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Δxs1F7Bναμς and Φxs1F7Bσις in Plato

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should override the explicit statements of Plutarch, supported—as I have tried to show—by the natural and obvious interpretation of the words of 'Αθ. Πολ. ch. 2. I know of no unambiguous evidence on the other side: and it is to be noted (1) that neither Plutarch nor the author of the *Athenian Polity* give a hint of a conflict of tradition on this point; and further (2) that Plutarch's statement is supported by the account which Isocrates gives (*Areopag.* § 32) of the good old times,—describing how οἱ τὰς οὐσίας ἔχοντες did not neglect the poor, but ἐπήμυνον ταῖς ἐνδείαις, τοῖς μὲν γεωργίας ἐπὶ μετρίαις μισθώσας παραδίδόντες κ.τ.λ. Now Isocrates, writing as *laudator temporis acti* is doubtless not a first-class

authority on a question of historic fact. Still the *Areopagiticus* is a serious political pamphlet: and, if it had been the established tradition in the time of Isocrates that the poor cultivators before Solon had to hand over five-sixths of their produce to their landlords, surely a writer of his repute would hardly have ventured on a moving description of the rich coming philanthropically to the succour of the poor by letting lands to them at 'moderate rents'!

On the whole, therefore, I venture to hope that—as the ancient authorities appear to be on their side—our old friends Liddell and Scott may be left uncorrected on this point.

HENRY SIDGWICK.

Δύναμις AND Φύσις IN PLATO.

WE might classify the senses of the term δύναμις according as it is used in reference to (a) animate things, or (b) inanimate things. Under (a) we might roughly class its uses to denote personal 'powers' of either an internal or external character by subdividing into (1) outward might or influence (due to κτήματα and χρήματα and the like), (2) corporal strength, (3) psychical effectiveness.

Under the first of these heads may be grouped such passages as *Menez.* 240 D ἡ τῶν Περσῶν δύναμις ('force' as concrete rather than abstract), *Tim.* 24 E, 25 A, *Rep.* ii. 364 A, iv. 423 A, *Laws* iv. 706 B, etc. But neither this nor the second loose and vulgar usage deserves more than a mere mention.

Passing on to (b) we find δύναμις frequently applied (1) to denote the 'effectiveness,' or sphere of action, of arts or sciences, e.g. *Rep.* v. 453 E ἡ γενναία...ἡ δύναμις τῆς ἀντιλογικῆς τέχνης, cp. *Gorg.* 447 C, 456 A, C. Also (2) it may denote the meaning or significance of a term, e.g. *Cratyl.* 394 B ἡ τοῦ ὀνόματος δύναμις, *ib.* 435 D, *Phil.* 24 C, etc. And further, (3) we find it applied as a technical term in mathematics, in the sense of (a) the side of a square or the root of a number, e.g. *Polit.* 266 B ἡ διάμετρος ἡ δυνάμει διπλούς...ἡ γε τοῦ λοιποῦ γένους πάλιν ἐστὶ κατὰ δυνάμιν αὐτῆς ἡμετέρας δυνάμεως διάμετρος. Cp. *Theaet.* 148 B ff., and also conversely (b) of a square or square number, e.g. *Rep.* ix. 587 D κατὰ δὲ δυνάμιν καὶ τρίτην αὐξήν κ.τ.λ. ('by raising to the second and third powers'), *Theaet.* 147 E τὸν μὲν δυνά-

μενον (sc. ἀριθμόν) ἴσον ἰσάκεις γίνεσθαι τετράγωνον καὶ ἰσοπλευρον προσείπομεν. Hence the δύναμις, in mathematical sense, may be either τοῦ ποιεῖν (square root) or τοῦ πάσχειν (square number): δυνάσθαι, as active, has for passive δυναστεύεσθαι (cp. Adam, *Nuptial Number* p. 31).

