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THE REALITY OF RELIGIOUS IDEALS

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Not the least significant fact of this great scientific age is its deep interest in religion. On the one hand, in spite of serious protests from the conservatives, science has established its right to apply the same method to the study of religion which has been of such great service in reducing the facts of other fields from chaos to order; and thus we have Comparative Religion, Higher Criticism, and the Psychology of Religion. On the other hand, attempts have been made from the philosophical side to furnish the same rationale for the ultimate religious concepts as for the scientific. The import of this has been, not to show that both sorts of ideas are ultimately equally invalid, equally lose themselves in the unknowable, as in the dark all cows are gray; but to show the legitimacy and importance of both in steering us in the direction of the real. What I am concerned with in this paper is to inquire into the validity of our religious ideals; but to do this I shall have to inquire first how any ideals become valid. If this seems a roundabout way, I still feel that it is the shortest way to reach the end in view.

The final problem which any theory of knowledge must attempt to solve is: How can ideas or concepts, which are merely structures of my mind, modifications of my brain and carried about in my head, mean or express the real nature of the world? To do justice to this problem here would be to furnish a complete system of epistemology and metaphysics. The limitation of our task makes this impossible; at most we can furnish only mere suggestions. We are concerned with the problem of knowledge in general only so far as this is involved in our more specific problem, namely, the real basis of our religious ideals. The first question, then, which we shall attempt to answer in barest outline is: How do concepts, structures in our mind, crystallize or *thicken*

into being, become objective fact? And the second, more special one, is: How does the criterion of the objectivity of concepts in general apply to the religious ideals?

One of the most suggestive things in modern philosophy is Herbert Spencer's definition of life, as "the continuous adjustment of internal relations to external relations." "We perceive that what we call intelligence shows itself when the external relations to which the internal ones are adjusted begin to be numerous, complex, and remote in time or space; that every advance in intelligence essentially consists in the establishment of more varied, more complete, and more involved adjustments; and that even the highest achievements of science are resolvable into mental relations of coexistence and sequence, so co-ordinated as exactly to tally with certain relations of coexistence and sequence that occur externally." And again: "Any assumption is justified by ascertaining that all the conclusions deducible from it correspond with the facts as directly observed; by showing the agreement between the experiences it leads us to anticipate and the actual experiences."¹ Or, as Professor James would express it: Our ideas are valid when they are "coterminous" with perception or fact. Our idea of an eclipse is true when our anticipation of it in space and time ends in the facts of the eclipse.

Life and knowledge are essentially adjustments to a larger world. The springs for such a process of adjustment must be found in human nature. Modern philosophy and psychology alike emphasize that we are essentially active or willing beings, beings with desires to be satisfied; and we are dependent upon the environment for the satisfaction of those desires. Our impulses or affections, as Butler pointed out long before Darwin and Spencer, are centrifugal; they point to objects beyond themselves for their realization; human nature as such is fragmentary, and points to a larger world for completion. Only in so far as the smaller system is adjusted to the larger system can our desires be realized. But how can the smaller system ever know anything about the larger and thus properly adjust itself?

The English empiricists from Locke down are right in emphasizing that our adjustments are the results of experience. Our

¹ First Principles, Chapter iv, The Relativity of Knowledge.

instinctive tendencies would remain at best vague and inchoate if it were not for individual experience, which serves to make them definite. It is by continuous attempts at adjustments, the fruitful adjustments surviving as exciting interest or gratifying desire while the vain ones perish, that the organism learns gradually what are the proper adjustments. It is only on the level of our ideational adjustments, however, that the question of the true and the false arises. The fruitfulness of these ideational adjustments is one evidence, at least, for their truthfulness. While not all fruitful ideas are true and not all true ideas are useful, in the long run such fruitful adjustments must be true to the character of reality. If deception and illusion worked as well in the long run as truth, science would be in vain; for falsehood is infinite, and there can be no science of falsehood. The usefulness of deception must always be for a limited purpose, due to the imperfect development or pathological condition of human nature. Just as, on the whole, pleasant things are wholesome, so, on the whole, useful ideas are true, though in either case there are temporary exceptions in the evolutionary process; in either case we must supplement experience with further experience.

