VIII.—SYMPOSIUM—CAN LOGIC ABSTRACT FROM THE PSYCHOLOGICAL CONDITIONS OF THINKING ?

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RASHDALL.

1.—*By* F. C. S. SCHILLER.

It might seem at first sight that this question could be answered in three ways alone: by "*yes*," by "*no*," and by "*sometimes from some of them*." But this is certainly too sanguine. Philosophical questions are usually obscure because of the inveterate ambiguity of the terms in which they are put. And in this case it is probably essential to a profitable discussion that we should first agree on the meaning and function of Logic. In case, however, that this should prove to be impossible, it will at least be advantageous to explain the meaning in which I propose to use that term.

The meanings which may be attributed to "Logic" are numerous, and most logicians find it necessary, or at least convenient, to employ a good many of them. It is, however possible to fix the extreme limits of the variation towards one or the other of which a consistent view of logic must tend. The first of these conceives "Logic" as concerned with actual thinking, or even more ambitiously, as a systematic evaluation of real knowing. It does not, as such, object to talk about "ideals of thought," but it insists that these ideals must be evolved from and kept in contact with the actual facts of thinking, and considers that apart from these they are void of meaning and lose all value. At the opposite extreme to this conception of Logic there lies a treatment which makes Logic a sort of calculus of imaginaries, as formal and as arbitrary as algebra,

and not requiring to be essentially connected with any human function of cognition.

Of these two conceptions of Logic, I shall very decidedly prefer the former. I shall assume, that is, that to be a real science and not a mode of intellectual trifling, Logic must deal with actual thinking, and that its norms, whatever they are, must not be disconnected from the actual cognitive procedure of observable human minds.

Assuming this, it seems that an affirmative answer to our question is simply inconceivable. For all actual thinking is psychologically conditioned throughout, and Logic has no business to ignore the fact. At any rate, the *onus* lies on those who assert that this fact is logically irrelevant. To me the relevance of some of these psychological conditions is so overwhelmingly evident that I cannot conceive what meaning the word "thought" can convey, if abstraction is really and rigidly made from (1) interest, (2) purpose, (3) emotion, and (4) satisfaction.

(1) I can nowhere discover anything deserving of the name of thought which is not actuated by psychological interest. To affirm this, moreover, seems merely a truism. It is merely to deny that thinking is a mechanical process like, *e.g.*, gravitation. It is to assert that the processes during which the course of consciousness comes nearest to being a purposeless flux of mental images are most remote from cognition. It is to deny that thinking proceeds without a motive and without an aim, and to assert that in proportion as interest grows more disciplined and concentrated thought becomes more vigorous and more definitely purposive.

(2) Thinking therefore must be conceived as essentially purposive, and as the more consciously so, the more efficient it grows. Whenever Logic therefore seeks to represent the actual nature of thinking, it can never treat of "the meaning" of propositions in the abstract. It must note that the meaning depends on the use, and the use on the user's purpose. Now

this purpose is primarily a question of psychical fact, which admits of being psychologically determined, and which no theory can safely ignore. If we attribute to logical rules a sort of inherent validity, a sort of discarnate existence apart from their application to cases of actual thinking, we reduce them to phantoms as futile as they are unintelligible.

(3) Emotion accompanies actual cognition as a shadow does light. Even so unexciting an operation as counting has an emotional tone. The effect of this emotional tone seems to be various, and it need not be denied that in some people and in some forms it may have a hurtful effect on the value of the cognitive results. But this must be shown, and cannot be assumed, in any given case. And its alleged hurtfulness is no reason for denying the existence of this emotional bias, except to those who are very far gone in that application of "Christian Science" to philosophy which declares all evil to be "appearance."

(4) If a feeling of satisfaction did not occur in cognitive processes the attainment of truth would not be felt to have value. In point of fact such satisfactions supervene on every step in reasoning. Without them, logical "necessity," "cogency," and "insight" would become meaningless words.

It seems clear, therefore, that without some psychological conditions, viz., those which have been mentioned, thinking disappears, and with it, presumably, Logic.* Some, at least, of the psychological conditions cannot be dispensed with.

It would have been needless to labour this point at such length if it had not been denied, and that by no less a personage than Mr. F. H. Bradley. Like so many of Mr. Bradley's gems, it occurs in a footnote,† which I make no apology for quoting.

* I rather suspect, however, that some symbolic logicians would regard thinking, *i.e.*, judging and inferring, as so inherently psychological as to be extra-logical.

† *Mind*, N.S., 51, XIII, 309.

"If in the end there is to be no such thing as independent thought," he says, "thought that is, which in its actual exercise *takes no account of the psychological situation* ;* I am myself in the end led inevitably to scepticism. The doctrine that every judgment *essentially depends on the entire psychological state*, of the individual, and derives from this its falsehood or truth is, I presume, usually taken to amount to complete scepticism."

We learn from this surprising passage that it is complete scepticism to take complete account of the facts in a cognitive procedure, and that if we will not deliberately falsify them, we lapse into scepticism. But I must confess that Mr. Bradley's menaces do not cow me. I can see no shadow of a reason why for logical purposes such falsification should be necessary. And even if it were, so far from deterring us from scepticism, I can conceive nothing that should incline us more irresistibly towards it.

But perhaps the terrible consequence of admitting the facts is not that we should fall into scepticism ourselves, but that we should impel Mr. Bradley towards it, and so expose him to all the rude remarks he has himself at various times made about sceptics. This would be a situation which I for one should contemplate without dismay. For in common with many other philosophers of various schools,† I have long suspected that only a very fine line of his own drawing separates Mr. Bradley from a scepticism to which both his heart and the core of his doctrine inclined. When, therefore, I am told that a simple request to recognise the facts drives him across the line, I am disposed to wonder only that so light an impetus should serve as a pretext for avowing what might well have been confessed before.

At all events Mr. Bradley's difficulty is of his own manufacture. Just before declaring that to take account of

* *Italics mine.*

† Notably Mr. Haldane.

psychology was death to logic, he had "agreed" that there was "no such existing thing as pure thought." *I.e.*, presumably no thinking free from psychological contamination. Admitting this, all should have been plain sailing. "Pure" thought being psychologically a false abstraction, its troublesome fiction need no longer encumber the logical account of actual thinking. But this, apparently, would be sheer surrender to pragmatism, and so Mr. Bradley prefers to be "led inevitably to scepticism." He insists, therefore, that there must be "independent" thought. The meaning of this postulate is not explained. But presumably thought has to be "*independent*" of the psychical conditions.* But of these he had just "agreed" no existing thought could be independent. And so the contradiction is completed which was to lead Mr. Bradley to avow his scepticism. That this contradiction is not accidental, but inherent in the intellectualist conception of Logic, we may venture to infer also from a very similar disaster which overtakes Mr. Bradley's most prominent disciple, Professor A. E. Taylor. In an article on "Truth and Practice" in the *Philosophical Review* for May, 1905, he begins (p. 267) by

* I may of course have failed to apprehend what Mr. Bradley here means by "independent." For the term is one of those most unscrupulously juggled with. When pluralism has to be demolished by a word, we hear much of the iniquity of the "independence" its reals claim, but when it is a question of vindicating a "useless" philosophy it appears that every well-conducted "theoretic" truth preserves a virtuous "independence." Similarly we are told by "realists" that in the act of knowing the object of knowledge is quite "independent" of the knower's act. It is clear that in neither of these cases can "independent" mean "*not connected with*." And yet if it means less than this the alleged "independence" of the pluralist's reals cannot yield an *a priori* refutation of pluralism. Now I am quite willing to agree to any consistent convention about the use of any term, or even, if necessary, to give up its use altogether. But it should at least be made clear what it is taken to mean, and I cannot but think that if the present vagueness and ambiguity of "independence" were curbed, either the argument about the "independence" of thought or that about the impossibility of "independent" reals would have to disappear from the armoury of our absolutists.

denouncing "the modern error of regarding Logic as somehow concerned with the subjective processes of cognition," and wishing to "purge it at the outset of psychological accretions," and holding that the whole "notion of an individual thinking mind is absolutely irrelevant to the explanation of what we mean by truth." He thereby arrives at the singular conclusion that pragmatism is "quite irrelevant to Logic" (p. 286).

And yet, before the end of the same article, he is overtaken by as complete a Nemesis as the most vindictive pragmatist could have desired. The "truth," which (p. 273) had scorned all dependence on human minds and rested its authority on its relation to "an ideal or universal consciousness, an impersonal *Bewusstsein überhaupt*," has after all to be introduced into an actual knower's mind. And then it turns out (p. 287) that "what I as an individual actually accept as true *depends on** what propositions have for me the *special feeling** of obligatoriness," and "the efficient cause of my acceptance of a belief as true is thus a form of emotion." Professor Taylor explains indeed that the case is peculiar, that it is "a very specific form of emotion," but not how even the most miraculous constitution could exempt it from psychological treatment. If then this feeling of logical obligation or necessity is essential to every act of human cognition, what becomes of the independence of Logic and the boasted "purging away of psychological accretions"? In at least one point the connection between Logic and Psychology is vital and cannot be dissevered.