It thus appears that the term δύναμις admits of a tolerably wide range of application. But Plato has taken care in some places to define this range with more precision. Thus in *Rep.* v. 477 C ff. he makes use of the term for the purpose of distinguishing between ἐπιστήμη and δόξα. First he describes δυνάμεις as γένος τι τῶν ὄντων αἷς δὴ καὶ ἡμεῖς δυνάμεθα ἃ δυνάμεθα καὶ ἄλλο πᾶν ὃ τι περ ἂν δύνηται, οἷον λέγω ὃ ψιν καὶ ἄκοήν τῶν δυνάμεων εἶναι. Then he remarks that a δύναμις has no visible properties whereby to define it—δυνάμεως γὰρ ἐγὼ οὔτε τινα χρεῖαν ὁρῶ οὔτε σχῆμα οὔτε τι τῶν τοιούτων,—and consequently its character is determined by that of the object upon which it is exercised and the effect which it produces: δυνάμεως δ' εἰς ἐκείνο μόνον βλέπω, ἐφ' ᾧ τε ἔστι καὶ ὃ ἀπεργάζεται...καὶ τὴν μὲν ἐπὶ τῷ αὐτῷ τεταγμένην καὶ τὸ αὐτὸ ἀπεργαζομένην τὴν αὐτὴν καλῶ, τὴν δὲ ἐπὶ ἑτέρῳ καὶ ἕτερον ἀπεργαζομένην ἄλλην. Then (477 E ff.) both ἐπιστήμη and δόξα are referred to δύναμις as their γένος or εἶδος, but distinguished from each other by their respective objects (ἐφ' οἷς), τὸ γνωστόν and τὸ δοξαστόν. So in 518 B, C ff. ἐπιστήμη is spoken of as δύναμις ἐνοῦσα ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ. Hence we conclude:—
ὄργανον : δύναμις :: ὄμμα : ὄψις :: τὸ λογιστικόν :

ἐπιστήμη. δύναμις, then, is best translated here 'function' (not 'faculty' or 'seelenvermögen,' as Krohn, *Der plat. Staat* p. 160: see Peiper's *Ontol. Plat.* pp. 574 ff.), which function may be of either bad or good quality according to the nature of its object and result; so that a δύναμις is not strictly identical with an ἀρετή (in spite of iv. 430 B, 443 B, v. 477 C), nor yet with φύσις. For the notion of δύναμις as conditioned by ἔργον we may compare 352 E ἀρ' οὖν τοῦτο ἀν θείης καὶ ἵππου καὶ ἄλλου ὁπουοῦν ἔργον, ὃ ἂν ἡ μόνω ἐκείνῳ ποιῇ τις ἢ ἀριστά;... ἔσθ' ὅτω ἂν ἄλλω ἰδοῖς ἢ ὀφθαλμοῖς;—ἀκούσαις ἄλλω ἢ ὠσίν; οὐδαμῶς. οὐκοῦν δικαίως ἂν ταῦτα τούτων φάμεν ἔργα εἶναι. 353 A: ἀρ' ἂν ποτε ὅμματα τὸ αὐτῶν ἔργον καλῶς ἀπεργάσαιντο μὴ ἔχοντα τὴν αὐτῶν οἰκείαν ἀρετήν κ.τ.λ. With which passages cp. *Ar. Eth. Nic.* i. 6, 1097b 24 ff., ii. 5, 1106a 15 ff. So ὅμμα as ὄργανον has ὄψις for δύναμις and also (opposed to τυφλότης 353 C) for ἀρετή, and, for ἔργον, τὸ ὄρᾶν (ὃ ἀπεργάζεται), and for object (ἐφ' ὃ, τὸ ὀρώμενον) χρώμα, σχῆμα. Again in 507 C ὄψις is described as the αἴσθησις wherewith we see what we see, but for its actualization there is needed not only a visible object (χρώμα) but also a third factor, light, without which ἡ τε ὄψις οὐδὲν ὁψεται τὰ τε χρώματα ἔσται ἄορατα. So the sun's light is the cause (αἰτία) which ὄψιν τε ποιεῖ ὄρᾶν ὅ τι κάλλιστα καὶ τὰ ὀρώμενα ὁρᾶσθαι (508 A). φῶς is thus the τίμιον ζυγόν by which are unified ἡ τοῦ ὄρᾶν αἴσθησις καὶ ἡ τοῦ ὁρᾶσθαι δύναμις (507 E) or ἡ τοῦ ὄρᾶν τε καὶ ὁρᾶσθαι δύναμις (507 C). The δύναμις may be present (ἐνοῦσα, παρούσα), as ὄψις in the eye, χρώα in the object, only *potentially* and unrealized—a potency which the subject will attempt vainly to use (χρῆσθαι) in the dark. Hence, though Plato prefers to use δύναμις of function realizable at will, it is evident that he has in mind here the distinction between potentiality and actuality, of which Aristotle made so much: cp. *de An.* iii. 5 where φῶς is αἴτιον καὶ ποιητικόν which ποιεῖ τὰ δυνάμει ὄντα χρώματα, ἐνεργεῖα χρώματα. The same distinction between the actual and potential underlies the discussion in *Theaet.* 197 ff. where ἕξις and κτήσις are distinguished, where κτήσις implies δύναμις τοῦ λαβεῖν καὶ ἔχειν ἐν ταῖς χερσίν or the recollection of previously acquired knowledge. But as 'efficiency' is the special mark of δύναμις, Plato does not trouble much to consider δυνάμεις which are unproductive of ἔργα, or which do not exist ἐνεργεῖα. He does not contrast δύναμις persistently with the actual, but rather regards it as a condition of actuality, and as of *causative* value.

