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THE FALLACIES OF "THE GREAT ILLUSION."

By GENERAL SIR EDMUND BARROW, G.C.B.

On Friday, January 16th, 1914.

LORD SYDENHAM, G.C.S.I., G.C.M.G., G.C.I.E., in the Chair.

THE CHAIRMAN: Ladies and gentlemen, I think that the lecturer needs no words of introduction from me. We all, especially those of us who have lived in India, know the excellent work he has done for the Army and for the country. We know him also as a man of sound opinions and deep thought, who has given his mind to all military questions and questions of national defence, and who is therefore peculiarly qualified to deal with the subject which we have met here to-day to discuss. I will now ask General Barrow to deliver his lecture.

LECTURE.

SOME three months ago a lecture was delivered in this theatre by Mr. Norman Angell on "The Place of Military Force in Modern Statecraft," a lecture which may be described as an epitome of his well-known work, "The Great Illusion."

On that occasion I ventured to protest against the use of this theatre for such a purpose, because I thought it was not the proper place from which to propagate and advertise the views of pacificists, but our genial Secretary tells me that the object of the Council in inviting Mr. Norman Angell to address us, was to draw a reply. That astute manœuvre was successful, and I at once fell into the trap laid by those wily strategists.

Now I am sure that Mr. Angell must have left this theatre with a feeling of great satisfaction, because he must have perceived that the fallacies and futilities of his lecture had not been even superficially discussed, and that the doctrines he so earnestly preached would practically go forth unanswered from this "Temple of War." Not only must the fact of his lecturing at the R.U.S.I. have impressed the public, but I may remind you that our JOURNAL has a very wide circulation in the Naval and Military world. Besides being read by thousands of British officers, who are quite capable of perceiving the fallacies of any

such lecture for themselves, it is often quoted or commented on by the naval, military, and political periodicals of foreign countries, that is to say, a lecture given here may reach people who are not in a position to gauge by daily intercourse the effect of these doctrines in our country, and consequently it has, either for good or evil, a far greater influence and a far wider audience than one delivered at some philanthropic academy.

You may justly ask why, what I call, the fallacies of his doctrine were not exposed at the discussion which followed the lecture? One good reason is that speakers here are only allowed ten minutes, and one cannot deal satisfactorily with a very complex and abstruse question under that limitation. Another reason is that in a debate on such an intangible subject people are rather apt to be somewhat discursive, and to raise issues which are either untenable or irrelevant. That, ladies and gentlemen, is my excuse for addressing you here to-day.

It will now be my endeavour to expose some of the fallacies of "The Great Illusion," and at least to prove by the attempt that we soldiers do not all bow down before its alluring doctrines, and that we repudiate theories which we are convinced may do harm to our country, by encouraging opposition to what the idealists call "militarism." The difficulty of dealing with this subject is its complex and evasive nature, and the wide field of theory and dogma covered by it. Wherever we propose to attack it we are confronted by vague and elusive theories and intangible assertions. Indeed, it is quite impossible in the limited time of a lecture to examine more than a few aspects of the question. I shall therefore endeavour to concentrate your attention on the main points rather than disseminate my attack over the whole field. Moreover, there is no temptation to do so, because I think all of us must agree with many of Mr. Angell's humanitarian opinions, such, for instance, as those on the supposed survival of warlike nations or the gradual improvement of human nature, and I feel sure that we here are just as desirous of peace as he is, provided it is peace with honour, the more so as many of us have a practical acquaintance with the miseries and horrors of war; but, on the other hand, there is much in his doctrines which I hold is not only misleading, but is actually harmful in its effects on public sentiment.

I will now invite your attention to the synopsis with which "The Great Illusion" is prefaced. In it the author "*sets out to prove that military and political power give a nation no commercial advantage; that it is an economic impossibility for one nation to seize or destroy the wealth of another, or for one nation to enrich itself by subjugating another.*"

Now, without meaning in the least degree to advocate war or the employment of force to obtain commercial advantage, I maintain that these contentions, which are avowedly the basis

of the author's propaganda, are simply untrue, or, at least, delusive. Let us examine them one by one.

I.—Military and political power give a nation no commercial advantage.

It seems to me that the whole history of the world teems with examples to the contrary, but I will give only a few instances from our own modern history. It was the naval power of Great Britain which enabled us to enforce the Navigation Laws,¹ which laws, I think, it is generally admitted, helped very largely to give us the carrying trade of the world in the Stuart and Georgian period. It was naval and military power which led us to a triumphant conclusion in the Napoleonic Wars. Without it we might have been practically excluded for an indefinite period from the trade of the Continent, as was the aim and object of the Berlin Decrees.

It was military and political power that ensured the freedom and development of our trade in India. Without the victory of Plassey the commercial enterprise of the East India Company in Bengal would have been annihilated by the tragedy of the Black Hole. Without the conquest of India our immense Indian trade would never have reached its present dimensions; so how can it be seriously asserted that we derive no commercial or national advantage from the possession of India? It is true that we do not exact a direct tribute from India in the sense that Rome exacted tribute from the Provinces, but indirectly we obtain a very great tribute from India in the pay and pensions of Indian officers and the profits and dividends we realize from Indian business and Indian investments. Leave allowances and pensions alone amount to four-and-threequarter millions per annum. Interest on the Public Debt of India and on railway capital aggregates nine-and-threequarter millions annually, and that, I would observe, is only a fraction of the total amount that flows to England in the shape of dividends and profits. Indeed, the cry among many so-called Indian patriots and their misguided supporters at home is that, India is subjected to what Mr. Keir Hardie quaintly calls "a regular soaking drain," whereas, of course, the real truth is that, capital well invested in India enriches both India and England, thus vitiating the fantastic theory that military and political power give no commercial advantage.

Again, it was naval and military power which enabled us to open China to the trade of the world, to an extent which would have been quite impossible had the Mandarins been able to resist us and to maintain their own exclusive policy in support of that lucrative Chinese institution called "squeeze." It is true we extended the facilities thus acquired for trade to other nations,

¹ Adam Smith describes those laws as "perhaps the wisest of all the commercial regulations of England."

but that does not vitiate my contention. I will give only one more instance taken from quite recent history. What but military and political power enabled us to open up the Soudan to peace, civilization, and commerce? In fact, our whole wonderful commercial growth has been largely and perhaps mainly dependent on military and political power; whereas, according to Mr. Norman Angell's teaching, it gives us no commercial advantage!

Let us pass on to his next contention:—

II.—*That it is an economic impossibility for one nation to seize or destroy the wealth of another, or to capture its carrying trade by conquest.*

Here, again, my best argument is to give concrete examples to the contrary. I will not enlarge on the classic case of Rome and Carthage, because we shall be told that is ancient history and inapplicable to the discussion of modern conditions, so I will take a more recent example from the history of Holland. Let me quote from Blackwood for October: "After having been one of the leading Powers of Europe for more than a century the Republic voluntarily retired from active life among the great nations. Her armies were disbanded. Her fleet was allowed to rot in harbour. Her generals and admirals were pensioned off. . . . Absolved from the duty of self-defence, the citizens grew for a while in prosperity. Free trade gave them cheap food. . . . When at last in 1781 England declared war against the Dutch Republic, the warlike nation grew rich at the expense of the unarmed. . . . The British Fleet had no difficulty in seizing the larger part of the Dutch merchantmen, and in destroying the commerce which the Republic was too peaceful to defend. The Dutch Colonies were forced to surrender to England with all their wealth."

Then came the French Revolution, and Holland being weak and defenceless, was easily absorbed by France.

"Before the Republic got through with France she had paid 276,000,000 guilders in regular, and 339,000,000 in extraordinary, taxes. In plain English, the Republic was robbed of its last cent. During these many years there was no trade, no commerce, no industry, while the Dutch Colonies all fell into British hands."

The Hollanders were forced to serve in the Napoleonic armies and a whole generation of young men were practically annihilated before peace came.

When it did come "the country was bankrupt, the people were hopeless, and in the town of Amsterdam one-half of the population was kept alive by public charity."

It is true that Holland has since revived, and that she is once again a great colonial and commercial Power, but apart from the industry of her people she owes this revival mainly

to the rivalries of the Great Powers and to the altruism of Great Britain. The Congress of Vienna reconstituted Holland, and England restored to her Java and other Dutch Colonies which she had lost during the great war. It is none the less true that if England had retained Java it would have been British merchants and planters who would ultimately have reaped where the Dutch had sown. It is none the less true that England and France between them seized or destroyed the whole wealth of Holland. It is none the less true that we captured the carrying trade absolutely and irrevocably.

I will now comment on another fallacy, namely:—

III.—*That it is an optical illusion to suppose that addition of territory adds to a nation's wealth, since that wealth remains in the hands of its population.*

This, again, is an assertion which I think can be reduced to an absurdity by taking a concrete example, that of Upper Burma. There we have a rich country of great potential value, which for political reasons we were compelled to annex in 1885, since then we have vastly developed it, and riches have for years been pouring into the laps of British traders instead of into the coffers of the Burmese Court or the pockets of its rapacious officials. Indeed, in this particular case it may even be said that the conquering State itself has profited, for if the Rangoon local Press is to be believed Burma has paid a good deal more than her fair share into the Indian exchequer. Personally I do not endorse their complaint as there are many offsets to the supposed drain, but, nevertheless, Burma is frequently described as the milch cow of India, just as Indians complain that the wealth of India is drained by England.

Again, let us suppose that our good friend and ally, Japan, has fallen out with us and has conquered and annexed Ceylon. I only say Japan because I don't want to make a bogey of Germany, or any other possible enemy. What would happen? Japanese officials would replace British officials. British planters would sell their estates for what they would fetch and migrate elsewhere. British shareholders in tea, rubber or other companies would sell out, though even at a heavy loss, and Japanese and Cingalese speculators would buy cheap. The railways being Government property would be confiscated, Japan thus acquiring 600 miles of railway for nothing, which would practically mean a gift of about five millions sterling. Surely all this transfer of property would imply that such benefit as we now get from Ceylon would in future accrue to Japan. Pay and pensions earned by service in Ceylon would go into Japanese pockets. Dividends would go to Tokio instead of to London. Several thousand Japanese would find employment as planters and traders, the railway would become a profitable asset as the capital charges would have been wiped out. Is it, therefore, true to say that it is

an optical illusion to suppose that the addition of Ceylon to the Japanese Dominions would add to the wealth of Japan? Mr. Angell says emphatically that it is. I confess that I am either too simple or too dense to appreciate the theory on which that opinion is based.

Still another fallacy :—

IV.—*If conquest is not to injure the conqueror he must scrupulously respect the enemy's property, in which case conquest becomes economically futile.*

I am not quite sure that this is even true of private property. Certainly it is not the view of the Marine Courts, and in any case I am sure it is not true of public property, such as State railways, canals, telegraphs, warships, munitions of war, and movable property, of any kind, even when we are talking of wars between highly civilized States.

