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Some Theories on Subjunctive Protasis with Indicative Apodosis

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his scientific view of causation; and here perhaps we may find a common ground for the two principal applications of the word *τύχη* which we find in his writings. *Τύχη* may mean the natural order and development of human affairs, where we cannot explain it scientifically, as in I. 4, while the same idea is better expressed by *φύσις* where we can obtain more satisfactory data for determining the nature of the causation. But *τύχη* may also be used to indicate the common changes and chances of this mortal life, where it is hopeless, and perhaps needless, to attempt to search out their causes. In the former case the word is used in a broad and quasi-philosophical sense, in the latter in a conventional and popular one: yet at the bottom of both usages there lies the idea of a limit to our knowledge of causation, which must be somehow expressed so as to be understood by the general Greek reader. Where he cannot be scientific in terminology, he does not disdain to be popular. Whether he really believed in a Divine government of the world is hard to say; but it is certain that he did not trouble himself about it where he could

dispense with it in his expositions. In ordinary chance and accident he naturally believed (if belief is the right word) like every one else; but he would leave as little space for it as possible in explaining historical events, and would have men leave as little in regulating their daily conduct. The passage already quoted from the original in the 37th book perhaps best sums up his historical attitude towards the philosophical problem. 'Those things of which it is impossible to ascertain the causes, such as a continual fall of rain, etc., may reasonably be ascribed to *ὁ θεὸς* or *ἡ τύχη*, if no cause can easily be discovered On such matters we may naturally follow the opinions of the multitude *διὰ τὴν ἀπορίαν*, and by prayers and sacrifices and oracles endeavour to ascertain what we can do to better our condition . . . *But where it is possible to discover the causes, remote and immediate* (*ἐξ ἧς καὶ δι' ἣν ἐγένετο*) *of the event in question, I do not think that in such cases we ought to have recourse to Divine agency in order to explain them.*'

W. WARDE FOWLER.

SOME THEORIES ON SUBJUNCTIVE PROTASIS WITH INDICATIVE APODOSIS.

CONDITIONAL sentences containing the subjunctive in protasis and the indicative in apodosis have long occupied the attention of grammarians. In 1884, Lillie,¹ evidently strongly influenced by the theories of Hoffmann,² attempted a solution along new lines. Briefly stated, the main points in his dissertation are as follows:

(a) We should exclude from the discussion those sentences in which the mood of the verb of the *si*-clause is not perfectly clear, e.g. when it is such a form as *dederis*; also those cases where there is a suspicion of indirect discourse. In this last category are to be included such expressions as *nisi restituerent statuas, vehementer eis minatur*, and those in which *si* approaches interrogative force (wo *si* im Sinne von 'ob' aufgefasst zu werden pflegt).

(b) In the remaining cases the subjunctive of the *si*-clause is due to the fact that that clause is logically subordinate; that is, the

indicative conclusion is an independent statement of fact, and the *si*-clause is a modifier of the nature of an afterthought—the relation between the two is merely that of *Hauptsatz* and *Nebensatz*. (Conversely, when the same mood appears in both clauses of a conditional sentence, the course of thought underlying begins with the action or state of affairs referred to in the *si*-clause, and the conclusion deals with a second action or state of affairs arising from the first; the relation of two such clauses is that of *Vordersatz* and *Nachsatz*.)³

(c) The indicative conclusion must always refer to a state of affairs (*nie ein Eintretendes, sondern stets ein Zuständliches behaupten müsse*, p. 5; *ein Zuständliches, das in seiner Allgemeinheit gelten soll*, p. 13). This peculiarity makes it possible for the indicative clause to be an independent statement though it is modified by a subjunctive *si*-clause; for the latter

¹ *Conjunctivischer Bedingungssatz bei indicativem Hauptsatz im Lateinischen*, Berlin, 1884.

² See his footnotes, *l.c.* pp. 4, 7, and 16.