How nearly 'power' is akin to 'cause,' δύναμις to αἰτία, we may learn from Aristotle: δύναμις λέγεται ἡ μὲν ἀρχὴ κινήσεως ἡ μεταβολῆς ἢ ἐν ἐτέρῳ ἢ ἡ ἕτερον κ.τ.λ., *Met.* Δ 12, 1019a 15, cf. *id.* 2, 1013a 29 ff., of the third, or efficient, cause, ἔτι ὅθεν ἡ ἀρχὴ τῆς μεταβολῆς ἢ πρώτη ἢ τῆς ἡρεμήσεως, οἷον ὁ βουλευσας αἰτίος καὶ ὁ πατήρ τοῦ τέκνου, καὶ ὅλως τὸ ποιοῦν τοῦ ποιουμένου καὶ τὸ μεταβλητικὸν τοῦ μεταβάλλοντος. So *Phileb.* 30 D διὰ τὴν τῆς αἰτίας δύναμιν. Thus δύναμις may be said to mean causative efficacy, moving force, power of self-extension. But it is not conceived by Plato as mere abstract notion, but as belonging to an operative subject regarded as *organon* in whole or in part, whose quality it is. Everything which is causative or operative must, in so far, possess δύναμις, and so 'power' is conditioned by and correlative with the object worked on, cause and effect being an inseparable pair. So the 'square root' involves in its notion that of the square which it has 'power' to form: if 3 is expressed as $\sqrt{9}$, or as a δύναμις, we necessarily think of it in relation to its square or expanded form. And as the 'power' of 3 is to make 9, or 3^2 , so the 'power' of ἱατρικὴ is to make ὑγίεια or of πατήρ to make τέκνον. And conversely, 9, or 3^2 , has the 'power' of becoming made by 3, ὑγίεια and τέκνον of becoming produced by ἱατρός and πατήρ: division is the converse of multiplication, and we can speak of a δύναμις τοῦ πάσχειν as well as of a δύναμις τοῦ ποιεῖν.

