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Note on Sophocles, *O.T.* 223–235

M. Furness

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defending the rhythm given by this conjecture. Parallels are abundant, e.g.

Η 30 σήμερον ὕστερον αὐτε μαχήσονται, εἰς ὃ
κε τέκνωρ
Λ 356 εἰ με καὶ εἰς ἐνιαυτὸν ἀνώγοιτ', αὐτόθι
μῖμνεν.
ρ 479 μή σε νέοι διὰ δῶμα ἐρύσσωσ', οἳ
ἀγορεύεις.

After the appearance of νεμεσίζετο the other changes necessary to produce the tradition are easy and inevitable. The nom. plur. becomes the acc. and κε is displaced by ῥα.

The case then stands thus: the vulgate passes beyond all reasonable license of language: the emendation is after all not such as to leave the origin of the traditional text an absolute mystery. It gives the required sense and sacrifices no word of the tradition entirely save ῥα. The most serious loss is that of the hiatus licitus, a loss, if it be a loss, that the judicious may condone; I shall not myself pretend to regret the removal of that notable and popular scholastic bulwark.

In l. 259 where the digamma is neglected in Ἴλον, there seems to have been a slight transposition. The original reading was doubtless:—

ἐξ ἀνιόντ' Ἐφύρης παρὰ Ἴλοο Μερμερίδαο.

Od. 5, 343

εἶματα ταῦτ' ἀποδὸς σχεδὴν ἀνέμοισι φέρεσθαι
κάλλιπ', ἀτὰρ χεῖρεσσι νέων ἐπιμαίεο νόστου
γαίης Φαιήκων, ὅθι τοι μοῖρ' ἐστὶν ἀλύξαι.

It matters little whether we take γαίης as dependent on νόστου with Curtius and Ameis-Hentze, or as an apposition to it with Nitzsch and Giseke. Whichever construction be adopted, the difficulty of νόστου here remains unexplained and inexplicable. Νόστος can only mean 'return-home,' 'reditus in patriam.' Now the land of the Phaeacians was certainly not the home of Odysseus, nor can

he be said to return to a place, which he was just about to visit for the first time. Hence Kammer is moved to delete l. 345 altogether. This step necessarily involves the removal of ll. 358–9 also, and the result is that Ino sets our hero the impossible task of swimming all the way home. Even as it is, he swims two days and two nights to reach Phaeacia (l. 388), surely a sufficient effort. van Herwerden, who agrees with Kammer's excisions meets the difficulty by boldly displacing νόστου in favour of γαίης.

The necessity for all this textual disturbance may, I think be obviated by merely changing the terminal letters of the one word which is the source of all the trouble. I would read:—

ἀτὰρ χεῖρεσσι νέων ἐπιμαίεο νόσφι.

Ino's instructions are simply that he is to swim 'away,' 'right away,' λιπὼν τὴν σχεδὴν, cf. δ 289 τόφρα δ' ἔχ', ὅφρα σε νόσφιν ἀπήγαγε Πάλλας Ἀθήνη, where νόσφιν is virtually equivalent to λιποῦσαν τὸν ἵππον, also N. 4. But the adverbial use of νόσφι, 'away,' needs no lengthy illustration for readers of Homer.

The loss or abandonment of νόσφι here may be traced to its position immediately before γαίης producing the possibility of a misunderstanding: but if I judge rightly of my author, he did not compose his sentences with any intention of forestalling perverse misapprehension. Clearly νόσφι at the end of a line could hardly be a preposition governing a noun in the next: moreover ἐπιμαίεο has prepared us to look for a genitive, and so γαίης is sufficiently safeguarded.

It would of course be possible to take νόσφι with γαίης not as a prep. but as an adverb, equivalent to τῆς νόσφι γαίης, 'the distant land.' The objection to this is that Ino would not be likely to add this discouraging detail. Odysseus would see that for himself, as indeed he does ll. 358–9.

T. L. AGAR.

NOTE ON SOPHOCLES, *O.T.* 223–235.

ὑμῖν προφωνῶ πᾶσι Καδμείοις τάδε·
ὅστις ποθ' ὑμῶν Δάιον τὸν Λαβδάκου
κάτοιδεν ἀνδρὸς ἐκ τίνος διώλετο,
τοῦτον κελεύω πάντα σημαίνειν ἐμοί·
καὶ μὲν φοβεῖται, τοῦτίκλημ' ὑπεξέλων

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αὐτὸς καθ' αὐτοῦ· πείσεται γὰρ ἄλλο μὲν
ἀστεργές οὐδέν, γῆς δ' ἀπεισὼν ἀβλαβής·
εἰ δ' αὖ τις ἄλλον οἶδεν ἐξ ἄλλης χθονὸς
τοῦτον αὐτόχειρα, μὴ σιωπάτω· τὸ γὰρ
κέρδος τελῶ 'γὼ χὲν χάρις προσκείσεται.

