IV.—“MODERN” PSYCHOLOGY: A REFLEXION.

By J. WARD.

THE modern era generally is supposed to have begun with the fall of Constantinople, but the “modern” psychology *par excellence* was unheard of till some three or four years ago. The founder of it, though he does not belong to it, may be said to be Prof. Wundt, from whose *Physiologische Psychologie* it has got its ideas, and in whose laboratory some of its chief exponents were initiated. It is in the main an old story: the disciples “rush in” where a master “fears to tread”. Much as Locke, we can imagine, would have expostulated with the French Sensationalists and Materialists who professed to develop his teaching, so does Wundt—with exemplary moderation and temper—seek to reclaim these wayward young experimentalists, to whose doctrines the name of Psycho-physical Materialism has been given. A younger generation that has witnessed and in some degree aided the rapid advances of experimental psychology is confident—and quite naturally so—that a method that has accomplished so much can accomplish a great deal more, perhaps everything. Certain reservations in favour of metaphysics, epistemology or “transcendental psychology” are allowed, sometimes for decency’s sake, but often with obvious irony. The new and the old ways of gathering the facts of mental life, we are told, are diametrically opposed: “the old philosopher betook himself to a quiet retreat and *thought them out*, the psychologist of to-day in the laboratory carefully measures and records his experiences”. Brain-processes furnish the touchstone of truth, the solid ground of nature for the “modern” psychologist: such mind-processes as he can correlate with these, either actually or hypothetically, he accepts as fact, and any that he cannot he is ready to stigmatise as fictions or “Hilfsbegriffe,” and to relegate to metaphysics, in other words, to cast aside as druff or dreams. For I take it we may assume that the word metaphysics in this connexion is almost always used dyslogistically. The outcome is that we have the psychology of Hume reinstated. It is the triumph of Associationism.¹ Sensation, Retentive-

¹ Cf. MIND, xv. pp. 234 ff. for a jubilation thereat *à propos* unfortunately of a very indifferent performance.

ness, Association by Contiguity—these are to be our ultimate and sufficient psychological conceptions: the facts of feeling and conation are resolved into facts of sensation; and all mind-processes held to be not merely conditioned but explained by brain-processes, which they accompany as epiphenomena or “Begleiterscheinungen”. It is not so long since the world was shocked at Lange’s *mot* about a psychology without a soul, but the “modern” psychology is a psychology without even consciousness. “Content of consciousness” as much as you like, but consciousness itself, consciousness as activity, is not our affair; we leave that to metaphysics, say our “modern” teachers.

By this sort of thing Prof. Wundt has recently confessed that he is astounded and depressed.¹ His depression one can understand; but there are several considerations that might help to lessen his astonishment. These young psychologists start from the brain, and look to this for their clue. “Let us then,” says one, in a recently published textbook, “seek for what is psychical where we find it conjoined to processes of the nervous system instead of setting out from a definite division into three faculties or any other such hypothesis.” In other words: Let psychological analysis conform to brain-physiology and await its verification from this. And is Prof. Wundt’s own procedure so very different? Though he has completed the circle of the moral sciences in his writings, all the psychology he has given us is “physiological”. He, too, begins with brain and localises—to be sure in a very tentative fashion—the organ of apperception, *i.e.*, of thought and volition, before he has ascertained psychologically in what thought and volition consist. And, when he does come to treat of them, uses language concerning them that makes it difficult to conceive how there can be an organ of apperception at all. Since 1874, when the *Grundzüge* first appeared, a whole generation of psychologists has arisen, and it is not too much to say that this work of Wundt’s has been the main pabulum of the majority, and especially of those who are the busiest and most aggressive, and go down to do their work in laboratories. One has only to turn over the pages of the *Philosophische Studien* to understand the psychophysical bias that Wundt has brought about. No wonder his pupils have adjusted their minds to their psycho-physical environment: in this they have found life and movement and enthusiasm, while psychologies of an older day lie dead and

¹ *Phil. St.*, vi. p. 382.

dusty on the library shelves. But if physiological psychology is to be kept within due limits, it must be *preceded* by a psychology that is not physiological, one in which the fundamental conceptions of the science are systematically and independently ascertained. What, for example, have religious feelings or the free will controversy or metaphysical hypotheses concerning the essence of the soul to do with physiology? Yet Wundt brings them all under the same covers as squinting, nausea, and catalepsy. The contents and even the arrangement of his book remind one more of a store in the backwoods than of a scientific treatise by one who feels he can teach the world about method. One can only suppose that, as has been the case with other great works, the arrangement of the book is the history of the author's mind. At any rate it is not surprising that young psychologists eager to be "modern," and introduced to the study of mind by way of brain sections, the frog's leg and Hipp's chronoscope, should find Wundt clear only so long as his psychology is physiological, and should speak with such general contempt of his "theory of apperception".

Take his own definition of sensation: Sensations are "those states of consciousness which cannot be analysed into simpler elements". Is it not plain that, according to such a definition, feeling and volition are either sensations or complexes of sensation, or are not *states* of consciousness? But this definition, which has appeared unchanged in the last two editions of the *Grundzüge*, its author now seems disposed to amend:¹ "sensations are to be the ultimate elements of such contents of consciousness as we refer to external objects". His own usage, however, does not conform to this definition: on the contrary, it does much to justify the resolution of feeling and volition into sensational elements, of which physiological psychology can take account, *plus* a purely hypothetical conception, to which it can have nothing to say. Thus he talks of an "immediate sensation of Activity" (*Activität*), and, again, of a "sensation of spontaneity" with which is conjoined that activity (*Thätigkeit*) of consciousness that is the essential attribute of apperception or will.² Then, again, he tells us that "in all volitional activity (*Willensthätigkeit*) we have to distinguish the more or less constant phenomenal accompaniments (*Begleiterscheinungen*)

¹ In the first edition (p. 274) the pure sensation is described as "the element out of which all the other products of consciousness proceed".

² *Ethik*, p. 380.

from this essential attribute of will (*viz.*, *Thätigkeit*)". Of these phenomenal accompaniments he enumerates two classes: (1) sensations of effort or strain (*Spannungsempfindungen*), and (2) feeling.¹ The former furnish "the nearest, if not the only *measure* of the energy of our volition," while the latter, as we learn elsewhere, is "the *mode* in which apperception reacts". The following sentence is then immediately added to make this mode clearer: "Apperception depends, as we shall see, on the one hand, upon the stimuli then at work; and, on the other hand, upon the total state of consciousness, how it is made up, that is, by present impressions and prior experiences. . . . If we would describe more nearly what it is that we experience (*empfinden*) in ourselves when pleased or pained we cannot do this more concretely (*anschaulicher*) than by denoting pleasure as a straining (*streben*) after, and pain as a straining against, an object."² Now as to this measure and these directions and their determinants in consciousness—we are equal to all these, say the "modern" psychologists, but we are not equal to the outstanding activity (*Thätigkeit*) which apparently is not *in* consciousness as part of the total state, but is first affected by that, and then reacts upon it. We object to recognise as a fact of consciousness what has no assignable place in the content of consciousness. To this Wundt makes a reply which may seem to many a hopeless and complete surrender: "You refuse to recognise this 'moment' of activity which is the one essential characteristic of will, because it can't be pointed out as a self-subsistent content of consciousness that may be isolated at least *in abstracto*, as sensations may be. But manifestly this is just what the conception of activity excludes. . . . The psychologist who denies it is under the dominion of a prejudice like that of the adherents of the Aristotelian physics who opposed the Newtonian conception of gravity, because gravity only manifested itself in processes between bodies and was not an independent entity." Now it is a great point with Wundt to maintain—and in this both he and the "modern" psychologists agree—that psychology has to do with nothing but processes or events. Turning then to his parallel case of physics, it is, I presume, sound doctrine to say that magnetism, heat, and all the so-called natural forces are equally with gravity processes between bodies; and that—while the difference between one

¹ *Philosophische Studien*, vi. p. 890.