Let me take a hypothetical case, namely, that of a war between Germany and the United States. Suppose the former victorious and that the Isthmus of Panama remains in its possession as the price of victory, what would be the result? Germany would acquire a property which is now exclusively that of the United States, and which has cost her 70 millions sterling. Now, even assuming that Germany scrupulously maintains the equal commercial rights of all nations in the use of the canal—to my mind rather a large assumption—will the conquest be futile? Will she not at least obtain all the profits arising from the dues levied on ships using the canal? According to the precepts of "The Great Illusion," if the conquest is not to be futile, the conqueror should respect the canal and pay the net profits to the United States—which is absurd—as our old friend Euclid would say.

I am not concerned to defend the seizure of *private* property on land, because I agree that it is usually very bad policy indeed, but in the case of public property no other course but confiscation is logical, and I fail to see why it should be futile. To my uninstructed mind war is only futile when it is waged without sufficient cause, or adequate resources, and when a State fails to take full advantage of victory to strengthen its position or to remove future causes of contention.

Let us now turn to another illusion :—

V.—*Political and Military Power can in reality do nothing for Trade.*

This is an amazing assertion, one which I shall endeavour to dispose of in a few words.

Mr. Angell, in Part I., Chapter V., of his book, argues that trade cannot be diverted or industry suppressed by conquest, and to support his contention he takes such preposterous suppositions as the Conquest of England, or that of Germany. I prefer to take the concrete historical examples of India and Algeria.

Has it done nothing for our trade in India? There was a time when Portugal and Holland were the European countries which derived most profit from the Indian trade, and we were comparatively nowhere—I am speaking of Tudor and Stuart times. How do we stand now? Portugal and Holland have practically vanished from the scene, while the trade of the British Empire with India largely exceeds 100 millions sterling *per annum*. If the contention is that the trade would have been equally developed without the possession of India, why is it that our trade with China, a country whose natural resources and population are far greater, only amounts to about 21 millions, although that amount includes the untaxed Hong Kong trade? What is it but the flag, that is to say political and military power, which has worked this miracle?

Algeria had in 1912 a total foreign trade of about 45 millions sterling, of which over 37 millions was with France and her colonies, the rest of the world doing only about eight millions worth of business with Algeria. Surely political and military power must have had some influence in creating this astonishing difference. The same phenomenon may be seen in Tunis. These facts would seem to prove that, despite doctrinaire theory, it is military and political power alone that have given France this great commercial superiority in trade with its North African Colonies.

I have now dealt, so far as time permits, with the axioms formulated in the synopsis of "The Great Illusion," except those where the author touches on what he calls "the human nature of the case." That aspect I do not propose to discuss, because it is an academic psychological subject on which everyone must form his own opinions. I prefer to restrict my lecture to those points which are capable of demonstration by concrete examples and practical facts. I will now turn to the book itself, of which the lecture given here in October last was a sort of short summary.

You will see in Part I., Chapter VII., of "The Great Illusion," that the author expounds at considerable length, and with much force, his views on what, for the sake of brevity, I will call

VI.—*The Colonial Fallacy.*

He summarizes his case thus: "*No nation could gain any advantage by the conquest of the British Colonies, and Great Britain could not suffer material damage by their loss.*" . . . "*The position of crown colonies in the respect which we are considering, is not sensibly different from that of the self-governing ones.*" He then proceeds to support his proposition by showing how utterly impossible it would be for Germany to derive direct advantages from the annexation of Canada, and by quoting our own bitter experience in South Africa. In such special and specific cases, I fully admit his arguments, because,

as he aptly says, when a people are firmly set they cannot be uprooted, but I would observe that self-governing colonies of European race are not the only colonies possessed by England on which a conqueror might cast covetous eyes. At the close of the lecture given here by him, an allusion was made by the Chairman to the case of Canada. This gave Mr. Angell in his reply a magnificent opportunity of enlarging on his pet example for demonstrating the futility of annexations; but if we consider this question, not in relation to self-governing colonies, but from the point of view of crown colonies or possessions, it bears quite another aspect. Mr. Angell and his critic both quoted an article on "Welt Politik" in the *National Review*, and I think I cannot do better than follow their lead and quote what is said on the subject of annexations in Part II. of that same article: "In trying to prove his case, he (Mr. Norman Angell)¹ generally restricts himself to citing the effect of annexing self-governing colonies like South Africa and Canada, and in doing so he has discreetly evaded all direct reference to possessions such as Burma, or Ceylon, or Nigeria, or the Malay States. It is true that he somewhat qualifies his contention by admitting that when a State occupies territory, not for conquest, "but for police purposes," that State does profit thereby, and he quotes India and Algeria as cases in point; but even then he proceeds to argue that the profit is moral rather than real, and that otherwise Germany is benefiting as much as England is by her conquests without having the trouble and expense of administering them. . . . Apart from the direct evidence of national advantage adduced by trade returns, it can be incontestably shown that India and other British possessions not only give profitable employment to a vast number of British subjects as such, but that England derives through them an immense annual income in pay, pensions, dividends, and other profits. No one nowadays supposes that, even if Great Britain were absolutely crushed, her enemies would be so rash or so foolish as to attempt to annex self-governing colonies like Canada or Australia; but if Great Britain does acquire solid advantages from her possession of countries such as Burma, Ceylon, and Malaysia, or from the command of strategic points like Gibraltar, the Suez Canal, or Hong Kong, it is inconceivable why Germany or Japan should not derive like advantages if either were in possession. India is perhaps a case apart, as the difficulties attending the administration of so complex, so populous, so restless, and so progressive an Empire are bewildering, and probably no nation would now care to face them with all their anxieties and uncertainties; but there are many other British possessions throughout the globe which, either directly or

¹ Mr. Norman Angell is not mentioned by name, but it is obviously his book to which reference is made.

indirectly, immediately or potentially, suggest an immense field of profit and employment for the growing population of Germany, while at the same time they would be easily controlled and would considerably enhance the prestige of Germany as a world-Power."

Those views seem to me absolutely irrefutable, and as they exactly express my own ideas and what I now want to convey to you, I have adopted them in their entirety. Take any one of the colonies mentioned, or British East Africa, and I maintain, with all due deference to the arguments adduced by Mr. Angell, that a State annexing any such colonies would obtain precisely the same advantages therefrom that we do. Indeed, it is quite arguable that it would extract even greater advantages by employing the weapon of "Protection." For instance, it might conceivably put a heavy duty on all manufactured goods from Great Britain and other foreign countries, and thus favour its own trade in such articles, just as is now done in the French colonies. As I have already mentioned, nearly $\frac{6}{7}$ ths of the trade of Algeria is with France, while German trade is less than $\frac{1}{16}$ th of the whole. I imagine that if Germany annexed Algeria we should very soon witness a remarkable reversal of these figures, and that Mr. Norman Angell would have to acknowledge that trade is so misguided as to follow the flag. In spite of the beauty and the logic of his theories, German trade in Algeria would be booming while French trade would proportionately decline. Similar results might be expected from the annexation of almost any colony which was not European in type, and remember that quite apart from trade, there are all the advantages connected with the task of administering a country—employment, pensions, prestige. If France lost North Africa the blow would be fatal to her as a Great Power, just as Spain ceased to be a Great Power when she lost her colonial empire. I do not say that that loss was the only cause of her decline, and I admit that quite recently Spain has probably gained by having lost Cuba and the Philippines, but that seeming paradox is due not to the truth of Mr. Angell's doctrines, but to the gross abuse of her past opportunities by Spain. Corruption, rapacity, neglect, bigotry, apathy and tyranny were fatal to colonial prosperity. Spain had abused her trust, and by the inexorable logic of cause and effect, she deservedly lost her colonial empire. But because Spain failed it is futile to tell us that colonies are of no real value, and that it is immaterial who owns them so long as trade prospers.

If England lost her colonies, she would soon also lose her carrying trade, her industries would languish, her great middle class would no longer find congenial employment abroad under the flag, her population would be pauperized, and England would cease to be a great, prosperous and proud community. Conversely the acquisition of such possessions by Germany would increase her trade, her mercantile fleet, and her home

industries. A great field would be opened out for her large and increasing middle class, and Germany would be not only the greatest military Power in the world, but also the greatest colonial Power.

I regret that in this discussion I am obliged to drag in the name of a great nation which for many centuries has been our friend and often our ally, but when Mr. Angell tells us in his emphatic way that "any talk of the German conquest of British Colonies is just so much moonshine; it will never be accomplished, it will never be attempted"; and when, on the other hand, General Von Bernhardt deplores the want of such assured markets as England possesses in her colonies, and says, "what we now wish to attain must be fought for"; and when Professor Delbrück, harping on the same theme bitterly proclaims that "England insists upon being the only great commercial and colonial Power in the world, and is only willing to allow other nations the favour of owning small fragments as enclaves wedged in helplessly between her possessions. This it is which we neither can, nor intend to, tolerate," I can only suggest that the divergence reflected in these conflicting statements, shows that it would be unwise to place too great reliance on the assurances of Mr. Angell, or even on our own honest desire for peace, and that it might be better to take suitable measures for the defence of the British Empire rather than put our trust in the early conversion of the world to the altruistic doctrines of the Idealists. Though at the same time I must admit that I fully agree with what was so well said by M. Clemenceau at the Fabian Society last month—"It is better to come to an understanding, even one having some drawbacks, with a rival, rather than to wear oneself out in endeavouring to injure him." That seems to me equivalent to the scriptural advice, "Agree with thine adversary quickly." Advice which might fitly be engraved over the portals of every Chancellerie in Europe or America.

VII.—*The Impossibility of Confiscation.*

This is another curious fallacy. Of course, if the argument is restricted to such incredible and preposterous cases as the conquest of Germany by England or the annexation of England by Germany as is done in Chapter VI. of his notorious polemic, it is easy to demonstrate the difficulties of confiscation, but such restriction is not a fair representation of the problem. It is a demonstration from a case which can never arise, so let us take a more reasonable supposition. Suppose Italy turned us out of Egypt—I don't suppose anyone dreams of so unlikely an event, as happily our relations with Italy have always been of the very best, but merely for the sake of illustration we will assume that she has become a great and aggressive Power, would it not then be practicable for her to occupy Egypt and confiscate the British shares in the Suez

Canal? Those shares are to-day worth £44,000,000, and bring us in an annual revenue of over one-and-a-quarter millions. I cannot conceive how it can be argued seriously that such confiscation is impossible. Italy would gain one-and-a-quarter millions of revenue just as we do, and we should lose precisely that amount.

Similarly, let us assume that a foreign Power annexes British East Africa. Surely the confiscation of the Uganda Railway, which is Government property, paid for by Great Britain, would be a clear gain to the foreign Power concerned, to the extent of the capital cost of that railway. Or, as I have already pointed out, if Germany seized Panama, even though the canal remained neutral for the passage of the ships of all nations, its confiscation as United States property would mean "rare and refreshing fruit" for Germany in the shape of a big surplus revenue from canal dues, a profit augmented by the fact that there would be no capital charges to meet.

