreover, since many of the coefficients that are significant in the Region model lose their significance in the SES and region model, it seems that the demographic variables explain a large part of the inter-regional differences in diffuse support for democracy.

In addition to the demographic and regional variables, I also use in the regression models a set of attitudinal variables that might influence the level of diffuse support for democracy: variables related to political participation, evaluation of the communist regime, trust, satisfaction, and specific support for democracy. Table A-5 in the Appendix presents the correlations between diffuse support for democracy and these attitudinal variables. The average of these correlations varies between .056 in 1990 and .148 in 1997, and the highest correlation is with voting intention (.243 in 1999). The attitudinal regression model is presented in Table A-7.²⁰⁸ The multiple determination coefficients show

²⁰⁷ 90% of the population in the Bucharest development region lives in urban areas. In the other regions the percentage of population living in urban areas varies between 41% in the South region and 64% in the West region. In terms of economic development, Bucharest is also the most developed region. Compared to GDP per capita in Bucharest, in the other development regions GDP per capita varies between 37% in the North East region and 58% in the West region (2003 data from National Institute of Statistics, 2005).

²⁰⁸ Since some attitudinal variables are missing from the 1990 and 1999 datasets, I have estimated for the other years a series of models without these variables and I compared the results of these models to the results of the full models. The comparison showed that the results are very stable across the models: they have the same signs and the size of the coefficients varies only by a small amount. Moreover,

Table 3 Diffuse support for democracy: full model

	1990	1997	1999	2002	2005
Intercept	2.548*** (.089)	2.197*** (.187)	2.141*** (.212)	0.350*** (.068)	2.866*** (.142)
Male	0.022 (.022)	0.038 (.039)	0.088 (.056)	-0.018 (.017)	0.023 (.039)
Age: 31 - 60	-0.013 (.024)	-0.089+ (.047)	-0.036 (.062)	0.034+ (.019)	-0.022 (.052)
Age: Over 60	-0.017 (.046)	-0.096 (.062)	0.009 (.086)	0.056* (.024)	-0.039 (.063)
Education	0.030** (.011)	0.073** (.022)	0.165*** (.027)	0.037*** (.010)	0.060** (.020)
Urban	0.005 (.025)	0.021 (.044)	0.001 (.063)	0.050* (.020)	0.025 (.042)
Orthodox	-0.031 (.035)	0.058 (.058)	-0.087 (.079)	-0.016 (.030)	-0.009 (.077)
Church attendance	-0.007 (.017)	-0.026 (.030)	-0.056 (.041)	-0.014 (.012)	-0.084* (.031)
North East	-0.112** (.040)	-0.115 (.077)	-0.262* (.105)	0.011 (.034)	0.001 (.075)
South East	-0.007 (.049)	-0.112 (.077)	-0.178+ (.104)	-0.021 (.035)	0.176* (.083)
South	-0.071 (.047)	-0.114 (.080)	-0.251* (.105)	0.000 (.034)	0.001 (.080)
South West	-0.022 (.047)	-0.164* (.083)	-0.213+ (.118)	0.027 (.035)	0.189* (.087)
West	-0.009 (.042)	-0.094 (.084)	-0.176 (.113)	0.039 (.036)	-0.084 (.084)
North West	-0.046 (.041)	-0.092 (.088)	0.071 (.109)	0.028 (.034)	0.009 (.077)
Center	-0.001 (.047)	-0.170* (.078)	-0.124 (.113)	-0.024 (.037)	-0.024 (.080)
Interest in politics	0.026+ (.014)	0.097** (.030)	0.118** (.041)	0.011 (.014)	0.075** (.029)
Vote for governing party	0.023 (.034)	0.116* (.050)	0.270* (.093)	0.032 (.022)	0.103+ (.056)
Political participation	---	0.247** (.077)	0.058 (.107)	-0.044 (.036)	0.091 (.082)
Communism was bad	0.062* (.031)	0.120** (.044)	---	0.098*** (.016)	0.114* (.050)
Interpersonal trust	0.056* (.023)	0.087+ (.048)	0.128 (.089)	0.038* (.017)	0.072 (.044)
Satisfaction with life	---	0.049+ (.028)	-0.005 (.029)	0.008 (.011)	-0.024 (.032)
Institutional trust	0.020 (.034)	0.064+ (.035)	0.021 (.044)	0.029* (.014)	0.067+ (.036)
Satisfaction with democracy	0.030 (.025)	0.104** (.034)	0.146*** (.038)	0.076*** (.010)	-0.004 (.023)
R ²	0.039	0.174	0.186	0.111	0.067
Adjusted R ²	0.027	0.156	0.171	0.103	0.056
N	1565	1000	1146	2212	1776

Notes: *** p < 0.001, ** p < 0.010, * p < 0.050, + p < 0.100. Unstandardized regression coefficients and (standard errors).
Data sources: USIA 1990, WVS 1997, WVS 1999, BOP 2002, BOP / WVS 2005.

that the attitudinal model explains roughly the same proportion of the variance in the dependent variable as the SES and region model in 1990 and 2005, it

out of all coefficients in Table 3 only five coefficients change their significance, without affecting the general interpretation of the results.

explains significantly more in 1997 and 2002, and it explains less in 1999. In order to avoid repeating the same information, I discuss the coefficients of the attitudinal variables in detail in the context of the full model and I will refer to the coefficients in the attitudinal model only when there are significant differences between Table A-7 and Table 3.

The final model, presented in Table 3, includes the demographic, the regional, and the attitudinal variables. It should be noted that the addition of the attitudinal variables to the SES and region model increases the proportion of the variance in diffuse support for democracy that is explained. Just like in the previous cases, the explanatory power of the full model is very small in 1990 (it explains only 3% of the variance), it increases until 1999, when it explains 17% of the variance, and then it decreases until 2005, when it explains only 6% of the variance.

Out of all the socio-demographic characteristics of the respondents, education is the only one that has a consistent effect on the level of diffuse support for democracy, reinforcing the conclusion that democracy is not a dividing issue for the Romanian public. Education has a significant positive effect in all years presented in Table 3, effect that is consistent with the theoretical expectation presented in the *Education – DSD hypothesis*: the more educated a person is, the higher the person's level of diffuse support for democracy. Education has the strongest effect on the dependent variable in 1990, 1999, and 2005, and it is the second strongest effect, after specific support for democracy, in 1997 and 2002.

Gender had a significant effect in the SES and region model in 1997 and 1999, but this effect disappears once the attitudinal variables are introduced in the model. Age, residence in the urban areas, and religion do not have a significant effect, but this was already the case in the simpler SES model and it is not the result of adding the regions or the attitudinal variables to the model.²⁰⁹ In the Romanian context, church attendance should be interpreted as an indicator of traditionalism which, given the history of the Romanian Orthodox Church, has the potential to decrease the level of diffuse support for democracy.²¹⁰ The coefficients for church attendance are negative in all years,

²⁰⁹ The exception here is the coefficient for religion in 1999, which was significant in the SES model, it was reduced in the SES and region model, and then it lost its significance in the final model.

²¹⁰ During the communist regime, the Romanian Orthodox Church (BOR) did not play the opposition role played by the Catholic Church in Poland but rather decided to follow the instructions received from the Communist Party. BOR did not attempt any forms of protest against the communist regime, not even when many of its churches were demolished. During the transition, BOR played a significant role in the political life of the country, especially during the first five years, as an active

but only in 2005 church attendance has a significant but very weak negative effect on the dependent variable.

Among the group of development region variables some of the coefficients are significant, but no region is significantly different from Bucharest in all years. Comparing the results of the full model to those presented in Table A-6, it can be seen that by including in the model the demographic and the attitudinal variables most of the inter-regional differences in support for democracy have been explained away (this is particularly true for 1997 and 1999). There are, however, two interesting findings. First, it should be noted that the three regions that correspond to Transylvania (West, North West, and Center) are similar to Bucharest in terms of diffuse support for democracy throughout the transition (the only exception is the coefficient for the Center region in 1997, which is significant and negative). This should not be surprising, given that Transylvania is generally perceived in Romania as being more democratic than the other historical regions.²¹¹ Second, two of the development regions (South East and South West) have a significant positive effect in 2005, indicating that the residents of these regions have a higher level of diffuse support for democracy. While this is an interesting result, it is also a puzzling one because the effect of these two regions should not be positive. In the other years included in the analysis the coefficients of these two regions were generally negative and non-significant. Moreover, the results for the two regions in section 5.2 are somewhat consistent with the results presented here. The only conclusion that I can reach at this point regarding the positive effect of the two regions is that there might be some recent developments in these regions that might account for these differences, but that I did not identify yet.

The next three variables in the model take into account the effect of different forms of political activism. The voting intention has a significant positive effect in 1997 and 1999, and a marginally significant positive effect in

agent of the governing party. During the electoral campaigns of 1990, 1992, and 1996 it was quite common to find orthodox priests who were recommending that people vote for the governing party and blamed the economic problems on the historical parties (PNTCD and PNL). Since the priest is usually the most important person in a village, these recommendations have shaped, to an extent, the views of those living in the rural areas.

²¹¹ This perception was generated in part by the history of the region: while Moldova was in the past under the influence of Russia and the Southern part of Romania was under the influence of Russia or the Ottoman Empire, Transylvania was influenced by the Austro-Hungarian Empire. Closer to the present, this perception was maintained by the fact that the 1989 revolution started in Timișoara (in the West region) and by the fact that PSD has consistently performed worse in this region compared to the rest of the country.

2005 (these results are similar to those in the attitudinal model). In the years when the country was governed by the PSD (in its different forms) the intention to vote for the governing party does not have a significant effect. If Anderson's interpretation of the effects of supporting the election winners or losers on satisfaction with different aspects of the political system is correct, then these results suggest that the supporters of PSD have a lower level of diffuse support for democracy. The variable of interest in politics has a consistent significant positive effect in the attitudinal model. In the full model the effect of this variable is reduced (probably as a result of having education among the set of independent variables), but it is still significant in 1997, 1999, and 2005: the higher the level of interest in politics, the higher the level of diffuse support for democracy. These results offer support to the *Interest – DSD* hypothesis, which argued that interest for politics should have a positive effect on diffuse support for democracy. At the same time, excepting 1997, political participation does not have a significant effect on the dependent variable. The coefficients of the variables included in this group suggest that diffuse support for democracy is primarily influenced by the cognitive involvement of the respondents rather than the more active involvement required by participation to protest activities.

The next variable in the model, negative evaluation of the communist regime, has a significant positive effect on the level of diffuse support for democracy throughout the transition, indicating that those who still use the communist regime as a reference point are more likely to support democracy if they evaluate the communist regime negatively. The result gives support to the *Communism – DSD* hypothesis and is consistent with the findings reported by Mishler and Rose (2001). Rose, Mishler and Haerpfer (1998: 207), however, argued that the effect of this variable should disappear in the long run and the Romanian case contradicts this expectation. It should also be noted that although the effect is consistent over time, it is also one of the weakest effects in all years.

The explanation for the persistence of this effect rests, again, in the political context. While politicians have stopped blaming the communist regime for the economic situation of the country (starting with 1996 they blame the previous government for this), they never stopped accusing their opponents of being communists, former communists, or of behaving like the communists. The issue of belonging to the elite of the Communist Party and the related issue of being a former collaborator of the security services have never really left the political scene in Romania. No later than 2004, during the televised debate between the two presidential candidates (Traian Băsescu, from PD, and Adrian Năstase, from PSD), Băsescu won significant points for declaring: “this country must have been cursed, if it has to choose, even today, fifteen years after the

revolution, between two former communists.”²¹² Being constantly reminded about the communist past of the politicians, the Romanian public never had a chance to stop thinking about the communist regime.

Interpersonal trust is significant or marginally significant in all years in the attitudinal model, but in the full model its effect is reduced, indicating that in the presence of the demographic variables this type of trust does not have a constant effect on the level of diffuse support for democracy. Satisfaction with life is also nonsignificant, suggesting that support for democracy is not influenced by the respondents' evaluations of their own personal life.

The last two variables in the model test the effect of other types of support on diffuse support for democracy. Trust in the state's institutions, as a generalized form of support for the structure of the system, has a very weak positive effect on diffuse support for democracy in the later part of the transition, suggesting that even if diffuse support is influenced by the support for the structure of the system, this influence is rather small. Given the low levels of trust in the state's institutions, however, it is possible that institutional trust will increase after the acceptance of Romania as a European Union member and, if the effect will still exist, then the diffuse support for democracy should be reinforced.

Satisfaction with the functioning of democracy in Romania had a significant positive effect during the middle of the transition, but this effect seems to have disappeared by 2005. The effect of this variable was the largest effect in the model in 1997 and 2002. Since satisfaction with democracy had a significant effect from 1997 to 2002, when the average level of diffuse support for democracy was lower compared to the beginning and the end of the transition, a possible interpretation is that specific support influences diffuse support only up to a certain point. Once democracy is almost generally accepted in a population, people seem to support it almost unconditionally, regardless of their specific evaluations of its functioning.

What are the main conclusions of the results presented in this section? First, it seems that democracy was adopted by the vast majority of the population as an ideal right from the beginning of the transition. Diffuse support for democracy was negatively affected by the poor performance of the CDR governance, but it recovered quickly, surviving the transition without significant losses. The percentage of people with positive attitudes towards democracy decreased from 1997 to 1999 but the loss was recovered between 1999 and 2005. If one looks at average score of support rather than at percentages, it seems the average score dropped from a high of 3.81 (on a scale from 1 to 4) in

²¹² Băsescu continued by saying that the difference between them is that Năstase has remained a communist at heart, while he had the power to change.

1990 to 3.16 in 1997 and then to 3.00 in 1999, but then the decreasing trend was reversed and it increased to 3.46 in 2005. These evolutions show some support for the *DSD change* hypothesis.

Second, while the ANOVA results indicate significant differences of support for democracy among the different population subgroups, the effects of the demographic variables disappear in most cases in the multivariate context. The education level of the respondent is the only socio-economic variable that consistently distinguishes among different levels of diffuse support for democracy, with a stronger effect during the middle of the transition, when support for democracy was decreasing. The other variable in the model that has a similar effect is an attitudinal variable: the negative evaluation of the communist regime. Interest in politics also seems to have a significant positive effect in most of the years, and specific support for democracy seems to have a significant effect only in those years when the level of diffuse support was somewhat reduced.

In terms of the strength of the effects, the two variables that have the largest effect on diffuse support for democracy are education and specific support for democracy, followed by interest in politics and negative evaluations of the communist regime.

Finally, given the high level of diffuse support for democracy, a significant question arises automatically: does this represent real support for democracy or is it partly determined by the tendency to offer the socially desirable answer to the question the respondents were asked? Is this real or declarative support? The answer to this question is offered in the next section.

Diffuse support for democratic values

The analysis in the previous section suggests that the Romanian population is characterized by quasi-unanimous diffuse support for democracy. But is this real support or is it just declarative support? When the respondents are asked if they agree with the statement that “democracy is the best system”, there is always a possibility that some of them will give the socially desirable answer instead of their own.

I start this section by presenting results based on the 2005 WVS data, indicating the level of support for a series of democratic values (tolerance and essential characteristics of democracy) that may capture more accurately the true level of diffuse support for democracy.²¹³ These analyses will show that,

²¹³ These results are based on data from the end of the transition (in 2005 Romania was already a NATO member and it was already known that it will become an EU

despite the high level of diffuse support measured by the “general” indicator used in the previous section, when people are asked about more specific democratic values they show much more variation in their attitudes. These results suggest that the analyses presented in this section are required for a more complete understanding of diffuse support for democracy.

The main analysis in this section uses as dependent variable an index composed of three measures of acceptance of political competition, freedom of expression, and the right to organize, indicating diffuse support for democratic values. After presenting the evolution of these three measures over time I focus on the differences in the level of diffuse support for democratic values among population subgroups defined by demographic variables and on differences within groups and across time. The last analyses in this section discuss the effects of demographic, regional and attitudinal variables on the dependent variable.


One set of items commonly used in the literature measures support for democracy by the acceptance / rejection of democracy and different alternatives to democracy: a military regime, a technocratic regime (in which experts, not the government, take the important decisions for Romania), and an authoritarian regime (a strong leader that does not bother with the parliament and with elections). As already presented in the previous section, nine out of ten Romanians consider that democracy is the best type of political system. When asked about a military regime, only 77% of the respondents consider it to be a bad form of government for Romania. The remaining two indicators present a rather different image: only 24% of the respondents consider that a technocratic regime would be bad and only 23% consider an autocratic regime with a strong leader to be bad. If these indicators really measure a democratic – anti-democratic attitude dimension, then the percentage of Romanians with democratic attitudes would vary from a high of 90% to a low of 25%.

It should be clear from these results that the four items do not measure the same phenomenon. I believe that the items that measure acceptance / rejection of a technocratic or authoritarian regime do not measure only democratic attitudes; they capture other attitudes as well. A positive response on the technocratic regime item could be interpreted as a positive attitude toward expert decision making, not only as a negative attitude toward government decision making. Similarly, since it is possible that respondents react to the “strong leader” component of the question instead of the “authoritarian regime” component, a positive answer on the authoritarian regime item could be interpreted not only as an anti-democratic attitude but also as an indicator of negative evaluations of the parliament and elections in Romania. While these

member). They suggest that measuring diffuse support for democracy using the “democracy is the best system” indicator might overestimate the true level of support.

two variables might show acceptance of anti-democratic regimes they could also be interpreted as measuring preference for an efficient governing act, in which the decisions are made quickly and by actors that know what they are doing.²¹⁴ These two items represent a negative vote for the Romanian political actors, suggesting that Romanians consider that the cabinet members are not experts and that the parliament is wasting time with useless debates instead of legislating.²¹⁵

Figure 4 Intolerance toward minority groups (% intolerants, 2005)



Tolerance is another indicator of democratic attitudes. Figure 4 presents the percentage of respondents (in 2005) who would not want the minority groups listed in the graph as neighbors. For five of the eight groups included in analysis (all are generally defined) the percentage of intolerants in the population does not go above 20%, indicating a relatively tolerant population. Unfortunately, the respondents do not show the same tolerance levels when asked about the other three, more specific, groups: 40% would refuse persons


²¹⁴ It is possible, of course, that some people prefer these regime types, but the general results suggest that they represent only a small fraction of the whole population.

²¹⁵ As an example, the Romanian politicians spent three months after the 2004 parliamentary elections trying to convince the former Speaker of the House, PSD's presidential candidate Adrian Năstase, that the office should go to a member of the governing coalition.

infected with AIDS as neighbors, 50% would not like to have gypsy neighbors, and this percentage increases to 60% in the case of homosexuals.

In the case of the persons infected with AIDS, the relatively high percentage of intolerants can be explained by the lack of education regarding how this disease is transmitted. The high level of intolerance toward the other two groups, however, is a clear sign of anti-democratic attitudes. Intolerance toward gypsies is a clear example of racial discrimination which could be partially explained by the fact that mass media is reinforcing negative stereotypes about this group on a daily basis. The explanation for the intolerance toward homosexuals resides in the fact that Romanians are extremely religious and consider this type of sexual preference as a sin.²¹⁶ Nevertheless, regardless of its sources, intolerance seems to characterize a high proportion of the population.

Figure 5 Essential characteristics for democracy (average score, 2005)



²¹⁶ In 2005, a total of 98% of the Romanians declared they believe in god (90%) or some sort of spirit or life force (8%), making Romania, at least according to this indicator, the most religious country in the European Union (tied with Malta), significantly more religious than Ireland, Poland, Portugal, or Italy (Special Eurobarometer 225, 2005: 9).

In Figure 5 I present the results for a third set of additional indicators: characteristics that Romanians consider to be essential for a democracy. For each of the ten characteristics the respondents were asked to grade their importance for a democracy on a scale from 1 to 10. Only four of these characteristics (free elections, equal rights for men and women, protection of civil rights and liberties, and the possibility of changing laws through referendum) could be included in a standard definition of democracy and, in all four cases, the respondents identified them correctly: the average score for three of them is higher than 9.25, and it is 8.40 for the fourth.²¹⁷

It seems, however, that Romanians define democracy in a wider sense, including in its definition characteristics that are related to the economic domain or to maintaining the order in the country. Surprisingly, the most important characteristic for a democracy is having a prosper economy, with an average score of 9.46. The existence of unemployment benefits is also considered an important characteristic of democracy (average score of 8.84). The scores for these two characteristics suggest that Romanians have a strong preference for social democracy. Even more interesting is the high average score (9.32) given to a characteristic which, normally, is completely irrelevant for a democracy: severe punishments for criminals. The scores for all these characteristics suggest that the answers to the items presented in Figure 5 were influenced by what the Romanians perceived as being important problems in the Romanian society at the time of the survey: the state of the economy and a high level of criminality.

Returning to the main analysis in this section, Figure 3 presents the evolution of three indicators that later I group in a factor score of democratic values: the first one measures agreement / disagreement with the statement that “it is good having more parties”, while the other two measure opinions about the intervention of the state in the activity of mass media and in the activity of political parties. All three are indicators of democratic values: political competition, freedom of expression, and the right to organize. The results show that in 1995 (the first year for which data are available) less than half of the Romanians considered that having a multi-party system is a good thing for Romania, and also less than half rejected the intervention of the state in the activities of mass media and political parties. The percentage of respondents

²¹⁷ By standard definition of democracy I understand a procedural definition of democracy that sees democracy as a form of organization of the political system. According to such a definition the characteristics of the economic system should not be included in the definition of democracy. The most important measures of democracy used in democracy research (the Freedom House index, the Polity index, and the Vanhanen index) are all based on such a procedural definition of democracy.

with democratic attitudes increased over time in all three cases, so that by 2003 – 2004, the last years included in analysis, 82% support a multi-party system, 74% reject state intervention in the activities of mass media, and 58% reject state intervention in the activities of political parties.

The increase in the support for a multi-party system seems to follow the evolution of the political parties over time. Although Romania never had as many political parties with seats in the parliament as other post-communist countries (e.g. Poland), during the first part of the transition there still was an inflation of parties which could be most easily observed during the electoral years.²¹⁸ As many of these parties have disappeared over time, and as the number of significant parties has reduced, it seems that the Romanian public became more attached to the idea of a multi-party system. The issue of mass media independence has always been a problematic one. PSD, in its different forms, has always tried to control mass media, from more direct forms at the beginning of the transition (replacing the leadership of the public TV and radio stations with PSD supporters) to more subtle ones later (directing the state's advertising campaigns only to those mass media organizations that had a positive outlook on the government activities and canceling or rescheduling the debts of these organizations to the state budget).²¹⁹ As the data in Figure 3 show, the people seem to have reacted to this issue, the number of respondents rejecting the state intervention in mass media increasing from 47% in 1995 to 74% in 2004. The October 2004 BOP survey asked the respondents how the state should intervene in the activity of the mass media. Of the 11.5% of the respondents who answered the open question, 67% said the state should control what the mass media is reporting (most of them expressing the idea that the mass media is lying and the state should force mass media to report the truth) and an additional 12% said that the state should control mass media in general, without elaborating.

For the last indicator, the percentage of people rejecting the intervention of the state in the activities of political parties has increased over time, but much slower than in the case of the other two indicators. The relatively low

²¹⁸ Considering the pre-electoral alliances as a single party, the number of parties represented in the lower house decreased from seven in 1992, to six in 1996, to five in 2000, and to four in 2004. In the current legislature almost three quarters of the seats belong to the center-left and the center-right alliances, 7% belong to the ethnic Hungarian party and 15% to the ultra-nationalist party. The remaining 18 seats are reserved for representatives of the national minorities. Excluding the parties representing national minorities, 65 parties received votes in 1992, 33 in 1996, 35 in 2000, and 24 in 2004.

²¹⁹ During the first years of the transition control over mass media was extremely important because those living in the rural areas received all their information only from the public TV and radio stations.

percentage of people recorded in 2004 is worrying because political parties are important political actors and the state should not have a significant role in their activities. When asked how the state should intervene in the activity of the political parties, 18.3% of the respondents offered an answer. 89% of them explained that state intervention is necessary because there are too many political parties, because the political parties are corrupt, they are stealing, they do not fulfill their campaign pledges, they fight too much among themselves, and their MPs do not do their job. These results suggest that the respondents' attitudes with respect to state intervention in the activities of the political parties are partly determined by their low level of trust in political parties and by their negative opinions about politicians as a group.

The trends of diffuse support for democracy and of diffuse support for democratic values shown in Figure 3 suggest that the indicator of diffuse support may be interpreted as a generalized attachment to democracy as a political system.²²⁰ By contrast, the indicators of diffuse support for democratic values seem to suggest a learning process: while people have accepted the idea of democracy, they are still learning the attitudes associated with this ideal.

The dependent variable used in the analyses presented in this section is a factor score of diffuse support for democratic values composed of the three indicators discussed above.²²¹ It should be noted that the results presented here do not cover the whole period of the transition, like in the previous section; they offer information only from 1995 to 2002, a period of time that corresponds, roughly, to the middle and the later part of the transition.²²² Table 4 presents the results of the ANOVA analyses that compare the average level of diffuse support for democratic values across groups and across time.²²³

²²⁰ That is, a strong attachment to the idea of democracy that may be almost automatic and very difficult to reverse – the typical form of diffuse support.

²²¹ In 1995 the factor explains 67% of the variance, KMO = .62, Cronbach's alpha = .74, minimum = -1.65, maximum = 1.73. In 1998: the factor explains 59% of the variance, KMO = .60, Cronbach's alpha = .64, minimum = -2.16, maximum = 1.42. In 2000: the factor explains 57% of the variance, KMO = .58, Cronbach's alpha = .61, minimum = -2.15, maximum = 1.44. In 2002: the factor explains 58% of the variance, KMO = .53, Cronbach's alpha = .62, minimum = -2.36, maximum = 1.26. The factor analyses offer a good solution for 1995 and 1998 and a moderate, but still acceptable, solution for 2000 and 2002. In all years the factor was extracted using the principal components method and the factor scores were saved using the regression method.

²²² The three measures included in the dependent variable are available only from 1995 to 2003 (except for 1997). I have selected the years to be used so that the analysis will cover as much as possible of this period of time, while allowing for some time between the measurements.

²²³ The mean differences are presented in Table A-10 in the Appendix.

The results presented in Table 4 show, just like in the case of diffuse support for democracy, significant differences among the population subgroups, with the same subgroups that support democracy also supporting democratic values. With the exception of 2000, in all other years included in analysis men show a significantly higher level of diffuse support for democratic values than women. For education and residence in urban / rural areas the differences between the average level of diffuse support for democratic values of the different population subgroups are extremely consistent over time.

In all years, those living in the urban areas have a higher average score than those living in the rural areas. The ranking of the educational groups is also very clearly determined: in all years, the higher the education of the respondents the higher their average level of diffuse support (the only exception is the comparison at the low end of the scale, between those with 4 grades or less and those with 5-8 grades). The education effect is stronger in this case than in the case of diffuse support for democracy. The three age groups show an interesting evolution of diffuse support for democratic values. In 1995 and 1998 the group of respondents over 60 has significantly lower levels of support than the other two groups. Over time, those with age between 31 and 60 maintain their level of support, but the younger respondents (under 30) become less attached to democratic values, to the extent that after 2000 their level of support for democratic values is similar to that of respondents over 60.

The differences between those that intend to vote for the governing parties and those that support the opposition parties are also significant, but they switch signs, depending on which parties are in power and which are in opposition. According to Anderson, those that support the governing parties should be more satisfied with different aspects of the political system. While this interpretation does seem to be correct at times, the results presented so far suggest that in the Romanian context this type of satisfaction is influenced not only by the support for a winning party but also by the characteristics of the party that is supported.

In Romania the effect of these characteristics is so powerful that it can actually reverse the expected relationship. Thus, supporters of PSD and its usual allies have a lower level of diffuse support for democratic values even when the parties they support are in power. Similarly, supporters of the group of parties that oppose PSD have a higher level of diffuse support for democratic values even when the parties they support are in opposition.²²⁴

²²⁴ It is perhaps telling that the parties that oppose PSD are labeled as “the opposition” even when they win the elections. This suggests again how important the communist – non-communist argument is in Romanian politics.

Table 4 Differences in average level of diffuse support for democratic values

	1995	1998	2000	2002	95 - 98	95 - 00	95 - 02	98 - 00	98 - 02	00 - 02
Men vs. women	▲	▲	x	▲	x	x	x	x	x	x
					Men	Women				
Under 30 vs. 31 - 60	x	x	▽	▽	x	x	x	x	x	x
Under 30 vs. over 61	▲	▲	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
31 - 60 vs. over 61	▲	▲	▲	▲	x	x	x	▽	▽	x
4 grades or less vs. 5 - 8 grades	▽	x	x	x	x	▽	x	▽	x	x
4 grades or less vs. 9 - 11 grades	▽	▽	▽	▽	▲	x	x	x	▽	x
4 grades or less vs. high school plus	▽	▽	▽	▽	x	x	x	x	x	x
4 grades or less vs. university plus	▽	▽	▽	▽	x	x	x	x	▲	x
5 - 8 grades vs. 9 - 11 grades	x	▽	▽	▽	x	x	▲	▲	▲	x
5 - 8 grades vs. high school plus	▽	▽	▽	▽	x	x	▲	▲	▲	x
5 - 8 grades vs. university plus	▽	▽	▽	▽	x	x	▲	▲	▲	x
9 - 11 grades vs. high school plus	▽	▽	▽	▽	x	x	▲	▲	▲	x
9 - 11 grades vs. university plus	▽	▽	▽	▽	x	x	▲	▲	▲	x
High school plus vs. university plus	▽	▽	▽	▽	x	x	▲	▲	▲	x
Urban vs. rural	▲	▲	▲	▲	x	x	x	x	▲	x
					Urban	Rural				
Orthodox vs. non-orthodox	x	x	▽	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
					Orthodox	Non-orthodox				
Vote power vs. vote opposition	▽	▲	▽	▽	▽	▽	▽	▲	▲	x
					Vote power	Vote opposition				
N	1174	1253	1775	2212						

Note: x indicates no significant differences. ▲ indicates that the first group in the compared pair has a significantly higher average score (p<.05). ▽ indicates that the first group in the compared pair has a significantly lower average score (p<.05). Data sources: COMALP 1995, BOP 1998, BOP 2000, BOP 2002.

The last three tables in this chapter present the results of a series of regression models explaining diffuse support for democratic values. The models in Table A-8 take into account only the demographic and regional variables. The SES model explains approximately a fifth of the variance in diffuse support for democratic values in 1995 and 1998, and less than 10% in 2000 and 2002. The Region model explains less variance than the SES model in all years: 7% in 1995 and 1998 and only 2% in 2000 and 2002. The addition of the region variable to the SES model increases the power of the model, but the increase is very small. Overall, the demographic and region variables explain a larger part of the variance in 1995 and 1998 and significantly less in 2000 and 2002, when diffuse support for democratic values was higher in the population.

In contrast with the results presented in Table A-6, where only education had a consistent effect on diffuse support for democracy, in the case of diffuse support for democratic values most of the demographic variables maintain their significant effects in the multivariate context as well. Education and residence in urban areas have a consistent positive effect throughout the period of time analyzed here. In both cases the effect is slightly stronger in 1995 and 1998 (when the two variables are the most important predictors in the model). These results are consistent with the related hypotheses presented in Chapter 2.

During the first half of the period of time analyzed here, men have a higher level of support for democratic values than women (the third most important effect in the model), but this effect disappears starting with 2000. Although a similar effect was found on the level of diffuse support for democracy as well, it is unclear why this effect exists. The only explanation that seems plausible is that men are more interested in politics and, as the results in will show, interest in politics is positively associated with the two dependent variables discussed here. The coefficients for the age groups show that people under 30 years are consistently less supportive of democratic values when compared to those with ages between 31 and 60 years. Starting with 2000 the effect of the age variable becomes stronger than the effect of residence in urban areas and the difference between those under 30 years and those over 61 years becomes significant as well.²²⁵ Finally, people of orthodox religion are significantly less attached to democratic values in 2000 (the least powerful effect in the model). A similar coefficient was found in the case of diffuse support for democracy in 1999, suggesting that religion does have an effect on support for democracy, but this effect is very weak.

The results of the SES model suggest that while democracy was generally accepted by a large proportion of the population, there was much

²²⁵ I discuss this result in more detail later, when I present the result of the full regression model.

more disagreement within the population with respect to democratic values (this could also be seen in Figure 3) and this disagreement follow a predictable pattern.

The Region model shows that there are significant inter-regional differences in diffuse support for democratic values, but these differences are reduced over time. In 1995 residence in any of the development regions outside Bucharest was associated with lower levels of diffuse support for democratic values.²²⁶ By 1998 the West region has closed the support gap that separated it from Bucharest and by 2000 only the South East and the South West regions were significantly less democratic than Bucharest. In 2002 the South and North East regions joined again the group of regions with less support for democratic values. The fact that the more developed regions (West, North West, and Center) were the fastest to close the attitudinal difference from Bucharest seems to indicate that there may be some relationship between the economic situation of a region and its level of support for democratic values. Since I do not have relevant regional data I cannot test this conclusion, but it seems a plausible relationship.

The SES and region model shows that the demographic variables maintain their effect even after the effect of development region is taken into account. In 1995 and 1998 the region variables continue to have significant, although reduced, effects on diffuse support for democratic values even in the presence of demographic variables. In 2000 and 2002, however, most of the inter-regional differences are explained away by the demographic variables and only the South West and the South East regions continue having significant effects. In all years education has the strongest effect, followed by the effects of the development region variables. The order of the remaining variables with significant effects (gender, age, and residence in urban areas) in terms of the strength of their effects varies over time.

The attitudinal model in Table A-9 includes three groups of variables: political participation variables, evaluative variables, and trust variables. Table A-11 in the appendix presents the correlation coefficients between diffuse support for democratic values and the attitudinal variables used in this model. The average of these correlations starts at a relatively modest .174 in 1995 and then it decreases constantly to .068 in 2002. The proportion of variance explained by the attitudinal model is similar to that explained by the SES and region model: almost a fifth in 1995 and 1998 and significantly less in 2000 (7%)

²²⁶ The last two models in Table A-8 show that the coefficients of the development region variables are reduced by the addition of demographic variables in the regression model, but they generally maintain their significance, suggesting that the effect of the region variables is not determined by regional differences in degree of urbanization.

and 2002 (4%). Since this model is presented primarily for comparison purposes, I will refer to its results later, when I discuss the results of the full model.

The full model in Table 5 brings together the demographic variables, the development region variables, and the attitudinal variables. The multiple determination coefficients show that the model performed better during the first half of the period I analyze (when it explained over a quarter of the variance in the dependent variable). As the level of diffuse support for democratic values increased, however, the variance explained by the model decreased significantly. Comparing the five regression models presented in this section it can be seen that each of the three main groups of variables brings its unique contribution to explaining diffuse support for democratic values²²⁷. The comparison between the factors that affect diffuse support for democratic values and those that affect diffuse support for democracy (see Table 3) indicates both similarities and several significant differences between the two models.

Gender, which had a significant effect in the SES and region models in both cases, loses its significance in the full models, when the attitudinal variables are taken into account. While age generally did not have a significant effect on diffuse support for democracy, in the case of democratic values age does seem to have a significant effect in 2000 and 2002.

Unfortunately, the effect is positive, suggesting that respondents under 30 years support democratic values to a lesser extent than those over 31 years, a conclusion that contradicts the *Age – DSDval* hypothesis. A partial explanation for this might be given by the fact that in 2000 and 2002 this group is composed of people that were in their teens at the time of the revolution, making them too young to remember the negative aspects of communism that older people had experienced first-hand. An example that supports this interpretation is given by the 2000 presidential elections, when young people voted in a high proportion for the ultra-nationalist candidate Corneliu Vadim Tudor, sending him into the second round.²²⁸ There are also some indications that young people tend to be less interested in the political aspects of the Romanian society.

²²⁷ The coefficients are generally smaller in the full model compared to the coefficients in the simpler models, suggesting that some effects are mediated by other variables in the full model. However, most of the variables that were significant in the simpler models are also significant in the full model, offering some support for the argument presented above.

²²⁸ This provoked quite a shock in the Romanian society, especially after some of the young voters explained their choice by saying that they voted for Corneliu Vadim Tudor as a joke.

Table 5 Diffuse support for democratic values: full model

	1995	1998	2000	2002
Intercept	0.162 (.211)	-0.411 (.258)	-0.567** (.195)	-0.401* (.174)
Male	0.189*** (.054)	0.097+ (.057)	-0.006 (.048)	0.066 (.045)
Age: 31 - 60	0.105 (.065)	0.123+ (.063)	0.233*** (.062)	0.210*** (.055)
Age: over 60	-0.023 (.083)	0.067 (.082)	0.271*** (.075)	0.260*** (.071)
Education	0.147*** (.025)	0.187*** (.028)	0.154*** (.024)	0.185*** (.024)
Urban	0.153** (.057)	0.228*** (.062)	0.219*** (.056)	0.154** (.048)
Orthodox	-0.101 (.075)	-0.102 (.090)	-0.129 (.095)	-0.024 (.070)
Church attendance	-0.026 (.048)	-0.111 (.073)	-0.057 (.037)	-0.063+ (.033)
North East	-0.238* (.108)	-0.302** (.106)	0.122 (.090)	-0.007 (.084)
South East	-0.496*** (.109)	-0.279* (.109)	-0.030 (.100)	-0.220* (.088)
South	-0.510*** (.107)	-0.232* (.111)	0.071 (.094)	0.034 (.085)
South West	-0.554*** (.116)	-0.377** (.123)	-0.237* (.109)	0.041 (.092)
West	-0.348** (.115)	-0.002 (.126)	-0.010 (.112)	0.096 (.096)
North West	-0.461*** (.118)	-0.342** (.118)	-0.004 (.101)	0.050 (.090)
Center	-0.375*** (.111)	-0.288* (.120)	-0.042 (.100)	0.037 (.090)
Interest in politics	0.085** (.031)	0.179*** (.036)	0.134*** (.035)	-0.026 (.040)
Vote for governing party	-0.192** (.061)	0.028 (.058)	-0.062 (.066)	0.040 (.064)
Political participation	---	0.136 (.107)	---	0.003 (.092)
Communism was bad	0.339*** (.056)	0.335*** (.065)	0.233*** (.053)	0.135** (.049)
Interpersonal trust	0.289*** (.062)	-0.074 (.085)	0.140** (.051)	0.084+ (.044)
Satisfaction with life	-0.035 (.035)	0.082* (.038)	0.068+ (.036)	0.016 (.030)
Trust in state institutions	-0.238*** (.048)	-0.094+ (.049)	-0.127** (.045)	-0.177*** (.041)
R ²	0.282	0.289	0.143	0.110
Adjusted R ²	0.270	0.277	0.133	0.101
N	1174	1253	1775	2212

Notes: *** p < 0.001, ** p < 0.010, * p < 0.050, + p < 0.100. Unstandardized regression coefficients and (standard errors).

Data sources: Data sources: COMALP 1995, BOP 1998, BOP 2000, BOP 2002.

A 2004 survey of young people from the seven largest cities in Romania offered some disturbing results regarding the values of the young people.²²⁹ They tend to exhibit high levels of intolerance toward homosexuals (45% of the respondents would not allow homosexuals to live in the respondent's city) and gypsies (the percentage in this case is 34%). Only 22% of the respondents are interested in politics, because they feel marginalized and consider that politicians are unprofessional and work only for their own interests. Since the sample was composed only of young people from the seven largest cities, these averages should be significantly less democratic for the whole population of young persons, presenting the image of an age group that is significantly less attached to democratic values than the rest of the population.

Education has a consistent positive effect, similar to the one identified in Table 3. Residence in the urban area has a significant and consistent positive effect on this dependent variable, offering some support for the *Residence – DSDval* hypothesis. The two religion variables in the model do not have a significant effect in the full model.

The dummy variables for development region also have a more structured effect than in the case of diffuse support for democracy. In 1995 and 1998 residence in any development region outside Bucharest (with the exception of the West region, the most developed region after Bucharest, in 1998) indicates a significantly lower level of diffuse support for democratic values. This effect, however, disappears almost completely in 2000 and 2002, suggesting that the rest of the country managed to close the gap with Bucharest. The corresponding coefficients for urban residence and development regions in the models presented in Table A-8 show that the effects of these variables in the full model are not strongly affected by inter-regional differences in urbanization: although the effects are reduced in the full model, most of them remain significant. Moreover, while the percentage of people living in urban areas is relatively constant over time, the effects of the development region variables change significantly over time.

Moving on to the attitudinal variables, it can be seen that their effects are significantly smaller when the demographic and the regional variables are included in the model. Out of the three variables indicating political involvement, interest in politics seems to be the most important, having a significant positive effect in all years with the exception of 2002. Interest in politics had a similar positive effect on diffuse support for democracy as well.

²²⁹ The survey was sponsored by the British Council and the Gallup Organization – Romania. The sample included 1004 respondents between 15 and 35 years old, from București, Brașov, Cluj, Constanța, Iași, Sibiu, and Timișoara. Similar findings, based on 2010 data, have been reported in Tufiș (2010b).

While the voting intention had a significant effect on diffuse support for democracy during the middle of the transition, diffuse support for democratic values is influenced by this variable only in 1995, showing again that supporters of PSD are less supportive of democracy. Just like in the case of the previous dependent variable, political participation has no significant effect.²³⁰

Evaluations of the communist regime play a significant role in determining the level of diffuse support for democratic values, but the effect of this variable is reduced when the demographic and regional variables are included in the model and it seems to decrease over time. Overall, however, respondents that have a negative opinion about communism tend to have a higher level of support for democratic values, an effect that is similar to the one identified in Table 3. Interpersonal trust has a significant positive effect in 1995 and 2000 and its effect on diffuse support for democratic values is stronger than the effect on diffuse support for democracy. It is possible that the stronger effect identified here is influenced in part by the items that compose the dependent variable.

Finally, if in Table 3 trust in the state's institutions had no significant effect, in here this variable has a significant negative effect, suggesting that those with lower levels of institutional trust have a higher level of diffuse support for democratic values. From a theoretical perspective, one would expect this effect to be positive. The direction of this effect suggests that institutional trust is a mediating variable that is probably a component of an attitudinal complex that relates distrust in the institutions of the state to democratic attitudes. High levels of criticism for the state's institutions are not a sign of refusing the structure of the political system, but rather a sign of dissatisfaction with the way these institutions act, because they do not comply with the standards for democratic institutions. From this perspective, the sign of this effect does not contradict the theory; it is the classical theory that does not fit the reality of a country in transition to democracy.²³¹

Looking at the size of the coefficients, education has the most powerful effect on diffuse support for democratic values in all years. When significant, trust in the state's institutions also has a strong effect, similar in size to the effect of education. The development region variables have strong effects in 1995 and 1998 (in 1995 the effects of some of the regions are similar in size to the effect of education). In 2000 and 2002 the effects of development region are

²³⁰ In 1998 and 2002 I also estimated models without the political participation variable and I compared their results to those of the full model. The coefficients remain practically the same in all models: they change only after the second digit and they keep their sign and significance levels.

²³¹ Chapter 6 analyzes these issues in a more detailed and structured manner.

weaker, similar in size to the effects of age or residence in urban areas. The other variables with significant coefficients have effects that are more or less similar in size.

The main conclusion for the results presented in Table 5 is that diffuse support for democratic values is significantly influenced by education and evaluations of the communist regime, just like in the case of diffuse support for democracy. In this case, however, additional factors have significant effects: residential area and trust in state's institutions (throughout the period of time analyzed here), age (starting with 2000), and development region (until 1998), partly because the democratic values analyzed here do not enjoy the support of the vast majority of the population as in the case of democracy as a political system.

Summary

Before moving to Chapter 5, which analyzes diffuse support for market economy and for market economic values, I briefly summarize the most important findings presented in this chapter.

The Romanian population is characterized by very high levels of diffuse support for democracy as a political system throughout the transition. At the same time, additional analyses show that diffuse support for democracy measured using multiple indicators of democratic values is lower, but it is increasing over time, suggesting a possible learning effect. The results presented in Figure 3 show that, even if at the beginning of the transition diffuse support for democracy may have been the result of inverse legitimation (although Sztompka's interpretation in terms of a cultural shock seems more plausible), by the end of the transition we can talk about 'real' diffuse support.

The ANOVA results show that different population subgroups are characterized by different levels of diffuse support for democracy and for democratic values. The most important differences appear among groups defined by gender, age, education, and residential area. Most of these effects continue to exist in the multivariate context as well, especially for diffuse support for democratic values.

Education, evaluations of the communist regime, and interest in politics are the variables that have a consistent significant effect on both dependent variables. In addition to these variables, diffuse support for democratic values is also consistently influenced by residential area, age (towards the end of the transition), and by development region (during the middle of the transition).

5. Diffuse support for the principles of the economic system

This chapter continues the analysis of the previous chapter, focusing on diffuse support for the principles of the economic system: market economy and market economy values. Since the variables that I use in this chapter are indicators of diffuse support, then their evolution over time should follow the same pattern as in the case of diffuse support for democracy: as people experience market economy we should observe an increase in the level of diffuse support, up to a certain moment, after which diffuse support should remain stable and not exhibit significant variation over short periods of time. As I show in the first section of this chapter, diffuse support for market economy follows the expected pattern, increasing from 1991 to 2001. Unfortunately, since this indicator is not available in the surveys I use after 2001, I cannot prove that the level of diffuse support for market economy remains constant after 2001. The evolution of the economy, however, as well as additional analyses presented later in the chapter, suggest that this is the most likely outcome.


The results presented in the first section also suggest that people have different views on what market economy should be. In the second section of the chapter I discuss two different models of market economy: the liberal model and the social democratic model. While support for the liberal model is slowly increasing over time, support for the social democratic model shows significant more variation over time. In addition to their distinct evolution over time, the two models of market economy have different determinants, the most important difference being that while the social democratic model is strongly affected by evaluations of the state of the economy, the liberal model is immune from such influences.

Finally, in the last section of the chapter I use diffuse support for democracy and diffuse support for the liberal model of market economy to create a typology of support for the new political and economic system which divides the population into four groups (Conformists / Activists, Economic Losers, Authoritarians, and Nostalgics) and I follow the evolution of these groups over time.

The communist regime left behind an economy on the verge of collapse, with an oversized agricultural sector and an unbalanced industrial sector. In addition to the poor state of the economy, throughout the 1980s the population

suffered from a chronic lack of even the most basic goods, as a direct result of Ceaușescu's plan of repaying in full Romania's international debts (in April 1989 Romania announced it has achieved its goal of repaying all its debts, becoming a "truly independent" country).²³²

Figure 6 GDP annual growth (%)



Data source: World Bank (n.d.).


These initial conditions have made the transition to market economy an even more difficult task than the transition to democracy. Faced with the task of

²³² During the last years of the 1980s, bread, butter, milk, cheese, sugar, and cooking oil were rationed. Buying meat required several hours of waiting in line (the government tried to offer a scientific explanation for the food shortage by devising a national plan of rational alimentation). Other goods were distributed based on waiting lists (the wait ranged between several months for a refrigerator or a color TV set and several years for a phone landline or a car). In order to increase the electricity available for production use, electricity for population use was also rationed, leading to the implementation of a system of planned daily blackouts. The same was true for heating during the cold season (Ceaușescu was reported as saying "If they are cold they should put some more clothes on"). Moreover, despite the severe economic crisis, many resources were diverted from the population in order to complete some of Ceaușescu's megalomaniacal projects (the most important among them were the People's House, which became the second largest administrative building in the world and required demolishing 20%-25% of the historic Bucharest, and the Bucharest – Danube – Black Sea canals).

reforming the economic system, the first post-communist government opted for a series of gradual reforms, trying to minimize the negative effects of the transition for the population. Unfortunately, this strategy proved to be a mistake, because the reforms the government hesitated to implement had to be implemented eventually, resulting in a prolonged transition to market economy.²³³

As the indicators presented in the first three figures indicate, Romania entered a long period of economic decline that increased the costs of the economic transition for a large part of the population. GDP had a significant negative growth during the first three years of the transition, and it took Romania another nine years to return to the level registered at the beginning of the transition: it was only in 2002 that GDP per capita returned to the 1990 level.²³⁴ After the first year of transition, when the government controlled the prices to a significant extent, inflation got out of control and the next three years were characterized by hyper-inflation.


Figure 7 Annual inflation, GDP deflator (%)



Data source: World Bank (n. d.).

²³³ The debate between advocates of shock therapy and advocates of gradualism (regarding economic reforms) was one of the most important policy debates in Romania at the beginning of the transition. For a detailed discussion of the two approaches, see Roland (2004) who shows that a theory of transition was absent before the fall of communism.

²³⁴ By comparison, GDP per capita in Poland, who implemented the radical reform plan proposed by Balcerowicz, returned to the 1990 level in 1995.

Figure 8 Unemployment (% of total labor force)

Data source: World Bank (n. d.).

