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LECTURE.

Friday, May 17th, 1878.

ADMIRAL A. P. RYDER in the Chair.

ON A COLONIAL NAVAL VOLUNTEER FORCE.

By THOMAS BRASSEY, Esq., M.P., Lieutenant Commanding Royal Naval Artillery Volunteers.

It is not suprising that the idea of organizing a Colonial Naval Reserve should have been deferred to the present time. The growth of our Colonial Empire has been so rapid that the resources out of which such a force could be created have only lately been at our disposal.

It has been remarked by Mr. Wilson, in his recent volume on the resources of modern countries, that none of the colonies were of great promise before 1845. Canada languished; New South Wales—then including Victoria and Queensland—was a feeble settlement, still troubled by a residuum of transported criminals; the Cape of Good Hope was almost Dutch. The total English population of the whole of our foreign possessions did not, in 1850, exceed 2,000,000. The population of these colonies has at least quadrupled in thirty years, and in some cases is now tenfold what it was in 1845.

Visitors to the Exhibition now being held in Paris will see abundant and gratifying proofs of the marvellous development of our colonies, and of their ability to provide adequate means of self-defence. The Australian governments have wisely embraced the opportunity of showing to the world their varied and valuable products. From New South Wales we have copper, silver, lead, marble, tin, slate, and opals; wine—including all the varieties of the French and German vineyards—tobacco, and, perhaps most important of all, wool. From Western Australia we find leather, timber, silk, coal, lead, and wines. Victoria, which boasts of 800 trees and flowering shrubs, exhibits also coal, wines, and cloth manufactures. She reminds us, by means of pyramidal models, of the value of her productions of gold, and of the exceptional good fortune of certain adventurers. From the Cross Reef Mine £1,000,000 worth, from the Long Tunnel 221,262 ounces, from the Port Philip Company's workings to the value of £1,500,000 have been extracted.

Queensland exhibits malachite, gold, copper, cinnabar, chrome, iron, plumbago, and antimony, sugar, coffee, wheat, maize, tobacco, silk, and wool. The commercial and agricultural development of the colony is set forth in the following figures:—

In 1876 the total value of the exports amounted to £3,875,000, including—

Wool	£1,449,576
Hides	79,612
Cattle	157,772
Preserved meat ..	94,642

The value of the imports in the same year was £3,126,000.

Queensland has a population of 200,000.

The live stock depastured includes—

Horses	130,289
Cattle	1,985,807
Sheep	7,241,810
Pigs	53,455

Lastly, South Australia exhibits copper, tin, wines, timber, leather, wool, and tobacco. With such a collection before us, we are justified in forming the brightest hopes for the future prosperity of the great Anglo-Saxon communities in the Antipodes. The page of their history is short, but they are a vigorous and energetic people, eager to embrace every opportunity afforded by a bountiful nature, and labouring valiantly in the spirit of their well-chosen motto, "Advance Australia."

The time seems now to have arrived when the colonies should be reminded of their obligations to provide for their own self-defence, and of their duty to take a part in those naval and military preparations, the cost of which should be borne in due proportions by the whole Empire.

The necessity for the organization of a Naval Reserve for the defence of the colonies has been recognised by many lecturers, who have preceded me in the theatre of the Royal United Service Institution. The brothers Colomb have been among the foremost in urging the need of such a force. They have shown what are the strategical points which are of the most vital importance to the integrity of the British Empire, and have earnestly recommended the appointment of a Royal Commission to examine the subject. Nothing, however, has been done, and we find ourselves at the present moment contemplating the possibility of war, and utterly unprepared with the means of defending the important outlying members of the Empire by those local forces, which might so easily have been organized. Readers of the papers published in the "Nineteenth Century" will remember the imaginary but very forcible description recently given by Sir Garnet Wolseley of a Russian squadron performing a cruise of circumnavigation in time of war, arriving off all our most valuable settlements, and winning a series of inglorious triumphs by levying black-mail on rich seaports, which could offer no resistance. It would per-

haps be found more difficult to carry out such a series of operations, than to describe them with the ready pen, which Sir Garnet so well knows how to use; but the bare conception of such a state of things ought to be unendurable, alike to the people of the mother-country and of her dependencies.

The policy of encouraging such a movement having been accepted, there can be no practical difficulty in raising a Naval Reserve in the colonies. If it be intended to provide the means of manning sea-going ships, the Naval Reserve which has been formed for the defence of the mother-country presents a model for imitation. If coast and harbour defence alone is attempted, the system of organization adopted for the Royal Naval Artillery Volunteers may be followed with advantage.