² *Grundzüge*, i.³ 585.

physical process and another is observable, is fact—force, as that which causes matter to undergo change at all, is a notion outside the facts. If Wundt's "activity" is to be understood as an activity which is generically the same in all psychical processes, then its treatment by the "modern" psychologists does *not* put them on a par with those early objectors to gravity but rather with modern objectors to force, such, *e.g.*, as Prof. Tait. Wundt's condemnation of them as "deeply sunk in the naïve substantiating of concepts" would so far seem to recoil upon himself. And this the more because Wundt in many places assimilates the conceptions of physical force and psychical activity.¹ Yet in this latest article he becomes almost pathetic as he protests how often he has had to insist that "will and apperception can have absolutely no reference save to definite internal processes somehow distinguishable from other processes by assignable characteristics". But why then does he degrade the only specific characters he can assign them to the rank of more or less constant accompaniments of the "one essential characteristic" which he cannot help setting over against "any given content of consciousness" as a process by means of which this content undergoes definite changes? The "modern" psychologist like the modern physicist elects to confine himself to the definite changes and the phenomenal accompaniments. These, he holds, are either sensations or comparable to them as being variable elements within the contents of consciousness which are somehow distinguishable.

If, then, Wundt prepared the way, why did he not follow : or if his frequent exposures of the error of it are so evident, why is he unheeded? It is a case of one of many perennial controversies in which neither side can convince the other. Unhappily this controversy has no generally recognised name. The side Wundt combats have been variously styled Sensationalists, Associationists, Presentationists. He himself proposes to call them Intellectualists on the ground that they identify feelings and volitions with cognitions. But this term, which with us denotes the opposite of Sensationalist, would certainly prove misleading. Presentationism or Associationism seem better names for a doctrine the gist of which is that all the elements of psychical life are primarily and ultimately cognitive elements, and that all the laws of their combination are reducible to

¹ Cf., *e.g.*, the section in his *Logik* (i. pp. 551 ff.) headed : "Der psychologische Kraft begriff".

association. It was Hume who first raised the issue clearly, as, *e.g.*, in the section of his *Treatise of Human Nature* in which he affects to prove that of self we have no "real idea". "The mind," he says, "is a kind of theatre, where several perceptions successively make their appearance; pass, re-pass, glide away, and mingle in an infinite variety of postures and situations. There is properly no *simplicity* in it at one time, nor *identity* in different." And lest his readers should reply: But players at least imply a stage, as impressions—to use Locke's figure—imply a *tabula rasa*, he hastens to remark: "The comparison of the theatre must not mislead us. They are the successive perceptions only, that constitute the mind; nor have we the most distant notion of the place, where these scenes are represented, or of the materials of which it is composed."¹ Now it must be acknowledged that Hume has never been conclusively refuted on psychological grounds; and, as his analysis of mind is the only one that seems to lend itself at once to physiological interpretation, there would have been nothing surprising in its present revival even if the most prominent of our living psychologists had been as pronounced in this controversy as he has been vacillating. That his inconsistency is in part unconscious only shows the difficulty of the controversy in question. A complementary inconsistency will be found in Hume and the Associationists. When Hume says: "For my part, when I enter most intimately into what I call *myself*, I always stumble on some particular perception or other. . . . I never can catch *myself* at any time without a perception, and never can observe anything but the perception," his very language, spite of himself, belies his theory. But not more than Wundt's language about sensations of spontaneity, sensations of activity, belies his.

Either side has a difficulty which the other presses home. The special difficulty of the presentationist who resolves all the facts of mind ultimately into ideas, impressions, cognita, or "contents of consciousness," as the phrase is now-a-days, consists in the agent and the activity which thought and consciousness imply. His favourite way of disposing of this difficulty is, as we have seen, to relegate it to some more fundamental science. "Modern" psychology makes a great show of system in this procedure by instituting a parallel between the subject of psychology and the substance of physics, and by insisting that psychology as a

¹ Green and Gnose's ed., vol. i. pp. 584 f.

science can deal only with events, and not with efficient causes. This very plausible assumption that psychology is a natural science co-ordinate with the rest will meet us again directly. Meanwhile, it is more to the point to notice the difficulty of those whose analysis of mind leaves them with feeling and activity as elements irreducible to cognitions, and yet part of the facts; thus making the antithesis of subject and object to be the very essence of the science. The difficulty on this side is, in some respects, the more serious of the two, for it presses immediately, and cannot be well postponed. Feeling, *i.e.*, pleasure and pain, the activity implied in consciousness (Wundt's Apperception, the Attention of many recent writers), and the subject of this feeling and activity are set off over against ideas or presentations as distinct factors or constituents of mind, and are, therefore, *so far as distinct from these*, regarded as not themselves ideas or presentations. Of course, it is admitted on all hands that these subjective factors cannot exist apart from the objective. But that does not affect the difficulty, which is that, though themselves classed apart from ideas or presentations, we are forced to admit that we have ideas or presentations of them. As it is sometimes put: we don't know them, but we know about them. But how can I know about what I don't know? Well, there is a sort of answer to this question, but it only defers the difficulty, and, in one respect, aggravates it. We know about things, so far as we know their relations—in this way we all know about the ether and the atoms; in this way the blind may know about light. Knowing these things themselves implies direct acquaintance, intuitional as distinct from conceptual knowledge. On a comparatively restricted basis of sense-acquaintance rest wide domains of scientific knowledge. "By means of data furnished in the narrow world of the senses, we may make ourselves at home in other and wider worlds, which can be traversed by the intellect alone."¹ So in like manner knowledge about feeling, attention, and the subject that acts and feels must rest, it would seem, on some direct acquaintance, even though comparatively restricted, *i.e.*, on some modicum, at least, of presentation. Moreover, this modicum must be our datum, and the wider knowledge, however scientific and stable, must be inferred from it. Having got this far, it cannot surprise us to meet the exact contrary of our first proposition employed to characterise these subjective factors: We

¹ Tyndall, quoted by G. H. Lewes, *Problems of Life and Mind*, i. p. 261.

know them, but we know nothing about them. Let us take one case as an instance—that of feeling. We frequently use this term as the very type of immediate certainty, and such immediacy and certainty seem absolute when feeling denotes being pleased or pained. That yet for all that we know nothing about it is best shown, it may be urged, by the fact that psychologists have so far been able to tell us nothing, and either, on the one side, make inferences about it from its causes, or, on the other, from its effects.