What the early English empiricists neglected, in their eagerness to show that we learn by experience, was to answer the question, who am I?—to define the individual. They emphasized the part played by the environment at the expense of the individual, his tendencies and needs. The ego was to be a mere passive tablet, a piece of white paper, upon which Nature could write her sequences. This implied that the ego must be a mere nothing in fact, as Hume points out, a mere result of association, a "bundle of perceptions." But in that case there was neither any need nor any possibility of adjustment or knowledge. If the individual centres are nothing, we have a lot of nothings playing on nothings, and the environment has vanished with the individual. Thus Humean empiricism would reach its logical bankruptcy.

It was at this point that Kant took up the problem. Kant emphasized the dignity of the individual at the expense of the environment. The mass of sensations or data which are thrust upon us could present no order or meaning as such. The laws and system of the data are the work of the subject, which confronts the

environment with certain predispositions, certain ways of looking at things. It is a matter of wonder to the naïve Kant that the data conform so obediently to the order forced upon them! For *we* make the system of nature. What makes nature seem so objective is that we all agree in making it in the same way; it is a sort of social collusion. But the environment takes revenge for this violence upon it. If we insist upon making nature according to our models, she will refuse, at any rate, to tell us anything about herself, and thus leave us to the solitude of our own fancies. When Kant attempts to distinguish between empirical causal relations and causality in general as dictated by the subject, his system utterly breaks down. If particular causal relations must be ascertained through experience, what remains for the boasted category of causality to do? Thus Kant, in giving arbitrary priority to the individual subject, lost all real access to the environment.

In this dilemma the theory of knowledge remained substantially until the evolutionary movement. Both Hume and Kant emphasized important aspects of knowledge: we must learn from experience the real character of nature; and yet we can only get out of nature the meanings or laws with which we confront it. The abstract methods of Hume and Kant could not overcome this antinomy. Both neglected the problem of the genesis of knowledge, in the light of which its nature must be interpreted. The two positions can be reconciled only in a more concrete theory of the individual, which takes account of the nature of the individual as modified by history.

This history is as old as the universe in its changes of cosmic weather—for old as star-dust is mind-stuff, old as existence are ideals. True, we have no right to read the meaning of the later and more complex stages of history into the earlier and simpler ones and speak of inorganic nature in terms of will or reason, as animistic philosophers are fond of doing. It is to us, the spectators, that the simpler stages have meaning or purpose. Yet we believe that the simpler ones are continuous in one history with the more complex ones, that the whole process is obedient to one direction; and though we cannot reproduce even problematically the content or meaning of the simpler stages, we can

at any rate to some extent reproduce their external or phenomenal form. What we must emphasize is that we, as thus conditioned by race history, are subjects, conscious egos, possessing properties of our own, capable of certain habits or adjustments as regards the environment, and not the mere passive result of mechanical laws, a chance conjunction in the dance of atomic elements, whether sensational or material.

When the individual history of human organisms begins, a certain structural differentiation, as a result of the survival process of evolution, has already determined for us our general data of a world. Our sense-organs admit only of a certain kind of diversity; they are tools for picking out a certain range of data as "signs" of the energies of our environment. Not only our data, however, but our capacity for reacting, both in general and in more specific directions, has already been determined by the character of the nervous system. We start upon our brief human history with a certain temperament and endowment; but more than that, we possess an equipment of certain dispositions or tendencies, needs, or demands, which must be satisfied. In these we reap the results of past adjustments from a race history indefinitely old. And while these results are not experience, not innate ideas, they serve to economize experience. They furnish us with the warp for which individual experience must furnish the woof. They are general docilities which can be made definite by being consciously tried out.

These tendencies may be merely individual and material, such as the tendency to self-preservation, characteristic of all life, and, we might say with Spinoza, of physical things, too. Or the tendencies may lead to social satisfaction. They may be a craving for friendship, a taste for music, a feeling for consistency, a sense of right, or a yearning for the supernatural. The special adjustments or tools for the satisfaction of these tendencies have already to a large extent been provided for by the order of things into which we are born. By our tendency to imitate we become familiar with the adjustments of society, its knives and forks, its laws, its science, its religion. In the course of this imitation, which we call education, we discover our own meaning or purpose—ourselves. We contribute our own reaction or interpretation to the

past. But whether our adjustments are the result of inherited dispositions, or of imitation, or of purposive experiment, what determines the repetition or survival of an adjustment is its capacity for ministering to the needs of the individual and the race.

