dilemma; but what it really covers is a quite different kind of "tentativeness"—that, namely, which consists in making remarks at large on a vaguely defined subject; and consequently it is best received in silence.

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ANTI-PRAGMATISME, *Examen des droits respectifs de l'aristocratie intellectuelle et de la démocratie sociale*. Par Albert Schinz, professeur à l'Université de Bryn Mawr (Pennsylvania). 1 vol. in-8° de la *Bibliothèque de Philosophie contemporaine*. Paris: Félix Alcan, éditeur.

The book is divided into three parts.

The first is a criticism of pragmatism from a philosophical standpoint, which Emile Boutroux, the well-known author of *Science et Religion*, characterized as "très net, très vigoureux, et qui apporte de la clarté dans une question très embrouillée." Instead of summarizing Prof. Schinz's whole argument, let us only call attention to the distinction which he considers fundamental and is the cause, according to him, of the whole quarrel about pragmatism. On pages 26 to 36 he distinguishes between what he calls "scientific" pragmatism and "moral" pragmatism. James and his followers have tried hard to identify their cause with that of the recent school of Poincaré, in France. A law, an idea, is not true or false in itself, but only relatively to us; it is true, or rather becomes true only when it yields results to the investigator. Prof. Schinz says that, thanks to the vagueness of the word "result," pragmatists have been able to impose upon us this identification, but as a matter of fact there is incompatibility between Poincaré and James: Poincaré means an idea is true when it yields *scientific* results, while James (without saying it explicitly, but it is the spirit of all his writings on pragmatism) really means that an idea is true when it carries with it valuable *moral* results. So, of course, there is an abyss between the two conceptions. Poincaré never had the remotest idea of allowing any moral preoccupations to interfere with the search for truth.

Whether James would admit that this interpretation of Schinz is correct, I do not know. I doubt it very much. But certainly the arguments brought forward here and elsewhere

in the book that moral and even religious preoccupations are back of all of James's pragmatism sound plausible enough. As a matter of fact, although in somewhat different forms, the same reproach is made to James by writers on the continent, Höffding, Boutroux and recently Rey, in his *Philosophie moderne* (pp. 28-42). James will probably some day answer at length that ever-recurring argument.

It is impossible here to take up the discussion of James's theory of truth as criticised by Schinz. The latter offers the following dilemma: either you accept the moral criterion of truth as more important than the rationalistic criterion or you do not. If you do not, but admit that an idea must first be rationally true anyway, then what is the use of a new philosophy, since in this case pragmatism only repeats what science always held? If you do accept the moral criterion as more important than the rationalistic one, then it is true you create something new—but you simply reduce philosophy to *moral* philosophy, which, of course, is intolerable.

The chapter devoted to what Prof. Schinz calls "Le cas Dewey" was published in the *Journal of Philosophy* in New York. To go into that criticism would lead us too far.

The second part of the book takes up this question, If pragmatism is so hopelessly weak from a logical standpoint, how can we explain its great success? Observing that pragmatism has found followers in America chiefly, and, even there, mostly among non-philosophers, Prof. Schinz explains that pragmatism is a philosophy that will satisfy a democratic country, and that really the writings of James show plainly that he himself favored pragmatism above all as a reaction against philosophies which were discouraging or morally fatal to the masses of our democratic epoch. Schinz goes so far as to say that pragmatism will finally win, and perhaps *ought* to win, "not because it is true, but because it is false" (p. 209). Truth is not good for the masses; they cannot assimilate it, and they make bad use of it. Moreover, science rests entirely on the idea of determinism of phenomena, which, of course, is bound to kill energy and all sense of responsibility in the people. Society is, after all, more important than scientific truth. Therefore let us choose society with untruth rather than truth with anarchy. The reason why Schinz calls his book *Anti-Pragmatisme* is therefore not because he objects to a pragmatic

philosophy; the masses need it, on the contrary. He only objects to having this philosophy called *true* philosophy. He deplores that we should be forced to keep truth from the people, but sees in it a necessary result of modern conditions, or, more plainly, of democracy, which he assails bitterly whenever he can. There is, he says, an automatic law to the effect that the more democratic we become the more it will be necessary to conceal truth from the people; the freer people become, the less free philosophy will be.

In the Middle Ages philosophers were free; to-day they are not. The second chapter of Part II illustrates this. Scholasticism meant that there was a philosophy for the masses, it was a body of doctrines useful to society, and which was given out as truth—and philosophers, besides that, were free. When Descartes and Bacon freed philosophy from the church, they took the first step to make it a slave of public opinion, which, all considered—if we understand Schinz right—is a servitude worse than the first. The stronger public opinion became, or, again, the stronger democracy became, the more the necessity grew to express only such theories as were useful to the masses, as were moral. The content of this chapter—which I consider the most interesting in the book for the philosopher—is summarized in this formulæ: Scholasticism treated philosophy as a servant of theology—*philosophia, ancilla theologiæ*. Pragmatism treats philosophy as a servant of ethics—*philosophia, ancilla ethicæ*. Or, in other words, pragmatism is modern scholasticism, and scholasticism was middle-age pragmatism. Pragmatism is the logical outcome of a movement that began at the dawn of modern philosophy; three great names mark three important stages of the evolution, Pascal, Rousseau, Kant. All three, opposing practical reason to pure reason, are the forerunners of James.

One point remains obscure, however, in all that: the relation of the pragmatic methods to the pragmatic theories obtained by the method. Schinz seems to consider them inseparable. James has objected to it. And, in fact, we can conceive very well of a man using the pragmatic methods and being an atheist. If, in his eyes, society might be better organized on atheistic than on religious principles, he could hold this view and still be a pragmatist.

The third part is a rapid sketch of Schinz's own views of

society. He emphasizes very strongly the disadvantages of democracy, and is rather pessimistic. According to him, society has gone too far into popular government to make it possible to go back. We must swallow it all. Here I notice, however, a contradiction. One chapter of Part III is called *Salut possible, mais improbable*, meaning that salvation from the process of leveling, which makes democracy a mediocracy, is hardly to be expected. Yet, in Appendix B, *Literature and the Moral Code*,¹ he develops the idea that if the elites of all nations were to unite for common action they might well counterbalance at least some of the worst effects of democracy.

Whatever one thinks of the author's own ideas—which are not those of everybody surely—he has certainly been more outspoken in dealing with pragmatism than most critics so far. To say the least, his book will set many readers thinking. The refutation of Schinz's views belongs by right to those who have been rather mercilessly attacked in “Anti-Pragmatisme.”

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¹ Appeared as an article in *INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF ETHICS*, July, 1906.