We note then two points: (1) that there must be some vagueness in the use of the word "know" when sane and reputable thinkers make such opposite statements, and (2) that in the case of feeling there must be something near akin to immediate knowledge, whether that be the most appropriate name for it or not. Even the view that expressly denies this seems to involve it by implication. Let us look at this latter point more closely first. Those who maintain that the immediacy of feeling is cognitive do so largely because they identify, or at least closely assimilate, feeling with sensation. The justification for such more or less complete identification is found in the important facts usually denoted as the feeling-tone of sensations. According to many of Wundt's statements, for example, feeling-tone is an element of the sensation along with intensity and quality. If sensation belongs to the cognitive constituents of mind, the elements of sensation must belong there too. But is this feeling-tone an element in sensation and not rather a consequent or effect of sensation? The whole of Wundt's exposition in the long chapter devoted to sensuous feeling seems to me a refutation of his original analysis, and even that is advanced with some hesitation.¹ In the main chapter he not only speaks of feeling as "an immediate affection of consciousness through sensation," and as a symptom of a *more central* process than we find in the quality and intensity of a sensory excitation; but he explains at length "the dependence of sensuous feeling on the total state of consciousness". Wundt, in short, in common with many others, recognises a difference between the immediacy of feeling and the immediacy of presentation. Such difference may be a difference of degree or a difference in kind. The prevailing opinion unquestionably is that it is only a difference of degree. This view finds expression in the familiar law first pointed out by Kant and formulated by Hamilton, *viz.*, that "knowledge and feeling, perception and sensation,

¹ *Physiologische Psychologie*, i.² p. 290.

though always co-existent, are always in the inverse ratio of each other". On the strength of this, Horwicz, and more recently Kröner, have made feeling—i.e., pleasure and pain—the fundamental fact of mind, from which definite presentations are gradually differentiated. Spite of all, there are, I believe, good grounds for the opposite view, *viz.*, that the difference as regards the immediacy between feeling and presentation is a difference of kind; that feeling is not obscure cognition nor sensation objectified feeling; that feeling, in a word, is always subjective and sensations always objective, objective of course I mean in a psychological sense. According to this view, the duality of consciousness or the antithesis of subject and object is fundamental: according to the opposite view, the difference of subject and object gradually "emerges" as the result of development or "differentiation".

We cannot further clear the ground without dislodging whatever is fixed and definite in that sand-heap of a term—consciousness. There are at least four distinctions in current use, the grounds of which we must, if possible, ascertain and explain. There is (1) the distinction of Consciousness and Self-consciousness; (2) the distinction of State of consciousness and Content of consciousness—terms which must have a different connotation even if they turn out to denote the same facts; (3) the distinction of a fact of consciousness and consciousness of a fact; and (4) the collective and the distributive use of the term consciousness. No doubt these different meanings overlap; indeed, we may find them all to arise from the first.

To begin: Is the term consciousness to be used collectively of the whole that we analyse, or distributively of each factor or element in it? When the phrase, State of consciousness is used, it seems obvious that consciousness is to be collectively understood. It cannot be exact to say that every state of consciousness consists of states of consciousness. A thing cannot be in two states at once, though its state may be more or less complex. That we do nevertheless continually find psychologists speaking of cognition and emotion and conation as both inseparable constituents of a state of consciousness and also in themselves states of consciousness, is due to the fact that but one of the three is usually prominent at a given time. Such writers first ignore the presence of the uninteresting factors and then use language which implies their absence. But when the phrase "content of consciousness" is used, since the whole content can without impropriety be regarded as made up of partial contents, the term

may be used either distributively or collectively. According to this usage, cognitions, feeling and volitions might be regarded as severally contents of consciousness, though all required to constitute one state of consciousness. We may suspect then that presentationists who confine themselves almost exclusively to the use of content attach a different meaning to consciousness from that assigned to it by those psychologists who speak freely of states of consciousness.¹ And, in consequence of this difference in signification of the fundamental term, we may suspect too that the subordinate terms, cognition, feeling and volition, are employed in a modified sense. We may possibly ascertain the precise difference we suspect if we consider the phrase "conscious of" and the cases in which it is appropriate to use it. We say, *e.g.*, I am conscious of hearing, of seeing, of feeling, of desiring, and so forth. But it is less accurate and less usual to say I am conscious of a noise, of a light, &c., unless we wish to emphasise the certainty of our subjective experience, and then the full meaning of the phrase becomes, I am conscious of hearing a noise, of seeing a light, and so forth. But now hearing a noise, seeing a light, and so on, are "facts of" consciousness; and it is because he is "conscious of" these facts of consciousness one and all that the presentationist calls them severally and together contents of consciousness. But consciousness of consciousness is what is ordinarily called reflexion, internal perception or self-consciousness. Thus it would seem that it is from the point of view of reflexion, which is the psychologist's natural standpoint, that the presentationist speaks of all his facts as "contents," rather than as constituents of conscious life. We come then to the distinction of consciousness and self-consciousness—if that may be called a distinction which as a source of confusion is perhaps without a parallel in the history of knowledge. The history of this distinction is instructive, but would detain us too long. As the terms are now used self-consciousness is but a special though an important case of cognition: it is, therefore, not a conscious state, but only the cognitive element in such a

¹ The presentationist is dominated by mechanical metaphors, or, perhaps, it would be fairer to say by those *quasi*-mechanical facts which certainly form a large part, and perhaps the clearest part, of the psychologist's domain: those for whom consciousness does not resolve into co-ordinate elements are influenced rather by the analogy of life, by teleological conceptions. For such a state of consciousness cannot have fewer constituents than conscious life as a whole, and like life is collectively used.

state. To make the state complete we must add the elements of feeling and action that pertain to this as to other psychoses.

But now we realise the fatal clumsiness of our terminology, for it is through this self-consciousness, which is but a part of cognition, that we *know* the whole consciousness to which it belongs. The whole is contained cognitively in what is but a part of itself existentially—much as a man sees himself full length through an image in his eyes. Under cover of the one term consciousness lies the problem of knowing and being in one of its most perplexing forms. Now just because it is not our business to deal with this problem we ought to be free from all temptation so to shape our phraseology as to hide it. When psychology and metaphysics were lumped together and it seemed to be but a question of taste after which of the two the combination should be called, a confusion of standpoints was inevitable.