In addition to the story of economic decline that was, more or less, common to all post-communist countries in transition, the graphs presented above tell another, more interesting, story. They clearly show two distinct stages during the economic transition. During the first years of the transition, under international pressure, the PSD-led government halfheartedly implemented a series of reforms, but it never managed to complete the transition. In its 1998 assessment of Romania, OECD concluded: “while social concerns were understandable, this strategy was ill-conceived and failed to produce sustainable gains in either economic or social conditions. Indeed, given the experiences of the last seven years, the costs of a gradual strategy have probably been higher than if a bolder approach in structural transformation had been adopted at the outset” (OECD, 1998). A similar warning was issued by OECD in 1993, but the government chose to ignore it. The hesitations in implementing a full reform have led to a current account and exchange rate crisis at the end of 1995. Moreover, in an attempt to increase its chances in the upcoming 1996 elections, the government tried to “bribe” voters so that between 1995 and 1996 the budget deficit doubled. 1996 was also the year when IMF and the World Bank suspended their financial assistance to Romania because of the delays in implementing the reforms.

The 1996 elections were won by the Democratic Convention “because of the widespread perception that the so-called democratic opposition had the political will and competence to engage in serious reform” (Tismăneanu and Kligman, 2001). In order to receive the much needed assistance from the IMF and the World Bank, the new government promised to implement a new package of macroeconomic and institutional reforms, which led to a new shock for the Romanian economy. While these reforms have impressed the international agencies (according to OECD, “the speed and scope of the reform package are impressive, even in comparison with other shock therapies adopted in transition countries”) they have imposed additional transition costs on a population that was already trying to recover from the first transitional recession.

Unfortunately, the governing coalition was able only to start the reforms; finishing them proved to be more difficult. Social pressures, resistance to change, intra-coalition fights have all contributed to the failure of the economic program of the CDR government and, in doing so, have paved the way for CDR’s defeat in the 2000 elections. The performance of the CDR government is also responsible for the decrease in the level of diffuse support for democracy discussed in the previous chapter. The 2000 elections returned PSD to power, mainly as a result of popular discontent with the state of the economy. “The irony of the November elections in Romania was that the economic analyses and indicators issued during the months leading up to the vote suggested that the country was starting to emerge from the deep, three-year recession that had coincided with the rule of the centrist coalition” (Aligică, 2001). In retrospect, it seems that, despite the fact that the reform program implemented by CDR was not completely successful, it managed to put Romania back on the track to complete the economic transition.


When PSD returned to power in 2000, Romania’s position in the international context was different from the one at the end of the Social Democrats’ previous term, especially with respect to Romania’s negotiations for becoming an EU member. As a result of this, PSD was forced (despite some opposition from inside the party itself) to continue the reforms initiated by CDR. Overall, regardless of the party in power, the first ten years of transition were characterized by delays in implementing the required reforms, leading to a prolonged economic transition and increased transition costs for the Romanian population.²³⁵

²³⁵ These delays were determined by initial conditions, mistakes made in the design and the implementation of the reform programs, social pressures, and the confrontational style that characterized Romania’s politics until 1996. For a detailed discussion of the problems of economic transition in Romania, see Pop (2006).

Diffuse support for market economy

I start this section by analyzing the evolution of diffuse support for market economy over time. Since the 1990 data show an unusually high level of support for market economy, I also present additional results from that year, results that will show that the high level of support was based in a large part on the enthusiasm generated by the fall of the communist regime rather than on a real belief that market economy is a good system. I continue the discussion by analyzing the level of diffuse support for market economy within different population subgroups and over time. Last, I present a series of regression analyses indicating the effects of demographic, regional, and attitudinal variables on the dependent variable.

Figure 9 Diffuse support for market economy (% positive support)



In Figure 9 I present the evolution of diffuse support for market economy between 1990 and 2001.²³⁶ In April 1990, only four months after the fall of communism, 96% of the respondents were supporting market economy.

²³⁶ Diffuse support for market economy was measured using the “It is good having a market economy” item, measured on a four-point scale (strong agreement, agreement, disagreement, strong disagreement) in 1990, 1998, 1999, and 2001, and

In the same survey democracy was supported by ‘only’ 90% of the population. This is an unusually large level of support which I believe is not offering an adequate measure for support for market economy at that particular point in time. The unanimity of support at the beginning of the transition can be explained by taking into account the dire economic situation during the 1980s and the severe shortage of basic foodstuffs discussed above. Nothing could have eroded the support for communism (if there still was any towards the end of the 1980s) as much as the decision to famish the population in order to pay Romania’s external debt.²³⁷ During the first months of 1990, the post-communist government went to great lengths to ensure enough food for everyone by stopping all previously planned food exports, by importing food, and, most importantly, by controlling the prices. Enjoying a large variety of aliments at affordable prices the population could not help but feeling that having a market economy is indeed a good thing.²³⁸

Other indicators from the same survey suggest, however, that the answers to the question of support for market economy were those of a euphoric population and not based on a complete understanding of what market economy was.

Figure 10 shows the expectations people had in 1990 about the state of the economy, unemployment, and prices during the next year. Despite the fact that 51% of the respondents believed unemployment would increase and 73% believed prices would also increase, when evaluating the economy as a whole, 80% of the respondents expected the economy to improve. These results could indicate a high degree of inconsistency in the evaluation of the state of the

on a two-point scale (yes, no) in the other years. I collapsed the four-point scale into a two-point scale (agreement, disagreement).

²³⁷ As a result of this policy, the average caloric intake decreased 10% during the 1980s, from 3,259 calories per day in 1980 to 2,949 calories per day in 1989 (Demekas and Khan, 1991: 15). The antipathy generated by this policy could be observed during the 1989 revolution, when one of the most popular slogans was “This Christmas we took our ration of freedom.”

²³⁸ An anecdotal example might explain its attractiveness. By the end of the 1980s one could buy whole chickens without waiting too much in line. They were sold two in a bag and the whole bag used to weigh not more than two pounds. In addition to their size, they also suffered from a color problem: most of them had a bluish-gray tint. People used to call them, affectively, “the Petreuş Brothers” (after two popular folk singers). After 1989, Romanians were shocked to find out in stores chicken thighs imported from USA that weighed as much as a whole communist-era chicken (they were so shocked in fact, that even after several years one could hear people in stores asking for “American thighs”).

economy, lack of knowledge about the functioning of the market economy, or an unwarranted optimism.

Figure 10 Expectations about next year's economy (1990)





Figure 11 Feelings about communism, capitalism, and social democracy (1990)



A second set of items asked about people's feelings toward communism, capitalism, and social democracy (see Figure 11). As expected, a large proportion of the respondents (85%) had negative feelings about communism. More interesting, however, are the answers to the other two questions. Capitalism was a source of positive feelings for only 46% of the respondents and of negative feelings for almost a quarter (27%). Social democracy seemed much more acceptable to the population: it generated negative feelings for only 11% of the respondents and positive for 56%. It seems that, although communism was clearly rejected, there was not yet a clear agreement about the type of economic system that should replace communism. At the beginning of the transition most people favored social democracy. There are several factors that can explain this preference. First, the communist regime has probably managed to convince a significant part of the population that capitalism was an unfair system in which the vast majority of the population is exploited by a small number of rich people (it is interesting noting that whenever the communist propaganda was criticizing the Western democracies it was referring to them as being capitalist countries, not as democracies). Second, it is possible that some people were preferring social democracy as a result of a rational decision: they were used to the free social services offered by the communist regime and did not want to lose them. Finally, the preference for social democracy may also be interpreted as partially reflecting the views of the government, especially those of Ion Iliescu.

Given the fact that Ion Iliescu was not only the president of Romania, but also the *de facto* leader of PSD (making him, probably, the most important post-communist politician in Romania), the evolution of his political and economic views played an important role during the transition. During the first months of the transition he proposed "communism with a human face" as a possible solution – basically a Romanian variant of perestroika. Faced with significant opposition to this idea (primarily because of the negative connotation associated with communism), he soon abandoned it and changed his discourse, arguing that some sort of socialism (for a while he was particularly fond of the Swedish model) would be preferable to pure capitalism. It was only after 2000 (when he was reelected as president) that he stopped proposing alternatives to market economy.²³⁹

²³⁹ Some of his later public statements, however, suggest that Iliescu still had some difficulties in fully accepting the ideals of market economy. In 2000 he declared: "this whole issue of the holy private property is a trifle", while in 2002 he added "land is not private property, it is a national resource." This last statement was remarkably similar to Ceaușescu's views on this subject: "The land belongs to the nation, to the people ... The fact that it is owned in one form or another, as so-called

Returning to the evolution of diffuse support for market economy presented in Figure 9, the data for 1991 seems to be closer to the real level of diffuse support. By 1991 the population already had the experience of three partial price liberalizations (in November 1990, April 1991, and June 1991) and of hyper-inflation. People were already paying the costs of transition and this was reflected in the fact that only 42% of the respondents were still supporting market economy. It seems, however, that these 42% were the hardcore supporters of market economy for, despite the fact that the economic situation continued to get worse, this was the lowest level of diffuse support for market economy registered throughout the transition. From this low point recorded in 1991 the level of diffuse support for market economy has increased almost constantly (the two exceptions are 1995 and 1999) so that by 2001, the last year for which data are available, 94% of the respondents believed that having a market economy was a good thing for Romania. These results contradict the theoretical expectation stated in the *DSM change* hypothesis: first, the decrease of support happened very quickly, from 1990 to 1991, not over a longer period of time and, second, the level of support did not stabilize at moderate to low levels but rather continued to increase to very high levels of support.²⁴⁰

The results also show a significant jump in support between 1996 and 1998, which cannot be explained by the evolution of the macroeconomic indicators presented in Figure 6 to Figure 8. Between 1996 and 1998 Romania experienced the second economic recession of the transition (the inflation rate jumped from 50% the previous year to 150% in 1997, unemployment increased from 6% in 1996 to 8% in 1997 and 10% in 1998, GDP per capita had negative growth in 1997 and 1998 after four years of modest positive growth). However, despite these negative changes in the Romanian economy, the percentage of people who supported market economy increased by more than 30%. Although I do not have hard data to support my interpretation, I believe that this unusual trend can be explained by political factors. The CDR government, who came into power in 1996, was a strong supporter of market economy (during the 1992 and 1996 electoral campaigns CDR accused the incumbents of not

property, does not give the user the right to ignore the general needs of the country” (cited in Georgescu 1987). See Tănase (2004: 51-53) for a very succinct and caustic description of the main stages of Iliescu’s metamorphosis as a political actor.

²⁴⁰ While a decrease in the level of support for market economy was expected at the beginning of the transition, the one observed in Figure 9 surprises both in terms of size (more than 50% of the population switched from having a positive opinion about market economy to having a negative opinion) and in terms of time (the change happened over only 18 months).

implementing the required economic reforms), and it reintroduced in the public discourse the theme of market economy and, more importantly, of the necessity of market economy for the future development of Romania. Being reminded daily that market economy is necessary, those who were still undecided about it ended up by believing that market economy is good for Romania.²⁴¹

The ANOVA results (see Table 6) compare the average level of diffuse support for market economy across different population subgroups and across time.²⁴² At the beginning of the transition men had a higher level of support for market economy, but this gender difference did not survive the transition. Among the age groups, those over 61 are significantly less supportive of market economy than the other two groups, while the difference between the young and the middle-aged respondents is significant only in 1994.

The subgroups defined by education level also exhibit consistent differences over time, with higher support for market economy coming from the more educated groups. It is worth noting that at the beginning of the transition the average level of support was significantly different among almost all groups, while toward the end of the transition significant differences remain only between the extremes of the education scale: primary versus secondary and higher education, indicating a wider acceptance of market economy.

Compared to residents of rural areas, those living in urban areas have had higher levels of diffuse support for market economy throughout the transition. The results for age, education, and residence confirm the theoretical expectation that young, highly educated people living in the urban areas were the strongest supporters of market economy, while older, less educated people from rural areas were slower to offer their support for market economy.²⁴³

²⁴¹ Perhaps “selling” the idea of market economy should be added to the small list of the CDR’s accomplishments.

²⁴² The mean differences are presented in Table A-12 in the appendix. The selection of the years to be included in analysis was subject to a series of constraints. The dependent variable was available only from 1990 to 1996 and from 1998 to 2001. I did not select 1990 because of the lack of variation on the dependent variable. In 1991 and 2001 the variable measuring evaluations of the communist regime was not available. From the remaining years I have selected two years from the beginning of the transition and two years from the second half of the transition. In both cases one was an election year and the other was a midterm year.

²⁴³ A similar finding could be observed in the case of diffuse support for democracy: the ‘modern’ group in the Romania society had more support for democracy than the ‘traditional’ group, especially during 1997-2002.

Table 6 Differences in average level of diffuse support for market economy

	1992	1994	1998	2000	92 - 94	92 - 98	92 - 00	94 - 98	94 - 00	98 - 00
Men vs. women	▲	x	x	x	x	▽	▽	▽	▽	x
Under 30 vs. 31 - 60	x	▲	x	x	▽	▽	▽	▽	▽	x
Under 30 vs. over 61	▲	▲	▲	▲	▽	▽	▽	▽	▽	x
31 - 60 vs. over 61	x	▲	▲	▲	x	▽	▽	▽	▽	x
4 grades or less vs. 5 - 8 grades	x	▽	x	x	x	▽	▽	▽	▽	x
4 grades or less vs. 9 - 11 grades	▽	▽	▽	▽	x	▽	▽	▽	▽	x
4 grades or less vs. high school plus	▽	▽	▽	▽	x	▽	▽	▽	▽	x
4 grades or less vs. university plus	▽	▽	▽	▽	▽	▽	▽	▽	▽	x
5 - 8 grades vs. 9 - 11 grades	x	x	x	▽	▽	▽	▽	▽	▽	x
5 - 8 grades vs. high school plus	▽	▽	▽	▽	▽	▽	▽	▽	▽	x
5 - 8 grades vs. university plus	▽	▽	▽	▽	▽	▽	▽	▽	▽	x
9 - 11 grades vs. high school plus	x	x	x	x	▽	▽	▽	▽	▽	x
9 - 11 grades vs. university plus	▽	▽	x	▽	▽	▽	▽	▽	▽	x
High school plus vs. university plus	▽	▽	x	x	▽	▽	▽	▽	▽	x
Urban vs. rural	▲	▲	▲	▲	▽	▽	▽	▽	▽	▽
Orthodox vs. non-orthodox	▽	▽	x	x	▽	▽	▽	▽	▽	x
Vote power vs. vote opposition	▽	▽	▲	▽	x	▽	▽	▽	▽	x
N	1512	1011	1253	1775						

Note: x indicates no significant differences. ▲ indicates that the first group in the compared pair has a significantly higher average score (p<.05). ▽ indicates that the first group in the compared pair has a significantly lower average score (p<.05). Data sources: USIA 1992, USIA 1994, BOP 1998, BOP 2000.

The last variable in the left panel of Table 6 suggests that, just like in the case of diffuse support for democracy, supporters of the democratic parties had higher levels of support for market economy when their preferred party was in power. Even more, they also had higher levels of support for market economy when their preferred party was in opposition as well.

Looking at the evolution of support within groups over time it can be seen that between 1992 and 1994 only some groups increased their level of support. With the exception of men (who, compared to women, had a higher level of diffuse support for market economy) the other groups could be considered laggards with respect to support for market economy. The groups resistant to change were older people, without a high school diploma, living in the rural areas and supporting the neo-communist parties. Between 1994 and 1998 all groups have significantly increased their level of support for market economy, while after 1998 only three groups continued to increase (urban, non-orthodox, and supporters of the opposition).

I continue this section by discussing the results of a set of logistic regressions showing the factors that affect the level of diffuse support for market economy.²⁴⁴ The first two years in these analyses (1992 and 1994) capture the effects of these variables during the first economic recession, 1998 during the second economic recession of the transition, and 2000 indicates the effects at the beginning of the period of economic recovery.

The likelihood ratio tests show that all models (except for the Region model in 1998) are well-fitted. Comparing the deviance (-2LL) statistics for the three models it can be seen that in all years the SES models perform better than

²⁴⁴ The models were estimated in SPSS using the logistic regression procedure. Since some variables are missing from the 1992 and 1994 datasets in Table A-15 and Table 7, in the years with full data I estimated additional models without the missing variables in order to check the stability of the results. In almost all cases the results remain the same (they do not change their signs, they do not change their significance level, and they present only very small changes in size). The only significant changes appear in 1992 (the coefficient for expectations about the future personal situation loses its significance when evaluations of the current personal situation is introduced in the model) and in 2000 (the coefficient for satisfaction with life loses its significance when evaluations of the current personal situation is included in the model and the effect of institutional trust disappears when satisfaction with life is included in the model). It should be noted that in the logistic regression the odds-ratios are always positive. A negative effect is indicated by an odd-ratio that is smaller than one, while a positive effect is indicated by an odd-ratio larger than one. It should be noted that the Nagelkerke R^2 coefficient is just an approximation of the OLS R^2 . The chi-square reported in the tables is a likelihood ratio test of the overall model. A significant chi-square coefficient indicates a well-fitting model.

the Region models and that the addition of the development region variables to the demographic variables increases the performance of the SES and region models. Finally, the Nagelkerke R^2 coefficients suggest that the model performs better in 1994 compared to 1992 and in 2000 compared to 1998.²⁴⁵

Among the set of demographic variables, education is the only one that has a consistent positive effect on diffuse support for market economy: controlling for the other variables in the model, the movement from one level to the next on the educational scale increases the odds of supporting market economy by 32% in 1992, by 56% in 1994, by 22% in 1998, and by 39% in 2000. Gender-based differences are visible only in 1992, when the odds of supporting market economy are 40% for men compared to women. Age has a significant negative effect on diffuse support for market economy in 1994, when it reduces the odds by approximately 40%. A negative effect is observed in 1998 as well, but only for those over 61 years. Residence in the urban areas has a strong positive effect in 1998 and 2000, doubling (on the average) the odds of supporting market economy and suggesting that the second economic recession had a stronger effect on those living in the rural areas. Unemployment has a significant negative effect, but only in 2000. It is interesting that this effect is significant only in 2000 although the unemployment rate in 1994, 1998, and 2000 was approximately the same (between 10% and 11%). This can be explained by the fact that in 2000 the unemployment benefit was smaller (96% of the minimum wage) compared to 1994 (103%) and 1998 (104%).²⁴⁶

The development region variables have significant effects on diffuse support for market economy in all years with the exception of 1998. Residence in North East, South, and North West reduced the odds of support by approximately 60% in 1994. In 1998 residence in the South East region reduced the odds of support by more than half, while residence in the Center region more than tripled the odds of support compared to Bucharest. By 2000 the Southern part of Romania (the South East, South, and South West regions) is significantly less supportive of market economy. Overall, the results of the Region models seem to reflect the differences among the regions with respect to economic development.

The SES and region model shows that when both demographic and regional variables are included in the model the coefficients of the demographic

²⁴⁵ In interpreting the Nagelkerke R^2 coefficient one should keep in mind that the variance of the dependent variable depends on its distribution. The distribution (pro / against market economy) in the four years was the following: 45% / 55% in 1992, 52% / 48% in 1994, 82% / 18% in 1998, and 90% / 10% in 2000. Thus, the dependent variable had the largest variance in 1994 and the smallest variance in 2000.

²⁴⁶ Data from National Institute of Statistics, 2005.

variables are slightly reduced but keep their significance. The interpretation of the effects of the demographic variables remains the same as in the case of the SES models. When controlling for demographic variables, the coefficients of the development region variables change significantly. First, it should be noted that the significant effects identified in the Region model in 2000 are completely explained away by the demographic variables. Second, the coefficients for the 1992 model are not changed significantly. Finally, in 1994 the effect of residence in the Center region is strengthened, and the effect of residence in the North West region becomes significant.

The attitudinal model is presented in Table A-15. The correlations between diffuse support for market economy and the attitudinal items included in the model are presented in Table A-13 in the Appendix. One of the most important findings is that diffuse support for market economy does not seem to be strongly related to these items: the average of the correlation coefficients is .110 in 1992, .143 in 1994, .084 in 1998, and .063 in 2000. This weak association is also visible in the attitudinal model, in which most of the significant effects are recorded at the beginning of the transition, while in 2000 none of the attitudinal items manages to achieve significance at the conventional level. The goodness of fit tests lead to the same conclusion: attitudinal variables had a stronger effect on diffuse support for market economy at the beginning of the transition compared to the second half of the transition. Just like in the previous chapter, I will discuss the substantive effects of the attitudinal variables in the context of the full model, referring to the results of the attitudinal model only if there are significant differences.

Moving on to the final model (see Table 7) it should be noted that while in the models explaining diffuse support for democracy the results were characterized by a certain degree of consistency, in the case of diffuse support for market economy the results do not offer such a clear picture: some of the coefficients are significant in only one or two years and, in some cases, some coefficients even change their signs.

Overall, it seems that the factors that determine the decision to support market economy or not played different roles at different moments in time, suggesting high attitudinal volatility, some disagreement between the real and the expressed opinion, or model sub-specification. The full model performs better at the beginning of the transition (but it should be remembered that in 1992 and 1994 there was significantly more variance that could be explained in the dependent variable), while in 1998 it does not do a very good job in explaining diffuse support for market economy.

Comparing the model presented here to the SES and region model it should be noted that the effects of the demographic variables are reduced in the presence of the attitudinal variables. Thus, gender and age, which had weak effects in the SES and region model, are only marginally significant in the full

Table 7 Diffuse support for market economy: full model

	1992	1994	1998	2000
Intercept	0.048*** (.682)	0.108*** (.623)	0.431 (.943)	0.456 (.737)
Gender: Male	1.281+ (.134)	1.083 (.173)	1.093 (.199)	1.219 (.183)
Age: 31 - 60	0.917 (.171)	0.700+ (.212)	0.738 (.255)	0.791 (.263)
Age: Over 60	1.039 (.213)	0.660 (.277)	0.459* (.333)	0.586+ (.321)
Education	1.239** (.074)	1.372*** (.069)	1.145 (.095)	1.388** (.110)
Residence: Urban	1.246 (.171)	1.133 (.189)	1.886** (.220)	2.338*** (.203)
Unemployed	1.277 (.603)	1.051 (.274)	0.880 (.326)	0.493** (.264)
Religion: Orthodox	0.842 (.236)	0.549* (.269)	1.692* (.260)	1.157 (.345)
Church attendance	1.025 (.091)	0.807+ (.125)	1.370 (.266)	1.394* (.145)
North East	0.543** (.234)	1.536 (.363)	0.908 (.382)	1.222 (.397)
South East	0.973 (.259)	0.739 (.325)	1.089 (.418)	0.464+ (.421)
South	0.467** (.258)	1.153 (.347)	1.592 (.409)	0.831 (.408)
South West	0.873 (.254)	1.239 (.349)	0.972 (.442)	0.428* (.396)
West	0.776 (.268)	2.003* (.337)	1.570 (.494)	2.442 (.732)
North West	0.344*** (.286)	2.428* (.356)	1.637 (.427)	0.679 (.430)
Center	1.703* (.259)	5.142*** (.395)	1.013 (.430)	1.230 (.479)
Interest in politics	1.251* (.094)	1.629*** (.124)	1.089 (.125)	0.969 (.129)
Vote for governing party	0.772 (.192)	0.652* (.202)	1.634+ (.241)	1.129 (.201)
Communism was bad	1.307 (.203)	1.602* (.211)	1.733* (.225)	1.124 (.220)
Interpersonal trust	1.833*** (.158)	1.300 (.210)	0.807 (.288)	1.129 (.201)
Current personal situation	1.247** (.076)	---	0.991 (.112)	1.133 (.117)
Future personal situation	1.379* (.120)	1.476*** (.091)	1.004 (.100)	1.000 (.093)
Satisfaction with life	---	---	1.271+ (.137)	1.268+ (.140)
Institutional trust	1.068 (.170)	1.038 (.135)	1.271 (.195)	1.440* (.173)
Nagelkerke R ²	0.194	0.308	0.137	0.175
-2LL	1845.443	1134.294	920.113	1097.433
Chi-square	237.478***	265.357***	99.603***	165.390***
N	1512	1011	1253	1775

Notes: *** p < 0.001, ** p < 0.010, * p < 0.050, + p < 0.100. Odds ratios and (standard errors of logit coefficients).
Data sources: USIA 1992, USIA 1994, BOP 1998, BOP 2000.

model, contradicting the theoretical expectations presented in the *Gender – DSM* (which stated a positive effect) and *Age – DSM* (which stated a negative effect) hypotheses. The effects of education are also reduced in this model, but education continues having a consistent significant positive effect (with the exception of 1998), offering some support in favor of the *Education – DSM* hypothesis. Even when controlling for the other variables in the model, respondents with higher levels of education had higher levels of diffuse support for market economy.

Residence in urban areas does not have a significant effect during the first economic recession, but it has a significant positive effect starting with 1998 (when it doubles the odds of supporting market economy). It seems that the two economic recessions had been especially traumatic for those living in the rural areas so that even by 2000, when the economic situation was starting to improve, they still had significantly lower levels of diffuse support for market economy. Unemployment has a significant negative effect only in 2000, which I already explained in the context of the SES and region model. Finally, the two religion variables have inconsistent effects over time. In 1994, those belonging to the orthodox church are less supportive of market economy, but in 1998 they are significantly more supportive. Similarly, church attendance has a marginally significant negative effect in 1994, no effect in 1998, and then a positive effect in 2000 (it increases the odds of supporting market economy by 40%).

By the end of the time period analyzed here, residence in a development region outside Bucharest does not change the level of diffuse support for market economy (the only exception is South West in 2000). In 1992 residence in North East and South (both less developed than the average) and residence in North West was associated with lower odds of supporting market economy, while residence in the Center region was associated with higher odds. In two of the counties included in this region (Covasna and Harghita) the ethnic Hungarians represent the majority of the population and in the other four counties they represent a significantly larger minority than in the rest of the country. Since the ethnic Hungarians have very close ties with Hungary they have experienced earlier than the rest of the population the benefits of a market economy which, I believe, explains why the coefficient for this region has a significant positive effect. In 1994, residence in West, North West, or Center regions increased the odds of support for market economy (by 2 in the West, by 2.5 in the North West, and by more than five in the Center region). It should be noted that these three regions completely overlap the historical region of Transylvania, which might explain these results.²⁴⁷

²⁴⁷ Transylvania is considered to have been influenced to a higher extent by Western values, it has a larger proportion of ethnic minorities, and it had, during the communist regime, more contacts with the economies of Hungary and Yugoslavia.

The attitudinal variables included in the model also fail to offer a clear image of the factors that influence diffuse support for market economy. The most interesting findings in this case are actually the ‘non-findings’. As indicated in the previous chapter, voting intention for the governing party had a significant positive effect on diffuse support for democracy when the CDR-led coalition was in power. In this case, however, voting intention has a significant effect only in 1994, despite the fact that the Romanian political parties had very distinct positions with respect to the reforms that were needed for the Romanian economy and with respect to how these reforms should be implemented.²⁴⁸

Interest in politics had a significant positive effect in all years in the attitudinal model. After controlling for demographic and regional variables, the effect of this variable is reduced but it still remains significant at the beginning of the transition, suggesting that the respondents who were better informed about the economic situation of the country were more likely to support market economy. The negative evaluation of the communist regime has a significant positive effect, but only in 1994 and 1998. The comparison of these effects to the consistent positive effects identified in Table 3 leads to the conclusion that when people think about the former communist regime they probably evaluate it primarily in political terms rather than in economic terms.

The coefficients for the three evaluation variables included in the model represent the most important finding of this model. Evaluations of the personal situation (either current or future) have a significant positive effect at the beginning of the transition but their effect disappears by 1998. The third evaluation variable, satisfaction with life, fails to achieve significance. These results show that at the beginning of the transition, when the population was divided with respect to market economy, diffuse support for market economy was influenced by how people evaluated the state of the economy. In the second half of the transition, however, these influences disappeared, suggesting that the attachment to market economy was more stable than at the beginning of the transition. This conclusion is reinforced by the fact that many variables that had significant effects in 1992 and 1994 are not significant later.

Looking at the strength of the effects, education has the strongest effect in 1992 (when the odds of support are multiplied by 2.36) and in 2000 (when the odds of support are multiplied by 3.73). In 1994 the effects of education is surpassed by the effect of residence in the Center region, which increases the odds of supporting market economy more than five times. Residence in the

²⁴⁸ The 1998 coefficient is significant at $p < 0.100$. The 1994 and 1998 coefficients have similar effects to those identified in Table 3: support for PSD and its allies has a negative effect on diffuse support for market economy, while support for CDR and its allies has a positive effect.

urban areas has the strongest effect in 1998, and the second strongest, after education, in 2000. Finally, compared to education and with the regional variables the attitudinal variables generally have weaker effects.

What are the main conclusions of the results presented in this section? Starting with 1991 the level of diffuse support for market economy has increased almost constantly, from a low of 42% in 1991 to a high of 94% in 2001, and this despite the two economic recessions the Romanian population had to survive, and despite the fact that it was only in 2002 that the Romania economy managed to recover the ground it lost during the first years of transition.

In the context of the full model, none of the demographic variables has a consistent effect throughout the transition. The most important effects are recorded for education and for residence in the urban areas. The coefficients for variables of evaluation (satisfaction with life, current personal situation, and future personal situation) are significant only at the beginning of the transition (1992 and 1994), but not later. Since by 1998 already more than 80% of the respondents were supporting market economy, these results suggest that evaluations play a significant role only when the level of diffuse support for market economy is not very high in the population.²⁴⁹ Once a certain threshold has been reached, it seems that diffuse support has the ability to self-sustain, and that respondents' evaluations of the state of the economy do not manage to change their attachment to the idea of market economy. The remaining results presented here do not offer a very clear image of the factors that affect diffuse support for market economy. While this situation could be explained in different ways, I believe it is determined primarily by the fact that the variable used to measure diffuse support for market economy asks the respondents about market economy in general, without explaining what market economy is. As I will show in the next section, people have at least two main interpretations of market economy (some define market economy in liberal terms, while others think of it in social-democratic terms) and each of these interpretations has different determinants. The results I present next suggest that the non-significant findings that characterized the models presented in Table 7 were determined in part by the fact that the dependent variable combines attitudes toward the liberal model of market economy with attitudes toward the social democratic model and the effects cancel each other.

²⁴⁹ A similar effect was observed in the case of the relationship between specific support for democracy and diffuse support for democracy.

Diffuse support for market economy values: liberal vs. social-democratic

The results presented in the previous section suggested that people have different attitudes towards different components of market economy. In order to capture the different interpretations of market economy, I analyze four variables that represent respondents' attitudes toward four main principles of a market economy: competition, private property, income differentiation, and responsibility for personal welfare. Two of these variables, competition and private property, represent orientations toward a liberal (classical) model of market economy, while the other two, income differentiation and responsibility for individual welfare, represent orientations toward a social-democratic model of market economy, one in which the state is actively intervening to reduce the inequalities produced by a 'pure' market economy.

I start this section by discussing the construction of the two dependent variables I use (diffuse support for the liberal model of market economy and diffuse support for the social democratic model of market economy) and by presenting the evolution of the four indicators over time. Next, I analyze the level of support for the two models within different population subgroups and how support within these groups changes over time. The rest of the section is devoted to the regression analyses indicating how support for the two models is affected by demographic, regional, and attitudinal variables.


I have recoded the two "liberal model" variables so that the minimum value (1) represents accepting a value that is opposed to this model (competition is a bad thing, state property should expand), while the maximum value (10) represents accepting a value that is consistent with the model (competition is a good thing, private property should expand). The two "social democratic model" variables are recoded so that the maximum value (10) corresponds to accepting this model (income differences should be reduced, the state should be responsible for everyone's welfare), while the minimum value (1) represents accepting a value that is inconsistent with the model (income differences should be increased, individuals should be responsible for their own welfare). In both cases, high values represent support for the liberal or for the social democratic model, while low values represent opposition to these models.

The correlation between the two indicators of the liberal model is .097 in 1992, .070 in 1999, .269 in 2002, and .412 in 2005. These correlation coefficients suggest that at the beginning of the transition respondents saw these components as almost independent of each other. Over time, however, the attitudes toward these values have become more and more consistent, suggesting a better understanding of market economy. Attitudes toward the two indicators of the social democratic model are moderately correlated throughout

the transition: .317 in 1991, .327 in 1997, .292 in 1999, and .352 in 2005. To a certain extent, this situation is consistent with respondents' previous experiences. While at the beginning of the transition competition and private property were new concepts for them, they have lived for a long time with income controls and state-provided social services (two of the main redistributive tools used in the state controlled economy).

A principal component factor analysis on the 2005 data shows that the distinction between the liberal and the social-democratic model has survived the transition: the analysis extract two factors, correlated at $-.176$. The first factor captures the attitudes toward the social-democratic model and explains 41% of the variance, while the second factor captures the attitudes toward the liberal model and explains 28% of the variance. Starting from the solution offered by the factor analysis I use in this section two dependent variables, constructed as additive scores: support for the liberal model of market economy and support for the social-democratic model of market economy.²⁵⁰

Figure 12 Diffuse support for the liberal model of market economy



²⁵⁰ I use additive scores rather than the factor scores because, in this case, the scale of the additive scores ranges from 1 to 10 and it is easier to interpret. The correlation between the two additive scores is $-.198$.


Figure 13 Diffuse support for the social democratic model of market economy

Figure 12 and Figure 13 present the evolution of the four variables discussed above over time. The two variables that create the index of support for the liberal model of market economy indicate a converging trend over time. At the beginning of the transition a very high proportion of the population was already supportive of economic competition and, although the results indicate a slight decreasing trend, at any point during the transition more than 75% of the population continued to support it. The second indicator, private vs. state property, shows a different image. Romania started the transition with an economy that was fully controlled by the state and that lacked any significant forms of private enterprise. Moreover, for several years after the beginning of the transition politicians have manipulated popular fears of the unknown represented by privatizing state-owned enterprises, delaying for a while a more widespread acceptance of the idea of privatization.

The neo-communists had several reasons for playing the fear card. First, as I have already argued, during the first years of transition the neo-communist parties had an ambivalent attitude toward market economy, hoping that the centralized economy could still be salvaged in a modified form. When FSN realized that transition to market economy was inevitable, they also realized that it would imply significant costs for the population. By delaying the privatization of state-owned enterprises they sought to sell to the public the image of a party that was trying to protect them from these costs. Second, FSN argued that the

population did not have enough funds to buy the firms from the state (which was true), suggesting that the only possible alternative would be selling them to foreigners. This added a nationalist tone to the debate on privatization, making the issue of privatization even more unattractive for certain population subgroups.²⁵¹ Finally, using the leaders of the historic parties as examples, FSN managed to link privatization to retrocession, by arguing that all the properties that were seized by the communist regime would have to be returned to their owners.²⁵² FSN claimed at the time that the leaders of the historic parties have returned to Romania to gain political power for their own interests and that the same thing would happen with the former owners of the state enterprises, who would return to Romania in order to get rich by “stealing” what was now the property of all Romanians.²⁵³

From 1990 to 1996 (when FSN was in power) support for privatization exhibited minor variations around the 40% mark.²⁵⁴ Starting with 1996 support for privatization increased, and this can be explained by the fact that the CDR government was the first post-communist government to start privatizing the state-owned enterprises (or closing those that were not profitable and could not be sold), proving to the people that privatization was not only necessary for the economic development of Romania, but it was also less harmful than FSN was suggesting.

²⁵¹ The success of this strategy is proved by the fact that one of the most popular slogans during public demonstrations and protests at the beginning of the transition was “We are not selling our country”.

²⁵² Important leaders of PNL (Radu Câmpeanu) and PNTCD (Ion Rațiu) returned immediately after the 1989 revolution to help create the historical parties. Radu Câmpeanu returned from France (where he lived since his exile in 1973) and Ion Rațiu returned from the UK (where he lived in self-exile since 1940).

²⁵³ Throughout the transition the retrocession issue has been at the front of the political agenda. In addition to being a highly contested issue, it also proved to be an expensive one. After 1989 many people whose houses had been seized during the communist regime asked for the houses to be returned to them and the courts ruled in their favor. In 1994 Ion Iliescu publicly criticized the decisions of the courts, which took their cue from the president and overruled their initial decisions. As a result of this, many cases have reached the European Court of Human Rights, who ruled in favor of the former owners and asked the Romanian state not only to return the houses, but also to pay damages for all the delays. A brief search on ECHR’s case database shows that in some cases the state had to pay more than 150,000 Euros in damages (see, for instance, Cornif v. Romania, application 42872/02, or Dobre v. Romania, application 2239/02). According to the Foreign Affairs Ministry, since 1998 there have been approximately 3,500 cases against Romania at the ECHR, 90% of them regarding retrocession issues.

²⁵⁴ The percentage in 1991 (59%) is unusually high by comparison to the surrounding years.

Figure 13 presents the evolution of the two indicators of support for the social democratic model of market economy. Overall the results indicate an increasing trend: the percentage of the population supporting the intervention of the state in the market in order to reduce the inequalities generated by the market mechanisms has increased over time. The evolution of the two indicators, however, is not monotonic, as was the evolution of the indicators of support for the liberal model, but is characterized by significant variations over relatively short periods of time.²⁵⁵ These short term fluctuations observed in the figure suggest that attitudes toward the state's involvement in economy might be influenced by economic performance.

Table 8 and Table 9 present the ANOVA results, showing the evolution of support for the two economic models across different population subgroups and across time.²⁵⁶ In the case of support for the liberal model, most of the changes over time within the population subgroups are not significant, suggesting a high level of stability of support for this type of market economy. This finding is consistent with our understanding of diffuse support as a form of support that is resistant to changes.

In the case of support for the social democratic model, most of the differences across time within population subgroups are significant. Moreover, the results show that the evolution of support within the population subgroups closely followed the evolution of support recorded within the whole population. The changes over time suggest that support for the social-democratic model were more easily influenced by the evolution of the economy. In the four years analyzed here the average level of support for the liberal model varied by only .5 points on a ten-point scale. The average level of support for the social-democratic model, by contrast, varied by as much as 2.6 points on a ten-point scale.

²⁵⁵ The data presented in Figure 12 and Figure 13 show that both support for the liberal model and support for the social democratic model increased over time. Since at the end of transition around 75% of the respondents support the liberal model and around 65% support the social democratic model, it seems that a significant proportion of the population supports both models, indicating a preference for a market economy in which the state has an active role in reducing inequalities.

²⁵⁶ The two indicators for the liberal model are available only in 1991, 1993, 1997, 1999, 2003, and 2005, while the two indicators for the social democratic model are available only in 1992, 1993, 1997, 1999, 2002, and 2005). Education was measured in years in 1993, not suitable for ANOVAs. Both analyses cover almost the whole transition period: from 1991 to 2005 in the case of support for the liberal model and from 1992 to 2005 in the case of support for the social-democratic model. Additional results (mean differences) are presented in the Appendix. See Table A-16 and Table A-17.

Table 8 Differences in average level of diffuse support for the liberal model

	1991	1997	1999	2005	91 - 97	91 - 99	91 - 05	97 - 99	97 - 05	99 - 05
Men vs. women	▲	▲	▲	▲	▽	▽	x	▽	x	▲
						Men	x	x	x	x
						Women	x	x	x	x
Under 30 vs. 31 - 60	x	x	▲	x	x	Under 30	x	▽	x	▲
Under 30 vs. over 61	▲	x	▲	▲	▽	31 - 60	x	x	x	x
31 - 60 vs. over 61	▲	▲	▲	▲	x	Over 61	x	x	x	x
4 grades or less vs. 5 - 8 grades	x	x	▽	x	x	4 grades or less	x	x	x	x
4 grades or less vs. 9 - 11 grades	▽	x	▽	▽	x	5 - 8 grades	x	▽	x	x
4 grades or less vs. high school plus	▽	▽	▽	▽	x	9 - 11 grades	x	x	x	x
4 grades or less vs. university plus	▽	▽	▽	▽	▽	High school plus	x	x	▲	▲
5 - 8 grades vs. 9 - 11 grades	x	▽	▽	▽	▽	University plus	x	x	▲	x
5 - 8 grades vs. high school plus	▽	▽	▽	▽	▽					
5 - 8 grades vs. university plus	▽	▽	▽	▽	▽					
9 - 11 grades vs. high school plus	▽	▽	▽	▽	▽					
9 - 11 grades vs. university plus	▽	▽	▽	▽	▽					
High school plus vs. university plus	▽	▽	▽	▽	▽					
Urban vs. rural	▲	▲	▲	▲	x	Urban	▽	x	x	▲
						Rural	▽	x	x	▲
Orthodox vs. non-orthodox	▽	x	x	x	▽	Orthodox	▽	x	x	▲
						Non-orthodox	x	x	x	▲
Vote power vs. vote opposition	▽	▲	▲	▲	▽	Vote power	▽	x	x	▲
						Vote opposition	▲	x	x	x
N	1000	1000	1146	1776						

Note: x indicates no significant differences. ▲ indicates that the first group in the compared pair has a significantly higher average score (p<.05). ▽ indicates that the first group in the compared pair has a significantly lower average score (p<.05). Data sources: USIA 1991, WVS 1997, WVS 1999, WVS/BOP 2005.

Table 9 Differences in average level of diffuse support for the social-democratic model

	1992	1999	2002	2005	92 - 99	92 - 02	92 - 05	99 - 02	99 - 05	02 - 05
Men vs. women	▽	▽	x	▽	▽	▲	▽	▲	x	▽
					Men					
					Women				x	▽
Under 30 vs. 31 - 60	▽	x	x	▽	▽	▲	▽	▲	x	▽
Under 30 vs. over 61	▽	▽	▽	▽	▽	▲	▽	▲	x	▽
31 - 60 vs. over 61	▽	x	▽	▽	x	▲	▽	▲	▽	▽
4 grades or less vs. 5 - 8 grades	▲	x	x	x	x	▲	▽	▲	▽	▽
4 grades or less vs. 9 - 11 grades	▲	x	▲	▲	▽	▲	▽	▲	▽	▽
4 grades or less vs. high school plus	▲	▲	▲	▲	▽	▲	▽	▲	x	▽
4 grades or less vs. university plus	▲	▲	▲	▲	▽	▲	▽	▲	x	▽
5 - 8 grades vs. 9 - 11 grades	▲	x	▲	▲	x	▲	▽	▲	x	▽
5 - 8 grades vs. high school plus	▲	▲	▲	▲		▲	▽	▲		
5 - 8 grades vs. university plus	▲	▲	▲	▲		▲	▽	▲		
9 - 11 grades vs. high school plus	x	▲	▲	▲		▲	▽	▲		
9 - 11 grades vs. university plus	▲	▲	▲	▲		▲	▽	▲		
High school plus vs. university plus	x	▲	▲	▲		▲	▽	▲		
Urban vs. rural	▽	▽	▽	▽	▽	▲	▽	▲	x	▽
					Urban					
					Rural				▽	▽
Orthodox vs. non-orthodox	▲	x	▽	x	▽	▲	▽	▲	▽	▽
					Orthodox					
					Non-orthodox				x	▽
Vote power vs. vote opposition	▲	▽	x	▽	x	▲	▽	▲	x	▽
					Vote power					
					Vote opposition				x	▽
N	1512	1146	2212	1776						

Note: x indicates no significant differences. ▲ indicates that the first group in the compared pair has a significantly higher average score (p<.05). ▽ indicates that the first group in the compared pair has a significantly lower average score (p<.05). Data sources: USIA 1992, WVS 1999, BOP 2002, WVS/BOP 2005.

Comparing the ANOVA results it is very clear that the supporters of the two models of market economy have different positions in the social structure. Men have higher levels of support for the liberal model of market economy throughout the transition, while women have higher levels of support for the social democratic model. Those over 61 years are consistently less supportive of the liberal model and more supportive of the social democratic model, which should not surprise, given that for this group the state pension is often the only source of income. Compared to those with ages between 31 and 60, the younger respondents (under 30) seem to have a higher level of support for the liberal model in 1999, and a lower level of support for the social democratic model in 1992 and 2005.

The differences based on education and on residence in the urban areas are the most consistent throughout the transition. Education increases support for the liberal model and it decreases support for the social democratic model. With the exception of those that have low levels of education (not more than 8 grades) all other educational differences are generally associated with different levels of support for the two models of market economy. Residents of urban areas support more the liberal model, while residents of the rural areas have a more positive attitude toward the social democratic model. This is, again, an expected result. After the fall of the communist regime the state controlled farms were disbanded and the land was returned to the peasants, who were left to work the land as they wished. Soon those living in the rural areas discovered that they had to pay at every stage of the process, and the prices were increasing from year to year. At the same time, the money obtained from the crops more often than not could not cover both the cost of living for one year and the costs required for working the land in the next season.

Religion has a significant effect only at the beginning of the transition, when those belonging to the orthodox church have lower levels of support for the liberal model and higher levels of support for the social democratic model. These effects disappear, however, when controlling for regional and attitudinal variables.

Voting intention also leads to significant differences in support for the two models and, just like in the cases of the other dependent variables, supporters of PSD show less support for the liberal model and more support for the social democratic model, while supporters of the 'democratic parties' are characterized by higher support for the liberal model and lower support for the social democratic model.

Overall, the liberal model is supported more by men, relatively young respondents, more educated respondents, people living in the urban areas, and supporters of the democratic parties. As Table 6 indicates, these groups also have higher levels of support for market economy in general (without making the distinction between the two types analyzed here). At the same time, support for the social democratic model is higher among women, older respondents, less educated respondents, those living in the rural areas, and supporters of the neo-

communist and extremist parties, the same groups that have lower levels of diffuse support for market economy.

Starting with Table A-19 I present a series of regression models explaining support for the two models of market economy. In all models I analyze data from only three years: 1993, during the first economic recession, 1999, during the second economic recession, and 2005, representing the end of the transition.²⁵⁷ In discussing the results of these analyses one should keep in mind the way the two dependent variables are coded. Both variables are coded so that the maximum value represents the highest level of support for the liberal and for the social-democratic model, respectively. However, support for the social-democratic model means accepting the intervention of the state in economy (to assure the individuals' welfare and to decrease income differences), which contradicts the ideals of the liberal model. As a result of this coding scheme, the independent variables should have opposing effects on the two dependent variables. Table A-19 contains the SES and region models explaining diffuse support for the liberal model of market economy. Comparing the multiple determination coefficients it can be seen that the demographic variables explain a larger proportion of the variance than the region variables. The importance of the region variables also seems to decrease over time. By adding the region variables to the SES model the only coefficient that changes significantly is the coefficient for residence in urban areas in 1999; all other coefficients are practically the same. The coefficients of the region variables, however, are significantly reduced (both in size and in significance) when controlling for the demographic variables.

Gender, education, and residence in urban areas have a consistent positive effect: men, people living in urban areas, and people with higher levels of education have a higher level of support for the liberal model of market economy.²⁵⁸ Age has a significant negative effect, but only at the beginning of the transition (in 1993). Religion also has a significant negative effect, but only at the end of the transition, in 2005. Overall, the demographic variables have

²⁵⁷ The dependent variables were also available in 1997 but I did not select this year because the independent variables missing in 1999 are also missing in 1997 and the distance between the two years is too small to add significant information.

²⁵⁸ In the 1993 dataset the education variable was measured in years of education instead of the five categories used in the other surveys. This explains the difference between the coefficients of this variable for 1993 and 2005. The corresponding coefficient for 1993 can be computed, although with some errors, by taking into account the fact that each of the five categories of the ordinal measure corresponds roughly to four years of education (the errors come from the fact that some people may repeat a grade, while others may follow some post-secondary programs that might classify them in the university plus category, although they should be included in the high school plus category).

effects that are similar to those observed in the case of diffuse support for market economy and diffuse support for democracy.

Looking at the coefficients of the development region variables when controlling for the demographic variables it can be seen that at the beginning of the transition most of the regions had lower levels of support for the liberal model of market economy. The two exceptions are the Center region, which is similar to Bucharest in all years included in the analysis, and the North East region. In 1999 and in 2005 only two regions have significant effects: North East and South, and in both cases the effect is negative in 1999 and positive in 2005. This sign change is interesting, especially because these are two of the poorest regions in Romania.

One possible explanation (but it is only a speculation at this point, because I do not have the data to test it) might be given by the changes in the patterns of temporary work emigration in these regions. Between 1990 and 1995 the emigration rate was 2.9‰ in Moldova and 1.8‰ in Muntenia, the two historical regions that correspond to the North East and South development regions. Between 1996 and 2001 the corresponding emigration rates were 5.8‰ in Moldova and 4.3‰ in Muntenia. After 2002, however, the temporary emigration rate increased more than five times, to 28.4‰ in Moldova and to 21.7‰ in Muntenia.²⁵⁹ Usually those who choose the temporary emigration path work for several years in more developed countries (the preferred destinations are Italy, for those who emigrate from Moldova, and Spain, for those who emigrate from Muntenia) and then return home with the money they managed to save. Although most of those who return use the money to build new homes and buy different goods, a significant proportion also use the money (or intend) to start a business. Anecdotal evidence from these regions also suggests that after working for several years in an established market economy people also adopt some of the values associated with this ideology, especially in terms of work ethic and in terms of attitudes towards starting one's own business.