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εἰ δ' αὖ σιωπήσεσθε, καὶ τις ἡ φύλον
 δέσας ἀπώσσει τοῦτος ἢ χαῖτου τόδε,
 ἀκ τῶνδε δράσω, τὰντα χρή κλίνειν ἐμοῦ. 235

There seems to be a considerable amount of difficulty about the connexion of thought in this whole passage. The outline of the sentence is:—‘Give information; if you do not, I shall, etc.’ εἰ δ' αὖ σιωπήσεσθε 233 resumes from κελύω σημαίνειν 226. But we have a considerable expansion of (A.) ‘Give information’ 223–232, and (B.) ‘if you do not give information’ 233–4; and we shall naturally compare these two parts of the sentence, to note the correspondence or non-correspondence of one with the other.

(A.) is perhaps rather complex. The clauses themselves give three distinct cases, and—by their explicit mention of motives, both against denouncing (κεῖ μὲν φοβεῖται) and for denouncing (πίσεται...ἀβλαβής, and τὸ γὰρ...προσκέσεται)—suggest an examination of motives expressed and implied.

The primary distinction is between a Theban and an alien murderer: on the hypothesis of a Theban murderer a secondary distinction is made between self-denunciation and denunciation by another.

Thus we have three cases:—

(1) A Theban murder is denounced by a Theban, other—as may naturally be assumed where nothing is said to the contrary—than himself.

(2) A Theban murderer is denounced, even—as a special case—by himself.

(3) An alien murderer is denounced—presumably by a Theban. [εἴ τις 230 may be assumed to be equivalent to *δοῖς ὑμῶν* 224.]

And the motives in each case are as follows:—

(1) No motives especially appropriate to this case are expressed or implied. Of course the general motives for denouncing are obedience to the command of Oedipus, and the desire to save Thebes. [We shall expect more particular cases to be accompanied by a special motive against denouncing, and an additional motive for.]

(2) Against: φοβεῖται 227.

For: πίσεται...ἀβλαβής 228.

(3) Against: none is expressed. [It is hard to understand why a Theban should be particularly anxious to abstain from denouncing an alien.]

For: τὸ γὰρ κέρδος...προσκέσεται 231. [τὸ κέρδος will presumably mean the usual or the expected reward. But why is this motive especially potent in this case? We can hardly assume that κέρδος and χάρις

would be absent or less in quantity in case (1).]

The second part of the whole sentence, which I have called (B.), may be more simply analysed on the same lines.

Case (1) The murderer is denounced by another man, his friend.

Case (2) The murderer is denounced by himself.

Motives, in both cases alike:—

Against: δέσας 234.

For: (in addition to the general motive) a double curse, on the murderer, and on the man who refuses to denounce him.

We are now in a position to perceive three main difficulties:—

(i.) It is hard to account satisfactorily for the distinction of cases in part (A.) of the sentence: the connexion between (2) and (1) is a not unnatural specialization; but the value of (3) as distinguished from (1) and (2) is very obscure; the distinction is not suggested by any preceding words, and the clauses dealing with the case do not themselves provide a justification.

(ii.) The motives for action in case (3) are very unintelligible.

(iii.) There is a distressing irrelevance between the cases distinguished in (A.) and those distinguished in (B.). In (A.) we have case (3) emphatically distinguished from (1) and (2), and as this distinction has not been accounted for previously we cannot help expecting that it will turn out to be of some value in the second part of the sentence; when we hear the second part we find that the distinction is completely disregarded, and—as Professor Jebb phrased it, *O.T.*₃, p. 214, l. 36,—a certain degree of discomfort attends the mental process.

These difficulties are certainly serious; and no explanation of the passage appears to avoid them. It seems indeed that we must consent to the alteration in 230 of ἄλλον to ἄλλος, explained—as ἄλλον is taken to be—by ἐξ ἄλλης χθονός. [The supposed substitution of ἄλλον for ἄλλος needs no particular explanation as an accident; or it may well be the work of some critic or actor, careless of logic but obsessed by the notion of verbal ‘irony.’ See 451.]

We may note how the three difficulties, as stated above, are thus modified.

