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Publisher: Routledge

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Royal United Services Institution. Journal

Publication details, including instructions
for authors and subscription information:

<http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/rusi19>

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Colonel J. Le Couteur

Published online: 11 Sep 2009.

To cite this article: Colonel J. Le Couteur (1861) Camps Of Exercise,
Royal United Services Institution. Journal, 5:19, 441-453, DOI:

[10.1080/03071846109418730](http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/03071846109418730)

To link to this article: <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/03071846109418730>

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Friday, June 7th, 1861.

MAJOR-GENERAL THE HONOURABLE JAMES LINDSAY, M.P.
in the Chair.

CAMPS OF EXERCISE.

By COLONEL J. LE COUTEUR, Jersey Militia Staff, A.D.C. to the Queen.

I THINK it proper that an officer who has retired for many years from the active service of the army, should offer some apology for presuming to read a paper on a subject so much more practically known to many, if not to all, who may now be present. From my position as commanding officer of three regiments of militia for above a period of thirty years in the island of Jersey, and subsequently as adjutant-general to the whole force, I have been lead to read much on military subjects, and have reflected deeply, not only on that most important of all considerations the defence of the country, but also on the best method of training troops in camps of exercise.

I was once asked by that accomplished officer, the late Major-General Torrens, whether I thought the camp at Chobham was all that was required for instruction? My reply was to the effect that the highly-distinguished commander, who handled that beautiful force with such consummate skill and ease, seemed to be making it a school for the brigadiers and commanding officers, rather than one for the juniors and soldiery. How so? Troops should be taught to move in order of battle, with every requirement of war,—guides, pontoon train, engineer establishment, military train, camp equipage, commissariat,—to encamp at distant uncertain points, to entrench a position, with a view to its defence against a superior force. General Torrens quite agreed with this view, but added that such expenditure as those movements might require would not yet be tolerated by the country; the money voted for Chobham was already expended, it would be useless to ask for a further supply just now.

Camps of exercise, or camps of instruction, have existed from the earliest periods, under the immediate direction of the Most High. The disposition of the Hebrew encampment was first laid out by the command of God. Cyrus, one of the most favoured of the heathen world, a general among the greatest and wisest, was not only himself trained in a camp of exercise, but he established one more perfect, in which his officers and soldiers were exercised to feats of arms, trained to martial array, and to field movements. The modern institutions of the "Legion d'honneur," or the "Victoria Cross," are imitations of his celebrated band of "alike

honoured." Yet, great as they were in personal merit and warlike accomplishments, he was surpassed by none of the "alike honoured." His consummate discrimination of merit was only equalled by the nobleness and liberality with which he rewarded it.

In a later period, before touching upon the purpose of a modern camp of exercise, it may not be deemed uninteresting to consider shortly to what end the greatest master of the art of war formed camps—whether as temporary camps of resistance, or camps of permanence.

In his first invasion of England, Cæsar landed his five legions, with 2,000 horse, from 800 vessels.

A great army of Britons had been assembled to oppose his landing. Appalled by the vastness of the fleet, they retired to the mountains. Cæsar having landed his army, chose a safe site for his camp, left a force to entrench it, and then marched against the enemy. The following morning, having forced the weakly barricaded camp of the Britons, he found the position well chosen, and immediately resolved to fortify it for his own army. The next morning, intelligence having been conveyed to him that a dreadful storm had caused infinite damage to his fleet, he returned and drew all his remaining ships within the fortifications of the camp. Ten days were employed in this duty, during which the soldiers had *no intermission of fatigue*, not even during night, until the camp was securely fortified.

From this camp Cæsar sent out foraging parties, and, although these and the camp itself were repeatedly attacked with extraordinary valour by the British, the camp remained impregnable.

From that base of his operations Cæsar conquered the Britons. As the period of the equinox drew nigh, taking advantage of an extraordinary calm, he suddenly re-embarked his army, with a great body of prisoners, set sail about ten o'clock at night, and by day-break brought his whole fleet safe to the continent of Gaul. In this instance he insured a constant supply of stores for the repair of his fleet, as well as rations for his men, by being master of the Channel.