Table A-20 presents the SES and region models explaining support for the social democratic model of market economy. The R^2 coefficients show that the models explain less variance in support for the social democratic model than in the case of support for the liberal model. Comparing the SES and region model to the SES model and to the Region model it can also be seen that most of the coefficients of the demographic variables do not change when controlling for development region (with the exception of urban residence in 1993 and gender in 2005), while most of the effects of development region variables are explained away when controlling for the demographic variables.

The only variable with a consistent effect throughout the transition in all models is education: the higher the education, the lower the level of support for

²⁵⁹ Data source: Sandu (2006: 28).

the social democratic model, an effect opposed to the one recorded in the case of support for the liberal model of market economy. Age has a significant positive effect in 1993, when people over 30 have higher levels of support for the social democratic model, and a somewhat weaker effect in 2005, when only those over 61 years old support the social democratic model more. Men offer less support to this model at the beginning of the transition, while in the other years included in analysis the effect of gender is not significant, although the coefficients are still negative. The coefficients of the region variables show that residence in the Southern and Western parts of the country was associated with higher levels of support for the social democratic model at the beginning of the transition. Later, however, these effects disappear, with only the Center region having a significant and positive effect in 1999, and the South West region having a significant and negative effect in 2005.

Overall, comparing the results in Table A-19 and Table A-20 it can be seen that the independent variables have different effects on support for the two models of market economy: education and gender have a positive effect in the case of the liberal model but negative in the case of the social democratic model. In the case of age, the direction of the effects is reversed, while urban residence has an effect only on support for the liberal model but not on support for the social democratic model. The development regions also have different effects, but in their case it can be concluded that the differences between Bucharest and the other development regions disappear over time in most cases.

Table A-21 presents the attitudinal model explaining support for the liberal model and Table A-22 presents the attitudinal model explaining support for the social democratic model.²⁶⁰ The correlations between support for the liberal model, support for the social democratic model, and the attitudinal variables are available in Table A-18 in the appendix. At the beginning of the transition the two dependent variables have a strong negative correlation ($r = -.481$). At the end of the transition this correlation is more than halved ($r = -.198$), suggesting that a differentiation in the attitudes toward the two models has occurred over time. The average correlation between the dependent variables and the attitudinal variables is very modest (about .130).

²⁶⁰ Since the 1993 and 1999 datasets do not include the variables measuring evaluations of the current / future personal situation and specific support for market economy, I present two models for the 2005 data: one without the variables that are missing in the previous years and one with all the variables included in the model. Comparing the two models it can be seen that when these evaluation variables are present most of the coefficients change their size and keep their significance, but there are some coefficients that change their significance as well.

The multiple determination coefficients show that the attitudinal model explains less variance in support for the liberal model of market economy over time, while in the case of support for the social democratic model the percentage of explained variance increases over time. The attitudinal variables exhibit the same pattern of diverging influences on the two models of market economy that was observed in the case of the demographic and regional variables.

Table 10 presents the full model explaining diffuse support for the liberal model of market economy, while the model explaining diffuse support for the social democratic model is presented in Table 11.²⁶¹ One of the most interesting findings in these models is the evidence they offer in favor of the argument that support for the liberal model and support for the social democratic model have different determinants. The socio-economic variables suggest that the supporters of the two different models have different characteristics and that membership in these groups has changed over time.

The multiple determination coefficients in these two tables show that the percentage of variance in support for the liberal model of market economy that is explained by the full model decreases over time (from 19% in 1993 to 13% in 2005), while the percentage of explained variance in support for the social democratic model of market economy increases over time (from 12% in 1993 to 16% in 2005).

At the beginning of the transition men were not only more oriented toward the liberal model; they were also rejecting to a higher degree the social-democratic model. At the end of the transition (2005) men still support to a higher degree the liberal model, but they are not different from women in supporting the social democratic model. An alternative interpretation of these results could be that during the transition men have transformed from strong supporters to weak supporters of the liberal market. Based on the sign and significance of the coefficients in the models, different population subgroups could be ranked from strong support for the liberal model (positive coefficient for liberal and negative for social democratic) to weak support for the liberal model (positive coefficient for liberal and not significant for social democratic) to weak support for the social democratic model (non-significant coefficient for liberal and positive for social democratic) to strong support for the social democratic model (negative coefficient for liberal and positive for social democratic).

²⁶¹ Since the liberal model and the social democratic model can be interpreted as competing models and since the same years are used in both analyses, I interpret the results of both sets at the same time in order to offer a better image of the different effect of the independent variables.

Table 10 Diffuse support for the liberal model of market economy: full model

	1993	1999	2005 model 1	2005 model 2
Intercept	6.774*** (.488)	5.740*** (.520)	3.875*** (.411)	3.777*** (.433)
Male	0.361** (.122)	0.568*** (.141)	0.288** (.107)	0.289** (.107)
Age: 31 - 60	-0.378** (.144)	-0.250 (.159)	-0.007 (.132)	0.001 (.133)
Age: over 60	-0.646*** (.184)	-0.207 (.201)	0.082 (.159)	0.093 (.164)
Education	0.048*** (.011)	0.441*** (.069)	0.412*** (.050)	0.406*** (.050)
Urban	0.230+ (.139)	0.176 (.151)	0.458*** (.115)	0.450*** (.115)
Unemployed	-0.284 (.248)	-0.106 (.243)	-0.709** (.249)	-0.706** (.250)
Orthodox	0.162 (.174)	0.014 (.193)	0.075 (.164)	0.072 (.163)
Church attendance	0.051 (.103)	-0.106 (.106)	0.103 (.074)	0.100 (.074)
North East	-0.875*** (.232)	-0.472+ (.272)	0.101 (.197)	0.113 (.198)
South East	-1.027*** (.281)	-0.072 (.255)	-0.058 (.211)	-0.043 (.212)
South	-0.667** (.239)	-0.486+ (.260)	-0.125 (.208)	-0.114 (.208)
South West	-0.727** (.269)	-0.049 (.282)	0.603** (.224)	0.586** (.224)
West	-1.314*** (.297)	-0.066 (.272)	0.003 (.213)	0.003 (.214)
North West	-0.459+ (.253)	0.201 (.274)	-0.073 (.207)	-0.061 (.208)
Center	-0.374 (.253)	0.233 (.294)	0.447* (.226)	0.440+ (.228)
Interest in politics	0.433*** (.099)	0.204* (.098)	0.171* (.069)	0.168* (.070)
Vote for governing party	-0.885*** (.153)	0.413+ (.211)	0.190 (.131)	0.172 (.130)
Interpersonal trust	0.405* (.165)	0.113 (.214)	0.261* (.126)	0.240+ (.127)
Current personal situation	---	---	---	0.021 (.077)
Future personal situation	---	---	---	0.007 (.070)
Satisfaction with life	0.012 (.026)	0.069 (.052)	0.103 (.075)	0.064 (.083)
Institutional trust	-0.196* (.096)	-0.183+ (.104)	0.199* (.096)	0.155 (.100)
Satisfaction with market economy	---	---	---	0.094 (.064)
R ²	0.206	0.181	0.138	0.139
Adjusted R ²	0.192	0.167	0.128	0.128
N	1103	1146	1776	1776

Notes: *** p < 0.001, ** p < 0.010, * p < 0.050, + p < 0.100. Unstandardized regression coefficients and (standard errors). Data source: WVS 1993, WVS 1999, WVS / BOP 2005.

Table 11 Diffuse support for the social-democratic model of market economy: full model

	1993	1999	2005 model 1	2005 model 2
Intercept	4.576*** (.560)	7.822*** (.513)	9.390*** (.437)	10.422 (.457)
Male	-0.413** (.139)	-0.173 (.130)	-0.110 (.117)	-0.126 (.115)
Age: 31 - 60	0.513** (.165)	0.013 (.162)	0.224 (.151)	0.088 (.151)
Age: over 60	0.511* (.215)	-0.250 (.200)	0.455* (.185)	0.217 (.190)
Education	-0.033** (.012)	-0.357*** (.067)	-0.289*** (.053)	-0.251*** (.053)
Urban	0.062 (.157)	-0.136 (.149)	-0.196 (.130)	-0.171 (.129)
Unemployed	0.314 (.282)	0.044 (.234)	0.290 (.285)	0.198 (.282)
Orthodox	0.090 (.198)	-0.060 (.199)	0.090 (.179)	0.124 (.175)
Church attendance	-0.009 (.116)	0.137 (.104)	-0.013 (.083)	0.004 (.081)
North East	0.903*** (.270)	-0.010 (.271)	0.063 (.223)	-0.078 (.220)
South East	0.571+ (.320)	-0.221 (.253)	-0.485* (.238)	-0.572* (.234)
South	0.862** (.276)	0.283 (.256)	0.169 (.229)	0.081 (.225)
South West	0.735* (.303)	-0.338 (.281)	-0.217 (.252)	-0.167 (.248)
West	0.521 (.344)	-0.159 (.276)	0.337 (.236)	0.293 (.233)
North West	0.798** (.291)	0.383 (.279)	-0.126 (.236)	-0.253 (.234)
Center	0.229 (.283)	0.626* (.279)	-0.272 (.255)	-0.335 (.251)
Interest in politics	-0.309** (.114)	0.141 (.100)	-0.261** (.081)	-0.221** (.080)
Vote for governing party	0.814*** (.169)	-0.362* (.157)	-0.123 (.140)	-0.018 (.142)
Interpersonal trust	-0.324+ (.182)	0.358 (.246)	0.315* (.146)	0.436** (.145)
Current personal situation	---	---	---	-0.277** (.086)
Future personal situation	---	---	---	-0.229** (.081)
Satisfaction with life	-0.080** (.030)	-0.275*** (.050)	-0.705*** (.084)	-0.414*** (.091)
Institutional trust	0.304** (.108)	-0.046 (.101)	-0.122 (.105)	0.077 (.109)
Satisfaction with market economy	---	---	---	-0.291*** (.072)
R ²	0.134	0.116	0.140	0.168
Adjusted R ²	0.118	0.100	0.130	0.157
N	1103	1146	1776	1776

Notes: *** p < 0.001, ** p < 0.010, * p < 0.050, + p < 0.100. Unstandardized regression coefficients and (standard errors). Data source: WVS 1993, WVS 1999, WVS / BOP 2005.

Age had a significant effect on support for both models at the beginning of the transition: it decreased support for the liberal model and it increased support for the social democratic model. By the end of the transition the effect disappeared, so that age does not differentiate anymore between different levels of support for the two models (in the case of support for the social democratic model age had a significant positive effect in 2005 in the partial model, but this effect is explained away by the attitudinal variables).

Education, like in all models presented so far, has a significant and consistent effect: more educated respondents have higher levels of support for the liberal model and lower levels of support for the social democratic model throughout the transition. Comparing the size of the effects it can be observed that the effect of education is stronger on support for the liberal model than on support for the social democratic model. Residence in the urban areas does not change the level of support for the social democratic model, but it significantly increases the level of support for the liberal model at the end of the transition (urban residence also had a significant positive effect in 1993 in the SES and region model, but this effect disappears when the attitudinal variables are added to the model). Unemployment has a significant negative effect on support for the liberal model in 2005 (probably as a result of the fact that unemployment was generated mainly by privatizing state enterprises), but it has no effect on support for the social democratic model.²⁶² The two religion variables (religion and church attendance) fail to achieve significance in any of the models.

Overall, the effects of the socio-economic characteristics show that educated men living in urban areas are the strong supporters of the liberal model, while the social democratic model is supported primarily by poorly educated people, regardless of their gender, age, or residence.

The dummy variables indicating residence in different development regions outside Bucharest also offer interesting results. At the beginning of the transition, with the exception of the North West and the Center regions, all other regions had lower levels of support for the liberal model of market economy. Moreover, residence in all regions except Center and West was associated with higher levels of support for the social-democratic model.

²⁶² One would expect unemployed persons to be more attracted to the idea that the state should be responsible for the individuals' welfare. On the other hand, given the size of the gray economy, not all unemployed persons in Romania are really unemployed: some work illegally, without any official records, while others may be recorded as unemployed while they work in other countries (according to unofficial estimates, around two million people work outside Romania).

During the second half of the transition, however, most of these regional effects have disappeared. In 1999 the only region that has a significant effect is the Center region, which shows a higher level of support for the social democratic model. In 2005 the South West region is the only one that has a significant positive effect on support for the liberal model of market economy (the Center region comes very close to achieving significance) while support for the social democratic model is significantly lower in the South East region. The coefficients for the South East and the South West regions in 2005 are partially consistent with their effects on diffuse support for democracy (see Table 3). Residence in the South West region is associated with higher levels of diffuse support for democracy and higher levels of support for the liberal model, while residence in the South East region is associated with higher levels of diffuse support for democracy and lower levels of diffuse support for the social democratic model of market economy. At this point it is not clear why these two regions have higher levels of support for the political and economic system.

The attitudinal variables in the model show clear distinctions between the supporters of the two models of market economy. Respondents who are interested in politics have higher levels of support for the liberal model in all three years included in analysis, and lower levels of support for the social democratic model in 1993 and 2005. Since education is also included in the model, the effect of interest in politics is net of the relationship that might exist between education and interest in politics. This suggests that those that have an active interest in politics have a better chance to obtain relevant information, process it, and use it in deciding which of the two alternative models to support or oppose.

Voting intention has a significant effect on both dependent variables during the first part of the transition. In 1993, supporters of the governing parties (PSD at the time) had lower levels of support for the liberal model and higher levels of support for the social democratic model. In 1999, when the CDR was governing the country, its supporters had higher levels of support for the liberal model (the coefficient was only marginally significant however) and lower levels of support for the social democratic model. By 2005 the significant effects disappear in both cases. These results are consistent with those recorded in the case of diffuse support for democracy. The coefficients for the trust variables do not offer a very clear picture of their effects: they change signs between 1993 and 2005 and, in the case of interpersonal trust, they have a similar effect on both dependent variables.

The most interesting differences in the group of attitudinal variables are indicated by the group of evaluation variables. Support for the liberal model seems to be completely independent of how people evaluate the state of the economy: none of the coefficients for evaluations of the current personal

situation, evaluations of the future personal situation, satisfaction with life, or satisfaction with the functioning of market economy are significant in the full model.²⁶³ Support for the social democratic model, however, is strongly influenced by these evaluations: those who feel their situation worsened during the last year demand more state intervention in the economy and this demand is increased if they expect their situation to continue worsening over the next year. The generalized evaluation of the personal life has a similar effect: the more satisfied a person is with its personal life, the less likely to support the state's intervention in the economy. In addition to these effects, satisfaction with the functioning of the market economy also decreases the level of support for the social democratic model.

It should be noted, however, that three of the four evaluation variables are missing from the 1993 and 1999 datasets. Nevertheless, comparing the results of the two 2005 models (one without these variables and one with the variables included in the model), it can be seen that the coefficient of the satisfaction with life variable, although reduced by the addition of the other three evaluation variables, does not change its significance.

Looking at the size of the coefficients, education has the strongest effect on both support for the liberal model and support for the social democratic model (although with different signs) in 1999 and 2005 (with an exception listed below), with the strongest effect being recorded in the 1999 models. The region variables have the strongest effect on both dependent variables in 1993. Voting intention and interest in politics have effects of similar size (about one point on a ten-point scale) on support for both the liberal and the social democratic model in 1993. The other variables in the models have smaller effects (less than .7 points on a ten-point scale) on support for the liberal model of market economy in all years included in the analysis. In the models explaining support for the social democratic model satisfaction with life has the second strongest effect, after education, in 1999 and it is the strongest effect in 2005 (1.6 points on a ten-point scale). The other evaluation variables have effects of similar size (about one point on a ten-point scale) in 2005.

The main implication of the results presented in Table 10 and Table 11 is that the economic problems that have characterized the Romanian transition to market economy have 'forced' the people to depart from the traditional model of market economy (i.e. the liberal model, the one that was proposed by the international organizations) and demand the intervention of the state as a

²⁶³ Satisfaction with life had a significant positive effect in the attitudinal model in 2005, but this effect disappears when the demographic and the regional variables are included in the model.

form of protection against the costs of the transition. The differences in support for the two types of market economy seem to be determined by the respondents' experiences during the transition: the losers of the transition support the social-democratic model while the winners reject this model in favor of the liberal model. Since 2001, however, the Romanian economy has improved continuously, foreign investments have increased significantly, and inflation and unemployment have decreased. Moreover, by becoming a European Union member Romania has now access to a series of funds under the EU's convergence objective, which can be used to modernize the outdated and underdeveloped infrastructure.²⁶⁴ If the economic conditions will continue to improve and if these improvements will not only be recorded in macro-economic indicators but will also be felt in the Romanians' daily life then support for state intervention in the economy should decrease and Romanians should support more and more the liberal model of democracy.

Summary

What are the main conclusions after discussing the diffuse support for market economy and for its different models? Diffuse support for market economy has constantly increased throughout the transition, so that by 2001 market economy is accepted as the best form of economic system by 94% of the population. People, however, have different views on what market economy is and the type of market economy to be implemented in Romania, and measuring diffuse support for market economy without distinguishing between the different models is confounding the effects of different independent variables. I addressed this problem by identifying two visions on market economy: the liberal model of market economy, based on economic competition and private property, and the social-democratic model, which is focused on the intervention of the state in the economy as a corrective factor for the inequalities produced by the functioning of the market.

Support for the two models of market economy exhibits different trends over time. While support for the liberal model is slightly increasing over time

²⁶⁴ Romania was supposed to receive 31.5 billion euros between 2007 and 2013 from structural and cohesion funds. Unfortunately, the problems Romania had in absorbing the funds received from the European Union during the accession period (mainly because of the insufficient number of projects asking for funds and of the inadequate management of the approved projects) have plagued the structural funds as well.

without drastic changes within short periods of time, support for the social democratic model shows a more accentuated increase, together with significant variations within short periods of time. Support for the social-democratic model is strongly affected by the public's evaluations of the state of the economy, while support for the liberal model is immune to these effects.

The groups that have suffered the most during the economic transition (especially those with low levels of education and those living in the rural areas) have higher levels of support for the social-democratic model. At the same time, support for the liberal model can be interpreted in a traditionalism-modernism key: the 'vanguard' groups in the society (especially younger, more educated people living in urban areas) have higher levels of support for the liberal model of market economy.

The dual transition

I conclude this chapter by presenting an analysis that brings together diffuse support for democracy (which was analyzed in the previous chapter) and diffuse support for the liberal model of market economy as two criteria that define attitudes toward the post-communist transition in Romania.²⁶⁵ The intersection of these two dimensions divides the population into the four categories presented in Figure 1. After discussing the evolution of these four groups over time (in terms of size) I focus the discussion on the demographic characteristics that define membership in these groups and on the changes in group membership over time.

The respondents' positions on these two variables can be combined so that each respondent belongs to one of four groups: those (the Conformists and the Activists) who support both democracy and market economy (D+M+), those (the Economic Losers) who support democracy but oppose market economy (D+M-), those (the Authoritarians) who oppose democracy but support market economy (D-M+), and those (the Nostalgics) who oppose both democracy and market economy (D-M-).

The first group (D+M+) is the most consistent with the goals of the post-communist transition (it accepts both democracy and market economy), while the last (D-M-) is in total opposition to both these goals. The other two

²⁶⁵ Based on the discussion in the second section, and given that 'officially' the goal of the economic transition was implementing a market economy in which the state does not play a significant role, I decided to use diffuse support for the liberal model of market economy as indicator of support for market economy.

groups have different degrees of inconsistency with the goals of the dual transition. Since I consider having a democratic system as being more important than having a pure market economy, and keeping in mind that support for market economy seems to be significantly influenced by the state of the economy, I consider the second group (D+M-) as representing only a minor deviation from the goals of the transition, a deviation that can probably be corrected by increases in the economic performance of the state. The third group (D-M+), however, being composed by a part of those who oppose democracy, is a more serious threat to the successful completion of the post-communist transition.

It should be noted that this analysis is primarily exploratory: since previous studies have not analyzed diffuse support for democracy and for market economy using this approach, the main goal of the analysis is to identify factors that seem to affect membership in the four groups defined above. Unfortunately, the variables used in defining the four groups are used in only three datasets (July 1997, July 1999, and November 2005). As a result of this, a full analysis of evolution over time is not possible.²⁶⁶ The analyses presented here cover only the second half of the transition (including the second economic recession and the economic recovery).

Table A-23 in the appendix presents in a condensed form the results of a series of cross tabulations between the variable that combines support for democracy and market economy and the set of socio-economic variables used in the previous analyses, indicating which population subgroups are over-represented or under-represented in the four support categories. The decrease in the level of diffuse support for democracy reported in Figure 3 can be observed in this table as well. Regardless of their attitudes toward market economy, approximately 15% of the population moved between 1997 and 1999 from the two columns showing support for democracy to the two columns showing opposition to democracy, increasing the size of the group that supports market economy and opposes democracy from 6% to 15% and the size of the group that opposes both democracy and market economy from 4% to 10%. By 2005, however, this trend was reversed and the two groups that represent diffuse support for democracy regained the members it lost between 1997 and 1999.

The evolution of the four strategies of support for democracy and market economy is presented in a graphical format in Figure 14 (the numbers

²⁶⁶ Leading to an even less exploratory analysis with even more tentative results than initially planned. This analysis could be improved by using additional surveys that include the two items used here and that cover the transition period. Unfortunately, the chances of finding such surveys for the beginning of the transition are extremely small (if they exist, they are, most probably, the result of private contracts, making them quite difficult to obtain).

are available in the last row of Table A-23). During any of the three years analyzed here, at least two thirds of the Romanians belong to the Conformist / Activist group (these two thirds of the population can be considered hardcore supporters of the new political and economic system, because they continued their support even when the situation in Romania was worsening). The increase in Authoritarians and Nostalgias recorded in 1999 comes only from the two groups that support democracy: Conformists/Activists and Economic Losers, suggesting that, in addition to those who oppose democracy, 15% of the population has only a very weak support for democracy that is easily abandoned during difficult situations.

Figure 14 Four strategies of support for democracy and market economy




Table 12 summarizes the results, focusing on the groups that are over-represented in each of the four support categories. The entries in the cells can be interpreted as a typology of the members of the four categories: by comparison with the other categories, the population subgroups listed in the category of interest are over-represented, creating a profile of support / opposition to democracy and market economy. Which population subgroups support both democracy and market economy?²⁶⁷ The main supporters are men with medium

²⁶⁷ The group of people supporting both democracy and market economy is the largest in the population: 73% belonged to this group in 1997, 67% in 1999, and 76% in 2005.

Table 12 Support for democracy and market economy – population subgroups

		Market Economy	
		Pro	Against
Democracy	Pro	Male At least high school Urban Vote for governing party	Female 8 grades or less Rural
	Against	Vote for opposition party	Female Rural Vote for opposition party
		Market Economy	
		Pro	Against
Democracy	Pro	Male Under 30 At least high school Urban Non-Orthodox Vote for governing party	Female 4 grades or less Rural
	Against	Orthodox Vote for opposition party	Female Over 60 8 grades or less Rural Vote for opposition party
		Market Economy	
		Pro	Against
Democracy	Pro	Male At least high school Urban Vote for governing party	Female Over 60 8 grades or less Rural
	Against	---	5 – 8 grades Rural

and high education (they have at least a high school diploma), who live in the urban areas, and who support the governing party.²⁶⁸

The results for 1999, when support for democracy was significantly lower compared to the other years, indicate two additional subgroups (young people and people of non-orthodox religion) that could be interpreted as hardcore supporters because they continued to support both democracy and market economy even in a difficult situation. The data in Table A-23 show that some of these subgroups are not only over-represented in the D+M+ category, but they are also under-represented in some of the other three support categories as well.²⁶⁹

The second category (D+M-) represents people who support democracy but are less attracted to the idea of market economy.²⁷⁰ This category is composed of poorly-educated (with at most eight grades completed) women living in the rural areas. By the end of the transition, in 2005, older persons (over 60) are also over-represented in this category. The members of this category are only a step away from becoming full supporters of the dual transition. I expect that membership in this category will decrease, in the future, mainly as a result of economic improvements and generational replacement.

The third category is represented by those who oppose democracy but support market economy (D-M+).²⁷¹ Although initially I found it difficult to understand why a person would belong to this category, Table 12 suggests an interesting explanation. The only population subgroup that is over-represented in this category is the group of supporters of opposition parties, and only in 1997 and 1999. At that point in time, the most important opposition parties were PSD and PRM. The significant increase in the size of this category from 1997 to 1999, the results of the 2000 general and presidential elections (in which the PRM presidential candidate managed to get into the second round and PRM received 24% of the seats), and the clear anti-democratic ideology of PRM are all factors suggesting that PRM supporters are responsible for inflating this category in 1999.²⁷² This interpretation is strengthened by the fact that by

²⁶⁸ In all three years included in the analysis the country was governed by a coalition of parties that are considered to be ‘the democratic parties’ (by opposition to the neo-communist PSD and the extremist PRM).

²⁶⁹ The only subgroup that is under-represented in all other support categories is the group of respondents who graduated college.

²⁷⁰ This was the second largest group in the population in 1997 (17%) and 2005 (18%) and the smallest group in 1999 (8%).


²⁷¹ The size of this group increased from 6% in 1997 to 15% in 1999 and then decreased to 4% in 2005.

²⁷² While this is only a speculative interpretation of these results, it is one that seems to fit the events of that period.

2005, when support for PRM has decreased significantly, supporters of the opposition are not over-represented in this category anymore.

The last category in the typology used in this section (D-M-) is represented by those who oppose both democracy and market economy.²⁷³ Women living in the rural areas and supporting an opposition party were over-represented in this category in 1997 and 1999. Two additional groups were also over-represented in 1999: older persons (over 60) with low education (8 grades or less). By 2005 only those living in the rural areas are still over-represented. However, given the small size of this group in 2005 (it contains only 28 cases, 1.6% of the population, less than the sampling error) this result should be interpreted with caution.

Figure 15 Possible trends of convergence to support for democracy and market economy



The results presented here suggest there was a trend in the population to move towards the upper left cell in the two-by-two table, to become supporters of both democracy and market economy. The analysis, however, covers only the second half of the transition. For the first half of the transition the probable trend can be estimated based on the evolution of the indicators presented in Figure 3 and Figure 12. Between 1990 and 1997 diffuse support for democracy has either remained constant or has slightly increased (this option seems more likely to have happened). During the same period of time, diffuse support for

²⁷³ The size of this group increased from 4% of the population in 1997 to 10% in 1999 and then decreased to only 2%.

the liberal model of market economy has followed an increasing trend. Combining the two trends suggests that, with the exception of 1990, when support for democracy and market economy was unusually high, at the beginning of the transition the four categories of support were more similar in size compared to the large differences observed later in the transition. Over time, the data suggest that the population has migrated among the four categories following the paths depicted in Figure 15 (the thickness of the arrows represents the size of the population that moved across those paths).

The results presented in this section suggest the existence of a convergence trend. If at the beginning of the transition the population was divided by attitudes toward democracy and market economy, these differences have reduced over time, with more and more people becoming supporters of both democracy and market economy.²⁷⁴ The structure of the support categories suggests that the more modern groups in the society have a higher level of support for democracy and market economy, while the more traditional groups tend to either reject both ideals or, in a larger proportion, to accept democracy but reject market economy. The current economic situation in Romania and the prospects for its evolution during the near future suggest that the convergence trend identified in this section will probably continue to function, so that the percentage of the population belonging to the D+M+ group will increase, primarily with members moving in from the D+M- group as they become more and more attached to the idea of a market economy. I will revisit the results of the analyses presented here in the last chapter, when I discuss the main conclusions of this study.

²⁷⁴ This convergence trend, however, was not monotonic. As the 1997 and 1999 data indicate, modifications of this trend were possible and did happen. Nevertheless, the general trend seems to be the one described here.

6. Generalized support for the structure of the system

After discussing in detail diffuse support for the principles of the political and economic system, the focus of this chapter is on the second dimension of support in this study: the structure of the political system. I begin the discussion by presenting the evolution of trust (as indicator of generalized support) in four types of institutions that are either part of the political system (central state institutions and local state institutions) or that are related to the political system through their actions (civil society institutions) or through their symbolic functions (traditional institutions). The results presented in this section will show that Romania, like most of the post-communist countries, is characterized by a generalized distrust towards the state's institutions. While older democracies are also faced with decreasing levels of trust in their institutions, distrust is significantly higher in Romania. In addition to this, compared to established democracies low levels of trust are more dangerous in a society that is just establishing its democratic system

In the second section of this chapter I discuss the factors that affect trust in the traditional institutions (the church and the army). These are the most trusted institutions in Romania, perhaps as a result of the fact that they are generally perceived as non-partisan institutions that are removed from the political and economic aspects of the Romanian society. Under this interpretation trust in the traditional institutions is most likely to be a form of diffuse support and its analysis can offer a point of comparison for the analysis of trust in the state's institutions.

The third section of this chapter is devoted to analyzing trust in the state's institutions. Previous studies have interpreted institutional trust either as an indicator of diffuse support or as an indicator of specific support or as an indicator of both diffuse and specific support. I will show in this section that in the case of Romania trust in the state's institutions seems to be primarily an indicator of specific support, being significantly influenced by evaluations of the state of the economy. However, the results also show that during the second half of the transition this indicator also has a component that can be characterized as diffuse support and this component seems to become increasingly important over time, with more people beginning to base their attitudes towards the institutions of the state on the institutions' roles in a democratic society rather than on the institutions' performance.

The results discussed in the previous two chapters indicate that by the end of the post-communist transition the Romanian population has accepted almost unanimously the ideals of democracy and market economy. This is,

however, only part of the story. The move from an autocracy with a centralized economy to a democracy with a market economy would not have been possible without the existence of a set of institutions whose main role was to implement the changes required by this transformation. The basic institutions that were necessary for the functioning of the new regime were put in place in a short period of time: by the end of 1991 a new Constitution was adopted and the first elections for a full parliamentary term were organized by the end of 1992.²⁷⁵ The population was thus faced with a new political system, with institutions that were quite different from the ones of the communist regime. How did the Romanian population react to these new institutional actors? This is the question I address in this chapter.

The evolution of institutional trust

In the first section of this chapter I analyze the evolution of trust in different institutions of the state throughout the transition. Based on the institutions' functions and on their distance from the public, the institutions analyzed in this chapter can be classified into four main categories: traditional institutions (the church and the army), central state institutions (the parliament, the cabinet, the presidency, and political parties), local state institutions (the police, the courts, and the local administration), and civil society institutions (trade unions, NGOs, and mass media).²⁷⁶

²⁷⁵ These institutions represent the backbone of the state's structure. Over time a series of changes have been implemented, adding new institutions, modifying the functions of the existing institutions, and redefining the relationships among them, culminating with the adoption of a new constitution in 2003. The debates about the structure of the political system still continue, the most important among them concerning the extent of the president's powers, the structure of the Parliament and the voting system.

²⁷⁶ Normally, political parties are considered to be institutions of civil society, representing the interests of their members in relationship to the state. The characteristics of the Romanian political parties and the way political parties are perceived by the citizens suggest, however, that the Romanian political parties do not function as civil society institutions. Regular citizens refer to political parties as 'they', never as 'us'. In a similar manner, political parties remember that Romania has a population only when elections are due and they try to gain as many votes as possible. People understand political parties as institutions of the state, not of the civil society. For these reasons I believe that in the Romanian context political parties belong to the central state institutions group. The results presented in Figure

Figure 16 Trust in traditional institutions (% trust)




Figure 16 presents the evolution of trust in traditional institutions from 1990 to 2006.²⁷⁷ It should be noted that in the Romanian context the church and the army are institutions that have a distinct position in the popular psyche, being seen as symbols of the Romanian state and nation. The church is the symbol of the Christian-Orthodox tradition, which many people consider to be a defining characteristic of Romanians, while the army is seen as an institution that has protected the Romanian state from external aggressions.²⁷⁸

In addition to this interpretation, the two institutions also share a series of common characteristics, justifying their placement into the group of

17 and Figure 19, showing the evolution of trust in the two groups of institutions, suggest that this decision is correct.

²⁷⁷ The church is also usually considered a civil society institution. While it is true that the church has a clear social function, the characteristics of the Romanian Christian-Orthodox church differentiate it from other civil society institutions. Compared to the activities of other churches, the Romanian Christian-Orthodox church is very rarely involved in charitable activities, it does not organize bible study groups, it does not run shelters for the homeless, and it does not run schools. Overall, the church sees itself and acts as a highly centralized actor that does not have responsibilities in these areas.

²⁷⁸ Actually, both institutions have a protective function: the church offers guidance and protection for the soul, while the army, arguably, offers physical protection.

traditional institutions: both the church and the army are highly hierarchical institutions, they are egalitarian institutions (everyone within a hierarchical stratum is treated equally), they are highly ritualistic institutions that emphasize the importance of order and of following the rules, and they both induce a submissive attitude (the church by claiming to offer the absolute truth that should not be questioned, and the army by insisting on the importance of following orders).

At the beginning of the transition more than three quarters of the respondents declared they have trust in church and almost 90% had trust in the army. In the case of the army, the high percentage of trust can be explained by the role the army had played during the revolution.²⁷⁹ The initial level of trust in the church is higher than expected, especially if one takes into account the fact that the communist regime has actively tried to reduce the role of religion in the communist society. Over time, trust in the church has followed an increasing trend, so that by the end of the transition the church is trusted by 90% of the population. This trend is consistent with the increase in the number of people who believe in god and who consider themselves to be religious.²⁸⁰

The evolution of trust in the army exhibits a different trend. From 1990 to 1997 between 85% and 90% of the population declared to have trust in the army. Starting with 1998, however, trust in the army shows a downward trend, characterized by two significant drops in the level of trust. The first one was recorded between 1997 and 1998, when trust in the army dropped by 13%, and the second one was recorded between 2002 and 2003, when trust in army dropped by an additional 13%. In both instances the decrease in trust followed mass media campaigns that placed the army at the center of a scandal.

In April 1997 mass media reported the involvement of the army in smuggling cigarettes using military airports and for the next three months mass media frequently reported the new developments in this case.²⁸¹ In 2002, different mass media organizations received an anonymous report about the state of the Romanian army. The authors of this report argued that the army was an institution led by officers with an outdated mentality, with poorly prepared


²⁷⁹ The general impression was that the army refused to use force against the population, as indicated by the ‘popular’ slogan “The Army is with us.” To this day, however, it is still not clear to what degree the army was involved in the 1989 revolution, especially with respect to the events in Timișoara.

²⁸⁰ 90% of the Romanians believe in god, with an additional 8% believing in the existence of a life force (2005 data).

²⁸¹ This scandal was labeled the “Cigarette 2 Affair” and it was the source of numerous speculations that linked it with mafia organizations, the president, and the secret services.

soldiers, without adequate equipment, and concluded that the army cannot perform in a conflict situation and cannot have a successful integration with the armies of the NATO members.²⁸² While I do not have any data to formally test for this conclusion, the fact that the decrease in trust in the army was in both cases preceded by a highly visible mass media scandal suggests that this was the probable cause.

Figure 17 Trust in state's central institutions (% trust)



If the level of trust in the traditional institutions remained relatively constant over time, trust in the institutions of the state changed over time following quite a different pattern. Figure 17 presents the evolution of trust in the state's central institutions: the parliament, the cabinet, the presidency, and political parties.²⁸³ These four institutions represent the key actors of the

²⁸² This became known as the “Armageddon I Report” and, over time, it was followed by eight more reports that were distributed to the mass media using the same strategy (anonymous authors, electronic delivery) and that pointed out problems in different areas of the Romanian society.

²⁸³ Although data for the presidency and the political parties are available only for the second half of the transition (starting with 1998), Figure 17 suggests that trust in

political system and, as such, they have a privileged position that allowed them to control the direction and the speed of the post-communist transition. They are also institutions that are required for a democracy and, from this perspectives, trust in these institutions can be interpreted as a form of support for the political system.

Figure 17 exhibits a series of remarkable trends. Looking at all four institutions as a group, they are characterized by decreasing levels of trust: over time the proportion of population with trust in the central institutions of the state has generally decreased, suggesting also a decrease in the level of support for the political system. To put these results in perspective, in 2006 only 21% of the Romanians trust the cabinet, compared to an average of 36% in EU15 and an average of 29% in the New Member States (NMS). While only 15% of the Romanians trust their parliament, the corresponding percentage is 41% in EU15 and 22% in the NMS. Finally, only 9% of the Romanians trust political parties, compared to 23% in EU15 and 14% in the NMS.²⁸⁴ Thus, although the older democracies are also confronted with low levels of trust in their institutions, this problem is more serious in the post-communist countries and it seems to be even more serious in Romania.

Comparing the results in Figure 17 to those presented in Figure 3 it can be seen that despite the fact that institutional trust has decreased during the transition, diffuse support for democracy has remained constant at very high levels, and diffuse support for democratic values has actually increased. In Chapter 2, when I discussed the significance of the indicator of trust in the institutions of the state, I argued that it is an indicator of generalized support for the political system (some authors consider it to be an indicator of diffuse support, while others consider it an indicator of specific support) that combines both elements of diffuse and elements of specific support and that its evolution over time should indicate which of the two interpretations is correct.

The significant variations in the level of institutional trust recorded here, together with the opposite trend that characterizes diffuse support for democracy and democratic values suggest that trust in the institutions of the state should be interpreted as primarily an indicator of specific support for the political system. While this conclusion is true in the case of Romania (and, possibly, in other new democracies as well), it does not apply in the case of older, more developed democracies. In countries that have had long democratic experiences citizens have learned to base their trust decisions on the functions

these two institutions had similar trajectories to those of trust in the parliament and the cabinet.

²⁸⁴ Data for the European Union and for the New Member States are taken from Eurobarometer 65.

and the behavior of the institutions, regardless of (or with only minor influences from) the current incumbents. The citizens of these countries have learned that although today's incumbent may be gone tomorrow, the institutions will remain as part of the political system.

In Romania the citizens have yet to learn this lesson. The Romanian politics during the transition was characterized by a highly personal style that made it difficult for the citizens to distinguish between the institutions and incumbents.²⁸⁵ Moreover, the political class did not change very much during the transition. In 2006 the most important politicians are generally the same persons that occupied top positions at the beginning of the transition. This also happens in Western democracies, especially for those who make a career out of politics. In the Romanian context, however, the high degree of survivability on the political arena was accompanied by poor performance of the political system. Seeing the same politicians making the same promises while the economic situation of the country worsened throughout much of the transition has probably led a part of the population to lose its trust in the political system as a whole. While people have the power to change the rulers every four years (and they have used it, especially in 1996 and in 2000), the use of a closed-list voting system has limited this power only to choosing among political parties, but not among individual candidates. Political parties have total control over nominations for office and, since all parties have followed the same strategy of nominating generally the same persons, no individual party could be punished for presenting the same offer in each election.²⁸⁶ That people have recognized this problem and their inability to solve it can be seen in the decrease in the turnout rate from 86% in 1990 to only 56% in 2004.

The second remarkable trend shown in Figure 17 suggests the existence of a significant honeymoon effect. At the beginning of the transition 75% of the

²⁸⁵ I am not sure, for instance, that Romanians evaluate the presidency without taking into account who the current president is. Between 1998 and 2006 the average correlation between trust in presidency and trust in the president was .56. The average correlation was .54 during the Constantinescu presidency, .64 during the Iliescu presidency, and .56 during the Băsescu presidency. It is also interesting to note that the correlation seems to be higher at the beginning of the presidential term and tends to decrease over time, suggesting that the contamination from incumbent to institution is at its highest immediately after the elections, possibly as a result of the honeymoon effect. Moderate to high correlations can also be observed between trust in the cabinet and trust in the Prime Minister. The average correlation was .39 when Radu Vasile was in office (1998-1999), .32 during Mugur Isărescu's mandate (1999-2000), .56 when Adrian Năstase was Prime Minister (2001 – 2004), and .38 for Călin Popescu Țăriceanu (from 2005).

²⁸⁶ Political parties act in this case as an oligopoly.

respondents had trust in the cabinet and 65% had trust in the parliament. The fact that this was the highest level of trust recorded for these two institutions throughout the transition suggests that it was the result of inverse legitimation. The honeymoon effect associated with elections is not evident for the 1992 elections. This can be explained by two factors: first, the 1992 elections did not result in a change in government, and second, trust in the parliament and the cabinet was probably still adjusting from the high levels at the beginning of the transition. The 1996 elections, which marked the first post-communist power transfer, show a very powerful honeymoon effect: trust in the parliament increased from 26% to 60% and trust in the cabinet increased from 31% to 66%. Trust in these two institutions immediately after the 1996 elections was almost as high as at the beginning of the transition. As I have already discussed in the previous chapter, the 1996 elections were seen as a chance to fix the mistakes made by the PSD government, leading to abnormally high levels of trust in the state's institutions.

Over the next four years, however, trust in the parliament and the cabinet decreased drastically, so that before the 2000 elections less than 10% of the population was still trusting the parliament and only 13% had some trust in the cabinet (the lowest level of trust recorded for the two institutions throughout the transition). More worrying, however, was the simultaneous decline of diffuse support for democracy during the same period of time, which suggests that part of the Romanian population was ready to give up on the idea of democracy. The evolution of trust in the state's central institutions and of diffuse support for democracy during 1990-2000 fits the findings of Bernhard, Reenock, and Nordstrom (2003: 427) who argued that new democracies are significantly more vulnerable to breakdown when faced with poor economic performance during the period of the first two governments. This was also evident in the results of the 2000 elections, when the ultra-nationalist PRM won a significant share of seats in the parliament and its presidential candidate advanced into the second round.²⁸⁷ Fortunately, some of the reforms implemented by the CDR government (especially during its first year in office, when the impetus for reform was not yet hindered by constant intra-coalition bickering over the distribution of office spoils) proved to be beneficial for the Romanian economy which started to improve in 2000 and continued the

²⁸⁷ The 2000 elections proved to be a nightmare for the supporters of CDR: not only did their preferred party lose the elections, but they were also in the awkward position of having to choose for the next president between Ion Iliescu, the former communist that many blamed for the problems Romania faced during the transition, and Corneliu Vadim Tudor, the authoritarian extreme-right leader of PRM.

ascending trend since then.²⁸⁸ The next electoral cycle (2000-2004), which returned PSD to power, shows a similar evolution: immediately after the election trust in parliament increased to 34% and trust in the cabinet increased to 47%, only to decrease again over the next years. Only this time diffuse support for democracy was increasing and recovering the losses it suffered during the previous electoral term. Even more, while under the previous governments trust in the state's institutions decreased constantly during their term in office, this time the last year in office actually shows an increase in trust (most likely the result of improvements in the economy). The last electoral cycle (2004-2008) is only partially captured by the data and it suggests that the presidency was the only institution that received a bonus of trust following the elections.²⁸⁹

Overall, the evolution of trust in the state's central institutions suggests that at the beginning of the transition trust was mainly determined by inverse legitimization. As the economic costs of the transition increased, institutional trust

²⁸⁸ These results suggest that the 1996 – 2000 period was crucial for the consolidation of democracy in Romania. A PSD victory in the 1996 elections would have probably led to even more delays in economic reforms and international isolation, opening the way for certain failure in the transition to democracy and market economy. Similarly, if CDR would not have restarted the economic reforms that were all but abandoned by PSD, the economy would have continued to get worse, which would have probably increased the level of support for anti-systemic parties like PRM.

²⁸⁹ After the 2004 elections it seems that attitudes toward the presidency follow a different pattern from the one of the other central institutions of the state. The explanation for this difference resides in the personal characteristics of the current president, Traian Băsescu. Ion Iliescu, president between 1990-1996 and 2001 – 2004 was a charismatic and experienced political actor, who seemed especially attractive to older persons, and to those living in rural areas. His supporters nicknamed him “Bunicuța” (the Little Grandma) or “Bătrânul” (the Elder), while his opponents called him “Comunistul” (the Communist) or “Bolșevicul Alb” (the White Bolshevik). Emil Constantinescu, president between 1997 and 2000, was a rather faded figure, a university professor with a rather elevated discourse, who never managed to mobilize the population to the extent Iliescu did. His nickname, even among his supporters, was “Țapul” (the Billy Goat). Băsescu instead is also a charismatic figure, but his charisma is different from Iliescu's. He has created for himself the image of a very active politician that tries solving the problems of the people (he repeatedly calls himself a “player-President”). He is perceived by the population as a people's president (to the extent that some of the political commentators compare him to Argentina's Perón) and he supports this image whenever possible by letting the mass-media report his more domestic activities (e.g. shopping in hypermarkets, eating in restaurants, dancing with his wife). His most common nicknames are Popeye, “Marinarul” (the Sailor) or “Corsarul” (the Pirate).

decreased, but it received a significant bonus following the 1996 and the 2000 elections. In the 2004 elections the honeymoon effect observed in the previous two elections failed to manifest itself again, suggesting, together with the finding that in 2005 less than a third of the population still had trust in the parliament, the cabinet, or the political parties, that the Romanian citizens have learned from their previous experiences not to hope too much from a new government.²⁹⁰

Finally, the third interesting result in Figure 17 shows that throughout the transition the preference order of the four institutions has remained the same, without any exceptions: The most trusted institution is the presidency, followed by the cabinet, the parliament, and the political parties on the last place. Moreover, all four institutions exhibit quite similar trajectories of trust over time (political parties are the outlier here, suggesting that the distrust for this institution is so pervasive that the honeymoon effect disappeared in this case long before the 2004 elections). I believe that this stability in the ranking of the four institutions over time can be explained by their structure. People tend to have more trust in an institution they can personalize and less trust in ‘faceless’ institutions: the presidency is represented by only one person, the president; the cabinet is represented primarily by the prime minister but, sometimes, other ministers represent it as well; the parliament is a more ‘diffuse’ institution – it has a large number of members and it does not have a clear representative; finally, trust in political parties as a whole suffers from the fact that political parties are institutions composed of multiple actors.

The results presented in Figure 17 lead to two additional conclusions. First, it is rather worrying that the presidency is the most trusted institution in this group, because I interpret this as a sign that Romanians are still too attached

²⁹⁰ And they were very wise to reach this conclusion. Although the Romanian economy has continued to improve, the political arena has witnessed a growing conflict between the two main parties of the governing coalition (PD and PNL). As a result of this conflict the coalition broke down, PNL lost a significant part of its MPs who left the party because of the deteriorating relationship between PNL and PD and formed a new political party (PLD – the Liberal Democrat Party), and the whole political system was practically paralyzed during the first months of 2007, the crisis culminating with the suspension of the Romania president. Since a majority of the population supported the president at the time, the parliament’s decision to suspend him for violating the constitution (even after receiving the non-binding decision of the Constitutional Court which found the president not guilty of these charges) was generally seen as another example of politicians voting according to their own interests and not according to the will of the people and had the potential to decrease trust in the parliament and in the political parties even more (not an easy task, given that in 2006 trust in parliament was at 15% and trust in political parties was at 9%).

to the idea of a strong leader (see also the results presented at the beginning of section 0) and that some attitudes that were characteristic to the communist regime (when all power was concentrated in the hands of the president) have survived the transition.²⁹¹ The Romanian president has very limited attributions and yet, a significant part of the population still considers that the president could and should solve their problems.²⁹²

Second, since the fall of the communist regime more than fifteen years ago, the population had not have yet a chance to learn trusting the institutions of the state. Even when the economy started to improve (after 2000) institutional trust continued its downward trend. Institutional trust in Romania is lower than in the Western democracies and, although in some cases the differences are not very large, I believe their effect is accentuated by the fact that the citizens of these more developed democracies have had periods of high levels of trust in the state's institutions while the Romanian citizens have never had this experience. Whether skipping the phase of trusting the state's institutions will have a negative effect on support for democracy and market economy or not is

²⁹¹ Choosing to have a popularly elected president was probably the worst institutional choice made at the beginning of the transition, because it created a dual leadership structure when consensus about the reforms to be implemented was needed most. In addition to this, the presidential powers have not been clearly defined and, even more, until 2007 no political actor has complained when the presidents have overstepped their boundaries. Throughout the Romanian transition this has led to a significant number of conflicts between the president and the prime minister that have hindered the country's progress: president Iliescu managed to replace prime minister Petre Roman, who was too reformist for the president's taste; president Constantinescu gave way to pressure from the CDR coalition and replaced prime minister Victor Ciorbea when the economic reforms of his cabinet have increased popular protests; finally, from the middle of 2005 on, prime minister Călin Popescu Țăriceanu has constantly had to fend off president Băsescu's attempts to interfere in the affairs of the government.

²⁹² Thus, trust in presidency can be influenced by multiple factors: some people trust the presidency because they are used to the idea of a single strong leader that should be responsible for all the decisions in the country (a remnant of the attitude created during the communist regime), others trust the presidency because they identify and understand this institution better than the other central institutions, while others may trust the presidency because of their support for the incumbent president. These are competing explanations for trust in presidency and, although I do not test their relative importance, I believe that each of them has a contribution in explaining the observed level of trust in the presidency.

still an open question.²⁹³ For now, however, it seems that a large part of the Romanian population cannot look past the behavior of individual politicians to have a larger picture of the political system as a whole.