³ The only exception to this rule allowed seems to be in sentences that are contrary to fact; see *l.c.* p. 12.

merely calls attention to specific cases that help to make good this generalizing statement of fact. According to the nature of the proof afforded by the *si*-clause, the sentences in question may be thus classified:

- I. *Förderndes* (favouring circumstances prove the rule).
- II. *Hinderndes* (the rule holds even under adverse circumstances).
- III. *Ausnahmen* (the exception proves the rule).
- IV. *Aufhebendes* (in special cases the proof is lacking).

(d) In every case the indicative statement is pregnant, *i.e.* it has a sort of double value. Generally it is an independent statement of fact primarily, yet it contains or suggests a conditioned statement that is presumably the proper apodosis of the conditioning clause. Sometimes, however, the reverse is true—the indicative is primarily a conditioned statement, and it is left to the hearer to understand the unconditioned.¹

In passing judgment on the merits of this theory we may start with (b)—the claim that when the underlying thought begins with the condition, the same mood is found in both clauses of a conditional sentence; and that the subjunctive *si*-clause with indicative conclusion is a phenomenon due to the fact that the thought of the indicative clause is antecedent, the *si*-clause being the expression of an afterthought and logically dependent.² Such a sweeping principle as this would seem to call for a careful demonstration, but on page 4 there appears the only clearly stated argument to prove its soundness. There we are told that, as the material is brought together, one is impressed with the brevity and unimportance of many of the *si*-clauses that contain the present subjunctive and are accompanied by an indicative conclusion. Such examples are cited as *si opus sit*, *si velint*, *si cupias* and *si roges*, and it is remarked that a mere adverbial rendering would in some cases be sufficient, *e.g.* *womöglich, nötigenfalls*. Such brevity and unimportance is taken to be an indication that these subjunctive *si*-clauses are mere subordinate modifiers of independent state-

ments, being of the nature of tags or afterthoughts. But far from supporting Lillie's position, this argument might easily be used to break down the very distinction that he is trying to establish. For if the phrases quoted above are short and unimportant, what of the following indicative *si*-clauses taken from Plautus? *Aul.* 771, *si otiumst*; *Bacch.* 99, *si lubet*; *M.G.* 972, *si illa volt*; *Amph.* 1051, *si volent*; *Asin.* 597, *si voles*; *Poen.* 778, *siquid refert*; *Men.* 557, *si potero*; *Asin.* 373 (and often), *si sapias*; *Ep.* 507, *si scis*. If the being short and unimportant proves that a *si*-clause is logically dependent, apparently the proper conclusion to draw is that logically dependent *si*-clauses are found as well in sentences that have the same mood in both clauses as in those where the mood varies. What other support he had for his theory is not definitely stated, but it is hinted that the argument above advanced is only a part of the proof. Possibly he has in mind the confirmation of his view that he finds in applying the same to the interpretation of individual examples. This, however, is not a very cogent argument, especially when the interpretations are as strange as those in this dissertation.

It is of course true that the thought of some conditional sentences begins with the *si*-clause, while in others the conclusion precedes logically. In a purely psychological investigation³ I have tried to describe in detail the difference in the thought underlying a conditional sentence according as it is the idea of the protasis or apodosis that occurs first to the mind, assigning the name Consequence Period when the thought of the protasis is antecedent, and Proviso Period when the reverse is true. But Lillie's contention that the thought underlying every conditional sentence with the same mood in both clauses is a Consequence Period, while that underlying sentences with subjunctive *si*-clause and indicative conclusion is a Proviso Period cannot be so readily granted. Certainly, as shown above, he has his case still to prove; and the proof of the same will be no easy matter.

For, in the first place, he must ask us to interpret in one way the sentence in which stands the short and unimportant (*e.g.*) *si velint*, and in exactly the opposite way the sentence in which appears the equally short and unimportant (*e.g.*) *si volent*. Further take such examples as

Plaut. *Asin.* 12;

Asinariam volt esse, si per vos licet.

³ *Amer. Jour. Phil.* xxiv. pp. 25 ff.

¹ But it is not explained why in such a case we do not find the same mood in both clauses.

² The words 'logically dependent' are intended as a mere paraphrase of 'being the expression of an afterthought'; *i.e.* the point of view is the *intention of the speaker*, and the order in which thoughts rise in his mind. In this way the words 'logical' and 'logically' are to be interpreted throughout the remainder of this paper. That this was Lillie's point of view appears clearly on p. 12 of his dissertation.