In considering a project for a Colonial Naval Reserve, it is essential to determine, *in limine*, to what extent the direct intervention of the Imperial Government will be required. Among a certain school of politicians, it will be considered that local defence is a task which must be left entirely to the Colonial Governments. They think that the colonies are quite able to take care of themselves; that, man for man, the colonists are better off than the population of the mother-country; that it is the duty of our statesmen to rear up young and vigorous communities in habits of self-defence, and to bring home to their people a sense of their obligation to make sacrifices for public objects, and to bear their proportionate share with the mother-country of the burdens of military preparations.

Another school of politicians is in favour of a closer connection with the colonies. They are anxious to promote a federal union of all the members of the British Empire. They wish to arrive at a mutual agreement on all questions of tariffs; and, with a view to concerted action in Imperial questions, they are in favour of giving to the colonies representatives who should sit in the great council of the Empire at its seat of Government. In consideration of the protection afforded by the fleet, they are prepared to recommend a contribution from the colonies to the naval expenditure of the country. In these views I concur, and I see additional evidences of their truth in the most recent incidents in our political experience. It is rarely possible for this country, under a popular representative Government, to pursue a satisfactory course in its relations with foreign countries. The greater number of those who take a lively interest in public business concern themselves rather with domestic questions than with foreign policy. Being without knowledge, they arrive at hasty conclusions, and every new incident that occurs produces a corresponding change in their opinions. Hence it is that our foreign policy is inconsistent and uncertain; that we disappoint allies in whom we have raised expectations; and make sacrifices for unattainable or unworthy objects.

The Eastern Question once disposed of, it is my earnest hope that the attention of British statesmen may be directed rather to the object of drawing the colonies and the mother-country more closely together, than to continental affairs.

In our relations with other nationalities we excite jealousy by

our prosperity. Although singularly unselfish and unaggressive, our country is not greatly loved abroad. On the other hand, old England, as their mother-country, still retains the warm affection of her colonies. Our Government may show a chilly indifference to their concerns, but England is still the "home" of all English-speaking people; and the identity of religion, history, laws, and literature, unites together every member of the family by bonds more enduring than the protocols and treaties, however valuable they may be, which are negotiated with foreign nations.

The arguments in favour of a cordial co-operation of the United Kingdom with the colonies in measures of mutual self-defence have been conclusively stated by several able writers in recent periodicals. I may specially refer to Captain Colomb, Sir Julius Vogel, and the author of a paper on England and her Colonies, which appeared in "Fraser's Magazine," in January. We are reminded, in the papers to which I refer, of the value of the colonies to the mother-country, for the inevitable development of the British population, and as the main source of our maritime prosperity. While foreign countries are steadily determined to exclude British industries from the markets over which they exercise control, the value of the colonial trade becomes increasingly manifest: and, while we derive these advantages from our vast colonial connection, it is obvious that, in proportion to their own prosperity, the colonies are bound to take their share in defending the Empire. It is to be regretted that these obligations were not more strictly defined at the time when the privilege of self-government was conceded.

In his speech at the Crystal Palace, in 1872, Lord Beaconsfield said:—"Self-government, when it was conceded, ought, in my opinion, to have been conceded as part of a great policy of Imperial consolidation. It ought to have been accompanied by a military code, which should have previously defined the means and responsibilities by which the colonies should have been defended, and by which, if necessary, this country should call for aid from the colonies themselves. In my opinion, no minister in this country will do his duty, who neglects an opportunity of resuscitating as much as possible our Colonial Empire, and of responding to those distant sympathies which may become the source of incalculable strength and happiness to this land."

From an Imperial point of view, the best defence of the colonies consists in a powerful navy; and it is because the naval service is constituted in part for the defence of the colonies that we may reasonably claim from all our dependencies contributions in equitable proportions, to be mutually and amicably determined, towards the naval expenditure of the country.

The latest tables, showing the progress of British mercantile shipping, give the total tonnage of the mercantile navy of the British Empire at 8,133,837 tons, and the tonnage of the United Kingdom only at 6,336,360 tons. The difference between these amounts (1,800,000 tons) represents a total tonnage for the colonies which is little short of the combined tonnage of the French and German

Empires. It must be evident that the owners of such a large tonnage will be quite able to contribute their share of the cost of defending the harbours from which they trade.