I will take it therefore, that, on the showing of intellectualist logicians themselves, a complete denial of the logical relevance of the psychological aspect of cognitive process is impossible. Indeed, in their practice this is so far recognised that their accounts are open rather to the criticism that in them logical and psychological considerations alternate in

* Italics mine.

inextricable confusion. But this only strengthens my case for the contention that Logic must *explicitly* take account of the psychological conditions of actual thinking and knowing, so far at least as in their absence its subject matter would disappear. I shall contend therefore that without them there is no such thing as actual thinking (and much less knowing), and that Logic becomes a science of the non-existent and impossible; that just in so far as a logical reasoning tries to abstract from these actual conditions, it increases the risk of *de facto* failure, so that the more "purely" "logical" it becomes the more likely is it to be ineffective and to be condemned as unintelligible; that strictly therefore *all* the psychological conditions have logical relevance, though no doubt it may often be impracticable to evaluate their full complexity, and so to attain more than a very moderate precision in the "logical" analysis of an actual argument. This last point perhaps only asserts that the logician as such is never the final judge of the value of an argument.

(1) I have already mentioned one large group of psychological conditions which are involved in all actual thinking. Purpose, interest, desire, emotion, satisfaction, are more essential to thinking than steam is to a steam-engine.

(2) The most fundamental conceptions of Logic, like "necessity," "certainty," "self-evidence," "truth," are primarily psychological facts. They are inseparably accompanied by specific psychological feelings. What is called their "strictly logical" sense is *continuous with* their psychological senses, and whenever this connection is really broken off, its meaning simply disappears. We have observed Professor Taylor's failure to abstract from the psychological feeling of "necessity," but may perhaps indulge in a further illustration.

Let us take therefore the conception of "certainty." The most anti-psychological of logicians could readily be forced to admit that all certainty in its actual occurrence was accompanied by a psychological feeling of certainty in various

degrees of intensity. He would appeal, however, to the distinction of "logical" and "psychological" certainty. Psychological certainty, we commonly say, is subjective and exists for individuals; logical certainty is objective and imposed on intelligence as such. Again, psychological certainty may set in long before logical proof is complete, often long before it ought, and conversely our psychological stupidity may rebel against mathematically demonstrated truths. From these current distinctions the logician is apt to infer that psychological and logical certainty have really nothing to do with each other and ought not to be confused. But if this be true, why are they both called by the same name? Surely, if logicians wished to keep them apart and could afford to do so, they could label them differently. That they have not done so is a strong presumption that it is impracticable.

Indeed the truth would seem to be, (a) that if the *feeling* of certainty is eliminated the word becomes unmeaning, and (b) that "logical" is quite continuous with psychological certainty. The notion of "logical" certainty arises from the extension of potential beyond actual purpose in thinking. We actually stop at the point at which we psychologically are satisfied and willing to accept a claim to truth as good, but we can sometimes conceive ulterior purposes which would require further confirmation and other minds that would be satisfied less easily. This engenders the ideal of a complete "logical" proof transcending that which is good enough for us, and capable of compelling the assent of all intelligences. But even if it could be attained, its certainty would still be psychological, as is our capacity to project the ideal. Both are dependent on the actual powers of individual minds. Thus for the moment mathematical demonstration seems to satisfy the logical ideal of intellectualist logicians, and is praised as absolutely certain. But that they think it so is merely psychological fact. For the reason simply is that so far they do not seem to have psychologically conceived the thought

of varying the postulates on which such demonstration rests. If they had recognised the hypothetical basis of mathematical certainty, they could conceive something more "certain."

(3) The fundamental logical operations, like conceiving, discriminating, identifying, judging, inferring, all have psychological aspects, and could not come about by "pure" thought. I have suggested elsewhere* that logical identity is always a postulate. It should be stated as that "*what I will shall mean the same, is (so far) the same.*" And by "the same" I do not mean *indistinguishable*, (though this too is a psychological criterion) as Mr. Bradley does in what he considers "the indisputable basis of all reasoning," the axiom that "*what seems the same is the same,*" which he himself calls "a monstrous assumption."† Logical identity emphatically does not rest on an easy acquiescence in appearances or psychological carelessness about noticing differences. It is a conscious act of purposive thinking, performed *in spite of observed differences*. "The same" means that for our purposes these differences may be ignored and the two terms treated alike.

The principle therefore is not mere psychological fact, carrying no logical consequences. Nor certainly is it a mere tautology, "A is A." It is ultimately one of the devices we have hit upon for dealing with our experience. As such it may be supposed to have passed through an experimental stage as a mere postulate, and even now a certain risk remains inherent in its use. That there shall be identity we have good grounds for insisting, but our claim that any A is A may often be frustrated. For, of course, the belief that identities are to be found, however well grounded in general it may be, in no wise guarantees the validity of any particular identity we may choose to "recognize." That therefore every attempted identification should come true, would be the experience only of an omni-

* *Personal Idealism*, pp. 94-104.

† *Principles of Logic*, p. 264.

potent being, whose volitions the course of events could never contravene. Only to such a being (if such can be conceived) would it be self-evidently, invariably, and "necessarily" true that "A is A"; in our human thinking the identities we select may prove to be mistaken. But on the whole the principle is valuable enough for us to ascribe our failures not to its inapplicability to our world, but to our own stupidity in selecting the "wrong" identities.

My limits forbid further illustrations, but I will select one more case, because it has been most disputed, viz., that of reasoning openly inspired by desire, *i.e.*, of a conclusion affirmed because we should like it to be true. Take the familiar argument: *The world is bad, therefore there must be a better.* It all rests on the desire for good, and the postulate of perfection. Now if postulation is as such invalid, and desire a mere obstacle to truth, it clearly follows that this argument is hopelessly illogical; which is accordingly what intellectualist logicians have everywhere maintained.* A bad world is logically evidence *against*, not *for*, the existence of a better.

Now against such abstract and *a priori* notions of what is good reasoning, I would lay it down that good reasoning is that which leads us right and enables us to discover what we are willing to acclaim as truth. And so tested the desire-inspired reasoning may clearly often be the better. It may prompt to more active inquiry, to keener observation, to more persevering experiment. The logician who declares *de non apparentibus et non existentibus eadem est ratio*, who declines to look for what he wants but does not see, who does not seek to penetrate beyond the veil of appearances, is, frankly, an ass. He frustrates his avowed purpose, the discovery of truth, by debarring himself

* *Qua* human they have, of course, not infrequently relapsed into the postulatory way of reasoning. Thus it is a favourite inference from the fact that all the parts of the world are imperfect, that the whole must be perfect. But if in this case it is legitimate to argue to the ideal from the defects of the actual, why not in others?

from whatever truth lies beneath the surface. His self-approbation, therefore, of the heroic self-sacrifice of his volitional preferences to "objective truth" which he "feels himself bound" to commit, is simply silly. What right indeed has he even to "feel bound"? For does not the phrase betray the emotional origin also of *his* attitude to truth? He accomplishes the sacrifice of "personal preference" to "objective truth" by dint of an emotional desire to mortify himself (or others), the satisfaction of which appears to him as a good. How then is he other or better than the voluntarist who makes bold to postulate, and verifies his anticipations?

Moreover, if we supply the missing premiss in the contention of the intellectualist, we find that it must take a form something like this, that it is *wrong* to anticipate nature, to go beyond what you can see, wicked to try whether the apparent "facts" cannot be moulded or remoulded into conformity with our desires. He must say "it is *wrong*." For he cannot say "it is impossible." For it is constantly done, and with the happiest effects.

If now we ask, *Why wrong?* we force the intellectualist to reveal the full measure of his prejudice. To defend his assumption he must do one of two things: (1) He may fall back upon his own feeling of the æsthetical or ethical impropriety of the voluntarist's procedure. But if so, his objection ceases to be purely logical. It may be declared to be only his idiosyncrasy, and be met by the retort—"but it does not seem improper to me. I do not, will not, and cannot worship disagreeable fact and unwelcome truth as you do. I do not, can not, and will not call a universe good which does not satisfy my desires, and I feel strongly that it *ought* to do so. Whether it does, or can be made to do so, I do not know as yet; it is one of the chief things I am staying in the universe to find out. If (a) it does, or can, then my desires are to be regarded as a sound, logical indication of the nature of reality and a valid method of penetrating to its core. If (b) it does

not, I may have, no doubt, to admit unwelcome truths and unpalatable facts. But I shall do so provisionally, and with a clear intention of abolishing them as soon and as far as I am able. If (*c*) it sometimes does, and sometimes not, why then I am entitled, nay bound, to try *both* methods. I have a right both to treat my wishes as clues to reality, and to subordinate them on occasion to facts which are too strong for me. And I observe that (whether you approve or blame) this is what, in fact, men have always done."

(2) If the intellectualist tries to find something more objective than his feeling of the wrongness of the voluntarist's procedure, what resource has he? Must he not appeal to the consequences of the two methods? Must he not try to show that the consequences of submission are always, or mostly, good those of postulation, always, or mostly, bad? But can he show this? Notoriously he cannot. And in either case has he not used the pragmatic test of logical value?