Plaut. *Men.* 1030 ;

Iubeo hercle, siquid imperist in te mihi.

The mood being the same in both clauses of these sentences, the underlying thought should be of the Consequence order according to the theory discussed. But how in the nature of things could the thought of (e.g.) *si per vos licet* be antecedent? Compare also Plaut. *Amph.* 1006, *Asin.* 373, *Bacch.* 766, *Capt.* 209, *Curc.* 328, *Ep.* 449, *M. G.* 1149, *Poen.* 675, *Ps.* 723, 1261, 1325. It is often difficult and sometimes impossible to tell whether the thought of a given conditional sentence is of the Consequence or the Proviso order, but in this list of sentences with the same mood in both clauses almost every reader will find one or more examples to add to *Asin.* 12 and *Men.* 1030 as cases in which the thought of an indicative *si*-clause cannot be antecedent. Such examples seem to show conclusively that the logical dependence of a *si*-clause does not necessarily affect the mood of the verb in that clause, and that some other theory must be sought to explain the phenomenon of subjunctive *si*-clause with indicative conclusion.

Not only does Lillie's theory thus seem to break down at once when put to a practical test, but it is also lacking in antecedent probability. For why should the Proviso Period force a variation in the mood of the verb in the *si*-clause of the sentence through which it finds expression? If my analysis (*l.c.* p. 27 ff.) of the two orders of conditional thought is correct, the difference between them may be illustrated as follows. Suppose I should say, 'I expect to do thus and so'; my friend who sees the outcome of the projected action may reply

'If you do that, you will be hurt.'

This sentence is the expression of a Consequence Period, the thought of the condition being antecedent. On the other hand, suppose that I am invited by my friend to accompany him somewhere. I am inclined to accept the invitation, but am overtaken by the thought of a possible hindering circumstance, e.g. that it may rain. I might then reply

'I will come, if it does not rain.'

This sentence illustrates the Proviso Period, the apodosis expressing the beginning of the train of thought. The marked difference in function between these two illustrative sentences is that the second carries with it an implication; i.e., when I say 'I will

come, if it does not rain," I imply 'otherwise not.' Such implication will be found to be lacking in the other sentence.¹ I can see nothing either in the implication that goes with the Proviso Period or in the fact that the apodosis is logically antecedent to lead us to expect any peculiarity in the mood of the conditioning clause.²

It is true that rarely in the Proviso Period the possible hindering circumstance is so slow in occurring to the mind that the speaker begins his sentence as an independent statement, not expecting the turn his thought will take. Thus, in the example cited above, I might get as far as 'I will come,' intending these words as an unconditional acceptance of the invitation; but overtaken at that point by the thought of possible rain, the idea 'my going' at once becomes contingent in my mind, and if I should represent fully in speech my course of thought, the result would be as follows:

'I will come; or rather, I will come, if it does not rain.'

In this sentence the repetition of 'I will come' is no mere tautology, for the first is an unconditional acceptance and forms a complete sentence, and its tone therefore varies somewhat from that of the second. This will become clear if the sentence be read aloud. In such a case as this we are usually careless enough to allow the first 'I will come' to do duty for both, and though it has been spoken in the tone of an unconditional acceptance we append our condition to it, sometimes interposing a saving phrase; e.g.,

'I will come;—that is, if it does not rain.'

Here of course there is a chance for a variation in the mood of the *si*-clause; that matter would be determined by the laws that govern the mood of the verbs in *si*-clauses generally. Any such variation would be due to the fact that we are putting together clauses that properly belong to different sentences, and not at all really to the fact that the underlying conditional thought is a Proviso Period. Even in such extreme cases as this Lillie could find no conclusive proof of the truth of his theory.

¹ This point is explained in detail, *l.c.* pp. 31 ff.

² Some perhaps would not so readily grant this; any such are referred to the demonstration just given that Lillie's theory will not stand a practical test, whatever the antecedent probability of its correctness. Though no variation of mood is to be expected when the underlying thought is a Proviso Period, there is often doubtless a variation in the tone of voice.