On another occasion, Cæsar, having planned an excursion towards the Scheldt against Ambiorix, sent all the baggage of his army to Atualica, a castle and camp which he had strongly fortified the previous year. Quintus Tullius Cicero, with the fourteenth legion and 200 horse, was left in its command. Cæsar was to be absent only seven days, during which he had enjoined Cicero to allow no one to quit the camp. On the seventh day, the men, becoming weary of confinement within the camp, were urgent to quit it; Cicero weakly yielded; sent half his force, or five cohorts, with carts and camp followers to forage. At this very moment a body of 2,000 horsemen of the Sicambri, who had been urged to attack the Roman camp, on being assured of its defenceless condition, and the absence of Cæsar with his army, suddenly attempted to force the entrance of the camp. The cohort on guard could scarcely withstand the attack. A centurion of the first rank, who was among the sick in garrison, rushed, though incompletely armed, to the assistance of the guard, and, although he bravely sacrificed his life, the post was maintained, and some confidence was restored; meanwhile the foragers returning, assaulted the enemy, who after much loss were driven off, and the camp was saved. In this in-

ance the prudence and foresight of the great commander were nearly set at naught by the imprudent weakness of Cicero, in yielding to the wishes of his men, and disobedience of orders. Cæsar, on returning, only complained of the sending out the cohorts to forage, observing, "That in war nothing ought to be left to fortune, whose power appeared evidently in the sudden arrival of the enemy, and much more in their coming up unperceived to the very gates of the camp." Few armies have ever been better trained than the Roman. Their system can be applied with advantage to any army.

Recruits for the Roman armies were selected from country labourers, as should be the case with our own, rather than from the population of towns; field labourers being more simple in manner, and hardy of frame. In their training, the practice was rigorous, methodical, and exact.

The recruit was furnished with an osier shield and a wooden club, each of them double the weight of the military shield and sword; with these he was trained twice in the day in attack and defence, and especially taught to give point: the manual of the javelin, and the shooting with arrows was taught scientifically, as the use of the rifle is to be now. When the soldier was deemed perfect in his elementary drill, he was taught evolutions and complex movements, to open or close ranks, to form square with celerity, and from square to form into the triangle or wedge, to move in these formations and in a hollow circle. Thrice in a month, fully accoutred and armed at all points, carrying *sixty* pounds weight of kit, the Roman soldiers marched four thousand paces, or above a two-hours' march from the camp, at times on a plain, at others over broken ground. The centurion was not only selected for his skill and prowess in the use of arms, but he was to be sober, vigilant, and active, more prompt to act than to speak, zealous to maintain his company in discipline, to see that it was suitably clothed, and well provided with *good shoes*. It is not a little remarkable, that the forecast of a savings bank was to be found in the stock purse for every cohort, and a general purse for the whole legion. Although in common, it had the same tendency as a savings bank to create a local *attachment* to the service.

During the decadence of the Roman state, the whole scene was corrupt; morals were licentious, and civil liberty drifted into slavery.

From the moment the Romans became enslaved, their armies felt the stain, and their discipline and conquests fell together.

Ancient traditions taught the Franks to claim the Romans as their kinsmen; yet, in the mediæval ages which followed the fall of the Roman empire, very little, if any, of that exact and stern discipline, which had been the soul of its armies, was retained. The barbaric sovereigns of Britain and of Gaul adopted the Roman insignia and imagery for the assertion and demonstration of their authority, but the trappings did not constitute the force.

It is after a lapse of seventeen centuries, that the armies of Britain and of Gaul have returned to that stern and steady discipline which have rendered them, combined, as renowned as the tenth legion of Cæsar, and as irresistible!

During a long period, which may strictly be called the feudal days, or those of chivalry, training to arms belonged rather to the feudal lords

and their immediate retainers, archers, or men-at-arms, than to great armies, or the people at large.

The invention of gunpowder, its application to the purposes of war, and the use of firearms and artillery rapidly revived strategy and tactics. In the fourteenth or the fifteenth century, though there may not have existed camps of exercise, yet the training of troops must have become pretty general, for the Emperor of the French, in his "Past and Future of Artillery," states that the best infantry of that period, the English archers, the Swiss and the Lansquenets, were mostly without defensive armour. *The English archers at Agincourt*, according to an eye-witness, Le Fevre de St. Remy, were without armour, and barefooted. Louis the Eleventh of France established an entrenched camp two leagues in length, in which to instruct his troops. These troops, says Philip de Commines, were composed of mounted men-at-arms of his free companies, trained to alight when necessary, with an artillery, which could be easily transported where wanted, and a great number of carts and chains.