It has been suggested by Captain Colomb, R.M.A., that one of the home dockyards—Pembroke, for example—might be closed, and the staff transferred to a dockyard which should be established at Sydney or Melbourne. Captain Colomb urges that, with our remaining dockyards, and the boundless resources of our private trade, we should be abundantly able to provide for the construction of new ships, and for the repairs of the Navy, even in times of the most pressing emergency; while, on the other hand, the growing importance of the Russian navy in the Pacific, the extension of British trade over most of the islands in that vast ocean, and the great distance which separates our Australian territories from the mother-country, make it highly desirable to establish a dockyard in that part of the world. It is to be presumed that some contribution would be obtained from the local governments towards the expenses of such a dockyard, if established in their midst. The facilities which it would afford to the mercantile marine would present an additional inducement to the colonies to make a contribution towards its maintenance.

The colonial governments have already begun to consider the question of local defence, and in one or two instances they have provided low free-board ironclad turret-ships for that purpose. Victoria has lately voted a sum of £350,000, together with an annual outlay of £73,000, to provide ships, artillery, torpedoes, and rifles, for the local defence. New South Wales has voted a like sum for the same object. The colony has formed a Volunteer Naval Brigade of 250 men, the annual expenditure on this little force being £3,916. In the Canadian Dominion, a committee appointed by the Royal Halifax Yacht Club, in a report dated 14th April, 1873, strongly recommend the organization of a Naval Reserve, a Coast Guard to protect property in the event of shipwreck, and a Lifeboat Institution.

It may be assumed that the Colonial Governments would be fully prepared to bear their share of the expenditure required for any complete scheme of Imperial defence by naval means; we may pass on therefore to consider what kind of force would be most useful for colonial service.

It has been already observed that the most effective means of defending the larger ports would consist in ironclads or turret vessels rather than in forts. Captain Colomb, R.N., has urged in his Prize Essay that the main object of our naval organization consists in the maintenance of our communications by sea, and that our coaling-stations abroad are the principal strategical positions which it is essential to guard. He argues that this object will be best attained by the maintenance of an adequate sea-going fleet, charged with two great defensive functions:—(1) that of keeping the enemy in his own ports, (2) that of keeping open the great sea-routes to and from the heart of the Empire. He considers that this duty can only be performed by sea-going vessels, and that the building of powerful ships, which are not fully sea-going, and which are more or less incapable of

maintaining the ocean communications of the Empire can only be justified on the assumption that the chief danger to be apprehended lies in a successful attack on our harbours.

But if, he says, our enemies are to career at will across our lines of communication, while we guard their terminations at headquarters, what will be left us to guard? He puts much faith in the sea-going fleet resting on the naval station as a protective force, and condemns with steady design the idea of the harbour-defence ship. Such vessels are every whit as likely to be withdrawn as the sea-going ship, when they are wanted; and the only result is that you build a bad sea-going ship, when, had you never considered harbour-defence, you would have built a good one.

Captain Colomb throws the local home and colonial harbour-defence entirely on forts, and the stationary and locomotive torpedoes. The supplemental local harbour-defence corps is to consist of volunteer torpedo men, whose functions will be of a nature peculiarly adapted to the superior education and undoubted skill and daring of the men who would be enrolled in such bodies.

This view is confirmed by the recent report of Admiral Phillimore on the conduct and efficiency of the Royal Naval Artillery Volunteers, dated 15th March, 1878.

The opinion of my predecessor on the Royal Naval Artillery Volunteers is given at page 7 of his Confidential Report, on quitting office, dated 18th October, 1876:—

“That they would be useful in the event of war, in the defence of the estuaries, while in peace they serve as a connecting link between the Volunteer movement and the Royal Navy.”

Both at London and Liverpool the condition of the Brigade is excellent. The Volunteers drill with celerity and precision, and are extremely zealous. They cheerfully conform to discipline, and are desirous of improving themselves in every way when embarked for their annual drill.

In some places they might supply the place of the Coastguard temporarily, if that force should be suddenly embarked.

They might furnish guards at rendezvous and places of embarkation to preserve order. Many of them have become expert artillerists.

I think the movement assists in making the Naval Service better appreciated and understood at certain places, and consequently increases the popularity of the Navy generally, which, if more seamen were required for ships of war, might be of great value in facilitating fresh entries.

In my judgment, Captain Colomb is the advocate of a wise policy. The Imperial and Colonial Governments should combine to create a fleet of sea-going ships, which should be kept in reserve in the harbours on the Australian station. Torpedoes and torpedo-boats should be provided for harbour defence. The Colonial Governments should man the sea-going ships, stationed in their own harbours, with their Naval Reserves, and they should provide the *personnel* necessary for harbour defence by the organization of corps of Naval Artillery Volunteers, after the model of those which have been successfully established in London and Liverpool.