Comparing the central state institutions and the traditional institutions it can be seen that even with the decrease of trust in the army recorded in the second half of the transition, the church and the army have been the most trusted institutions throughout the transition. Given the characteristics of these traditional institutions and the incompatibility of their institutional cultures with a democratic culture, the results presented in Figure 16 suggest that the Romanian post-communist citizen has the most trust in the most undemocratic institutions. Does this finding indicate that the Romanian citizen is an anti-democratic citizen at heart?²⁹⁴ I believe that the answer to this question is negative and that trust in the traditional institutions should not be interpreted as an indicator of anti-democratic attitudes.


There are different factors that can explain these results. First, the post-communist transition has been a period defined by significant changes in all areas of the society. Faced with the uncertainty of the transition, a large proportion of the population seems to have rewarded the order and stability that characterize the traditional institutions with a bonus of trust. Second, and this is particularly true of the church, the traditional institutions were insulated from the negative effects of the economic transition because they do not have attributions in that particular area. Thus, while trust in the state's institutions has been negatively affected by the economic recession, the church and the army have been able to maintain their level of support. Finally, the high level of trust in the church is consistent with Sztompka's idea of providentialism as a substitute of trust.

In Figure 18 I present the evolution of trust in three additional state institutions: the police, the courts, and the local administration. Unlike the institutions discussed above (with the possible exception of some of the political parties), these three institutions have representatives at the local level and, because of this, they are more often in contact with the public, allowing the citizens to make a more informed decision of trusting or not trusting them. Although in all three cases the level of trust varies in a much more unstructured way than in the case of the state's central institutions, some patterns can still be observed.

²⁹³ While popular support for the new political and economic system seems to be stable, it is unclear what would happen to this support if Romania were to experience another period of significant economic problems.

²⁹⁴ This argument is commonly used by 'political analysts' when discussing the fate of the Romanian democracy.

Figure 18 Trust in state's local institutions (% trust)



In the case of the police and the local administration (both institutions that have representatives in all cities, towns, and communes), the level of trust does vary, but only within a rather narrow band of trust: roughly between 40% and 50%. Trust in the local administration, especially in 1992 and 1996, suggests the existence of a honeymoon effect similar to the one recorded for the central institutions. This is explained by the fact that the local administration is a politicized institution, in the sense that the party that wins the general elections uses local administration jobs as a way to reward some of its supporters at the local level.²⁹⁵

Trust in the courts and the justice system varied around the 50% mark between 1991 and 1997 then it dropped 20% and stabilized for the rest of the transition around 25%-30%. While the corruption of the justice system has been one of the most common themes on the public agenda in Romania in the second half of the transition, it can explain only partially the evolution of trust in the courts. The first debates regarding corruption in the justice system appeared

²⁹⁵ These supporters have only a moderate importance for the parties. The most important supporters and party members are usually rewarded with MP seats or with jobs in the central administration, which are much more productive and allow those who contributed to the party coffers during the electoral campaign to recover some of their contributions.

during the CDR government, when the new power had started to investigate some of the economic deals made by members of the previous government. This alone, however, cannot explain the significant drop in the level of trust. Moreover, between 2000 and 2004, when the negotiations with the European Union began to advance, the topic of corruption in the justice system has become more and more important (the reports of the EU have constantly given red flags to the justice system for delays in reforming the system and for corruption) yet trust in the justice system has stayed at the same level as in 1998. After 2004 the new government named Monica Macovei (an independent, former president of APADOR-CH, a human rights organization) as minister of justice. While she was in office she managed to improve the image of the justice system (at least in the eyes of the EU) by reforming it and by tackling a series of high-level corruption cases.²⁹⁶ These positive developments, however, have not managed to improve the level of trust in the justice system. Comparing the result presented in Figure 17 and Figure 18 it can be seen that for the most part of the transition the population had more trust in the police and the local administration than in the justice system or the state's central institutions. Even in these two cases, however, those who do not have trust represent the majority in the population. Figure 19 presents the evolution of trust in three civil society institutions: trade unions (which represent their members in relationship not only with their employers but also with the state), non-governmental organizations (which are the typical example of a civil society institutions), and mass media (including newspapers, TV, and radio stations). Although mass media institutions are primarily economic, they also have a middle role between the citizens and the state, more often than not being the only channel the citizens use to obtain information about the state's activities.²⁹⁷

Out of the three institutions included in this group, mass media is the only one that managed to gain the trust of a majority of the population. Between 1990 and 1997 trust in mass media decreased, probably as a result of the highly visible politicization of mass media institutions: the public television was

²⁹⁶ EU officials have praised her activity as minister of justice, by declaring that the chances of Romania becoming a EU member in 2007 would have been smaller under a different minister.

²⁹⁷ It is precisely because of this role that the government has tried, during the first six years of the transition, to control as much as possible of the 'independent' mass media institutions (either directly or indirectly, by controlling the distribution channels) and to name as directors of the public television (TVR) people it favored. Răzvan Theodorescu, director of TVR during 1990-1992, a period of time during which the public television was famous for its subservient attitude to the government, has later become a PSD senator.


controlled by the government of the day (i.e. PSD until 1996) and the newspapers had clear political affiliations. From 1997 on trust in mass media increased, and by the end of the transition seems to be stable around the 60% - 65% mark.²⁹⁸

Trade unions have been a significant actor during the first half of the transition and quite often, through negotiations with the government, they have obtained a series of benefits for their members that were supposed to cover some of the costs of the economic transition. This can explain the level of trust in trade unions between 1990 and 1997. Once the CDR government came into power in 1996, with a renewed commitment to privatization, the number of people employed in the state sector has decreased significantly and the relevance of the trade unions has decreased as well.²⁹⁹

The third type of institution included in this group is the non-governmental organization. Data for trust in NGOs are available only starting with 1998 and they do not offer enough information to adequately assess the evolution of trust. The only conclusion that can be extracted from the data is that trust in NGOs varies around a rather low level: only a third of the population trusts NGOs. There are several explanations for this finding. First, during the communist regime the civil society was almost nonexistent in Romania: the few acts of open dissent to the regime were always the result of the action of single individuals or a very small group of individuals. The situation did not change very much after the fall of the communist regime: after living for a long period of time in a system that actively discouraged any form of individual intervention in the social life, people have been very slow to

²⁹⁸ Yet, mass media is not completely independent from the political arena and this probably explains why a third of the population still does not have trust in mass media. During the second half of the transition the Romanian mass media has undergone a series of transformations, the most important being the creation of several mass media trusts owned by powerful businessmen (these trusts usually include, as a minimum, a national TV station, several radio stations, a newspaper with nationwide circulation, plus local and niche-publications). More recently, foreign mass media corporations have also entered on the mass media market. However, most of the mass media owners have close ties with political parties (one trust belonged to Dan Voiculescu, who later became the leader of the Conservative Party, while another is controlled by Dinu Patriciu, who is often accused of controlling the leadership of PNL), raising doubts about the objectivity of the journalists in these trusts.

²⁹⁹ At the end of 1996 almost half of the employed population was working in the state sector. At the end of the CDR government, in 2000, this percentage was only 30%. Trade unions are significantly less common in the private sector, and even where they exist, their counterpart is the employer and not the state.

Figure 19 Trust in civil society institutions (% trust)

understand that they should take responsibility for some of the changes that they would have liked to see.³⁰⁰ Second, the economic difficulties encountered during the transition have left little disposable resources (both in terms of time and money) that people could invest in supporting civil society. Third, since the state offered a series of financial incentives (e.g. reduced tax rates) in order to help the development of the civil society, a significant number of NGOs have been formed only to benefit from these incentives.³⁰¹

Finally, the evolution of the civil society during the 1990 – 1996 period has also had a negative effect on trust in NGOs. During the first part of the transition the Romanian civil society has acted as a vocal opponent to the neo-communist government and a strong supporter of the democratic opposition (similar to the role of the civil society in Poland or Czechoslovakia before the fall of the communist regime).³⁰² It should also be noted that despite the fact

³⁰⁰ For a detailed description of the Romanian civil society, see Civil Society Development Foundation (2005).

³⁰¹ I still remember the time when one of my best friends (an undergraduate colleague with an overdeveloped business sense) tried to convince me to form an NGO together so that we could import used cars and office equipment without having to pay any custom taxes, increasing thus our profits.

³⁰² In 2004 a series of recordings from the official meetings of the PSD leadership have been leaked to the press. In one of them, Adrian Năstăte (prime-minister and PSD

that the civil society is formed by multiple NGOs with multiple interests (in addition to organizations working in the political area one could also list feminist organizations, as well as organizations that try to help the abandoned children or organizations that try to reduce discrimination against the roma population, against people with alternative lifestyles or against people infected with AIDS), the most visible organizations are those that are closest to the political system and that have a clear political preference. As a result of this, it is possible that the supporters of PSD and its allies at the time have developed an attitude of distrust for the civil society as a whole, based on their opinions about only a small part of the civil society.³⁰³

The results analyzed in this section present an interesting image of the evolution of institutional trust in Romania during the post-communist transition. The most trusted institutions are the traditional institutions, which seem to have attracted high levels of support from the Romanian public as a result of two mechanisms that did not require any action of their part. First, they have not been affected by the decrease in trust generated by economic difficulties during the transition. Second, the traditional institutions are symbols for order, a quality that was in short supply in the post-communist society.³⁰⁴ Faced with the risks and the problems of the transition, people have directed their trust toward

leader at the time) was warning his colleagues that in the upcoming elections they will have to fight not only other political parties, but also a number of NGOs that could erode public support for PSD. The solution he offered was to create a series of NGOs that would be favorable to PSD and to activate PSD members who belonged to other NGOs and use them to gather information about the activities of these NGOs. As an example, Năstăte suggested that Adrian Severin (who was member of SAR, a NGO extremely critical towards PSD) should go to the press and express his disagreement with the conclusions of those SAR reports that were creating a bad image for PSD.

³⁰³ PRM and its leaders are often accusing NGOs of trying to undermine the government.

³⁰⁴ The high levels of trust in the church and the army might also be explained by the fact that these two institutions are not partisan institutions, they activate beyond politics. It should be noted, however, that the church has been anything but non-partisan at the beginning of the transition (up to 1996 the church was one of PSD's most important electoral agents in the rural areas), contradicting this argument. The relatively high level of trust in the presidency also suggests a possible explanation in these terms, since the president, once elected, is supposed to be above partisan politics. Up to this moment, however, none of the three post-communist presidents has managed to put aside his political affiliation while in office.

the only institutions that gave them the impression that at least some things are stable, do not change overnight: the church and the army.³⁰⁵

The state's most important institutions (the parliament, the cabinet, the presidency, and the political parties) have failed so far to gain the trust of a significant part of the population. Poor economic performance, political scandals, and corruption accusations have all contributed to a significant decrease in institutional trust over time, so that at the end of the transition less than a third of the citizens have trust in the institutions that create the basic structure of the state. The evolution of institutional trust presented in Figure 17 supports the *TSI change* hypothesis: trust decreased over time (although is started at medium and not at low levels, as hypothesized).

The only central institution that has managed to approach the 50% trust level is the presidency, which, as I have already discussed, more often than not has been a disruptive factor in the good functioning of the Romanian democracy. At the same time, despite the poor performance of the state's institutions, diffuse support for democracy has stayed at very high levels and diffuse support for market economy has increased over time, reaching similarly high levels. This suggests that people have become so attached to the ideals of democracy and market economy that they have insulated them from any form of negative influence. A second explanation for the combination of low institutional trust and high diffuse support resides in the fact that most of the Romanians do not make the distinction between an institution and its incumbents.³⁰⁶ Whenever someone has a critique related to the political arena, chances are that person will blame not only the parliamentarians but also the parliament, and, more generally, not only the politicians but also the state's institutions.³⁰⁷

³⁰⁵ Trust in church has increased throughout the transition, despite the fact that the Romanian Orthodox Church chose not to oppose the communist regime (even when the regime was demolishing the churches) and despite the fact that recent evidence suggests that some of the priests have collaborated with the security services.

³⁰⁶ Perhaps, at some level, they make this distinction, but in evaluating an institution they cannot go beyond the actions of the institution's incumbents. It is a classic case of people not being able to see the forest because they are distracted by too many crooked trees.

³⁰⁷ A series of often used verbal clichés offer some evidence for this interpretation. Persons that are unhappy with the political life in Romania will not hesitate to use at least one of the following: "What is happening in Romania ... This is not democracy", with its more general variant "Only in Romania ...", or "Democracy was what we needed ..." All these clichés go along the lines of a popular self-depreciative joke that starts by describing the beauties and riches of Romania and whose punch-line is "Too bad it's inhabited by Romanians".

Civil society institutions also have failed to attract the trust of a large number of citizens. With the exception of mass media (which is a hybrid between an economic enterprise and a civil society institution), the other two institutions analyzed here are trusted by only a small part of the population. Having started the transition with an underdeveloped civil society, Romania did not manage yet to improve too much in this area. At the end of the transition the most important problem faced by the civil society remains the very low level of citizen involvement.³⁰⁸

The overall image is that of a population that has lost its trust in the state's institutions, has never really trusted citizen initiatives, and has focused all its trust on the traditional institutions. The atomization and individualism generated by the communist regime may have disappeared for a while at the beginning of the transition, but they reappeared soon enough and continued blocking the evolution to a more trusting society. In the next sections of this chapter I offer a brief discussion of trust in traditional institutions and then I focus on the determinants of trust in the state's institutions.

Trust in traditional institutions

As I have shown in the previous section, the church and the army are the only two institutions that are trusted by a majority of the Romanian population, suggesting that the traditional institutions represent a refuge from the risks and the constant changes that have characterized the post-communist transition. Before moving on to the main dependent variable of this chapter, institutional trust, I analyze in this section trust in the traditional institutions. Since trust in the church and the army seems to be a form of diffuse support for these institutions, the results presented in this section will provide a portrait of trust in traditional institutions that can be compared, in the next section, to the factors that affect trust in the institutions of the state.

High levels of trust in traditional institutions (especially in the church) are indicative of a large proportion of the population using a strategy of escapism resulted from the inability to cope with the challenges of the transition. Given the characteristics of these two institutions, it is to be expected that trust in traditional institutions is particularly high in those population subgroups that have suffered the most from the economic transition (the same subgroups that are least attached to the ideals of democracy and market

³⁰⁸ Since data for all three institutions are available only in 1999 and from 2003 on, these are the only analyses of trust in civil society institutions that I present in this chapter.

economy: women, older persons, poorly educated persons, and persons living in the rural areas). This interpretation is consistent with Sztompka's description of providentialism as one of the functional substitutes of trust (Sztompka, 1999: 116). Faced with significant transformations (political, economic, social), suffering the substantial costs of the economic reforms, being disappointed by the differences between the hopes generated by the revolution and the realities of the transition, a significant part of the population has turned towards god and religion as sources of consolation and support during difficult times. Since providentialism leads, according to Sztompka, to apathy and passivism at the societal level, I consider this strategy to be characterized by escapism.³⁰⁹

Table 13 shows the ANOVA results, comparing the evolution of the average level of trust in traditional institutions across groups and across time.³¹⁰ These results confirm the theoretical expectation presented above. Compared to women, men have lower levels of trust in traditional institutions during the last years of the transition. Over time, both men and women have a similar evolution of trust: increase from 1992 to 1995, constant levels from 1995 to 1999, and then a slight decrease from 1999 to 2002 and 2005.

This slight decrease in the average level of trust at the end of the transition comes partly from an increase in the number of respondents who do not have trust in the army and partly from a movement within the group of the respondents who have trust in the church from the "very much trust" to the "much trust" category (if in 1999 the distribution for the two categories was 58% to 31%, the distribution changed to 53% to 34% in 2002 and to 40% to 44%).

The comparisons among the age groups indicate a positive relationship between age and trust in traditional institutions throughout the transition: the older the respondent the higher the level of trust in church and in the army. Over time, the three age groups have a similar evolution, with trust increasing more

³⁰⁹ It should be noted that, with the exception of vigilance and excessive litigiousness (which can be explained by the lack of trust in the justice system), all other functional substitutes of trust are also evident in the Romanian case: corruption, ghettoisation (indicated by an increase in the number of gated communities), paternalization (as evidenced by the discussion of trust in presidency), and the externalization of trust (Romanians are particularly fond of the European Union).

³¹⁰ The dependent variable, trust in traditional institutions, is an additive score from trust in the church and trust in the army and it can take values between 1 (no trust at all) and 4 (very much trust). The correlation coefficient between the two components varies between .23 and .41. Just like in the previous chapter, the mean differences are presented in a numerical format in Table A-24. The five years included in analysis have been selected so that they would cover the whole transitional period at equal intervals.

Table 13 Differences in average level of trust in traditional institutions

	1992	1995	1999	2002	2005	92-95	92-99	92-02	92-05	95-99	95-02	95-05	99-02	99-05	02-05
Men vs. women	x	x	x	▽	▽	Men	x	▽	x	x	x	x	x	x	▲
						Women	▽	x	▲	x	x	▲	x	▲	▲
Under 30 vs. 31 - 60	▽	▽	▽	▽	▽	Under 30	x	x	▲	x	x	▲	x	▲	▲
Under 30 vs. over 61	▽	▽	▽	▽	▽	31 - 60	▽	x	▲	x	▲	▲	x	▲	▲
31 - 60 vs. over 61	▽	▽	▽	▽	▽	Over 61	▽	x	▲	x	▲	▲	▲	▲	▲
< 4 grades vs. 5 - 8 grades	x	▲	▲	▲	▲	< 4 grades	x	x	▲	x	x	▲	x	▲	▲
< 4 grades vs. 9 - 11 grades	▲	▲	▲	▲	▲	5 - 8 grades	x	▲	▲	x	x	▲	▲	▲	▲
< 4 grades vs. high school +	▲	▲	▲	▲	▲	9 - 11 grades	x	x	▲	x	x	▲	x	▲	▲
< 4 grades vs. university +	▲	▲	▲	▲	▲	High school +	x	x	▲	x	x	▲	x	▲	▲
5 - 8 grades vs. 9 - 11 grades	▲	x	▲	x	x	University +	▽	▽	x	x	x	▲	x	▲	▲
5 - 8 grades vs. high school +	▲	▲	▲	▲	▲										
5 - 8 grades vs. university +	▲	▲	▲	▲	▲										
9 - 11 grades vs. high school +	▲	▲	▲	▲	▲										
9 - 11 grades vs. university +	▲	▲	▲	▲	▲										
High school + vs. university +	▲	x	x	▲	▲										
Urban vs. rural	▽	▽	▽	▽	▽	Urban	▽	x	▲	x	x	▲	x	▲	▲
						Rural	▽	x	▲	x	▲	▲	▲	▲	▲
Orthodox vs. non-orthodox	▲	▲	▲	▲	▲	Orthodox	▽	x	▲	x	▲	▲	▲	▲	▲
						Non-orthodox	x	x	▲	x	x	▲	x	▲	▲
Vote power vs. vote opposition	▲	▲	▽	▲	x	Vote power	x	▲	▲	▲	x	▲	▲	▲	▲
						Vote opposition	▽	x	x	▽	▲	▲	▲	▲	▲

N 1512 1174 2074 2212 1800

Note: x indicates no significant differences. ▲ indicates that the first group in the compared pair has a significantly higher average score (p<.05). ▽ indicates that the first group in the compared pair has a significantly lower average score (p<.05). Data sources: USIA 1992, COMALP 1995, BOP 1999, BOP 2002, BOP 2005.

rapidly in the older age groups (in 1995 those over 31 years had more trust than in 1992, while for the group under 30 the average level of trust in 1995 was not significantly different from the average level of trust in 1992). With minor exceptions (high school versus university in 1995 and 1999 being the most important), education decreases the level of trust in the church and the army in all years. University educated respondents have started the transition with decreased trust in the traditional institutions (indicated by significant negative differences between 1992 and the next three years in analysis), but all education groups (including university after 1995) have had the same trajectory of trust, the only difference being the level. The differences between residents in urban and rural areas and between the groups defined by religion are also consistent with the theoretical expectations: support for the traditional institutions is significantly higher among those living in the rural areas and those belonging to the orthodox church.

Overall, with only minor exceptions, the evolution of trust in traditional institutions follows a similar pattern for all population subgroups analyzed here. Most of the groups have had the same average level of trust from 1999 to 2002, with a small number of groups presenting increases from 1992 to 1995. Between 2002 and 2005 the average level of trust decreased for all population subgroups.

Table A-26 presents the results of the SES and region models explaining trust in the traditional institutions.³¹¹ The multiple determination coefficients show that the demographic variables explain more variance (about twice as much) than the development region variables, and that both sets of variables have their own contribution in explaining trust in the church and the army. They also show that all three models explain less variance in the dependent variable over time (in the case of the SES and region model the R^2 coefficient decreased from 19% in 1992 to 13% in 2005). It should also be noted that the effects identified in the SES model and in the Region model are present (with minor exceptions) in the SES and region model as well, most of the changes being observed in the case of the development region variables.

Looking at the effects of the demographic variables, it can be seen that all of them have significant effects (at least in some years) on trust in traditional institutions. Men have significantly less trust in the church and the army towards the end of the transition (the coefficient is marginally significant in

³¹¹ The analyses were performed using SPSS. For each year I have also estimated additional models (results not shown), without the variables that are missing in other years, in order to assess the stability of the results. The only effect that changes significantly is for evaluations of the future personal situation, which becomes significant when evaluations of current personal situation or satisfaction with life are missing from the model.

2002 and significant in 2005). The difference between men and women, however, is rather small: only .1 points on a four-point scale. With the exception of 1992, age has a significant positive effect in all other years: older persons tend to have more trust in the traditional institutions. While the effect of age is stronger than that of gender, it is still rather small: about .2 points on a four point scale.

Education has a significant negative effect on the dependent variable (the effect was stronger at the beginning of the transition, but it remained significant throughout the transition): its total effect varies between a quarter and a half of a point on a four point scale. Residence in the urban areas has a significant negative effect starting with 1995, similar in size to the effect of gender. Finally, the two variables indicating the respondent's religion and frequency of attending church have a positive significant effect (what one would expect given that one of the components of the dependent variable is trust in the church). In terms of their size, the effect of religion is of about .2 points, while the total effect of church attendance is similar to the effect of education: about .4 points.

The coefficients of the development region variables show that with the exception of 1995 in all other years trust in traditional institutions is higher in most of the regions when compared to Bucharest. The size of these effects varies over time, but regional effects are either the strongest or the second strongest (after education) in all years included in analysis.

The attitudinal model is presented in Table A-27. The correlations between trust in traditional institutions and the attitudinal variables included in the model are presented in Table A-25 in the Appendix (the average of the correlations varies around .10 in all years included in analysis). Comparing the multiple determination coefficients for each of the three groups of variables separately, it can be seen that the demographic variables have the most important effect on trust in traditional institutions, followed by the attitudinal variables and by the development region variables. In all three cases, however, the percentage of the explained variance decreases over time. Just like in the previous chapters, I will discuss the effects of the attitudinal variables in the context of the full model, referring to the coefficients of the attitudinal model only if they differ significantly.

The full regression model, which includes attitudinal, regional, and demographic variables, is presented in Table 14. The full model explains about a quarter of the variance in trust in traditional institutions at the beginning of the transition and about a fifth at the end of the transition.

Table 14 Trust in traditional institutions: full model

	1992	1995	1999	2002	2005
Intercept	2.451*** (.133)	2.409*** (.133)	2.431*** (.133)	2.167*** (.102)	2.043*** (.125)
Gender: Male	0.023 (.032)	-0.041 (.035)	-0.026 (.026)	-0.054* (.025)	-0.153*** (.030)
Age: 31-60	0.053 (.041)	0.030 (.041)	0.088** (.033)	0.073* (.031)	0.109** (.040)
Age: Over 60	0.002 (.053)	0.175** (.053)	0.186*** (.041)	0.138*** (.038)	0.181*** (.049)
Education	-0.106*** (.017)	-0.064*** (.016)	-0.082*** (.014)	-0.063*** (.013)	-0.126*** (.016)
Residence: Urban	-0.052 (.037)	-0.137*** (.037)	-0.150*** (.032)	-0.086** (.028)	-0.076* (.033)
Romanian	0.015 (.077)	-0.035 (.075)	0.219*** (.061)	0.102+ (.057)	0.046 (.062)
Orthodox	0.186* (.075)	0.169** (.055)	0.178*** (.054)	0.169** (.052)	0.137* (.062)
Church attendance	0.141*** (.018)	0.270*** (.030)	0.110** (.035)	0.158*** (.020)	0.121*** (.022)
North East	0.105+ (.061)	0.207** (.068)	0.377*** (.053)	0.397*** (.050)	0.307*** (.058)
South East	0.144* (.070)	0.071 (.069)	0.315*** (.058)	0.397*** (.051)	0.090 (.061)
South	0.184** (.063)	0.076 (.069)	0.310*** (.056)	0.342*** (.050)	0.247*** (.061)
South West	0.522*** (.068)	-0.025 (.074)	0.385*** (.059)	0.178*** (.054)	0.190** (.069)
West	0.288*** (.070)	0.063 (.072)	0.296*** (.059)	0.181** (.056)	0.173** (.065)
North West	0.239*** (.068)	0.158* (.074)	0.414*** (.058)	0.225*** (.054)	0.092 (.062)
Center	0.228** (.070)	-0.119 (.075)	0.245*** (.061)	0.178*** (.053)	0.084 (.063)
Interest in politics	-0.031 (.024)	0.040* (.020)	0.014 (.016)	0.062** (.021)	0.129*** (.023)
Vote for governing party	0.083* (.039)	0.114** (.042)	-0.022 (.037)	0.161*** (.031)	0.044 (.037)
Interpersonal trust	0.062 (.040)	0.090* (.039)	0.155*** (.028)	0.054* (.026)	0.142*** (.030)
Communism was bad	-0.142* (.059)	-0.081* (.036)	0.014 (.031)	-0.026 (.026)	-0.014 (.033)
Current personal situation	-0.007 (.020)	---	-0.019 (.018)	-0.005 (.018)	0.018 (.027)
Future personal situation	0.015 (.021)	0.026 (.022)	0.010 (.015)	0.008 (.015)	0.003 (.019)
Satisfaction with life	---	0.085*** (.023)	0.040+ (.021)	-0.034+ (.020)	-0.002 (.024)
Satisfaction with democracy	0.103*** (.028)	---	---	0.038* (.018)	0.076*** (.022)
Satisfaction with market economy	0.110*** (.031)	---	---	0.056** (.019)	0.042+ (.023)
R ²	0.247	0.236	0.177	0.206	0.200
Adjusted R ²	0.236	0.222	0.168	0.198	0.189
N	1512	1174	2074	2212	1800

Notes: *** p < 0.001, ** p < 0.010, * p < 0.050, + p < 0.100. Unstandardized regression coefficients and (standard errors). Data sources: USIA 1992, COMALP 1995, BOP 1999, BOP 2002, BOP 2005.

The size of the effects of the demographic variables is slightly modified by the addition of the attitudinal variables to the model, but all of them maintain their significance. Gender starts having a significant effect only towards the end of the transition, with men having less trust in the traditional institutions. Most of this difference comes from women having more trust in the church.³¹² Although the population has become more religious over time, this phenomenon is more accentuated in the case of women: they are more likely to believe in god and they are also more likely to attend church services more often.³¹³

Starting with 1995 age has a significant positive effect, with older respondents having more trust in the traditional institutions. Education has a strong and consistent negative effect: the more educated a person is, the less trust it has in the traditional institutions. Residence in the urban areas is also an indicator of less trust in the church and the army. Finally, respondents that belong to the orthodox church and those that attend church more frequently seem to have more trust in traditional institutions. These are the same effects that were discussed in the SES and region models.

The coefficients for the development region variables maintain their significance even when the attitudinal variables are included in the model. Just like in the case of the SES and region model, with the exception of 1995 (when only the North East and the North West regions have a significant coefficient) in all other years those living outside Bucharest have generally more trust in the church and the army than those living in the capital city. Overall, based on the effects of the demographic and regional variables it can be concluded that the population subgroups that were less attached to the ideals of democracy and market economy seem to be the same subgroups that have more trust in traditional institutions.

Moving on to the attitudinal variables, it can be observed that when controlling for the demographic and regional variables many of the coefficients of the attitudinal variables are changed in size, sign, or significance. Interest in politics had a significant negative effect in 1992 and 1999 in the attitudinal model. In the full model interest in politics has no significant effect in those years, while in the other years it has a surprising positive effect that seems to

³¹² In 2002 and 2005 the correlation between gender and trust in the church is negative and significant, while the correlation with trust in the army is weakly positive in 2002 and non-significant in 2005.

³¹³ One does not need data to reach this conclusion: just walking by a church would offer sufficient evidence for it. Moreover, in Romanian families going to church is the women's 'job': more often than not they go to church regularly (the whole family going to church on Sunday is a less common phenomenon in Romania), they lit candles for both the living and the departed, they pray for their families and they are responsible with the observance of religious holidays.

increase over time.³¹⁴ The correlations in Table A-25 show that interest in politics has a negative correlation with traditional trust in 1992 and 1999, a positive correlation in 2005, and no significant correlation in 1995 and 2002. Additional analyses on trust in church and trust in the army show that interest in politics has a significant positive effect on trust in both types of institutions. Given the relationships of interest in politics with the other variables it is difficult finding an explanation for its positive effect on trust in the traditional institutions.

Voting intention for the governing party has a similar effect to the one it has on diffuse support for democracy and market economy: when PSD and its allies are in power (1992, 1995, and 2002), their supporters have significantly more trust in the traditional institutions. When the ‘democratic opposition’ is in power, their supporters are no different from the supporters of PSD (the coefficient in 1999 had a significant negative effect in the attitudinal model, but it is not significant in the full model). This is yet another finding suggesting that the supporters of PSD are characterized by a more traditional outlook.

Interpersonal trust has a significant positive effect starting with 1995, suggesting that those respondents that have more trust in their fellow citizens also tend to be more trusting of the traditional institutions. In the attitudinal model interpersonal trust had a significant effect only in 1999 and 2005. Negative evaluations of the communist regime had a significant negative effect in all years in the attitudinal model. When controlling for demographic and regional variables, the effect remains significant only in 1992 and 1995, showing that those who had a negative opinion about the communist regime were less likely to trust the church and the army. Starting with 1999 traditional trust is no longer affected by the evaluations of the communist regime.

Evaluations of the personal situation (the current situation, the future situation, or the more general indicator of satisfaction with life) generally do not have an effect on trust in the church and the army (current personal situation had a significant negative effect and satisfaction with life had a positive effect in the attitudinal model in 1999, but these effects disappear in the full model). The only significant effect from this group is recorded for satisfaction with life in 1995. In the previous section, when discussing the evolution of trust in traditional institutions, I have argued that the high level of trust in these institutions could be explained as a reaction to the problems of the transition. The results in Table 14 suggest that this argument may not be correct, at least with respect to the economic problems.

³¹⁴ I call this effect surprising because interest in politics also had a positive effect on diffuse support for democracy, which has a weak negative correlation with trust in traditional institutions in 1995 and 1999 (in 2002 and 2005 the correlation between the two variables is not significant).

The last two variables included in the model (specific support for democracy and specific support for market economy) are less relevant for trust in traditional institutions, but I included them to allow comparisons with the models explaining trust in the state's institutions. I will discuss these results in the next section. Overall, the models in Table 14 explain approximately 20% of the variance in the dependent variable and suggest that high levels of trust in traditional institutions are recorded among the less modern population subgroups.

Trust in the state's institutions

In this section I present and discuss the results for the main dependent variable I use in this chapter: trust in the state's institutions. After discussing the construction of the index of trust in the state's institutions, which includes both central and local institutions, I move the focus of the analysis on discussing the differences in the level of trust among population subgroups and within population subgroups over time. Finally, in the last half of the section, I present the results of a series of regression analyses that identify the effects of demographic, regional, and attitudinal variables on institutional trust.

The dependent variable is an additive score of trust in four central institutions (parliament, cabinet, presidency, and political parties) and three local institutions (police, courts, and local administration), that can take values from 1 (very little trust) to 4 (very much trust).³¹⁵ I have used an additive score rather than a factor score because the scale of the additive score is easier to interpret (in terms of levels of trust, from very little to very much trust) than the scale of the factor score.³¹⁶

³¹⁵ Due to data availability problems, the dependent variable does not include trust in presidency, political parties and police in 1992, and trust in presidency and political parties in 1995. The correlation between the score containing all items and the score without trust in presidency, political parties, and police is .95 in 1999, .97 in 2002, and .97 in 2005, suggesting that the absence of these indicators of trust from the dependent variable in 1992 and 1995 does not pose a significant problem for the comparability of the results over time.

³¹⁶ For each of the five years included in analysis I have tested if the variables can be grouped in an index using factor analysis and reliability analysis. Factor analyses (principal components extraction with varimax rotation) have extracted a single factor in all years, except for 1999 (the solution in this case offers two factors; an additional factor analysis, with principal components extraction and direct oblimin rotation, shows that the factors are significantly correlated at .47 and that all variables have loadings higher than .33 on both factors). KMOs for the five years

As shown in Figure 17 and Figure 18, trust in both the central and the local institutions has decreased over time (with the central institutions suffering a more drastic loss of trust). Moreover, with only minor exceptions, throughout the transition the majority of the population did not have trust in the state's institutions. The state's institutions have failed to convince the public that they are functioning as they should. This should not be a surprising conclusion, given that the mass media is reporting almost daily stories about the difficulties different institutions have in following the law. The examples vary from business deals between politicians and state institutions that cannot be explained by the rules of the market economy, to businessmen that are released from prison because they develop serious illnesses as soon as they are imprisoned, to tenders whose results are known before the decision is made, to different judicial decisions in identical trials, to custom officers that are able to build houses only from their civil servants income, to students that are able to buy the subjects for the baccalaureate exams, to patients that are left to die on the street because the doctors are sending them from one hospital to another, to the whole leadership of a political party supporting a colleague by joining him on his way to an interrogation in a corruption case, to MPs sleeping in their seats or reading newspapers during parliamentary debates, to a prime minister receiving a fabulous inheritance from an aunt that made some business deals that MBA holders dream about, to a president who insults journalists, and to another president who gets out of a pub, gets behind the wheel, and drives home to the presidential palace (and who also ends up insulting journalists). Whether these stories are true or not or whether they can be justified or not is less important because once mass media reported them the public uses them to revise its opinions about the institutions that are involved.³¹⁷

are: .72, .75, .83, .85, and .84. Total variance explained by the factor for the five years is: 52.4%, 53.2%, 50.8%, 58.5%, and 57.4%. Cronbach's alpha coefficients for the five years are: .69, .78, .83, .88, and .87. It should also be noted that in all years the variables with the highest loadings on the factor are trust in parliament and trust in cabinet (the differences between the two loadings appear only at the third decimal), suggesting that these are the defining institutions for the dimension of trust in the state's institutions. The correlations between these two measures for the five years included in analysis are: .51, .52, .58, .66, and .64. All these checks suggest that the one factor solution is the best for this situation.

³¹⁷ These are just some of the stories that have been reported by the Romanian mass media during the transition. Since I am not convinced that all these stories have been accurately reported by the media and since the Romanian justice system still has some trouble understanding the concept of "freedom of expression" (as evidenced by a significant number of journalists who spend short periods of time in jail) I do not offer specific information about these cases. A Romanian reader will, undoubtedly, recognize who the main actors in these stories are.

Table 15 Differences in average level of trust in state's institutions

	1992	1995	1999	2002	2005	92-95	92-99	92-02	92-05	95-99	95-02	95-05	99-02	99-05	02-05	
Men vs. women	x	x	x	x	x	Men	▲	▲	▲	▲	▲	▲	x	▲	▲	
						Women	▲	▲	▲	▲	▲	▲	x	▲	▲	
Under 30 vs. 31 - 60	▽	x	x	x	x	Under 30	▲	▲	▲	x	▲	▲	x	▲	▲	
Under 30 vs. over 61	▽	▽	▽	▽	▽	31 - 60	▲	▲	▲	▲	▲	▲	x	▲	▲	
31 - 60 vs. over 61	▽	▽	▽	▽	▽	Over 61	▲	▲	▲	▲	▲	▲	x	▲	▲	
< 4 grades vs. 5 - 8 grades	▲	x	x	▲	x	< 4 grades	▲	▲	▲	▲	x	▲	▽	x	▲	
< 4 grades vs. 9 - 11 grades	▲	▲	▲	▲	▲	5 - 8 grades	▲	▲	▲	▲	x	▲	x	▲	▲	
< 4 grades vs. high school +	▲	▲	▲	▲	▲	9 - 11 grades	▲	▲	▲	x	x	x	▽	x	x	
< 4 grades vs. university +	▲	▲	▲	▲	▲	High school +	▲	▲	▲	▲	x	▲	x	x	▲	
5 - 8 grades vs. 9 - 11 grades	▲	▲	▲	▲	▲	University +	▲	▲	▲	x	x	x	▲	▲	x	
5 - 8 grades vs. high school +	▲	▲	▲	▲	▲											
5 - 8 grades vs. university +	▲	▲	▲	▲	▲											
9 - 11 grades vs. high school +	x	x	x	x	x											
9 - 11 grades vs. university +	▲	x	x	x	x											
High school + vs. university +	x	x	x	x	x											
Urban vs. rural	▽	▽	▽	▽	▽	Urban	▲	▲	▲	▲	x	▲	x	▲	▲	
						Rural	▲	▲	▲	▲	▲	▲	x	▲	▲	
Orthodox vs. non-orthodox	▲	x	x	▲	x	Orthodox	▲	▲	▲	▲	▲	▲	▽	▲	▲	
						Non-orthodox	x	▲	▲	x	x	▲	x	x	x	
Vote power vs. vote opposition	▲	▲	▲	▲	▲	Vote power	▲	▲	▲	▲	x	▲	▽	▲	▲	
						Vote opposition	▲	▲	▲	x	▲	▲	▲	▲	x	

N 1512 1174 2074 2212 1800

Note: ▲ indicates no significant differences. ▼ indicates that the first group in the compared pair has a significantly higher average score (p<.05). ▽ indicates that the first group in the compared pair has a significantly lower average score (p<.05). Data sources: USIA 1992, COMALP 1995, BOP 1999, BOP 2002, BOP 2005.

In Table 14 I present the ANOVA results, showing the differences in the average level of institutional trust across population subgroups and across time.³¹⁸ The two gender groups do not differ with respect to trust in the state's institutions and they have identical evolutions over time, showing a monotonic decrease in the average level of trust, with the only non-significant difference being between 1999 and 2002 in both cases. From the three age groups I analyzed, respondents over 61 years have significantly more trust in the state's institutions than those who are younger in all five years. The average level of institutional trust follows a similar trend in all three groups, the only difference being recorded for the youngest respondents, who have the same average level from 1995 until 2002 while for the other groups the level of trust is the same only from 1999 to 2002.

Respondent's education has a significant negative effect on institutional trust, but this is weaker than the effects education had on diffuse support for democracy and market economy (see Table 2, Table 4, Table 6, Table 8 and Table 9). In the case of institutional trust, education seems to have an effect only for those who are poorly educated (at most eight grades), who tend to have more trust in the state's institutions. Once a person has had at least some high school experience, its level of trust in the state's institutions is not significantly different from the average level of those who have either finished high school or have continued their studies to obtain a college degree. Looking at the evolution over time (the right panel of the table), it can be seen that all groups have suffered decreases in trust between 1992 and 1999. Between 1999 and 2002 only those with university education have continued losing trust, while the remaining groups have either maintained their level of trust or have even gained some trust.

Those living in the rural areas had significantly more trust during the transition compared to residents of the urban areas, but in both groups institutional trust has decreased over time. Those belonging to the orthodox church seem to have higher levels of institutional trust in 1992 and 2002. However, their level of trust has decreased throughout most of the transition (except between 1999 and 2002, when their trust increases). Finally, regardless of what party was in power, supporters of the governing party have always had more trust in the institutions of the state than the supporters of the opposition party, a finding that is different from the effect of this variable in the previous chapters.

Overall, the ANOVA results show a generalized decrease in institutional trust over time, with the only exception being the 1999 – 2002

³¹⁸ Additional results from these analyses are reported in the appendix, in Table A-28.

period, when most of the groups maintained their level of support and some (poorly educated, orthodox, and supporters of the governing party) have even managed to increase their support for the institutions of the state. The groups that have more institutional trust are older people, poorly educated, living in the rural areas, and supporting the governing parties. At the other extreme, young people, more educated, living in the urban areas, and supporting the opposition parties are characterized by lower levels of institutional trust.

Starting with Table A-29 I analyze the effect of the three groups of variables on trust in the state's institutions both individually and together.³¹⁹ The multiple determination coefficients show that the demographic variables are better predictors of institutional trust than the regional variables. However, the SES and region model does a rather modest job in explaining the variance in the dependent variable, and its power is decreasing over time (from 13% in 1992 to 4% in 2005). The coefficients of the demographic variables show only minor size changes when the regional variables are added to the model. Some of the effects of the development region variables, however, are explained away by the demographic variables.

Out of the group of demographic variables, gender and religion fail to achieve significance in any of the years included in analysis. Age has a significant positive effect, but only for respondents over 60 years old, who have higher levels of institutional trust. Education has a significant negative effect, but only in 1992, 1995, and 2002. It should be noted that education had a more consistent and stronger effect on diffuse support for democracy and diffuse support for market economy than the effect identified in this model. The largest total effect is recorded in the 1992 model, when education can decrease the level of institutional trust by .38 points on a four-point scale (in 2002, by contrast, the total effect is only .13 points).

Residence in the urban areas has a significant negative effect on institutional trust throughout the transition. The coefficient for nationality is significant only at the beginning of the transition, suggesting that people belonging to minority groups defined by nationality may have been a little

³¹⁹ The models were estimated using SPSS. To test for the stability of the results, in all years I also estimated a series of additional models, without the variables that are missing from the 1992, 1995, and 1999 datasets (results not shown). These models indicate a high level of stability: all coefficients maintain their signs and most of them also keep their significance (some of the coefficients for development regions become significant, and in 1999 and 2002, evaluations of personal situation become significant in models without satisfaction with life or evaluations of cabinet activity). There are some variations in the size of the coefficients, but none is significant enough to change the conclusions offered here.

hesitant at the beginning of the transition about how they were going to be treated by the state. After 1992, however, the effect is no longer significant. Finally, church attendance has a significant positive effect in 1995, 1999, and 2005, showing that more religious people have more trust in the institutions of the state. The non-significant effect at the beginning of the transition may reside in the fact that it was still too soon after the communist regime for some people to feel comfortable about attending church. The non-significant coefficient in 2002 is more difficult to explain. However, I do not believe that a variable like church attendance can change signs twice in six years, especially since these six years are not characterized by any significant changes at the societal level that are related to the religious domain. Moreover, the differences between the coefficients in 1999 or the 2005 coefficient and the 2002 coefficient are not statistically significant.

Moving on to the development region variables, most of these coefficients are significant in 1992 and 1995, showing that residence in any development region outside Bucharest was associated with higher levels of support for the state's institutions. In 1999, however, with the exception of the North West region all other regions have significant negative effects. This significant coefficient sign reversal can be explained by the fact that 1999 was the third year of the CDR government, when it was clear that CDR was failing to keep its promises. After going through a second economic recession, after being disappointed by the performance of what seemed at the time to be the last chance for successful democratization, a significant part of the population was beginning to question the ideals of democracy and was having less and less trust in the state's structure. By 2002, however, in response to changes in the economic situation of the country, these coefficients switched their signs again and continued to increase until 2005, when four of the seven regions were characterized by higher levels of institutional trust.

In terms of the size of the effects, in 1992 education and region have the strongest effect (they can change the level of support by .3-.4 points on a four point scale) while the effects of the other variables are smaller than .2. In all other years region variables have the strongest effect (about .25-.30 points) and all other variables have effects that are not larger than .2 points on a four-point scale.

The model presented in Table A-30 shows that the attitudinal and evaluation variables explain a large proportion of the variance in institutional trust (from a third at the beginning of the transition to a fifth during the last years of transition), significantly more than the demographic or the regional variables alone.³²⁰ The correlations between institutional trust and the attitudinal

³²⁰ In 1992, 2002, and 2005 I also estimated additional models excluding the two variables of specific support for democracy and market economy (results not

variables are presented in Table A-25 in the appendix. The two variables of specific support are highly correlated with the dependent variable (on the average, .44 in 1992, .31 in 2002, and .40 in 2005). However, as I already showed in the previous footnote, having them in the model does not change the interpretation of the results in a substantive way.

The full model is presented in Table 14. One of the most interesting results is indicated by the multiple determination coefficients: in the case of institutional trust the full model explains significantly more variance than in any other dependent variable discussed so far, and this is mostly determined by the effects of evaluation variables.

Generally, the effects of the demographic variables are not significantly changed by the addition of the attitudinal variables to the model (education is the exception). Trust in the state's institutions is not affected by the gender of the respondent (the only significant coefficient is in 2005, but the effect is negligible). This finding is consistent with the results presented in the previous chapter, where gender had a significant effect only on diffuse support for the liberal model of market economy. Age has a consistent significant positive effect, offering some support for the *Age – TSI* hypothesis: respondents over 60 years old have a significantly higher level of trust in the state's institutions compared to the younger respondents. Taking into account the effect of age on trust in traditional institutions as well, it can be said that older respondents generally have a less critical attitude when evaluating these institutions.

Education has a consistent significant negative effect on institutional trust, supporting the *Education – TSI* hypothesis. It should be noted that in the models presented in Table A-29 education was not significant in 1999 and 2005 but when the effects of the attitudinal variables are taken into account education has a significant effect in all years and this effect is stronger in all years with the exception of 1992. Moreover, the effect of the respondents' education also seems to become stronger over time, so that the highly educated have less and less trust in the state's institutions. Given the fact that education has a significant positive effect on diffuse support for democracy and for market economy, it could be argued that education should also have a positive effect on institutional trust. This expectation may be valid in the context of a society in

shown). The comparison showed that adding these two variables to the model leads to a slight reduction of the effects of the other variables, but the results are the same in terms of significant / non-significant effects (the only exception is the coefficient for evaluations of the current personal situation in 1992, which is significant when the two specific support variables are not included in the model). The multiple determination coefficients for the restricted models are .216 in 1992, .152 in 2002, and .136 in 2005.

Table 16 Trust in state's institutions: full model

	1992	1995	1999	2002	2005			
Intercept	1.447*** (.117)	0.921*** (.112)	1.472*** (.143)	1.512*** (.122)	1.490*** (.107)	1.250*** (.106)	0.739*** (.117)	0.573*** (.111)
Gender: Male	0.039 (.030)	0.038 (.029)	-0.059 (.036)	0.014 (.024)	-0.051+ (.027)	-0.048+ (.026)	-0.062* (.029)	-0.060* (.027)
Age: 31-60	0.032 (.038)	0.013 (.035)	-0.036 (.042)	0.033 (.031)	0.038 (.033)	0.044 (.031)	0.076* (.037)	0.058 (.036)
Age: Over 60	0.162** (.050)	0.099* (.047)	0.107* (.054)	0.132*** (.038)	0.106** (.040)	0.110** (.038)	0.153** (.047)	0.117** (.045)
Education	-0.047** (.015)	-0.036** (.014)	-0.052** (.016)	-0.052*** (.013)	-0.061*** (.014)	-0.064*** (.013)	-0.093*** (.014)	-0.083*** (.014)
Residence: Urban	-0.061+ (.032)	-0.088** (.029)	-0.162*** (.038)	-0.153*** (.028)	-0.116*** (.029)	-0.098*** (.028)	-0.087** (.031)	-0.068* (.030)
Romanian	0.081 (.068)	0.040 (.063)	-0.130 (.079)	0.021 (.057)	-0.045 (.059)	-0.021 (.057)	-0.006 (.058)	0.020 (.055)
Orthodox	0.092 (.064)	0.067 (.059)	0.012 (.058)	0.083+ (.049)	-0.025 (.053)	-0.026 (.051)	0.021 (.056)	0.013 (.054)
Church attendance	0.019 (.017)	0.015 (.015)	0.100** (.031)	0.075* (.032)	-0.021 (.021)	-0.024 (.020)	0.034+ (.020)	0.024 (.019)
North East	0.104+ (.057)	0.133* (.054)	0.272*** (.069)	-0.160** (.049)	0.192*** (.052)	0.135** (.050)	0.278*** (.054)	0.266*** (.051)
South East	0.228** (.070)	0.214*** (.061)	0.163* (.071)	-0.141** (.053)	0.108* (.053)	0.119* (.051)	-0.024 (.057)	-0.034 (.054)
South	0.157** (.060)	0.143* (.056)	0.181* (.073)	-0.103* (.051)	0.164** (.053)	0.163** (.051)	0.216*** (.055)	0.211*** (.052)
South West	0.269*** (.063)	0.250*** (.057)	0.231** (.078)	-0.073 (.055)	0.060 (.056)	0.106* (.054)	0.235*** (.061)	0.184** (.059)
West	0.242*** (.066)	0.167** (.061)	0.267*** (.075)	-0.175** (.054)	0.100+ (.058)	0.091 (.056)	0.131* (.060)	0.092 (.057)
North West	0.399*** (.064)	0.311*** (.059)	0.301*** (.076)	0.072 (.054)	0.084 (.056)	0.096+ (.054)	0.149** (.056)	0.131* (.053)
Center	0.191** (.063)	0.180** (.058)	0.127+ (.077)	-0.253*** (.056)	0.001 (.055)	0.004 (.053)	0.068 (.059)	0.078 (.056)
Interest in politics	-0.056* (.022)	-0.044* (.020)	0.046* (.021)	-0.005 (.015)	0.148*** (.021)	0.128*** (.021)	0.153*** (.020)	0.126*** (.019)
Vote for governing party	0.290*** (.032)	0.217*** (.030)	0.243*** (.047)	0.146** (.036)	0.316*** (.028)	0.285*** (.028)	0.177* (.057)	0.147* (.057)
Interpersonal trust	0.138*** (.036)	0.114*** (.034)	0.267*** (.041)	0.169*** (.026)	0.167*** (.027)	0.144*** (.026)	0.112*** (.027)	0.091*** (.026)
Communism was bad	0.045 (.053)	0.019 (.054)	0.106** (.040)	0.074** (.026)	0.020 (.026)	0.005 (.026)	0.070* (.032)	0.036 (.030)
Current personal situation	0.092*** (.017)	0.030+ (.016)	---	0.043* (.017)	0.027 (.019)	0.002 (.018)	0.068** (.024)	0.033 (.023)
Future personal situation	0.118*** (.019)	0.064*** (.018)	0.067** (.022)	0.065*** (.015)	0.048* (.019)	0.030 (.018)	0.120*** (.019)	0.082*** (.017)
Satisfaction with life	---	---	0.116*** (.024)	0.119*** (.019)	0.100*** (.020)	0.058** (.020)	0.148*** (.022)	0.084*** (.022)
Satisfaction with democracy	---	0.221*** (.024)	---	---	---	0.115*** (.019)	---	0.116*** (.020)
Satisfaction with Market economy	---	0.190*** (.023)	---	---	---	0.090*** (.019)	---	0.118*** (.022)
R ²	0.285	0.392	0.228	0.208	0.204	0.258	0.234	0.308
Adjusted R ²	0.275	0.383	0.214	0.200	0.196	0.250	0.225	0.299
N	1512	1512	1174	2074	2212	2212	1800	1800

Notes: *** p < 0.001, ** p < 0.010, * p < 0.050, + p < 0.100. Unstandardized regression coefficients and (standard errors). Data sources: USIA 1992, COMALP 1995, BOP 1999, BOP 2002, BOP 2005.

which institutional trust indicates diffuse support for democracy. In the Romanian context, however, institutional trust seems to be determined primarily by evaluations.