VIII.—*The Indemnity Futility*:—

To this subject Mr. Angell has devoted Chapter VI. of his book, and though much that he has written thereon is based on sound financial theory, I must endeavour to show that it is not quite an impossibility to exact an indemnity out of a conquered country. He says, what is possibly quite true, that at any given moment England could not lay her hands on 50 millions of gold, and that any larger amount would have to be paid for in credit notes or in actual commodities. He admits that such payment by us would mean an actual loss of wealth to us, but he argues that the country exacting the indemnity would not receive any addition to its real wealth, and he quotes the Franco-German case as a proof of the truth of his theory. He shows that the decade following the war was a period of "boom" for French trade, and an era of "slump" for German trade, and he boldly infers that this was mainly the result of the war indemnity paid by France. Of course, one must admit that the indemnity may have been partly responsible for the great disturbance of international markets which took place about that period, but without pretending to be a political economist, I think I may suggest that there were other causes at work which might account for these disturbances, one of which possibly was that the German free trade policy of those days was, in spite of all Cobdenite theory, detrimental to German business. This fact was plainly perceived by Bismarck, and in 1879, or thereabouts, "Protection" was adopted as the guiding principle of German trade and industry. The result was "colossal," to use a favourite German expression, and Germany at once began to forge ahead. I am therefore not inclined to attach too much importance to the deduction drawn from the case of the Franco-German War indemnity. The exact effect of a war indemnity depends on so many factors, political, financial, and economical,

that I defy even the wisest professors of political economy to foretell with certainty the ultimate effects. Those effects, I presume, also depend largely on the form in which the indemnity is exacted. Gold and drafts might be utilized profitably in cancelling national debts, and so reducing future expenditure. Or if too great a transfer of gold was deemed a dangerous disturbance of markets, an indemnity might be exacted in other forms. For instance, the transfer of Suez Canal shares would simply mean the transfer of revenue from Great Britain to some other country, which would annually be one-and-a-quarter millions better off. Or the indemnity could be exacted in battleships or merchant shipping, or even Cardiff coal, thereby either obviating contemplated capital expenditure on armaments or fostering the carrying trade of the country concerned. I may be utterly wrong on this point, and I am open to conviction, but I should think it was quite possible to frame a scientific indemnity which would not injure the country which exacts it.

IX.—*The Fallacy of Unproductive Expenditure.*

In dealing with this question Mr. Angell makes great capital out of the loss incurred by unproductive expenditure on armaments, which loss he debits against what an indemnity brings in.¹ I am, of course, aware that his view is supported even by so eminent an authority as the Chancellor of the Exchequer, who has recently told us that we might just as well throw all the money spent on armaments into the North Sea, but with all due deference to so noted a financial expert, and to the commonly accepted opinion that armaments are unproductive expenditure, I would suggest for your consideration that money spent on armaments may be legitimately compared to an insurance policy for posterity, and therefore not altogether a bad investment, for, as Adam Smith says, "Defence is much more important than opulence." Apart from this, in my view, armament expenditure is not altogether unproductive. The term armaments when used in this connection includes expenditure under two heads, "*personnel*" and "*matériel*"; the former embraces all such items as pay, pensions, instruction, and perhaps the food and clothing of men and horses, while the latter includes expenditure under ships, guns, rifles, ammunition, transport, coal, etc. Now, I maintain that a great deal of this expenditure is *not* unproductive. It gives employment to a vast number of men, not only those in the Army and Navy, but also those employed in shipyards, factories and coal mines, even in agriculture, for soldiers require bread and meat, and horses require oats and barley and forage. If, then, this so-called unproductive expenditure were terminated by abolishing the Army and the Navy, not only would more than half a million men—soldiers, sailors, artisans, miners, and farm labourers—be thrown on the market to swell the ranks of the

¹ Vide his article in the *Financial Review of Reviews* for June, 1913.

unemployed, but employment itself would diminish, Armstrong's, Vickers Maxim, and dozens of other firms might have to close down. Horse breeding would become unremunerative, and the constant unfailing demand for coal, armour plates, weapons, machinery, and for many articles of food and clothing would automatically cease. Of course, it may be argued that men require food and clothes whether they are in His Majesty's service or loafing on the Thames Embankment. True! but the well-paid, well-fed, well-clothed bluejacket or dragoon creates a demand for a far greater quantity of beef and boots, beer and tobacco than the casual worker or the Embankment loafer, so that I maintain that even directly, "armaments" mean reproductive expenditure, and tend to foster many great industries, while indirectly there is, I believe, an immeasurable advantage and absolute gain to the nation in stamina, physique, and all those moral qualities, instilled by discipline, tradition, and pride of service, which our manhood acquire in the ranks of the Army and Navy. Moreover, I would suggest to you that if the pay of the gunner or of the Chief of the Staff is unproductive expenditure so also is that of the postman, or of the Board School teacher, or even of the Cabinet Minister. You have no more right to cavil at the former as unproductive than at the latter. They all have their useful functions, even if they produce nothing concrete.

Another fallacy, and that, I maintain, the most dangerous of all, is that :—

X.—Preparation for War is a childish futility.

Mr. Angell does not specifically say this, but it is the obvious inference to be drawn from the following sentiments to which Mr. Angell has given expression :—

"Si vis pacem para bellum" may have been true of a State which represented to some extent an oasis of civilization in a desert of savagery, but that does not represent the situation of Great Britain.

If each repudiates any intention of attack and is sincere in that repudiation, the necessity for defence falls to the ground.

If it be demonstrated that no possible advantage can be obtained by a successful attack, no one will make that attack.

Aggression is out of date, and when aggression ceases self-defence will be no longer necessary.

Now, to preach such theories, to an unthinking mob of voters who are only too eager to be caught by plausible catch-words, or to be beguiled by illusive pictures of ease without effort, or something for nothing, seems to me not only foolish

but positively harmful. It is foolish because it is setting up crude theories against the experience and wisdom of all the ages. It is harmful because there are thousands and thousands of our people in every grade of society, from influential politicians down to timid spinsters, who will joyfully welcome such arguments as a step towards disarmament, economy and universal peace. Such doctrines can only encourage delusive hopes which might soon be irretrievably blasted by all the misery and desolation consequent on a disastrous war, which we had made insufficient preparation to avert. I am not going to waste time discussing this crowning fallacy. It is too self-evident!

Apart from the fallacies with which I have been dealing, there is one point out of which Mr. Angell makes great capital, one, indeed, which I cannot class among the fallacies, namely, *the interdependence of international finance and commerce*. Of course, we are all aware that there has been an enormous development in this respect during the last hundred years. That is no new or original discovery, and we may suppose that even statesmen and soldiers are cognizant of so patent a change, and of the complications and dangers which it adds to war, but they are also aware that the logic of moneybags and the piteous appeals of Messrs. Jeshuron, Croesus and Midas are not the factors which will decide the issues of peace or war when the honour or interests of the nations are at stake. No doubt those influences will have a restraining or steadying effect, but they are not the final or the most potent influences, and, moreover, it is neither the prudence of the financier nor even the wisdom of the statesman which will govern the ultimate decision, but the wild will of a reckless and ignorant mob, plunging the nations into war over some fancied insult, some real injury, or some threatened interest. At such moments weak Governments, however prudent and wise, are swept off their feet. Some untoward and unforeseen event, a massacre of missionaries in China, a fanatical outburst of Islam, a wanton defiance of the Monroe Doctrine on the one hand, or some outrageous perversion of its principles on the other, will drive the mob into the streets bellowing for war regardless of financial consequences or catastrophic possibilities. Consequently full reliance on the restraining influence of the interdependence of finance would be the height of folly, while entire trust in the efficacy of arbitration would be a crime.

Time will not permit me to expose fallacies which in my opinion underlie many other of the arguments or assertions advanced by Mr. Angell, and, indeed, I may have failed to convince you even regarding those on which I have touched.

Without any desire to be personal I have found it necessary to criticize what I would venture to call "angelic" sophistries, because those sophistries are liable to be accepted as gospel

truth by many intelligent and sincere persons, and I could not but be aware that any brutal or cynical theory contrary to the principles of peace and righteousness would be summarily rejected by them if I failed to dispute those sophistries, more especially as Mr. Angell tells us most emphatically that those who write and talk in a sense contrary to his "must be guilty either of very great ignorance or some insincerity." I trust you will at least acquit me of insincerity, and I hope that the very assertiveness of my remarks may perhaps induce such happy optimists as his disciples to ponder a little on the subject, and to consider whether the history of the world, the experience of ancient Rome and of modern Britain, and above all the natural cupidity of nations as well as of men, does not present another aspect to the case than the pleasing but illusive vision of an all-wise, virtuous, and altruistic world governed, not by brute force, but by reason and philosophic dogma.

As to very great "ignorance," I can only plead as my excuse that as it is a subject which one *angel* does not fear to tread, so that I may perhaps be forgiven for my folly in rushing after him, more especially as I honestly believe that the extreme doctrines of the pacifists are a positive danger to us in this sentimental and emotional age, because their propaganda seems deliberately calculated to disarm our country. They glorify wealth and comfort while inferentially they disparage patriotic sacrifice, and magnify the drawbacks of military service. They encourage reliance on such weak reeds as arbitration or the "financial interdependence of nations," while they completely disregard racial jealousies, national aspirations, and personal ambitions.

I am not competing with Mr. Angell for the Nobel prize, but I am confident that "*si vis pacem*" is a surer recipe for peace than *the interdependence of finance*. The advocates of naval and military efficiency are the true pacifists! Not those who, with a sublime indifference to facts, preach disarmament.

As we all know, the risk of financial ruin did not prevent the Balkan races from plunging into an insane and sordid scrimmage for the spoils of war amongst themselves. So too, a knowledge of the evils and horrors of war will not preserve the peace of nations if they believe their honour or their interests are menaced. Moreover, all States are not civilized, and it is the untamed and barbaric nations that may in the future, as in the past, be the disturbing cause. Some new Asiatic or African question, the yellow peril, or some Pan-Islamic cataclysm may contain the germs of future trouble between the great nations of the world, and though I, too, am a pacifist in the sense that I *know* and abhor the suffering and misery that war entails, I also recognize the eternal truth of the old Roman adage, *Si vis pacem para bellum*, nor do I ignore the moral of the Divine teaching when in its profound wisdom we were told, "When a strong man armed keepeth his palace his goods are

in peace. But when a stronger than he shall come upon him, he taketh from him all his armour in which he trusted and divideth his spoils."

DISCUSSION.

Col. Sir Claude MacDonald: I wish, after listening to the interesting lecture of my old friend, to say that I entirely endorse every word he has said. I have had the honour of representing His Majesty's Government for 13 years in Japan and for five years in China, and I beg to state most emphatically that the commercial advantages which I had the good fortune to obtain for Great Britain in China, were largely due to the fact that there was a strong English fleet in Chefoo ready at hand. This may be immoral, but it is very true. To illustrate my point, I would remind you that when the lease of Port Arthur was obtained from the Chinese Government by the Russians, they, too, had a very powerful fleet out there. The same thing applies with regard to our lease of Wei-hai-wei and the enlargement of our territory at Hong-Kong; while the French also on that occasion obtained very material advantages in South China. Another nation, which the lecturer mentioned, and which has always been a very great friend of ours, also demanded the lease of a port. His Excellency, the great statesman, Li Hung Chang, came to me and said: "Dear me, why are these people asking for something? They have only got two men-of-war in Chinese waters, one called the "Marco" and the other called the "Polo"! I did not enlighten His Excellency with the fact that they had only one man-of-war, which was called the "Marco-Polo." This particular nation never got what they asked for, which shows you how military and political power have some effect in obtaining commercial and other advantages. I have said these few words in support of the lecturer, my old friend General Barrow, because it is due to his and General Gaselee's gallant dash up to Peking which enables me to be here this afternoon, otherwise I might be in "another place," where, at any rate, the climate would be more genial than what we are at present favoured with in our own beloved land.