It is vain, therefore, to seek an escape from the conclusion that actual thinking is pervaded and conditioned through and through by psychological processes, and that Logic gains nothing, and loses all vitality and interest, all touch with reality, by trying to ignore them. To emphasize this is not, of course, to deny that for logical purposes some psychological conditions may sometimes be irrelevant. Thus in using concepts it is generally possible to abstract from the particular nature of the psychological imagery. The reason is that identity of meaning overpowers diversity of imagery; if this were otherwise, the use of concepts would be impossible. Again an error, say of counting, may be psychologically a very complex fact; it may nevertheless be logically a very simple error. By my counting 2 and 3 as 6, there may hang a lengthy tale; but for the logician it may be enough to say that the result ought to have been 5. It should be observed, however, even here, that the logical description of this process as an "error" involves an appeal to psychology; the error could not be recognised as such but for my capacity

to correct it, or at least to admit the validity of processes which enable others to correct it. If I were psychologically incapable of counting $2+3$ as other than 6, I could not recognise my "error," a "common" arithmetic would disappear, and there would remain no way of deciding which process was counting and which miscounting, but the experience of the respective consequences, and the test of survival.

When, however, the logician thus abstracts from the concrete facts of reasoning, he should do so with a consciousness of the nature and dangers of his procedure. He should feel that he may have left out what is essential, that he may have failed to notice the actual meaning of the thought he examined, and have substituted for it some wholly different imagination of his own. The proposition which he solemnly writes down an error or a fallacy may not have been a prosaic affirmation at all ; it may have been poetical hyperbole, or an hypothesis, a jest or a sarcasm, a trap, or a lie. He will, therefore, get a very little way into the analysis of actual thinking if he declines to recognise that in its actual use the same form of words may serve all these purposes, and cannot be treated logically until he has found out what its actual meaning is. A lie, I presume, is a proposition which claims truth like any other. But the claim is for export only ; the liar himself knows it to be "false," and has rejected the claim, even though he has persuaded all the world. I do not see how "the meaning" of such a proposition can be represented as single and simple, or indeed how its logical status can even be discussed without going into these facts. Does it not follow that logicians have no right to their habit of speaking of "the meaning" of a proposition as if it were a logical fixture ? *The actual* meaning is always a psychological fact, which in the case of an ambiguity intended, implied, or understood, may be many. The "logical" meaning is potential ; it is at best the *average* meaning with which the proposition is most commonly used. It is only more or less probable, therefore, as the interpretation of an

actual judgment. And to build a system of apodictic doctrine on foundations such as these is to build a house of cards.

I would conclude, therefore, what I fear must seem a very sketchy paper, by drawing the final inference that the logician must become a psychologist as well, and drop the notion of a "pure" and "independent" logic. He must conceive his business strictly as the evaluation of actual human thinking, and dismiss as unscientific presumption the wild-goose chase of an "absolute thought," and as illusory trifling the construction of symbolic systems which cannot be applied. His "rules" and "principles" will be as empirical in their use as in their origin, and will afford a modest guidance which actual thinkers will not despise and will find serviceable enough if they are intelligent enough to use them properly.

2.—*By* BERNARD BOSANQUET.

LOGIC, I suppose I may say, is the science which considers the nature of thought as manifested in the endeavour to apprehend truth. If it is objected by the Pragmatist that this is no differentia, I should be content to let the sentence run "as manifested in a fully self-consistent form."

We are asked the question, Can logic abstract from the Psychological conditions of thinking?

I will begin by answering the question, because the answer will explain in general the relation—as I see it—of "thinking" to its "psychological conditions." But then I shall have to point out that the question seems to have no direct bearing on the passage with reference to which it has been raised, and that this is really dealing with something different. I take it, then, that logic is able to abstract from the psychological conditions of thinking if and in so far as the thought which logic investigates has a nature of its own and does not take its nature from these conditions. This would be so, for example, if the conditions in question were the common form of conation, and

imported no peculiar element into that conation which takes the shape of thinking in pursuit of truth. It would still be so, even supposing the conditions—interest, purpose, and the rest—to exhibit a peculiar character when they belong to the thinking which logic investigates, if it were the case that that character was already adequately investigated within the bounds of logic proper, leaving nothing to be ascertained by a further scrutiny of these phenomena as purely psychical disturbances.

Now, if we consider the first movement, as it were, of interest (taking interest as typical of the rest) which starts a train of thinking in the pursuit of truth (or of thinking which endeavours after full consistency), it must fall, I suppose, under the former of these cases. If we consider the more methodised interest of a reflective mind, engaged in a scientific inquiry and welcoming the specific logical procedures which lie before it, we must refer such an interest, surely, to the latter case. But I cannot see any conceivable case in which interest, or, say, emotion, can introduce into a train of thinking in pursuit of truth, a procedure which—demanding logical scrutiny—yet belongs to the interest and not to the thinking. If it introduces discontinuity or substitutes one issue for another in the train of thought, logic has nothing to scrutinise—unless the second case is treated as an *ignoratio elenchi*; if it introduces definite error, logic is here on its own ground, and knows what it has to analyse. The case of a suggestion which should fall within and contribute to the true line of argument, settles itself; such a suggestion belongs *ex hypothesi* to the train of thinking which logic considers.

I conclude, then, in the first instance, that logic can take care of itself. It can deal logically with any interest which embodies itself in a continuous train of thinking in pursuit of truth, and also with an interest which interferes with such a train otherwise than by mere interruption—or as a case on the boundary line, by a substitution of foreign issues. It can and must abstract from all forms of interest which are

extraneous to and interrupt the definite continuity of a train of thinking in pursuit of truth (or "endeavouring after full consistency"). Such forms of interest may relatively be termed psychological, *i.e.*, *merely* psychological, as contrasted with logical conditions of thinking. Logic, as the science which takes account of thinking in the pursuit of truth, must abstract from any condition of thinking which is in this sense merely psychological. What influences the train of thinking proper must appear in the form of judgment or reasoning however fallacious, and at this point must necessarily become the object of logical criticism.

This, I said, is my conclusion in the first instance. I should prefer to restate it in a form which will more completely explain and justify the relative distinction between logical and psychological interest, and avoid any appearance of arbitrariness.

I suppose that at least all conscious process is in a sense psychological process, and its conditions are in a sense psychological conditions, under which or through which the mind arrives at results of one kind or another. Now as I see the matter, the fundamental nature of this process—a nature which we might roughly describe as "continuity"—is one with the principle which when fully explicit takes the form of thinking in pursuit of truth or in pursuit of full consistency. (This form of thought is present, I should contend, in the higher phases of "practice.") Psychological process, in a word, when it differs from the process which is the object-matter of logic, differs by being inarticulate, circuitous, fragmentary. It is the logical process broken up and disguised; or rather, the logical process is the psychological process in its explicit and self-consistent form. To do violence to a simile of Plato, the Glaucus which is the mind owes its misshapeness to being made up of myriad imperfect growths of its own substance according to its own law, but stunted, arrested, distorted, in all possible ways. I do not mean that all arrested growths—the everyday conations which find a speedy and single termination

—are misshapen or diseased; but I mean that their early arrest though natural and necessary *ad hoc* is the main feature that produces the distinction between them and the fuller developments of the mind's nature. Now these fuller developments themselves—the wider growths of theory and practice—are never, I should imagine, found typically perfect in actual psychological process. I do not suppose that a sustained argument of any great compass is ever thought through by an actual mind without interruption or irrelevance. It is enough if continuity of content reappears and maintains itself throughout and within the psychological detail and the momentary distraction. It is clear therefore to me that the relation of thinking in the pursuit of truth to common psychological conditions is not one of abstract to concrete but of concrete to abstract. Strictly speaking then, when logic abstracts, it abstracts from an abstraction—the abstraction which speaks of psychological conditions of thinking, as though something isolable, shaping the course of thought from without. The psychological conditions which do not amount to true logical interest are simply, I take it, interests which are either prevented by conflict from working out their conation as a systematic whole, or are incapable of doing so from the nature of their original content. In the latter case the end of the conation is predetermined, and needs but little development of context as a means to its realization. In thinking which pursues truth or full consistency—which of course may be subservient to practice in the larger sense, as when a minister announces that he has to think out what can be done for the Army—the object of the conation is to construct an ideal whole of a certain type; no point can be predetermined at which the conation is to stop. It is then on the whole the interests in predetermined ends from which logic must abstract; or, as I prefer to say, looking at psychological process as a whole, it recognises their partial nature, and the obscurity in which they involve the principles of mental continuity and advance.

Therefore it abstracts from the abstraction which would give them the name of psychological conditions of thinking *par excellence*, and dismisses them as trivial or as obstructive beside the more fully developed systematic conations, in which the nature of mind finds room to display itself articulately.