How far our adjustments or dispositions are *a priori*, in the sense of inherited, or are acquired within the history of the individual organism, we are not at present in a position to state, and perhaps never shall know; but one thing is certain, when we begin to be conscious of what we are doing, to reflect upon our own acts and processes, we do find ready-made a complex set of adjustments or dispositions; experience has already taken on certain forms or serial arrangements; we look for certain connections and continuities between phenomena. Hence the *a priori* categories of men like Kant and Schopenhauer. We awaken to that yearning for the wholeness of things which intoxicated Plato; we recognize certain demands for consistency and beauty, which both outstrip and set the programme for individual striving. That these adjustments or dispositions are the products of the interaction of the organism and the environment, physical and ideal, through the history of the race; that the environment has dictated to us what dispositions we must entertain to *survive*, long before our dispositions begin reflectively to dictate to nature what it shall *mean*—this is the contribution of the evolutionist movement. To supplement the empiricism of Locke and Hume, therefore, we must first recognize an instinctive structure with its tendencies, a subject capable of cumulative adjustment; and then substitute for the history of one individual experience the history of the race. In order to learn from experience, we must be equipped with mines of tendencies or interests which the energies out-side us can touch off. Nature can only become real to us as passing through human nature.

In all our adjustments, whether they are self-conscious or merely sentient, is involved trial, or experiment. Knowledge, too, starts with certain guesses, certain random efforts, spontaneous constructions—those surviving, on the whole, which issue in fruitful results. And the results become fruitful because the adjustments are made with reference to the character of reality. The organism must take account of the diversity, as well as identity,

of the environment; in other words, for the mental adjustment to become fact or to be successful, the *meant* identity or *meant* diversity must coincide with the *objective* identity or diversity of character. This aim at adjustment may be found in all stages, and may take account of a very abstract and immediate aspect of the environment or may aim at a very concrete and remote environment. Nor can we be neutral as regards reality beyond us, as we might be if we were merely bundles of perception or logic machines. We are bundles, not of perceptions, but of desires. The necessity to act in order to survive makes it impossible to be indifferent as regards our environment. And our actions imply certain beliefs with reference to the bigger world—the environment which we confront, whether we are conscious of those beliefs and whether they are those we profess or not.

How can we bring these beliefs or hypotheses to the test? How can we know whether they are the mere constructions of our brain, mere symbols, or whether they also express the character of reality? We have two ways of testing: one is a subjective way, referring to the proper functioning of our own thought; the other is objective, or refers to action. Ultimately, the two must coincide. The subjective criterion is that of consistency. Contradictory judgments cannot both be true. If I make the judgments that a house is red and that it is not red in the same respect, both judgments cannot express fact. But mere consistency does not make our ideas objective. Nor is social agreement sufficient to constitute objective fact. We can agree as to the meaning of centaurs and mermaids and a geometry of n dimensions. Yet this agreement does not constitute them objective facts. Ideas to become objective must not merely be consistent and capable of being agreed upon: they must lead to certain consequences of perception and action. If we can act *as if* a certain faith is real, if the environment responds to our action by ratifying our will, then our faith crystallizes into being and ceases to be mere faith or subjective attitude. We have hit upon the meaning, the real character, of our environment. Hence our environment responds by granting our request. Truth, finally, must be tested through the consequences in the way of conduct or procedure to which it leads—provided that we include in these both the difference which the object makes to our individual nature now and

the ratification of further experience. The latter can only come in as a proviso, necessary at any one time, owing to the finitude of human nature and the fluent character of reality. True, sometimes our response takes the form of intuitive certainty, the net result of race history; but this certainty must in the end be capable of being tested in the procedure of experience—even the golden rule and the venerable axioms of geometry.