The number of sea-going ships and torpedo-boats, and the forces of Naval Reserves and Naval Artillery Volunteers, which would be necessary to man them, is a subject worthy of mature examination by

a Royal Commission. Such a Commission should include, not only officers of acknowledged capability to deal with technical questions, but representatives, who should be authorised to express the views of the colonists, with reference to the proportions in which they would be prepared to contribute to the expense.

I wish to insist emphatically on the importance of the work which would devolve on such a Commission. We cannot conceal from the world the wealth accumulated in the colonial capitals, all of which lie on the sea-board. Their inhabitants possess all the spirit and resources necessary to repel an attack, but these places are at present defenceless. Floating and stationary defences cannot be designed, a Naval Reserve or Militia cannot be organized, without naval and military advice. The colonies having no body of officers to assist them in such a task, it is for the mother-country to take the initiative in the discharge of the urgent Imperial duty of preparing a scheme for the mutual self-defence of all the dependencies of the Empire.

I am not competent to enter into the details of such a scheme as the Royal Commission which I recommend would be enabled to prepare. A degree of local and professional knowledge, which I cannot pretend to possess, and which, indeed, cannot be combined in any individual, would be required in the preparation of a satisfactory plan. As an example of what might be done, I will, however, venture to refer to some notes which I made on the formation of a Naval Reserve in Canada, after visiting the ports in the Gulf of St. Lawrence in 1872.

It is believed that in the Canadian Dominion there are not less than 87,000 seafaring men. In 1872, about 1,000 decked vessels, and 17,000 open boats, manned by 42,000 men, were employed. On December 31st, 1876, the Canadian Dominion possessed 6,952 vessels, of 1,205,565 tons. During the year 1876, 480 new vessels, of 151,012 tons, were built in the Dominion. The value of the fish exported from Canada in the same year amounted to £1,000,000. The value of the exports of the same class from Newfoundland in 1875 was £1,340,000.

It is stated in the annual report of Governor Hill, for 1872, that about 10,000 men are engaged in the seal fishery of Newfoundland, and that this number includes almost every available able-bodied man on the island. The total male population, it should be added, is 75,000.

The rigorous climate of Canada and Newfoundland, throughout their long winter season, makes it impossible for fishermen to follow their regular vocation. The long interval of enforced idleness during winter would afford an admirable opportunity for regular attendance at drill, without interfering with other lucrative employment. A vigorous effort should be made to enrol these colonial fishermen in the Naval Reserve of the British Empire. They are thoroughly inured to the hardships of the sea by the severe weather, which frequently prevails on their native shore. No subjects of the British Crown are more loyal and devoted. There would be no difficulty in giving to the fishermen of Newfoundland and the maritime provinces of the Canadian Dominion an opportunity of embarking for their annual drill at a port

easily accessible from their own homes. A vessel should be commissioned specially for the purpose of training seamen, who have joined the Naval Reserve from Newfoundland, from the ports in the Gulf of St. Lawrence, and from Quebec, Montreal, and other places on the great river. The vessel should be of the corvette class, having a covered deck, in which the battery of guns would be placed. In such a vessel the drills might be carried on with regularity in the most severe weather. The drill-ship would be stationed during mid-winter at St. John's. The harbour is admirably sheltered and a large population of fishermen is congregated in the town and its vicinity. During a portion of the winter the drill-ship should be moved to other points on the coast where the fishermen are settled in large numbers. Thus the members of the Colonial Naval Reserve would have an opportunity of going through the annual course of drill, without being exposed to the hardship of a long sea-voyage to St. John's in their small fishing boats in mid-winter. Along the coasts of Newfoundland there are numerous admirably sheltered harbours, which are rarely frozen up. An anchorage might be selected for the training-ship both in Placentia Bay and in Trinity Bay, perfectly secure, and easily accessible to the large numbers of British seafaring men dispersed along those distant shores. As the spring approached, and the navigation was opened in the Gulf of St. Lawrence, the ship could proceed from harbour to harbour along the southern shores of the Gulf. At Sydney, Charlottetown, and Gaspe, many seamen could be enrolled for the national reserve. It should be arranged that the drill-ship should visit the harbours mentioned sufficiently early in the season to enable the seamen sailing from those ports to go through their annual drills, before the navigation of the St. Lawrence was fully open. The reserve men might thus have the opportunity of attending on board the training-ship, without suffering the serious inconvenience which would be felt if they were taken from their employment afloat in the season of open navigation. Another similar training-ship should be stationed at Halifax, which should visit the numerous harbours on the coast of Nova Scotia and in the Bay of Fundy, in the winter season, when multitudes of fishermen are compelled to remain on shore in consequence of the inclemency of the weather.