Whatever be the ultimate conceptions to which metaphysics may lead us, our proximate conception of knowledge of every kind, the conception from which we must start, implies (1) a subject knowing and an object known, (2) a necessary dependence of the subject on the object so far as its knowing goes, and (3) no such dependence of the subject so far as its being goes. We cannot know more than there is: there may be more than we can know. All sorts of qualifications may need to be made if we rise to the supreme generality of metaphysics: absolutely unknown being, *e.g.*, may prove to be an *Unding*; but on that level to which empirical psychology ought to confine itself, at least, as much "relativity" as the above, seems unquestionable. We have next to apply this to consciousness of consciousness as a case of knowledge of being. First, as regards the distinction of subject knowing and object known, we find the sort of antinomy that is apt to characterise ultimate problems. If we identify the two we transcend our empirical conception of knowledge. A knowledge in which subject and object are one is at best but a limiting case towards which we might perhaps conceive ourselves approximating in self-consciousness, and even continuing to approximate indefinitely. But so soon as subject and object are the same, there can obviously be no dependence of the one as regards knowledge, no independence of the other as regards being. If, however, on the other hand, we regard the subject knowing as distinct from the object known; then, in order that this knowing subject may be an object known, we require a second subject or at least a higher grade of consciousness. We seem

committed not only to consciousness of consciousness but to consciousness of consciousness of consciousness, and so on indefinitely. This has been regarded as a *reductio ad absurdum* from Aristotle onwards, and has led psychologists generally, either to shirk the whole question or to incline to the alternative of absolute identity. But whatever may be our speculative preference for an absolute limit as against an indefinite regress, there is surely great force in Kant's doctrine that it is the business of science to abide by the latter. After all perhaps the regress will not be found to go very far.

And now perhaps we may look again at the duality of consciousness. For self-consciousness this duality is a fact of presentation: we are conscious of, that is, have cognition of, the subjective as well as of the objective. But this cognition does not constitute its object any more than other cognitions. What is this duality which we reflectively know? Again, in trying to answer this question we must take care not to prejudice it by raising at the same time the very distinct question: How we can know the subjective? how anything pertaining to the subject can become objective? A recent writer¹ I find foreclosing the whole inquiry by an *a priori* demonstration, that any objectivation of the subjective is *ex vi terminorum* a manifest contradiction. But this is just to repeat the confusion of the psychological and metaphysical above mentioned. A proposition may be true *secundum quid* which may or may not be true *simpliciter*.

Symbolising everything cognised or presented by O, we say (1) that O is always part and never the whole of a psychosis or state of consciousness: the remainder, the non-O constituents, we may symbolise by S, and the whole which they together constitute we may represent as S-O; the hyphen serving to indicate that each is relative to the other. The duality of consciousness is then a name for this relation S-O. The cognition of their duality in self-consciousness or reflexion would be symbolically represented as $S-\left\{ \begin{smallmatrix} S' \\ O \end{smallmatrix} \right.$, and the indefinite regress which is supposed to be the fatal absurdity of this view could be represented as a series thus: $S-O, S-\left\{ \begin{smallmatrix} S' \\ O \end{smallmatrix} \right., S-S'\left\{ \begin{smallmatrix} S'' \\ O \end{smallmatrix} \right., \&c.$

According to the doctrine that feeling is different in kind from presentation, feeling itself pertains to S and not to O, but the knowledge of feeling like all knowledge pertains to O, that

¹ Natorp, *Einleitung in die Psychologie nach kritischer Methode*.

is to say, knowledge of feeling is not possible in consciousness below the form or stage $S-\begin{smallmatrix} S \\ O \end{smallmatrix}$. Similarly of the activity said to be implied in all consciousness: that too pertains to S and not to O and is only known reflectively. And now at length we may try to face the difficulties besetting this view. What immediacy can these subjective elements have if they have not the immediacy of presentations, and if they are not known presentatively how can they be known representatively or at all? As to the first question one can only say they have that other immediacy which is necessary to the immediacy of presentation. All such terms as object, presentation, intuition, apprehension, impression, attention, involve, literally taken, a spatial immediacy, so to say. Why a relation that is actually more fundamental than spatial relations should so invariably be conceived by the help of spatial metaphor is in itself an interesting enough inquiry. But it concerns us more to note that what is prefigured is an actual relation of two distinct things and not a merely analytic distinction within one. The relation of presentation is a real relation—as much so as that of causal efficiency or reciprocal action. But whereas in these *both* the related terms are known, in the duality of consciousness, one of them is *being*, as Dr. Stirling would say. For mere consciousness what is presented, what affects, is the not-self; what reacts and feels is self, and that is not presented but ‘presented to’. Feeling and willing are being positively and in the concrete; whatever other being there may be, they are the immediate being to which known being is the immediate counterpart.¹

But now comes the question, how this feeling and active subject, thus antithetic to known being, can be itself known as feeling and active. That this inquiry is not wanting in

¹ To these statements I can see sundry objections. First, they run counter to most of the accepted definitions of sensation. In sensation, it will be urged, there is no object, no presentation of not-self: that begins, at the earliest, with perception. After the term consciousness, sensation is perhaps the most hopeless in all our psychological vocabulary. ‘Recept.’ if it had not already been appropriated to distinguish generic ideas from concepts proper, might have served to deliver us from some of the cobweb of sensation. Anyhow, as a point of method, it seems to me that presentation is the term with the prior claim to definition, and that sensation as ordinarily defined is a very problematic and tentative affair. Again, it may be said that it is all a question of words. I allow this so far as to admit that it is not a question to be settled by mere observation, introspective or other. It is a question, as Whewell would have said, of selecting and explicating the appropriate conception.

difficulty may be gathered from the diametrically opposite conclusions reached; say, for example, by Maine de Biran or Mansel and by Kant. "The one presented substance," says Mansel, "is myself." But in what way presented? "All that is presented through a sense," Kant remarks, "is in so far invariably phenomenal; and an inner sense must either be disallowed altogether, or the subject, which is its object, *can be presented only as phenomenon*, and not as it would judge of itself, if its intuition were pure self-activity, *i.e.*, intellectual. The whole difficulty lies in this: how a subject can inwardly intuit itself. But this is a difficulty besetting all theories alike."¹ In this dilemma the French Reidians and Mansel practically decide for the first alternative: they disallow an inner sense, as by Kant restricted, or at any rate identify—so far as self-consciousness goes—the sensible and intellectual intuition, which he held to be fundamentally opposed. By absolutely identifying the self-knowing and the self-known Mansel (*cf. Metaphysics*, p. 369) finds it superfluous to ask *how* a subject can intuit itself. We don't ask how A is A. Psychology with him passes over into ontology. But then, as I have already said, in such a passage there is a leap. Such duality in unity is as much a mystery as the theological trinity in unity. It stands as much apart from the relation of knowledge as the conception of a *causa sui* from the relation of cause and effect, or that of a *primum mobile* from all the working conceptions of physics. I do not say this objection is to be held altogether and finally fatal; but it is at least serious enough to justify us in trying further.

Kant chooses the other alternative, according to which the I and the Me² are not identical. But his inner sense is not only not co-ordinate with his external (though it took him a long time to see this), but it cannot with any propriety be called a sense at all.³ The advance from consciousness to self-consciousness is not by way of an extended receptivity but by way of intellectual activity. Such activity, however, must be something very different from "intellectual intuition". Our cognition of the subjective approximates to what we may call the noumenal, inasmuch as it is determined by intellectual activity; and though, like all our activity, it depends

¹ *Kritik*, 2te Aufl., Hartenstein's edn., p. 77.

² We owe to Prof. James this very convenient simplification: I = Subject Ego, Me = Object Ego.