In the degree, then, in which we can act *as if*, we have hit upon the true meaning of the environment; we can dictate to it because it has already dictated to us. Most of our guesses or faiths as regards reality are only partially responded to; we can only in part act *as if*. We can only act, perhaps, as though our faith were real for a certain abstract purpose. However, in so far as the environment responds even for the abstractest purpose, our idea or faith must embody an essential aspect of reality. Thus the atomic theory serves admirably for the grosser purposes of chemistry, while, in its classic form at least, it breaks down for certain phenomena of physics, such as electricity. Hence its truth must be regarded as partial. It does not express the whole truth of the character of the physical world; yet it does embody an essential, if abstract, aspect just in so far as we can act as if the world were made that way and get our results. If we take the ether, again, we find that for certain purposes it has been treated as a perfect fluid and for others as a perfect jelly. We have here apparent contradiction in the assumed substrate of phenomena, yet both beliefs with reference to it lead to fruitful consequences. Hence the abstract partial aspects must each have its right; and a concept must be possible that embodies both characters without contradiction. When we can form a concept, a mental construction, on which we can act consistently as if it expressed the essence or nature of reality, then this ceases to be mere belief or idea; it thickens into being, it *is* reality. Reality then conforms to our categories or ideas because these have been adjusted to it. It should be added that knowledge becomes exhaustive only when we deal with objects which are themselves meanings. Any number of people can have the reality of Hamlet.

It has been fashionable of late to speak of concepts as shorthand, merely convenient symbols, but without relation to the real world. In so far as they are mere subjective guesses, and reality

refuses to respond to them, to behave as if they were true, in so far we may speak of them as mere shorthand, mere symbols. But in so far as they become convenient, in so far as they form the basis of prediction, just so far do they cease to be mere shorthand. They must seize upon characters of reality in order to be serviceable, even though in the case of physical nature these characters are to-us-ward and do not reproduce or copy the inner reality of the process, and so do not completely thicken into being, but must be regarded as instrumental—good instruments if they work. So far as regards the real or inner nature of the environment, we must act by faith, not by sight. Our sensations as such are dependent for their character not merely upon the environment, but also upon our psychophysical organism, and at best they are but signs of what we intend. Nor can the real character of the environment be ascertained by mere thought, as Plato supposed, but by thought or creative imagination that realizes itself in action. Our ultimate clue to reality is that it behaves as if it conformed to our idea of it; when that happens, our constructive imagination must have succeeded in divining it or hitting it off, or succeeded so far as our finite limitations permit. How complex this environment shall be assumed to be, what diversity it shall possess for us, depends upon how we must regulate our conduct to obtain the satisfaction of our will. If we must act as if there were other individuals, other relatively independent centres of activity, then there *are* other individuals; and their *character* must be such as we must adjust ourselves to in order to have our expectations of them realized, in order to live properly. If we regard the physical world as mechanical, as mere means to an end, whereas we recognize human beings as ends in themselves, it is because only by distinguishing such objective values we attain the satisfaction, or good, of our will. Thus both the diversity of existence and the diversity of meaning, as regards the bigger world, are known through the differentiation of the activity of the subject, necessary in order to accomplish its end.

It is the plurality and changeability of our world that divorces truth as a mental structure from the characters of reality it means. Our meanings must readjust themselves to their changing objects or else prove false. On the other hand, truth could not mean

reality, could be nothing but mere shorthand, unless our mental structures were continuous with their environment. Here we seem to have an antinomy. Both discontinuity and continuity seem to be necessary in order to account for the nature of truth. Monism, by affirming the unity of the world as a static whole has failed to account for the relativity of truth as it attempts to express fact. Pluralism again, of the old-fashioned type, with its indifferent substances, made unity or continuity impossible, and hence made knowledge impossible. Both unity and plurality, continuity and discontinuity, must be true of the real, though under different conditions, because we must act as if they were true in order properly to adjust ourselves to the environment. Both, however, must be relative. The concrete truth must be somehow a universe of process with diversity of structure; with relatively stable centres that can interact and, in a measure, picture each other; of continuities and discontinuities according as the conditions are present or absent for connecting certain energies. If we must adjust ourselves to it as if it were such, then such it must be, even though we may not now be able to explain how it is so.