We have not neglected to avail ourselves of the services of our colonial population for the purpose of increasing our military resources. We have enrolled large bodies of men belonging to races distinct from our own. There can be no sufficient reason for neglecting to recruit for the Navy among the vast numbers of loyal Englishmen, who animated by a splendid spirit of enterprise and adventure, have settled on the extensive coasts of our Canadian Dominion.

In a lecture delivered at the Royal Colonial Institute, on the 4th February, 1873, M. Bourniot, a member of the Canadian Senate, remarked that, "In the men that sail the fishing fleets of Canada, we see the elements of a very powerful marine, which will be found invaluable in times of national danger. It may be estimated that the total strength which the fisheries employ throughout all British North America is composed of some 70,000 men." M. Bourniot was of

opinion that there was no reason why training ships, supported by the local governments, should not be started in the colonies, if the system were found to work well in the United Kingdom.

The policy recommended seems to be in consonance with the views expressed by Lord Elgin, who, when Governor-General of Canada, argued with so much force on the advantages to England and her colonies of an intimate union between them. "Is the Queen of England," he wrote, "to be the Sovereign of an Empire, growing, expanding, strengthening itself from age to age, striking its roots into fresh earth, and drawing new supplies of vitality from virgin soils? Or is she to be, for all essential purposes of might and power, Monarch of Great Britain and Ireland merely?"

The organization of a Naval Reserve in our North American Colonies is not only to be desired as a means of adding to our naval strength for Imperial purposes, but also for defending the colonies themselves. All our colonies, including India, should have a defensive force of their own. Organization beforehand is essential to success in war. By the bestowal of infinite pains on her military organization, Prussia, which seemed for ever fallen after the battle of Jena, turned the tide of fortune in 1815, and, after the campaigns of 1866 and 1870, has become the greatest power of Central Europe.

It is one of the great recommendations of the scheme which I have advocated on this occasion, that it need not involve the country in a lavish expenditure. It is well to prepare in advance plans of earthworks, to be thrown up when required, and to organize corps of naval volunteers. It does not follow that we should undertake the construction of the extravagant fortresses which surround our arsenals at home, or withdraw a single man from the well-rewarded labour-market of the colonies. To build fleets and forts, and to maintain armies in every dependency of the Crown, would be an exhausting and an unnecessary effort. I remember, and approve, the language held by Sir Robert Peel in 1850, when he said: "I believe that in time of peace we must by our retrenchment consent to incur some risk. I venture to say that if you choose to have all the garrisons of all your colonial possessions in a complete state, and to have all your fortifications secure from attack, no amount of annual expenditure will be sufficient to accomplish your object."

Since the date of Sir Robert Peel's speech, that noble Volunteer movement, one of the most honourable features in the recent history of this country, has been originated. A quarter of a century ago, the voluntary submission to drill and discipline of large masses of men, in numbers far exceeding those enrolled in the regular Army, was not anticipated by British statesmen. By the extension of the Volunteer movement, garrisons can be maintained in the largest fortresses and in the most distant outposts, without adding in any appreciable degree to the charges on the Imperial and Colonial revenues.

The mother-country could readily furnish a staff of officers and instructors for the purpose of training the Colonial Naval Reserves. The number of officers required must depend on the strength of the

force which it is deemed expedient to raise. In whatever numbers they may be wanted, they can be supplied from the ranks of those who have retired from the active list, or who are, for the time being, on half-pay. The presence of a body of naval Officers in our colonies will form a valuable link with the United Kingdom.

They will carry with them the spirit of discipline and devotion to their country, which they have acquired from service in the Navy, and they will help to keep alive its illustrious traditions in those young communities, in which it is so important to create a high tone of morality and conduct. The example of her great men is the most valuable inheritance of a nation, and in the career of many of our sea officers the highest moral excellence has been combined with dauntless bravery and skilful seamanship.