The Chairman: I am sure we are all sorry that Mr. Norman Angell cannot be here this afternoon to defend his theories, but his representative, Mr. Langdon-Davies, is present, and I will now call upon him to speak.

Mr. Bernard M. Langdon-Davies: I owe it to your courtesy that I am able to take the place of a man far more distinguished than myself, and to touch upon a few points of general interest in the paper. May I say in the first place that I think General Barrow is doing a thing which is very dangerous to our military arrangements. He does not believe that these doctrines ought to be discussed here, because, as he says himself, if they are unrefuted here they will be dangerous to our military arrangements. He then discusses them here, and, I venture to say, he has in no sense whatever refuted them. And why has he failed to refute them? Because he has not represented them correctly; because he has set up for himself a set of nincpins and has trundled the ball at them with great satisfaction to himself, and has been giving us the treat of watching him knock them over. I want to give five points in which he has misrepresented the whole doctrine of "The Great Illusion" of Mr. Norman Angell, which are fundamental points in our doctrine. In the first place, Mr. Norman Angell is pointing out facts in regard to warfare in the 20th Century, and the reader of the paper has tried to annihilate him by

dragging in records of the 17th and 18th Centuries—before the introduction of the locomotive engine, before the introduction of steam-ships, before the introduction of the electric telegraph, before everything upon which our arguments mainly depend. In the second place, Mr. Norman Angell's argument applies, and only applies, and has never been intended to apply to anything else, but to warfare between two highly-civilized, highly-organized communities. Yet now we are treated to disquisitions on Algeria and the conquest of India centuries ago, which he would not deny have had an effect on the commercial development of the world. In the third place, Mr. Norman Angell has never asserted that a conquered nation might not suffer by its conquest, but he has questioned whether the conquering nation gains, which is a totally different proposition. In the fourth place, the reader of the paper has entirely neglected the fact that although you may get something from the conquered country, the question that Mr. Norman Angell has asked, the subject that he is laying down for discussion, is whether that something which you gain is commensurate with the cost of gaining it; and that question has not been dealt with by the reader of the paper to-day. And the fifth misapprehension of Mr. Norman Angell's whole position was in that description of him given at the end of the paper as a pacifist, as one of the people who lives in Utopia with his head in the clouds and possessing nothing but vague ideals. I note, by the way, that idealists and moralists and sentimentalists are all mixed up together by the lecturer as if they were the same thing. Mr. Norman Angell is not in that sense or in any such sense to be styled a pacifist. He is a student of economics who is bringing to the people certain things for discussion. He has never for one moment—and it is a libel to say that he has—hinted at the disarmament of one nation as against another. His whole doctrine is an assertion of the right of defence, because he denies the right of force to rule. If one man attacks another, or if one nation attacks another, that is an assertion of the right of force to the control of property; and defence by an individual or a nation is a denial of the right of force to the control of property. In that sense, and in every sense, there is no stronger upholder of the right of defence in this country than Mr. Norman Angell. To say that he believes in disarmament, in taking it lying down, in these or any Utopian ideals, is a libel and nothing else. Those are the five general misconceptions of the reader of the paper. Now, may I deal with one or two points in particular? Firstly, with regard to military power giving commercial advantage, as I pointed out, the examples are all taken from the 17th and 18th Centuries. Mr. Norman Angell has never denied, in fact he has pointed out that military force could very likely in times past give commercial advantage when used for one of two purposes—for the sake of preventing force being used against one, or for the sake of compelling barbarous people to develop the resources of their country, or to allow others to do so if they would not do so for themselves. He has pointed this out himself, but even so it is open to us to question the final balance sheet. I do not say which way it will go—I do not know; I want to discover. We have heard a great deal of talk about India this afternoon; we have heard a great many examples given with regard to India. I admit that we have a trade of 109 millions a year with the Indian Empire, and very advantageous it is. It is 44 per cent. of the total trade of India. We might or might not have had that percentage of the total trade of India had some other Power had the task of governing and of conquering it—we might or we might not. That we cannot know. But I would point out this fact, that

there is another Empire in the world with which we have an annual trade of 100 millions, very nearly the same amount, and that is the German Empire, which it has never cost us a penny to conquer, which we have had no trouble in maintaining, and which does not involve us in complications with the other Powers of the world. So that, as I have just stated, I think we can get these advantages, and we do get these advantages without the necessity of conquest. Then I come to the example taken of one country seizing or destroying the wealth of another. I was astonished to see that the reader of the paper had taken the case of Holland. Why, it is proverbial that Holland to-day is, proportionately to the number of its population, one of the wealthiest and most prosperous countries in the world. And besides that, if it is true that wealth was taken from it, our point is not that in a past time Holland may not have suffered by conquest, but that we must ask whether the citizens of the countries which took the wealth from Holland gained by doing so. And even that is not our final question; but what they would gain to-day in the circumstances of to-day. I think the reader of the paper will agree with me that there came about four arguments on the same question, broadly speaking, namely the possibility of confiscation of colonies, and one thing and another. I want to point out one criticism of the whole of that argument, namely, that the reader of the paper took all the figures on the credit side and never mentioned one on the debit side. He never mentioned the cost in these cases of taking the Panama Canal or Ceylon, or whatever it may be—the cost of preparation for war, the cost of the conduct of the war, the cost of policing, the cost of defending yourself against possible reprisals, the indirect loss to your trade during the war, the indirect loss to your trade in the unproductive expenditure. Not one of those things on the debit side of the account did he mention. Now may I refer to one particular point, the Panama Canal. I have just been spending five months in all parts of America, and I have been taking a great interest in the questions of American politics at the present time. Seriously, does the reader of the paper imagine to-day that the advantage of the Panama Canal to the United States of America is contained in the exaction of tolls? Why, that has a very serious offset to it in the present necessity, as the United States Government seems to think, of the increase of the fleet to protect the Canal. Go round the cities in the Gulf of Mexico; go up the great ports of the Pacific coast as I have been doing in the last few months, and you will know that the advantage to America is coming from the enormous influx of trade to those ports, which the government of the Canal would not affect one way or the other. There will be no tolls unless the shipping is allowed to go through to communicate with those ports; so that the country which took the Canal for the purpose of the tolls and then refused to allow the ships to go through would not find that it had gained very much by so doing. I am afraid I have used up the time at my disposal, but I should just like to allude for a few moments to the last point but one in the paper, unproductivity. I perfectly agree that there is no such thing as absolute unproductivity. It is a relative question. Things are more or less productive. But the arguments used by the lecturer are precisely the arguments which I always find in the mouths of labouring men who have not studied political economy. I had it brought before me three times only a month ago in the People's Institute in the City of New York, that because you employ people therefore your labour or your industry is productive. I think I can show you

that what the reader of the paper has said in that connection is incorrect by a *reductio ad absurdum*. If expenditure on armaments is good for employment, good for the prosperity of a nation, carry it on; build more armaments and more armaments and more armaments until the whole nation is making or manning armaments; and then you will find it is mere hypocrisy to say that any man wants employment or wants work. No honest man wants to work; he wants to be rewarded for work; and if the whole nation were employed making and manning armaments we should be spending our last penny on defence, as Mr. Herbert Samuel recently advised us to do if necessary, and we should have killed ourselves in the process. We should all be dead of starvation and should have nothing whatever left to defend. As to General Barrow's last point, the great truth that the reader of the paper has discovered is that the main object of defensive measures is protection against attack. I cannot imagine any other object of defensive measures than protection against attack. But perhaps his point is that we in our movement wish to get rid of defensive measures. If I recall Mr. Norman Angell's words aright he speaks of his lifelong and passionate belief in the duty of a nation to defend itself to its last penny and its last man if it is attacked. Those are his words, and to brand us as people who are going in for disarmament is a libel. Our object is threefold. Mr. Norman Angell and those of us who are following him are trying to point out certain facts of modern commerce and modern international relations which are too often neglected. We say that the removal of misapprehensions on these points will remove many of the causes which lead to distrust and hostility between the nations, and we advocate measures to disseminate the study and the mastery of those facts, and that is the beginning and end of our propaganda. I would ask the reader of the paper to think, and think again, before he attacks doctrines of which he has so little apprehension as these doctrines; and I think he has no right to question, as impliedly he does question, the arguments and motives of a movement the idealism and patriotism of which is perhaps scarcely less than his own.

Lord Newton: I hope I shall be acquitted by the last speaker (whose remarks struck me, if I may say so, as of a somewhat aggressive character in the mouth of a pacifist) if I do not reply specifically to his arguments and if I leave the reply to General Barrow, who intimated in the course of his remarks that he was only precluded by want of time from dealing with them. I hope, therefore, that I may be allowed to put my own views on the question of disarmament without arousing any unnecessary hostility. In the first place I should like to observe that it seems to me when we are discussing the question of disarmament we are the very last people who ought to complain. There are, as I understand it, two methods of defending your own country: one is to defend it in person; the other method is to defend it by paying someone else to do so. With regard to the first method, it would be an exaggeration to term it economical, but at all events it is effective. The other method is distinctly not economical, and there are many people who hold it to be ineffective. But the curious thing is that it is the persons who are in favour of the latter principle who are always denouncing expenditure. I hope I shall not annoy the gentleman who spoke last if I describe the advocates of disarmament somewhat colloquially as a class who won't play and who object to pay. It has always struck me, as a mere ignorant observer, that the weakness of the Norman Angell principle is that it is founded