³ On Kant's gradual discovery of this difference, see Caird, *The Critical Philosophy of Kant*, i. pp. 616 f.

on receptivity, yet it is only the manner of this receptivity, not the matter of it, with which it is concerned. It cannot then without great inaccuracy be called phenomenal, as that term is ordinarily used of things external, albeit it has the phenomenal taint, so to say, inasmuch as the strictly phenomenal is the indispensable condition of its realisation. This unique character of subjective cognition and the inexactness of the whole phraseology of inner sense is shown by any careful analysis of the consciousness of self. Sufficient merit has perhaps not yet been accorded to Berkeley in this particular, (especially when we take account of the sensational atmosphere in which he philosophised,) for so clearly discriminating between idea and notion and insisting that of self we have a notion but not an idea. How thorough and through conceptual is self-consciousness may be gathered from its dependence on social intercourse and language: the child has probably a considerable knowledge of other selves and of its own self as an object to them before it can put any meaning into the words, "I am I".

But the real problem of subjective cognition now-a-days has less to do with the notion of self than with the nature of our knowledge of the feeling and activity attributed to it. Even after the notional character of self-consciousness is admitted it could still be maintained that feeling and activity (or attention) are presentations of an inner sense.¹ But the moment this is done their generic distinction from cognitions is surrendered. On the other hand, if they are not presented they cannot be represented. It is probably quite true to say that introspection is really retrospection; but what we retrospectively observe of the subjective is not fading feeling or facts congealed to facts. It is too absurd to suppose that if feeling and activity were in "the field of presentation" at all they could be anywhere but in the focus; that we are too absorbed to regard them while they are present and only take note of them when they are gone. If the feeling agent, *i.e.*, the knower, and the known must be antithetic and distinct, and if consequently direct presentation or representation of feeling and activity are alike impossible, it seems plain that any knowledge we have of

¹ Kant, for example, who between the two editions of the *Kritik* began to see that his inner sense was only very equivocally a sense at all, did not hesitate, some ten years later, to refer the feeling of pleasure and pain to a more inner or "interior sense" (*sensus interior*), at the same time defining inner sense (*sensus internus*) as that in which the body is affected by the mind in contrast to the outer senses in which the body is affected by other bodily things.

them must be in some way constructive or mediate. What little agreement there is among psychologists seems to point that way. The advance from the stage at which the subject merely interacts feelingly with its environment to the stage at which it knows about its feeling and interaction is held to be due fundamentally to the ascertainment of relations between sensations and movements on the one side and the conception of self on the other, which conception becomes itself defined as the process goes on. And a vastly long and complicated process it is, far too long to follow here even in outline. In the course of it, no doubt, new presentations are experienced, such as the various motor adjustments depending on attention, the thrills and pangs, the glows or shivers of various emotional excitements. But there is nothing in any of these to warrant the assumption of either an inner or an interior sense. At the same time—beside the fundamental contrast of sensation and movement—the contrast between the bodily localisation of certain impressions and the external projection of others, the many invariable sequences of ideo-motor action and particularly the observation and teaching of one's fellow-men, are among the materials that make possible this shaping of one's knowledge into inner and outer, with their implication of a centre within as well as of an indefinite universe beyond. But all we know is a circumferential area having neither inner edge nor outer sharply defined or necessarily fixed. Not till this belt has acquired a certain breadth and completeness, so to say, are those relations discerned which yield this constructive knowledge of a central subject towards which or from which all the lines, as far as they are traceable, seem to radiate. Now before entirely discarding this time-honoured figure, which is perhaps not wholly inapt, it is worth one or two remarks. First, the subjective is neither to be represented as a definite sector of the ring nor yet as the inner circle of two concentric portions into which the whole sharply divides. Subjective knowledge is not in this sense more immediate than objective, nor do we obtain it by turning right away from this. Both constitute one experience, though, as said, it is only when this experience is organised beyond a certain degree of elaboration that it becomes self-revealing to the subject of it. The duality of knowing and being is not to be resolved into duality of knowledge. Again, the subject itself is, of course, not adequately conceived as a central point, though certain of its relations may be not unfitly symbolised by such a

figure; as, *e.g.*, its individuality, the contrast of activity and passivity in the incoming and outgoing radii, and perhaps that of knower and known in the opposition of centre and circumference. As regards this last, however, the figure usually resolves into the more concrete picture of the eye with its visual field, incapable of seeing itself, and seeing what is nearest to itself but indistinctly. No doubt, having made a beginning, we can go on and advance in this "thought-knowledge" about self as we advance in "thought-knowledge" about not-self. But the point is that, however far such knowledge is extended, it will not thereby become "sense-knowledge": it advances by the discernment of new relations, not by the acquisition of new sensations. If feeling and activity are presentations they must be so apart from the advance to self-consciousness; in fact, an inner sense must be primordial. And as it is nowhere denied that feeling and activity are constituents in every conscious state, we are brought practically to consider what I have ventured to call the presentationist position. It will be best to begin *de novo*, and work up from this new side to our present question as to the character of subjective knowledge.

The chief difficulty which the presentationist has to face is the implication of the conscious subject, and of its activity in consciousness. This, as we have seen, he tries to minimise by (1) transferring to what he calls the contents of consciousness everything commonly ascribed to the subject in the way of act or change, nay, even such attributes as unity and continuity; and (2) leaving to some other science to make what it can of the *form* of consciousness; generally with a certain irony, much as western learning might leave the eastern to study the *pillars* of the earth, while reserving to itself the study of gravitation. One prominent exponent of this view, by way of illustrating the mathematical rigour with which this division into content and form is intended, refers to the simile of the eye and the field of sight mentioned a little above. In actual sight the character and changes of the field depend in part at least on movements of the eye: not so with the eye of the mind. Here "it is not the eye that closes, but the objects that disappear: not the eye that variously accommodates, but the features of objects that now advance into distinctness and now retire into obscurity. It is not the eye that wanders hither and thither, but now one object is in the focus

and now another." All is determined by the objects seen, nothing by the eye that sees—except the seeing. Now it must be frankly allowed that this latest analysis of mind and the delimitation of the province of psychology that follows from it seem at first sight to promise enormous simplification, and to be besides but the logical outcome of the whole Herbartian movement. If it was a merit to reduce the multitude of faculties to the single faculty of apperception or attention, it is surely a crowning achievement to banish Faculty altogether. For, whereas faculties could at least be compared *inter se*, Faculty absolute is comparable with nothing. Again, since the special faculties were severally superseded by explanations based solely on the properties or relations of presentations themselves, we have now these alone outstanding as data for positive investigation, and the notion of subjective faculty or activity, (whether called consciousness or apperception matters not,) since it applies alike to all these data, can specially affect none. Even if anything could be known about it, empirical psychology could safely leave it aside. Psychical phenomena or presentations or "whatever there is consciousness of" can now be completely characterised by quality, intensity, duration, complexity, and serial order, and can be correlated with physical phenomena as readily as shadows with the shapes that project them. So correlated they are amenable to experiment and to measurement and mental chemistries or mental physiologies become sober realities.