At so early a period as 1476, the Swiss must have been carefully trained in camps of exercise.

They were formed in heavy battalions in solid squares with as much front as depth, composed of artillerymen (*coulevriniers*), halberdiers, and pikemen in varied proportions. The artillerymen were either placed in front, or on the flanks of the battalion. The pikes destined to resist cavalry were firmly fixed on the ground. The halberts, much shorter, were of signal use when the *melee* took place. Their army, according to the usage of the period, was formed in three corps; but instead of moving in rear of one another, or in column, they moved *en échelon*, the centre corps marching straight on the foe, while the two others attacked his flanks. Their artillery, composed of light guns, was placed within the intervals of infantry. To protect the guns, and to clear the line of march, they had musketeers, who acted as skirmishers, and were named the forlorn hope (*enfants perdus*).

They feared no cavalry, as this could not break their ranks; and as to artillery, which alone could furrow their compact masses, this, owing to its discharge being slow, gave little cause for alarm. Firm to receive its first fire, they rushed on the guns, in order that they might seize and turn them on the enemy. Sentence of death was passed on any who should quit his ranks. No cries were allowed, but a deadly silence enforced. With tactics, however, valour has changed its nature, coolness and compact order have replaced headlong bravery and single combat. These troops were found to be invincible, and Louis the Eleventh took six thousand of them into his service. On these he re-organised the French army, leaving, writes a contemporary, three treasures to his successor, a standing army of 60,000 men, a marvellous train of artillery, such as had never been seen, and all his frontier towns well fortified.

About the early part of the seventeenth century, or 1610, Prince Maurice of Nassau introduced a new system of manœuvre, quite different from the very deep and square columns or lines which had prevailed. He formed his battalions of 500 men, ten deep, and his squadrons, from 100 to 200, five deep. These enabled them to form from columns into lines with greater celerity. The Emperor of the French gives the credit of

ving rendered armies more flexible, and of having introduced a new order of battle, to him rather than to Henry the Fourth and his immortalised minister Sully.

The northern Cæsar, Gustavus Adolphus, may be said to have taken the hint from Maurice of Nassau, but his mighty and inventive genius stepped at once from the unwieldly and inconvenient depths of order of battle to what may be called Dundas' tactics. In his camp of exercise he formed his regiments into companies, sections, and sub-divisions (*Corporalschafften*), each having a chief file and coverer, so that every private, without appeal to his officers, knew his place. Each company was composed of 72 musketeers and 54 pikemen; eight companies formed a corps of 1008 men, and two regiments a brigade. The king had seen that, with the old deep formations, the rear ranks were thrown into disorder by the front ranks, especially when a heavy fire from artillery mowed down whole ranks. Gustavus formed his regiments in six ranks while moving, and three deep in order of battle. The front rank kneeling, the second stooping, the third erect. The pikemen were distributed so as to receive cavalry. Guns were attached to the regiments, so that each brigade was a moveable fortress. The wonderful success which attended his arms, prove the sagacity and greatness of his designs. He abandoned the system of forlorn hopes, or *tirailleurs*, because he deemed that battles were to be won by masses, not by skirmishers. Chemnitz states, "No one equalled him in leading an army to battle, in covering a retreat without loss; or in encamping in security in the open field by rapidly covering it with entrenchments. It was impossible more perfectly to understand fortification, attack, and defence!"

To severe discipline he added most liberal and impartial justice. Favour was unknown. No one could rise but by merit. He partook in hardships with his soldiers, and in camp slept in the open air when they did so.

The tactics of Gustavus Adolphus form an era in war! Camps of instruction were instituted by Louis XIV. of France, and although no great changes were introduced in the movements of infantry by that monarch, the greatest honour belongs to Vauban for his improvements in the science of defence and attack, in a word, of Fortification!