upon the essential fallacy that we have grown more moral. I do not gather from the previous speaker that even he claims that nations have grown more moral. Certainly I do not observe that morality appears to be on the increase, even amongst the most highly civilized nations of Europe, or even in the United States; and I think it would be quite sufficient to recall to your minds very recent events in history to prove it, such, for instance, as the attack of the Italians upon Tripoli; the case of the peaceful penetration of Morocco; the equally peaceful penetration of Persia by Russia; the instance of the action of Austria in the case of Bosnia Herzegovina, and, finally, the case of the late Balkan War. I maintain that it is sheer brazen hypocrisy to pretend that those wars arose out of any cause but from the weakness of the country which was attacked. I hope I shall not again offend the previous speaker by insinuating that the most illustrative examples that I can recall to my mind of his own principles are at the present moment those unfortunate countries—Morocco, Persia, and I think I might add, Korea. Korea was a country which not only did not waste any money upon armaments, but was a free trade country as well. That country, in common with the other two unfortunate nations which I have mentioned, put the Norman Angell principles into practice, and now at all events one of the three has already ceased to exist. Is there anybody in this room who will seriously contend that the future of the smallest European Power, however cultured and advanced it may be, is worth anything at all unless it takes all the steps that lie within its power to provide for its own safety? Why, we have the example at the present moment of all these cultured and advanced nationalities spending, I might say, their last penny, and serving in their own persons, merely for the purpose of preserving their own existence; and we know perfectly well that if it were not for these precautions, in spite of their culture and all the rest of it, their big and powerful neighbours would pick a quarrel with them, and it would not be long before they were absorbed. All these agitations at the present moment, as far as this country is concerned, seem to me always to lead to the same point; they all seem to me to lead to a kind of abject supplication upon our part to the Germans to cease increasing their Navy. I venture to draw your attention, though it is somewhat egotistical on my part to do so, to the lessons of history. This is no new feature in English foreign policy. In the beginning of the year 1870, within something like six months of the Franco-German War, the English Foreign Minister, Lord Clarendon, approached the Prussian Government, Count Bismarck then being the Prime Minister, with the object of persuading the Prussians to disarm, and all the arguments with which we are familiar were used by him, and used by him, I need scarcely tell you, in vain. It is unnecessary for me, and it would be impossible for me to quote in full, the replies which were made by Count Bismarck; they will be found, if anybody is curious upon the subject, in a work which I have recently produced myself. But the gist of the replies may be included in a sentence or two. The reply of Bismarck was to this effect: "It is all very well for you who live in an island to preach retrenchment to us, but put yourselves in our skin"—that was his elegant phrase. "What would you say to us if we came to you and told you that your Navy was too big, and that you were spending too much money upon it?" (I may tell you, by the way, that we were spending more than three times as much upon armaments as the Prussians were spending upon their Army and Navy combined.) What would the reply have been?

The reply would have been that it was a piece of gross impertinence on the part of the Prussian Government, and I believe that that would be the reply which would be made at the present day. Well, if it is an impertinence on the part of the Prussian Government, or any other Government, to address this kind of remonstrance to us, it is equally an impertinence, in my opinion, for us to address this remonstrance to Germany. If I were a German citizen there is nothing I should resent more than to be read a lecture by the English Chancellor of the Exchequer, or the English First Lord of the Admiralty, or any other Englishman upon the inequity of German armaments. I hope that at some not far distant date, so-called British statesmen may at least be able to grasp the simple fact that the amount which a nation, whether it be Germany or any other nation, spends upon its armaments is a matter which concerns that nation alone, and which it will decide for itself without consulting the opinion of English theorists or of anybody else.

Col. W. R. Clifford: Sir Edmund Barrow said in his lecture that he did not want to go at all into the personal element involved in this question, but inasmuch as rather further on he remarks on the moral effect introduced by service and discipline and tradition, I may perhaps be justified in making a few brief remarks on the subject. I speak with very great diffidence in the presence of so many other officers senior to myself, who know the British soldier far better than I can ever do, but I can claim this, that I have been myself a regimental officer from subaltern to commanding officer, and therefore I may perhaps be in a position to give as good advice as those who advised Mr. Norman Angell when he slandered the British soldier in the way he did in his book. I should be very pleased to find out what the name of the officer was who advised him, because I am perfectly certain he was somebody who had no knowledge whatever of the British soldier.

Mr. Langdon-Davies: Captain March Phillippis.

Col. Clifford: I should not take him as any very great authority. I have had the privilege of serving most of my life with the British soldier, and I think perhaps I know as much as Captain March Phillippis. In one of his chapters, Mr. Norman Angell says that human nature changes. That is quite true. But when it comes to the question of the effect of military service he apparently drops that argument because it is not convenient, and he still continues to argue that the effect of service on the British soldier is not for his benefit; in other words, that he ends up by being a worse man than he was when he came into the Service. I dispute that argument entirely. When you are considering the man you need not consider his military virtues—that goes without saying; what you want to consider are his virtues as a citizen, whether they are bettered by his having been a soldier or whether they become worse. I venture to say that you will find no more generous character than the British soldier. Those who know him well know that. I know his small acts of generosity; I know his acts of generosity on a very much bigger scale. They are so numerous that I could go on quoting them till I wearied you. What about his sobriety? Is it not proverbial now that the British soldier of the present day is a sober man? I can assure you that when I was commanding my regiment not very long ago, I found that the instances of drunkenness that came before me were almost nil. And, what is more, there was no screening of such cases. So that I think we may

conclude that the British soldier is no worse either in the matter of sobriety or in the matter of generosity than other citizens; indeed, I claim for him that when he finishes his time he is a very much better man than when he came into the Army. You must not judge the soldier, as he so often is judged, when you see him in the unhappy circumstances in which we sometimes do in the streets in rather ignominious employment. That is not always his fault; that is sometimes ours; and I am sure it is the earnest desire of all of us to see these things bettered. I am afraid I am straying somewhat from the subject of the paper, but my whole object was to defend, as far as in me lies, as an old regimental officer, the British soldier from the attacks which have been most wantonly and wickedly made upon him.

Admiral The Hon. Sir Edmund Fremantle, K.C.B.: Ladies and gentlemen, as an old member of the Council, I entirely agreed with the decision of the Council to hear Mr. Norman Angell in this theatre. I think we were quite right in doing so, but I also entirely agree with the lecturer that he ought to have been suitably answered. I feel that we are much indebted to my friend, Sir Edmund Barrow, for coming here to-day to give that answer, and I am very proud to see such a large number of people present, many of whom, I am sure, are as convinced as I am of the fallacies which have been raised by Mr. Norman Angell in his book "The Great Illusion." I did not hear the lecture at this Institution, but I have read the book, and I am as much convinced as Sir Edmund Barrow of its fallacies. The great danger is that many of us, not in this theatre, but in the city, do think in terms of £ s. d. They think of the moneybags; they think of commerce; they think of trade—all extremely good things in themselves, but they think those things move human nature, that they move nations. I do not agree with them. I do not think it is correct to do so. I should like to say a few words to those who are anxious to reduce the Budget for the British Navy. From some statistics which were given mainly by the Prime Minister himself a short time ago, it is clear that whereas when this Government came into office the amount spent on the Civil Service and the amount spent on the Naval and Military Services were practically equal, it is now the case that there are only 42 and a decimal millions spent upon the Naval and Military Services and there are 57 millions and a decimal spent upon the Civil Service. As a matter of fact, if we go to figures we shall find that there has been an increase in the Civil Service of 34 millions and an increase in the Naval and Military Services of seven millions; and the Prime Minister stated that there has been an increase in the Army Estimates of the principal Powers of Europe of a matter of 80 millions, and in the Naval Estimates of a matter of 35 millions, a total increase of 115 millions on the part of our friends or enemies on the Continent. Under those circumstances it is quite clear that the present is a most inopportune moment for the pacificists, who are really the stormy petrels of the body politic, to attempt to take action with a view to the reduction of the Naval Estimates. I should like to say a word or two about the advantages or the disadvantages of Colonies. There was a great deal of truth in much of what was said by Mr. Norman Angell, but there is far more truth in what has been said by our lecturer to-day. It was only a few nights ago at the Colonial Institute that I heard a very good lecture given by a German professor on the German Colonies, and he said distinctly: "We want those Colonies for our industries; we want

them to grow the produce which we require. We do not want to have them for colonization; we do not want to have to take our people abroad; we want them at home, although, of course, a certain number of Germans would be in those Colonies for administrative purposes." But he distinctly disclaimed the idea of wanting Colonies for colonization; he wanted Colonies for the direct assets they would give them. It strikes me very forcibly that many of the remarks made by Mr. Norman Angell are practically truisms. But there is certainly no truism in his statement that aggression is out of date, because that, I think, we all dispute; and he is begging the whole question when he says that when aggression ceases self defence will be no longer necessary. The recent history of the world does not show that aggression has ceased. I think the best answer which can be given to Mr. Norman Angell was given in "Blackwood," and if you will allow me one minute I should like to read what is there said: "Man does nothing except for profit, that is their argument. War is unprofitable, therefore war must cease to exist. It is not for money that poets sing their songs and scholars write their books." We know that honour, patriotism and distinction and many other things do produce wars; I think they do produce something better than merely looking for money or for personal advantage from the money point of view.

Col. E. M. Lloyd: We have had a very interesting discussion on the economics of the question, but what we are concerned with here is not so much whether Mr. Norman Angell's theories are sound, as whether they are likely to be accepted abroad, and if so whether in consequence we can assume that war will be abolished. I think Mr. Norman Angell is quite mistaken in suggesting that his argument is novel, and that is the point that I particularly wish to lay stress on. Anyone who is familiar with the writings of Cobden will know that this theory is nothing else than Cobdenism brought up to date. There is the same insistence on the worthlessness of Colonies. I should like to read you a short passage from a letter that Cobden wrote during the Indian Mutiny. He doubted our ability to hold our ground in India, and he thought we had made a mistake in going there. But he found that even among his own friends there were many who differed from him, and he writes to one of them: "If you talk to our Lancashire friends they argue that unless we occupied India there would be no trade with that country, or that somebody else would monopolize it, forgetting that this is the old Protectionist theory which they used formerly to ridicule." To him it was a great shock to find that those cotton spinners, who had backed him up in doing away with the Corn Laws, would not back him up when he proposed to imperil their markets. In the same way he put it as unflinchingly as Mr. Norman Angell, that war cannot help trade, and that the Navy was of no use to commerce. He said the best thing we could do would be to cut down our Army and Navy Estimates by a half and use the money so saved in reducing our taxes on raw materials. So also with the interdependence of nations. He said that all nations are so bound together economically that all the tendencies of the age make for peace; yet four great European wars followed within 20 years. The fact that Mr. Norman Angell is saying the same things as Mr. Cobden said 50 years ago would not necessarily show that they are false. But we know that these doctrines have been before the world for all that time, and instead of Free Trade gaining ground it has lost ground. Other nations hanker after Colonies, and

therefore unless Mr. Norman Angell can convert the apostles of colonization in Germany, we have no reason whatever to think that his teaching will have any bearing at all on the preparation for war in the future.