Many of those who uphold this conception of psychology seem to imagine that whoever demurs to it must either cling to some unverifiable, "metaphysical" prejudice or at least deny that all psychical changes have physical concomitants. That objection may be taken on such grounds is likely enough. But there are other grounds of objection which the presentationist cannot so easily ignore. First of all he overshoots the mark: in striving to simplify psychology he really abolishes it altogether. He has pushed back the standpoint from which he set out, until physical facts and psychical facts are no longer diametrically opposed in aspect but both are brought into one view. The old distinction of inner and outer, or, as it has become now-a-days, of "concave and convex," is for him no longer absolute. By rising above the plane he finds the two standpoints can meet in one. No doubt they can; but what does rising above the plane mean? Obviously it means forsaking science for speculation, soaring into "the cloudland of metaphysics". And those presentationists who are willing to call

their doctrine materialistic tacitly admit this ; for materialism in psychology as much transcends the facts as idealism would in physics. But confining ourselves to what is directly intended, it will be enough to say that they treat the psychological standpoint as if it were essentially the same as a physical standpoint. The mistake is one of method in the larger sense : in other words, presentationism is epistemologically absurd. Now it is worth remarking by the way that, ready as these writers are to defer in general to the Theory of Knowledge, it appears never to have occurred to them to ask whether their vaunted simplification is logical in the higher sense or not. It seems to me that it is not thus far logical, however much it may commend itself as such to those who have no sense of philosophical orientation. The start is apparently made from the natural or object sciences. The chief data of these sciences come to us by way of sight or hearing or touch, and as they come are entirely disparate. Now we can perfectly well conceive the problem to arise as to the means by which these severally incomparable groups of facts might be related ; and the solution to be found in eliminating the "form" peculiar to each. So it may be supposed were obtained, first of all, Physical Optics, Physical Acoustics, &c. ; and finally General Physics. Into the former there enters nothing due to seeing or hearing, and into the latter nothing of sense at all. Now "the contents of consciousness" or presentations are a group of facts disparate with all beside. Why not proceed as before : eliminate the form of consciousness or the inner sense, and then it will be possible to correlate these objects with the rest ? Such a proposal seems on a par with projects for economising the currency by abolishing bullion altogether or for increasing the power of the lever by reducing the short arm to zero.

In one respect certainly the procedure of the psychologist and that of the physicist are alike. The material extended world is the object of the one as the individual mind is the object of the other ; and each keeps himself distinct from his object. The physicist may be colour-blind or left-handed and have his "personal equation," but none of these enter into his science ; and spite of the much greater difficulty of eliminating the personal in this sense, the psychologist is a psychologist, and not an autobiographer, only in so far as he keeps clear of it. But the physicist does more : he eliminates not only the personal but the mental altogether. So far the presentationist will agree ; and he will probably remark : Yes, our business is with the phenomena of mind as theirs is with the phenomena of matter. The remark seems clear,

but it is really confused. The word phenomenon does not mean the same thing in the two cases. There is not a genus phenomenon divisible into the two mutually exclusive species, mental and material, as the latter may be divided into optical, acoustical, and so forth. Evidently not, for—if we must needs speak of mental phenomena at all—then the physicist himself in converse with material phenomena furnishes the phenomena or rather the phenomenon of the psychologist. This brings out another point obscured by the common parallel of psychical and physical. The material world is conceived but not known as a single whole, a universe. The universe, as Kant would say, is an idea of the reason. It is left to poetry or to speculation to contemplate the universe dramatically as a concrete unfolding; for the sciences are forced to deal with it piecemeal. The phenomena of the physicist's chief generalisations are abstractions: they have no individuality, no dates, no places. His laws are like single threads in a vast tapestry, which are identified by their colour or their material. He lights upon them here and there as a patient fly might do, and thus he knows the stuffs and the texture but not the pattern, the plurality and the continuity but not the unity nor the meaning. Now, we cannot talk of mental phenomena in this wise. The mind is not stuff nor part of a general continuum. Whereas for the physicist the macrocosm is an ultimate ideal, for the psychologist the microcosm is the prime reality. He reaches his elements by analysis, not his whole by synthesis. It is not Mind, a word which in psychology is unmeaning, but the individual mind that he studies; and every fact within his range is concrete, has a date and a place. The language the physicist uses of his phenomena is generally of the form: There is this or that, *a*, *b*, *c* or *d*, and the psychologist in talking of him can say: *There is* such or such a mind. But he cannot bring out the characteristics of the psychological standpoint by saying: There are such and such presentations or feelings or movements. To this end his statements must (and always do) take the form: *He has* such and such presentations, feels thus or thus and acts in this wise or that. Now this I take it is the "form of consciousness," and to eliminate *it* is to ignore the concrete experience of the individual mind, and to abolish what is the characteristic of psychology altogether. But it is worse. Since the psychical standpoint—the standpoint, that is to say, that the psychologist studies—is the real, if not the logical, presupposition of the physical, to resolve it into the latter is tantamount to saying that there are phenomena

that appear to no one, objects that are over against nothing, presentations that are never presented : in short, in the oddest of all ways, to say that there are only things *per se*. Perhaps the presentationist may think to escape this distastefully metaphysical outcome by referring us again to the pure form of consciousness which is his "absolute presupposition". But a form that effects nothing is nothing: "There is consciousness of" differs in no assignable respect from "There is," when consciousness is completely extruded as wholly unknown from the content that is.

In fact, of course, it is not thus extruded. The so-called content of consciousness itself reveals the so-called "form". But some of our modern psychologists, satisfied, I suppose, with what they have done for this in putting it out of harm's reach, feel at liberty to explain away all the traces of it they find within the known content. In this they make common cause with the older sensationalists or associationists, whose lineal descendants they are. The blundering and incompetence of these doctrines have been so often exposed that it would be superfluous to dwell on this the second objection that may be urged on the score of method. It is here assumed that the whole of self-consciousness is knowledge, using the term widely to include, if necessary, both true and false knowledge. The mistakes and difficulties of psychological observation may suffice, if proof be wanted, to show that self-consciousness does not consist in the mere reception of presentations but in the discernment of relations : in other words, that, in the presentationist's phraseology, it consists of associative combinations of presentations ; or, as the teleologists would say, it is intellectual not sensible. Yet again, once grant the gradual building up of the conception of self, and then the fact that this conception enters into every deliverance of self-consciousness leads to the same conclusion. Self-consciousness is thus in its logical character and its psychological composition comparable with objective knowledge, using the term as widely as before. In both we can distinguish between meaning and mere psychical structure, as we can between the import of a proposition and the strokes or sounds of which it is composed. But it is obvious that we cannot analyse this structure indefinitely ; and when it ceases to be possible we have simple presentations, or what we provisionally assume to be such. Now comes the strange perversity of the presentationist. Where psychology and physics differed, *viz.*, in standpoint, he identified them ; here, where they are alike, he treats them differently. He allows the meaning to hold in objective knowledge, but

ignores everything but the etymology in subjective knowledge. The psychologist is, no doubt, in a unique position: it is part of his business to analyse to the uttermost, but it is only part. So far he is comparable to the scholar who is both phonologist and exegete in one: the presentationist would then resemble a commentator who in his zeal for thoroughness should resolve Homer into an arrangement of gutturals, dentals, labials and the like. Knowledge precedes science in psychology as elsewhere, and what we roughly call our common-sense conceptions concerning the subjective must like those concerning the objective stand or fall according as they do or do not make things intelligible. What they are made of—in the sense of psychological analysis—is then beside the question. But oddly enough the view seems to prevail that nothing is to be valid in psychology but what is sensory. The subject and subjective activity are set aside as “popular assumptions” due to our common ways of talking about mental events, or as temporary hypotheses which “modern” analysis shows to be superfluous. Popular they certainly are just as other categories or fundamental conceptions—Substance, Cause, or End, for instance. But hypotheses they are not according to any accepted meaning of the word. Before any one is entitled to dismiss them on this plea he is bound to show that he can do without them. This no presentationist, sensationalist or associationist has ever done, and I think it can be shown that he never can do it because the attempt is essentially absurd.