(i.) The cases in part (A.) are now:—(1) The murderer is denounced by a Theban, (2) even though it may be by himself. (3) The murderer is denounced by an alien. Thus the distinction, made by ἄλλον, between a Theban and an alien murderer, which to a great extent obscured the value

of case (3) as opposed to the others, has now disappeared. On the other hand, the distinction made by ἄλλος between a Theban and an alien denouncer is already implicit in the passage. In 223-4 Oedipus has strongly emphasized ὑμῖν προφανῶ πᾶσι Καὶ δμείοις τάδε ὅστις ποθ' ὑμῶν κ.τ.λ. : it then occurs to him that his utterance may reach the ears of some who are not Thebans, and to such men also he speaks a word: so that ἄλλος now following this emphatic ὑμεῖς is more than intelligible—almost inevitable. ἄλλον either makes an antithesis which is unmotivated, or fails to make an antithesis where one is expected.

(ii.) The motives in (A. 3) are now perfectly clear:—

Against denouncing: Absence of the general motive *for*, appropriate to cases (1) and (2). Why should an alien be interested in saving Thebes, or anxious to oblige the Thebans' king?

For: He (no less than an ἄσπός) will be rewarded [τὸ κέρδος = the same κέρδος as in the case of an ἄσπός.] by me (though I am not his ruler), and will have in addition a standing balance of gratitude to his credit.

The word προσκείσεται gains a peculiar appropriateness by the change to ἄλλος. In the case of an ἄσπός, always on the spot, the χάρις could be realised at once: in the case of a ξένος it is allowed to remain on deposit till an opportunity for drawing on it occurs.

(iii.) If we now consider the cases distinguished in (B.) as compared with those of (A.), we find not an irrelevance nor a merely mechanical parallelism, but a more artistic and rational modification. In (A.) we distinguish a Theban denouncing the murderer, even if it is himself, from an alien denouncing the murderer. As the sentence passes into its second part, we notice in the first place—looking backwards—that this distinction has done its work; the previous emphasis on ὑμεῖς required it, and the requirement has been satisfied: in the second place—looking forwards—further reference to this distinction would be inconvenient; the already mentioned motive, which is to be mentioned again (φόβος), is irrelevant to the nationality of the denouncer; and the additional motive, which is to be mentioned now (the double curse), so far as it owes its validity to religious fear is similarly irrelevant, while so far as

it owes its validity to respect for Oedipus it is positively inapplicable to the case of an alien denouncer. [Oedipus himself refers explicitly to this limitation of his authority in the words γῆς τῆσδε 236, which should be taken not with ἄνδρα, nor with ἀπανδῶ, nor with ἐσδέχεσθαι, nor with τινά, but with the verbal notion of the whole clause, in the sense of, 'wherever my authority is recognized.'] Thus we have εἰ τις 233, with no specification of nationality, as opposed to ὅστις ὑμῶν 224 and εἰ τις ἄλλος 230.

As to the other distinction, (B. 2) is obviously equivalent to (A. 2); (B. 1) also is probably equivalent to (A. 1), for we may either take φίλον as not literally emphatic, thus understanding that no definite distinction is intended of the case in which a Theban might abstain from denouncing a murderer who was neither αὐτός nor strictly speaking φίλος, or we may assume implicitly that in the case of a murderer who was neither φίλος nor αὐτός no Theban would hesitate about denouncing. The repetition of the distinction—itself not very essential to the argument, but remaining present in the mind—between φίλον and αὐτοῦ has a value, as marking for us that the two parts of the sentence, in spite of modifications, are rhetorically treated as corresponding one to the other.

M. FURNESS.

[Mr. Furness's paper is an argumentation in favour of a somewhat neglected emendation of L. Purgold *Observationes criticae in Sophoclem*, etc. (Jena and Leipzig, 1802). The author's defence of it is as follows 'mirari subit, nulli Criticorum levem mendam observatam fuisse, quae semel cognita, statim sic corrigi poterat et debebat

εἰ δ' αὖ τις ἄλλος ἐξ ἄλλης χθονός.

Nam satis perspicue opponitur hic versus versui 228 supra ὑμῖν προφανῶ πᾶσιν Καὶ δμείοις τάδε. Deinde, quae nostrum versum sequuntur verba τὸ γὰρ κέρδος τελεῶ 'γω, χ'ῆ χάρις προσκείσεται rem certe evincunt. Thebanis enim, quippe subditis, rex, sicut facit, imperare debebat, ceteros hosce externos nisi lucro atque praemio proposito Oedipus in sententiam suam perducere non poterat.'—Ed. C.R.]