Brig.-General F. G. Stone: Mr. Norman Angell's fallacies have been so fully and finally dealt with by the lecturer that I can add nothing of any value to their logical refutation. But there is rather an important domain outside logic, which is known as human nature, and this domain is apparently unexplored by Mr. Norman Angell, except in so far that he appears to believe that the dominant motive of individuals and nations is always and under all circumstances to be rich in material comforts and financially prosperous. Mr. Norman Angell's arguments remind me irresistibly of the reasoning of parents who are anxious to provide for the worldly advantage of their children by suitable marriages; the son or daughter listens dutifully, and quite sees the force of the argument, for are they not obviously sound? But when it comes to the scratch the girl raises the illogical objection that she does not like the suitor who is recommended, and the boy upsets the apple-cart by falling violently in love with someone who is actually detrimental to his prospects in life. Love, hate, ambition, revenge, religion, idealism, expediency, self preservation, and many other complex factors enter into the question of one country making war on another; to make war without adequate preparation means disaster, hence every Power which desires to maintain a self-respecting existence must maintain a suitable standard of military efficiency—in which is included naval efficiency where required. In 1868 war between France and Prussia was freely discussed. France feared the aggrandisement of Prussia by means of an extension of the area of the North German Confederation, and felt that if a check was to be inflicted on Prussia, now was the time, as France could not grow stronger by putting off the apparently inevitable conflict, while Germany undoubtedly would grow stronger. There was also a great amount of internal discontent in France; the Emperor Napoleon III. felt that his throne was in danger, and that if he could not pacify the people by the grant of greater internal liberty by means of constitutional government, then war was the only alternative. Bismarck was perfectly well aware of the sentiments of France, and of the Emperor; he was also absolutely bent on the unification of Germany. When, therefore, persistent efforts were made by France in 1869, through the medium of Lord Clarendon, to induce Prussia to reduce her armaments, Bismarck was under no illusion as to the altruism of the proposal, although scarcely anyone either in France or England seems to have been aware that Bismarck was determined in some way to bring matters between France and Prussia to a crisis, and at the same time to put France morally in the wrong. Bismarck's closely-reasoned and masterly reply to one of Lord Clarendon's letters to Sir Augustus Loftus, the British Ambassador at Berlin, is well worth reading in the full text; but the following extract from it sums up the case against disarmament in succinct, dignified terms, which seem applicable to all circumstances and to all time:—"It must be acknowledged that whilst on the one hand, the state of preparation for war, of the Great Powers, gives rise to apprehension, still, that very state of preparation may, on the other hand, prove a practical guarantee that any attempt to assail or disturb existing rights will be firmly and effectively met. . . . The inclinations of a nation may be essentially peaceful, they may rest on a keen appreciation of their own interests, but they are, nevertheless, liable to be suddenly

changed by some unforeseen accident or by fictitious agitation. Under these circumstances neither the most powerful monarch, nor the most influential Minister, is able to estimate or guarantee the duration of peaceful inclinations." We all know that almost immediately after the French protestations that they were so convinced of the peaceful disposition of their people and their Government that they were willing to reduce the French Army by one-tenth as a proof of sincerity, without making any demand on Prussia for reciprocity, the Hohenzollern succession to the Spanish Throne set France in a blaze from end to end, and an irresistible demand for war on Prussia completely obliterated all dallying with disarmament. I quote this as a conspicuous instance of war being demanded by a nation on what rightly or wrongly it considered a point of honour—it most certainly was nothing more. Prussia, on the other hand, was playing for a very material stake, and won it. Most people who have taken the trouble to study the phenomenal growth of German prosperity see the beginning of it in the military organization of Prussia under von Moltke's genius, which produced "the Nation in Arms." Without quoting other instances, is it not an obvious fact that good government can only be maintained throughout the world by the knowledge that the necessary force to ensure it is always capable of being called in where moral suasion fails? And above all, does not a nation get even more value out of the national training of its citizens in habits of discipline, cleanliness, self-denial, order, and respect for authority, than it does out of the secular education of the children at school, which goes just far enough to make them dissatisfied with their lot, and throws them on the world at the most critical time of their lives without having learnt their duty to God or their neighbour, and without a glimmering of their responsibilities to their country?

Dr. Miller Maguire: At this late hour I think it would be almost trifling with the audience if I did more than express as a civilian who has been bound to study and to observe the history of Europe for the last 30 years or so, my entire agreement with the most admirable address of the lecturer, General Sir E. Barrow, who has done a service to the British nation in his capacity as a lecturer, especially in the present age of cant and false hypocrisy, which very few soldiers could have done in the capacity of warriors. Not that any one of us in this room would depreciate in the least the services of our soldiers in every capacity and in every clime. But what we want above all things now is the *Truth!* If we get at the truth in regard to military matters, especially if it is expressed by such an eminent authority, we ordinary civilians would be only too happy to support him in every way. With regard to the abominable remarks continually made in our nation, and in our nation alone, by certain persons who might have been better taught, about the decadence of the manners and morals of our soldiers relatively to other parts of the community, I have something to say. I alternately spend my time among Press men and lawyers—when I get a brief—and soldiers for the rest of the day; and there is not the slightest doubt about it that the officers of the British Army can hold their own with regard to morals, and what is as important to ladies, with regard to love-making and manners, with any other profession with which I am connected. The privates, in language, civility and tone generally are at least as presentable as their brothers in civilian careers, and the Generals of the British Army are at least as

competent as the Government will allow them to be, that is to say, every man who gets a chance does his duty well. He has not lost anything by being a soldier. A man of 60 years of age or a man of 50 years of age, like myself, if he had deteriorated by soldiering would have sufficient common sense left to repent and know wherein he had deteriorated, and to warn others. For my own part I was improved from being a very sad boy indeed, when I joined the Army, and even the Inns of Court "Devil's Own" Volunteers, to something of a man when I left them, although I had the misfortune, according to the paltry sophists represented by this grand illusioner, of having been for some time attached to that regiment as a private, and attached to the Guards' course as an officer, and I found the Guards respectable enough for any man, English or Irish.

Mr. Langdon-Davies: I was also in the Devil's Own.

Dr. Miller Maguire: I have not the least objection to that, or to his re-entering the corps; and I am sure if the gentleman answers to the name he will do well in some part of the great universal frame. I want to emphasize the truths put forward by soldiers and by statesmen, although we are not all soldiers. We become taxpayers and fathers of families, some of us, to be saved from ruin by soldiers. Lord Chancellor Bacon, a great lawyer, sets forth in his "Essay on the True Greatness of Kingdoms and States"—I commend this to the late member of the Devil's Own, who has the Law Library at his disposal—every single word only, in regard to another century, that the gallant lecturer has said to-day: "above all things if you wish to preserve the greatness of the State you must have a race of military men," and "to be master of the sea is an abridgment of a monarchy," and "above all for Empire it is most important that a nation do profess arms as their principal honour, study, and occupation." "No nation that doth not profess arms in time of peace need expect success in arms in time of war." He did not write for a day or for a passing whim, but for all time, and he proved that it is the duty of one generation to introduce such ordinances, customs, drills, experiments and such zeal in arms, regardless of cost, as may "sow greatness to posterity." The gallant lecturer begs of you to "sow greatness for posterity!" Not by fooling in time of peace. *Si vis pacem, para bellum*. Work in time of peace—trust not to fortune or luck, be ready. Then with regard to Mr. Norman Angell's theories that money is not riches and that it makes no matter whether a nation is a few milliards in debt more or less. Well! I think all these theories have been well tossed to pieces by the John Bulls in this room already, and by their ancestors in history. Substituting the angelic virtues of the book for the diabolical vehemence of the orator, does he pretend for one moment that he has not told us in his admirable piece of special pleading this afternoon that "The Great Illusion" is bosh? I read "The Great Illusion" three times, and I was paid five guineas one way and another for criticizing it, and therefore I ought to know something about it! This "Great Illusion" led us to believe that there was something very wonderful indeed in the proposition made. It now turns out that not even the most radical Englishman could be deluded by the "Illusion" into throwing aside the philosophy of Lord Bacon for the bosh of the 20th Century. There is no possible way of getting a civic virtue except by reading and re-reading the annals of the past. The farther back you go the more you will learn. England without Queen Elizabeth! Why, there would

not be a woman here worth——well, they would be a very inferior set of ladies in appearance and in means. England without Queen Anne? England without the Black Prince, Drake, Frobisher, Howard and Raleigh? Great Britain without Churchill, the Duke of Marlborough, and without Wellington? He tells us to confine ourselves to the last Century. Oh, gentle Radical shepherd, whose soul's in Algeria, tell me when the last Century began? I thought it began before the year 1813 or 1814. Where were we then? Telling the United States to mind her own business; chastising the soldiers of Soult after having passed the Pyrenees, and in the land of the Ghurkas trying to reduce them to civilization. What about 1854? Is it not true that if our fools of legislators had learnt the advice of the past our soldiers would have been in a very different state when they were in the trenches of Sevastopol? Turning to foreign history, what about the growth of Prussia and Japan and the United States? When did the growth of Prussia begin? Was it centuries ago? I trow not! Has not the growth of Prussia gone up in a marvellous way in half a century: 1864 in Denmark to 1866 in Bohemia and 1870 in France, merely because in time of peace it was more ready for war than its adversaries? I am talking as a mere ordinary, common, vulgar student of the most ordinary history you can buy for 6½d. How was it that the campaigns in Denmark and Bohemia made Prussia so celebrated? How was it that whereas the French were singing "A Berlin," the Prussians were round Paris within six weeks? Was that a good thing? Were starving women good things? Is starvation a good thing? The whole history of the world points to one tale, that as long as the world goes round adequate provision in time of peace is the only possible way by which a nation can come through a war with success. If you think that you are going to conquer Ulster by being unready to beat Orangemen in time of peace, the Orangemen may take it into their heads to beat you on July 12th. How did the United States conquer the Confederates—how did these hold out so long? How did the Yankees defeat the Spaniards in 1898? If you think that you are going to put down strikes in Africa by tomfoolery about syndicalism, or by Glory Hallelujahs round walls such as the Jericho triumph? If you think you are going to conquer modern forts without guns, you are mistaken. What was the argument that converted the population of South Africa to reason only yesterday? It was one gun, Sir, and not let off even—a gun prepared. I would like to quote in conclusion the words, not of an ordinary Radical philosopher, but the words of the greatest of all Radicals that ever lived, the immortal Latin secretary of Oliver Cromwell—Milton—who was angelic enough, who wrote the triumph of the Angels and Seraphs over the able and erudite devil's own hosts of Beelzebub and Belial—while Shakespeare warned you to be "True to yourselves and naught would make you rue." Milton's magnificent prophecy is true to-day, because your ancestors a hundred years ago were true to themselves and true to posterity; their Trust—they preferred honour to finance, glory to cant and Empire to false philosophy. They held this fort—this Britain—long after their banknotes were inconvertible, and thus they realized the vision of Milton—who was under no illusion when he wrote words which every mother here should teach her children about their forebears:—"Methinks I see a noble and puissant nation rousing herself like a strong man after sleep, and shaking her invincible locks—as an eagle viewing her mighty zenith and kindling her undazzled eyes at the full mid-day beam." Thus an immortal poet wrote to the Puritan warriors, nor did he dream of

a petty generation of ignorant sophists, and metaphysical illusionists, and Welsh rhapsodists and hypocritical children of Midas throttling the energies and blighting the future of his beloved land.