How does the above teleological criterion of being apply to the religious environment? We have seen how the mind has constructed for itself and projected a world of ideas in order to meet its environment, and said, "That art thou." In so far as its prediction has been verified and the proper adjustment thus obtained, the environment has replied, "That am I." The character we have given this environment has depended upon the needs of the soul to make itself at home in the world, to satisfy its wants. The environment again has reacted upon the adjustment and shown how far it has been adequate. Thus we have come to construct an inorganic, an organic, and a supra-organic, or psychic, environment, each of which grades of environment has proven its reality by the necessity of adjusting ourselves to it in order for the highest well-being. But in this historic process of adjustment even the psychic environment of social unity has proven inadequate without the faith in an ultimate spiritual environment which shall be the objectivity and fulfilment of our fragmentary human ideals. Thus the soul of man has built itself nobler

mansions, has constructed the ideal world of religion, even as the swallow builds herself a nest in order to feel cosier and more at home in an otherwise cold world. Now, does the religious ideal of a realized good in the world have any real basis, or is it but a fond dream? Is there any environment beyond and still higher than the supra-organic or social environment, already so difficult for us to grasp and yet so real? Man has at any rate acted upon the belief in such an unseen environment, higher than the human, and persists in doing so. Is there any justification for this?

The same criterion must be applied to the reality of the religious environment as has been applied to other kinds of environment. I can see no intrinsic difference as regards the test of religious concepts or hypotheses from the test of scientific. The former are more momentous hypotheses, to be sure, but that does not alter their verification. Science, too, is fundamentally built on faith, a faith built on very slender evidence—the faith that this Chinese puzzle of a world can be sorted and be made to fit together into a systematic whole; as religion is built upon the faith in a Power that is righteous, sympathizes with, and works for, righteousness. In any case the idea must be justified or proved by its consequences, or its ability to satisfy the needs of the individual, or at any rate the race in its progressive evolution. As we expect the scientific demand to grow more definite and articulate in the course of evolution, so we should expect the same in regard to the religious demands. If it is a great distance from Thales to modern science, so it is a long stretch from the Book of Judges to the Sermon on the Mount. In the case of science and religion alike, immediacy—whether the immediacy of perception as in science or the vaguer immediacy of instinctive feeling as in religion—must be interpreted and corrected in the light of further experience.

The question is: Is the religious environment bound up with the history of man in such a way that he must act *as if* it were real in order to attain his highest development? If the religious ideal is bound up with moral and social unity, as well as the highest individual appreciation and satisfaction; if there is no abatement of this adjustment, but, on the contrary, it increases in complexity and unity with the development of human life; if life would

be poorer without it; if, in short, the religious adjustment has proved a necessary one, in order to attain the highest and most effective life; and if materialism fails to inspire such a type of life, then the religious ideal must in some degree possess objective reality. Here, too, we have the survival of the fittest as regards beliefs; and the history of the race might be written as the history of religious beliefs. The working of the religious hypothesis must in-so-far be taken as evidence of its truthfulness, just as the working of the scientific hypothesis is in-so-far regarded as evidence of its truth. Both must be modified in the light of the requirements of further experience. The progressive usefulness in either case must prove the greater objectivity of the content. Can any one doubt the cementing influence of religious beliefs on social unities, or the heightening effect on morality of the faith in an impartial and sympathetic Spectator and Co-operator, or the association of religion with the highest in art? And as we learn to substitute more and more, in the progress of evolution, inner unity for mere mechanical coexistence, are we not progressing towards the appreciation of a higher spiritual unity, a supra-individual unity of souls greater than nations and greater than humanity; a unity which is not a mere block unity, like that of Parmenides, but a unity which embodies the end of ideal striving? If it is a fact that the religious ideal is thus essential to the highest unity and development of life, then the religious ideal can be no mere shadow projected by the imagination of man; but it becomes objective; it thickens into being. It is the ultimate constitution of the cosmos.

The mistake has been in the past of trying to express the environment of the individual and the race in merely physical or perceptual terms. This would provide no standard of fitness. It would merely record the fact of survival, and stamp that fit which does survive. We must, I think, regard the kingdom not-of-this-world as no less real than the kingdom of this world; the realm of formal demands and ideals no less real than the realm of facts and impulses. And not only must the former be as real as the latter, looked at from the point of view of existence, but the former must count for more, must legislate to the latter; the ideal environment must set the ultimate survival conditions of the natural. Else

the process can have no unity or meaning. Else no generalization would be possible. Natural science becomes as hopeless as ethics, for both involve the axiom that the cosmic process has direction, or is amenable to certain ideals.