It could be argued that the highly educated acted throughout the transition as guardians of democracy, always ready to punish the state's institution for what they see as departures from the 'normal' behavior of democratic institutions. Since previous studies in other post-communist countries in Central and Eastern Europe did not find such a negative effect, it would be interesting to find out if this effect is characteristic to Romania only. Given the characteristics of the Romanian transition, the most likely candidates for testing the existence of the negative effect of education are other countries in the region that have also had a troubled transition.

A similar negative effect can be observed for residence in urban areas (in line with the *Residence – TSI* hypothesis). Belonging to a minority group (either ethnic or religious) does not have any effect on trust in the state's institutions, contradicting the *Nationality – TSI* and *Religion – TSI* hypotheses, which stated that minority groups (especially those defined by ethnicity) should have lower levels of institutional trust. Church attendance does seem to have a positive effect, but only during the middle of the transition, offering thus only partial support to the *Religiosity – TSI* hypothesis. Overall, this first set of variables shows that the same variables that had a significant effect on diffuse support for democratic and market economy values also influence institutional trust: education, residence in urban areas, and, to a smaller degree, age.

Residents of development regions other than Bucharest generally have higher levels of trust in the state's institutions (1999 is an exception which I already explained when discussing the effects of the region variables in the SES and region model).³²¹ While it is true that Bucharest is different from the rest of the country (more developed, more educated, richer, and more modern) I believe that part of the significant positive effect of the development regions is generated by the fact that the distance between the central institutions and the citizens is larger (both physically and mentally) in their case.³²² It is also interesting to note that the two development regions that seem to be more similar to Bucharest are Center and West, regions that are not only more

³²¹ These variables were less important in the models presented in the previous chapter.

³²² The chances of direct contact with the central institutions are greatly reduced, and the evaluations of these institutions are based primarily on secondary experiences (i.e. mass media). Since the patterns of mass-media consumption are different in these regions (more reliance on information received from TV stations and local newspapers rather than the central newspapers), residents of these regions receive a less negative image of the central institutions.

developed than the rest of the country (excepting Bucharest) but that are also characterized by increased feelings of regional pride and distrust towards the central institutions.³²³

Voting intention for the governing party has a significant positive effect on trust in the state's institutions. However, in contrast with the previous results, which showed very clearly that the effect of voting intention was dependent on the governing party, the dependency in this case is weakened: in 1999, when CDR was in power, the coefficient is smaller than in 1995 or 2002, when PSD was in power, but it is still significant and positive. In 2005, when PSD was again in opposition, the effects is only marginally significant but it is positive (moreover, as I argued when discussing Figure 17, although 2005 was the first year in a new electoral cycle, the honeymoon effect was no longer evident towards the end of the transition). Trust in the state's institutions is the first dependent variable analyzed here which is influenced by the voting intention in the way described by Anderson. Interest in politics, the second variable of political participation in the model, has a negative effect in 1992, but after that its effect is significant and positive, offering support for the *Vote – TSI* hypothesis and confirming Dowley and Silver's finding (2003).³²⁴

Interpersonal trust has a consistent significant positive effect on trust in the state's institutions (a similar effect was found on trust in traditional institutions as well), suggesting there might be a certain type of spillover effect that makes people that are generally more trusting at the individual level also trust more the state's institutions.³²⁵

³²³ The most significant attempts to frame important issues in terms of a center – periphery divide have come from these regions (and, perhaps, the Cluj county, which is close to both regions and is a powerful influence center, especially for the Center region). Most of these debates referred primarily to economic issues (e.g. the ratio of the counties' contribution to state budget versus the state contribution to the counties' budget). More recently, in some of the political parties (especially PSD and PD) the local organizations from these two regions have started opposing their party leadership (mostly from Bucharest) more openly.

³²⁴ Explaining the negative effect recorded in 1992 is quite difficult. It is possible that the effect was the result of the fact that 1992 was an electoral year, with a very heated electoral campaign that might have accentuated the negative feelings of the supporters of the democratic opposition towards the institutions of the state (which were completely controlled by PSD). This explanation, however, is only a speculation that cannot be tested with the available data.

³²⁵ A similar effect was found by Kaase (1999) in Western European countries and by Dowley and Silver (2003) in post-communist countries. The size of the effect, however, is rather small.

The next group of variables in the model captures the effect of different types of evaluation on institutional trust. The variable measuring negative evaluations of the communist regime has a weak significant positive effect only in 1995 and 1999 which I believe to be determined by the absence of the two indicators of specific support from the model (the two models for 2005 offer some evidence for this interpretation). If this is true, then institutional trust is not affected by how people evaluate the communist regime.

Evaluations of the personal situation have a significant positive effect: the more satisfied a person is with its personal life, the higher the trust in the state's institutions. It is interesting to note that respondents base their trust decision on how they expect their personal situation to be in the near future rather than on their situation during the previous year. The results for these two variables suggest that the prospective pocketbook theory is more appropriate in the Romanian context.³²⁶ In addition to these evaluations, the more general indicator of satisfaction with life also has a significant positive effect. In the models presented in the previous chapter, satisfaction with life did not have a significant effect on diffuse support for democracy, for market economy, or for democratic values. These findings suggest that trust in the state's institutions seems to be more an indicator of specific rather than of diffuse support (which should not be influenced by evaluations of short term performance).

The last variables in the model are the two indicators of specific support for democracy and market economy. Given their high correlations with institutional trust, for 1992, 2002, and 2005 I present in Table 14 models both with and without these variables. Adding satisfaction with the way democracy and market economy function in Romania in the model leads to a significant increase in the proportion of explained variance in the dependent variable and, generally, to relatively smaller coefficients for the other independent variables. Overall, however, the interpretation of the results remains the same. Both variables have significant positive effects, but these effects are significantly weaker at the end of the transition compared to the beginning of the transition. The weakening of this effect, coupled with the disappearance of the honeymoon effect observed in Figure 17 suggest that although institutional trust seems to be an indicator of specific support it also seems to have a diffuse support

³²⁶ For the 2005 dataset I also estimated a model (results not shown) that included among the independent variables evaluations of the state of the economy at the national level during the previous year. This variable had a significant positive effect, suggesting that in addition to the prospective pocketbook approach the retrospective sociotropic approach might also have an effect on institutional trust. Unfortunately, this variable was not available in the other years included in analysis and I could not verify whether this effect was significant throughout the transition.

component that has become more important over time. If the trends I described here will continue I expect that in a relatively short period of time (within 10 years) institutional trust will begin to behave more as an indicator of diffuse support. For the moment, however, from the group of attitudinal variables trust in the state's institutions is strongly influenced by evaluations of the personal life (the *Satisfaction – TSI* and *Economy – TSI* hypotheses) and more general evaluations of the functioning of the political and economic system.

Looking at the strengths of the effects for all three types of variables, the two variables of specific support have the strongest effects when they are included in the model (.6 points in 1992 and about .35 points in 2002 and 2005 on a four-point scale). Satisfaction with life also has a relatively stronger effect (.35 points in 1995 and 1999 and about .2 points in the last two years). Evaluations of the future personal situation have the same effect in all years in which their coefficient is significant: .2 points. With the exception of 2002, development regions have a relatively strong effect (about .25 - .30 points on a four-point scale). Finally, education also has a strong effect starting with 1995 (.2 - .3 points) while all other demographic variables have weaker effects (about .15 points or less). Overall, the strongest effects are recorded for the specific support variables, followed by evaluation variables, development region, and education.

Summary

The measures of diffuse support for the principles of the political and economic system presented in the previous two chapters showed a population that has become more and more attached to the ideals of democracy and market economy. The structure of the new system, however, does not enjoy similar levels of support. Of the different types of institutions that function in a democracy, Romanians have the most trust in the traditional institutions (the church and the army), which have the least democratic internal structure, and have the least trust in the state's central institutions (parliament, cabinet, presidency, and political parties), which are considered to represent the main structure of a democratic regime. The level of trust in the state's local institutions and in civil society institutions places these two types between the two extremes discussed above.

In Chapter 2 I argued that there is disagreement in the literature regarding the type of support that is captured by the trust in institutions indicator (some authors consider it an indicator of diffuse support, while others see it either as measuring specific support or as combining both types of support).

The results presented here suggest that trust in institutions in post-communist Romania should be interpreted as primarily an indicator of specific support, because it is strongly influenced by evaluations of personal situation and evaluations of the functioning of democracy and market economy. Throughout the transition the decision to trust the state institutions has been based on these evaluations. At the same time, the evolution of some of the effects of these evaluations suggests that the indicator of trust in institutions also contains a diffuse support dimension that seems to become more important over time.

The differences in the levels of trust for the different institutions analyzed in this chapter might also be influenced by another factor, which I have discussed only very briefly: the way people perceive these institutions. As shown in Figure 16, the most trusted institution in Romania are the church and the army, both institutions that are removed from the political arena and that are generally perceived (with some exceptions in the case of the church during the first half of the transition) as non-partisan institutions.

From the group of central state institutions, the most trusted is the presidency, which, at least theoretically, is also a non-partisan institution that is supposed to represent the whole population (the presidential candidates can be party members, but the elected president cannot have any political affiliation). Although all Romanian post-communist presidents have failed to really act in a non-partisan way, they often declared that they represent all Romanians, regardless of their political opinions, and some of their actions (e.g. trying to find solutions to significant political or economic problems by meeting with all political parties) helped create such an image for at least a part of the population. Among the groups of civil society institutions, mass media is the only one which was perceived as becoming more independent over time and it is also the only one which has managed to attract more trust during the transition, especially after 1996, suggesting that the interpretation of trust as being influenced by the perceived partisanship might be correct. Unfortunately, this argument cannot be tested with the available data.

It seems, thus, that at the beginning of the transition, when most of the state's institutions were new, respondents based their trust decisions on the only information they could easily obtain: the incumbents' behavior. The existence of a strong honeymoon effect offers additional support to this interpretation. Unfortunately, this strategy has led to a significant decrease in the level of trust in the state's institutions and, as people became more accustomed to the institutions, this trust based on incumbent behavior seems to have been transformed into diffuse support for the institutions. This conclusion may be confirmed or not by future data, but for now it seems that institutional trust is slowly changing from being mainly a form of specific support to being a form

of diffuse support for the structure of the system. What this means is that more and more people will begin thinking of the state's institutions in terms of their functions rather than in terms of their incumbents or their performance. The transformation of specific support to diffuse support, however, will leave the state's institutions faced with very low levels of trust and it will probably take a long period of time for these institutions to gain the support of a large part of the population.

The results presented here complement the results presented in the previous chapter: most of the population subgroups that were characterized by higher levels of diffuse support for democracy and market economy are also characterized by lower levels of trust in the state's institutions. Thus, younger people, more educated people, people living in urban areas, and those living in Bucharest are both more supportive of the principles of the system and have less trust in the institutions. This confirms again that institutional trust has a strong evaluative component and the idea that these 'modernizing' groups in the Romanian society have acted as democracy watchdogs, constantly and relentlessly drawing attention to the 'undemocratic' practices of the state's institutions.

Some of the results also indicate a series of problems that need to be addressed before the quality of the Romania democracy will improve. Given the characteristics of the Romanian orthodox church, the fact that the church is trusted more than any other institution by 90% of the population is problematic. Trusting an institution that promotes a submissive attitude, that is very conservative, that promotes intolerance toward different minority groups, and that has often tried to influence the political arena is not going to help citizens become more democratic.

Another problem comes from the fact that in a country that has a parliamentary-presidential system with a very weak president (constitutionally), the presidency is the most trusted central state institution. This indicates that a large part of the population still believes in the idea of a single strong leader that can solve most of the problems. Recent events in Romanian politics seem to have acted as a catalyst for the distrust in the Romanian political class, placing at the top of the public agenda the issue of changing the structure of the political system on two dimensions: first, it is widely recognized that the constitution does not offer clear and consistent rules for the separation of power, especially with respect to the parliament and the president, and that it needs to be modified, and second, distrust in political parties and politicians in general has increased support for the idea of replacing the current voting system (closed party lists) with a system that makes the politicians more accountable to the public.

The last problem is that only a small proportion of the population trusts civil society institutions. The Romanian society has remained atomized and

individualized, with very few people willing to 'get involved'. For democracy to improve in Romania, more people need to become more active at the society level, and the state needs to promote this attitude. The improvement of the economy as well as some of the legislation that was recently adopted (e.g. tax deductions for charitable donations) have the potential to increase the proportion of active citizens.

7. Specific support for the action of the system

After discussing diffuse support for the principles of the system and generalized support for the structure of the system in the previous three chapters, in this chapter I focus on the third component of the model discussed in Chapter 2: specific support for the action of the system, which is measured using two indicators of satisfaction with the way democracy and market economy function in Romania.³²⁷ Out of the three forms of support I analyze (support for the principles of the system, support for the structure of the system, and support for the action of the system), this type is the most volatile and the most likely to be strongly influenced, according to Easton, by the perceived general performance of the political and economic systems.

At the same time, the importance of specific support depends on the level of diffuse support and on time. In a system that is characterized by high levels of diffuse support, short periods of time with low levels of specific support should not have significant effects on the system, while long periods of time with low levels of specific support might have a negative effect on diffuse support. In a system with low levels of diffuse support even short periods of low levels of specific support may decrease diffuse support even more, increasing the risk of a legitimacy crisis.

In the first section of the chapter I present the evolution of specific support for democracy and market economy, by comparison to the evolution of diffuse support. The results will show that Romania was characterized by a pattern that combined an increase in diffuse support with a decrease in specific support both for democracy and market economy. The results will also show a remarkable similarity in the evolution of specific support for democracy and specific support for market economy, suggesting that the two forms of support have common determinants.

In the last two sections of the chapter I discuss the factors that affect specific support for democracy and for market economy. The results will show

³²⁷ Specific support for democracy is measured by the item “How satisfied are you with the way democracy is working in Romania” while specific support for market economy is measured by the item “How satisfied are you with the way market economy is working in Romania.” Both items use a five-point scale, from ‘very unsatisfied’ to ‘very satisfied’.

that the factors that influence specific support are different from the factors that affect diffuse support. The most important predictors in the case of specific support are the evaluations of the state of the economy. Support for the governing party also has a significant effect. A second significant finding will show that the effects of the demographic variables change their signs during the transition, a phenomenon which I discuss in both sections.

The evolution of specific support

In Figure 20 I present the evolution of specific support for democracy and market economy. I also included in the figure, for comparison purposes, the two indicators of diffuse support (originally presented in Figure 3 and Figure 9). Unfortunately, from 1994 to 2001 (the middle of the transition) the two indicators of specific support are not available (with the exception of specific support for democracy in 1997 and 1999), so the trend during this period of time is estimated based on the available data. Thus, although it is clear that specific support decreased from 1994 to 2001, it should be noted that changes during this period are not visible.


With this data limitation in mind, how did specific support change during the transition? The results presented in Figure 20 show three significant trends. First, with respect to evolution over time, specific support for both democracy and market economy has decreased from 1990 to 2002, with only minor variations.³²⁸ After 2002, specific support seems to increase until 2004 and then shows a slight decrease, but the general trend beginning with 2002 is one of a slow increase in specific support for both democracy and market economy.

The evolution of specific support for market economy offers some support in favor of the *SSM change* hypothesis: specific support for market economy stays low throughout the transition and it slightly increases towards the end of the transition, when the economic situation started to improve in Romania (the percentage of people satisfied with market economy varied between a high of 37% in 1992 to a low of 11% in 2002, the average for the transition being only 20%). With respect to the second dependent variable, the *SSD change* hypothesis (which stated an increase in the level of specific support for democracy over time) is not supported by the data: specific support for democracy not only shows a clear decreasing trend, followed by a slow increase

³²⁸ Specific support increased from 1991 to 1992 by roughly 9% in the case of satisfaction with democracy and by 6% in the case of satisfaction with market economy.

at the end of the transition, but it also records rather low values throughout the transition (the percentage of people satisfied with the functioning of democracy varied between 58% in 1990 and 17% in 2002, with the average for the whole transition being around 32%).

Figure 20 Specific support for democracy and market economy (% positive support)



The second significant finding is the remarkable similarity between the evolution of specific support for democracy and specific support for market economy. The two variables have an almost identical evolution, with the only difference being that satisfaction with democracy is, on the average, almost 11% higher than satisfaction with the functioning of market economy (the difference is higher, around 14%, at the beginning of the transition, and lower, around 8%, at the end of the transition). While the low levels of satisfaction with market economy can be explained by the fact that the Romanian economy suffered a long recession during the transition and started to improve only after 2000, the developments in the political sector followed a different trend and this should have probably led to a different evolution of specific support for democracy than the observed one.

After a rather violent beginning of the transition (violent ethnic clashes between Romanians and Hungarians in Târgu Mureş in March 1990, miners beating intellectuals in Bucharest in June 1990 and occupying the Parliament

and forcing the Prime Minister to resign in April 1991) the political situation in Romania normalized.³²⁹ Similarly, after the initial confusion that led to an inflation of political parties, starting with the 1992 elections the number of relevant political parties has decreased throughout the transition. Following the 1996 elections Romania experienced the first peaceful transfer of power, and the second one took place after the 2000 elections.

Despite these improvements in the political context of Romania, people seemed to be less and less satisfied with the functioning of democracy. A graph presenting only this variable would be quite difficult to interpret, given the contradiction between the real situation in the country and the respondents' evaluation of this situation. Once specific support for market economy is taken into account, however, a possible explanation for this trend is quite visible in Figure 20: it seems that satisfaction with democracy is closely related to satisfaction with market economy (the correlation coefficient between the percentage of people satisfied with democracy and the percentage of people satisfied with market economy for the eight years with complete data is .992).³³⁰ The results presented in Table 16 offer some evidence that supports this interpretation (the evaluation variables have a consistent positive effect on satisfaction with democracy).

Finally, the third important finding in Figure 20 is that specific support for democracy and market economy and diffuse support for democracy and market economy have different evolutions over time, suggesting that the two

³²⁹ After 1991 the only significant instance of political violence was recorded in January 1999 when 15,000 miners from Jiu Valley started marching to Bucharest protesting against the restructuring of the mining sector. After the police forces failed to stop the march (some of the troops were captured by the miners), negotiations between Prime Minister Radu Vasile and the leader of the miners, Miron Cozma solved the crisis. Although the conflict was generated, apparently, by economic issues, the involvement of the Greater Romania Party (PRM) and the actions of the miners (army specialists argued that the miners used military tactics) suggest that this was in fact an attempt to overthrow the government.

³³⁰ The questionnaires in 1991, 1992, and 1993 asked the democracy item on the first page and the market economy item on the third, fourth, and sixth page, respectively (the two items were separated, on the average, by 40 other items). Starting with 2002 the two items were asked in sequence, with the democracy item being asked first. While the position of the items after 2002 might suggest a possible response bias, the results for the first three data points suggest that even if a response bias does exist, its effect is minimal. See also the correlations between the two items in Table A-32 in the appendix.

forms of support are not strongly related.³³¹ This finding is consistent with Easton's argument that specific support does not have a significant effect on diffuse support in the short run.³³² It is interesting, however, that diffuse support for both democracy and market economy has stayed at (or increased to) high levels despite a rather long period (17 years) of low levels of satisfaction. Easton argued that prolonged periods of low specific support have the potential to decrease the level of diffuse support. The finding presented here contradicts this expectation and raises the questions of how long does it take for low specific support to have a negative effect on diffuse support and under which circumstances can this effect be observed.

Specific support for democracy

As indicated in the previous section, the Romanian citizens have become less and less satisfied with the functioning of democracy during the transition, despite a visible improvement of the political situation in the country and despite a relatively constant level of diffuse support for democracy. The results in Figure 20 suggest that the decrease in the level of specific support for

³³¹ The results in Table 3 support this interpretation: specific support for democracy has a significant effect on diffuse support for democracy only during the middle of the transition, and even then its effect is not very large.

³³² It should be noted, however, that the combination of high diffuse support for democracy and low specific support for democracy is quite common in the post-communist world. Data from the fourth wave of the World Values Survey (data collected between 1999 and 2001) shows the following average levels of support for democracy: in the post-communist countries diffuse support = 88%, specific support = 30%; in Latin America diffuse support = 89%, specific support = 48%; in the older democracies in Western Europe diffuse support = 94%, specific support = 61%; in the newer democracies in Western Europe (Spain, Portugal, and Greece) diffuse support = 95%, specific support = 67%. Within the post-communist world, significant differences exist function of the success of the transition. Thus, in the countries that joined the EU in 2005 diffuse support = 87%, specific support = 34%. In the countries that joined the EU in 2007 (Bulgaria and Romania) diffuse support = 88%, specific support = 24%. Finally, in the countries that did not join the EU (Croatia, Ukraine, Belarus) diffuse support = 90%, specific support = 22%. The countries within each group are quite similar, with the exception of Italy, which seems more similar to the post-communist countries: diffuse support = 97%, specific support = 35%. These results show that although specific support is smaller than diffuse support in all groups of countries, the difference between the two is significantly larger in the post-communist world.

democracy might be explained by the significant effect of the evaluations of the economic situation. In this section I discuss in detail the factors that have an effect on specific support for democracy. First I focus on the bivariate relationships between specific support for democracy and different demographic variables and then I analyze the effects of demographic, regional, and attitudinal variables in the multivariate context.³³³

I begin the analysis by presenting ANOVA results showing the differences in the average level of specific support for democracy across population subgroups defined by demographic characteristics and across time.³³⁴ Before discussing the results in detail it should be noted as a general finding that, in contrast to the other dependent variables analyzed in this project (diffuse support for democracy, diffuse support for market economy, and trust in the state's institutions), the differences in specific support for democracy between the different population subgroups change their sign during the transition.³³⁵

I believe the significance of this finding can be identified by comparing the results presented here to those presented in Table 2 and Table 4. The results presented in these tables showed that throughout the transition higher levels of diffuse support for democracy could be observed for men, younger people, more educated people, and people living in the urban areas. The same population subgroups seem to be less satisfied with democracy at the beginning of the transition but at some point during the transition they become more satisfied with the functioning of democracy, compared to the other subgroups.

This suggests that different population subgroups evaluate the way democracy is developing in Romania based on different criteria. While the population as a whole seems to evaluate the functioning of democracy based on the state of the economy, this seems to be the main factor used by the less

³³³ For the regression analyses I selected one of the three years at the beginning of the transition (1992) and two of the five years at the end of the transition (2002 and 2005) in which both specific support for democracy and specific support for market economy were available. The selection of years for the ANOVAs was done subject to the availability of the dependent variables.

³³⁴ The mean differences are presented in Table A-31 in the appendix.

³³⁵ For instance, the comparison between those poorly educated (4 grades or less) and those with a high school diploma shows that during the first half of the transition (1990 and 1997) those who finished high school were less satisfied with the functioning of democracy. Towards the end of the transition, however, the difference is reversed and those with a high school diploma are more satisfied with democracy. A similar trend can be observed for all demographic variables in Table 17.

democratic groups, whereas the most democratic groups seem to also take into account the political situation.

An example might clarify this idea. At the beginning of the transition (1990) the more educated a person was, the lower its level of satisfaction with democracy. As I have argued before, the first years of the transition were characterized by significant problems on the political arena and it seems that the more educated reacted to these ‘departures from normality’ by being less satisfied with the way the Romanian democracy was developing. Over time the Romanian democracy improved and this might explain why at the end of the transition the more educated are more satisfied with the functioning of democracy. In the case of the less educated, at the beginning of the transition they did not seem to be disillusioned by the problems of the Romanian democracy. As soon as they began paying the costs of the economic transition, however, they became less satisfied with the functioning of the democracy.³³⁶ While this is only a tentative explanation of the findings presented here, I believe it is one that fits the data to a certain extent.

The left panel in Table 17 shows that the sign reversal of the previously discussed differences happened prior to 1997 for the groups defined by gender and for most of the groups defined by education, between 1997 and 2002 for the groups defined by age and for those with the lowest level of education, and after 2002 for the groups defined by residence area. The voting intention variable shows that throughout the transition those who support the governing party are more satisfied with the way democracy works, regardless of which parties are governing.³³⁷

The results in Table A-31 in the appendix show very large differences in the average level of specific support for democracy between the two groups defined by support / opposition to the governing party. In 1990 the average level of specific support among those who were intending to vote for the governing party was 1.33 points higher (on a five-point scale) than the average level of support among the opponents of the governing party. Over time the difference between the two groups has decreased (.53 in 1997, .21 in 2002, and .38 in 2005).

A possible interpretation for this effect might reside in the fact that the satisfaction generated by having one’s preferred party in power was higher at the beginning of the transition compared to later in the transition. Over time people became accustomed to choosing their leaders through elections and it is also

³³⁶ A similar argument can be made for the population subgroups defined by age and residence.

³³⁷ In 1990 and in 2002 PSD was the governing party, while in 1997 and 2005 the PSD group was in opposition.

Table 17 Differences in average level of specific support for democracy

	1990	1997	2002	2005	90 - 97	90 - 02	90 - 05	97 - 02	97 - 05	02 - 05
Men vs. women	▽	▲	x	▲	▲	▲	▲	x	▽	▽
					Men			x		
					Women			x		
Under 30 vs. 31 - 60	▽	x	▲	x	▲	▲	x	▽	▽	▽
Under 30 vs. over 61	▽	▽	▲	▲	▲	▲	▲	x	▽	▽
31 - 60 vs. over 61	▽	▽	x	x	▲	▲	▲	▲	x	▽
4 grades or less vs. 5 - 8 grades	x	▲	▽	x	▲	▲	▲	▲	x	▽
4 grades or less vs. 9 - 11 grades	x	▲	▽	x	▲	▲	▲	x	▽	▽
4 grades or less vs. high school plus	▲	▲	▽	▽	▲	▲	▲	▽	▽	▽
4 grades or less vs. university plus	▲	x	▽	▽	▲	▲	▲	x	▽	▽
5 - 8 grades vs. 9 - 11 grades	x	x	x	x	x	▲	x	x	▽	▽
5 - 8 grades vs. high school plus	▲	x	x	▽	▲	▲	▲	x	▽	▽
5 - 8 grades vs. university plus	▲	x	x	▽	▲	▲	▲	x	▽	▽
9 - 11 grades vs. high school plus	▲	▽	x	▽	▲	▲	▲	x	▽	▽
9 - 11 grades vs. university plus	▲	▽	x	▽	▲	▲	▲	x	▽	▽
High school plus vs. university plus	▲	x	x	x	x	▲	x	x	▽	▽
Urban vs. rural	▽	▽	▽	▲	▲	▲	x	x	▽	▽
					Urban			x		
					Rural			x	x	▽
Orthodox vs. non-orthodox	▲	▽	x	▽	▲	▲	▲	x	▽	▽
					Orthodox			x		
					Non-orthodox			▲	x	▽
Vote power vs. vote opposition	▲	▲	▲	▲	▲	▲	▲	x	▽	▽
					Vote power			x		
					Vote opposition			▽	▽	▽
N	1565	1000	2212	1776						

Note: x indicates no significant differences. ▲ indicates that the first group in the compared pair has a significantly higher average score (p<.05). ▽ indicates that the first group in the compared pair has a significantly lower average score (p<.05). Data sources: USIA 1990, WVS 1997, BOP 2002, BOP/WVS 2005.

also possible that they understood that in a democracy one does not win all the time. Getting used to the idea that democracy offers only temporary advantages to the winners might have decreased the satisfaction of being a winner.

The right panel shows that at the end of the transition only three population subgroups managed to have a satisfaction level similar to the one they had at the beginning of the transition: people under 30 years, people with a college degree, and those residing in urban areas (i.e. the more modern groups in the Romanian society). All other groups are less satisfied with the functioning of democracy in 2005 than they were at the beginning of the transition.

Before discussing the results of the regression analyses I stop for a moment to discuss the political situation in Romania in each of the three years included in analysis, hoping that this information will help interpret the regression results better.

The 1992 survey was conducted in April, five months before the general parliamentary and presidential elections and two months after the local elections which marked some significant victories for the opposition parties in some of the larger cities. Compared to the other years included in analysis it can be said that at the time of the 1992 survey people were paying much more attention to the political developments and the political parties were already mobilizing for the upcoming elections. Economically, the country was in the middle of the first recession but at the time of the survey the government was trying to buy some votes by offering additional support to those who have been affected the most by the economic transition. Politically, after Prime Minister Petre Roman was replaced in September 1991 (under pressure from the miners) with Theodor Stolojan (who was generally perceived as a technocrat rather than having a strong political affiliation) the political situation was starting to normalize.

2002 was the middle of the 2001 – 2004 electoral cycle, with PSD controlling (alone) both the parliament and the presidency. While the macro-economic indicators show that the economy started improving in 2000, 2002 was the first year in which this improvement could be observed at the individual level: unemployment and inflation were decreasing and the real income was increasing. Being a midterm year, the political context was quite calm. It should be noted, however, that although PSD was the governing party both in 1992 and in 2002, the 2002 PSD was quite different from the 1992 PSD. The country had already advanced significantly towards democracy and market economy and PSD was continuing the reforms that had been initiated by the CDR government. The most important goals of the government at the moment were related to foreign policy: Romania was actively trying to become a NATO and EU member and these issues were at the top of the public agenda.

The last year included in the regression models, 2005, was the first year in the 2005 – 2009 electoral cycle. In the November 2004 elections PSD was replaced by a coalition government composed by the liberals, the democrats, and other minor parties, while the PSD presidential candidate (former Prime Minister Adrian Năstase) lost the elections in favor of Traian Băsescu (the presidential candidate of the democrats). The 2004 election results were partly determined by the failure of PSD to convince the EU to accept Romania as a member at the beginning of 2005, at the same time with the other post-communist countries. While the population was disappointed by this missed opportunity, it also knew that it had one more chance and it hoped that the new government would be able to finalize the accession process. Since 2005 was also the first year of the new government, the general mood in the population was one of optimism. Economically, the country was in a better situation than in any of the previous years. Overall, 1992 was a year in which Romania still had significant economic and political problems and in which the population was mobilized due to the upcoming elections, 2002 was characterized by the beginning of economic recovery, while 2005 was characterized by an optimistic outlook at the population level.

Moving on to the results of the regression analyses, Table A-33 presents the results of the models containing the demographic and development region variables. The multiple determination coefficients show that both groups of variables explain roughly the same amount of variance. The SES and region model, however, shows that the total effect of the two groups of variables is rather small: they explain less than 5% of the variance in all years and, in the case of 2005, even less than 1%. It should also be noted that the coefficients of the demographic variables are practically unchanged when controlling for the development region, while the region coefficients change both their size and their significance when controlling for the demographic variables.

Most of the effects of the demographic variables disappear in the multivariate context. Moreover, none of the demographic variables has a consistent effect throughout the transition, offering some additional support for the finding of changing effects reported in the previous table.

Age has a significant positive effect in 1992, but only for those over 60, and a negative effect in 2002, but only for those with ages between 31 and 60. Education has a marginally significant negative effect at the beginning of the transition and a significant positive effect at the end of the transition, confirming the finding in the bivariate relationship. Residents of urban areas have a lower level of specific support for democracy in 2002 but in the other years the effect is not significant. Finally, religion has a significant positive effect at the beginning of the transition. Overall, the coefficients of the demographic variables do not offer a very clear image of the effects on the

dependent variables. This is probably the result of the fact that the effects of the demographic variables change over time, combined with the fact that in most cases the effects are very close to the conventional .05 significance level, so that even minor changes can lead to changes in the level of significance. As I will show later, when the attitudinal variables are also included in the model the effects of the demographic variables change again.

Most of the coefficients for the development region variables fail to achieve significance. The exceptions are the South, South West, and West regions, which have a positive effect in 1992, and the South West (negative effect) and the North East (positive effect) regions in 2002. The South West region is showing, once again, different effects over time.

The attitudinal model presented in Table A-34 explains significantly more variance in satisfaction with the functioning of democracy (about 15%), compared to the SES and region model.³³⁸ Both political participation variables and evaluation variables have significant effects, with the last group of variables having a stronger and more consistent effect on the dependent variables.³³⁹ This confirms the theoretical expectation stated in Chapter 2, when I argued that specific support is determined primarily by evaluation variables and that most of the demographic variables should not have significant effects. I discuss the effects of the attitudinal variables in the context of the full model, referring to the results of the attitudinal model only if it shows significant differences.

The full model, which adds the attitudinal variables to the SES and region model, is presented in Table 16. It should be noted that the model explains approximately 17%-18% of the variance in satisfaction with the functioning of democracy when all three groups of variables are taken into account, with the largest contribution to the multiple determination coefficients coming from the attitudinal variables.³⁴⁰

³³⁸ The correlations between specific support for democracy and the attitudinal variables are presented in Table A-32 in the appendix. The average correlation increases from .16 in 1992 to .22 in 2005.

³³⁹ In addition to the models presented in Table A-34 I also estimated a set of models (results not shown) which included two variables of evaluation of the responsiveness of the political system: agreement / disagreement with the statements "people like me can influence important local decisions" and "people like me can influence important national decisions." Only one coefficient (influence national decisions in 1992) is significant, suggesting that specific support for democracy is affected more by economic evaluations rather than evaluations of the political system.

³⁴⁰ I also estimated models including the two variables of evaluation of the political system (results not shown). The only significant coefficient was recorded in 1992 for the variable of influence on the national decisions, suggesting again the primacy of economic evaluations in determining specific support for democracy. A third set of

Comparing the results presented here to those of the SES and region model, it can be seen that the addition of the attitudinal variables to the model does change the coefficients of the demographic variables to a certain extent: in some cases (e.g. education) the effects of some demographic variables are explained away by the attitudinal variables, while in others (e.g. age) the coefficients are either reduced or increased. In the previous models for the other dependent variables, the addition of the attitudinal variables had a significantly less important impact on the effects of the demographic variables, suggesting, again, that the mechanism that determines specific support for democracy is quite different from those determining diffuse support or institutional trust.

Overall, the socioeconomic characteristics of the respondents have only minor effects on the dependent variable: gender does not have a significant effect; age has a significant positive effect in 1992 that disappears in 2002 and reappears again in 2005, but reduced. The education effect changes depending on the analysis that is used and on what other variables are included in the model. The ANOVA model showed a negative relationship at the beginning of the transition and a positive one at the end of the transition. In the multivariate context education had a significant positive effect in the SES and region model in 2002 and 2005.

When the attitudinal variables are taken into account, education seems to have a significant negative effect and only in 2005. Residence in urban areas has a significant negative effect in 2002 only. Religion also has a positive effect, but only at the beginning of the transition. The development region variables have mostly non-significant effects (there are four significant coefficients, but they do not show a very clear image).

As I argued before, there are several factors that can account for the significant variation in the coefficients of the demographic and regional variables and I should add that these variations can also be influenced by the differences between the economic and political contexts at the time the surveys were conducted. Overall, however, the SES and region variables bring only a minor contribution to the explanation of satisfaction with the way democracy is working in Romania.

The attitudinal variables have a stronger effect on the level of specific support for democracy. Those who are interested in politics are significantly

models included evaluations of the cabinet's activities among the individual variables (results not shown) in 2002 and 2005. In both years satisfaction with the cabinet's activities had a strong positive effect on the dependent variable, and increased the multiple determination coefficients by approximately 50% (to .248 in 2002 and to .274 in 2005). Using this variable in the mode, however, reduces the effects of the other independent variables significantly.

Table 18 Specific support for democracy: full model

	1992	2002	2005
Intercept	0.939 *** (.239)	1.146 *** (.148)	0.788 *** (.174)
Male	-0.006 (.059)	-0.008 (.038)	-0.008 (.043)
Age: 31 - 60	0.181 * (.076)	-0.003 (.048)	0.068 (.056)
Age: Over 61	0.350 ** (.106)	0.011 (.058)	0.153 * (.070)
Education	-0.051 (.032)	0.017 (.020)	-0.051 * (.022)
Residence: Urban	0.125 + (.068)	-0.105 * (.041)	-0.054 (.047)
Religion: Orthodox	0.244 * (.095)	-0.085 (.062)	-0.055 (.071)
Church attendance	0.036 (.033)	0.002 (.029)	0.009 (.032)
North East	0.001 (.114)	0.307 *** (.074)	0.010 (.084)
South East	0.077 (.141)	-0.019 (.076)	0.016 (.087)
South	0.180 (.116)	0.030 (.076)	0.002 (.087)
South West	0.185 (.122)	-0.182 * (.080)	0.165 + (.094)
West	0.365 ** (.124)	0.123 (.085)	0.112 (.092)
North West	0.479 *** (.123)	0.011 (.079)	0.067 (.089)
Center	-0.003 (.125)	0.019 (.078)	-0.040 (.090)
Interest in politics	-0.018 (.044)	0.121 *** (.031)	0.141 *** (.032)
Vote for governing party	0.250 * (.089)	0.148 *** (.042)	0.148 * (.056)
Communism was bad	0.119 (.126)	0.100 * (.039)	0.168 *** (.046)
Current personal situation	0.255 *** (.033)	0.132 *** (.026)	0.156 *** (.039)
Future personal situation	0.221 *** (.041)	0.101 *** (.027)	0.176 *** (.032)
Satisfaction with life	---	0.211 *** (.030)	0.273 *** (.032)
R ²	0.180	0.173	0.191
Adjusted R ²	0.170	0.166	0.182
N	1565	2212	1776

Notes: *** p < 0.001, ** p < 0.010, * p < 0.050, + p < 0.100. Unstandardized regression coefficients and (standard errors). Data sources: USIA 1992, BOP 2002, BOP 2005.

more satisfied with democracy towards the end of the transition. It is possible that by obtaining more information they have a better understanding of the developments in the political arena, leading them to a less critical attitude. Voting intention has a significant positive effect in all three years, regardless of which party is in power. This suggests the existence of a possible 'winner' effect. Since in 1992 the survey was conducted during a pre-electoral period, it is possible that the effect of voting intention was inflated by that particular context. An alternative explanation is the one I offered when I discussed the bivariate relationship: the satisfaction obtained from betting on the winner decreases once a person realizes that the winners will eventually lose.

Negative evaluations of the communist regime have a significant positive effect at the end of the transition, offering some support for the *Communism – SSD* hypothesis. While the effect is not very large (a sixth of a point on a five point scale), its importance comes from the fact that even in 2005, sixteen years after the revolution, people are still taking into account their evaluations of the communist regime when evaluating the current regime.³⁴¹

It is surprising, however, that this variable does not have a significant effect at the beginning of the transition. Being closer in time to the communist regime, the variable should have had a positive effect. Moreover, this effect should have been even stronger, given the electoral context. Comparing the coefficients of this variable for the 1992 and 2002 model it can be seen that the non-significance of the 1992 coefficient comes from the fact that its standard error is significantly higher, suggesting that the distribution of the variable might be responsible (in 1992 90% of the respondents considered that communism was bad, while in 2002 the corresponding percentage was 44%).

Specific support for democracy is strongly influenced by the evaluation variables included in the model: all coefficients are significant and positive. Evaluations of the personal situation have a significant positive effect both when people think about the evolution of their situation during the previous year and when they are estimating how they are going to live over the next year, showing that specific support for democracy is influenced by both prospective and retrospective evaluations (these findings offer evidence in favor of the *Economy – SSD* hypothesis). It can also be noted that both variables have a larger effect in 1992 compared to the other two years, probably explained by the fact that the economy was performing significantly worse in that year. When the economy performs better (as in 2002 and 2005) the effects seem to be smaller.

³⁴¹ As I have shown in Chapter 4, comparisons with the communist regime are still present in the political arena in Romania: politicians are quite often accusing their opponents of being former communists and many actions of the state's institutions are characterized as being of communist-type.

In addition to these evaluations, the more general indicator of satisfaction with life also has a significant positive effect, confirming the *Satisfaction – SSD* hypothesis.

It should also be noted that the evaluation variables have the strongest effects in terms of size. The total effect of satisfaction with life is about .8 points on a five-point scale, while the total effects of evaluations of the personal situation range from about one point in 1992 to about .8 points in 2005. The effects of all other variables included in the model are less than half a point on a five-point scale, with most of them varying around .2 points. I will return to these results in the last section of the chapter, when I summarize the main conclusions. For now I move the discussion to the factors that affect specific support for market economy.

Specific support for market economy

The difficulties of the economic transition in Romania did not help the evolution of specific support for market economy: as shown in Figure 20 satisfaction with the functioning of market economy has decreased from 1991 to 2002 and only after 2002 it has begun a modest ascending trend. In this section I focus my attention on the factors that affect specific support for market economy both in the bivariate context (through the ANOVA analyses) and in the multivariate context (through regression analyses). Table 19 presents the ANOVA results in a simplified form.³⁴² The comparison of the results for the two dependent variables in this chapter shows significant differences in the effects of the demographic variables.³⁴³ Thus, while the population subgroups were characterized by significant differences in the average level of specific

³⁴² The mean differences are presented in Table A-35 in the appendix. Due to data availability issues (specific support for market economy is not available between 1994 and 2001), the ANOVA results in this section use a different set of years than in the case of specific support. While the last two years are the same in both cases (2002 and 2005), the first two years cover only the beginning of the transition (1991 and 1993) in the analysis presented here, while the analysis presented in the previous section covered both the beginning (1990) and the middle of the transition (1997).

³⁴³ These differences exist despite the almost perfect correlation between the aggregate level of specific support for democracy and the aggregate level of specific support for market economy and despite their almost identical evolution over time. This finding offers additional support for the argument that although specific support for democracy is influenced by economic evaluations it is also affected by other variables.

Table 19 Differences in average level of specific support for market economy

	1991	1993	2002	2005	91 - 93	91 - 02	91 - 05	93 - 02	93 - 05	02 - 05
Men vs. women	x	x	x	x	x	▲	x	▲	x	▽
					Men	▲	x	▲	x	▽
					Women	▲	x	▲	x	▽
Under 30 vs. 31 - 60	x	x	▲	x	x	▲	x	▲	x	▽
Under 30 vs. over 61	x	x	▲	x	▲	▲	x	▲	▽	▽
31 - 60 vs. over 61	x	▽	x	x	x	▲	x	▲	▲	▽
4 grades or less vs. 5 - 8 grades	x	x	x	x	x	▲	x	▲	▲	▽
4 grades or less vs. 9 - 11 grades	x	▲	x	x	x	▲	x	▲	x	▽
4 grades or less vs. high school plus	x	x	▽	▽	x	▲	x	▲	x	▽
4 grades or less vs. university plus	x	▲	▽	▽	x	▲	x	▲	x	▽
5 - 8 grades vs. 9 - 11 grades	x	x	x	x	x	▲	x	x	▽	▽
5 - 8 grades vs. high school plus	x	x	x	▽	x	x	▽	x	x	▽
5 - 8 grades vs. university plus	x	x	x	▽	x	x	▽	x	x	▽
9 - 11 grades vs. high school plus	x	x	x	▽	x	x	▽	x	x	▽
9 - 11 grades vs. university plus	x	x	x	▽	x	x	▽	x	x	▽
High school plus vs. university plus	x	▲	x	x	x	x	▽	x	▽	▽
Urban vs. rural	x	▽	x	▲	▲	▲	x	▲	▽	▽
					Urban	▲	x	▲	▽	▽
					Rural	x	x	▲	x	▽
Orthodox vs. non-orthodox	▲	---	x	x	---	▲	x	---	---	▽
					Orthodox	▲	x	---	---	▽
					Non-orthodox	x	▽	---	---	▽
Vote power vs. vote opposition	▲	▲	▲	▲	x	▲	x	▲	x	▽
					Vote power	▲	x	▲	x	▽
					Vote opposition	▲	x	▲	x	▽
N	1000	1015	2212	1776						

Note: x indicates no significant differences. ▲ indicates that the first group in the compared pair has a significantly higher average score (p<.05). ▽ indicates that the first group in the compared pair has a significantly lower average score (p<.05). Data sources: USIA 1991, USIA 1993, BOP 2002, BOP/WVS 2005.

support for democracy, in the case of specific support for market economy most of the comparisons between the population subgroups do not show significant differences. Men and women have similar levels of satisfaction with the functioning of the Romanian market economy throughout the transition. The comparison of the age-defined population subgroups shows only minor differences: those over 60 are more satisfied than those between 31 and 60 in 1993, while in 2002 the youngest group is more satisfied than those over 31.

The education groups show no differences at the beginning of the transition, some minor differences in 1993 (the relationship is weak and negative in this year), and more consistent differences after 2002 (in 2002 the differences are significant only for the comparisons between the least educated and those with at least a high school diploma, while in 2005 the differences are significant for most comparisons), with the relationship becoming stronger and positive. Residents of urban areas seem to be less satisfied with the functioning of market economy at the beginning of the transition, and more satisfied towards the end (although the differences are significant in only one of the two years for each period). Finally, voting intention has the same effect as in the case of specific support for democracy: supporters of the governing party are more satisfied with the way market economy is functioning in Romania, regardless of the party in power.

In terms of evolution over time (the right panel in Table 19) all population subgroups seem to have followed a similar trend to that recorded for the population as a whole: a decrease of support from 1991 to 2002, followed by an increase from 2002 to 2005. The population subgroups defined by age, education, and residence have started the transition with similar levels of support. Although the changes of support between 1991 and 1993 are not significant within the groups (with the exception of those in the urban areas and those with age between 31 and 60), by 1993 there are already some significant differences between some of the population subgroups. These inter-group differences are quite interesting: those over 60 are more satisfied in 1993 than those with ages between 31 and 60, those with the lowest level of education are more satisfied than those with a college degree, and rural residents are more satisfied than those living in urban areas.

It seems that the groups that should have been affected the most by the transition costs were actually more satisfied with the functioning of the market economy, a finding that is somewhat counterintuitive. The fact that the intra-group differences between 1991 and 1993 are not significant points out toward the explanation for this finding. Despite the fact that the macro-economic indicators presented in Figure 6 – Figure 8 show an economy that was in significant trouble, it seems that the effect of the recession had not been yet felt by the population.

The delay of this effect was generated by the fact that during the first years of the transition the government tried to reduce the transition costs for the population. Moreover, 1992 was an electoral year and the government intensified its efforts to paint the economic situation in nice colors that would not affect its chances to be reelected (and this strategy worked). While the more traditional groups in the society seemed content with the state of the economy as it was described by the government, the more modern groups were already seeing the delays in the economic reforms and the attempts of the government to cover up the real state of the economy, making them less satisfied with the development of the market economy. Thus, these 'reversed' relationships identified in 1993 can be explained by the fact that the more educated groups were evaluating the state of the market economy not only based on economic performance, but also based on their preferences toward the speed of economic reforms.³⁴⁴

After 1993 specific support for market economy decreased in all population subgroups, a trend that was reversed after 2002 so that by the end of the transition all groups had a level of satisfaction similar to the one they had at the beginning of the transition (the exception is the university-educated group, which is significantly more satisfied with market economy in 2005 than it was in 1991). Since starting with 2000 the Romanian economy has improved continuously (and it seems this growth will continue for several years) I expect that over the next few years specific support will continue to increase.³⁴⁵

The last tables in this section present the results of a series of regression models explaining satisfaction with the functioning of market economy in Romania. The SES and region models in Table A-36 show that specific support for market economy, just like specific support for democracy, is only weakly affected by the demographic and the region variables: the two groups of variables together explain only between 2% and 4% of the variance in satisfaction with the Romanian market economy. The individual effects of the independent variables are also very small: with the exception of some development regions which have a .3 points effect on a five-point scale, all other variables have effects that range between .1 and .2 points.