Lieut.-Colonel Alsager Pollock: A few years ago M. Bloch brought out a book in which he said war was impossible. Since then, Mr. Norman Angell has written a book to prove that war is unprofitable, and that, therefore, no nation will be likely to undertake it. I came here expecting that a 4.7 would be let off from the platform at a nightingale. Whether it would have been the same if Mr. Norman Angell had been here in person or not I cannot tell. At all events, instead of a nightingale I believe the shell fell in the neighbourhood of a gamecock, who thought so little of it that he regarded it as a peashooter, and proceeded to pick up the pieces. It seems to me that even this afternoon the real point has not been brought forward quite strongly enough. Surely it does not matter twopence whether M. Bloch is right in saying that war is impossible, or Mr. Norman Angell in saying that war is unprofitable. I got an idea of what it means from the vigorous speech of the gentleman who represented Mr. Norman Angell. Supposing I had pulled his nose after this meeting, probably he would have hit me in the eye knowing me to be a small old man of 60 years of age. But then I called to mind what Lord Newton, Sir Claude MacDonald and others mentioned had taken place in consequence of the readiness to attack. Sir Claude MacDonald mentioned that the name of a ship divided into two was not regarded as quite so valuable an adjunct to a policy as two warships in China. Supposing I had been Georges Carpentier, I imagine that probably even Mr. Norman Angell's advocate would have allowed me to tweak his nose with impunity; at any rate, I would willingly allow Georges Carpentier to tweak my nose lest he gave me worse. The key to peace has been well stated by M. Gaston Roulfier in "*le Napoléon de mes rêves*," when the shade of the Emperor asserted most truly:—*on n'obtiendra la paix universelle que par la domination universelle.*

The Chairman (Lord Sydenham): Before asking the lecturer to reply to the discussion, I should like to say a few words. I quite agree it is a good thing that this subject should be discussed in this theatre, even though this is not a Temple of Peace. We cannot tell to what extent the theories of "The Great Illusion" may be grasped at by people who are only too ready to find plausible suggestions for imagining that war can be rendered impossible, and for throwing off what has been called the burden of armaments, which I am glad to see Sir Edmund Barrow has largely disproved by showing that armaments are not an altogether unproductive burden. I imagine that most of us took up "The Great Illusion" with perfectly open minds, willing to be disillusioned, and hoping we should find that the author had found out some practical means of mitigating national and racial hostility, and so preparing the way towards the peace of the world in the future. I do not know what others thought of it; but I found only a series of propositions which seemed to me to be falsified by all the history I knew, and a number of assertions, made in the most dogmatic fashion, which appeared to me to be wildly inaccurate. I agree with Sir Edmund Barrow, that if these propositions were to become articles of faith among our people the only result would be grave danger to our national existence. I am glad, therefore, that he has come forward to refute them this afternoon, though I need not say that you cannot attempt

to deal with all that the book contains in the course of such time as the Council of this Institution would permit. One could easily write a volume on every one of the ten heads with which the lecturer has dealt. I find myself handicapped at starting, because we are told by Mr. Norman Angell's representative that only modern experience can be taken as of any account. I certainly did not understand that from the book, and I should like to know when we are to begin. At what period of history may we take it that the doctrines of "The Great Illusion" begin to be applicable, because it must be remembered that these theories touch the elementary passions of nations and of mankind, which, after all, have not changed much throughout the ages? Therefore I claim for a moment to deal with a little past history, although it is not perhaps so recent as it ought to be according to Mr. Norman Angell's views. I admit that, in relying on the historical argument, we can none of us say what would have happened to this country, what our future would have been, if our ancestors had accepted the theories of "The Great Illusion." But, on the other hand, surely all history from the earliest times can tell us what happens to nations which neglect to prepare for war, which are unable to defend themselves; and history can also teach us what victory means and what defeat entails. In the Seven Years' War we emerged triumphant, as you all know, and as a result of that war we gained Canada, Nova Scotia, Cape Breton, Tobago, Dominica, St. Vincent, Granada, and Senegal. During that war, our trade largely increased. Can anyone really believe that if Canada had become French it would have been of no advantage to France and no disadvantage to us? That is the doctrine of "The Great Illusion"—at least if that doctrine may be assumed to go back as far as the Seven Years' War. In the War of American Independence, our resources were overtaxed by the tremendous strain put upon them, and consequently our trade decreased. But, nevertheless, we held our own at sea. If we had been defeated in that war, we should have lost India. Can anyone say it would have been no disadvantage to us or to India if India had passed to some other Power. In the wars of the French Revolution and Empire, our trade more than doubled. India became an undisputed British Possession, and the wonderful progress and prosperity since attained, which I am happy to have seen in India, then became possible. But, further than that, Australia and New Zealand were left to us to develop and to populate at leisure, without any fear whatever of external aggression, and Europe secured a long period of peace. Surely we must all admit—certainly we cannot deny—that to the maritime ascendancy that we won at that crisis of our history can be traced the enormous development of our oversea trade from 96 millions in 1815 to more than 1,900 millions to-day. How can anyone, with such figures and facts before him, be induced to believe that military and political power give a nation no commercial advantage? It is obvious that we could not have obtained that trade unless we had other qualities besides the naval and military qualities, and it is equally certain that if we possessed the commercial abilities and had not the naval and military force, that trade could never have been built up. Just think of the start it gave us over our rivals, and the long arrears they had to make up before they could attempt to compete with us, and imagine what would have happened to us if we had been defeated in that war. Surely it must be plain to us all that, if we had been defeated in the great wars which began in 1792 and ended in 1815, we should have had no British Empire to-day. If such a fallacy as this of "The Great Illusion" finds believers here, surely, as one of the speakers said to-day,

it will not be believed by other peoples who are careful students of our own history—who frame their policy upon our history. And perhaps after all it is the views of foreign nations that are of the most importance. I have referred to these three wars for a particular reason. As a result of two of them, as I have said, our trade increased. In the other case, for a special reason, our trade decreased by 27 per cent.; but Mr. Norman Angell says in his book that "the more a nation's wealth is protected the less secure does it become." Again, did this doctrine become applicable last year, or the year before, or one hundred years ago? To support his theory the author says that "Swiss and Belgian merchants are driving English from the Canadian markets." That statement is quite inaccurate. In the year in which the last edition of "The Great Illusion" was published, our exports to Canada were 95,300,000 dollars in value, while Belgium exported to Canada 3,240,000 and the Swiss exports to Canada amounted to 2,773,000 dollars. Clearly the exports of Belgium and Switzerland are negligible quantities compared with our own, and they show no signs of rapid expansion. The statement I have quoted, therefore, ought not to have been made. It is made evidently with a wish to show that Belgium and Switzerland could not protect their trade, and that therefore it is quite unnecessary for us to protect ours. That is another fallacy. In the first place, Belgium is protected, as we all know, by international guarantees; and, in the second place, very powerful armed interests are concerned in securing that neither Belgium nor Switzerland shall lose their independence. Sir Edmund Barrow has dealt most effectively with the fallacy that "it is an optical illusion to suppose that an addition of territory adds to a nation's wealth, since that wealth remains in the hands of its population"; but there is one point which I should like to emphasize further, always premising that I do not know when this doctrine began to apply. Suppose that the territory produces no wealth at all, and that it is conquered by a progressive Power; it may then become wealth-producing to a large extent, and not only will its own population gain, but the annexing country must share in the trade which the produced wealth will create, and that annexing country must, therefore, benefit. And that is precisely what is happening now in the Sudan, to which Sir Edmund Barrow has referred. It has also happened on a vast scale in Canada, Australia and New Zealand, where British labour and British capital have made huge areas of wilderness into wealth-producing territory. Sir Edmund Barrow has characterized the tenth fallacy as being the most dangerous of all, and I quite agree with him; but this fallacy is closely connected with another in "The Great Illusion," and may have arisen from it. The author makes the unqualified statement that "Physical force is a constantly diminishing factor in human affairs." That is one of those plausible assertions which is likely to be peculiarly harmful. It is true that we do not now go about armed for self-protection; it is true that force is kept more perhaps in the background than it was. It may be true—I am not at all sure that it is true—that force is not so frequently employed as it was; but it is emphatically not true that physical force is less necessary now than it used to be in the past. The security of London is preserved by physical force, highly organized and costly to an extent which would have been undreamed of a century ago, and, as we know, that force is barely sufficient. In support of this very dangerous theory, the author of "The Great Illusion" tells us a little story. A bank in a Western mining town was constantly being held up because it contained gold that was wanted for the payment of the wages of the

employees of the mine. The company arranged to pay the wages in cheques on a San Francisco bank, and the author tells us that "the bank was never attacked again." The moral drawn from that, as far as I can make out, is that the intelligence of the bank manager was so great that it enabled physical force to be dispensed with. But what is the real moral? Merely that the Government of the United States, for reasons of its own, did not provide the physical force required in a small mining town and did provide sufficient physical force at San Francisco. The author makes an even more amazing statement in support of his theory. He tells us that the Sudani tribesman is "Manly, sturdy, hardy, with the courage and warlike qualities which no European can equal; but the frail and spectacled Englishman is his master, and a few scores of such will make themselves masters of teeming thousands of Sudanis; the relatively unwarlike Englishman is doing the same all over Asia." Ladies and gentlemen, I refrain from characterizing that statement. If the "frail and spectacled Englishman" is doing anything of this kind in Asia, or any other part of the world, it is because physical force lies ready and near behind him. The Sudan was very recently conquered, and that fact cannot be forgotten. There is force ready on the spot, and there is much more force, the whole force of the Empire, behind it. The Sudan Camel Corps, which is not officered by frail and spectacled Englishmen, is a most efficient body, and only a few weeks ago it was necessary to quell disturbances on the Zeraf River. A year ago I was on the North-West frontier of India, which Sir Edmund Barrow knows so intimately. The men who hold that frontier for us are not frail or spectacled, and nothing struck me so much as the tremendous effect of force, not outwardly visible, but ready for action and well understood by the wild tribesmen of the border. But there is an even more striking instance of the necessity of physical force to which Dr. Miller Maguire has referred. In July last, the Union Government of South Africa was face to face with a revolution at Johannesburg, and the situation was saved by Imperial troops. The Commission of Inquiry reported that it was fortunate the task "was entrusted to well-disciplined forces," and they most significantly added: "Had the Imperial forces not been on the spot to render prompt assistance, the injury to life and property would have been much greater." To-day that Government is confronted by an even greater emergency. We are told that every good citizen is on the side of order, but that does not avail. The future of the Union depends upon the sufficiency, the efficiency, and the wise handling of the armed and organized forces at the disposal of the Government, and apparently the second revolution will be averted without bloodshed. The lesson is a plain one for us all to read. To possess organized force and to make it clear that you are prepared to use it in good time is the most humane policy which any civilized Government can adopt. I will take only one more point, and that is this: I read with amazement the following pronouncement:—If a nation "remains military it decays; if it prospers and takes its share of the work of the world it ceases to be military." Ladies and gentlemen, Germany was never so military as it is to-day, and never before has Germany taken such a large part in the work of the world, and done so with such evident and such well-deserved success. Russia was never more military than she is to-day, and Russia is beginning to play a part in the world's work, and to share in the world's commerce and industry to an extent never before approached, whilst at the same time her revenue is steadily increasing. Japan was never more military than to-day, and we have seen in Japan