No difficulty arising from the relation between developed theory and developed practice can be exploited in favour of conceptions which suggest the dependence of truth on pure psychological conditions as such. The ultimate distinction between theory and practice is, indeed, none too easy; it is analogous to that between observation and experiment; between a result unveiled by changes we have made, and a result infected and qualified throughout by changes of our making. But these distinctions only arise at a point far beyond the elementary misunderstandings which are now before us. For the pursuit of goodness and the interest in beauty raise just the same problem as the pursuit of truth. It is as essential to them as to thinking in pursuit of truth not to be dependent on the mere psychological situation, on "the entire psychological state of the individual." Neither goodness nor beauty are conceivable as determined by mere psychological conditions; as if good were to be determined by the total actual want and beauty by the total actual feeling. The mind has its fundamental nature, which leads it, in different activities, to strive for harmony with the whole. But in the actual momentary mind this nature, as we have seen, conflicts with its own outgrowths, and maintains itself among them only through its self-assertion in the completer forms of interest, which on the whole predominate, and sustain the mind as a system.

I have now answered the question whether logic can abstract from the psychological conditions of thinking; and my answer is in short that it not only can, but must; it must abstract from these—if I may invent a barbarism—by concreting them; by showing what they are as imperfect efforts of

mind to assert its own nature, and how the mind leaves them behind, and thrusts them aside, in its complete working. Any psychological conditions which are more than this become *ipso facto* logical conditions and fall within the analysis of logical process.

I now turn to the criticism of an alleged denial. Something has been denied; but what? The sentence which seems intended to indicate what has been denied runs thus: "It seems clear, therefore, that without some psychological conditions, viz., those which have been mentioned, thinking disappears, and with it, presumably, logic. Some, at least, of the psychological conditions cannot be dispensed with." The critic's argument, I admit, has been partly, though very slightly, directed to establish the logical relevance of the psychological conditions; but here in the conclusion we have relevance and existence inextricably mixed. It is only fair to place beside this extravagant suggestion as to what has been denied—as if it had been denied that need and desire are necessary to thinking—a somewhat full quotation from the incriminated article.*

"But I shall doubtless be told that the intelligence springs from and depends upon need and desire. There is no understanding, it will be urged, and no truth, except where there is an interest; and since interest and want must be admitted to be practical, we have here a clear proof that all in the end is subordinate to practice. To myself, however, this proof adduced by the Logic of Pragmatism seems hardly to require any serious discussion. To me it seems obvious that if some function belongs to our nature, there will be a need and desire which correspond to that function. Hence, if the free use of the intellect is really one aspect of our being, we shall in consequence have a need and desire for that use. And how this can prove that no interest is in the end intellectual I

* Mr. F. H. Bradley, in *Mind*, 51, p. 323.

wholly fail to perceive." "And you might as well come to me and offer to argue that I cannot want to look at a star, because my vision and my want are always terrestrial. And you might as well demonstrate to me that plainly I can love nothing beyond me, because my love after all must be a piece of myself."

But stress is laid more particularly on the demand that there shall be thought which "in its actual exercise takes no account of the psychological situation," and on the proposition "the doctrine that every judgment essentially depends on the entire psychological state of the individual, and derives from this its falsehood or truth, is usually taken to amount to complete scepticism."

Such views, we are told, involve a claim to falsify the facts in a cognitive procedure, the facts being the total psychological state of an individual mind in the moment of judging, and the procedure being the judgment passed in a determinate inquiry into truth.

The point, I think, is a simple one. Logical theory, the general account of consistent thinking, may fairly be challenged to explain its attitude towards psychological process in general, and towards the influences under which such process is carried on. Logic is a cognitive procedure whose object-matter, indeed, is consistent thinking, but which must be prepared to defend its boundaries by going on occasion somewhat beyond them, as is the case more or less with every science. In general, therefore, I should not gravely object to saying that the psychological situation, so far as it can be made an object of thought, comes under the cognitive procedure of logic, negatively, at least, *i.e.*, with a view to showing what sort of thing in it is relevant, and what sort of thing is not. I have given an example of such explanation, as I understand it, in the earlier part of this paper.

But a determinate train of thought is in a wholly different position; and this is why our discussion as to the relation of

logic and psychological conditions has only a general bearing—the bearing of a general theory on a specific case—on the present question. Logic, in fact, as the theory of the mind as knowing, has to explain why a specific scientific procedure can *not* depend on the entire psychological situation. A determinate train of thought—an inquiry started by a definite discrepancy or positive suggestion within a certain range of experience—is made what it is by the limitation of its object-matter. Its object-matter, so far as it is a cognitive procedure, is not the mind as knowing, but a certain range of questions, opinions, perceptions, which it has, no doubt, to develop, but to develop in their own continuity of content wherever the argument may lead. To make the truth or falsehood of a phase in such a conation depend on the entire psychological state of the individual is simply to murder the argument. The universal, the continuity of content, the *nervus probandi*, is the nature of mind having so far found itself in a certain content and become explicit, and so working itself out according to its law in the completest unity and concreteness. The unity, that is, the continuity, of the logical process, the identity of content throughout, is, as I understand the matter, the only clue by which we get from data to conclusion or, what is the same thing, introduce consistency into experience. Now the mind of the individual at any moment is not such a unity; it is a Glaucus, the net want or response of which is no true totality, but the balance of influences from myriads of heterogeneous growths. To substitute its momentary want or response as a whole—this, it must be remembered, is the point—for its determinate ordering of experience in some one province where it is at its best, is to cut off the “pathway to reality” and ignore all phases and levels of self-assertion in the spirit of man.

I have said that the same principle holds with morality and æsthetic as with truth. It could not be better illustrated than by the passage where Kant discriminates æsthetic pleasure

in an object from interest in its existence. If the question is whether the thing is beautiful, we are not asked to say whether we or any one in the world cares a straw for the existence of the thing, or even could possibly care for it, but only how we judge it in mere contemplation (perception or reflection).* The whole passage is to the point. We may also recall Aristotle's distinction between the pleasure proper to an activity and the pleasures that interfere with it.

Thus the critic has applied to determinate trains of thinking what could only be true, at the outside, of logic and the psychology of cognition.† The total psychological situation cannot conceivably be an object, say, to an inquiry into the connection between wages and out-relief, as a cognitive procedure. The inquiry will go where the argument—the universal, or continuous nature of the subject—may lead it. "The thing itself will give the clue," but if it departs from that path the nerve of the inference is broken, and the nexus between mind and reality so far ceases to exist.

If I have made myself clear so far it will not be necessary to deal at length with the rest of the argument before us. The root of the whole matter is indeed obvious, but I take it to be especially made distinct in the sentence, "Must he not try to show that the consequences of submission are always or mostly good, those of postulation always or mostly bad?" The language echoes the reference to Protagoras in the Theatetus, and I presume that the echo is intentional. It is a confusion of Logic and Ethics—and there can be no ground for excepting Æsthetic—under the common heading of conative process; a refusal to recognise the common nature which takes these modes of self-transcendence beyond the *de facto* aspect of psychical change as determined by felt

* R. iv, 47.

† These, again, as determined procedures, would leave outside them other influences in the mind, which they would be unable to unite as a homogeneous context with themselves.

want, not to speak of the problem of distinguishing them from one another. The word satisfaction is used as a master-key; but it opens only the outer gate. Serviceable as indicating that cognition is a form of practice, it becomes mischievous when it suggests that no more than this can be said of our endeavour after the true, the good, and the beautiful.

If I am asked *what* more is to be said, as for example by way of determining the distinctive character of the conation which aims at truth, my answer is simply a reference to the science of Logic. I am convinced that the wilful omission to enter upon the specific ground of logical science, typified by the reiteration of the barren appeal, "But is not truth a satisfaction?" is as responsible for the Protagorean confusion to-day, as it was in the time of Socrates. All the minor puzzles about "pure" thought in relation to "actual" thought, and postulation in its bearing upon success, fall into their places when this matter of principle is understood. The absurdity is illustrated by representing scientific postulation as if it was demanding a £5 note from a man of undecided mind, who may give it you simply because of your importunity, or again may not. Those for whom logic exists do not believe that it is importunity which prevails with the universe; to them the condition of victory appears to be adaptation; and adaptation means conformity,* and conformity means following the method of experience, which is investigated by the science of the mind as knowing. We are plainly told, indeed, that importunity does not always prevail: "I subordinate my wishes on occasion to facts which are too strong for me." Here again the truth implied is commonplace and obvious; the note of pragmatism lies in the suggestion of a tussle with the universe by brute force, instead of a continuity in experience of a definable type. Or again, the rough popular treatment of the argument *a contingentia mundi*, is thoroughly character-

* "Natura non nisi parendo vincitur."

istic. We need only compare it with a careful statement of the nexus as given in Nettleship's biography of Green,* or with a criticism of the self-consistency of certain desires, as suggested in *Appearance and Reality*,† to see the difference between a crude reference to the desire for good and an appreciation of the method by which experience develops.

I may say in conclusion that I do not accept, and I do not much believe that anyone does accept, the name Intellectualist. The application of it in the history of philosophy, as for example, by Gomperz to Socrates,‡ appears to me destructive of all sound interpretation; and in modern controversy it can hardly be other than an appeal to the prejudices of the man in the street, which it should be the task of philosophy to "loosen by criticism." It is fatal to the whole endeavour to work out an ideal of experience beyond discursive thinking, and also beyond blind data of feeling, and its application to the author of *Principles of Logic*, and *Appearance and Reality*, seems as bad a blunder in nomenclature as could well be conceived.