In 1992 the demographic variables have no significant effect. At the end of the transition education has a significant positive effect and residence in urban areas has a significant negative effect in both 2002 and 2005, while age

³⁴⁴ A similar effect was identified in the previous section: the more modern groups were less satisfied with the functioning of the Romanian democracy because of significant political problems, which seems not to matter for the more traditional groups.

³⁴⁵ It is more difficult, however, to say how specific support will change across population subgroups.

has a significant negative effect in 2002 only. Adding the development region variables to the model has no significant effects on the coefficients of the demographic variables. The effects of the development region variables, however, change significantly when the demographic variables are taken into account: nonsignificant coefficient become significant, significant coefficients lose their significance and, in some cases, the coefficients change their signs. However, these changes do not exhibit any significant patterns.

The attitudinal variables in Table A-37 have a strong effect on specific support for market economy (with the exception of interest in politics at the beginning of the transition, all other significant effects are positive): together they explain between 13% and 19% of the variance in the dependent variable.³⁴⁶ The correlations between specific support for market economy and the attitudinal variables are presented in Table A-32 in the appendix. Since I discuss the effects of the attitudinal variables later, in the context of the full model, here I will present only two general remarks. First, by comparison to the model explaining satisfaction with the functioning of democracy, the political participation variables seem to have a less consistent effect in this model. Second, it seems that satisfaction with market economy is not affected by people's evaluation of the communist regime.

The final model (Table 18) shows that most of the variance in specific support for market economy is explained by the attitudinal variables, especially by the evaluations variables.³⁴⁷ Adding this last group of variables to the SES and region model leads to some significant changes in the effects of the demographic variables.

While age had a weak negative effect in the SES and region model in 2002, in the full model age has a significant positive effect in 1992 and 2005 for those over 60 years old. The coefficients for education are also changed: while the effect was significant and positive at the end of the transition in the SES and region model, when attitudinal variables are added to the model the effect of education remains significant only in 2005, when it has a weak negative effect.

³⁴⁶ A similar effect can be observed in the attitudinal model explaining specific support for democracy.

³⁴⁷ Since satisfaction with life has a moderate to high correlation with the dependent variable (around .30) I also estimated a set of models (results not shown) which excluded it from the independent variables. The coefficients of the other variables are not significantly changed by the presence of the satisfaction with life variable in the model. An additional set of models shows that satisfaction with market economy is strongly influenced by satisfaction with the cabinet's activities (the adjusted r-squared coefficient increases to .236 in 2002 and to .303 in 2005). However, this variable explains away most of the effects of the other variables in the model.

Table 20 Specific support for market economy: full model

	1992	2002	2005
Intercept	0.808 *** (.217)	1.108 *** (.143)	0.598 *** (.169)
Male	-0.003 (.056)	-0.008 (.038)	0.007 (.041)
Age: 31 - 60	0.020 (.073)	-0.040 (.046)	0.093+ (.054)
Age: Over 61	0.216 * (.103)	-0.030 (.054)	0.169 ** (.064)
Education	-0.023 (.033)	0.011 (.019)	-0.041 * (.021)
Residence: Urban	0.120+ (.063)	-0.081 * (.041)	-0.111 * (.044)
Religion: Orthodox	0.138 (.092)	-0.050 (.058)	-0.024 (.068)
Church attendance	0.011 (.034)	0.030 (.029)	0.073 * (.030)
North East	-0.091 (.114)	0.210 ** (.072)	0.055 (.079)
South East	0.164 (.146)	-0.106 (.074)	0.065 (.082)
South	-0.011 (.107)	-0.025 (.074)	0.011 (.080)
South West	0.057 (.119)	-0.273 *** (.077)	0.272 ** (.091)
West	0.259 * (.123)	-0.046 (.082)	0.202 * (.087)
North West	0.268 * (.121)	-0.138+ (.077)	0.089 (.084)
Center	0.101 (.114)	-0.033 (.076)	-0.036 (.084)
Interest in politics	-0.067 (.047)	0.084 ** (.030)	0.096 ** (.031)
Vote for governing party	0.382 *** (.065)	0.161 *** (.044)	0.115 * (.054)
Communism was bad	0.115 (.100)	0.040 (.038)	0.117 * (.052)
Current personal situation	0.289 *** (.035)	0.121 *** (.025)	0.140 *** (.037)
Future personal situation	0.215 *** (.045)	0.071 ** (.023)	0.153 *** (.029)
Satisfaction with life	---	0.203 *** (.029)	0.278 *** (.031)
R ²	0.209	0.153	0.189
Adjusted R ²	0.199	0.145	0.180
N	1512	2212	1776

Notes: *** p < 0.001, ** p < 0.010, * p < 0.050, + p < 0.100. Unstandardized regression coefficients and (standard errors). Data sources: USIA 1992, BOP 2002, BOP 2005.

Residence in the urban areas has a significant negative effect towards the end of the transition that seems to be unaffected by the attitudinal variables. Church attendance seems to have a weak positive effect at the end of the transition.

Most of the coefficients of the development region variables are not significant, and out of the six significant coefficients three are very close to the conventional significance level. Just like in the model explaining specific support for democracy, it should be noted that the demographic and the development region variables together explain only a very small part of the variation in the dependent variable.

The effects of the political participation variables are similar to those presented in Table 16: interest in politics increases the satisfaction with market economy towards the end of the transition. The voting intention variable also has a significant positive effect: supporters of the governing party are more satisfied with the functioning of the market economy, not only when the anti-reform PSD was in power but also when the modern PSD or the Liberal – Democrat coalition were governing the country. Just like in the model explaining specific support for democracy, the effect of this variable is significantly stronger in 1992 (which was an electoral year) compared to the effects in 2002 (a midterm year) or in 2005 (the beginning of a new term).

Evaluations of the communist regime have a weak positive effect only in 2005, suggesting that satisfaction with the functioning of the market economy is rather influenced by more current evaluations.³⁴⁸

The last three variables in the model, measuring economic evaluations, have consistent positive effects of similar sizes to the effects they have on specific support for democracy. Respondents who consider their life has improved during the last year are more satisfied with market economy and this effect is increased if they expect the improvements of the personal situation to continue over the next year as well. Just like in Table 16, the economic evaluations have a stronger effect in 1992, when the country was in the middle of the first economic recession. It is also interesting to note that the retrospective evaluations had a stronger effect at the beginning of the transition, while at the end of the transition prospective and retrospective evaluations have similar effects. Satisfaction with life has a significant positive effect which seems to increase over time.

³⁴⁸ Throughout the transition, the most disadvantaged groups have looked back to the communist regime with some regret for the stability it offered in economic terms (especially job stability, low inflation, and low unemployment). Yet, it seems that this was not enough to make the evaluation of the communist regime variable have a significant effect on satisfaction with market economy.

Overall, the strongest effects come from retrospective evaluations (the total effect varies from 1.1 points in 1992 to .6 points in 2005, on a five-point scale), from prospective evaluations (the total effect varies from .9 points in 1992 to .6 points in 2005) and, in 1992, and from voting intention (the effect is .4 points). The development regions, when significant, have only a .2 - .3 points effect. The effects of the demographic variables are even smaller: all are weaker than .2 points.

Summary

While the results presented in this chapter are not particularly surprising when each of the two dependent variables are analyzed individually, they offer some interesting insights when they are considered together or in relationship with the other dependent variables presented in the previous chapters.

The results presented in Figure 20 show that specific support for democracy and specific support for market economy have an almost identical evolution over time, suggesting that satisfaction with the functioning of democracy in Romania is strongly influenced by the respondents' evaluations of the economic situation. A second important finding is that despite low and very low levels of specific support, diffuse support for democracy has stayed at high levels throughout the transition, while diffuse support for market economy has increased to similarly high levels. Data from the fourth wave of the World Values Survey show that in all countries specific support for democracy is smaller than diffuse support for democracy. The difference between the two forms of support, however, is significantly larger in the post-communist countries, and even larger in those post-communist countries that had a troubled transition. While data were not available in the WVS dataset I suspect that the same pattern exists in the case of support for market economy as well.

Following Easton's arguments about the relationship between the two types of support, these results can be interpreted in three different ways. First, they may indicate that fifteen years of low specific support do not represent a sufficiently long period of time for the specific support to decrease diffuse support. This interpretation seems less plausible than the others given that, compared to the average life span, fifteen years do represent a rather long period of time. Second, these results can be interpreted as showing that in Romania (and probably in other post-communist countries as well) the attachment to democracy and market economy is so strong (as a result of the cultural shock of the fall of the communist regime) that it survives even prolonged periods of low levels of specific support. Third, it is possible that Easton's argument functions only in the context of a stable political and economic system. In a transition

context, people were probably expecting (or have learned to expect) that the transition was going to be problematic and was going to require some sacrifices, opening a window of time in which diffuse support was not affected by specific support. Moreover, in the case of Romania the first transfer of power (in 1996) seems to have acted as a resetting mechanism: given that the democratic opposition was governing for the first time, people seem to have canceled once again the relationship between specific and diffuse support. The poor performance of the 1996-2000 government activated this relationship (as indicated by the decrease in diffuse support observed towards the end of the 1990s) but a new transfer of power and the beginning of the economic recovery seem to have stopped the effect once again. Thus, through a series of fortunate coincidences, the low levels of specific support have failed to decrease the level of diffuse support for democracy and market economy.³⁴⁹ I do believe, however, that in the future specific support will act more in the manner described by Easton.

It should also be noted that a fourth explanation is possible for the pattern of high diffuse support combined with low specific support, and this explanation is based on the effects of external factors. Compared to other transitions to democracy (especially the post-war transitions of Italy and Germany and the transitions of the Latin American countries), post-communist countries have enjoyed the benefits of an international context that was conducive to democratization. By comparison to the Latin American transitions, the post-communist countries have been significantly helped by the presence of the European Union right next door. The EU has helped those countries that have shown their interest in a quick transition (e.g. Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic), while the laggards (e.g. Bulgaria or Romania) have been forced to implement the required reforms through the combined effort of the EU and of their own citizens. By comparison to the post-war transitions, the post-communist transitions have benefited from the fact that the developed democracies were not involved in the post-war reconstruction effort and also by the fact that the transition to democracy had been initiated from within and not forced from outside by an occupying force. It is possible then that low levels of specific support have not had a chance to decrease the level of diffuse support, because the post-communist citizens knew that they had the support of the Western world.

By comparison to diffuse support, the mechanisms that affect specific support are different. First, the most important factor that affects the level of satisfaction with the functioning of democracy and market economy is the

³⁴⁹ Which would have been a truly unfortunate event.

respondents' evaluation of the state of the economy. Second, while diffuse support is significantly affected by demographic variables, these variables explain only a small proportion of the variance in specific support. Third, while the demographic variables have a consistent effect on diffuse support, the analyses presented in this chapter show that in the case of specific support the demographic variables have a different effect (in terms of direction) at the end of the transition than the effect they had at the beginning of the transition.³⁵⁰ As I have argued in the previous sections, this finding seems to suggest that different population subgroups use different criteria in deciding if they are satisfied or not with democracy and market economy. In the case of specific support for democracy it seems that the more modern groups in the Romanian society were less satisfied with democracy at the beginning of the transition because of significant problems in the political life. Once these problems were solved, the level of satisfaction with democracy within these groups increased, while the more traditional groups continued to be dissatisfied with democracy, mainly because of economic problems. In the case of specific support for market economy a similar mechanism does seem to exist. At the beginning of the transition the more modern groups were less satisfied with the functioning of market economy because they did not agree with the speed of the economic reforms, while the more traditional groups were more satisfied because the government was trying to reduce the costs of the economic transition. Once the Romanian economy advanced more towards becoming a market economy, the more modern groups switched their evaluation focus from ideological factors to the performance factors used by the rest of the population and, given that they were less affected by the transition costs, they became more satisfied with the functioning of the market economy in Romania.

Finally, the results presented here suggest that a clear understanding of the factors that affect specific support for democracy and market economy is possible only when both dependent variables are taken into account, and when the relationships are analyzed over a longer period of time: the evolution of specific support for democracy would have been more difficult to explain if specific support for market economy would not have been taken into account. Moreover, an analysis focused only on the beginning or only on the end of the transition would have offered different results (with respect to some variables) than the ones obtained by analyzing the relationships throughout the transition.

³⁵⁰ I have discussed these changes in detail when presenting the ANOVA results in Table 17 and in Table 19.

8. Conclusions

In this study I have explored in detail the evolution of public support for the new political and economic system in Romania throughout the transition, from 1990 to 2006. After presenting the result of my analyses in the previous chapters, the final chapter of the book is devoted to reviewing and synthesizing the main conclusions of the study, to discussing the main contributions this study brings to the literature, to pointing out the study's main limitations and to suggesting possible directions for future research.

Main conclusions and implications

Before presenting the main conclusions of the study I summarize the road that has led me to these conclusions. In the introductory chapter I have stated the assumptions of the study and the research questions, and I have argued that the study can be placed at the intersection of two theoretical dimensions and one methodological approach, describing it as a case study of political culture change during the post-communist transition in Romania.

In the second chapter I have presented the theoretical framework of the study. Starting from the assumption that democratic consolidation requires legitimacy, I have adapted Easton's model of political support to the particularities of the Romanian context. This adapted support model defined the internal structure of the study, by distinguishing, based on the object of support, between diffuse support for the principles of the political system, diffuse support for the principles of the economic system, generalized support for the structure of the political system, specific support for the action of the political system, and specific support for the actions of the economic system. Since I analyze public support for the new political and economic system over time, I use Eckstein's and Swidler's theories of culture change to develop general expectations about how support changes over time. These expectations are further revised, based on the type of support that is analyzed, by using insights from Mishler and Pollack's model of thick / thin culture.

In the third chapter I described the datasets I used in analysis, I discussed a series of methodological issues related to the data analysis process (the treatment of missing data, index construction, and statistical methods), and I described the dependent and independent variables, together with a series of

hypotheses describing the expected effects of the independent variables on the dependent variables.

In the next four chapters I presented the empirical analyses for each of the four types of support defined by the adapted support model. In Chapter 4 I discussed diffuse support for the principles of the political system, distinguishing between support for democracy as a type of political system and support for democratic values. The fifth chapter was reserved for the analysis of diffuses support for the principles of the economic system, distinguishing between support for market economy and support for two different models of market economy: the liberal model and the social democratic model. In Chapter 6 I focused on trust in the action of the political system, measured as trust in different institutions of the state. Finally, in the seventh chapter I analyzed specific support for the actions of the political system and specific support for the actions of the economic system.

In each of the four empirical chapters I followed the evolution of support over time, I discussed the differences in the level of support among population subgroups and the differences within the population subgroups over time, and I analyzed the effects of different types of variables (demographic, regional, attitudinal, and evaluative) on the level of support. Throughout these chapters I described the most important developments (political, economic, and social) in the Romanian society over time, placing thus the results of the statistical analyses into a broader context.

Diffuse support for the principles of the political system

The evolution of diffuse support for the principles of the political system leads to two distinct conclusions. If this form of support is measured using a general indicator of diffuse support for democracy, the conclusion is that the revolution of 1989 was a defining event in the Romanian history, an event that managed to legitimize the new political system for almost the entire population. Diffuse support for democracy decreased between 1997 and 1999, in response to prolonged economic problems, but this loss of support was quickly recovered. The evolution of this indicator suggests that political culture (some components of it, to be more exact) can change over very short periods of time, disconfirming the theories of culture change proposed by Eckstein and Swidler.

If diffuse support for the principles of the political system is measured by multiple indicators of acceptance of democratic values (which may be considered as a more accurate measure of attachment to democracy), the evolution of these indicators over time suggests the existence of a learning effect which offers support to Eckstein's and Swidler's views on culture change.

The regression analyses show that the only demographic variable that has an effect on diffuse support for democracy throughout the transition is education, suggesting that democracy was never a contested issue in the Romanian society. The evaluation of the communist regime also has a significant (but decreasing) effect throughout the transition, indicating that at least part of the diffuse support for democracy is generated by the comparison to the previous regime. These results suggest that diffuse support for democracy should be interpreted as an affective form of support.

When using acceptance of democratic values as an indicator of diffuse support for democracy, education and the evaluation of the communist regime maintain their effects. Diffuse support for democratic values, however, seems to also be influenced by other demographic variables (residence and age), suggesting that some groups are slower in adopting these democratic values. Moreover, the models show significant inter-regional differences in diffuse support for democratic values during the middle of the transition.

Diffuse support for the principles of the economic system

The evolution of diffuse support for the principles of the economic system shows that starting with 1991 diffuse support for market economy has increased almost constantly. Despite the fact that Romania experienced two significant economic recessions between 1990 and 2000, the percentage of people who consider that having a market economy is good for Romania increases over time.

In terms of the factors that affect diffuse support for the market economy, education is the only demographic variable that has a significant effect throughout the transition, while the other demographic variables have significant effects only in some years. Inter-regional differences are significant at the beginning of the transition but they disappear later. A similar pattern is observed in the case of the variables measuring evaluations of the personal economic situation. Overall, market economy seems to be a more divisive issue than democracy, but less divisive than democratic values.

When diffuse support for market economy is analyzed in a more detailed manner, distinguishing between the liberal model of market economy and the social democratic model of market economy, the results offer an interesting image. Support for the two models of market economy exhibits different trends over time. While support for the liberal model is slightly increasing over time without drastic changes within short periods of time (suggesting that its interpretation in terms of diffuse support is valid), support for the social democratic model shows a more accentuated increase, coupled

with significant variations within short periods of time (suggesting that it behaves more like a specific form of support).

The regression models show that support for the two models has different determinants. Support for the social-democratic model is strongly affected by the public's evaluations of the state of the economy, and it is higher among the groups that have suffered the most during the transition. In contrast to these results, support for the liberal model of market economy is immune to the effects of the evaluation variables and it is higher among the more modern groups in the society (younger, more educated people living in urban areas).

Overall, the results suggest that the Romanian society has not reached yet an agreement with respect to the type of market economy that should be implemented, although it seems that the preferred solution for most of the people is having a system based on the principles of market economy, but in which the state is actively intervening in order to correct the inequalities generated by the market.

Generalized support for the structure of the system

The evolution of trust in the state's institutions shows that generalized support for the structure of the system is characterized by a decreasing trend over time. This trend, however, is interrupted in the first year of the electoral cycles, when support for the structure of the system increases, evidence of a honeymoon effect. These trends suggest that trust in the state's institutions should be interpreted as an indicator of specific support rather than an indicator of diffuse support.

The results presented in Chapter 6 also show that the low levels of trust in the state's institutions recorded in Romania are accompanied by almost all of the functional substitutes of trust identified by Sztompka: providentialism (indicated by high levels of trust in the church), paternalization (indicated by high levels of trust in the presidency), corruption, ghettoisation, and the externalization of trust (indicated by high levels of trust in international organizations).

The regression analyses show that, throughout the transition, the level of support for the structure of the system is influenced by demographic variables, by regional variables, by attitudinal variables, and by evaluation variables, suggesting a population that is divided with respect to its attitudes toward the structure of the system.

Compared to diffuse support for the principles of the system, generalized support for the structure of the system is influenced by different factors. The most important difference can be observed in the case of the respondents' education level, which has a positive effect in the first case and a

negative effect in the second case, leading to the characterization of the highly educated respondents as guardians of democracy.

The decrease in the effects of the evaluation variables and of the specific support variables over time suggest that although trust in the state's institutions is primarily and indicator of specific support for the structure of the system, the diffuse support component of this indicator is becoming increasingly important.

Specific support for the actions of the system

Specific support for both democracy and market economy is decreasing for most of the transition and only during the last years of the transition this trend is reversed, leading to the conclusion that specific support for the actions of the system is strongly influenced by the state of the economy. Comparing the trends of the two forms of specific support also leads to the conclusion that specific support for democracy and specific support for market economy have a common set of determinants.

The regression analyses presented in Chapter 7 suggest that specific support for the action of the system is determined through a different mechanism than the other two types of support. First, specific support for the actions of the system is determined primarily by the evaluations of the state of the economy. Second, by contrast to the other forms of support, the demographic variables change their effect on specific support for the action of the system during the transition.

Implications

After discussing the main findings for each of the dependent variables I analyzed in Chapters 4-7, in this section I bring the different types of support together and I discuss the main implications of this study.

The evolution of the different forms of support over time shows that the Romanian transition has been characterized by the following pattern of support: increasing levels (from moderate to very high) of diffuse support for democracy and for market economy (with a social democratic component) combined with decreasing levels (from moderate to low) of generalized support for the structure of the system and decreasing levels (from moderate to low) of specific support for democracy and market economy. This pattern of increasing diffuse support for the system, despite decreasing specific support suggests that people's attachment to the principles of the system is genuine: people support the system because they truly believe that having a democracy and a market economy is good for them.

Additional results suggest that while specific support for democracy is generally lower than diffuse support for democracy in all democracies, the difference between the two types of support is significantly higher in the case of the post-communist countries and, within the post-communist world, slightly higher in the case of the countries that experienced delays in transition. Given the determinants of specific support, it seems likely that, over time, the post-communist countries will become more similar to the developed democracies, reducing the difference between the two types of support.³⁵¹

The existence of this pattern also suggests that the legitimacy of the new regimes has not been reduced by the low levels of specific support, as it was suggested by Easton. It should be noted that post-war Germany has also been characterized by a similar pattern of high diffuse / low specific support for a significant period of time following the end of the war, while in Italy this pattern is still evident. The experience of the Latin American countries, in which low levels of specific support have caused in some cases a democratic breakdown, suggests that the European transitions to democracy have benefited from a favorable international context which has prevented such a possibility: democracy in Europe has been actively promoted by international actors (the Allied forces in the case of post-war Germany, the European Union in the case of the Central and Eastern European countries).

The failed post-communist transitions support this argument. With the exception of the Baltic States the European former soviet republics (Ukraine, Belarus, and Moldova) have remained under Russian influence after gaining their independence and the European Union never tried to promote democracy in these countries in order to avoid a conflict with Russia. These countries are still trying to complete their transitions and recent developments (the Orange Revolution in Ukraine and the protests surrounding the 2006 presidential elections in Belarus) suggest they still have a chance for successful democratization.

The relationships between the different types of support analyzed in the book show that diffuse support for democracy and diffuse support for market economy are largely immune to the influences of the other types of support. Generalized support for the structure of the system, however, is strongly influenced by specific support for democracy and market economy. Given these results, it can be argued with a high degree of certainty that the citizens' attachment to the principles of the political and economic system will remain strong for a long period of time. If the economy will continue its ascending

³⁵¹ Italy is the exception to the rule, showing high levels of diffuse support combined with low levels of specific support, suggesting that for some cases it is possible that the current pattern of support will not change significantly.

trend that started in 2000, then it is possible that specific support for democracy and market economy will also increase, and this increase has the potential of increasing the level of institutional trust and of decreasing the demand for the state's corrective intervention in the market mechanisms.

Looking at the factors that affect support it can be seen that different types of support are generated through different mechanisms. Given the very high levels of diffuse support for democracy, the only factors that affect this type of support are education and (increasingly less important) comparisons with the communist regime. The results presented in Chapter 5 suggest that there is a lack of consensus regarding the type of market economy and that support for one model or the other is determined primarily by evaluations of the economy and by the respondents' experiences during the transition: the winners prefer the liberties associated with a liberal model of market economy, while the losers demand more state intervention in the economy. Trust in the state's institutions is influenced by a variety of factors, the most important being satisfaction with the functioning of democracy and market economy. Finally, both forms of specific support are driven primarily by the economic performance and by people's perceptions of the economy.

When taking into account only the socio-economic characteristics of the respondents, the results of the analyses presented in Chapters 4 –7 can be interpreted as indicators of cleavages that divide the Romanian society with respect to support for democracy and market economy. In the multivariate context, education is the only characteristic that distinguishes between different levels of support for the new political and economic systems throughout the transition: more educated respondents have higher levels of diffuse support for democracy, democratic values, market economy, and the liberal model of market economy. They also have lower levels of support for the social democratic model of market economy, and less trust in traditional and state institutions. With respect to satisfaction with the way democracy and market economy work, education has a positive effect only towards the end of the transition. In addition to education, residence in urban areas has a similar effect on acceptance of democratic values, on support for the liberal model of market economy, and on trust. All other socio-economic characteristics have generally non-significant effects in the multivariate context.

When the effects of the socio-economic characteristics on the different types of support are analyzed individually, the results indicate significant effects in almost all cases (with the exception of satisfaction with the way market economy works).³⁵² The effects identified in the univariate analyses are

³⁵² Since only education and residence in urban areas (in some cases) maintain their significance in the multivariate context, it can be argued that most of the differences

generally consistent across the different dependent variables used in analysis. Summarizing these results, it can be observed that men, younger respondents, people living in urban areas, and people with high levels of education are characterized by higher levels of support for democracy, for democratic values, for market economy, and for the liberal model of market economy. These subgroups are also characterized by lower levels of trust in traditional and state institutions. Since these differences exist throughout the transition, it can be argued that age, education and residence could be interpreted as significant cleavage lines in the Romanian population.³⁵³ Moreover, given the characteristics of the Romanian society, the groups defined by age, education, and residence are overlapping to a certain extent, suggesting that the cleavages are reinforcing: compared to rural areas, urban areas are characterized by a lower average age and by higher levels of education.

When discussing the results of the analyses presented in the previous chapters, I have labeled younger people, with high levels of education and living in urban areas as the “modern” or “vanguard” groups in the Romanian society, while for older people, with low levels of education and living in rural areas I have used the label “traditional” groups.³⁵⁴ The results can be interpreted using a modernism – traditionalism key and the groups identified above represent the two extremes of this dimension.³⁵⁵ Age, education, and residence are indicators of the modern-traditional value dimension. These variables are also indicators of resource availability and they correspond, to a certain degree, to the distinction between the winners and the losers of the economic transition. Although these cleavages have played a significant role during the transition, I expect their importance to decrease in the future: the average level of modernism in the population will increase through both generational replacement and an increase in the number of people obtaining a college degree.

in support determined by the other characteristics are captured by the differences in the respondents’ education level.

³⁵³ Although gender has a significant effect in most of the analyses, it cannot be considered a cleavage line. While age, education, or residence-based differences in political values are recognized as such at the public level, gender is not perceived as a source of differences in political values.

³⁵⁴ For a brief discussion of the importance of the vanguard groups see section *Political culture components*.

³⁵⁵ It should be noted that the labels I use for these groups are based on averages: young people, highly educated, living in urban areas are, generally, more modern than older people, with low education and living in the rural areas. This does not mean, however, that some people living in rural areas (for instance) cannot be more modern than some people in urban areas.

While it can be argued that Romania has finished its transition to democracy and market economy, it is equally true that there are significant qualitative differences between the Romanian democracy and market economy and these systems in the older democracies. Of particular importance is the relatively low level of trust in the state's institutions. This is probably the first problem that the Romanian state needs to address in order to increase its citizens' satisfaction. At the level of the public, the most significant problem that needs to be addressed is the citizens' low levels of interpersonal trust and of involvement in collective action. While I do believe that citizens have played an important role in the success of the Romanian transition I also believe they still have the potential for improving the quality of the Romanian democracy.

Contributions to the literature

Main contributions

A first contribution to the literature comes from the fact that I analyzed support for the new political and economic system throughout the transition. When I started working on this project I claimed that there are no previous studies that have analyzed support for democracy and market economy over such a long period of time in the post-communist context. As I format the final version of the book for the publisher, this claim is no longer valid: at the end of 2006 Rose, Mishler and Munroe published their study on Russia analyzing support from 1992 to 2005. Even in this situation, however, this research still brings a significant contribution to the literature of post-communist transitions, being the first study that offers a detailed account of the evolution of support in a post-communist country that completed its transition to democracy and market economy.

A second contribution to the literature comes from the fact that I focus in the book on support for both democracy and market economy, while distinguishing between different types of support and different objects of support. As a result of this approach, by analyzing diffuse support for democracy and democratic values, diffuse support for market economy and for two models of market economy, support for the structure of the system, and specific support for democracy and for market economy, I am able to offer a very detailed image of the mechanisms of support during the Romanian post-communist transition. I am also able to test the relationships between different types of support, showing that generalized support for the structure of the system is significantly affected by specific support for democracy and market economy, that specific support for market economy has a significant effect on

support for the social democratic model of market economy but not on support for the liberal model, and that diffuse support for democracy was influenced by specific support for democracy during the middle of the transition, when diffuse support for democracy was decreasing. To my knowledge this is the only analysis of support in the post-communist context that distinguishes between the different types of support and analyzes the whole transition period.

Finally, a third contribution to the literature comes from the fact that in the field of post-communist transitions Romania is an understudied country, scholars focusing rather on the successful countries of the region (i.e. the Czech Republic, Hungary, or Poland) or on countries considered important from a policy perspective (especially Russia). Since Romania may be considered a representative case for the group of countries that had a late and troublesome transition (i.e. Bulgaria, Romania, and Ukraine) this book fills a gap in our knowledge about troubled transitions and about the region.

Specific contributions

By analyzing the effects on the dependent variables throughout the transition I am able to identify if some of these effects are time-dependent. Previous studies (Russia prior to 1994 mainly) identified a positive effect on support for democracy and a positive effect on support for market economy.³⁵⁶ Gender has a significant positive effect throughout the transition only on support for the liberal model of market economy, confirming some of the previous results to the extent that they made the distinction between different types of market economy.

With respect to age, most studies found a significant negative effect on diffuse support for democracy. In the Romanian case the effect is non-significant for most of the transition, disconfirming the previous results, and it is positive at the end of the transition. The positive effect at the end of the transition needs more analysis to decide if it is a country-specific result or if the younger cohorts, educated after the transition, are indeed less democratic. Previous studies have also found negative effects of age on diffuse support for market economy in the first half of the transition, also confirmed in the Romanian case. According to my findings, however, this effect seems to disappear in the second half of the transition. Mishler and Rose (1997, 2001) have found a nonsignificant or a weak positive effect of age on institutional trust. In Romania age has a significant positive effect throughout the transition.

³⁵⁶ For specifics about these effects and the previous studies see section on independent variables.

In the case of education, previous studies have generally found a positive effect on diffuse support for democracy and on diffuse support for market economy, with some studies (Dalton 1994, Mishler and Rose 2001) finding a non-significant effect in the case of democracy. In the models I presented here education is the only variable with a consistent positive effect throughout the transition on diffuse support, confirming the previous findings and showing that the effect also exists in the second half of the transition. Mishler and Rose (1997, 1999, 2001b) have found no significant effect of education on trust, while McAllister (1999) found a negative effect. My results confirm McAllister's results, showing that education has a negative effect on trust throughout the transition. Residence in the urban areas has been identified in previous studies as having a positive effect on support for democracy and a negative effect on institutional trust. My results confirm these previous findings and show that the effects exist in the second half of the transition as well.

Thus, with respect to the effects of demographic variables my results confirm some of the previous findings, show that some of the effects identified in the previous literature exist during the second half of the transition as well, and, in some cases (gender-DSD, age-DSD, age-TSI, and education-TSI) contradict previous results.

Support for the governing parties has been identified in the previous literature as having a positive effect on trust and on specific support for market economy. My results confirm this finding and expand it, by suggesting that this variable also seems to have an effect on diffuse support for democracy and market economy, mediated, however, by the characteristics of the governing party. The results in the case of interest in politics also confirm the findings of previous studies, which identified a positive effect on diffuse support for democracy, and show that this effect is found in the case of the other forms of support as well.

The results in the case of economic evaluations confirm the positive effect on specific support identified in the previous studies. In the Romanian case, however, economic evaluations also have a positive effect on institutional trust and a negative effect on support for the social democratic model of market economy, which were not tested in the previous literature.

Future research directions

All research projects are subject to a series of limitations determined by data availability, by financial and temporal resources, and by the researcher's interests. At the same time, some of these limitations may be addressed in future research projects, conducted either by the same researcher or by other researchers who are interested in the same topics. This book does not make

exception from this rule. In the final section of this chapter I discuss the main limitations of the study and I identify possible lines of research that I would like to follow in the future.

The most important limitation of this study consists of the fact that it analyzes the evolution of support for the political and economic system in the context of a single country, Romania. The decision to use a case study approach in the analysis of this topic was partly determined by the fact that at the time I started working on this project there were no previous studies that analyzed the evolution of support over time in the post-communist world and one of the goals of this study was to explore the effect of time on the factors that affect the different types of support and on the relationships between the different types of support.

A second limitation of this research project is related to the treatment of the development region variables in the statistical analyses. The empirical results have shown significant inter-regional differences for some dependent variables. While in most cases I was able to explain these differences, in other cases I could not find any plausible explanation (see, for instance, the positive effect of residence in the South West region on diffuse support for democracy). Given that the respondents are clustered within development regions, the analyses should have taken the clustering effects into account by testing the models in the context of multilevel models. The decision to not use this approach in my research was based on two factors. First, I did not have region-level data to be used in the multilevel models. The National Commission for Statistics offers regional data only starting with 2000. If I will find regional data for the 1990 – 2000 period, I will be able to address this limitation and test the models in the multilevel context. The decision to not use a multilevel approach was also determined by the fact that the estimation of multilevel models is significantly more difficult when combined with multiple imputation. It should also be noted that Romania uses different regional classifications. I used in my analyses the classification based on development regions (the NUTS-2 regions) because it is the classification that offers the highest probability of finding regional data. In addition to this classification, however, one could also use a classification based on historical regions or a classification based on cultural regions. It is possible that using a different classification will lead to a better understanding of inter-regional differences (if these differences are based on cultural factors).

A third limitation of this research project comes from the fact that data availability issues have led to analyzing different types of support at different time points. While the years included in the analysis cover roughly the same time period, the analysis still suffers from the lack of a common set of years especially because some of the relationships between different types of support

could not be tested. Unfortunately, the only solution for this limitation requires additional data and I think that I have already found all the surveys that were conducted in Romania during the transition.³⁵⁷

A fourth limitation of the study, related to the previous one, is related to the treatment of time in the statistical analyses. Due to the insufficient number of time points the effect of time could not be tested in a structured way (i.e. using a growth model or a time series model). Pooling the data and using dummy variables for time is a possible solution, but this approach will offer information only about the effect of time. If the focus is on how the effects of different variables change over time, this would require using interaction terms and preliminary tests I have conducted show that when this approach is used the model is seriously affected by multicollinearity.

I switch now the focus of the discussion on possible lines of research. The most obvious way in which the current study can be extended and improved is by studying the evolution of support in a comparative context. This will allow testing if the results obtained in the Romanian context are country-specific or if they can be generalized to a larger context. Based on my own interests, I intend to continue studying the topic of support in the post-communist world along two dimensions.

The first one will extend the study by analyzing the evolution of support in a sample of post-communist countries that will include both countries that have had a rapid transition (e.g. the Czech Republic, Poland, Hungary) and countries that have had a troubled transition (e.g. Bulgaria, Croatia, Ukraine). The main problem that needs to be solved before starting this research project is finding datasets that cover different periods during the transition and that contain the relevant items. The only comparative project that fits these requirements is the New Democracies Barometer. The second dimension which I intend to study explores the evolution of support in the post-communist countries after becoming EU members. Since most of the countries have joined the EU in 2005, with Romania and Bulgaria becoming members two years later, in 2007, this research project will have to wait for several years of data to be collected before starting the analysis. Other researchers interested in the evolution of support over time may extend this study by comparing the post-communist transitions to the democratic transitions in Southern Europe, to the transitions in Latin America, or to the transitions in Asia.

In addition to these lines of research, there are several findings in the book that have raised my interest and that I will probably address in the future.

³⁵⁷ An alternative solution to this problem would require access to the TARDIS, a solution that seems even more unlikely than finding new data from more than ten years ago.

The first one is the finding that diffuse support for the liberal model of market economy and diffuse support for the social democratic model of market economy have different determinants and common determinants with opposing effects. I believe that the measures I used for these two dependent variables can be improved and that this finding should be analyzed in more detail.

A second interesting finding suggested that trust in the state's institutions should be interpreted primarily as a form of specific support but that it also contains a diffuse support component that seems to become more important towards the end of the transition. I believe that a more detailed analysis of institutional trust will offer additional information about its specific support and diffuse support components.

Finally, a third finding (which I discussed only in passing, because it was the result of an additional analysis) was that measuring support for democracy through a set of indicators commonly used in the literature (acceptance of authoritarian alternatives to democracy) leads to different conclusions than the ones obtained using the indicator of diffuse support for democracy. My interpretation for this set of contradicting results was that the indicators of acceptance of authoritarian alternatives are measuring not only support for democracy but other dimensions as well. This is an argument that needs further testing and that could bring additional contributions to the literature on measurements of support for democracy.

Keeping these possible lines of research in mind, this is where I end (for now) this research project.

Appendix – Additional results

Figure A-1 Development regions in Romania




Table A-1 Hypotheses about the effects of independent variables in the full regression models

	DSD	DSDval	DSM	DSMlib	DSMsd	TSI	SSD	SSM
Demographic variables								
Gender: Male	○	○	+	+	-	○	○	○
Age	-	-	-	-	+	-	○	○
Education	+	+	+	+	-	-	○	○
Residence: Urban	+	+	+	+	-	-	○	○
Unemployed	n/a	n/a	-	-	+	n/a	n/a	n/a
Nationality: Romanian	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	+	n/a	n/a
Religion: Orthodox	○	○	○	○	○	+	○	○
Religiosity	+	-	○	○	○	+	○	○
Attitudinal variables								
Voting intention for governing party	+	○	○	○	○	+	+	+
Interest in politics	+	+	+	+	-	+	+	+
Political participation	+	+	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a
Interpersonal trust	+	○	+	○	○	+	○	○
Evaluation variables								
Negative evaluation of communist regime	+	+	+	n/a	n/a	○	+	+
Satisfaction with life	○	○	○	+	-	○ / +	+	+
Subjective perceptions of economy	○	○	○	+	-	○ / +	+	+
Evaluations of political outputs	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	+	n/a
Other types of support								
Institutional trust	+	+	+	+	+	n/a	n/a	n/a
Specific support for democracy	+	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	+	n/a	n/a
Specific support for market economy	n/a	n/a	n/a	+	-	+	n/a	n/a

Note: ○ indicates a nonsignificant effect, + indicates a positive effect, - indicates a negative effect, and n/a indicates that the variable is not used in that model.

Table A-2 Datasets used in analysis

No.	Year	Month	Survey series	Data collection	N	% missing (average)	% missing (maximum)	% missing (voting)
1	1990	April	USIA	Sociobit	1565	5.78	21.34	16.17
2	1990	November	USIA	Sociobit	1515	3.41	14.72	17.23
3	1991	October	USIA	Sociobit	1000	5.42	19.60	22.20
4	1992	April	USIA	Sociobit	1512	6.57	26.98	23.61
5	1993	May	USIA	Sociobit	1015	5.48	22.76	25.62
6	1993	July	WVS / EVS	RIQL	1103	1.28	4.26	13.78
7	1994	September	USIA	Sociobit	1011	5.00	13.75	28.49
8	1995	September	COMALP	UB	1174	5.31	23.76	31.26
9	1996	September	MECELEC	UB	1158	3.69	10.54	---
10	1997	July	WVS / EVS	RIQL / UB	1000	5.20	18.00	32.70
11	1998	June	BOP	CURS	1212	5.96	18.56	38.37
12	1998	November	BOP	MMT	1253	6.60	20.59	32.16
13	1999	May	BOP	MMT	2074	4.62	16.63	30.71
14	1999	May	USIA	Sociobit	1018	4.59	12.77	21.02
15	1999	July	WVS / EVS	RIQL / UB	1146	4.43	16.14	32.72
16	1999	October	BOP	CURS	2019	5.58	20.85	32.84
17	2000	May	BOP	MMT	1796	5.40	20.27	18.15
18	2000	November	BOP	CURS	1775	5.18	22.25	25.30
19	2001	May	BOP	MMT	2102	5.41	19.70	26.36
20	2001	November	BOP	CURS	2080	6.99	19.76	36.78
21	2002	May	BOP	IMAS	2212	3.57	15.19	39.33
22	2002	October	BOP	MMT	2128	5.00	16.21	41.68
23	2003	May	BOP	Gallup	2100	6.17	26.52	31.71
24	2003	October	BOP	CURS	2035	7.25	26.98	33.81
25	2004	May	BOP	MMT / Gallup	2209	3.48	16.70	---
26	2004	October	BOP	Gallup	1800	5.43	20.28	26.44
27	2005	May	BOP	Gallup	1800	4.42	21.17	33.61
28	2005	November	BOP / WVS / EVS	Gallup	1776	4.34	16.33	32.55
29	2006	May	BOP	Gallup	1994	5.82	19.31	38.01

Table A-3 Data availability – dependent variables

No.	Year	Month	DSD	DSDval	DSM	DSMlib	DSMsd	TSI	SSD	SSM
1	1990	April	Y	---	Y	---	---	Y	Y	---
2	1990	November	---	---	---	---	---	Y	Y	---
3	1991	October	---	---	Y	Y	---	Y	Y	Y
4	1992	April	---	---	Y	---	Y	Y	Y	Y
5	1993	May	---	---	Y	---	---	Y	Y	Y
6	1993	July	---	---	---	Y	Y	Y	---	---
7	1994	September	---	---	Y	---	---	Y	---	---
8	1995	September	---	Y	Y	---	---	Y	---	---
9	1996	September	---	Y	Y	---	---	Y	---	---
10	1997	July	Y	---	---	Y	Y	Y	Y	---
11	1998	June	---	Y	Y	---	---	Y	---	---
12	1998	November	---	Y	Y	---	---	Y	---	---
13	1999	May	---	Y	Y	---	Y	Y	---	---
14	1999	May	Y	---	Y	---	---	Y	Y	---
15	1999	July	Y	---	---	Y	Y	Y	Y	---
16	1999	October	---	Y	Y	---	---	Y	---	---
17	2000	May	---	---	Y	---	---	Y	---	---
18	2000	November	---	Y	Y	---	---	Y	---	---
19	2001	May	---	---	---	---	---	Y	---	---
20	2001	November	---	Y	Y	---	---	Y	---	---
21	2002	May	Y	Y	---	---	Y	Y	Y	Y
22	2002	October	---	Y	---	---	Y	Y	Y	Y
23	2003	May	---	Y	---	---	---	Y	Y	Y
24	2003	October	---	Y	---	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
25	2004	May	---	---	---	---	---	Y	Y	Y
26	2004	October	---	---	---	---	---	Y	Y	Y
27	2005	May	Y	---	---	---	---	Y	Y	Y
28	2005	November	Y	---	---	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
29	2006	May	---	---	---	---	---	Y	Y	Y

Table A-4 Mean differences in diffuse support for democracy

	1990	1997	1999	2005	90 - 97	90 - 99	90 - 05	97 - 99	97 - 05	99 - 05
Men vs. women	0.06	0.11	0.23	0.06	Men 0.62	0.73	0.35	0.10	-0.27	-0.37
					Women 0.68	0.90	0.35	0.22	-0.32	-0.54
Under 30 vs. 31 - 60	-0.01	0.12	0.14	-0.01	Under 30 0.54	0.66	0.35	0.12	-0.19	-0.31
Under 30 vs. over 61	0.05	0.21	0.32	0.04	31 - 60 0.66	0.81	0.35	0.15	-0.32	-0.46
31 - 60 vs. over 61	0.05	0.09	0.18	0.05	Over 61 0.70	0.94	0.34	0.23	-0.36	-0.59
4 grades or less vs. 5 - 8 grades	0.01	-0.04	-0.24	0.06	4 grades or less 0.73	1.17	0.31	0.44	-0.43	-0.87
4 grades or less vs. 9 - 11 grades	-0.09	-0.09	-0.40	-0.02	5 - 8 grades 0.68	0.91	0.35	0.23	-0.33	-0.56
4 grades or less vs. high school plus	-0.09	-0.29	-0.68	-0.08	9 - 11 grades 0.73	0.86	0.38	0.13	-0.35	-0.48
4 grades or less vs. university plus	<i>-0.18</i>	<i>-0.55</i>	<i>-0.88</i>	<i>-0.20</i>	High school plus 0.53	0.58	0.32	0.05	-0.21	-0.26
5 - 8 grades vs. 9 - 11 grades	-0.10	-0.05	-0.16	-0.07	University plus 0.37	0.48	0.30	0.11	-0.07	-0.19
5 - 8 grades vs. high school plus	<i>-0.10</i>	<i>-0.25</i>	<i>-0.43</i>	<i>-0.13</i>						
5 - 8 grades vs. university plus	<i>-0.20</i>	<i>-0.51</i>	<i>-0.63</i>	<i>-0.25</i>						
9 - 11 grades vs. high school plus	0.00	-0.20	-0.28	-0.06						
9 - 11 grades vs. university plus	-0.10	<i>-0.46</i>	<i>-0.48</i>	<i>-0.18</i>						
High school plus vs. university plus	<i>-0.10</i>	<i>-0.26</i>	<i>-0.20</i>	<i>-0.12</i>						
Urban vs. rural	0.05	0.15	0.27	0.11	Urban 0.61	0.71	0.33	0.11	-0.27	-0.38
					Rural 0.71	0.93	0.39	0.23	-0.32	-0.55
Orthodox vs. non-orthodox	-0.03	-0.01	-0.27	0.03	Orthodox 0.65	0.85	0.35	0.20	-0.30	-0.50
					Non-orthodox 0.67	0.61	0.41	-0.05	-0.26	-0.21
Vote power vs. vote opposition	0.02	0.22	0.43	0.07	Vote power 0.56	0.57	0.33	0.01	-0.23	-0.24
					Vote opposition 0.76	0.99	0.38	0.23	-0.38	-0.61
N	1565	1000	1146	1776						

Note: Regular text indicates no significant differences. **Gray bold text** indicates that the first group in the compared pair has a significantly higher average score (p<.05). *Gray italic text* indicates that the first group in the compared pair has a significantly lower average score (p<.05). Data sources: USIA 1990, WVS 1997, WVS 1999, BOP 2005.

Table A-5 Correlations between diffuse support for democracy and attitudinal variables

1990 (N = 1565)	V1	V2	V3	V4	V5	V6	V7	V8
V1 Support for democracy	1.000							
V2 Interest in politics	0.085	1.000						
V3 Vote for governing party	0.013	-0.169	1.000					
V4 Political participation	---	---	---	1.000				
V5 Communism was bad	0.038	0.060	-0.110	---	1.000			
V6 Interpersonal trust	0.088	0.066	0.131	---	-0.094	1.000		
V7 Satisfaction with life	---	---	---	---	---	---	1.000	
V8 Institutional trust	0.050	-0.087	0.594	---	-0.074	0.194	---	1.000
V9 Satisfaction with democracy	0.063	-0.094	0.452	---	-0.070	0.203	---	0.804
1997 (N = 1000)	V1	V2	V3	V4	V5	V6	V7	V8
V1 Support for democracy	1.000							
V2 Interest in politics	0.226	1.000						
V3 Vote for governing party	0.175	0.103	1.000					
V4 Political participation	0.185	0.205	0.046	1.000				
V5 Communism was bad	0.145	0.046	0.263	0.034	1.000			
V6 Interpersonal trust	0.104	0.082	0.021	-0.011	-0.013	1.000		
V7 Satisfaction with life	0.157	0.072	0.080	0.053	0.127	0.120	1.000	
V8 Institutional trust	0.085	0.034	0.174	-0.118	0.026	0.095	0.120	1.000
V9 Satisfaction with democracy	0.186	0.132	0.254	-0.021	0.130	0.153	0.194	0.412
1999 (N=1146)	V1	V2	V3	V4	V5	V6	V7	V8
V1 Support for democracy	1.000							
V2 Interest in politics	0.181	1.000						
V3 Vote for governing party	0.243	0.052	1.000					
V4 Political participation	0.116	0.183	0.062	1.000				
V5 Communism was bad	---	---	---	---	1.000			
V6 Interpersonal trust	0.088	0.032	0.104	0.008	---	1.000		
V7 Satisfaction with life	0.066	0.065	0.132	0.018	---	0.061	1.000	
V8 Institutional trust	0.002	-0.021	-0.024	-0.061	---	0.083	0.163	1.000
V9 Satisfaction with democracy	0.142	0.047	0.109	-0.031	---	0.050	0.247	0.309
2002 (N = 2212)	V1	V2	V3	V4	V5	V6	V7	V8
V1 Support for democracy	1.000							
V2 Interest in politics	0.086	1.000						
V3 Vote for governing party	0.055	-0.064	1.000					
V4 Political participation	0.006	0.204	0.108	1.000				
V5 Communism was bad	0.163	0.038	-0.037	-0.045	1.000			
V6 Interpersonal trust	0.094	0.077	0.055	-0.002	0.017	1.000		
V7 Satisfaction with life	0.118	0.057	0.050	0.009	0.113	0.141	1.000	
V8 Institutional trust	0.119	0.089	0.308	-0.068	0.016	0.177	0.186	1.000
V9 Satisfaction with democracy	0.239	0.106	0.112	0.021	0.106	0.117	0.305	0.323
2005 (N = 1776)	V1	V2	V3	V4	V5	V6	V7	V8
V1 Support for democracy	1.000							
V2 Interest in politics	0.124	1.000						
V3 Vote for governing party	0.104	0.042	1.000					
V4 Political participation	0.069	0.211	0.081	1.000				
V5 Communism was bad	0.110	0.076	0.200	0.100	1.000			
V6 Interpersonal trust	0.062	0.068	0.029	0.013	-0.003	1.000		
V7 Satisfaction with life	0.026	0.121	0.102	0.013	0.128	0.102	1.000	
V8 Institutional trust	0.053	0.137	0.160	-0.050	0.083	0.121	0.274	1.000
V9 Satisfaction with democracy	0.045	0.133	0.141	-0.020	0.151	0.107	0.332	0.400

Note: Data sources: USIA 1990, WVS 1997, WVS 1999, BOP 2002, BOP 2005. Shaded cells indicate correlations that are significant at $p < .05$. Bolded cells indicate correlations with the dependent variable.