Readers of naval story will be familiar with the fine passages in which Southey concludes his biography of Lord Nelson. He tells us how, on the sunny morning of the 21st October, 1805, as the British fleet was bearing down on the formidable array of ships under Villeneuve, Nelson withdrew to his cabin, and, looking for death with almost as sure an expectation as for victory, piously discharged his devotional duties. You know with what calm courage shortly afterwards he entered into battle, and with what conduct and valour our officers and men followed their illustrious chief to victory. The battle of Trafalgar, though considered by Southey as the most signal success that ever was achieved upon the seas, was dearly bought by the death of Nelson; and yet, as his biographer most truly says, "He cannot be said to have fallen prematurely, whose work was done; nor ought he to be lamented, who died so full of honours, and at the height of human fame. The most triumphant death is that of the martyr; the most awful that of the martyred patriot: the most splendid that of the hero in the hour of victory: and if the chariot and the horses of fire had been vouchsafed for Nelson's translation, he could scarcely have departed in a brighter blaze of glory. He has left us, not indeed his mantle of inspiration, but a name and an example, which are at this moment inspiring thousands of the youth of England, a name which is our pride, and an example which will continue to be our shield and our strength."

That the navy of our own time contains many brave men, prepared to serve their Queen and country in the spirit which animated Lord Nelson, we cannot doubt. You remember how the gallant Burgoyne refused to enter the boat in which the sole survivors of the crew of the "Captain" were saved. Humanity to the savage, and fortitude in death were conspicuously illustrated in the closing hours of Captain Goodenough. But the occasions which brought out the high qualities of Lord Nelson are happily rare. The annals of a nation must be long, in order to furnish many examples equally illustrious. Our share in the honour which belongs to the descendants of such men is a privilege of high value; and it will surely be one of the strongest inducements to the formation of a Colonial Naval Reserve, that a link will thus be created with a navy possessing the splendid traditions which belong to the British service.

Captain CYPRIAN BRIDGE, R.N.: Lest it should be supposed that I have risen too soon, and not waited for other Officers of greater experience, and who have given more attention to this subject than myself, I will, with your permission, just mention in a few words why I take such an interest in this question. In the first place, I take an interest that I believe every naval Officer must take; in the second place, I take an interest that I think every colonist (I myself having been born and lived in a colony for some years) ought to take in it; and, in the next place, I take special interest in it as having taken some part in trying to direct the attention of my brother Officers and the public at large to the great question of raising a volunteer force which might be to the Navy what the great Rifle and Artillery Volunteer force has been to the Army. For these three reasons I have, perhaps, been induced to pay more attention to this subject than many people are inclined to think it deserves. In my opinion, no subject that could be brought before any assembly of Englishmen, whether in the mother country or the colonies, is more worthy of attention than this. As Mr. Brassey has very well told us, in the able and interesting paper which he has just finished, the very life of the Empire depends upon those relations which have been maintained with many of our great colonial dependencies. It has been my good fortune to visit every great group of colonies, with the exception of those in South Africa, beginning at Vancouver's Island and ending in Australia, so that I have a somewhat intimate personal knowledge of the condition of many of them. Of the great colony of Canada I am only acquainted with the maritime provinces; of Canada proper, the only places I have ever visited are Gaspé and Paspébiac; as to Nova Scotia, Newfoundland, and New Brunswick, almost every part of their coasts I know well. To show how feasible it has been thought in the Dominion of Canada, even some years before the Confederation, to establish a naval force of their own, there was in existence at Halifax, certainly as far back as 1865, a naval volunteer force. When I became aware that it was in existence, my stay at Halifax was too short, and my occupations too numerous, to enable me to make many inquiries concerning it. I did see some of the Officers and men in uniform, but I understood it was more upon a land basis than a sea basis. The Officers had military titles, and it was intended that they should be employed in time of war chiefly in defending batteries on shore. This is not, of course, what has been aimed at in the proposals Mr. Brassey has made this afternoon; but still I think it does show that, even at that period, they were willing to take some steps towards forming such a force as has been proposed. With regard to the docking facilities in Australia, there must be many Officers who have served in Australia, much later than I have; but as far back as 1859, the ship to which I belonged, of over 1,400 or 1,500 tons, as we then counted them, was docked at a very large dock at Cockatoo Island, above Sydney, which even at that time was very much larger than was necessary to take in a ship of her size, and had previously taken in an Austrian frigate. The island was entirely given up to workshops and such places as are required in a naval yard; and I should imagine, with a very small expenditure of money, and in a very short time, it would have been made, and probably is now made, a very suitable and useful naval arsenal. I should, therefore, be very sorry to see the proposal carried out which Captain Colomb has made, and Mr. Brassey approved, to close one of our dockyards to open up others, because I do not think it is necessary. There was one point to which Mr. Brassey did not allude, which he mentioned as supplementing his proposal, and that is, he did not draw our attention—it could not have escaped his notice, because he has recently been to those parts himself—but he did not consider it necessary to draw attention to the fact, that in the Indian Empire we have a very large nautical population. I do not mean to put them upon anything like the same footing as the colonists; but that they are good seamen, and fit to go anywhere, has been shown by the manner in which they have altogether taken the place of European seamen on the splendid Peninsular and Oriental steamers, not to mention others. It would be possible to so organize a force of these men, that they might set free a very large number of the seamen belonging to Her Majesty's Service at present engaged in special employment, which, during war, could be performed by men of the description of which I have spoken, and would enable the Europeans who now are employed in them to take part in the more important operations of war. There are also, I believe, con-