In 1778, forty battalions and 20 squadrons, with 40 guns, were formed into a camp of instruction at Vausseix, under Marshal Broglie, besides a smaller force of ten battalions and nine squadrons in a camp at Paramé. Here the vexed questions between the older system of manœuvre and that introduced by the great Frederick were canvassed and worked out by the manœuvres then carried on. The true relative value of the two systems was appreciated. It was seen that neither was absolute or exclusive—that the variety of movements and the operations of war require the employment of various modes of formation and deployment; that consequently troops act best in those movements which are admitted to be the most simple and prompt, leaving it to the *coup-d'œil* of the general to choose on the field of manœuvre or battle such as the circumstances of the moment should make preferable. A later writer, after some critical remarks on the disastrous conclusion of the war with the Anglo-American States, after tendering his admiration of the English constitution and government in high terms of praise, proceeds to offer warnings, which are not more out of season now than they were then: "While all the nations of Europe are

occupied in perfecting their tactics, England remains the only power which holds to old principles, although she should be among the first to seek how to perfect this art. The English conquered formerly because the armies opposed to them followed the same order of battle. Justice must be done to the English people, and whenever bravery is in question, they yield to none; but in these days bravery in battle does not determine victory; it is decided by skilful manœuvres, a rigid discipline, a blind obedience to officers in command. The days of the Edwards are bygone. Great Britain has neglected to profit by the leisure which a time of peace afforded her to organise a militia, which should be equal to her defence if she were attacked in her homesteads. She has carried all her attention to her Navy; but what would befall her if France really effected a descent upon her soil? Can she flatter herself that she will be in a position to prevent it with an undisciplined militia, armed citizens, or labourers? What effect would such defenders of the nation have against 40,000 select troops, brave, trained to war, disciplined, and commanded by intelligent leaders?" After these ominous words of caution, and an entirely mistaken view of the discord which politics might be supposed to create, he continues: "The English have been persuaded that their maritime power would suffice to secure them from any incursion on the part of France; that they had to fear no such revolutions as were caused by William the Conqueror, and William of Nassau; but, neighbours as they are to France, knowing her power, her wealth, the resources which she can create, how is it that they have not calculated that she may, *when she pleases*, think seriously of creating a navy, make it as formidable as that of England, by means of which to land—if wanted—200,000 men on her shore." (1780.)

In a note, it is observed: "It is in London itself that it must be sought to vanquish our vain-glorious rivals, and not elsewhere." "This expedition, prepared and carried out with the greatest promptitude, is the only one which might disconcert the measures of the Cabinet of St. James."

In the short space of a quarter of a century, the Emperor of the French has accomplished the prophecy. France, when it suited her policy, has created the fleet we saw at Cherbourg—the iron-plated gunboats, and a body of seamen such as no fleet but that of England possesses; in addition to a finer composed army than she ever before displayed.

The great Duke of Wellington and Lord Overstone have, with military and statistical authority, shown the frightful consequences which a hostile march on London would entail, not alone on the nation but on the world at large: the fall of Nineveh would be as a feather in the world's balance to such a calamity. The Volunteers of Britain have been aroused, gloriously, by the mere forecast of the shadow. Vattel foresaw this grand movement of our Volunteers, in his laudation of England. "An admirable constitution there places every citizen in a situation that enables him to contribute to this great end, and everywhere diffuses a spirit of true patriotism, which is zealously employed for the public welfare. Happy constitution! which they did not suddenly obtain; it has cost rivers of blood; but they have not purchased it too dear. May luxury—that pest so fatal to the manly and patriotic virtues, that minister of corruption so dangerous to liberty—never overthrow a monument that does so much honour to human nature—a monument capable of teaching kings how