Table A-6 Diffuse support for democracy: SES and region models

	SES model					Region model					SES and region model				
	1990	1997	1999	2002	2005	1990	1997	1999	2002	2005	1990	1997	1999	2002	2005
Intercept	2.754 *** (.064)	2.840 *** (.121)	2.622 *** (.152)	2.622 *** (.052)	3.182 *** (.123)	2.904 *** (.029)	3.336 *** (.061)	3.239 *** (.080)	0.874 *** (.025)	3.340 *** (.059)	2.787 *** (.071)	2.984 *** (.143)	2.808 *** (.177)	0.707 *** (.058)	3.173 *** (.139)
Gender: Male	0.032 (.021)	0.082 * (.040)	0.135 * (.057)	-0.016 (.017)	0.044 (.037)						0.030 (.021)	0.087 * (.040)	0.125 * (.058)	-0.017 (.017)	0.047 (.038)
Age: 31 - 60	0.006 (.024)	-0.063 (.049)	-0.060 (.062)	0.016 (.020)	-0.018 (.051)						0.004 (.024)	-0.071 (.049)	0.017 (.062)	0.017 (.020)	-0.019 (.051)
Age: Over 60	0.002 (.046)	-0.012 (.063)	0.029 (.085)	0.046 + (.025)	-0.034 (.059)						-0.003 (.046)	-0.027 (.064)	0.019 (.085)	0.047 + (.025)	-0.031 (.059)
Education	0.032 ** (.011)	0.120 *** (.021)	0.210 *** (.026)	0.047 *** (.010)	0.086 *** (.019)						0.030 ** (.011)	0.117 *** (.022)	0.204 *** (.026)	0.045 *** (.010)	0.089 *** (.019)
Urban	0.002 (.024)	0.010 (.045)	0.050 (.061)	0.024 (.019)	0.019 (.042)						-0.009 (.025)	-0.006 (.046)	-0.015 (.063)	0.027 (.020)	0.022 (.043)
Orthodox	-0.023 (.030)	-0.002 (.054)	-0.285 *** (.079)	-0.014 (.027)	0.007 (.080)						-0.013 (.034)	0.003 (.059)	-0.194 * (.080)	-0.022 (.030)	-0.027 (.082)
Church attendance	0.003 (.017)	-0.022 (.031)	-0.043 (.041)	-0.003 (.012)	-0.088 ** (.030)						0.000 (.017)	-0.021 (.032)	-0.063 (.042)	-0.008 (.013)	-0.077 * (.030)
North East						-0.090 * (.038)	-0.247 ** (.079)	-0.420 *** (.112)	-0.008 (.034)	-0.101 (.074)	-0.081 * (.039)	-0.145 + (.080)	-0.290 *** (.110)	0.039 (.034)	-0.028 (.075)
South East						0.003 (.048)	-0.216 ** (.081)	-0.347 *** (.103)	-0.094 * (.036)	0.058 (.083)	0.001 (.049)	-0.167 * (.080)	-0.191 + (.103)	-0.038 (.035)	0.131 (.081)
South						-0.072 + (.042)	-0.195 * (.084)	-0.413 *** (.104)	-0.052 (.036)	-0.119 (.079)	-0.054 (.045)	-0.133 (.083)	-0.275 ** (.105)	-0.002 (.036)	-0.027 (.080)
South West						0.001 (.043)	-0.193 * (.088)	-0.303 * (.121)	-0.032 (.036)	0.092 (.086)	0.014 (.045)	-0.188 * (.087)	-0.225 + (.117)	0.015 (.037)	0.149 + (.088)
West						0.006 (.041)	-0.162 + (.088)	-0.275 * (.116)	-0.004 (.037)	-0.164 + (.085)	0.010 (.042)	-0.097 (.087)	-0.192 (.117)	0.034 (.037)	-0.109 (.085)
North West						-0.018 (.039)	-0.086 (.089)	0.069 (.118)	-0.021 (.035)	-0.087 (.080)	-0.015 (.040)	-0.073 (.090)	0.055 (.117)	0.014 (.035)	-0.021 (.077)
Center						-0.009 (.045)	-0.216 ** (.079)	-0.093 (.118)	-0.065 + (.036)	-0.071 (.082)	-0.004 (.048)	-0.163 * (.081)	-0.083 (.114)	-0.034 (.038)	-0.022 (.080)
R ²	0.011	0.072	0.118	0.024	0.032	0.009	0.015	0.041	0.008	0.011	0.018	0.080	0.134	0.030	0.042
Adjusted R ²	0.006	0.066	0.113	0.021	0.028	0.004	0.008	0.035	0.005	0.007	0.009	0.067	0.123	0.024	0.035
N	1565	1000	1146	2212	1776	1565	1000	1146	2212	1776	1565	1000	1146	2212	1776

Notes: *** p < 0.001, ** p < 0.010, * p < 0.050, + p < 0.100. Unstandardized regression coefficients and (standard errors). Data sources: USIA 1990, WVS 1997, WVS 1999, BOP 2002, BOP / WVS 2005.

Table A-7 Diffuse support for democracy: attitudinal model

	1990	1997	1999	2002	2005
Intercept	2.634*** (.060)	2.225*** (.124)	2.229*** (.127)	0.453*** (.045)	2.876*** (.099)
Interest in politics	0.041** (.014)	0.139*** (.028)	0.195*** (.040)	0.033* (.014)	0.110*** (.027)
Vote for governing party	-0.005 (.032)	0.115* (.047)	0.377** (.102)	0.021 (.021)	0.122* (.054)
Political participation	---	0.328*** (.076)	0.260* (.110)	-0.016 (.036)	0.108 (.082)
Communism was bad	0.050 (.031)	0.118** (.044)	---	0.102*** (.016)	0.128* (.048)
Interpersonal trust	0.062** (.022)	0.102* (.048)	0.165+ (.090)	0.041* (.017)	0.081+ (.044)
Satisfaction with life	---	0.077** (.028)	-0.001 (.030)	0.013 (.011)	-0.016 (.033)
Institutional trust	0.000 (.032)	0.022 (.035)	-0.036 (.047)	0.015 (.014)	0.023 (.036)
Satisfaction with democracy	0.030 (.025)	0.092** (.035)	0.146*** (.040)	0.077*** (.010)	0.000 (.023)
R ²	0.020	0.133	0.111	0.086	0.037
Adjusted R ²	0.016	0.126	0.106	0.083	0.033
N	1565	1000	1146	2212	1776

Notes: *** p < 0.001, ** p < 0.010, * p < 0.050, + p < 0.100. Unstandardized regression coefficients and (standard errors).
Data sources: USIA 1990, WVS 1997, WVS 1999, BOP 2002, BOP / WVS 2005.

Table A-8 Diffuse support for democratic values: SES and region models

	SES model				Region model				SES and region model			
	1995	1998	2000	2002	1995	1998	2000	2002	1995	1998	2000	2002
Intercept	-0.818 *** (.155)	-0.916 *** (.207)	-0.723 *** (.149)	-0.721 *** (.122)	0.671 *** (.088)	0.625 *** (.091)	0.204 ** (.075)	0.224 *** (.065)	-0.262 (.179)	-0.462 * (.234)	-0.619 *** (.174)	-0.684 *** (.144)
Gender: Male	0.233 *** (.055)	0.162 ** (.058)	0.047 (.047)	0.065 (.044)					0.266 *** (.055)	0.176 *** (.058)	0.048 (.047)	0.067 (.044)
Age: 31 - 60	0.165 * (.067)	0.136 * (.065)	0.232 *** (.063)	0.188 *** (.054)					0.129 * (.066)	0.235 *** (.064)	0.188 *** (.063)	0.188 *** (.054)
Age: Over 60	0.049 (.084)	0.132 (.082)	0.268 *** (.077)	0.229 ** (.068)					-0.023 (.084)	0.089 (.083)	0.256 *** (.077)	0.228 *** (.068)
Education	0.237 *** (.024)	0.281 *** (.026)	0.209 *** (.024)	0.203 *** (.023)					0.215 *** (.025)	0.259 *** (.026)	0.200 *** (.024)	0.194 *** (.023)
Urban	0.290 *** (.058)	0.343 *** (.061)	0.211 *** (.057)	0.171 *** (.048)					0.217 *** (.059)	0.277 *** (.063)	0.213 *** (.058)	0.169 *** (.049)
Orthodox	-0.112 (.074)	-0.086 (.077)	-0.180 * (.082)	-0.084 (.065)					-0.107 (.077)	-0.103 (.087)	-0.186 + (.092)	-0.038 (.070)
Church attendance	-0.070 (.050)	-0.098 (.076)	-0.031 (.036)	-0.046 (.032)					-0.047 (.049)	-0.101 (.077)	-0.054 (.037)	-0.057 + (.033)
North East					-0.612 *** (.114)	-0.780 *** (.112)	-0.131 (.094)	-0.281 ** (.085)	-0.366 *** (.110)	-0.416 *** (.109)	0.089 (.092)	-0.047 (.084)
South East					-0.832 *** (.118)	-0.613 *** (.120)	-0.322 ** (.103)	-0.509 *** (.090)	-0.608 *** (.112)	-0.333 *** (.113)	-0.081 (.100)	-0.247 ** (.090)
South					-0.954 *** (.114)	-0.755 *** (.117)	-0.158 (.098)	-0.237 ** (.086)	-0.637 *** (.111)	-0.334 *** (.110)	0.049 (.095)	-0.006 (.085)
South West					-0.906 *** (.124)	-0.926 *** (.131)	-0.538 *** (.113)	-0.191 * (.093)	-0.697 *** (.119)	-0.479 *** (.126)	-0.301 ** (.107)	0.038 (.093)
West					-0.598 *** (.125)	-0.243 + (.137)	-0.219 + (.116)	-0.131 (.097)	-0.436 *** (.119)	-0.063 (.128)	-0.022 (.111)	0.066 (.095)
North West					-0.806 *** (.124)	-0.762 *** (.123)	-0.185 + (.100)	-0.170 + (.090)	-0.606 *** (.120)	-0.429 *** (.119)	0.002 (.101)	0.030 (.091)
Center					-0.527 *** (.120)	-0.526 *** (.125)	-0.137 (.099)	-0.156 + (.090)	-0.422 *** (.115)	-0.334 *** (.123)	-0.048 (.101)	0.033 (.090)
R ²	0.175	0.214	0.099	0.084	0.075	0.071	0.020	0.019	0.211	0.233	0.111	0.093
Adjusted R ²	0.170	0.209	0.096	0.081	0.069	0.066	0.016	0.016	0.202	0.224	0.104	0.087
N	1174	1253	1775	2212	1174	1253	1775	2212	1174	1253	1775	2212

Notes: *** p < 0.001, ** p < 0.010, * p < 0.050, + p < 0.100. Unstandardized regression coefficients and (standard errors). Data sources: COMALP 1995, BOP 1998, BOP 2000, BOP 2002.

Table A-9 Diffuse support for democratic values: attitudinal model

	1995	1998	2000	2002
Intercept	0.315* (.141)	-0.207 (.156)	-0.041 (.122)	0.135 (.121)
Interest in politics	0.167*** (.031)	0.322*** (.036)	0.231*** (.034)	0.103* (.040)
Vote for governing party	-0.303*** (.060)	0.091 (.057)	-0.147* (.064)	-0.020 (.068)
Political participation	---	0.431*** (.107)	---	0.144 (.089)
Communism was bad	0.441*** (.057)	0.442*** (.067)	0.267*** (.052)	0.153** (.047)
Interpersonal trust	0.386*** (.064)	-0.086 (.091)	0.122* (.052)	0.113* (.045)
Satisfaction with life	0.000 (.036)	0.075+ (.038)	0.080* (.036)	0.045 (.032)
Institutional trust	-0.369*** (.048)	-0.203*** (.049)	-0.197*** (.045)	-0.247*** (.040)
R ²	0.193	0.189	0.076	0.040
Adjusted R ²	0.188	0.185	0.073	0.037
N	1174	1253	1775	2212

Notes: *** p < 0.001, ** p < 0.010, * p < 0.050, + p < 0.100. Unstandardized regression coefficients and (standard errors).
Data sources: Data sources: COMALP 1995, BOP 1998, BOP 2000, BOP 2002.

Table A-10 Mean differences in diffuse support for democratic values

	1995	1998	2000	2002	95 - 98	95 - 00	95 - 02	98 - 00	98 - 02	00 - 02
Men vs. women	0.27	0.24	0.09	0.12	0.02	0.10	0.08	0.08	0.06	-0.02
					-0.01	-0.09	-0.07	-0.08	-0.06	0.01
Under 30 vs. 31 - 60	-0.02	-0.06	-0.14	-0.17	0.00	0.12	0.13	0.12	0.12	0.01
Under 30 vs. over 61	0.31	0.33	0.03	0.04	-0.03	0.00	-0.02	0.03	0.01	-0.03
31 - 60 vs. over 61	0.33	0.39	0.18	0.21	0.03	-0.15	-0.14	-0.18	-0.17	0.01
4 grades or less vs. 5 - 8 grades	-0.25	-0.17	0.00	-0.15	0.06	-0.20	-0.10	-0.26	-0.16	0.10
4 grades or less vs. 9 - 11 grades	-0.41	-0.46	-0.21	-0.37	0.14	0.05	0.00	-0.09	-0.14	-0.05
4 grades or less vs. high school plus	-0.73	-0.85	-0.49	-0.52	0.01	0.00	-0.06	-0.01	-0.08	-0.07
4 grades or less vs. university plus	-1.37	-1.44	-0.98	-1.03	-0.05	0.04	0.10	0.10	0.16	0.06
5 - 8 grades vs. 9 - 11 grades	-0.16	-0.28	-0.20	-0.22	0.00	0.19	0.24	0.20	0.24	0.05
5 - 8 grades vs. high school plus	-0.48	-0.67	-0.49	-0.37						
5 - 8 grades vs. university plus	-1.12	-1.27	-0.98	-0.88						
9 - 11 grades vs. high school plus	-0.32	-0.39	-0.28	-0.15						
9 - 11 grades vs. university plus	-0.96	-0.98	-0.77	-0.66						
High school plus vs. university plus	-0.64	-0.59	-0.49	-0.51						
Urban vs. rural	0.52	0.63	0.41	0.37	-0.06	0.04	0.07	0.09	0.12	0.03
					0.06	-0.07	-0.08	-0.12	-0.14	-0.02
Orthodox vs. non-orthodox	-0.15	-0.09	-0.19	-0.07	-0.01	0.00	-0.01	0.01	-0.01	-0.02
					0.05	-0.04	0.06	-0.09	0.02	0.10
Vote power vs. vote opposition	-0.49	0.25	-0.26	-0.13	-0.38	-0.14	-0.19	0.24	0.18	-0.06
					0.36	0.10	0.16	-0.27	-0.20	0.07
N	1174	1253	1775	2212						

Note: Regular text indicates no significant differences. **Gray bold text** indicates that the first group in the compared pair has a significantly higher average score (p<.05). *Gray italic text* indicates that the first group in the compared pair has a significantly lower average score (p<.05). Data sources: COMALP 1995, BOP 1998, BOP 2000, BOP 2002.

Table A-11 Correlations between diffuse support for democratic values and attitudinal variables

1995 (N = 1174)		V1	V2	V3	V4	V5	V6	V7
V1	Democratic values	1.000						
V2	Interest in politics	0.183	1.000					
V3	Vote for governing party	-0.244	-0.058	1.000				
V4	Political participation	---	---	---	1.000			
V5	Communism was bad	0.236	0.071	-0.113	---	1.000		
V6	Interpersonal trust	0.162	0.134	-0.026	---	0.064	1.000	
V7	Satisfaction with life	0.003	0.012	0.031	---	0.148	0.118	1.000
V8	Institutional trust	-0.217	0.031	0.241	---	0.077	0.189	0.198
1998 (N = 1253)		V1	V2	V3	V4	V5	V6	V7
V1	Democratic values	1.000						
V2	Interest in politics	0.328	1.000					
V3	Vote for governing party	0.125	0.079	1.000				
V4	Political participation	0.193	0.218	0.087	1.000			
V5	Communism was bad	-0.278	-0.174	-0.281	-0.080	1.000		
V6	Interpersonal trust	-0.063	-0.051	0.022	-0.028	0.040	1.000	
V7	Satisfaction with life	0.048	-0.024	0.022	-0.037	-0.150	0.110	1.000
V8	Institutional trust	-0.078	0.015	0.106	-0.055	-0.155	0.139	0.224
2000 (N = 1775)		V1	V2	V3	V4	V5	V6	V7
V1	Democratic values	1.000						
V2	Interest in politics	0.173	1.000					
V3	Vote for governing party	-0.128	-0.073	1.000				
V4	Political participation	---	---	---	1.000			
V5	Communism was bad	-0.149	0.037	0.216	---	1.000		
V6	Interpersonal trust	0.054	0.059	-0.029	---	0.005	1.000	
V7	Satisfaction with life	0.069	-0.003	-0.166	---	-0.123	0.049	1.000
V8	Institutional trust	-0.081	0.039	0.009	---	-0.006	0.163	0.198
2002 (N = 2212)		V1	V2	V3	V4	V5	V6	V7
V1	Democratic values	1.000						
V2	Interest in politics	0.068	1.000					
V3	Vote for governing party	-0.066	-0.064	1.000				
V4	Political participation	0.057	0.204	-0.108	1.000			
V5	Communism was bad	0.080	0.038	-0.037	-0.045	1.000		
V6	Interpersonal trust	0.037	0.077	0.055	-0.002	0.017	1.000	
V7	Satisfaction with life	0.023	0.057	0.050	0.009	0.113	0.141	1.000
V8	Institutional trust	-0.143	0.089	0.308	-0.068	0.016	0.177	0.186

Note: Data sources: COMALP 1995, BOP 1998, BOP 2000, BOP 2002. Shaded cells indicate correlations that are significant at $p < .05$. Bolded cells indicate correlations with the dependent variable

Table A-12 Mean differences in diffuse support for market economy

	1992	1994	1998	2000	92 - 94	92 - 98	92 - 00	94 - 98	94 - 00	98 - 00
Men vs. women	0.09	0.04	0.02	0.01	-0.05	-0.37	-0.39	-0.32	-0.35	-0.02
					-0.09	-0.44	-0.47	-0.35	-0.38	-0.03
Men										
Women										
Under 30 vs. 31 - 60	0.05	0.12	0.04	0.03	-0.15	-0.41	-0.42	-0.26	-0.27	-0.01
Under 30 vs. over 61	0.09	0.24	0.12	0.08	-0.07	-0.42	-0.44	-0.34	-0.37	-0.03
31 - 60 vs. over 61	0.04	0.12	0.08	0.06	0.01	-0.37	-0.43	-0.38	-0.44	-0.05
4 grades or less vs. 5 - 8 grades	-0.08	-0.20	-0.06	-0.07	0.05	-0.45	-0.47	-0.50	-0.52	-0.02
4 grades or less vs. 9 - 11 grades	-0.14	-0.25	-0.12	-0.12	-0.06	-0.42	-0.45	-0.36	-0.39	-0.03
4 grades or less vs. high school plus	-0.20	-0.36	-0.15	-0.16	-0.06	-0.43	-0.45	-0.37	-0.39	-0.02
4 grades or less vs. university plus	-0.35	-0.54	-0.17	-0.18	-0.11	-0.40	-0.43	-0.29	-0.32	-0.03
5 - 8 grades vs. 9 - 11 grades	-0.05	-0.05	-0.06	-0.06	-0.14	-0.26	-0.30	-0.12	-0.16	-0.04
5 - 8 grades vs. high school plus	-0.12	-0.16	-0.09	-0.09						
5 - 8 grades vs. university plus	-0.27	-0.35	-0.11	-0.12						
9 - 11 grades vs. high school plus	-0.06	-0.11	-0.03	-0.04						
9 - 11 grades vs. university plus	-0.22	-0.30	-0.05	-0.06						
High school plus vs. university plus	-0.15	-0.18	-0.02	-0.03						
Urban vs. rural	0.12	0.16	0.10	0.11	-0.09	-0.39	-0.43	-0.31	-0.34	-0.03
					-0.05	-0.42	-0.44	-0.37	-0.39	-0.02
Urban										
Rural										
Orthodox vs. non-orthodox	-0.10	-0.21	0.03	-0.03	-0.05	-0.42	-0.44	-0.38	-0.39	-0.02
					-0.15	-0.28	-0.37	-0.13	-0.21	-0.08
Orthodox										
Non-orthodox										
Vote power vs. vote opposition	-0.11	-0.15	0.08	-0.04	-0.05	-0.51	-0.48	-0.46	-0.43	0.03
					-0.09	-0.32	-0.41	-0.23	-0.32	-0.09
Vote power										
Vote opposition										
N	1512	1011	1253	1775						

Note: Regular text indicates no significant differences. **Gray bold text** indicates that the first group in the compared pair has a significantly higher average score ($p < .05$). *Gray italic text* indicates that the first group in the compared pair has a significantly lower average score ($p < .05$). Data sources: USIA 1992, USIA 1994, BOP 1998, BOP 2000.

Table A-13 Correlations between diffuse support for market economy and attitudinal variables

1992 (N = 1512)		V1	V2	V3	V4	V5	V6	V7	V8
V1	Market economy is good	1.000							
V2	Interest in politics	0.150	1.000						
V3	Vote for governing party	-0.107	-0.176	1.000					
V4	Communism was bad	0.069	0.042	-0.117	1.000				
V5	Interpersonal trust	0.108	0.057	0.005	0.066	1.000			
V6	Current personal situation	0.147	0.039	0.117	0.039	0.076	1.000		
V7	Future personal situation	0.185	0.112	0.048	0.075	0.023	0.450	1.000	
V8	Satisfaction with life	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	1.000
V9	Institutional trust	0.003	-0.117	0.343	0.019	0.094	0.275	0.274	---
1994 (N = 1011)		V1	V2	V3	V4	V5	V6	V7	V8
V1	Market economy is good	1.000							
V2	Interest in politics	0.234	1.000						
V3	Vote for governing party	-0.150	-0.147	1.000					
V4	Communism was bad	0.199	0.071	-0.021	1.000				
V5	Interpersonal trust	0.039	0.002	0.046	0.150	1.000			
V6	Current personal situation	---	---	---	---	---	1.000		
V7	Future personal situation	0.206	0.040	0.052	0.296	0.107	---	1.000	
V8	Satisfaction with life	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	1.000
V9	Institutional trust	0.030	-0.043	0.279	0.269	0.194	---	0.303	---
1998 (N = 1253)		V1	V2	V3	V4	V5	V6	V7	V8
V1	Market economy is good	1.000							
V2	Interest in politics	0.099	1.000						
V3	Vote for governing party	0.116	0.079	1.000					
V4	Communism was bad	-0.148	-0.174	-0.281	1.000				
V5	Interpersonal trust	-0.035	-0.051	0.022	0.040	1.000			
V6	Current personal situation	0.067	-0.001	0.124	-0.202	0.004	1.000		
V7	Future personal situation	0.075	-0.017	0.127	-0.209	0.033	0.411	1.000	
V8	Satisfaction with life	0.073	-0.024	0.022	-0.150	0.110	0.327	0.268	1.000
V9	Institutional trust	0.058	0.015	0.106	-0.155	0.139	0.107	0.207	0.224
2000 (N = 1775)		V1	V2	V3	V4	V5	V6	V7	V8
V1	Market economy is good	1.000							
V2	Interest in politics	0.056	1.000						
V3	Vote for governing party	-0.061	-0.073	1.000					
V4	Communism was bad	-0.051	0.037	0.216	1.000				
V5	Interpersonal trust	0.020	0.059	-0.029	0.005	1.000			
V6	Current personal situation	0.095	0.022	-0.228	-0.149	0.043	1.000		
V7	Future personal situation	0.073	0.106	-0.098	-0.075	0.068	0.359	1.000	
V8	Satisfaction with life	0.094	-0.003	-0.166	-0.123	0.049	0.523	0.290	1.000
V9	Institutional trust	0.053	0.039	0.009	-0.006	0.163	0.147	0.241	0.198

Note: Data sources: USIA 1992, USIA 1994, BOP 1998, BOP 2000. Shaded cells indicate correlations that are significant at $p < .05$. Bolded cells indicate correlations with the dependent variable.

Table A-14 Diffuse support for market economy: SES and region models

	SES model				Region model				SES and region model			
	1992	1994	1998	2000	1992	1994	1998	2000	1992	1994	1998	2000
Intercept	0.360** (.328)	0.942 (.409)	1.600 (.646)	1.437 (.486)	1.377+ (.164)	1.193 (.207)	8.196*** (.292)	14.311*** (.321)	0.471+ (.396)	0.685 (.498)	1.212 (.746)	1.799 (.627)
Gender: Male	1.409** (.123)	1.325+ (.146)	1.138 (.188)	1.242 (.175)					1.406** (.126)	1.307+ (.152)	1.165 (.193)	1.238 (.178)
Age: 31 - 60	0.955 (.154)	0.663* (.191)	0.667+ (.245)	0.745 (.250)					0.936 (.158)	0.616* (.197)	0.682 (.246)	0.715 (.255)
Age: Over 60	1.129 (.196)	0.594* (.249)	0.478* (.312)	0.577+ (.305)					1.063 (.203)	0.580* (.261)	0.477* (.317)	0.538* (.311)
Education	1.321*** (.062)	1.563*** (.062)	1.220* (.088)	1.394** (.101)					1.356*** (.066)	1.529*** (.064)	1.225* (.088)	1.380** (.103)
Residence: Urban	1.246 (.145)	1.104 (.163)	1.808** (.202)	2.260*** (.197)					1.057 (.153)	1.175 (.175)	1.853** (.214)	2.131*** (.198)
Unemployed	1.295 (.536)	0.767 (.250)	0.723 (.309)	0.447** (.251)					1.145 (.546)	0.756 (.256)	0.715 (.316)	0.439** (.255)
Religion: Orthodox	0.702 (.214)	0.389*** (.234)	1.390 (.222)	0.909 (.293)					0.810 (.224)	0.572* (.247)	1.477 (.247)	1.140 (.332)
Church attendance	1.017 (.081)	0.931 (.113)	1.331 (.251)	1.566** (.139)					1.019 (.087)	0.855 (.119)	1.335 (.255)	1.407* (.145)
North East					0.425*** (.219)	0.831 (.289)	0.535+ (.344)	0.817 (.373)	0.543** (.228)	1.182 (.322)	0.897 (.366)	1.340 (.391)
South East					0.696 (.233)	0.428** (.273)	0.713 (.389)	0.320** (.380)	0.920 (.248)	0.622 (.300)	1.057 (.404)	0.521 (.404)
South					0.350*** (.232)	0.649 (.278)	0.837 (.358)	0.458* (.375)	0.441*** (.242)	1.055 (.319)	1.602 (.396)	0.879 (.396)
South West					0.651+ (.229)	0.681 (.283)	0.551 (.412)	0.252*** (.356)	0.833 (.240)	1.027 (.317)	1.034 (.421)	0.498+ (.381)
West					0.726 (.247)	1.136 (.290)	1.216 (.466)	1.740 (.722)	0.768 (.258)	1.566 (.313)	1.666 (.482)	2.934 (.742)
North West					0.426*** (.241)	1.319 (.294)	1.059 (.393)	0.494+ (.391)	0.408*** (.262)	1.929* (.324)	1.786 (.410)	0.809 (.414)
Center					1.360 (.235)	3.477*** (.350)	0.670 (.392)	0.997 (.454)	1.481 (.246)	4.233*** (.381)	1.102 (.424)	1.419 (.478)
Nagelkerke R ²	0.065	0.166	0.073	0.118	0.063	0.096	0.017	0.057	0.114	0.224	0.087	0.152
-2LL	2007.083	1265.660	967.391	1152.932	2010.016	1324.119	1007.810	1210.822	1948.327	1214.106	957.439	1119.389
Chi-square	75.838***	133.991***	52.325***	109.890***	72.905***	75.531***	11.906	52.000***	134.593***	185.545***	62.277***	143.433***
N	1512	1011	1253	1775	1512	1011	1253	1775	1512	1011	1253	1775

Notes: *** p < 0.001, ** p < 0.010, * p < 0.050, + p < 0.100. Odds ratios and (standard errors of logit coefficients). Data sources: USIA 1992, USIA 1994, BOP 1998, BOP 2000.

Table A-15 Diffuse support for market economy: attitudinal model

	1992	1994	1998	2000
Intercept	0.101*** (.450)	0.124*** (.341)	1.728 (.581)	1.849 (.441)
Interest in politics	1.365*** (.080)	1.904*** (.105)	1.335* (.125)	1.238+ (.114)
Vote for governing party	0.662* (.180)	0.574** (.186)	1.580+ (.228)	0.821 (.179)
Communism was bad	1.290 (.195)	1.876** (.205)	1.829** (.213)	1.228 (.206)
Interpersonal trust	1.653*** (.147)	1.058 (.188)	0.734 (.286)	1.041 (.186)
Current personal situation	1.228** (.071)	---	1.032 (.111)	1.173 (.112)
Future personal situation	1.382* (.112)	1.460*** (.085)	1.073 (.097)	1.077 (.080)
Satisfaction with life	---	---	1.213 (.134)	1.248+ (.133)
Institutional trust	0.913 (.155)	0.940 (.119)	1.111 (.167)	1.175 (.160)
Nagelkerke R ²	0.106	0.169	0.073	0.038
-2LL	1958.678	1262.907	967.814	1227.950
Chi-square	124.242***	136.744***	51.903***	34.873***
N	1512	1011	1253	1775

Notes: *** p < 0.001, ** p < 0.010, * p < 0.050, + p < 0.100. Odds ratios and (standard errors of logit coefficients).

Data sources: USIA 1992, USIA 1994, BOP 1998, BOP 2000.

Table A-16 Mean differences in diffuse support for the liberal model

	1991	1997	1999	2005	91 - 97	91 - 99	91 - 05	97 - 99	97 - 05	99 - 05
Men vs. women	0.30	0.57	0.86	0.42	<i>-0.38</i>	<i>-0.72</i>	<i>-0.20</i>	<i>-0.33</i>	<i>0.19</i>	0.52
					<i>-0.12</i>	<i>-0.15</i>	<i>-0.08</i>	<i>-0.03</i>	<i>0.04</i>	<i>0.08</i>
Under 30 vs. 31 - 60	0.25	-0.12	0.48	0.05	0.03	<i>-0.65</i>	0.02	<i>-0.68</i>	<i>-0.01</i>	0.67
Under 30 vs. over 61	0.74	0.34	1.08	0.48	<i>-0.35</i>	<i>-0.42</i>	<i>-0.18</i>	<i>-0.08</i>	<i>0.16</i>	0.23
31 - 60 vs. over 61	0.49	0.46	0.60	0.43	<i>-0.37</i>	<i>-0.31</i>	<i>-0.24</i>	0.06	<i>0.12</i>	0.06
4 grades or less vs. 5 - 8 grades	-0.27	0.22	<i>-0.54</i>	0.06	<i>-0.46</i>	<i>-0.19</i>	<i>-0.36</i>	0.27	<i>0.10</i>	<i>-0.18</i>
4 grades or less vs. 9 - 11 grades	<i>-0.56</i>	<i>-0.39</i>	<i>-0.99</i>	<i>-0.49</i>	0.04	<i>-0.45</i>	<i>-0.03</i>	<i>-0.49</i>	<i>-0.07</i>	0.41
4 grades or less vs. high school plus	<i>-1.34</i>	<i>-1.50</i>	<i>-1.87</i>	<i>-1.23</i>	<i>-0.28</i>	<i>-0.62</i>	<i>-0.29</i>	<i>-0.34</i>	<i>-0.01</i>	0.32
4 grades or less vs. university plus	<i>-2.36</i>	<i>-2.40</i>	<i>-2.52</i>	<i>-1.99</i>	<i>-0.61</i>	<i>-0.71</i>	<i>-0.25</i>	<i>-0.10</i>	0.37	0.47
5 - 8 grades vs. 9 - 11 grades	<i>-0.29</i>	<i>-0.61</i>	<i>-0.46</i>	<i>-0.55</i>	<i>-0.50</i>	<i>-0.35</i>	0.00	0.15	0.50	0.35
5 - 8 grades vs. high school plus	<i>-1.07</i>	<i>-1.72</i>	<i>-1.34</i>	<i>-1.29</i>						
5 - 8 grades vs. university plus	<i>-2.08</i>	<i>-2.62</i>	<i>-1.98</i>	<i>-2.05</i>						
9 - 11 grades vs. high school plus	<i>-0.78</i>	<i>-1.11</i>	<i>-0.88</i>	<i>-0.74</i>						
9 - 11 grades vs. university plus	<i>-1.79</i>	<i>-2.01</i>	<i>-1.53</i>	<i>-1.50</i>						
High school plus vs. university plus	<i>-1.01</i>	<i>-0.90</i>	<i>-0.65</i>	<i>-0.76</i>						
Urban vs. rural	0.99	1.04	0.90	0.86	<i>-0.19</i>	<i>-0.33</i>	0.01	<i>-0.14</i>	<i>0.21</i>	0.35
					<i>-0.15</i>	<i>-0.43</i>	<i>-0.11</i>	<i>-0.28</i>	<i>0.03</i>	0.31
Orthodox vs. non-orthodox	<i>-0.68</i>	0.05	<i>-0.29</i>	<i>-0.02</i>	<i>-0.33</i>	<i>-0.46</i>	<i>-0.19</i>	<i>-0.13</i>	<i>0.14</i>	0.26
					0.39	<i>-0.07</i>	0.47	<i>-0.47</i>	<i>0.07</i>	0.54
Vote power vs. vote opposition	<i>-1.24</i>	0.78	0.81	0.45	<i>-1.15</i>	<i>-1.45</i>	<i>-0.91</i>	<i>-0.30</i>	<i>0.25</i>	0.55
					0.87	0.59	0.79	<i>-0.28</i>	<i>-0.08</i>	0.20
N	1000	1000	1146	1776						

Note: Regular text indicates no significant differences. **Gray bold text** indicates that the first group in the compared pair has a significantly higher average score ($p < .05$). *Gray italic text* indicates that the first group in the compared pair has a significantly lower average score ($p < .05$). Data sources: USIA 1991, WVS 1997, WVS 1999, WVS/BOP 2005.

Table A-17 Mean differences in diffuse support for the social-democratic model

	1992	1999	2002	2005	92 - 99	92 - 02	92 - 05	99 - 02	99 - 05	02 - 05
Men vs. women	-0.36	-0.31	-0.13	-0.33						
					Men	1.45	-1.06	2.38	-0.14	-2.52
					Women	1.69	-1.03	2.56	-0.16	-2.72
Under 30 vs. 31 - 60	-0.47	-0.28	-0.18	-0.37	Under 30	1.27	-1.10	2.45	0.09	-2.37
Under 30 vs. over 61	-1.28	-0.45	-0.54	-1.11	31 - 60	1.55	-1.01	2.55	-0.00	-2.56
31 - 60 vs. over 61	-0.82	-0.16	-0.36	-0.73	Over 61	2.01	-0.92	2.36	-0.57	-2.93
4 grades or less vs. 5 - 8 grades	0.84	0.15	0.40	0.06	4 grades or less	1.85	-0.73	2.14	-0.43	-2.58
4 grades or less vs. 9 - 11 grades	1.32	0.30	0.75	0.76	5 - 8 grades	1.41	-1.51	2.39	-0.53	-2.92
4 grades or less vs. high school plus	1.58	0.74	1.33	1.25	9 - 11 grades	1.29	-1.28	2.59	0.03	-2.57
4 grades or less vs. university plus	1.93	1.94	1.95	2.04	High school plus	1.60	-1.06	2.73	0.08	-2.65
5 - 8 grades vs. 9 - 11 grades	0.47	0.15	0.35	0.71	University plus	1.87	-0.61	2.15	-0.33	-2.48
5 - 8 grades vs. high school plus	0.74	0.59	0.93	1.20						
5 - 8 grades vs. university plus	1.09	1.79	1.55	1.99						
9 - 11 grades vs. high school plus	0.27	0.44	0.58	0.49						
9 - 11 grades vs. university plus	0.61	1.64	1.20	1.28						
High school plus vs. university plus	0.34	1.20	0.62	0.79						
Urban vs. rural	-0.49	-0.48	-0.68	-0.71	Urban	1.64	-0.99	2.55	-0.08	-2.63
					Rural	1.46	-1.20	2.35	-0.31	-2.66
Orthodox vs. non-orthodox	0.58	-0.27	-0.42	0.07	Orthodox	1.69	-1.00	2.48	-0.21	-2.69
					Non-orthodox	0.69	-1.51	2.33	0.13	-2.20
Vote power vs. vote opposition	0.73	-0.51	0.02	-0.45	Vote power	1.98	-0.43	2.17	-0.24	-2.41
					Vote opposition	1.26	-1.61	2.70	-0.18	-2.88
N	1512	1146	2212	1776						

Note: Regular text indicates no significant differences. **Gray bold text** indicates that the first group in the compared pair has a significantly higher average score ($p < .05$). *Gray italic text* indicates that the first group in the compared pair has a significantly lower average score ($p < .05$). Data sources: USIA 1992, BOP 1999, BOP 2002, WVS/BOP 2005.

Table A-18 Correlations between diffuse support for market economy values and attitudinal variables

1993 (N = 1000)		V1	V2	V3	V4	V5	V6	V7	V8	V9
V1	Support for liberal model	1.000								
V2	Support for social-democratic model	-0.481	1.000							
V3	Interest in politics	0.209	-0.155	1.000						
V4	Vote for governing party	-0.289	0.241	-0.131	1.000					
V5	Interpersonal trust	0.083	-0.074	0.013	-0.072	1.000				
V6	Current personal situation	---	---	---	---	---	1.000			
V7	Future personal situation	---	---	---	---	---	---	1.000		
V8	Satisfaction with life	0.003	-0.061	0.022	0.060	0.049	---	---	1.000	
V9	Institutional trust	-0.115	0.120	0.005	0.147	0.034	---	---	0.157	1.000
V10	Satisfaction with market economy	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---
2005 (N = 1776)		V1	V2	V3	V4	V5	V6	V7	V8	V9
V1	Support for liberal model	1.000								
V2	Support for social-democratic model	-0.198	1.000							
V3	Interest in politics	0.137	-0.146	1.000						
V4	Vote for governing party	0.104	-0.092	0.066	1.000					
V5	Interpersonal trust	0.040	0.056	0.007	0.068	1.000				
V6	Current personal situation	0.128	-0.271	0.102	0.149	0.036	1.000			
V7	Future personal situation	0.122	-0.248	0.164	0.171	0.107	0.540	1.000		
V8	Satisfaction with life	0.145	-0.274	0.122	0.156	0.040	0.453	0.393	1.000	
V9	Institutional trust	0.061	-0.046	0.141	0.161	0.172	0.127	0.189	0.175	1.000
V10	Satisfaction with market economy	0.133	-0.201	0.093	0.197	0.137	0.275	0.277	0.330	0.352

Note: Data sources: WVS 1993, WVS/BOP 2005. Shaded cells indicate correlations that are significant at $p < .05$. Bolded cells indicate correlations with the dependent variable.

Table A-19 Diffuse support for the liberal model of market economy: SES and region models

	SES model			Region model			SES and region model		
	1993	1999	2005	1993	1999	2005	1993	1999	2005
Intercept	5.676*** (.381)	5.781*** (.387)	5.033*** (.300)	8.262*** (.194)	7.801*** (.204)	7.350*** (.155)	6.664*** (.448)	5.927*** (.450)	4.796*** (.350)
Gender: Male	0.506*** (.125)	0.642*** (.135)	0.369*** (.106)				0.518*** (.124)	0.636*** (.136)	0.360*** (.106)
Age: 31 - 60	-0.387** (.149)	-0.259+ (.156)	0.061 (.131)				-0.438** (.148)	-0.256+ (.155)	0.022 (.131)
Age: Over 60	-0.760*** (.191)	-0.193 (.208)	0.115 (.159)				-0.855*** (.191)	-0.200 (.207)	0.096 (.159)
Education	0.064*** (.011)	0.529*** (.065)	0.426*** (.048)				0.058*** (.011)	0.513*** (.064)	0.445*** (.048)
Urban	0.583*** (.137)	0.314* (.144)	0.408*** (.114)				0.396** (.144)	0.220 (.151)	0.427*** (.116)
Orthodox	-0.378 (.257)	-0.330+ (.176)	-0.754** (.250)				-0.392 (.255)	-0.108 (.190)	-0.764** (.250)
Church attendance	0.050 (.178)	-0.043 (.104)	-0.033 (.153)				0.052 (.181)	-0.082 (.106)	0.044 (.161)
North East				-1.121*** (.244)	-0.976*** (.276)	-0.367+ (.199)	-0.297 (.255)	-0.540* (.265)	0.529* (.227)
South East				-1.261*** (.286)	-0.626* (.265)	-0.538* (.218)	-0.634* (.260)	-0.094 (.256)	0.009 (.205)
South				-1.212*** (.244)	-1.079*** (.266)	-0.754*** (.208)	-0.954*** (.270)	-0.557* (.260)	0.688** (.224)
South West				-1.324*** (.271)	-0.412 (.292)	0.006 (.228)	-0.905** (.283)	-0.060 (.285)	-0.042 (.211)
West				-1.596*** (.312)	-0.465 (.283)	-0.287 (.218)	-0.854*** (.245)	-0.096 (.269)	-0.089 (.206)
North West				-0.986*** (.257)	0.030 (.281)	-0.499* (.209)	-0.976*** (.238)	0.146 (.272)	0.190 (.196)
Center				-0.390 (.265)	-0.054 (.301)	-0.153 (.226)	0.091 (.103)	0.218 (.293)	0.136+ (.074)
R ²	0.112	0.151	0.109	0.046	0.034	0.013	0.136	0.165	0.122
Adjusted R ²	0.105	0.145	0.105	0.040	0.028	0.010	0.124	0.154	0.114
N	1103	1146	1776	1103	1146	1776	1103	1146	1776

Notes: *** p < 0.001, ** p < 0.010, * p < 0.050, + p < 0.100. Unstandardized regression coefficients and (standard errors). Data sources: WVS 1993, WVS 1999, WVS / BOP 2005.

Table A-20 Diffuse support for the social democratic model of market economy: SES and region models

	SES model			Region model			SES and region model		
	1993	1999	2005	1993	1999	2005	1993	1999	2005
Intercept	5.650*** (.427)	7.154*** (.391)	7.437*** (.325)	4.083*** (.214)	5.839*** (.198)	5.843*** (.176)	4.751*** (.499)	7.114*** (.445)	7.554*** (.384)
Gender: Male	-0.502*** (.142)	-0.135 (.129)	-0.244* (.118)				-0.533*** (.141)	-0.121 (.129)	-0.226+ (.118)
Age: 31 - 60	0.491** (.166)	0.150 (.162)	0.272+ (.152)				0.567*** (.166)	0.171 (.161)	0.277+ (.153)
Age: Over 60	0.564** (.214)	-0.130 (.201)	0.572** (.188)				0.697** (.214)	-0.139 (.200)	0.551** (.188)
Education	-0.049*** (.013)	-0.376*** (.064)	-0.391*** (.052)				-0.044*** (.013)	-0.400*** (.064)	-0.417*** (.053)
Urban	-0.316* (.151)	-0.070 (.146)	-0.244+ (.127)				-0.095 (.160)	-0.110 (.151)	-0.184 (.131)
Orthodox	0.389 (.289)	-0.219 (.175)	0.513+ (.290)				0.449 (.287)	0.034 (.191)	0.526+ (.290)
Church attendance	0.188 (.197)	0.142 (.106)	0.133 (.171)				0.192 (.202)	0.094 (.106)	0.101 (.180)
North East				1.012*** (.269)	0.210 (.270)	0.536* (.227)	0.133 (.285)	-0.086 (.269)	-0.297 (.260)
South East				0.638* (.317)	0.023 (.256)	-0.045 (.247)	0.951** (.294)	-0.333 (.255)	-0.097 (.240)
South				1.136*** (.270)	0.526* (.254)	0.789*** (.232)	0.906** (.305)	0.200 (.258)	-0.198 (.257)
South West				1.068*** (.300)	-0.258 (.282)	0.446+ (.255)	0.462 (.319)	-0.492+ (.285)	-0.504* (.244)
West				0.572+ (.344)	0.003 (.279)	0.535* (.245)	0.961*** (.277)	-0.235 (.276)	0.227 (.236)
North West				1.063*** (.283)	0.476+ (.271)	0.362 (.239)	0.964*** (.269)	0.371 (.276)	0.050 (.227)
Center				0.188 (.290)	0.790** (.274)	0.282 (.254)	-0.032 (.117)	0.621* (.281)	-0.113 (.085)
R ²	0.058	0.054	0.080	0.031	0.021	0.012	0.081	0.077	0.088
Adjusted R ²	0.051	0.047	0.076	0.025	0.015	0.008	0.069	0.064	0.081
N	1103	1146	1776	1103	1146	1776	1103	1146	1776

Notes: *** p < 0.001, ** p < 0.010, * p < 0.050, + p < 0.100. Unstandardized regression coefficients and (standard errors). Data sources: WVS 1993, WVS 1999, WVS / BOP 2005.

Table A-21 Diffuse support for the liberal model of market economy: attitudinal model

	1993	1999	2005 model 1	2005 model 2
Intercept	7.137*** (.306)	6.574*** (.332)	5.261*** (.260)	4.886*** (.287)
Interest in politics	0.583*** (.097)	0.512*** (.098)	0.334*** (.069)	0.320*** (.069)
Vote for governing party	-1.066*** (.145)	0.714* (.234)	0.326* (.136)	0.271* (.132)
Interpersonal trust	0.368* (.173)	0.209 (.222)	0.150 (.129)	0.112 (.130)
Current personal situation	---	---	---	0.119 (.079)
Future personal situation	---	---	---	0.053 (.072)
Satisfaction with life	0.022 (.027)	0.093 (.055)	0.353*** (.076)	0.214* (.086)
Institutional trust	-0.272** (.097)	-0.370 (.107)	0.029 (.099)	-0.058 (.104)
Satisfaction with market economy	---	---	---	0.173** (.067)
R ²	0.125	0.071	0.043	0.050
Adjusted R ²	0.121	0.067	0.040	0.046
N	1103	1146	1776	1776

Notes: *** p < 0.001, ** p < 0.010, * p < 0.050, + p < 0.100. Unstandardized regression coefficients and (standard errors). Data source: WVS 1993, WVS 1999, WVS / BOP 2005.

Table A-22 Diffuse support for the social democratic model of market economy: attitudinal model

	1993	1999	2005 model 1	2005 model 2
Intercept	4.974*** (.350)	7.001*** (.307)	8.954*** (.285)	10.086** (.310)
Interest in politics	-0.459*** (.109)	-0.032 (.095)	-0.371*** (.078)	-0.318*** (.077)
Vote for governing party	0.981*** (.163)	-0.418* (.159)	-0.249+ (.135)	-0.104 (.138)
Interpersonal trust	-0.357+ (.183)	0.334 (.246)	0.421** (.147)	0.517*** (.144)
Current personal situation	---	---	---	-0.358*** (.085)
Future personal situation	---	---	---	-0.260** (.081)
Satisfaction with life	-0.084** (.029)	-0.326*** (.051)	-0.888*** (.081)	-0.494*** (.090)
Institutional trust	0.368*** (.107)	0.100 (.099)	0.048 (.103)	0.234* (.105)
Satisfaction with market economy	---	---	---	-0.311*** (.072)
R ²	0.092	0.055	0.095	0.136
Adjusted R ²	0.088	0.051	0.093	0.132
N	1103	1146	1776	1776

Notes: *** p < 0.001, ** p < 0.010, * p < 0.050, + p < 0.100. Unstandardized regression coefficients and (standard errors). Data source: WVS 1993, WVS 1999, WVS / BOP 2005.