3.—By H. RASHDALL.

MR. SCHILLER has rightly insisted upon the importance of context in the interpretation of language and of thought. The meaning of a proposition cannot be gathered from that proposition alone, taken in isolation from all other contents of the mind whose judgement that proposition expresses. But I do not think he has himself observed that salutary principle in the present controversy. He has not asked himself, so far as I can see, for what purpose anyone supposes it possible for Logic to abstract from the psychological conditions of thinking. And the answer to be given to the main question seems to me to

* Page xc.

† Ed. 2, p. 509, and footnote.

‡ Gomperz, *Gr. Denker*, II, p. 53.

depend entirely upon the purpose for which it is supposed that the attempt can be made. He has shown that it is impossible for actual thought to exist in entire separation from psychological processes. He has shown that thought itself is a psychological process, which I suppose nobody ever denied. He has shown again that thought can only exist in a mind. Even this has hardly, I suppose, been explicitly denied, though undoubtedly it has not always been remembered by Philosophers of a certain school; but (whatever may be said of others) Mr. Bradley is the last thinker against whom such a charge can plausibly be made. Mr. Schiller has shown further that thinking is only one among many psychological processes or aspects of consciousness; that consequently there is no such thing as bare, naked thought, not accompanied by feeling or volition; and that our thinking is actually affected by the nature of the willing and the feeling that go on, side by side, with the thinking in a given individual mind. Here again we have an elaborate demonstration of a truth which has never been explicitly denied, though it has, doubtless, not been sufficiently remembered by those "Intellectualists" who have practically expelled feeling and willing out of the Universe; but among those thinkers Mr. Bradley is certainly not to be included. The great value of Mr. Bradley's metaphysic, as it seems to me, is precisely to have asserted the place in Reality of feeling and of willing against Hegel, or (if so it be) a particular interpretation of Hegel which is certainly not unknown in this country. If and in so far as anybody has asserted that we can abstract from the psychological conditions of thinking in the sense of thinking without willing and feeling, Mr. Schiller has certainly, as it seems to me, proved his point. But what I imagine to be meant by the assertion that in Logic we can make such an abstraction, is that we can for a particular purpose not attend to these psychological conditions, but can attend, or aim with more or less success, at attending exclusively to one aspect of a consciousness which in point of fact has other

aspects. The particular aspect of the contents of consciousness which we attend to as Logicians is the truth or falsehood of the judgements and inferences contained in that consciousness. It may be said that we do in a sense make abstraction even of the consciousness itself—that is to say, we examine the truth or falsity of the judgements, not indeed without remembering that judgements imply a mind, but without attending to the question whose mind it is that judges.

Mr. Schiller frequently writes as though “abstracting” meant effecting an actual separation—as though it were supposed that we could abolish feeling or emotion by not attending to them and so could think without feeling or even without having a mind to think with. To deny that we can, in the sense and for the purpose which I have explained, abstract from the psychological conditions of thinking would, if the denial is to be really thought out, amount to the assertion that we cannot judge of the truth or falsity of a proposition at all; for certainly the truth or falsehood of a judgement is an abstraction, when we take it apart from the other aspects of the judgement. And the other aspects of the judgement, of which we make abstraction, are, or certainly include, the psychological aspects. The Psychologist, so long as he really confines himself to the psychological point of view, (which no Psychologist can ever really do for long together) knows nothing of the truth or falsity of judgements. It may no doubt be said that “the most fundamental conceptions of Logic, like ‘necessity,’ ‘certainty,’ ‘self-evidence,’ ‘truth,’ are primarily psychological facts”; at all events they are psychological facts; I am not quite sure that I understand the “primarily.” We do, indeed, usually attribute these qualities not to minds, but to judgements; but it is quite true that we could not do this unless there were minds which could make the judgements and recognise these qualities in them; these epithets do undoubtedly imply certain ways in which certain judgements impress the mind. But in whatever sense they are

psychological facts, error and falsity are also psychological facts. And how do we know the difference between truth and falsehood? Surely Psychology, *qua* Psychology, cannot tell us. When we attempt to pronounce a judgement true, and another judgement, which (if it is actually made by some mind or other) is no less a psychological fact, we are adopting not the psychological but the logical attitude. We are precisely making abstraction of the psychological conditions of thought in the only sense in which any one has seriously contended that such a feat is possible.

Does Mr. Schiller deny that it is possible to judge whether propositions are true or false? I am bound to say that such a denial is what at bottom it seems to me that Pragmatism means. If it does, it is not difficult to show that it is suicidal. Even were it true that propositions are true or false in so far as they help us to satisfy our desires or achieve our purposes, the Pragmatist cannot express what he means without saying that it satisfies our desires or helps to the attainments of our ends *to think them true*. It is the thinking them to be true, not the assertions themselves, which does sometimes help us in this way. It is thereby acknowledged that there is such a thing as thinking an assertion to be true, and that consequently the truth of a judgement is not the same thing as satisfying desire. Even if it were true that we have "a right to treat our wishes as a clue to reality," that would not show that to wish a thing is the same thing as to judge it to be reality or to hold good of reality. Even if the Pragmatist were inclined to go the length of asserting that "to be true" means only to serve our ends, even so he makes the assertion that it is true that what serves our ends is true. If "to be true" meant merely "to serve our ends," this would be equivalent to saying "what serves our ends, serves our ends." And even such an identical proposition is a judgement, and implies that a judgement is something different from a feeling or a volition. To recognise this difference, and to examine

what flows from it, is precisely what is meant by a Logic which endeavours to abstract from the psychological conditions of thinking.

Whatever may be the case with Mr. Schiller, it is clear to me that Professor James does really go to this length of refusing to recognise any difference between true and false judgements. Practically he holds that a judgement is simply a feeling. He is in fact a Sensationalist, and the only difference between his position and Hume's is that Hume knew that his system led to pure Scepticism about Morality, about Science, and about Religion, though he admitted that his doubts, at least as regards Science, left him the moment he left his study; while Professor James apparently believes that he can reconcile pure Sensationalism not only with Science but with Religion and Morality.

I am bound to say that some passages quoted by Mr. Schiller from Professor Taylor seem to me to make in the same direction. When he says that "what I as an individual actually accept as true depends on what propositions have for me the special feeling of obligatoriness," he seems to go near to a confusion of judgement with feeling. After all "obligatoriness" means what I cannot but think true, and feeling is here, as it seems to me, wrongly used as the equivalent of "judge." In this particular passage (though not in his general position) Professor Taylor, by exaggerating the extent of the possible abstraction of thinking from its psychological conditions, has almost arrived at much the same results as Mr. Schiller arrives at by denying that any such abstraction is possible at all. It has driven him into at least appearing to identify a judgement with a feeling, and has been led to the mistake by the same irrelevant consideration which has so powerfully impressed Mr. Schiller, *i.e.*, the undeniable fact that thinking is accompanied by certain kinds of feeling or emotion. He has pushed the contrast between our actual thinking and the ideal of pure, abstract thought to the point of

refusing to admit that our actual thinking is thought at all. In both Professor Taylor and Professor James this position has led to the denial of any absolute morality. Professor Taylor's Absolute ignores and despises (from the intellectual point of view) the distinction between right and wrong, because it is merely a mode of human feeling; while Professor James, who is, as it were, his own Absolute, regards as right everything which happens to satisfy his desires. Once more, with less consciousness of the fact, Professor James finds himself in the same position as Hume. But Pragmatism would not be proved to be true, even if it could be shown that Professor Taylor was a Pragmatist too.

How far Professor James' position is shared by Mr. Schiller, I am not quite sure. But that Mr. Schiller does not see any particular difference between feeling and judging may be inferred from his talking about a man's "own feeling of the æsthetical or ethical propriety of the voluntarist's procedure." Much of the plausibility of Mr. Schiller's argument turns simply upon the device of using the word "feel," when other people say "think." When I talk about feeling that a procedure is ethically proper, I am using "feel" as a popular equivalent for "think." A feeling with a "that" after it is not a mere feeling, but a judgement.