Let us examine for a moment one of the latest of these attempts, one that seems to have found especial favour among prominent teachers both in England and in America—I mean that of Dr. Hugo Münsterberg. The business of empirical psychology according to him is to describe the spectacle presented to some unknown, impotent, and apathetic spectator, who is to be called the subject Ego, albeit it is false to attribute personality to it. The constituents of the spectacle consist, of course, ultimately of sensations; and at first there is little to note except their promiscuous coming and going. But as all have to leave traces or memory-images behind, stable associations are gradually formed, and so the spectacle becomes one of a continual interplay between a varying environment and a comparatively fixed central group. This group is the Me, objective or personal Ego, to which it is just as false to attribute consciousness as it was to attribute personality to the subjective Ego. The Me-group is made up, first of all, of organic and

muscular sensations, and then of such memory-images as can sustain themselves without direct resuscitation by new arrivals. These free images presently constitute a fresh play within the Me; which henceforth includes a sort of pictorial Me with a pictorial environment. When things have developed thus far it continually happens that some change in the environment, such as was followed in the past by certain muscular reactions, occurs with the like result again. But now such a change leads to a rehearsal, so to say, in the pictorial sphere, of what is about to happen actually. The representation of the muscular movements arises before the actual movements have had time to supervene. The old copy thus regularly preceding the new original is taken for the cause of it. This is the process called volition. The representation of the movement is all that answers to the supposed "feeling of innervation" or sense of effort. And when it is said that certain psychical changes unaccompanied by bodily movements are due to the activity of the conscious subject this only means that such changes are accompanied, either really or ideally, by those feelings of strain that have been presented times innumerable along with bodily actions. "Where the illusion of a conscious activity, set over against the content of consciousness, arises there is really nothing for experience to lay hold of except (1) that a group of sensations of strain take up their position within the field of consciousness, and (2) that certain [other] changes in the field make themselves observable." So much for subjective activity. The case of feeling is still briefer. Those changes in the environment which the biologist and the physiologist understand to be salutary stimuli produce reflex expansions of the body; those tending to injure the organism, on the contrary, reflex contractions of the body. By such means the body is brought nearer to objects of the one class and removed further from those of the other. The sensations due to these reflexes become associated with the originating stimuli perceived at the same time and constitute for these their pleasure or pain characteristics. As the reflexes produce contrary bodily acts so these sensations have contrary qualities; and as they pertain entirely to the body, the basis of the Me, which turns towards the pleasurable and turns from the painful, the close connexion of feeling and action is manifest without more ado. In this association these sensations have nothing objective about them; indeed, they forfeit all their presentational independence and become simply an index of the "*eudæmonistic worth*" of other

sensations, so that we say that such or such "a content is apprehended with pleasure or with pain".

The first thing to ascertain concerning this exposition is whether the author has succeeded in keeping his conscious ego clear of all suspicion of meddling or interest, and in keeping his personal ego clear of all implication of consciousness. The reader's suspicions will doubtless have been aroused at two points—at the mention of "*the illusion of an activity of consciousness*," and again at the mention of "*a measure of the worth of sensations*". The conscious ego, since it is not active, ought surely to be free from *illusions* about activity, and in the personal ego, which is not conscious, it ought to be difficult to find any hint of consciousness. Given a landscape painting and a percipient confined to space of two dimensions, could the statement arise that here is the illusion of a space of three?

And what are we to make of the "hedonical worth of sensations"? The reader must kindly submit to a little more detail. First of all we are required carefully to distinguish between (1) the localised muscular sensations of advancing and withdrawing our bodies or limbs, and (2) the sensations that arise whenever such movements occur as reflexes. The former, it is allowed, are definite objects, and as such "emotionally indifferent," but the latter are "the determining measure of other objects, what is called feeling-tone". This very "modern" psychologist then proceeds to complain that "the recent lively discussions in Germany, England, and America concerning the material basis of the feelings, strictly speaking, referred always to the content of the feeling co-ordinate with sensation and never to the state itself of the subjective attitude, *viz.*, pleasure and pain". In this censure many of us will in the main concur; if not always deserved, it is deserved very often. But it is a surprise to find this Saul among the prophets. How in his theory, where all is sensation, can there be an element not co-ordinate with sensation? The laws of association may perhaps explain how a particular presentation becomes at length inseparably merged in a complex, and in that way ceases to be independent. But can they explain how such particular sensation can acquire a wholly new kind of independence and come to measure the worth of other sensations or constitute the attitude in which they are "apprehended"? And are we to assign this "subjective attitude" to the impersonal subject that passively looks on or to the unconscious Me-object that is but a group of sensations?

Receptivity at all would be as contradictory to the latter as partiality to any special content would be to the former. On these perplexing questions the following passage from Münsterberg's latest work may throw some light : " To the impersonal consciousness there is given a system of contents that differentiates—just according to the way in which it is regarded—into a physical world and an individual psychical world. It is the former from the quantitative standpoint, the latter from the qualitative. The idea of the Ego-personality also differentiates in the impersonal consciousness into this double content. How is this fundamentally diverse contemplation possible? Solely through certain contents of the impersonal consciousness, which—it must be owned—play a quite peculiar double part. For they can *either* be apprehended, like all other contents, merely as definite occurrences. Then there results a manifold of contents that are altogether co-ordinate, absolutely incommensurable and simply unlike—a system of qualities without space, without time, without degree, without substance, without cause. Or, on the other hand, those peculiar contents are *not* apprehended as independent, co-ordinate occurrences, but become for the impersonal consciousness the standard, the medium of comparison—in short, the worth of the remaining contents. They then forfeit their independent content, cease to become isolated objects of consciousness ; but the world of the remaining content thereby gains order " of various kinds. The sensations that play this peculiar double rôle are, it seems, those that arise through muscular movement or strain. " On movement mainly depends the space value ; on strain, the intensity value ; and on the products of extending and flexing, the pleasure-pain value." We are, of course, here concerned with this wonderful piece of extempore speculation only so far as it bears on this last kind of order and worth.