Table A-23 Support for democracy and market economy by socio-economic characteristics

	1997 (N=1,000)				1999 (N=1,146)				2005 (N=1,776)						
	D+M+	D+M-	D-M+	D-M-	Total	D+M+	D+M-	D-M+	D-M-	Total	D+M+	D+M-	D-M+	D-M-	Total
Gender:															
Female	48	60	52	71	51	47	62	56	65	51	52	64	63	62	54
Male	52	40	48	29	49	53	38	44	35	49	48	36	37	38	46
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Age:															
Under 30	24	25	27	15	24	27	19	20	11	23	20	16	28	20	20
31 - 60	53	45	49	60	52	51	49	52	51	51	54	49	46	50	52
Over 60	23	30	24	25	24	22	32	28	38	26	26	35	26	30	28
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Education:															
4 grades or less	13	27	19	25	16	10	29	23	32	16	19	31	22	30	22
5 - 8 grades	17	28	18	30	20	14	20	20	28	17	11	20	16	28	13
9 - 11 grades	22	24	24	34	23	24	23	28	25	25	22	23	22	28	22
High school plus	35	19	32	11	31	39	25	25	13	33	34	21	38	14	32
University plus	12	1	6	0	10	12	3	4	2	9	13	4	3	0	11
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Residence:															
Rural	39	58	36	64	43	41	58	49	62	45	38	56	48	71	42
Urban	61	42	64	36	57	59	42	51	38	55	62	44	52	29	58
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Religion:															
Non-Orthodox	16	17	10	7	16	18	14	10	9	15	14	13	18	8	14
Orthodox	84	83	90	93	84	82	86	90	91	85	86	87	82	92	86
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Voting intention:															
Opposition	38	49	62	75	43	50	66	74	74	57	46	51	50	62	47
Power	62	51	38	25	57	50	34	26	26	43	54	49	50	38	53
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Total	73	17	6	4	100	67	8	15	10	100	76	18	4	2	100

Note: Cell entries are percentages. Due to rounding errors, percentages may not always sum up to 100. **Gray bold text** indicates that the observed percentage in the cell is significantly higher than the expected percentage. *Gray italic text* indicates that the observed percentage in the cell is significantly lower than the expected percentage. Significance level: $p < .05$, computed from adjusted standardized residuals. Data sources: WVS 1997, WVS 1999, and BOP/WVS 2005.

Table A-24 Mean differences in trust in traditional institutions

	1992	1995	1999	2002	2005	92-95	92-99	92-02	92-05	95-99	95-02	95-05	99-02	99-05	02-05	
Men vs. women	-0.04	-0.06	-0.04	<i>-0.08</i>	<i>-0.16</i>	Men	-0.07	0.00	0.29	0.00	0.07	0.36	0.07	0.36	0.29	
						Women	<i>-0.09</i>	-0.04	0.17	0.02	0.05	0.26	0.03	0.24	0.21	
Under 30 vs. 31 - 60	<i>-0.16</i>	<i>-0.15</i>	<i>-0.11</i>	<i>-0.09</i>	<i>-0.16</i>	Under 30	-0.08	-0.08	0.27	-0.01	0.02	0.35	0.02	0.35	0.33	
Under 30 vs. over 61	<i>-0.30</i>	<i>-0.36</i>	<i>-0.34</i>	<i>-0.25</i>	<i>-0.40</i>	31 - 60	<i>-0.07</i>	-0.04	0.26	0.04	0.08	0.34	0.04	0.30	0.26	
31 - 60 vs. over 61	<i>-0.15</i>	<i>-0.21</i>	<i>-0.23</i>	<i>-0.16</i>	<i>-0.23</i>	Over 61	<i>-0.13</i>	-0.01	0.18	0.02	0.13	0.31	0.11	0.29	0.18	
< 4 grades vs. 5 - 8 grades	0.06	0.17	0.13	0.15	0.21	< 4 grades	-0.09	-0.06	0.20	0.03	0.09	0.29	0.06	0.26	0.20	
< 4 grades vs. 9 - 11 grades	0.26	0.27	0.23	0.21	0.25	5 - 8 grades	0.02	0.02	0.35	-0.01	0.07	0.33	0.07	0.33	0.26	
< 4 grades vs. high school +	0.43	0.46	0.41	0.37	0.41	9 - 11 grades	-0.07	-0.09	0.19	-0.02	0.02	0.26	0.04	0.28	0.24	
< 4 grades vs. university +	0.68	0.47	0.51	0.50	0.61	High school +	-0.06	-0.08	0.18	-0.02	-0.01	0.24	0.02	0.26	0.25	
5 - 8 grades vs. 9 - 11 grades	0.20	0.11	0.09	0.06	0.04	University +	<i>-0.29</i>	<i>-0.23</i>	0.13	0.06	0.11	0.42	0.05	0.36	0.31	
5 - 8 grades vs. high school +	0.37	0.30	0.28	0.22	0.21											
5 - 8 grades vs. university +	0.62	0.30	0.37	0.35	0.40											
9 - 11 grades vs. high school +	0.18	0.19	0.18	0.16	0.16											
9 - 11 grades vs. university +	0.42	0.20	0.28	0.29	0.36											
High school + vs. university +	0.25	0.01	0.09	0.13	0.19											
Urban vs. rural	<i>-0.28</i>	<i>-0.29</i>	<i>-0.30</i>	<i>-0.24</i>	<i>-0.23</i>	Urban	<i>-0.08</i>	-0.07	0.20	0.01	0.04	0.28	0.03	0.27	0.24	
						Rural	<i>-0.09</i>	-0.09	0.25	0.00	0.08	0.34	0.09	0.34	0.25	
Orthodox vs. non-orthodox	0.21	0.24	0.25	0.30	0.19	Orthodox	<i>-0.09</i>	-0.08	0.23	0.01	0.06	0.32	0.04	0.31	0.26	
						Non-orthodox	-0.07	-0.04	0.20	0.02	0.12	0.27	0.09	0.25	0.15	
Vote power vs. vote opposition	0.32	0.25	-0.12	0.29	-0.01	Vote power	-0.03	0.18	0.41	0.21	0.05	0.44	-0.16	0.23	0.39	
						Vote opposition	<i>-0.10</i>	<i>-0.26</i>	0.08	<i>-0.16</i>	0.09	0.18	0.25	0.34	0.09	
N	1512	1174	2074	2212	1800											

Note: Regular text indicates no significant differences. **Gray bold text** indicates that the first group in the compared pair has a significantly higher average score (p<.05). *Gray italic text* indicates that the first group in the compared pair has a significantly lower average score (p<.05). Data sources: USIA 1992, COMALP 1995, BOP 1999, BOP 2002, BOP 2005.

Table A-25 Correlations between trust variables and attitudinal variables

	V1	V2	V3	V4	V5	V6	V7	V8	V9	V10	2002	V1	V2	V3	V4	V5	V6	V7	V8	V9	V10
1992	1.000										2002	1.000									
V1 Traditional trust		0.435	1.000								V1		0.480	1.000							
V2 Institutional trust		-0.142	-0.117	1.000							V2	-0.004	0.089	1.000							
V3 Interest in politics		0.238	0.343	-0.176	1.000						V3	0.226	0.308	-0.064	1.000						
V4 Vote for governing party		0.021	0.094	0.057	0.005	1.000					V4	0.057	0.177	0.077	0.055	1.000					
V5 Interpersonal trust		-0.073	0.019	0.042	-0.117	0.066	1.000				V5	-0.050	0.016	0.038	-0.037	0.017	1.000				
V6 Communism was bad		0.082	0.275	0.039	0.117	0.076	0.039	1.000			V6	-0.001	0.148	0.067	0.079	0.112	0.143	1.000			
V7 Current personal situation		0.079	0.274	0.112	0.048	0.023	0.075	0.450	1.000		V7	0.032	0.175	0.096	0.135	0.109	0.109	0.512	1.000		
V8 Future personal situation										1.000	V8	-0.002	0.186	0.057	0.050	0.141	0.113	0.493	0.396	1.000	
V9 Satisfaction with life											V9	0.124	0.323	0.106	0.112	0.117	0.106	0.296	0.272	0.305	1.000
V10 Satisfaction with democracy											V10	0.137	0.304	0.080	0.122	0.109	0.073	0.272	0.242	0.289	0.660
V11 Satisfaction with market economy											V11										
1995	1.000										2005	1.000									
V1 Traditional trust		0.405	1.000								V1		0.507	1.000							
V2 Institutional trust		-0.017	0.031	1.000							V2	0.049	0.137	1.000							
V3 Interest in politics		0.200	0.241	-0.058	1.000						V3	-0.101	0.160	0.042	1.000						
V4 Vote for governing party		0.045	0.189	0.134	-0.026	1.000					V4	0.105	0.121	0.068	0.029	1.000					
V5 Interpersonal trust		-0.074	0.077	0.071	-0.113	0.064	1.000				V5	-0.051	0.083	0.076	0.200	-0.003	1.000				
V6 Communism was bad											V6	0.013	0.194	0.098	0.108	0.072	0.127	1.000			
V7 Current personal situation											V7	0.043	0.270	0.107	0.154	0.074	0.146	0.400	1.000		
V8 Future personal situation											V8	0.044	0.274	0.121	0.102	0.102	0.128	0.371	0.344	1.000	
V9 Satisfaction with life											V9	0.171	0.400	0.133	0.141	0.107	0.151	0.265	0.302	0.332	1.000
V10 Satisfaction with democracy											V10	0.168	0.398	0.099	0.116	0.097	0.117	0.251	0.286	0.336	0.662
V11 Satisfaction with market economy											V11										
1999	1.000										2002	1.000									
V1 Traditional trust		0.413	1.000								V1		0.413	1.000							
V2 Institutional trust		-0.078	-0.019	1.000							V2	-0.093	0.158	0.068	1.000						
V3 Interest in politics		0.116	0.194	0.113	0.061	1.000					V3	-0.083	0.106	0.161	0.266	0.065	1.000				
V4 Vote for governing party		-0.053	0.200	0.010	0.151	0.077	0.158	1.000			V4	-0.015	0.225	0.048	0.174	0.168	0.183	0.411	1.000		
V5 Interpersonal trust		0.021	0.271	0.054	0.163	0.131	0.158	0.470	1.000		V5	0.021	0.271	0.054	0.163	0.131	0.158	0.470	0.368	1.000	
V6 Communism was bad											V6										
V7 Current personal situation											V7										
V8 Future personal situation											V8										
V9 Satisfaction with life											V9										
V10 Satisfaction with democracy											V10										
V11 Satisfaction with market economy											V11										

Note: Data sources: USIA 1992 (N=1512), COMALP 1995 (N=1174), BOP 1999 (N=2074), BOP 2002 (N=2212), BOP 2005 (N=1800). Shaded cells indicate correlations that are significant at p < .05. Bolded cells indicate correlations with the dependent variable.

Table A-27 Trust in traditional institutions: attitudinal model

	1992	1995	1999	2002	2005
Intercept	2.740 *** (.104)	2.866 *** (.084)	3.355 *** (.056)	2.921 *** (.064)	2.599 *** (.086)
Interest in politics	-0.095 *** (.023)	-0.007 (.021)	-0.058 *** (.016)	-0.001 (.022)	0.027 (.022)
Vote for power	0.224 *** (.041)	0.236 *** (.039)	-0.102 ** (.036)	0.264 *** (.027)	-0.030 (.044)
Interpersonal trust	0.033 (.043)	0.055 (.042)	0.172 *** (.030)	0.050+ (.030)	0.115 *** (.032)
Communism was bad	-0.132 * (.058)	-0.097 * (.039)	-0.071 * (.032)	-0.059 * (.028)	-0.097 ** (.036)
Current personal situation	-0.016 (.021)	---	-0.051 ** (.019)	-0.028 (.019)	-0.036 (.028)
Future personal situation	0.016 (.021)	0.007 (.023)	-0.003 (.016)	0.001 (.017)	0.003 (.020)
Satisfaction with life	---	0.108 *** (.026)	0.055 * (.022)	-0.033 (.021)	-0.017 (.026)
Specific support for democracy	0.141 *** (.031)	---	---	0.044 * (.020)	0.083 *** (.023)
Specific support for market economy	0.110 ** (.033)	---	---	0.065 ** (.020)	0.078 *** (.024)
R ²	0.113	0.063	0.039	0.073	0.052
Adjusted R ²	0.109	0.058	0.036	0.069	0.047
N	1512	1174	2074	2212	1800

Notes: *** p < 0.001, ** p < 0.010, * p < 0.050, + p < 0.100. Unstandardized regression coefficients and (standard errors). Data sources: USIA 1992, COMALP 1995, BOP 1999, BOP 2002, BOP 2005.

Table A-28 Mean differences in trust in state's institutions

	1992	1995	1999	2002	2005	92-95	92-99	92-02	92-05	95-99	95-02	95-05	99-02	99-05	02-05
Men vs. women	0.04	-0.02	0.01	-0.03	-0.03	0.19	0.29	0.27	0.39	0.10	0.09	0.21	-0.01	0.11	0.12
						0.13	0.26	0.21	0.32	0.13	0.08	0.19	-0.05	0.06	0.12
Men															
Women															
Under 30 vs. 31 - 60	<i>-0.08</i>	-0.07	0.01	-0.02	-0.05	0.15	0.20	0.19	0.32	0.05	0.04	0.18	-0.01	0.12	0.13
Under 30 vs. over 61	<i>-0.32</i>	<i>-0.29</i>	<i>-0.16</i>	<i>-0.18</i>	<i>-0.18</i>	0.15	0.28	0.24	0.35	0.13	0.09	0.20	-0.04	0.07	0.11
31 - 60 vs. over 61	<i>-0.24</i>	<i>-0.21</i>	<i>-0.17</i>	<i>-0.16</i>	<i>-0.13</i>	0.18	0.35	0.33	0.46	0.18	0.15	0.28	-0.02	0.11	0.13
< 4 grades vs. 5 - 8 grades	0.12	0.11	0.02	0.11	0.10	0.23	0.42	0.31	0.50	0.19	0.08	0.27	-0.12	0.08	0.19
< 4 grades vs. 9 - 11 grades	0.34	0.28	0.20	0.23	0.11	0.22	0.32	0.30	0.48	0.10	0.08	0.26	-0.02	0.16	0.18
< 4 grades vs. high school +	0.39	0.30	0.19	0.25	0.17	0.17	0.28	0.20	0.28	0.11	0.03	0.11	-0.08	-0.01	0.07
< 4 grades vs. university +	0.45	0.39	0.12	0.37	0.19	0.14	0.22	0.17	0.28	0.08	0.03	0.14	-0.05	0.06	0.11
5 - 8 grades vs. 9 - 11 grades	0.22	0.17	0.18	0.12	0.01	0.17	0.08	0.23	0.23	-0.08	0.06	0.07	0.14	0.15	0.01
5 - 8 grades vs. high school +	0.27	0.19	0.17	0.14	0.07										
5 - 8 grades vs. university +	0.33	0.28	0.10	0.26	0.09										
9 - 11 grades vs. high school +	0.05	0.02	-0.01	0.02	0.06										
9 - 11 grades vs. university +	0.12	0.11	-0.08	0.14	0.07										
High school + vs. university +	0.06	0.09	-0.07	0.12	0.02										
Urban vs. rural	<i>-0.28</i>	<i>-0.28</i>	<i>-0.22</i>	<i>-0.23</i>	<i>-0.16</i>	0.15	0.24	0.21	0.30	0.08	0.06	0.15	-0.03	0.06	0.09
						0.16	0.30	0.26	0.42	0.14	0.11	0.26	-0.04	0.12	0.16
Orthodox vs. non-orthodox	0.21	0.05	-0.03	0.09	-0.01	0.18	0.30	0.25	0.38	0.13	0.08	0.21	-0.05	0.08	0.13
						0.02	0.07	0.14	0.17	0.05	0.11	0.15	0.07	0.10	0.04
Vote power vs. vote opposition	0.42	0.31	0.19	0.40	0.21	0.24	0.41	0.28	0.52	0.17	0.05	0.28	-0.13	0.11	0.24
						0.12	0.18	0.26	0.31	0.06	0.14	0.19	0.09	0.13	0.04
N	1512	1174	2074	2212	1800										

Note: Regular text indicates no significant differences. **Gray bold text** indicates that the first group in the compared pair has a significantly higher average score ($p < .05$). *Gray italic text* indicates that the first group in the compared pair has a significantly lower average score ($p < .05$). Data sources: USIA 1992, COMALP 1995, BOP 1999, BOP 2002, BOP 2005.

Table A-29 Trust in state's institutions: SES and region models

	SES model					Region model					SES and region model				
	1992	1995	1999	2002	2005	1992	1995	1999	2002	2005	1992	1995	1999	2002	2005
Intercept	2.431*** (.084)	2.228*** (.112)	2.054*** (.099)	2.274*** (.082)	1.951*** (.086)	2.154*** (.050)	2.000*** (.056)	2.250*** (.040)	2.032*** (.042)	1.921*** (.044)	2.196*** (.103)	2.055*** (.132)	2.252*** (.118)	2.243*** (.098)	1.859*** (.104)
Gender: Male	0.041 (.031)	-0.001 (.036)	0.015 (.026)	-0.020 (.028)	-0.013 (.030)						0.034 (.031)	-0.013 (.036)	0.024 (.026)	-0.023 (.028)	-0.013 (.030)
Age: 31 - 60	0.007 (.040)	0.032 (.043)	0.003 (.033)	0.023 (.034)	0.036 (.040)						0.006 (.039)	0.037 (.043)	-0.011 (.032)	0.023 (.034)	0.044 (.040)
Age: Over 60	0.130* (.053)	0.187*** (.056)	0.132*** (.039)	0.110** (.041)	0.137** (.048)						0.162** (.053)	0.211*** (.056)	0.107** (.039)	0.119** (.041)	0.142** (.048)
Education	-0.073*** (.015)	-0.040* (.016)	0.002 (.012)	-0.038** (.014)	-0.005 (.015)						-0.076*** (.015)	-0.035* (.016)	-0.009 (.012)	-0.034* (.014)	-0.005 (.015)
Urban	-0.157*** (.034)	-0.213*** (.039)	-0.195*** (.029)	-0.180*** (.030)	-0.140*** (.033)						-0.128*** (.034)	-0.190*** (.040)	-0.201*** (.030)	-0.157*** (.031)	-0.108** (.034)
Romanian	0.149* (.073)	-0.035 (.079)	-0.031 (.058)	0.077 (.061)	0.027 (.063)						0.170* (.074)	-0.044 (.083)	-0.013 (.059)	0.020 (.062)	0.000 (.064)
Orthodox	0.071 (.070)	0.053 (.061)	0.015 (.051)	0.038 (.055)	-0.011 (.062)						0.102 (.070)	0.067 (.061)	0.028 (.052)	0.015 (.056)	-0.011 (.063)
Church attendance	0.029 (.018)	0.112*** (.033)	0.081* (.034)	-0.007 (.021)	0.071*** (.021)						0.014 (.018)	0.094** (.033)	0.071* (.034)	-0.007 (.022)	0.065** (.022)
North East						0.393*** (.074)	0.209** (.075)	-0.153** (.055)	0.169** (.056)	-0.037 (.061)	0.112+ (.061)	0.242** (.073)	-0.254*** (.051)	0.195*** (.055)	0.225*** (.059)
South East						0.459*** (.068)	0.259** (.080)	-0.082 (.057)	0.145* (.059)	0.195** (.065)	0.270*** (.073)	0.126+ (.075)	-0.181** (.056)	0.069 (.057)	-0.068 (.062)
South						0.390*** (.068)	0.420*** (.080)	0.096+ (.053)	0.092 (.058)	0.167** (.059)	0.155* (.065)	0.152* (.075)	-0.164** (.054)	0.167** (.056)	0.175** (.061)
South West						0.242*** (.071)	0.352*** (.078)	-0.196*** (.058)	0.142* (.062)	0.149* (.066)	0.357*** (.081)	0.162* (.067)	-0.157** (.057)	0.048 (.060)	0.153* (.067)
West						0.136* (.065)	0.192* (.077)	-0.278*** (.057)	0.018 (.057)	0.088 (.063)	0.249*** (.069)	0.284*** (.078)	-0.234*** (.057)	0.081 (.062)	0.108 (.066)
North West						0.287*** (.065)	0.293*** (.074)	-0.080 (.052)	0.265*** (.055)	0.405*** (.058)	0.302*** (.068)	0.302*** (.080)	0.028 (.056)	0.035 (.060)	0.125** (.061)
Center						0.242*** (.061)	0.347*** (.072)	-0.149** (.050)	0.286*** (.055)	0.279*** (.058)	0.159* (.067)	0.131 (.080)	-0.299*** (.059)	-0.040 (.059)	0.048 (.065)
R ²	0.102	0.085	0.045	0.045	0.030	0.047	0.033	0.032	0.024	0.028	0.140	0.103	0.078	0.058	0.051
Adjusted R ²	0.097	0.078	0.041	0.041	0.026	0.042	0.027	0.029	0.020	0.025	0.131	0.091	0.071	0.051	0.043
N	1512	1174	2074	2212	1800	1512	1174	2074	2212	1800	1512	1174	2074	2212	1800

Notes: *** p < 0.001, ** p < 0.010, * p < 0.050, + p < 0.100. Unstandardized regression coefficients and (standard errors). Data sources: USIA 1992, COMALP 1995, BOP 1999, BOP 2002, BOP 2005.

Table A-30 Trust in state's institutions: attitudinal models

	1992	1995	1999	2002	2005
Intercept	1.031 *** (.083)	1.553 *** (.091)	1.582 *** (.050)	1.194 *** (.065)	0.779 *** (.078)
Interest in politics	-0.066 *** (.019)	0.008 (.021)	-0.041 ** (.014)	0.066 ** (.020)	0.056 ** (.018)
Vote for power	0.284 *** (.029)	0.319 *** (.046)	0.111 ** (.035)	0.345 *** (.026)	0.111 (.066)
Interpersonal trust	0.105 ** (.035)	0.230 *** (.043)	0.184 *** (.027)	0.151 *** (.027)	0.075 ** (.028)
Communism was bad	0.033 (.051)	0.078 + (.042)	0.033 (.027)	-0.018 (.026)	-0.022 (.031)
Current personal situation	0.029 + (.016)	---	0.032 + (.017)	-0.014 (.019)	0.003 (.023)
Future personal situation	0.069 *** (.018)	0.053 * (.022)	0.056 *** (.015)	0.019 (.018)	0.072 *** (.017)
Satisfaction with life	---	0.121 *** (.026)	0.141 *** (.019)	0.056 ** (.020)	0.076 *** (.022)
Specific support for democracy	0.243 *** (.025)	---	---	0.122 *** (.019)	0.124 *** (.021)
Specific support for market economy	0.195 *** (.024)	---	---	0.089 *** (.019)	0.139 *** (.023)
R ²	0.347	0.135	0.127	0.214	0.235
Adjusted R ²	0.344	0.131	0.124	0.211	0.231
N	1512	1174	2074	2212	1800

Notes: *** p < 0.001, ** p < 0.010, * p < 0.050, + p < 0.100. Unstandardized regression coefficients and (standard errors). Data sources: USIA 1992, COMALP 1995, BOP 1999, BOP 2002, BOP 2005.

Table A-3/ Mean differences in specific support for democracy

	1990	1997	2002	2005	90 - 97	90 - 02	90 - 05	97 - 02	97 - 05	02 - 05
Men vs. women	-0.15	0.16	0.02	0.10	Men 0.55	0.62	0.27	0.07	-0.27	-0.34
					Women 0.85	0.78	0.52	-0.07	-0.33	-0.26
Under 30 vs. 31 - 60	-0.23	0.07	0.13	0.05	Under 30 0.56	0.40	0.15	-0.16	-0.41	-0.25
Under 30 vs. over 61	-0.53	-0.35	0.16	0.14	31 - 60 0.86	0.77	0.43	-0.09	-0.43	-0.34
31 - 60 vs. over 61	-0.30	-0.41	0.02	0.10	Over 61 0.74	1.09	0.83	0.35	0.08	-0.27
4 grades or less vs. 5 - 8 grades	0.14	0.43	-0.15	-0.02	4 grades or less 0.87	1.41	1.06	0.54	0.19	-0.35
4 grades or less vs. 9 - 11 grades	0.22	0.59	-0.22	-0.07	5 - 8 grades 1.16	1.12	0.90	-0.04	-0.26	-0.22
4 grades or less vs. high school plus	0.67	0.38	-0.24	-0.23	9 - 11 grades 1.24	0.97	0.77	-0.27	-0.46	-0.19
4 grades or less vs. university plus	0.91	0.25	-0.18	-0.32	High school plus 0.58	0.51	0.17	-0.07	-0.41	-0.34
5 - 8 grades vs. 9 - 11 grades	0.08	0.16	-0.07	-0.05	University plus 0.21	0.32	-0.17	0.12	-0.37	-0.49
5 - 8 grades vs. high school plus	0.53	-0.05	-0.08	-0.21						
5 - 8 grades vs. university plus	0.77	-0.18	-0.03	-0.30						
9 - 11 grades vs. high school plus	0.44	-0.21	-0.02	-0.16						
9 - 11 grades vs. university plus	0.69	-0.34	0.04	-0.25						
High school plus vs. university plus	0.24	-0.13	0.06	-0.09						
Urban vs. rural	-0.62	-0.27	-0.08	0.10	Urban 0.55	0.48	0.10	-0.08	-0.45	-0.37
					Rural 0.91	1.02	0.82	0.11	-0.09	-0.19
Orthodox vs. non-orthodox	0.38	-0.31	-0.03	-0.19	Orthodox 0.81	0.76	0.49	-0.04	-0.32	-0.27
					Non-orthodox 0.12	0.35	-0.08	0.23	-0.20	-0.43
Vote power vs. vote opposition	1.33	0.53	0.21	0.38	Vote power 0.87	1.00	0.63	0.13	-0.25	-0.37
					Vote opposition 0.07	-0.13	-0.33	-0.20	-0.40	-0.20
N	1565	1000	2212	1776						

Note: Regular text indicates no significant differences. **Gray bold text** indicates that the first group in the compared pair has a significantly higher average score ($p < .05$). *Gray italic text* indicates that the first group in the compared pair has a significantly lower average score ($p < .05$). Data sources: USIA 1990, WVS 1997, BOP 2002, WVS/BOP 2005.

Table A-32 Correlations between specific support and attitudinal variables

1992 (N = 1512)		V1	V2	V3	V4	V5	V6	V7
V1	Satisfaction with democracy	1.000						
V2	Satisfaction with market economy	0.455	1.000					
V3	Interest in politics	-0.012	-0.051	1.000				
V4	Vote for governing party	0.169	0.218	-0.176	1.000			
V5	Satisfaction with life	---	---	---	---	1.000		
V6	Communism was bad	0.038	0.038	0.042	-0.117	---	1.000	
V7	Current personal situation	0.308	0.351	0.039	0.117	---	0.039	1.000
V8	Future personal situation	0.290	0.310	0.112	0.048	---	0.075	0.450
2002 (N = 2212)		V1	V2	V3	V4	V5	V6	V7
V1	Satisfaction with democracy	1.000						
V2	Satisfaction with market economy	0.660	1.000					
V3	Interest in politics	0.106	0.080	1.000				
V4	Vote for governing party	0.112	0.122	-0.064	1.000			
V5	Satisfaction with life	0.305	0.289	0.057	0.050	1.000		
V6	Communism was bad	0.106	0.073	0.038	-0.037	0.113	1.000	
V7	Current personal situation	0.296	0.277	0.067	0.079	0.493	0.143	1.000
V8	Future personal situation	0.272	0.242	0.096	0.135	0.396	0.109	0.512
2005 (N = 1776)		V1	V2	V3	V4	V5	V6	V7
V1	Satisfaction with democracy	1.000						
V2	Satisfaction with market economy	0.662	1.000					
V3	Interest in politics	0.133	0.099	1.000				
V4	Vote for governing party	0.141	0.116	0.042	1.000			
V5	Satisfaction with life	0.332	0.336	0.121	0.102	1.000		
V6	Communism was bad	0.151	0.117	0.076	0.200	0.128	1.000	
V7	Current personal situation	0.265	0.251	0.098	0.108	0.371	0.127	1.000
V8	Future personal situation	0.302	0.286	0.107	0.154	0.344	0.146	0.400

Note: Data sources: USIA 1992, BOP 2002, BOP 2005. Shaded cells indicate correlations that are significant at $p < .05$. Bolded cells indicate correlations with the dependent variable.

Table A-33 Specific support for democracy: SES and region models

	SES model				Region model				SES and region model			
	1992	2002	2005	1992	2002	2005	1992	2002	2005	1992	2002	2005
Intercept	2.604*** (.163)	2.387*** (.118)	2.510*** (.132)	2.853*** (.093)	2.471*** (.060)	2.721*** (.068)	2.434*** (.200)	2.431*** (.139)	2.493*** (.158)			
Gender: Male	0.023 (.064)	0.010 (.041)	0.035 (.045)				0.020 (.063)	0.042 (.040)	0.045 (.045)			
Age: 31 - 60	0.137+ (.079)	-0.122* (.050)	-0.029 (.061)				0.131+ (.078)	-0.116* (.050)	-0.024 (.061)			
Age: Over 60	0.304** (.113)	-0.089 (.061)	0.089 (.073)				0.336** (.113)	-0.075 (.060)	0.093 (.073)			
Education	-0.034 (.030)	0.078*** (.020)	0.072** (.023)				-0.054+ (.030)	0.076*** (.020)	0.071** (.022)			
Urban	-0.041 (.069)	-0.156*** (.044)	-0.076 (.049)				0.002 (.070)	-0.147*** (.044)	-0.075 (.051)			
Orthodox	0.348* (.145)	-0.075 (.087)	-0.072 (.095)				0.352* (.147)	-0.138 (.088)	-0.088 (.097)			
Church attendance	-0.002 (.136)	0.018 (.080)	-0.042 (.092)				0.065 (.138)	0.037 (.080)	-0.025 (.094)			
North East				0.199 (.144)	-0.109 (.080)	-0.060 (.092)	-0.022 (.123)	0.326*** (.079)	-0.024 (.091)			
South East				0.341** (.128)	-0.190* (.084)	0.050 (.100)	0.160 (.126)	0.009 (.081)	-0.010 (.096)			
South				0.448*** (.126)	-0.045 (.082)	0.076 (.091)	0.417** (.134)	0.085 (.090)	0.128 (.100)			
South West				0.346** (.133)	0.106 (.089)	0.127 (.099)	0.308* (.132)	-0.203* (.086)	0.070 (.102)			
West				-0.140 (.128)	0.009 (.080)	-0.056 (.095)	0.539*** (.132)	-0.083 (.086)	0.065 (.096)			
North West				0.220+ (.119)	0.018 (.079)	-0.038 (.093)	0.129 (.143)	-0.096 (.082)	-0.023 (.095)			
Center				0.043 (.120)	0.340*** (.077)	-0.031 (.089)	0.033 (.036)	0.037 (.031)	0.060+ (.035)			
R ²	0.027	0.015	0.010	0.026	0.029	0.004	0.056	0.043	0.014			
Adjusted R ²	0.021	0.011	0.006	0.022	0.026	0.001	0.047	0.036	0.006			
N	1565	2212	1776	1565	2212	1776	1565	2212	1776			

Notes: *** p < 0.001, ** p < 0.010, * p < 0.050, + p < 0.100. Unstandardized regression coefficients and (standard errors). Data sources: USIA 1992, BOP 2002, BOP 2005.

Table A-34 Specific support for democracy: attitudinal model

	1992	2002	2005
Intercept	1.435 *** (.180)	1.093 *** (.088)	0.873 *** (.116)
Interest in politics	-0.029 (.041)	0.115 *** (.029)	0.095 ** (.029)
Vote for power	0.314 *** (.078)	0.157 *** (.041)	0.131 * (.059)
Communism was bad	0.124 (.133)	0.103 ** (.040)	0.129 ** (.046)
Current personal situation	0.248 *** (.034)	0.132 *** (.026)	0.141 *** (.039)
Future personal situation	0.229 *** (.043)	0.101 *** (.027)	0.165 *** (.032)
Satisfaction with life	---	0.223 *** (.029)	0.277 *** (.032)
R ²	0.144	0.148	0.176
Adjusted R ²	0.141	0.146	0.173
N	1565	2212	1776

Notes: *** p < 0.001, ** p < 0.010, * p < 0.050, + p < 0.100. Unstandardized regression coefficients and (standard errors). Data sources: USIA 1992, BOP 2002, BOP 2005.

Table A-35 Mean differences in specific support for market economy

	1991	1993	2002	2005	91 - 93	91 - 02	91 - 05	93 - 02	93 - 05	02 - 05
Men vs. women	-0.10	-0.04	0.01	0.05	0.05	0.28	-0.04	0.23	-0.08	<i>-0.31</i>
					Men	0.38	0.11	0.27	0.00	<i>-0.27</i>
Under 30 vs. 31 - 60	-0.09	0.15	0.15	0.02	Under 30	0.16	-0.04	0.19	-0.01	<i>-0.20</i>
Under 30 vs. over 61	-0.01	-0.19	0.15	0.07	31 - 60	0.39	0.06	0.19	<i>-0.14</i>	<i>-0.33</i>
31 - 60 vs. over 61	0.08	<i>-0.34</i>	0.01	0.05	Over 61	0.32	0.03	0.54	0.25	<i>-0.29</i>
4 grades or less vs. 5 - 8 grades	0.00	0.20	-0.10	0.04	4 grades or less	0.40	0.09	0.53	0.22	<i>-0.31</i>
4 grades or less vs. 9 - 11 grades	-0.03	0.25	-0.10	0.02	5 - 8 grades	0.30	0.13	0.24	0.07	<i>-0.17</i>
4 grades or less vs. high school plus	-0.09	0.11	<i>-0.15</i>	<i>-0.19</i>	9 - 11 grades	0.33	0.14	0.19	0.00	<i>-0.19</i>
4 grades or less vs. university plus	0.05	0.43	<i>-0.18</i>	<i>-0.31</i>	High school plus	0.34	-0.01	0.27	-0.08	<i>-0.36</i>
5 - 8 grades vs. 9 - 11 grades	-0.03	0.05	0.00	-0.02	University plus	0.17	<i>-0.28</i>	-0.07	<i>-0.52</i>	<i>-0.44</i>
5 - 8 grades vs. high school plus	-0.09	-0.09	-0.05	<i>-0.24</i>						
5 - 8 grades vs. university plus	0.05	0.23	-0.08	<i>-0.35</i>						
9 - 11 grades vs. high school plus	-0.07	-0.14	-0.05	<i>-0.22</i>						
9 - 11 grades vs. university plus	0.08	0.18	-0.08	<i>-0.33</i>						
High school plus vs. university plus	0.15	0.32	-0.03	-0.12						
Urban vs. rural	0.00	<i>-0.17</i>	-0.07	0.10	Urban	0.36	0.00	0.20	<i>-0.16</i>	<i>-0.36</i>
					Rural	0.28	0.09	0.30	0.11	<i>-0.19</i>
Orthodox vs. non-orthodox	0.24	---	0.01	-0.11	Orthodox	0.35	0.08	---	---	<i>-0.27</i>
					Non-orthodox	0.13	<i>-0.27</i>	---	---	<i>-0.40</i>
Vote power vs. vote opposition	0.42	0.42	0.22	0.35	Vote power	0.42	0.07	0.36	0.01	<i>-0.35</i>
					Vote opposition	0.21	0.00	0.15	-0.06	<i>-0.21</i>
N	1000	1015	2212	1776						

Note: Regular text indicates no significant differences. **Gray bold text** indicates that the first group in the compared pair has a significantly higher average score ($p < .05$). *Gray italic text* indicates that the first group in the compared pair has a significantly lower average score ($p < .05$). Data sources: USIA 1991, USIA 1993, BOP 2002, WVS/BOP 2005.

Table A-36 Specific support for market economy: SES and region models

	SES model					Region model					SES and region model				
	1992	2002	2005	1992	2002	2005	1992	2002	2005	1992	2002	2005	1992	2002	2005
Intercept	2.541 (.159)	2.022 (.114)	2.184 (.126)	2.585 (.089)	2.258 (.057)	2.429 (.063)	2.585 (.089)	2.258 (.057)	2.429 (.063)	2.429 (.193)	2.133 (.134)	2.116 (.152)	2.429 (.193)	2.133 (.134)	2.116 (.152)
Gender: Male	0.014 (.063)	-0.004 (.040)	0.034 (.043)							0.008 (.062)	-0.003 (.039)	0.042 (.043)	0.008 (.062)	-0.003 (.039)	0.042 (.043)
Age: 31 - 60	-0.034 (.076)	-0.140 (.047)	0.003 (.057)							-0.044 (.076)	-0.137 (.047)	0.011 (.057)	-0.044 (.076)	-0.137 (.047)	0.011 (.057)
Age: Over 60	0.191 (.110)	-0.107 (.057)	0.111 (.069)							0.205 (.111)	-0.102 (.056)	0.119 (.069)	0.205 (.111)	-0.102 (.056)	0.119 (.069)
Education	-0.036 (.031)	0.060 (.019)	0.063 (.021)	**						-0.047 (.031)	0.055 (.019)	0.063 (.021)	-0.047 (.031)	0.055 (.019)	0.063 (.021)
Urban	-0.025 (.069)	-0.132 (.043)	-0.140 (.046)	**						-0.022 (.067)	-0.131 (.043)	-0.131 (.048)	-0.022 (.067)	-0.131 (.043)	-0.131 (.048)
Orthodox	0.197 (.144)	0.145 (.084)	-0.071 (.090)							0.246 (.148)	0.086 (.086)	-0.099 (.092)	0.246 (.148)	0.086 (.086)	-0.099 (.092)
Church attendance	0.017 (.142)	-0.066 (.077)	-0.004 (.088)							0.063 (.146)	-0.044 (.077)	0.009 (.089)	0.063 (.146)	-0.044 (.077)	0.009 (.089)
North East							0.282 (.144)	+	-0.173 (.076)	*	0.025 (.124)	0.038 (.085)	-0.109 (.124)	0.224 (.076)	0.038 (.085)
South East							0.235 (.124)	+	-0.271 (.080)	***	0.204 (.095)	0.010 (.087)	-0.022 (.118)	-0.042 (.078)	0.010 (.087)
South							0.233 (.123)	+	-0.173 (.079)	*	0.137 (.087)	0.229 (.094)	0.303 (.133)	-0.069 (.086)	0.229 (.094)
South West							0.241 (.131)	+	-0.051 (.084)		0.248 (.093)	0.204 (.097)	0.209 (.127)	-0.291 (.082)	0.204 (.097)
West							-0.032 (.119)		-0.046 (.078)		-0.027 (.089)	0.103 (.090)	0.310 (.130)	-0.190 (.082)	0.103 (.090)
North West							0.030 (.116)		-0.025 (.076)		0.013 (.084)	0.042 (.089)	0.232 (.144)	-0.168 (.078)	0.042 (.089)
Center							-0.054 (.119)		0.253 (.074)	***	0.066 (.083)	0.119 (.033)	0.009 (.035)	0.051 (.031)	0.119 (.033)
R ²	0.017	0.015	0.018	0.031	0.028	0.010	0.016	0.031	0.028	0.038	0.043	0.028	0.038	0.043	0.028
Adjusted R ²	0.012	0.011	0.013	0.028	0.028	0.006	0.011	0.028	0.028	0.028	0.037	0.019	0.028	0.037	0.019
N	1512	2212	1776	1512	2212	1776	1512	2212	1776	1512	2212	1776	1512	2212	1776

Notes: *** p < 0.001, ** p < 0.010, * p < 0.050, + p < 0.100. Unstandardized regression coefficients and (standard errors). Data sources: USIA 1992, BOP 2002, BOP 2005.

Table A-37 Specific support for market economy: attitudinal model

	1992	2002	2005
Intercept	1.072 *** (.140)	1.001 *** (.083)	0.890 *** (.112)
Interest in politics	-0.081 * (.040)	0.081 ** (.028)	0.050 + (.029)
Vote for power	0.385 *** (.058)	0.170 *** (.043)	0.090 (.054)
Communism was bad	0.129 (.100)	0.047 (.039)	0.073 (.050)
Current personal situation	0.280 *** (.033)	0.127 *** (.025)	0.120 ** (.037)
Future personal situation	0.227 *** (.044)	0.073 ** (.023)	0.147 *** (.030)
Satisfaction with life	---	0.213 *** (.028)	0.287 *** (.031)
R ²	0.189	0.127	0.160
Adjusted R ²	0.186	0.125	0.157
N	1512	2212	1776

Notes: *** p < 0.001, ** p < 0.010, * p < 0.050, + p < 0.100. Unstandardized regression coefficients and (standard errors). Data sources: USIA 1992, BOP 2002, BOP 2005.

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Abstract

This study starts from the assumption that an important requirement for the success of democratic consolidation in post-communist countries is that citizens accept the two defining dimensions of the new regime, democracy and market economy, and the values associated with these. Since these are main components of the political culture, a series of important questions arise: How does political culture change? Is there a single political culture, or are there different patterns of political culture? How do these patterns evolve over time? How can these patterns and their evolution be explained? In my research I analyze these issues by studying the Romanian political culture from the beginning of the transition to the moment Romania became a member of the European Union. To answer these questions I use seventeen years (from 1990 to 2006) of data which will allow me to identify the different patterns of political culture in Romania and to explain their evolution over time.

The study contributes to the literature in several ways. First, while previous studies have focused either on a single country and a single point in time or on a group of countries and a single point in time, this study analyzes political culture change over a long period of time. The results of such an endeavor add a temporal dimension, which was not addressed in previous studies, to our understanding of political culture in post-communist countries.

Second, while most of the existing literature studied political culture in post-communist countries during the initial stage of the transition process (there are only a few studies that go beyond 1995), this project analyzes political culture change during the whole process of transition to democracy and market economy. The findings will indicate whether the relationships among different components of political culture identified in previous studies continue to hold, or whether they were context-specific, depending on a particular stage during the transition.

Finally, the study of Romanian political culture by itself is a minor contribution to the literature. In the field of post-communist transitions Romania is an understudied country, scholars focusing rather on the successful countries of the region (i.e. the Czech Republic, Hungary, or Poland) or on countries considered important from a policy perspective (Russia, the Former Soviet Union). Since Romania may be considered a representative case for the group of countries that had a late and troublesome transition (i.e. Bulgaria, Romania,

and Ukraine) the project will fill a gap in our knowledge about troubled transitions and about the region.

By focusing on the attitudes of the citizens, this study aims at recognizing the important role society has in transitions to democracy and addresses “the missing agenda” (Clark 2002) in the post-communist transitions literature.

Keywords: political culture, democratization, transition, post-communism, Romania

Résumé

L'étude ci-présente a comme point de départ la présupposition qu'une des plus importantes conditions pour la réussite de la consolidation de la démocratie dans les anciens pays communistes est que les citoyens acceptent les deux dimensions qui définissent le nouveau régime: la démocratie et l'économie de marché, les valeurs qui leur sont associées de même. Comme celles-ci sont les principales composantes de la culture politique, les suivantes questions extrêmement importantes s'imposent: Comment la culture politique change-t-elle? Y a-t-il une culture politique nationale, ou devrait-on discuter plutôt de différents modèles de la culture politique? Comment ces modèles évoluent-ils? Comment ces tendances s'expliquent-elles? Dans l'étude ci-présente j'approche tous ces problèmes, en analysant la culture politique roumaine dès le début de la transition jusqu'au moment où la Roumanie a été acceptée dans l'Union Européenne. Pour répondre à toutes ces questions j'utilise des bases de données couvrant une période de dix-sept années qui me permettent d'identifier de différents modèles de culture politique en Roumanie et d'expliquer leur évolution à travers le temps.

La présente étude contribue aux débats sur de multiples dimensions dans la littérature de spécialité. Tout d'abord, si les études antérieures ont examiné un pays ou un groupe de pays à un seul moment donné dans leur évolution, la présente recherche examine le changement de la culture politique pendant une période de temps significative. C'est la dimension temporelle qui manquait aux études précédentes qu'une telle approche ajoute à notre manière de compréhension de la culture politique dans les anciens pays communistes. Deuxièmement, si les études antérieures ont analysé la culture politique des anciens pays communistes dans l'étape initiale de la transition (trop peu d'études analysent des données plus récentes de 1995), j'analyse dans ce projet de recherche, le changement de la culture politique à travers le processus de transition vers la démocratie et l'économie de marché vu dans son intégralité. Les résultats de ces analyses révéleront soit que les relations entre les différentes composantes de la culture politique qui ont été identifiées dans les études précédentes se confirment de même à la fin de la transition, soit qu'elles aient été dépendantes du contexte, caractérisant seulement certaines étapes de la transition. Enfin, mais pas le moindre, l'analyse de la culture politique roumaine est en soi-même une contribution à la littérature de spécialité. Dans le domaine de la transition des anciens pays communistes, la Roumanie est un pays

rarement étudié, les analystes se concentrant plutôt sur les histoires de réussite de la région (la Tchéquie, la Pologne ou la Hongrie) ou sur les pays considérés du point de vue stratégique comme plus importants (la Russie, les anciennes républiques soviétiques). Mais la Roumanie peut être considérée un cas représentatif dans le groupe des pays caractérisés par une transition retardée et problématique (la Bulgarie, la Roumanie, l'Ukraine), ainsi que cette étude contribue à une meilleure compréhension des transitions difficiles en l'Europe centrale et l'Europe de l'Est.

Mettant en évidence les attitudes des citoyens, ce volume vise à démontrer le rôle important que la société joue dans les transitions démocratiques. Ce sont la remarque de Clark (2002) concernant *le thème absent* des études centrées sur les transitions post-communistes et son conseil de l'étudier qui se trouvent à son origine.

Mots clés: culture politique, démocratisation, transition, post-communisme, la Roumanie

Rezumat

Studiul de față pornește de la prezumția că una dintre cele mai importante condiții pentru succesul consolidării democrației în fostele țări comuniste este ca cetățenii să accepte cele două dimensiuni definitorii ale noului regim, democrația și economia de piață, și valorile asociate cu acestea. Dat fiind că acestea sunt principalele componente ale culturii politice, următoarele întrebări devin extrem de importante: Cum se schimbă cultura politică? Există o singură cultură politică națională sau ar trebui, mai degrabă, să se discute despre diferite modele de cultură politică? Cum evoluează aceste modele în timp? Cum pot fi explicate aceste modele? Abordez, în acest studiu, toate aceste probleme, analizând cultura politică românească de la începutul tranziției până în momentul în care România a fost acceptată în Uniunea Europeană. Pentru a oferi răspunsuri acestor întrebări folosesc baze de date care acoperă o perioadă de timp de șaptesprezece ani și care îmi permit identificarea diferitelor modele de cultură politică din România și explicarea evoluției acestora de-a lungul timpului.

Studiul contribuie la discuția din literatura de specialitate pe multiple dimensiuni. În primul rând, dacă studiile anterioare au analizat o țară sau un grup de țări la un singur moment în timp, cercetarea de față analizează schimbarea culturii politice de-a lungul unei însemnate perioade de timp. O astfel de abordare adaugă dimensiunea temporală, care lipsea studiilor anterioare, modulului în care înțelegem cultura politică în fostele țări comuniste.

În al doilea rând, dacă studiile anterioare au analizat cultura politică în fostele țări comuniste în etapa inițială a procesului de tranziție (doar puține studii analizează date mai noi de 1995), eu analizez, în acest proiect, schimbarea culturii politice de-a lungul întregului proces de tranziție la democrație și la economia de piață. Rezultatele acestor analize vor arăta dacă relațiile dintre diferite componente ale culturii politice care au fost identificate în studiile anterioare se confirmă și la sfârșitul tranziției sau dacă ele au fost dependente de context, caracterizând doar anumite etape ale procesului de tranziție.

Nu în ultimul rând, analiza culturii politice românești este, prin ea însăși, o contribuție la literatura de specialitate. În aria tranzițiilor din fostele țări comuniste România este o țară rar studiată, analiștii aplecându-se, mai degrabă, asupra poveștilor de succes din regiune (Cehia, Polonia sau Ungaria) sau asupra unor țări considerate ca fiind mai importante din punct de vedere strategic (Rusia, fostele republici sovietice). România poate fi considerată, însă, un caz

reprezentativ pentru grupul țărilor cu o tranziție întârziată și problematică (Bulgaria, România, Ucraina), astfel încât studiul de față contribuie la mai buna înțelegere a tranzițiilor dificile din Centrul și Estul Europei.

Punând accentul pe atitudinile cetățenilor, acest volum încearcă să demonstreze rolul important pe care societatea îl are în tranzițiile democratice și adresează direct ceea ce Clark (2002) numea *tema absentă* a studiilor din aria tranzițiilor post-comuniste

Cuvinte-cheie: cultură politică, democratizare, tranziție, postcomunism, România