Hence in its widest sense δύναμις means much what we mean by 'relativity': it is the necessary quality of every object and every subject of a related pair—δύναμιν τὸ μὲν ποιεῖν ἔχον, τὸ δὲ πάσχειν, *Theaet.* 156 A. Each member of the correlated pair is dynamical, and their causativeness is reciprocal: if 3 is the factor of 9, it is only because the nature of 9 admits of such a mode of production. Everything which is in relation to another thing may be termed a δύναμις, or said to possess δύναμις. So in *Rep.* ii. 366 E justice and injustice are regarded as each τῇ αὐτοῦ δυνάμει ἐν τῇ τοῦ ἔχοντος ψυχῇ ἐνόν: *ib.* 367 D justice δύνησι, injustice βλάπτει, and in E the question is raised τί ποιοῦσα ἑκατέρω τὸν ἔχοντα αὐτὴ δι' αὐτήν... ἢ μὲν ἀγαθόν, ἢ δὲ κακόν ἐστίν—i.e. states of soul or moral qualities are effective 'powers.' Thus moral virtues, or vices, are δυνάμεις, and intellectual states also, e.g. ἐπιστήμη or δόξα, as we have seen. The distinction between the psychical and corporeal side is most clearly brought out in the epistemological doctrine of the *Theaetetus*.

In pp. 184-5 we have the organon or physical medium (δ' οὖ) of sensation distinguished from the sentient subject, ἡ αἰσθανόμεθα, i.e. the bodily organs from the soul. And the δυνάμεις (δύς, ἀκοή, etc.) equally with the ὄργανα are spoken of as δ' ὧν: and the phrase ἡ διὰ τῆς γλώττης δύναμις is used. So in the case of τὰ κοινά,—general qualities, mathematical relations and the like—αὐτὴ δ' αὐτῆς ἡ ψυχὴ ἐπισκοπεῖ, whereas it perceives sensible qualities διὰ τῶν τοῦ σώματος δυνάμεων—i.e. in pure διάνοια or νοήσις there is no special organon, and so no special δύναμις, but the soul is its own δύναμις, or δ' οὖ. But here too, in the purely intellectual sphere, the objects—ideas of ὁμοιότης, ταυτόν, θάτερον, etc.—are δυνάμεις no less than the soul which thinks them: they condition it no less than it them, or rather, the νοήματα are the resultants of the two factors νοοῦν and νοούμενα. Hence δύναμις may attach to subject and object in sensation or in cogitation, as material or immaterial. And so in *Soph.* 247 C, E, the definition of ὄν offered for the acceptance of the materialists is δύναμις—τὸ καὶ ὁποιοῦν κεκτημένον δύναμιν, εἴτ' εἰς τὸ ποιεῖν ἕτερον ὁτιοῦν πεφυκός, εἴτ' εἰς τὸ παθεῖν καὶ σμικρότατον ὑπὸ τοῦ φαυλοτάτου, πᾶν τοῦτο ὄντως εἶναι: and similarly in 248-9 the idealists are forced to admit in thought and its object ποιεῖν and πάσχειν, since γνῶσις implies δύναμις and δύναμις involves κίνησις. So that δύναμις is the common denominator to which all reality, all causal relation whether outer or inner, spatial or non-spatial, is reduced. ὄντως οὐσία = δύναμις, the perceiving and percipient, sensuously and intellectually—qualities and relations, with the minds which they affect whether mediately or immediately: or, if we prefer to put it so, psychical and corporeal 'functions' and their food or material. Hence it is apparent that the superficial classification with which we set out is sufficiently inadequate for a formulation of the import of the term in Platonic doctrine; but *exempli gratia* it may be of service.