orious it is to rule over a free people." True and happy as this opinion may be, nevertheless to the Volunteers alone, interests so mighty may not be entrusted. The former French writer goes on to ask, "What forces has this power (England) to oppose to her rival?" I repeat it—shall it be by citizens armed in haste, without discipline, without tactics, that she will oppose a formidable army, brave and highly disciplined? Notwithstanding the fine state of discipline of the French army, its late military writers complain that colonels have introduced into their regiments new systems, deviations from regulations, which were irksome to learn. Men were taught to move with extraordinary alertness—to fire with great rapidity; and received great praise for what never can be turned to account in a field of battle: another officer might assume the command of the same corps, with an entirely different system, when the officers and men would have to unlearn in part and learn afresh in part. Is this complaint confined to the French army? That incomparable soldier, either for covering an advance or a retreat, a great though not a faultless tactician, Marshal Ney, remarks—"Most of the infantry manœuvres executed in time of peace are not used in war; those easiest to be understood ought to form the basis of manœuvring, and their execution should be rigorously enforced. The superfluous must be rejected without hesitation; and the leisure of winter-quarters, now spent in teaching useless evolutions, which the troops will scarcely ever have to perform, even in the course of numerous campaigns, be devoted to instructing the infantry officers and non-commissioned officers.

"They should be taught the system of attacking and defending fortified places; they should be exercised in the erection of military field-works; in attacking and defending a post; in military reconnoitring, &c.; and lastly, their *coup-d'œil* must be exercised in the choice of positions and encampments, whether for offensive or defensive operations."

It is in this view that it is asked, how camps of exercise should be constituted; so as to form an army, not only for field movement, to captivate the eye, but for absolute practical, habitual, work of war?

The system might commence at the Royal Military Colleges, where, in addition to the usual instruction, studies and practical instruction for field-works, we would apportion two half days in the week for instruction in regimental and brigade drill. When the superior under officers of companies became thoroughly equal to command their respective companies as battalions—by rope-drill—they should be further instructed in brigade rope drill. When conversant with this, the companies should act as battalions, and in brigade perform all the simple movements of great bodies necessary for service in the field. Other parties with descriptive flags, and with ropes, might take space for and represent cavalry and artillery.

Such exercise would tend to health, be an instructive amusement, and impart to an intelligent youth a feeling of confidence in the knowledge of his profession. With such a course, and occasional lectures to explain how some of such movements have been applied to fields of victory or why battles were lost, not only would the knowledge of handling troops be gained, but the object or meaning of such and such a movement would be

plainly apparent. Cadets so instructed might join their corps almost prepared for the field, while they would probably take a more lively interest in acquiring the peculiar after knowledge needful to fit them for ultimate command.

In a camp of exercise it would be proposed to divide the instruction into regularly established courses; for instance,—

MONDAY.—*In fine weather.*—Squad, company, and regimental drills.

In foul weather.—Assembly of officers in a hall of instruction, for *viva voce* examination by the majors or captains in turn.

The men to be kept up in aiming drill, the recruits and defaulters at shed drill. As in the Russian army, the men to be encouraged to learn sewing, for the repair of their clothes, shoemaking, or any trade which might conveniently be taught in a permanent camp of instruction, and which on discharge might enable them to add by their industry something to their pension. No better member of society can be met with than a sober, industrious soldier or sailor who settles down to his trade or calling.

TUESDAY.—*In fine weather.*—Brigade drills for more instruction, under the eye of the brigadier, in which any commanding officer should be called out to assume the command of the brigade, under the supposition that the brigadier is *hors de combat*, or disabled.

In foul weather.—A lecture, presided over by the brigadier, to be prepared by a selected officer from the staff or a battalion, on the principles of the secure march of armed parties through the country of an enemy; reconnoitring to be effected in an open or a wooded country, either with, or without cavalry or artillery.

The nature and duties of advanced, rear, and flank guards to a division, or to an army on its march.

The safety of the land transport train, its effectual security by peculiar instant formation in case of sudden attack.

On the manner of giving commands, and the execution of evolutions and grand movements.

On the attack and defence of posts and of fortified places.

By Officers of the Artillery or Engineers.—On the attack and defence of posts and of fortified places; on the powers of artillery; on field fortification, roadmaking.

By Officers of the Commissariat.—On the provisioning of armies; the most perfect mode of contracts.

By Officers of the Military Train.—On the most perfect means of transport; the difficulties to be surmounted in the country of an enemy; the best mode for its own defence from attack.

By Officers of the Medical Department.—The best choice of a camp; best means of keeping an army in health; food; clothing; drainage; sanitary suggestions to officers on detachment when far from a medical officer.

In a word, each to convey the best instruction in his power to all.