siderable naval establishments there; at Bombay, I understand, the dockyard is a very large one. Mentioning that, reminds me of the unfortunate fact, that the Indian Navy was abolished; we are now feeling the want of it. In Mr. Brassey's paper, he of course alluded to a subject which, if not obviously, is very intimately connected with one to which he was virtually addressing himself, and that is the defence of our ocean commerce. Of course, this question of raising a volunteer naval force in the colonies is solely with a view to defending our commerce. It seems to me there is a great amount of unnecessary alarm. No country has ever had so great an ocean commerce as we have, and no country has ever been in a position so thoroughly well able to defend it. All the arguments drawn from the case of the "Alabama," or the history of the war between the Northern and Southern States, when the American flag was driven from the ocean by one or two fast cruisers, are absolutely inapplicable to the condition of affairs at present. The American flag flew on sailing ships almost exclusively, and the cruisers which went against those ships, and eventually swept them off the seas, were steamers. A glance at the chart (on the wall) will show that it is marked with numerous lines, which lines, going from port to port, mark out the great highways upon which the ocean commerce of the world chiefly passes. Almost without an exception, every one of the most important of those lines begins and ends at or passes through some British possession. There is one great gap, I admit, in the system of defence supplied by our foreign possessions; that is the line which, we will say, begins at Vancouver's Island and ends at the south of South America and the Straits of Magellan. It is true that that line is flanked entirely by foreign countries, and we have no stations within those limits, which must be some 6,000 or 7,000 miles apart, where we can post a defensive squadron, or, what is still more important, for a defensive squadron, obtain supplies. But we ought to recollect we hold both ends of the line in our own hands. We hold Vancouver's Island, and we hold almost entire command of the Straits of Magellan in the Falkland Islands. If, therefore, we maintain the positions we have got, and by so doing prevent the only cruisers that can be sent abroad by any enemy, Russia for instance, obtaining supplies of coal, I do not see what we have to fear from vessels employed as the "Alabama" was employed. Our commerce at present is carried on to a much greater extent than ever before by steam vessels. Those steam vessels would find almost along the whole of their route always friendly coaling stations where they could obtain supplies of fuel. But no other country would be in the same position, or scarcely any other country. Consequently, I do not think there is much danger, except perhaps at the very outset of war, when cruisers would start with full supplies on board, which they would afterwards find very great difficulty in replenishing. I do not think, except at the outset of war, much danger need be anticipated; and probably the increased "risk," in case of war with Russia at this moment, would be no more than a very small addition to the insurance already paid. It therefore shows how extremely necessary it is that we should defend and hold these places, and keep them entirely secure against attack. Therefore I say it would be more advisable to turn our attention to establishing a naval volunteer force which should be upon the spot, and should keep those places in our hands, and prevent them falling into the hands of the enemy, than to drawing upon it to man cruisers and keep open highways, a service which I think would be thoroughly well performed by the Royal Navy. In common with many others, I have read the very able paper in the *Nineteenth Century*, written by Sir Garnet Wolseley, and I am one of the few people who do not agree with it in the least. I think an examination of it—it has been submitted apparently to no examination in any other periodical—would show that the career of that Russian squadron which Sir Garnet Wolseley has painted, has had no parallel in literature, except perhaps the cruise of the "Flying Dutchman." My impression is, if they were to pick up some of these small vessels, of the "Frolic" class, for instance, which he thinks likely, we should be very much the gainers by the fact, and that they would be terribly hampered by such a capture in their possession.