Next, to compare δύναμις with φύσις. In *Phileb.* 29 B each of the elements in the sensible world is said to be οὐδαμῶς εἰλικρινές ὃν καὶ τὴν δύναμιν οὐκ ἀξίαν τῆς φύσεως ἔχον, whereas τὸ ἐν τῷ παντὶ πῦρ is πλήθει τε θαυμαστόν καὶ κάλλει καὶ πάσῃ δυνάμει τῇ περὶ τὸ πῦρ οὖσῃ. Here δύναμις is 'sense-affecting property,' while φύσις is substantial nature or constitution, as something original and essential—the latter being fire as absolute, in and for itself, the former as its relative efficiency. Or φύσις ('production')

may be said to denote the thing's generic aspect, as member of a given stock whose name it bears—'Fire.' Again in *Phileb.* 64 E we find: καταπέφενγεν ἡμῖν ἡ τὰγαθοῦ δύναμις εἰς τὴν τοῦ καλοῦ φύσιν—'the efficient power of the Good has fled down into the substantial nature of the Beautiful.' δύναμις is appropriate to the Good as the pre-eminent αἰτία—also as super-ordinate notion, cf. *Eth. Nic.* A 1, 1094a 10 ὅσαι δ' εἰσὶ τῶν τοιούτων (sc. τεχνῶν) ὑπὸ μίαν τινὰ δύναμιν καθάπερ ὑπὸ τὴν ἵππικὴν χαλινοποιητικὴν κ.τ.λ., which also shows the force of the prep. in καταπέφενγεν. Similarly in *Rep.* 433 D the other virtues owe δύναμιν τοῦ ἐγγενέσθαι to Justice, and in 508 A, B the eye owes its δύναμις to the Sun—τὴν δύναμιν, ἣν ἔχει, ἐκ τούτου ταμευομένην ὥσπερ ἐπίρρυτον κέκτηται. The Universal δύναμις or energy descends into the particular φύσεις to which it imparts their particular δυνάμεις, by a kind of self-division or self-expansion, as the root expands into its square, or the πυθμῆν, or primary ratio, in the geometrical progression proceeds onward in the series 1...n. As thus expanded and actualized the Ideal δύναμις becomes itself φύσις: hence, in *Phileb.* 66 A τὴν αἰδίου φύσιν (as subject to ἡρῆσθαι, if the text be right) can indicate τὰγαθόν. And so the Ideas as real are said to be ἐσθηκότα ἐν τῇ φύσει, i.e. permanent elements, or rather laws, in *rerum natura*: they are as factors 'present' in their resultants, roots manifested in their expansions, limits applied to τὸ ἄπειρον. The φύσις of a thing may be said to be its compound union of both form and matter; but its δύναμις depends solely on its formal character.

A thing as φύσις is, thus, composite, mixed, extended, whether physically or logically. For φύσις of logical genera and species cp. *Soph.* 257 A ἡ τῶν γενῶν φύσις, C ἡ τὰ θατέρου φύσις, D τὰ τῆς θατέρου φύσεως μορία, which shows that the φύσις of such genera is soluble, divisible, and that its unity is not that of the individuum but of the ὅλον, of the sum not of the monad. φύσις of personal moral nature is also analysable into μέρη, as *Rep.* vi. 495 A τὰ τῆς φιλοσόφου φύσεως μέρη. And physically, the φύσις of a σῶμα is its constitution of elements: *Tim.* 74 D τὴν δὲ τῶν νέρων φύσιν ἐξ ὁστού καὶ σαρκὸς ἀζύμου κράσεως... ξυνεκέρασται. Thus the resultant of elemental factors, or δυνάμεις, is φύσις—so *Phil.* 25 E ἡ τούτων (i.e. τῶν πέρας ἔχόντων) ὀρθὴ κοινωνία τὴν ἰγείας φύσιν ἐγέννησεν. So in general, φύσις is to δύναμις as effect to cause, result to agent, subordinate to super-ordinate: the ὃ ἀπεργάζεται, whereby the

otherwise incomprehensible δύναμις is conditioned and determined, appears as actual ἐν φύσει. This distinction is set forth as that between the human and the Divine in *Laws* iii. 691 E: φύσις τις ἀνθρωπίνῃ μειγμένη θείᾳ τινὶ δυνάμει κατιδούσα κ.τ.λ. But φύσις may be contrasted with other notions beside δύναμις. Thus it may denote what is independent of human effort or volition: so φύσει is opposed to νόμῳ (*Prot.* 337 C, *Gorg.* 482 E, etc.), to τέχνῃ (*Rep.* ii. 381 A), to διδασκόν (*Prot.* 323 C), to σοφίᾳ (*Apol.* 22 C). So it indicates what is innate, instinctive—the inherited, permanent, and transmissible characteristics, as opposed to the acquired and artificial. And the natural and permanent is the true and genuine—