I admit that on sensationalistic premisses there can be no abstraction from the psychological conditions of thinking; for on such premisses there can be no abstracting, and consequently no thought, at all; for all thought implies abstraction. If to judge means to have an idea, all ideas must be equally true. But I am unwilling to suppose that Mr. Schiller can have been led by his loyalty to Professor James into the same quagmire of sensationalistic Metaphysic; and consequently I look about for some less extravagant interpretation of his thesis. Does it mean that Psychology itself judges whether propositions are true or false? If so, all I can only say that Mr. Schiller chooses to attribute to Psychology, or a branch of Psychology,

the functions that other people attribute to Logic. It would almost seem that this is what Mr. Schiller deliberately intends to do, when he says that in pronouncing it necessary to say that 2 and 2 make 5 "the logical description of this process as an 'error' involves an appeal to Psychology; the error could not be recognised as such but for my capacity to correct it, or at least to admit the validity of processes which enable others to correct it." But surely when we pronounce that a judgement actually made is an error we are thinking, if there be such a thing as thinking in the world. Mr. Schiller seems to be here using the barren truism that thinking is a psychological process to suggest that it is *only* a psychological process; which must mean that there is no real difference between thinking and any other psychological process, and consequently no distinction between true thinking and false. When we judge that a proposition is false, we are putting ourselves into the logical, not the psychological attitude—unless Mr. Schiller is simply calling Logic Psychology. That is exactly what is meant, and all that is meant by saying that we can abstract from the psychological conditions of thinking. As mere psychological fact, the judgement that 2 and 2 makes 5 does not differ from the judgement 2 and 2 make 4; when we pronounce that there is a difference, we do so as Logicians, not as Psychologists. When Psychology leaves the question of thinking as an occurrence and concentrates itself upon the question of validity, it becomes what other people call Logic: and there could not be such a Science, unless we could neglect everything or an actual thinking which is irrelevant to the assertion of its truth or falsehood.

Or does Mr. Schiller mean that attention to psychological thinking may be useful as an instrument in the discovery of truth and the detection of error. This on the whole is, I believe, all that Mr. Schiller really thinks, though this will not justify his attack on the "Intellectualist Logicians." To a very limited extent a true meaning could be found for such an assertion. Upon a very optimistic view of the world the fact that a belief

was in accordance with my wishes might be a reason for thinking it true, but then the fact that the world is of such a character would need independent proof. It would be more in accordance with experience to say that the fact that a judgement has been suggested by inclination, by habit, by education or the like may be a reason for suspecting it to be untrue: but still that does not prove its untruth. It would be insane Scepticism to doubt the truth of Euclid because it has to be taught, though much so-called scientific scepticism about Morality rests upon this naive assumption. If we do doubt its truth, we can only satisfy our doubts by thinking harder, and making a more deliberate effort to abstract from everything about Euclid except the validity of his arguments—the high reputation which he enjoys or enjoyed till yesterday, the respect which I may feel for the character of my mathematical master and the like. I don't see that any knowledge of psychological facts whatever will enable me to perform this process better. The question of the purpose for which I study Euclid is irrelevant to the question of its truth or falsity. The fact that I study it to avoid punishment or to pass an examination does not show that it is false: the fact that I study it from pure love of truth does not show that it is true. Equally irrelevant is the question whether it is right to study Euclid or not. To call the superior cogency of the arguments for the fifth proposition of Euclid's first book, as compared with the arguments which may be urged against them, a psychological fact, is simply to play havoc with universally received distinctions of language, which, after all, express distinctions of thought. I cannot say that the arguments are good without (1) abstracting from the psychological context in which the judgement comes to me, and (2) introducing a reference to a reality beyond the judgement which goes beyond the purely psychological point of view.

To sum up the whole matter, Mr. Schiller's thesis may mean simply that we can only discover truth or falsehood by the use of our own minds, which, besides thinking, do also feel

and will: that is a fact which nobody denies. Or he may mean that the fact that we can only distinguish between truth and falsehood by the use of our own minds is a reason for asserting that truth is only what commends itself to my feelings or accomplishes my volitions; and that consequently the fact that I think a thing is no reason for thinking that it really is so. And that is Scepticism. And Scepticism is as fatal to Morality as it is to Science. I recognise that Mr. Schiller and the Pragmatists mean to be champions of Morality. They want to be on the side of the Angels: I fear they are really on the other side altogether. Professor James has explicitly asserted that the good means "that which satisfies my desires." So has Professor Alexander, who knows that his ethical system is substantially Hume's. If so, my moral judgements possess as little validity as other judgements. Moral obligation disappears as well as Truth. I cannot make out whether Mr. Schiller wishes to follow Professor James and Hume in this matter.

I have so far said nothing about Professor Bosanquet. I have done so because on the whole, if I understand him rightly, I agree with him. But I fear no one can so far abstract from the psychological conditions of thinking (though we all aim at it) as to express himself in exactly the same way as anyone else. My mode of expression has been different from Professor Bosanquet's, and can hardly hope he would approve of all that I have said: but in the main, so far as I understand him, I think my view of the matter comes to much the same thing as his. If it is not so, I hope Professor Bosanquet will set me right.

4.—COMMENTS ON PROFESSOR BOSANQUET'S PAPER.

By F. C. S. Schiller.

I cannot honestly say that Professor Bosanquet's paper, rich as it is in interest and instruction in other ways, has

answered my questions or discussed the problems I have sought to raise, viz., as to how the conception of a Logic independent of psychological matter of fact can be reached. For he has not consented to cast back his mind to the point at which my problem arises, to the primitive chaos of immediate experience that is before the sciences have been discriminated and set in orderly relations to each other, when as yet all things are together as undifferentiated "fact" and the spirit of man still broods tentatively over the confusion and has not bethought him to create the sciences that tame the chaos.

But this was doubtless my fault. I did not make it sufficiently plain that I wanted to begin at the very beginning, and to call in question the original delimitation of the sciences.

If I had succeeded in explaining this, Professor Bosanquet would no doubt have seen that he could not meet my objections by putting himself at the standpoint of an already constituted science of Logic. He would have seen that the question was as to how that standpoint was to be attained, and whether, as currently conceived, it was valid. My problem was as to how, starting from actual reasoning, we could effect the discrimination in it between what is logically valuable and what is merely psychological. I wanted to know how logical values could be disentangled from the whole mass of material which psychology essays to describe.

Professor Bosanquet, on the other hand, appears to have unconsciously presumed that Logic possessed a standpoint, fixed, definite, and subject to no doubt, whence it could serenely analyse our actual reasonings. He replies therefore from the lofty heights of "those for whom Logic exists"—*already*, he refers me "simply to the science of Logic," he charges me with "wilful omission to enter upon the specific ground of logical science," in short, he takes for granted the very disentangling and discriminating which I was trying to examine.

Now this procedure is all very well for those who are quite fixed in their faith that Logic exists, and exists in the way they

believe, and is no longer a problem, and I do not for a moment dispute that from his point of view Professor Bosanquet's remarks are natural and just. But he will readily understand that it hardly meets the demands of those who are still, unfortunately, groping for firm ground, who doubt whether "the specific ground of logical science" has been scientifically arrived at, and scruple to cut Logic quite loose from its roots in psychology. And as it is among the latter that I must humbly rank myself, it would have been kinder of Professor Bosanquet to have told me how he fixed the boundaries of Logic with *a priori* certainty, rather than to accuse me of trespassing on its holy ground.

It is one of the unfortunate consequences of this misunderstanding as to what the problem under discussion was, that Professor Bosanquet's reply becomes almost wholly irrelevant from my point of view, as I will now proceed to show.

(1) "Psychological process," he tells us, "differs from that which is the object matter of Logic by being inarticulate, circuitous, fragmentary. It is the logical process broken up and disguised," a "Glaucus" whose divine original is, however, "never found typically perfect in actual psychological process." And so logical process, far from being an abstraction from psychological process as I had thought, is really more concrete, "the mere psychological conditions" are mere rubbish.

Now all this is plausible, and for aught I care may even be true, once Professor Bosanquet's standpoint is conceded. But it is not even relevant *until then*. Nor is it anything I am bound to concede. For I did not in the least mean by the "psychological conditions of actual thinking," the "mere" or "pure" conditions Professor Bosanquet has substituted for them, the worthless residuum which may be flung aside when Logic has evaluated them. I meant the most concrete thing imaginable, the psychical process in its all-inclusive activity. I called it "psychological process" merely to indicate that it

was what psychology seems to aim at describing in its integrity and as it occurs.

Professor Bosanquet's "merely psychological process" is certainly an abstraction, as such vastly inferior to his "logical process." But it is not psychical process at all to my thinking. It is the actual psychical process with its values extracted and extirpated, whereas my "psychological process" is the foundation in fact on which Professor Bosanquet erects his arbitrary ideal of a perfect "logical process." This latter he confesses to be an ideal, but what I want to know is why that ideal should be framed, and how it is to be defended against an objector who condemns it as a travesty of actual cognition which inevitably leads to a frustration of the human desire for knowledge.

(2) Professor Bosanquet admits that his conception of Logic may fairly be challenged to explain its attitude towards psychological process in general, and then goes on to defend the passage I had quoted from Mr. Bradley by an interpretation which, for the credit of the human reason, I am willing to believe may be psychologically correct, but of which I can find no hint in the original text.

But though Professor Bosanquet permits us to inquire into the general relation between Logic and Psychology, he entirely demurs to introducing such considerations into any "determinate train of thinking." To do this is "simply to murder the argument."

This assertion does not, I fear, convince me, and it seems a pity that the murderousness of this procedure is so perfunctorily illustrated. It seems moreover to have escaped Professor Bosanquet that I was raising the two questions together, the second being a logical consequence of the first. For if, generally speaking, logical process is organically connected with psychological process (as I conceive it), how can it be denied *a priori* that this connexion may

penetrate into and pervade the inmost fibre of every actual thought?