These extreme cases are naturally most common in the offhand speech of everyday life; a stenographer might catch them here and there, but we should hardly expect to find many in the language of a studied composition. That they are not of frequent occurrence in the material with which Lillie is working is shown clearly by the fact that the protasis often precedes the indicative conclusion. If there are any such there, his description of the indicative clause as an independent statement of fact would be in a sense correct as applied to them. But it is not true of the conditional sentence generally through which a Proviso Period is expressed; for the thought period is usually complete before we begin to speak, and the interdependence of clauses is not a whit less close when I say

'I will come, if it does not rain'

than when my friend says

'If you do that, you will be hurt.'

The classification offered by Lillie (c) may be more briefly treated. Of his four classes the two last (*Ausnahmen* and *Aufhebendes*) are very insignificant numerically, and the real effect of the classification is hardly more than the making of two large groups (*Förderndes* and *Hinderndes*), i.e., those examples in which *si* is used with concessive force are drawn off into a class by themselves. This I think is the one point of value in the classification; the remainder seems to be a flagrant case of fitting facts to a theory. The theory is that, in every sentence of the class under discussion, the *si*-clause by its reference to concrete cases somehow supports the truth of the apodosis. Now this can happen naturally only when the apodosis is of the nature of a generalizing statement; hence we are told (p. 5) that it must always be such, and that, accordingly, the present and the imperfect tenses are the only ones properly used, the (frequently occurring) future and other tenses needing a special dispensation (p. 14). The violent handling of individual examples to make them fit the theory is well illustrated by the treatment of Cic. *Cato Maior* 7, 21, which is explained in detail (p. 5). As punctuated here it reads

At memoria minuitur, credo, nisi eam exerceas.

The interpretation is that the first clause is the unconditioned expression of a general truth—the memory is doomed (in every case) to fail; the conditioning clause produces

evidence of the validity of the preceding proposition by citing a case where this happens, i.e., when people neglect to use their memories.

The last point (d) mentioned in the summary at the beginning, namely that the indicative conclusion is a pregnant expression, is interesting and important. It is stated more clearly elsewhere, and will be considered later.

Following Lillie came Blase with a paper on the present subjunctive in conditional sentences.¹ His material is divided into three groups according to mood and tense; the sentences that go to make up these groups may be represented by typical formulae, namely *si sit—sit*, *si sit—est*, and *si sit—erit*. The sentences of the last two forms are of interest for the present discussion, and Blase devotes the first pages of his paper to an examination and rejection of all previous theories to explain the phenomenon of subjunctive *si*-clause with indicative apodosis. His own suggestion is particularly unsatisfying—that in all such cases it is the subjunctive of the *si*-clause (and not the indicative of the conclusion) that should be made the basis of the explanation of the form of the sentence, and that this subjunctive (just as in the form *si sit—sit*) must be justified by deriving it from some independent (paratactic?) use of that mood. I say that this suggestion is very unsatisfying, for what proof is there that the speaker or writer of hypotactic *si*-clauses which contain the subjunctive felt any conscious connection between the use of the mood there and its use to express e.g. jussive or optative ideas?² As a matter of fact it has yet to be proved that subjunctive *si*-clauses are even derived originally from such uses in parataxis. It is certainly much more practical to try to find some peculiarity of meaning in these sentences made up of subjunctive *si*-clause and indicative conclusion—a peculiarity of which the speaker was duly conscious—to serve as an explanation of the peculiarity of form. Other investigators have not despaired of finding a way out in this direction.

The rest of Blase's paper is given over to a most interesting and important demonstration of the gradual retreat of the form *si sit—sit* before the advance of the forms *si sit—est* and *si sit—erit*. With this historical

¹ 'Der Konjunktiv des Präsens im Bedingungssatze,' *Wölflin's Archiv*, ix. p. 17 ff.

² Delbrück's concessions along this line in his latest utterances are very significant. See *Neue Jahrbücher*, v. (1902), p. 317 ff.

development we are not at present concerned. We should like to know rather what is the difference in meaning between e.g. *si sit—erit* and *si sit—sit* when they are used by the same author.