φύσει καὶ μὴ πλαστῶς *Laws* vi. 777 D; ἡ κατὰ φύσιν ἀληθῶς οὐσα...πολιτικὴ *Polit.* 308 C. Applying here also the same terms to the intellectual as to the physical sphere, we can thus speak of ἡ τοῦ κάλλους φύσις (*Phaedr.* 254 B), φύσις being equivalent to οὐσία, 'essence,' what a thing is αὐτὸ καθ' αὐτό, or absolutely regarded. Which brings us again to our former point of contrast—δύναμις as relative and self-externalizing with φύσις as absolute and self-complete. In the Idea both these aspects are combined—Unity in process of cognition expanding into Totality, root into square, σπέρμα into φυτόν.

R. G. BURY.

NOTE ON VIRGIL, *AENEID* 5, 359.

*Et clipeum efferrī iussit, Didymaonis artes,
Neptuni sacro Danaïs de poste refixum.
hoc iuvenem egregium praestanti munere
donat.*

Virg. *Aen.* 5, 359.

ALL explanations of the second line which violate the plain meaning (such as rendering *refixum* 'hung up,' or with Conington making it = *refixum et ademptum Danaïs*) must be dismissed as palpable subterfuges.

The words *Danaïs refixum* can only mean 'taken down by the Greeks,' and the explanation of those who so take them is fairly given by Deuticke (11th edition of Ladewig and Schaper's *Virgil*)—'The Greeks therefore had carried off (*geraubt*) the shield from a temple of Neptune in which it was dedicated. How it afterwards came into the hands of the Trojans Virgil does not state.'

This explanation must however be dismissed. It obviously explains nothing and it rather strains the meaning of *refixum*, but the fatal objection is that it makes the whole line nonsense. A shield 'carried off by the Greeks' can only be a memorial of Greek valour, and the mind naturally thinks of it as carried off by them during the sack of Troy. But the object of Virgil in writing the line is clearly not to connect the shield with memories of disaster and defeat, but to *enhance* its value in the eyes of the youthful Trojan to whom it is presented. It exhibits 'the skilled workmanship of Didymaon,' it is a 'glorious gift' for a 'very goodly youth,' and the words *Neptuni...refixum*

beyond question indicate some quality which is to be a cause of exultation, and not of grief, to its possessor.

If this be accepted—and it seems to me beyond dispute—we are in a complete dilemma. We must either mistranslate the line or we must put up with an explanation which is worse than useless. Under these circumstances any suggestion which is not obviously foolish deserves consideration, and I put one forward in the hope that some readers of the *Classical Review* will be able to contribute some of the additional evidence which is required to support it. It is this. Why should not the shield have been 'taken down' (not 'carried off') by the Greeks from a *Grecian* temple of Neptune when starting for Troy, and there won by Aeneas in combat with the chosen champion who bore it? What nobler prize could Aeneas select than a sacred shield, of rare beauty, and which recalled a proud memory?

The weakness of this suggestion is, of course, that the practice of taking dedicated armour or weapons to battle needs proof. Under stress of necessity¹ they were certainly used, cf. Livy, 22, 57; 24, 21 (quoted in Conington) and the well-known instance of David taking the sword of Goliath 1 Sam. xxi. 9, nor is there any *à priori* improbability in such weapons being supposed to possess peculiar efficacy, and indeed in Livy 24, 21 those who take the Gallic spoils

¹ See too Val. Max. 7, 6 and Sil. Ital. 10, 599, two excellent references for which I am indebted to the editor.—T. E. P.