The burden of proof seems clearly to lie upon those who attempt such a denial.

Moreover even Professor Bosanquet's rather meagre illustration suggests this possibility. How can "the connexion between wages and outdoor relief" be inquired into as a cognitive procedure, without evaluating also the possible effects of political prejudices on the data dealt with, on the facts alleged, the analyses made, and the remedies suggested by the inquirers? Is it explicable that mankind should be divided into two great parties on every conceivable question, if the partisan feeling Professor Bosanquet thinks extralogical did not permeate the evidence from end to end, principles, "facts," inferences and all? Must we contend that free traders or protectionists are all illogical fools because their feelings naturally weight their intellectual scales?

Or more generally, if it is granted, as I understand Professor Bosanquet does grant, that the actual human mind is biased, and must always be so, how can it be logically irrelevant to recognize this bias? Will not its evaluation be the evaluation of a normal feature in human thought? And if so how can Logic shirk it?

I am sure, therefore, we should all be very grateful to Professor Bosanquet if he would explain how his independent Logic is arrived at, the more so as his published works do not define his attitude on this point. I presume it must be *a priori*, because if it were done empirically, it would be open to the objection that, *de facto*, the consequences of so conceiving Logic do not seem very satisfactory.

I will next consider Professor Bosanquet's protest against my classification of the current "idealist" Logic as intellectualistic. I am sorry that such a harmlessly descriptive term should be regarded as disparagement, and I am at a loss to

understand why any intellectualist should be ashamed of his creed. Though unable to accept it myself, I have always thought a complete intellectualism one of the most wonderful and superhuman achievements of the human mind. Complete and consistent intellectualism, however, is certainly a very distant ideal, and I have never attributed it to Mr. Bradley, who is plainly less intellectualistic than, *e.g.*, Hegel or Plato. My classification of him as an intellectualist was, however, relative to definite points which I stated, and to the differences which separate us. And so long as nobody denies that his doctrine is intellectualistic in some crucial respects and as compared with a more voluntaristic logic, I can see no impropriety in so denominating it. And it seems to me to be unworthy of philosophy to abandon a correct description simply because Professor Bosanquet is afraid that the man in the street does not like intellectualism.

I will conclude my remarks with a string of questions concerning points which Professor Bosanquet has left obscure in my mind.

(1) I cannot at all understand his definition of Logic, partly, perhaps, because it does not refer to mine, nor state how far he accepts or rejects it. But it seems very ambiguous. Does it conceive Logic as a normative science or not? If it does, then how can its norms disclaim connexion with the actual course of thought from which they are extracted? If it does not, then how can it help being essentially psychological, *i.e.*, an attempt to do over again, on no definite principle, the description of psychical process which psychology may be presumed to have already accomplished?

Again, what is meant by the reference to "truth"? Does it mean the formal claim made by all judgements, or its validation?

If it means the formal claim, then what assures us of its validity? If the validation, then will not the original claims fall into the province of psychology?

The reference to self-consistency indicates perhaps that "truth" is conceived as essentially a "claim"; but I cannot see that the study of a "self-consistent form of thought" is an obvious equivalent of the "endeavour to apprehend truth." But it is better to stop guessing at Professor Bosanquet's meaning as he can doubtless easily explain it.

(2) Does Professor Bosanquet conceive "adaptation" as wholly *passive*, and deny the possibility of our adapting our environment to our needs? If he does, has he not surrendered to naturalism? If he does not, why does he ignore the logical value of human activity as shown, *e.g.*, in postulation?

(3) What does he mean by "the rough popular treatment of the argument *a contingentia mundi*," with which he reproaches me?

(4) If he admits that need and desire are necessary to thinking, how can he limit their logical influence and dogmatize about their cognitive value, *a priori*?

(5) When he accuses me of confusing Logic and Ethics, is he referring to my recognition of Logic as a science of values? If not, what more or else does he mean?

(6) Before stigmatizing the doctrine that "truth is a satisfaction" as a "barren" one, had he ever examined its possibilities of fecundity? And if he has, how can he be sure that this truth will prove as "barren" under our care as under his? And if the establishment of this truth was such a barren victory, why has it been conceded to us so grudgingly and ungraciously? Why, to pursue another of Professor Bosanquet's metaphors, were we prohibited from so much as looking over the garden wall, if it was known all along that we were in possession of "the key to the outer door"? Even now, however, there is no just cause for alarm. I can assure Professor Bosanquet, that even when we have fought our way into the innermost sanctuary of the Temple of Life, we shall only cast out a few decrepit idols, and that no harm will come

to the True, the Good and the Beautiful. The danger to them comes from quite a different quarter, in which their union is not recognized.

(7) And lastly when he defines Logic as an endeavour, and cognition as a form of practice, and says that need and desire are necessary to thinking, does he at all consider these phrases to constitute a correction or modification or extension of the position he formerly held? And does he not consider them to use psychological terms?

5.—*Reply to Mr. Schiller's Comments by Bernard Bosanquet.*

There must be an end to rejoinders at some point; and I am not going to do more than shortly reiterate the main line of my argument. And this I only do because it appears to me not to be alluded to in the reply. The questions in that would I think all answer themselves from a consideration of what I have written, and it is not my business to answer them.

But I can attach these few remarks to one observation in the reply, viz., to the statement that I, and as I understand logicians in general, do not explain or justify our "independent" logic.

I shall not treat of my own works separately, in comments on this. The question of their merits is not one with the only important question, what attitude logic on the whole takes up on the point at issue. It is urged, I gather, that the science is arbitrary, and that it furnishes no answer to the question how logical values are to be disentangled from the whole mass of material which psychology essays to describe. This statement strikes me as quite extraordinarily false; and the making of it seems to betray the same complete inattentiveness which neglects the fact that the argument of my paper was precisely directed to this point.

My attempt in the paper—to begin with this—was just to point out that logical science is the recognition of a mode of

activity, which is one great division of the satisfaction aimed at by the psychological process, in a word, by the soul, so far as it comes to know what it wants: and though I have no great respect for an account of genesis (which I suppose is what is asked for, as we are commanded to begin before Science has been thought of, and yet to explain the distinctive nature of logic), yet no doubt delimitation may be thrown into the form of an account of genesis. I presume this is really what is suggested. I think it, as I say, extraordinarily false to assert that logic is defective in this matter of delimitation. The whole fabric of a logical system is an attempt to show how the distinctive interest in one form of harmony of the soul, the form of truth, takes shape and specialises itself as against or as beyond other psychological interests and habits. It is quite impossible to develop this at length. I have already pointed it out in principle and the detail would require volumes, but I will add a few hints.

Logic usually begins by selecting certain forms of language as appropriate to its needs, and the selection is more or less progressive. The imperative and optative moods and the interrogative sentence are dropped out at once, the historical tenses at a more advanced stage. I may say here that I do not call the Science of Logic normative: I call the object of the science self-normative; the object of logical science being the scientific activity of the mind. If the necessity of the self-normative development, which logic recognises and analyzes, can be impeached, it must surely be impeached in detail. You must argue the point whether the content of imperative and optative or of the question can be brought into one whole of truth with statements which directly qualify reality.

Then further, the relation of common psychological association to the universal connection of Science is elaborately worked out; this relation is the basis of Lotze's logic and plays a large part in Mr. Bradley's. It is pointed out how the psychological connections are imperfect attempts to do what the

ruling interest demands and what is more completely done by the judgement of logical connection, and generally the relation of psychological to logical necessity, mentioned in the first paper of this discussion, is a well known logical topic, and is discussed wherever a logician speaks of the test of truth, as in the controversy between Mill and Whewell with all its sequel. How far belief depends on practical attitude is again a familiar point of discussion, and I do not remember to have seen a refutation of the criticism which Mr. Bradley has passed upon Dr. Bain's doctrine. It is very much to the point of the present argument. The occasional subordination of truth to practice is recognised in the theory of working hypothesis; and the justification and limits of postulation, together with the value and limitations of desire as a source of postulates has certainly been treated by myself. My treatment is very likely unsuccessful; but it takes the liberty to exist. It is, no doubt, covered and rendered unimportant by something very different from it, with a few words upon which I will end these remarks.

Since Plato formulated the doctrine of the *ἀγαθόν*, with its intellectual and ethical degrees of adjustment and fulfilment, no fresh treatment of the authoritativeness of our desires or of the relation of the great self-expressions to the ordinary mind has, in principle, been necessary. If anyone wants to assert that there can be a desire which guarantees its own fulfilment, he is still bound to go for his type to Plato's desire of the *ἀγαθόν* and to accept or refute the conditions which Plato imposes on its realisation. This condition, in a word, is criticism, that is the adjustment of an element to a whole, both intellectually and volitionally. This is, for Plato, essential to fulfilment of the soul's desire, and if we conceive of ourselves as members of a whole, it seems impossible to deny its necessity. Absolutism and nullity seem alike contradictory if alleged of the member of a whole.