Lebreton,¹ who confines his investigation to the writings of Cicero, quite dissents from the treatment by Blase of the sentences of the forms *si sit—est* and *si sit—erit* in his author. He would make at least four subdivisions on the basis of meaning:

(a) When the subject of the verb of the *si*-clause is the indefinite second singular. Blase (*l.c.* p. 20) strenuously objects to looking for an explanation of the subjunctive in this circumstance, because the indicative and imperative sometimes also have the indefinite second singular as their subject. Lebreton's answer is that when the indicative (rather than the subjunctive) is used the speaker singles out and envisages an unnamed individual, and that there are many cases almost impossible of explanation unless we accept this distinction. Whatever the estimate we may place on this criterion of the use of the indicative and the subjunctive, and despite the persistent effort to discredit any explanation of the use of the subjunctive on the basis of its indefinite subject,² we may well feel that here is a phenomenon that will bear further investigation, especially in view of the very widely extended use of the subjunctive in all sorts of dependent clauses in which the subject is the indefinite second singular.

(b) When *si* is concessive. This class was noted above in the discussion of Lillie's views. Lebreton further notes that the adversative relation between the clauses allows the indicative conclusion to remain an independent statement of fact; e.g., '(Even) if he does his worst, I will go.' Here 'my going' is not conditioned on the 'if'-clause—I am going anyway, even under adverse circumstances.

(c) When the verb of the conclusion is one of possibility or necessity. Lebreton regards this use as 'an illogical extension of the syntax of independent sentences,' i.e., of the use of (e.g.) *possum* where the English idiom calls for 'I could,' and French use the conditional mood (cf. p. 279).

(d) When no peculiarity of meaning is easily discerned (see table p. 364).

Lodge³ takes up the old question, but with special reference to the use of indicative forms in the apodoses of conditional sentences contrary to fact. He passes judgment rather hastily on the work of Lillie and Blase, inclining to support the former. For he says, *si* has to a certain extent the effect of a subordinating particle in the semi-interrogative construction after verbs of Trial and Expectation, being there paralleled by *ut*- and *dum*-constructions; hence Lillie is right in claiming that some *si*-clauses are logically dependent, though he is mistaken in trying to explain all cases of subjunctive *si*-clause with indicative conclusion in this way. But this really misses Lillie's meaning; for he expressly states that he excludes from the discussion all such cases as this (wo *si* im Sinne von 'ob' aufgefasst zu werden pflegt, p. 3). Consequently we must judge of Lillie's theory in its application to the remaining sentences that exhibit the peculiar modal use under discussion. I have tried to show that it breaks down when so applied, and Blase's rejection of the theory (*l.c.* p. 21 ff.) seems abundantly justified.

However, these opening remarks of Lodge are not without interest for the present discussion. For they call attention to the possibility that, in certain cases, *si* may be used where the thought would find more natural and exact expression through a conjunction of another kind. If in this way *si* should usurp the function of (e.g.) an interrogative word in an indirect question, we should have at hand a ready explanation for the presence of a subjunctive in that clause, whatever the mood of the verb in the conclusion. I do not think, however, that Lodge meant that any such application of his remark should be made; rather he seems to feel that, in attacking the problem of subjunctive *si*-clause with indicative conclusion, we should bend our energies to an explanation of the indicative conclusion, not of the subjunctive *si*-clause.

In setting forth his view, the sentences that employ the present subjunctive are first considered, the theory evolved for them being then applied to the sentences that contain the secondary tenses of that mood. The theory for the present subjunctive may be summed up as follows:

(a) A normal ideal conditional sentence consists of two members both of which refer to the future. Normal then would be (with

¹ *Études sur la langue et la grammaire de Cicéron*, Paris, 1901, pp. 349 ff.

² See Greenough, *Trans. Amer. Phil. Assoc.* ii. (1871), p. 161, and references in Blase, *l.c.* pp. 19 and 20.

³ *On the Theory of the Ideal Condition in Latin*, *Studies in honour of B. L. Gildersleeve*, Baltimore, 1902, pp. 253 ff.

others) the two forms *si sit—sit* and *si sit—erit*.