WEDNESDAY, A.M.—Movements by divisions of all arms: artillery, cavalry, infantry, military train, for more instruction by the commanding general; siege operations.—P.M. Repose.

THURSDAY.—Repose; cleaning arms; drying, cleaning, and repairing clothes.

FRIDAY.—*Grand movements.*—It is supposed that the camp of instruction may consist of 30,000 infantry, 6,000 cavalry, 60 guns, with 1,050 artillery, and 900 horses, and about 2,250 horses for officers.

N.B. Eighteen hundred men and 3,600 horses might be required in a hostile country for the military train or transport of provisions, forage, spare ammunition, camp equipage and ambulance of such an army advancing to meet an enemy, with requirements for three days.

Of these it is supposed the first division is ordered to march as a corps of observation, with provisions for three days.

It is composed of 10,000 infantry—four brigades of three battalions; 2,000 cavalry—four regiments; 20 guns, with 350 artillerymen and 300 horses; 750 horses for officers; 600 men, and 1,200 horses for the field, train, and supplies; the supply for three days for this force would stand thus:—

	Casks.	WEIGHT.		REMARKS.
		lbs.	lbs.	
DAILY. { 12,950 rations of biscuit, 1 lb...	...	12,950	12,950	in live cattle.
12,950 " " meat, 1 lb...	...	...	...	
12,950 " " spirits, $\frac{1}{2}$ pint	90	6,475	...	
4,250 " " corn, 10 lb...	...	42,500	...	
4,250 " hay or straw, 12 lb.	...	57,000	...	
Fuel	..	...	55,000	"
TOTAL	...	112,925	Weight of	one day's consumption, exclusive of meat and fuel.
		3		
		338,775	Weight for	three days.

Required for conveyance of Provisions and Forage, 182 four-horse waggons + $\frac{1}{2}$ =	243
" " Spare Ammunition	20
" " Camp Equipage, &c.	20
" " Ambulance, &c.	17
TOTAL	300

General observations.—This statement does not include the transport which may be occasionally required for carrying out the rations to the troops when occupying dispersed cantonments, or an extended bivouac, nor for the procuring of fuel; nor has any allowance been made for non-effective animals from casualties.

The number of waggons will generally be found sufficient, admitting always that the magazines are within six or eight leagues of the troops; for the transport so employed, without any general resting days, will seldom perform more than 10 or 12 miles a day when loaded, and about 15 when unloaded; and assuming the magazines to be 24 miles from the camp or cantonments, the waggons are reckoned to take four days in going

to and fro, including the time consumed in receiving their loads. No allowance has been made for unavoidable waste, losses from weather, leakage of liquids, &c., but on the other hand it must be inferred and admitted that hay and straw, or green forage may generally be looked for near the bivouac or cantonment—therefore one may be placed as a set off against the other—whilst it might at the same time meet the contingencies alluded to in the first paragraph of these observations.

The spare small arm ammunition is calculated at 360,000 rounds in addition to the 60 carried by the soldier; the transport, however, for this must be regulated, in some measure, by what the artillery may have the means of conveyance for by their carriages. The transport for the camp equipage and ambulances can only be considered as an approximation under ordinary circumstances. With us it has always been the custom to allow each subaltern of infantry forage for one horse or mule, captains two, field officers three, and officer commanding a regiment of infantry four; which therefore are included in the estimate.

A waggon, according to the state of the roads, is reckoned to convey from 1,700 to 2,000 lbs.; if mules were employed, a single mule from 150 to 180 lbs.; ten mules being assumed equal to one waggon, or 3,000 mules to 300 waggons.

The transport, immediately attached to the troops, should consist of the regular military train; but the other would be probably auxiliary, and hired in the vicinity of the operations according to circumstances. No army ought to move without its own permanent military train to the extent provided for in the estimate, with a reserve for casualties; and, had our troops on the late expedition (to the Crimea) been so provided, the probability is, that a great portion of their sufferings and privations would have been obviated.

Under the supposition that the enemy's country afforded no means of subsistence, reserves of everything requisite to meet the consumption for the probable period the operations would last, must be formed at the starting point or base.