Now it may be safely assumed that our experience answers exclusively to the second of these worlds—the world of order and worth. The first is nothing but the presentationist hypothesis, the *ne plus ultra* of psychical atomism. Again, we have not in the first instance to deal with the statement that feeling, if it could be isolated as an independent presentation, would turn out to be one of the sensations produced by reflexes expanding or contracting the body. This the author has to prove, and he has attempted to prove it by experiments on himself. What immediately interests us is simply the ample admissions Münsterberg incidentally makes, *viz.*, that in the world of

order, pleasure and pain are never independent or isolated presentations, are not co-ordinate with sensation, and not apprehended like the other contents of consciousness; but are themselves the subjective attitude in which these contents are apprehended, are *for the impersonal consciousness* the standard of worth by which they are compared and through which the world comes to contain "gewollte, gewerthete Dinge". It interests us further to note that Münsterberg has not been able to adhere to the distinction between the conscious but impersonal and the personal but unconscious Ego with which he sets out. The very phrase "impersonal consciousness," with its implied contradistinction from personal consciousness, shows, as was maintained above, that he has identified the psychical standpoint with the point of view of knowledge in general. This is borne out by the fact that he places all kinds of order on a level: temporal, spiritual, substantial, causal values figure alongside of values that have for their standard feeling and will. Even this could be allowed if at the same time his personal Ego were endowed with a "personal consciousness," so that it could be said the world contained "*gewollte und gewerthete Dinge*" for it. But then this would resolve his "impersonal consciousness" into the psychologist at his post of knowledge, and the whole difficulty of the psychical standpoint which the psychologist contemplates from thence—all the puzzle about the I and the Me—would arise again.

"Modern" psychology then is bent—and often avows that it is bent—on reducing "all psychical life to a mere looking on at physical brain-processes"¹ from another side: its psychology is simply brain turned inside out. The anxiety to resolve feeling and activity into sensations might lead one to suppose that there was ample physiological warrant for such an enterprise. Whereas it is notorious that no psychophysical problems have produced such a crop of hypotheses or occasioned such keen controversy as have the two questions concerning the physiological concomitants of feeling and attention. And in the case of feeling, at all events, the evidence is dead against classing it as a form of sensation. No special end organs, no special nerves, no special centres have been found for feeling, spite of much zeal spent in the search. On the other hand, the prevalent teleological explanations of feeling are, so far as they go, so many refutations of the presentationist. The notion of stimulating a centripetal nerve and the notion of furthering or hindering

¹ Cf. Münsterberg, *Beiträge*, i. p. 22.

life are very far from running on all fours. Because of the difference between them, we can talk of a pleasant or painful taste or sound but not of a green taste or a yellow noise. Very similar remarks apply in the case of activity, though possibly the application is not so obvious. Had Wundt succeeded in establishing the existence of an organ of apperception *within* the brain, I for one should feel that he had so far put an end to his own theory of psychical activity and to every other. Apperception would then be on a level with walking or eating and Gassendi's *Ambulo ergo sum* as good as Descartes' *Cogito ergo sum*. So far as acts are but definite movements, so far they must involve definite structures; and so far too their psychical concomitants, when they have any, must be presentational. But a brain centre for attention is as preposterous as a special organ for life would be; and all attempts to find one have signally failed.

Psycho-physics seems to warrant us in saying that differentiation of presentations is the psychical parallel of differentiation of nervous structure, whereas psychical activity or life seems to be the concomitant of the more or less intense working or functioning of this structure, and pure feeling a function, so to say, of this function. Even in a machine we distinguish mechanical arrangement from motive power and efficiency; and in some machines the mechanical arrangement includes gauges and work-indicators which register the power and the good or bad working of the machine in action. I do not mean by this to imply any useful analogy between psychical life and a more or less automatic machine at work: but simply to illustrate by another instance the difference of category between presentations on the one hand, and conscious life, and feeling on the other. In the machine, in the organism, in mind, the fundamental conceptions are inter-dependent, in no case are they reducible to one.

It will be agreed on all hands that the theory of presentations is the one part of psychology that is comparatively clear; in which important generalisations, such as the laws of association, have been established, and in which instructive correspondences can be found with the underlying physical phenomena. The psychologist has therefore every motive to adopt presentationism, *if it is adequate to the facts*. Now I think it will be again agreed that presentationism is adequate to (say) nine-tenths of the facts, or better, perhaps, to nine-tenths of each fact. I therefore see no reason why it should not be made into a more or less independent branch of psychology, as neurology, for example, is a more or less distinct department of physiology. The mistake of the

"modern" psychologists is that they either snatch at a hasty simplification by mistaking the nine-tenths for the whole; or worse--like Münsterberg, try to bring what they can of the outstanding tenth under the common rubric, presentation, and to banish the rest from the region of the knowable altogether.

On the whole then we seem justified in concluding that presentationism is not successful in its attempt to evade the difficult question concerning the character of subjective knowledge: certainly it gives us nothing that can be called a solution of it. I hope to be allowed at an early date to take up the problem anew and independently. Meanwhile there is only space to urge one point, the perfectly unique character of this subjective knowledge. This is ignored when reflexion is regarded as co-ordinate with sensation, inner sense without outer sense; when the term "phenomenon" is applied to mental facts as it is to material facts; or when the relativity of subject to object is confused with the relativity of object to object. The position taken up by Descartes and Locke, *viz.*, that we have a clearer and more certain knowledge of our own existence than of the existence of external things, and Kant's position that internal experience is only possible through external, seem both true, although Kant maintained the second in refutation of the first. But they remain unmediated; and so long as psychical facts are referred to one unknown x just as physical facts are to another unknown x , it is difficult to see how they ever can be mediated. As with other negative terms, so with this one, "unknown"; it implies both an unknown that is knowable and an unknown of which there can neither be knowledge nor ignorance. Again, knowledge is said to be either sensible or intelligible, presentative or constructive. If so, there may be an unknown from the point of view of sense that is not an unknown from the point of view of understanding, and this unknown to sense may or may not be an unknowable for it. Now, what I am disposed to maintain is that the Ego is both an unknown and an unknowable for sense: the Non-Ego partly an unknown but not an unknowable, so far as the possibilities of sensational *rapport* are unlimited. The "I" cannot be presented to itself because it is itself: the presented, *ex vi termini*, is the other. When we pass to intelligible knowledge, we have as regards the Non-Ego that shaping, relating, in-forming of the matter of sense that constitutes phenomenal experience in the Kantian meaning of the words. In this process I am inclined to believe the subject comes to know itself intelli-

gibly; the outward advance is an inward revealing. If it be said that such knowledge, since it lacks appropriate sense-particulars, must be unreal and empty; this, I should urge, is to confound the Ego with the Non-Ego, to ignore the unique character of subjective knowledge and so far to beg the whole question. Just because the relation of subject and object is not, so to say, a commutable relation, is it reasonable to expect the knowledge of the one to differ importantly from the knowledge of the other. Phraseology like that of Hamilton's—"The Ego and the Non-Ego are given by consciousness in equal counterpoise and independence . . . in absolute coequality"¹—is mere phraseology, but very misleading. To ignore this difference seems to be the mistake of presentationism; but it must be owned as a difficulty besetting, as Kant urges, every theory alike.

¹ *Lectures on Metaphysics*, i. p. 292.