(b) The form *si sit—est* may be called the 'spurious' form. Its justification consists in the fact that the present indicative of the conclusion is always a verb with a future outlook (e.g., *possum*, *expecto*, etc.). Though these present indicative forms are primarily mere statements of an attitude or tendency to act, still their future outlook enables them to imply a proper apodosis for a subjunctive *si*-clause (which, according to Lodge's theory, always refers to the future).

(c) We may classify sentences of this form according to the kind of verb in the indicative conclusion, each kind of verb, in its own way, possessing a future outlook.

- (1) Verbs of Trial and Expectation.
- (2) Verbs of Possibility, Power, Obligation, and Necessity.
- (3) The Active and Passive Periphrastic.
- (4) Any word or phrase that looks toward the future.
- (5) The present tense denoting progress.
- (6) A number of uses like *longum est*, *par est*, *aequum est*.

In Lodge's theory perhaps the most valuable feature is the elaboration of Lilie's suggestion that the indicative conclusion is a pregnant expression. I should hesitate to claim for this principle such a wide scope of application as either Lilie or Lodge. Yet in certain cases it may be very properly applied, though I can fancy Blase again saying 'so wird hier nur die alte Ellipsentheorie zu neuem Leben erweckt' (*l.c.* p. 21). Since neither of its advocates explains this point in detail, I may illustrate by the use of two concessive contrary to fact sentences.

Cic. Cat. Mai. 11. 38 :

..... affero res multum et diu cogitatas easque tueor animi, non corporis viribus. Quas si exsequi nequirem, tamen me lectulus meus oblectaret, ea ipsa cogitantem, quae...

In such a sentence as this, the apodosis states what would be true under changed circumstances, and implies that the same thing is true under the present circumstances, i.e. *oblectaret* not only means 'would delight me,' but it also clearly implies 'does delight me.' This may perhaps be called the normal procedure; sometimes it is reversed.

Cic. Lael. 27, 104 :

Sed nec illa exstincta sunt alunturque potius et augentur cogitatione et memoria mea, et si illis plane orbatus essem, magnum tamen affert mihi aetas ipsa solacium.

Here the speaker chooses to state outright the existing state of affairs (*affert*), leaving it to the hearer to infer that the same state of affairs would continue under changed circumstances—an inference which the mood and tense of the verb in the protasis render easy. This second example may serve to illustrate how an indicative conclusion can be a pregnant expression (Lilie), or imply an apodosis (Lodge). I can see no valid reason for trying to discredit this method of explanation; it is very probable that many sentences of the form *si sit—est* are to be treated in this way, especially those in which the verb of the conclusion is *possum*, *debeo*, or other like expression.

The remainder of Lodge's treatment of the present subjunctive is less helpful for the present discussion, partly doubtless because of the brevity of his paper, partly too, I think, because this part of his article is but a stepping-stone to the theory for the secondary tenses of the subjunctive. To explain the use of the latter as future from a point in the past originally,¹ he has felt it desirable to claim a reference to the future for all cases of the form *si sit—sit*, *si sit—erit*, and *si sit—est*. This fancied necessity for finding some kind of future reference in all cases has reacted unfavourably for the purposes of the present investigation. For, satisfied with the future reference of the form *si sit—erit*, Lodge has been content to rank it as 'normal'² along with *si sit—sit*, certainly at least implying that the first named form calls for no explanation. Again, to secure the future reference, it has been necessary to assume

¹ The implied evolution of a specific contrary to fact construction through this use of the secondary tenses of the subjunctive to express a future from a point in the past would be more convincing if it should be first shown that the latter use antedates the employment of the imperfect subjunctive for the present contrary to fact; certainly the frequent occurrence of such a use is late rather than early (see *Class. Rev.* xv. p. 51 ff.), and already in Plautus about one fourth of the present contrary to fact sentences are using the imperfect subjunctive (*Amer. Jour. Phil.* xxii. p. 316).