What has been said with reference to the existence of the religious environment applies equally to its character. We cannot agree with Herbert Spencer that utter characterlessness, existence without content, is the goal of religious progress. What possible efficiency could mere empty existence have in human evolution? The same criterion which shows us *that* God is, shows us also *what* he is. The development of religion, moreover, shows more and more agreement as regards its content. All the developed religions agree in maintaining, though with different emphasis and concreteness, certain attributes as indispensable. Thus the ideal of goodness, as the supreme factor in the religious ideal, is common to all the great religions. It is evident that the more empty and vague the religious ideal is, the less effective it is; and that, on the other hand, the religious content which conduces to the most definite understanding of man's problems and contributes most to the development of man must be most objective.

We can only mention some of the most prominent characters of the religious ideal which have proved indispensable to its historic efficiency. One is the unity of the religious ideal as opposed to polytheism, the demand for one unique and final embodiment of the highest good. Furthermore, this unity must be a personal experience, not necessarily having our limitations, but capable of entering into sympathetic relations with all good strivings, as it has sufficient power to enforce its ideal. God must not be merely an impersonal constitution. Even the atheism of classical Buddhism could not be made practical until it apotheosized the founder.

Practical religion must, furthermore, identify itself with the values or norms of life primarily. In other words, the religious ideal must not be pantheistic. Only the finite can have worth. I do not see how any one can love or worship things in general, this medley of comedy and tragedy, of harmony and discord, which we call a world. Such a worship would seem possible only by killing the nerve of activity, by saying to the passing moment,

“Verweile doch, du bist so schön,” which, if we believe Faust, is equivalent to selling one’s self to the devil. However satisfying such a view may be aesthetically, it is not ethical. Pantheism is as unethical as materialism. A God that is identical with the totality of existence is helpless to redeem the world, as he is equally responsible for its sins and its virtues. Hence Christianity preaches a kingdom that is not of this world, a God of righteousness. “Be ye perfect as your Father in Heaven is perfect.” God is identified with the absolute worth or goodness of the world, not with its mere brute existence. God is just, as identified with the realm of ideals, and as such he sets survival conditions to the lower finite centres; but the God required by human experience must also be merciful, and, as such, he strives to raise our finite lives to the standard. In this love of the perfect and striving to make the finite perfect, justice is not abrogated but fulfilled. The world consists of many centres of consciousness, who must learn to imitate, and make their own, the perfect good, each in his own way. And in this lies both the tragedy and the zest of life.

The truest and most objective religious ideal, then, is that which can furnish the completest and fullest satisfaction of the demands and longings of evolving humanity. The various religions, no matter how ancient and venerable, must submit to the pragmatic test, their ability to minister to human experience in all its complexity. Religions must not appeal merely to our credulity for the miraculous. In that case the savage religions would rank at the top; for, in the absence of science, there is no limit to the miraculous. Nor must the appeal be to a mere supernatural revelation or authority. In that case Brahmanism and the old Pharisaism would rank foremost. Religions must appeal to the good sense of man; they must increase his perspective or sanity. They must enable him to think more deeply and truly; to appreciate and create greater beauty; to live more completely and fully, individually and socially. Christianity neither can nor must claim any exemption from this test of the completest ministry to human nature. With this it stands or falls, not with its ecclesiasticism or creeds. For the Sabbath was made for man, and not man for the Sabbath.

Christianity is the highest religion to us because it, as no other,

furnishes, in the simplest and completest way, that environment of the soul which satisfies and makes objective its yearning for the highest good. And inasmuch as the personality of Jesus answers all our demands for personal goodness, as no other historic individual does—fulfils them not only relatively but completely—we must acknowledge him as divine in a unique way. He is to the Western world, at any rate, the concrete universal, the beautiful life—not only individually beautiful and complete, as a work of art, but the greatest energizing power for beauty, truth, and goodness. Nor is his claim to this position waning, but ever gaining new strength in the dissolution of dogmas and the crash of creeds. And in the struggle for survival which is now going on between the Western and Eastern world, in spite of, yea from, the smoke and din of battle and secular conquest, the ideal dominion of the Galilean promises to extend itself, in the centuries to come, to the ends of the earth.