the rise of the arts of peace going on *pari passu* with the success and development of the arts of war. According to the author of "The Great Illusion"—and this is a very recent history, so that I think his doctrine must apply to these cases—Germany, Russia and Japan must either be beginning to decay, or they must be ceasing to be military. There is no other alternative if the theory of "The Great Illusion" is true. Which is happening? Are they hastening to decay, or are they ceasing to be military? The author may very likely say that he means something quite different by the word "military." If so, it should have been explained in a footnote or somewhere. He may say that Germany, Russia and Japan are not military in his sense; but I think most of us will agree that the sentence as I have quoted it, as it stands in the last edition, is a most misleading one. I will say only one more thing in regard to Mr. Davies' speech. He told us that conquest is too expensive to be attempted, and that Sir Edmund Barrow did not present the other side of the balance sheet. Why is conquest expensive? It can only be because the nation attacked is thoroughly well able to protect itself. If it has no protection then conquest will be cheap, and the balance sheet will certainly be heavily on the side of the conqueror. I fear I have detained you far too long, but one cannot, in such a short space of time, even glance at the abounding fallacies of "The Great Illusion." I would like to tell you in a few words the one deduction I can get out of it—I have read the book twice—and that is this. If the whole world were divided up into areas of exactly equal civilization, each ruled by a Great Power, and if all Governments and all peoples had been simultaneously brought to a firm belief that all war was useless, because it would be equally injurious to the victor and the conquered; then armaments might be dispensed with. I think, ladies and gentlemen, we may all grant that, and we may equally grant that if all mankind ever becomes perfectly virtuous, then criminal laws and police may safely be abolished. But till that time comes I think it is better for us to rely upon the words of an even wiser man than the author of "The Great Illusion." More than 2,400 years ago Solon is said to have said to Cræsus: "A king will come with iron and take away your gold," and those words came true. For us at the present time, on the strength of "The Great Illusion," to reduce our standards of preparation for war would be a certain sign of the madness with which the gods afflict nations and individuals whom they wish to destroy. I am sure you will all welcome the declaration made by the Lord Chancellor yesterday that the standard of our armaments is not to be reduced, and that our naval strength is not to be weakened. We can at least gather from this that the theories and the fallacies of "The Great Illusion" have not penetrated into the minds of His Majesty's Government.

General Sir Edmund Barrow, in reply, said: After the very comprehensive remarks you have heard from the Chairman it is quite unnecessary for me to detain you for my remarks, but I would say that if, as Mr. Davies urged, I was only arguing one side of the question, I did not come here to argue it from his point of view. I do not see how he could have expected me to put the arguments on what he called the debit side. Mr. Davies has left the theatre, so I need not attempt to criticise his speech as I had originally intended to do. I have just turned up "The Great Illusion" to see who this military officer was that he quoted, and I find it is a certain Captain March Phillipps of Rimington's Tigers. I do not know anything about him, but the language he used regarding

the soldier makes me so indignant that I can hardly bring myself to refer to it. I will just read it to you now if you will allow me. He says: "In soldiers' eyes lying, theft, drunkenness, bad language, etc., are not evils at all. They steal like jackdaws. The language I used to think of a merchantship's forecandle was pretty bad, but the language of Tommies in point of profanity and obscenity beat it hollow." That I think must render every one of us justly indignant. It is true that Mr. Norman Angell disclaimed saying those words himself, but I will tell you how he disclaimed it. He said, "please, please, dear reader, do not say that I am slandering the British soldier; I am quoting a British officer." I am sure none of us will agree with that description of the British soldier! I will not make any further remarks with regard to the other speeches we have heard, because the Chairman has summarized all that is necessary to be said on this occasion. I thank you all for your kind attention.

The Chairman: I now ask you to pass a hearty vote of thanks to Sir Edmund Barrow for the most illuminating lecture he has delivered. In giving this lecture he has added another to his great services to the country, and no one could have better dispelled the astounding fallacies of "The Great Illusion" than the lecturer to whom we have listened with so much interest.

The resolution of thanks was carried by acclamation.

Col. Sir Lonsdale Hale: Ladies and gentlemen. As Chairman of the Council I wish to convey the thanks of the meeting and of the Council to my friend, Lord Sydenham, for kindly taking the Chair this afternoon.

Note by the Lecturer.

With the permission of the Council I now add the following comments on the remarks made by Mr. Bernard Langdon-Davies when opening the discussion at the close of my lecture.

He accuses me of setting up nine-pins in order to knock them over. The nine-pins (ten in this case) were set up, not by me, but by Mr. Norman Angell. The first five were taken *verbatim* from the synopsis which prefaces his book, and when an author takes the trouble to epitomize his case in a synopsis one may reasonably assert that his critics are not misrepresenting him if they assume that it is a correct though brief statement of the fundamental points of that author's doctrine and arguments. Those fundamental points were more fully developed in Chapters I. to III. of Part I. of "The Great Illusion," while Chapters IV. to VIII. were devoted to stating his case with regard to the special subjects of "Confiscation," "Indemnity," and "Colonies." The subject of "Unproductive Expenditure" was particularly dealt with by him in the *Financial Review of Reviews* for June, 1913, while my tenth "nine-pin" was, I contend, a logical and fair deduction from the quotations I gave from pages 291 to 298 of his book. I therefore now reiterate my statement that the "nine-pins" were set up by him, and if, as Mr. Davies says, I knocked them over, I have good reason to be satisfied. Mr. Davies next goes on to say that I have tried to annihilate Mr. Norman Angell by dragging in records of the 17th and 18th Centuries. On the contrary, most of my examples were taken from the 19th Century—and after. It is true that I made an allusion to the Navigation Laws, which were framed in the 17th Century, but it was in the 19th Century that we reaped the harvest. Similarly as regards Holland and India, it was the fruition

of our policy in the 19th and not the seed time in the 17th and 18th Centuries to which I drew attention. Some of my other examples—hypothetical cases like "Panama" and "Egypt"—were even taken from futurity. Most people would say I was too previous, but Mr. Davies is not satisfied, and accuses me of trifling with ancient history because I refer to Burma (1886) and the Sudan (1898) and Panama (1950?). If so, what does he think of Mr. Norman Angell, who dips so far back into the musty records of the past as the Franco-German War of 1870, and the lessons taught by the fate of Spanish America!

My next offence is that I have not confined the argument to warfare between two "highly-civilized and highly-organized communities." Why should I do so? As I said in my lecture, "It is the untamed and barbaric nations that may in the future, as in the past, be the disturbing cause." When I wrote those words I had in my mind some speech or dictum regarding the wars of the future, made by one of our wisest and most foreseeing of Statesmen—the late Lord Salisbury. I am content to abide by his wisdom rather than accept the restricted conditions prescribed by Mr. Langdon-Davies.

I am accused of libelling Mr. Angell by suggesting that his doctrines are harmful, because their acceptance may lead to disarmament. In fact, Mr. Davies tells me that "his whole doctrine is an assertion of the right of defence." I am glad to hear it, for I never should have guessed it, but now I may hope that he will convert many of his disciples, who have hitherto imagined the contrary, and I trust that "The Right of Defence" will be the subject of his next lecture. Mr. Davies, after a few generalities on the subject of the 17th Century, takes the specific case of India, and says while I talk about the 100 millions of trade with India, "what about the 100 millions of German trade?" I humbly admit that our trade with Germany is very precious to us, but it is infinitely more precious to Germany. While we export 40 millions to Germany she exports 70 millions to us, mostly manufactured goods, whereas our exports are largely such items as coal, cotton yarn, raw wool, and woollen yarn, articles which serve mostly to develop German manufactures and German industry, so that I think I am right in my assertion that as regards Anglo-German trade Germany gets the best of the bargain. Whereas, in the case of the Indian trade, our imports into India are not only ten times those of Germany, but they are mostly manufactured articles, and apart from trade statistics, as I have shown in my lecture, we derive an enormous income from pay, pensions, Indian dividends, so, take it all round, our profits *from India* are infinitely greater than our profits from Germany, thus illustrating my general contention that trade follows the flag, and that Colonies are profitable.

Mr. Davies points triumphantly to the fact that Holland is to-day, for its size, one of the richest countries in the world. Quite so! I said so myself! But Holland too has Colonies, and she has had a whole century in which to recuperate. I took the case of Holland to show how a nation which would not exert itself to defend its interests and its independence might be humbled to the dust and all but crushed out of existence. Mr. Davies asks whether "the countries which took the wealth of Holland gained by doing so?" Of course they did! The French sucked the lifeblood of Holland for 20 years, their armies lived on Holland like leeches, so much so that even King Louis, when asked for more and more money by his imperious brother, was constrained to abdicate for very shame. Then as to England. When we took St. Eustatius we

captured over 180 merchantmen, with goods valued at four millions sterling. That capture hardly cost us a cent or a man. Similarly Java would have been enormously profitable to us had we not restored it at the end of the war. Mr. Davies then says, "even that is not our final question, but what would they gain to-day in the circumstances of to-day?" Let me tell him! If Germany, owing to the defencelessness of Holland and the apathy and folly of England and France, was enabled to annex Holland, she would gain not only the rich Colonies of Java, Sumatra, etc., but also what is far more important, a great strategical position in Holland and a great natural trade route by the Rhine to Rotterdam and the open sea. Of course, he will rightly say such a supposition is incredible and preposterous, as Germany would have to fight both England and France. Quite so! That helps my argument. If you are prepared to fight for your rights or your interests, no one will attack you, but if you rely solely on your moral rights, on arbitration, and on the interdependence of finance, and such-like bulwarks, you will go under at once just as Holland did a hundred years ago.

As to my Panama example, there is much to be said on both sides, but I cannot enter into a discussion on so delicate a subject without, perhaps, saying something indiscreet or tactless, which might hurt the susceptibilities of American or German readers, as obviously the question of relative naval and military power would be involved.

Mr. Davies has dealt very vigorously with my remarks as to armaments not being wholly unproductive, and tells me, not very politely, that my arguments were "just those of labouring men who have not studied political economy," and to prove the folly of my contention he adopts the *reductio ad absurdum*. I might very well reply by a *tu quoque* and tell him that "if building motor cars is good for employment, carry it on; build more and more motor cars till the whole nation is engaged in the industry!" Of course, such an argument would be just as futile as his is, and as he himself says, "it is a relative question." You build as many motor cars as the market will absorb. Similarly you spend or should spend as much on armaments as is necessary to insure your safety and your national interests.

Before I forget it, let me here interpolate that I have ascertained that the Captain March Philipps whose outrageous indictment of the British soldier was quoted by Mr. Norman Angell as that of "an able and cultivated British officer," cannot be traced at the War Office as ever having served as an officer in the British Army, unless a temporary local corps in South Africa can be so classed, so that his knowledge of the British soldier seems to be limited to his acquaintance with those whom he met "with Remington," by which I presume is meant Rimington's Horse, and later in Damant's Horse.

Finally, I must apologize for my misconception of Mr. Norman Angell's mission, for Mr. Langdon-Davies now tells us of Mr. Angell's "life-long and passionate belief in the duty of a nation to defend itself to its last penny and its last man." I must confess I never gathered this from his writings, and was under the delusion that he and his disciples were opposed to "militarism" in any shape. Like Pope Gregory I was mistaken about them, and had classed them in my mind as "*Non Angli sed Angeli*," but I now find they are not little angels at all, but, according to Mr. Davies, Devil's Own Fighting Britons consumed with a burning and patriotic desire to defend their country to the last ditch, so that I hope we may now see many of them rushing to enrol themselves in the Territorial Army.