² I cannot pass unchallenged Lodge's surprising statement (*l.c.* p. 256) that a normal ideal conditional period consists of two members of which 'one is not the complement of the other nor is it dependent on the other.' Though they were otherwise applied by him, the words of Blase (*l.c.* p. 20) are none too emphatic for this situation: 'Eine solche Unabhängigkeit ist bei einer regelrechten Bedingungsperiode einfach nicht möglich, da ihre Eigentümlichkeit gerade auf der gegenseitigen Abhängigkeit der beiden Satzglieder beruht.' In the same paragraph the phrase 'a premiss in the form of a wish' is at least misleading.

that, in the form *si sit—est*, the verb of the conclusion always has a future outlook. But when the *si*-clause is concessive or has for its subject the indefinite second singular, there are plenty of cases of this form in which the indicative of the conclusion has no future outlook;¹ such future outlook would be really undesirable, for the subjunctive of the accompanying *si*-clause does not refer to the future either (see examples in Lebreton pp. 354 ff.). Finally, the possibility does not seem to be recognized that the explanation of the form *si sit—est* should be based, in some cases, not on the indicative of the conclusion, but on the subjunctive of the *si*-clause.

After looking at the subject in hand from all sides, it is hard to resist the conclusion that Lebreton is right in insisting on a subdivision according to meaning, and that the proper mode of procedure is to seek an explanation for subjunctive *si*-clause with indicative apodosis along the line of the functional differences thus brought out; and further, since these functional differences are very marked, that we should expect the correct explanation not to be the same in every case, being prepared, if necessary, to make now the subjunctive *si*-clause, now the indicative conclusion the basis of explanation. In closing this paper I may therefore enumerate various functional classes in which we may perhaps hope to find some light shed on the problem of subjunctive *si*-clause with indicative conclusion.

(1) In apodosis such verbs as *expecto, viso* (Expectation, Trial).

(2) In apodosis such verbs as *possum, debeo* (Ability, Necessity).

(3) *Si*-clause is concessive.

(4) Subject of the verb of the *si*-clause is the indefinite second singular.

(5) Disjointed combinations arising from a shift of the point of view of the speaker.

(6) Sentences possessing no obvious peculiarity of meaning.

To recognize the cases that employ the secondary tenses of the subjunctive, we may add

(7) *Si*-clause refers to a future from a point in the past.

(8) Sentence is contrary to fact.

It is quite possible that still other classes might be added with profit. How some of the above classes may be utilized for the

solution of the problem in hand has already been indicated, though it does not really fall within the province of this paper to go into that matter very deeply. One word I would add however with reference to class (6). Lebreton seems to find a few cases falling under that heading among the sentences of both the form *si sit—erit* and *si sit—est*. To dispose of such examples satisfactorily it may be necessary to answer the very difficult question What, at bottom, is the essential difference of meaning between *si sit* and *si erit*? Or, to put the question in terms of a time-honoured controversy, What is the distinction in meaning between *si sit—sit* and *si erit—erit*? My suggestion with reference to this question, if it be raised, is that we need not go back to original or fundamental meanings of the indicative and the subjunctive for an explanation;² for the Roman speaker had no such consciousness and was influenced by no such consideration.³ Whatever the distinction was, we may be sure that it was not abstract—rather it was of a common practical sort. The Transactions of the early meetings of

² Here again it is difficult to allow Lodge's statement to pass unchallenged. He bases his whole theory on the original force of the subjunctive (*l.c.* p. 255). This original force, he says, must have been futurity and nothing else; for it is generally agreed that the I.E. force of the subjunctive was futurity, and this was the case of the optative also (cf. Goodwin, *Greek Moods and Tenses*, Appendix I). Though, as above noted, this question need not be raised, since it has been raised, we are perhaps justified in asking for a little more information about the exact meaning of this statement. For if in the I.E. period future indicative, subjunctive, and optative forms all expressed mere futurity, how were *e.g.* wish and exhortation expressed? There is a serious difficulty here, for that such ideas were expressed cannot be doubted, and it is just as certain that the verb-forms through which they were expressed were *ipso facto* the expression of wish and exhortation. In view of Lodge's confidence in the strength of the position he takes, it may not be out of place to call attention to the fact that a small (but, I hope, respectable) minority of scholars hold an altogether different theory with reference to early modal usage.