So long as the army operates within a radius of from 24 to 30 miles, the transport stated would suffice to maintain the supply; but in the event of advancing another 30 miles, then an intermediate dépôt would have to be formed at the termination of the first 30 miles, from whence the transport with the army would proceed to load up. This intermediate dépôt would be supplied from the grand reserve at the base, and would require about 240 additional waggons (an auxiliary description locally formed would answer), and so on in proportion to the augmentation of the distance from the grand reserve, always assuming the country to be entirely destitute of provisions and forage.

It is with a deep feeling of gratitude, that the above valuable memorandum is acknowledged to have come from that highly distinguished officer the late Commissary General Sir George Maclean.

It would seem, from the information thus afforded by an officer of the greatest experience, to be of the very highest importance that commissariat officers should be employed at all our garrison stations, in order to enable them to acquire that knowledge which would be for the public interest whenever their services should be required, either for provisioning bodies of

oops at home, or for service in the field. In what other manner are young men to learn the price and quality of provisions, the cost of transport, and all the requirements of bodies of troops, except at enormous cost to the public?

If some innovation in the usual mode of conducting grand reviews is now proposed, it is from a hint by Marshal Suchet, one of the most able of Napoleon's generals. He remarks that, in reviews, movements are performed with uniform regularity; if anything goes wrong, it is soon set to rights by the general commanding, or some of his staff; there is nothing to disturb his composure but the unpleasantness of exhibiting mistakes.

Far different is it on the field of combat, where the confusion, the turmoil of battle, smoke, noises, death, and destruction, in various forms, wounds and cries of anguish, the loss of commanders of tried skill and valour, a corps in part annihilated, guns taken, combine to perplex and confuse; when all these disasters fail to disturb the man, or to deprive him of a cool penetrating glance, or to prevent him from affording aid and support wherever wanted, with the promptness and precision of a field day—such a man is truly a great general. Might not some training towards such a result be possible and useful? We will now suppose the first division, composed as above, ordered to march into a hostile country as a corps of observation, with provisions for three days as enumerated. It marches in column of divisions right in front with videttes, an advanced guard, flank guards, the cavalry, artillery, and field train in succession, and with a rear guard. We will further suppose that the division has advanced into the hostile country a day and a half unexpectedly. The advanced vidette suddenly perceives the enemy, and halts concealed. A staff officer flies to the rear, reports to the general commanding that a force of the enemy, from 10 to 15,000 men, with eight guns, and a body of cavalry is in view, and halted at dinner.

The general gallops to the front, dismounts, and from the brow of a hill observes the enemy; his left flank resting about one mile distant, under direct enfilade from the point of observation. He orders the most complete silence to be kept; the troops to march up with trailed arms; the first brigade to take its left shoulder forward under cover of the hill; and when its rear has passed the flank of the enemy to wheel to its left into line, and advance in direct *échelon* to attack by battalions from the right: the second brigade to form in like manner, and march in support of the attack: twelve guns to be placed so as to enfilade the line of the enemy, and disturb his formations: one regiment of cavalry to be in support of the guns: one regiment of cavalry and four guns to cover the right of the first brigade.

The third brigade, with one battalion of the fourth brigade, in double columns of battalions at quarter distance, one regiment of cavalry, and four guns, is ordered to form the second line.

Two battalions of the fourth brigade, with a regiment of cavalry, and four guns, are to form the reserve.

One battalion of the fourth brigade is to guard the field train.

The enemy, surprised and vigorously attacked, has his left wing rolled up, but makes a skilful defence with his right wing.

A staff officer announces that the commander of the first brigade is killed, (six guns having opened upon it, supported by *tirailleurs*,) the captains of Nos. 1, 5, and 7—sections 3 and 5 of those companies, are also

killed or wounded ; as also files 7, 9, 16, 21 of companies 3, 4, 6, 8. The senior subaltern and covering sergeant of those companies are also wounded. One man only is to fall out to assist a wounded man to the rear. The nominally killed and wounded are instantly to repair to and form in rear of the centre sergeants of battalions.

The general-in-chief whilst directing the attack is killed.

An aide-de-camp reports the disaster to the second in command.

The first line, requiring support, is reinforced by the second line.

The cavalry charge the broken wing of the enemy.

The colonel who commanded it is reported killed, with a considerable loss of officers and men.