I should say, then, if you ask for a norm of any science, for its justification in what it regards and disregards, there is none

but the approach to individuality on the part of the science itself—its completeness and comprehensiveness. You cannot attack any science from without. It can only be judged by itself at a further stage. Therefore, I think it truer to speak of the mind, in Science or in the theory of Science, as dropping out abstract psychical processes and going forward on the path of concrete fulfilment or individuality. But I quite recognise, with Dr. Rashdall, that if we set this growing individuality against the confused condition of the momentary mind, the latter may in a sense be held the concrete—the *συγκεχυμένον*, the concrete of confusion—and the former may then be treated as an abstraction from it. In that sense, as he says, a judgement of truth abstracts from the psychological detail of moment, although the whole, by connection with which it is true, has a far higher degree of concreteness than the momentary mind itself. The fundamental point throughout is the essential connection of adjustment and fulfilment, whether in the intellectual qualification of reality, or in practical change.

6.—COMMENTS ON DR. RASHDALL'S PAPER.

By F. C. S. Schiller.

Turning next to our President's paper, I find myself in much smoother waters. That is, I have no difficulty in understanding what he means. And so it is much easier for me to remove what seem to me his misapprehensions. His difficulties with my thesis seem, however, to be, on the whole, different from Professor Bosanquet's. Both, indeed, decline to accept my conception of the relation of Logic to Psychology, and both have taken it for granted that the standpoint of Logic is clear and indisputable. But Dr. Rashdall has seen that the nature of Psychology also is involved, and has made his conception of it quite clear.

Unfortunately, that conception seems to me to be entirely arbitrary, gratuitous, and untenable. As now current in our

philosophy, it goes back to the distinction, which Mr. Bradley has so vigorously insisted on in the first chapter of his *Logic*, between the logical and the psychological idea, validity and existence. The distinction itself is a valuable one, if it is not exaggerated, and it is remembered that we cannot distinguish without connecting, and that it is the *connexion* between Logic and Psychology which is our problem. But as the point is stated in Mr. Bradley's *Logic*, many readers carry away the conviction that no psychological idea has validity and no logical idea has existence. And this, of course, is absurd, as Mr. Bradley himself came to see. You will find his self-correction in *Appearance and Reality*, p. 51.* Unfortunately, this has not been as widely noticed. And so we are still told that values lie beyond the province of Psychology. But for this dogma I can conceive no reason, earthly, celestial, or infernal.

If we conceive Psychology as the Science which aims at describing mental process as such, its own purpose will, of course, debar it from becoming normative, *i.e.*, from evaluating the values which may happen to occur in a psychical process. But this is not to say that it ignores them. It must, of course, recognise them, if in point of fact they occur, as obviously they do. Only it will treat them just as facts, and describe them, while leaving it to Logic to evaluate them, that is to utilise and harmonise the claims to be "true," which all judgments make, whether or not they are true.

The logician, therefore, as I conceive, takes over from Psychology the existence of his values and their description. His task is to evaluate them, *i.e.*, to determine the validity of the claims to truth which are actually made and have been described by Psychology as they actually occur. To shirk this duty seems to me to reduce Logic to an impotent formality.

* I cannot make out Professor Bosanquet's attitude towards this question from the footnote on p. 16 (Vol. II) of his *Logic*. On the face of it, it seems to deny that an intellectual activity is a psychical fact.

Logic and Psychology therefore have the same subject matter, but regard it with a different purpose. Cognitive values occur twice over, in Psychology as so many facts, in Logic as subjects for a critical evaluation. It is necessary to state, therefore, whether we are speaking of values as claims, or as validated after logical criticism. But I will not pursue this subject, as I have recently devoted an article in *Mind** to its elucidation.

The next misapprehension which I find in Dr. Rashdall's paper concerns the relations of Humism and Humanism. He tries to bring down three birds with one stone and argues that I must be a Humian because James is a sensationalist and a sensationalist must be a Humian. On a previous occasion this argument was further clinched by hurling the *Theætetus* at our heads. I believe, however, that all the logical and metaphysical difficulties of Platonism can be traced back to Plato's failure to understand Protagoras, and propose to show this fully in a forthcoming volume. Meanwhile, I can only briefly traverse all these allegations, and declare that, and why, there is nothing in them.

- (1) I am not a sensationalist, because
- (2) I am a voluntarist, and
- (3) Sensationalism (at least of Hume's type) is a form of intellectualism. Moreover
- (4) What I mean "voluntarism" above all to emphasize is the all-pervasive *activity* of conscious life, which
- (5) Modern Psychology has worked out in detail. Hence
- (6) A psychologist is not a Humian, even if he makes much of sensations. For
- (7) He conceives sensations differently, as products of active, selective functioning.
- (8) James, therefore, is not a sensationalist. Nay,

* N.S., No. 58.

- (9) He has refuted Hume in one of his two vulnerable spots, viz., his psychology, whereas the transcendentalist answer to Hume is a huge *ignoratio elenchi*, and, moreover, stands and falls with the correctness of Hume's psychology.
- (10) What is taken to be sensationalism in James is really his empiricism and immediatism. But these are just what lead us to insist so on the reality of values and activities, as immediately experienced. James makes this quite clear in his article on the *Experience of Activity*.*
- (11) On the other hand no one who has once agreed to Hume's demolition of the conception of activity can ever get it back.
- (12) This is why the transcendentalists have ultimately to deny the reality of human activity, and why
- (13) Their desperate attempt to conceive the Absolute's as the sole activity in a world composed of phantoms is a failure.

Having mentioned 13 points and the Absolute, I should stop for luck's sake, but there are two points in Dr. Rashdall's paper which I cannot pass over without a mild protest.

The first is his animadversions on Professor Taylor, who has now quite convinced me that he does not mean to be a Pragmatist.† Still, even where his writings are least successful, they evince a gallant attempt to see the real points at issue and to pierce through the mists of intellectualistic prejudice in which his early "Anglo-Hegelian" education has enfolded him. Moreover, on Dr. Rashdall's own showing, his difficulty is just the opposite to mine: what I cannot see is, how Logic can deal with absolute "thought"; what he cannot see is, how it can deal with human thought. It seems unfair also to single out his

* *Psych. Rev.*, January, 1905.

† Cf. my article in *Mind*, N.S., 59.

ethical views for denunciation. For surely he has only stated, lucidly and impressively, what has always been known to be the ultimate ethical consequence of absolutistic Monism. Of course, the Whole cannot be specifically moral and good so long as immorality and evil exist in the universe, even as appearances or illusions.

Next, it seems to me unfair to prejudice our discussion of the logical question by threatening all sorts of disasters to morality and knowledge as consequent upon coming to our conclusion about it. Dr. Rashdall knows that we repudiate his allegations and credits us with pursuing the same aims as he does; but ought not this to make him very reluctant to bring such charges without substantiating them in detail? In point of fact there is nothing in them :—

- (1) Scepticism has really much greater affinity to Absolutism than to Pragmatism, as the examples of Mr. Bradley and Mr. Joachim show.
- (2) Pragmatism is the only real antidote to Scepticism, as
- (3) Hume himself was acute enough to perceive. That he was content to leave his Pragmatism one-sided and restricted to Science merely shows that he had no wish similarly to save religion and philosophy. And
- (4) Dr. Rashdall's argument, I regret to say, appears to me to be in a way pragmatic, and that in the worst way. It is an appeal to consequences. But in his own words, Pragmatism would not be proved false even if it could be shown that he, too, was a Pragmatist. For the way in which the consequences are in this case appealed to, seems to me quite illegitimate. Before the ulterior consequences are called in *in terrorem*, the proximate consequences should be threshed out. And I have faith enough in truth to believe that its discovery in epistemology will not lead to its destruction in ethics.

In conclusion, one very remarkable fact about my thesis may be pointed out, viz., that *the more you contest it, the more you confirm it.*

If, that is to say, you do not agree with me and think that you are right and I am wrong, there will arise the conflict of convictions which is so normal in the philosophic world. We shall each of us be convinced that our own beliefs are absolutely right, true and logical, and that they ought to commend themselves to every rational mind, to intelligence as such—for we all naturally identify our beliefs with those of intelligence as such. Being thus convinced of the entire rationality of our own beliefs, we shall naturally be annoyed to find that other minds do not share them. We grasp, therefore, at the excuse that the others would agree with us if their minds could only be cleared of the obfuscations of psychological prejudice. Each of us, whatever his opinion, will think this, if he thinks his beliefs true, and if not, does he really believe them? A claim to absolute truth, therefore, is made on every side of every argument. But in point of fact this claim never is, nor can be, substantiated. Should not this shake our dogmatic confidence that one individual opinion alone, viz., our own, should attain to absolute truth unalloyed by psychological distortions? Why should each of us make an exception in his own favour?

Is it not simpler, therefore, and honester, to disallow this common claim, to drop this appeal to an unknowable ideal, to strike out this X in every one's contention? Let us frankly recognize that in all logical disputes we are dealing with human reasonings alone, and that in these the personal equations and psychological context of the parties to it can never really be abstracted from. The more we differ and the more confident we are that we are right the more manifest do we make this truth. And does not a "Logic" that tries to ignore these facts flee from earth to take refuge in some supercelestial paradise of fools?