In the same passage, while trying to show that all the uses of the Latin subjunctive betray this assumed original force, Lodge passes unnoticed those cases in which the *si*-clause is concessive or the subject of the verb is the indefinite second singular. To these might be added the use of the present subjunctive in early Latin for the present contrary to fact; for here there is no more future force than there is when the imperfect subjunctive is so used (*e.g.*) in Cicero; cf. *Class. Rev.* xv. p. 51 ff. The statement in the Gildersleeve-Lodge Grammar, 596 Rem. 1, is very misleading on this point.

³ See again Delbrück, *Neue Jahr.* v. p. 325: 'In den Einzelsprachen findet sich nicht als einzelne Gebrauchstypen bei denen der Sinn des Kasus sich ganz aus der Situation zu ergeben scheint. Von einer Grundbedeutung des Kasus hat der Sprechende nicht das geringste Bewusstsein' (italics mine).

¹ Lodge does not notice these classes, but even among those he does recognize he admits that the future outlook is not always obvious (*l.c.* p. 257, class 6); the same might be said of some of the sentences quoted under (4).

the American Philological Association contain much literature on the subject. One of the most interesting contributions—that of C. D. Morris¹—has received less attention

¹ Vol vi. (1875), p. 44 ff.

than it deserves. Whatever we may think of the detail, its method is certainly sane and suggestive.

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THE LATIN SAPPHIC.

WE may represent what was presumably the rhythm of the Greek sapphic thus:

π ο ι - κ ι - λ ο θ ρ ο ν' ἀ - θ α ν α τ' Ἀ φ - ρ ο - δ ι - τ α

where the time taken by each bar is equal, though the third bar is divided between a long and two shorts, and the fifth bar between two longs.

Again, we may represent the modern English rhythm of the sapphic thus:

which is approximately the rhythm of Fleming's music to *Integer vitae*, and of 'Needy knife-grinder.'

The differences between these two rhythms are three:

(1) There is a change from what is in the main triple time to 'common' or duple time. I say 'in the main,' for the effect of triple time is broken by bars 3 and 5.

(2) There is a change from 5-bar rhythm to 4-bar rhythm.

(3) The stress in the English rhythm comes on the fourth and sixth syllables instead of on the fifth and seventh.

These differences deserve separate attention; and when we have determined the causes of each, we may be able to see to what extent they were produced or furthered by Horace himself, and so finally to form some idea of the Latin sapphic as conceived by Horace, between its Greek parent on the one hand and its English (degenerate) offspring on the other.

(1) The first change was due in the main to the genius of the Latin language itself, which did not easily accommodate itself to triple-time rhythms. The Roman sense of time in speech was not so delicate as the Greek, and perhaps the triple time was felt too tripping for the dignity of Roman speech. Horace however clearly aided the change by consistently putting a long syllable in the fourth place. Before him Catullus

has shown a distinct preference for a long syllable in that place, as in his two sapphic poems he has only three lines beginning

- - - - -
 (2) The second change was due to the desire for an easier and more symmetrical rhythm, and naturally came about when lyrics were read rather than sung. In the case of the sapphic it was helped on by the change of accent (to be next discussed); but in this respect a similar effect has overtaken two other nearly allied Greek lyric metres.

(a) The Alcaic line, originally

θ ε λ ω τ ι φ ε ι - π η ν ἀ λ λ α μ ε κ ω λ υ - ε ι (5 bars)

has become

O mighty-mouthed inventor of harmonies;

(β) the 'hendecasyllable,' originally

(with some variations, not now to the point,)

has become

O ye chorus of indolent re-viewers.

(3) The third change was due undoubtedly to the influence of the caesura after the fifth syllable—the 'Horatian caesura,' as it is called, though Catullus in his sapphics has only two lines in which there is a different caesura. As the cause of this we must assign a desire to get an effect of conflict between metrical ictus and word-stress, followed by a reconciliation. This effect was no doubt strengthened by the lengthening of the fourth syllable; for though conflict between ictus and accent might be produced by making syllables 4 and 5 consist of an iambic word, yet the effect of syncope is much stronger when the fourth