The captain of the first battery is reported killed, and two of the guns disabled.

Four guns from the second line are ordered to the support of the first battery.

As each successive casualty is supposed to occur, the adjutant of each corps will call out the numbers of killed or wounded, who will immediately fall out, thus the troops will be taught how to close up gaps in their ranks during action, how to remedy disorder, and how officers quite unexpectedly may be called upon to exercise command and judgment.

It is believed that by some such teaching young men of ardour, with a natural genius for war and command, might more or less frequently exhibit qualifications now lying dormant.

This instructory disorganisation, if applied to every arm, might prepare each to meet real difficulties with such resources as can only best be called forth by a ready and previously prepared mind. The confusion might at the outset seem to be inconvenient, but the teaching and knowledge gained might prove invaluable on a day of battle.

The great Napoleon shows how even his very ablest marshals required teaching : Probably no better explanation of the meaning of the words "*en main*," "in hand," has ever been given than by that great instructor.

On the 16th of June, 1815, at a quarter past three, Napoleon gave orders for Marshal Ney to manœuvre, so as to envelope "the right of the enemy, and to fall at arm's length on his rear. That army is lost if you act vigorously ; the fate of France is in your hands." The following day, the 17th, after describing to Marshal Ney the victory gained over the Prussian army, it is stated, "the Emperor goes to the Mill of Bry, on the main road from Namur to Quatrebras ; it is therefore impossible that the English army can act in your front ; if such were the case, the Emperor would march directly upon it by Quatrebras, while you would attack it in front with your divisions, which must now be united, and that army would be instantly destroyed. Therefore, inform His Majesty of the exact position of your divisions, and of all that passes before you. The Emperor has seen with sorrow that you did not unite your divisions yesterday ; they acted unconnectedly, hence you suffered losses. If the corps of Counts d'Erlon and Reille had been united, not an Englishman would have escaped from the corps which came to attack you.

"If the Count d'Erlon had executed the movement on St. Amand which the Emperor had ordered, the Prussian army would have been totally destroyed, and we should probably have made thirty thousand

risoners. The corps of Generals Gerard, Vandamme, and the Imperial Guard were all along united.

"You are exposed to reverses when detachments are compromised.

"The Emperor hopes and desires that your seven divisions of infantry and the cavalry shall be well united and formed, and that together they may not occupy one league of ground, in order to have them well in *your hand*, and to employ them when wanted."

Here is a plain meaning, 46,000 men within three miles of space are "in hand."

Had Marshal Ney attacked the British at "Quatre Bras" with both corps, instead of with Reille's only—18,000 men,—it certainly might have been a serious affair for the Allies.

FRIDAY.—On intermediate days. Brigade instruction. This duty to be taken by regular roster.

A brigade to march in order of battle, complete in all arms, with Engineers and Field Train. On arriving at previously selected ground, the troops to be halted to encamp. One battalion to pile arms after having placed camp guards.

The second battalion to detach picquets and outposts in such directions as effectually to guard the camp, and protect it from insult.

The third battalion, in fatigue jackets, to proceed with the chief engineer to construct lines of defence, or such field-works as might, by a preconcerted plan, eventually tend to aid in the defence of an approach to the Capital. For this purpose every description of tools should be ready at hand. And if it be true that by one man one cubic yard, or twenty-seven cubic feet of earth, may be dug out in one hour, in the teaching of such for two hours at most, a large amount of useful labour might be gained, for the general defence of the country. In this way moreover the qualifications of the men might become known to their officers, and (in the division of labour) labourers, used to the spade and pickaxe, set to a suitable work; carpenters to their own branch, or to making gabions, fascines, or palisades; those unacquainted with the use of tools, to wheeling or collecting materials: all under the direction of the engineer department, and pioneers of battalions.

After a training of two hours, the brigade to be re-assembled and marched to camp. Each battalion of the whole force being thus, in turn, instructed in field works.

Premiums, or prizes, to be given to those companies and battalions, whose work should be pronounced by the chief engineer to be the best.

SATURDAY.—Grand guard mounting. March past the commanding general, with the whole force, all the bands of each brigade united.

Camp duties. Repose.

SUNDAY.—Parade for divine service.