Captain FIELD, R.N.: I did not come here with any intention of speaking, and I did not hear the opening remarks of the lecturer, but as the Chairman has invited me to address the meeting, I will take the liberty of saying a few words. And, first, I desire to say how gratified I am to see the honourable gentleman come here as he

does frequently, to offer criticisms and remarks and suggest improvements in our system of naval defence, and I only wish there were more honourable members in the House of Commons who would take the same interest in naval affairs. It is for want of more men to interest themselves in naval questions that the Naval Service is not adequately represented nor naval policy adequately discussed in that House. But when I turn to the lecture the honourable gentleman has delivered, I have to ask myself what practical good is likely to follow from it. He makes certain very valuable suggestions, but then arises a question, how are they to be carried out? No doubt, as he states, Officers can readily be supplied by the mother country to our various colonies who might assist in any scheme of local defence in those colonies; but, I take it, the mother country cannot be expected to organize a system of colonial defence in colonial waters. Whatever defence we may set on foot would be mainly an Imperial defence, and then our best mode of defending our colonies is on the high seas, meeting hostile fleets or cruisers. But if the honourable gentleman's views are to be entertained at all, they must be entertained by the Colonial Governments, and it would become our Government's duty to invite their co-operation and support; therefore, I should say papers like that which has been read to-day had better be sent forthwith to each Colonial Government, that they may study the question from our point of view. But the honourable gentleman suggests that ships might very well be supplied. He did not quite say how they were to be found, whether to be built and supplied by the Home Government or by the Colonial Governments. I rather fancy he inclined to the idea that the Home Government would supply the ships, and the Colonial Governments the men. Then arises this question—the House of Commons is very jealous of the national expenditure, and if we are to build ships to send out to the Colonies for the Colonial Governments to man, I think people in England will consider if we build the ships and pay for them, we had better man them ourselves, because then they will not be confined to the use of a particular colony, but will be ready for use in any part of the world. I, therefore, think the question of the supply of ships by our Home Government is one not likely to be entertained by the House of Commons or the country. The scheme sketched out by the lecturer seems to me to resolve itself into this, that it can only be used for defensive purposes in their respective harbours; guarding their harbours, whether by torpedo crews or the erection of forts and manning them; so that the colonial port may be safe from a *coup de main* on the part of a foreign squadron. We have at present no colonial navy. There is one ship, I think, in Australia which has been sent out and paid for, but I think it would be a very good thing to invite Colonial Governments to pay certain sums of money to meet the expenditure that will be incurred by the Home Government if they do send out more ships to colonial waters. If the Colonial Governments would be prepared to pay the expenses, the mother country would not hesitate to send more ships out there, and to send out gunners and crews, and to supplement those crews by men raised in the colonial stations, so that after all it resolves itself simply into a pure question of money. Is there public spirit enough in our various colonies to carry out the views the honourable gentleman enunciates? I think there is good public spirit in them, but it takes the near approach of war to stir them up to any exertion. It was only the near approach or fear of war that led to the formation of our great Volunteer Corps in this country, and it will only be the sense of danger which will induce our colonial friends to stir themselves up to form some such corps, whether land or sea forces. But I think they might very properly be invited by this Government to take some measures for their own defence, and not to leave the mother country to do everything for them. They have behaved admirably in Canada in forming local militia corps, and Australia is stirring itself on the question. They have invited an eminent engineer to go and make suggestions as to the best way of defending their harbours. Beyond that, I do not think the mother country can be expected to find funds to protect colonies merely in colonial waters. Whatever funds the House of Commons will vote they will insist shall be expended for Imperial defence generally, and not in sending out ships built in this country to be manned by any colonial force whatever. Those are my humble opinions. I think, whatever can be done by the colonies in the way of local defence will be done on intimation from the mother country, but they must find the money; they must also find the men, and if they will find the money for the ships we can readily supply them.

Captain P. H. COLOMB, R.N. : After Mr. Brassey's splendid peroration it is rather difficult to get one's mind back to the facts of the case before us, but the remarks of Captain Bridge and Captain Field have brought us into a more proper frame of mind for discussing the question. At the outset I have to make one little remark of a personal nature. My brother and I, as in the case of the twins in the popular song, get sometimes mixed, and it is difficult to say occasionally which is which. Mr. Brassey has sometimes particularized me, and when he has done so he has always most correctly stated my views, but in the case of proposing to close the dockyard at Pembroke, and to open a dockyard instead at the Antipodes he is quoting the other twin, and consequently I am not to be held responsible for that. I do not mean to say if I considered the question, I should not agree with him; my brother and I are in very close agreement on these questions, but it is a matter which I have not at all considered, and I have no opinion about it. Wherever Mr. Brassey comes I observe that he brings with him an enormous number of those things which I always express myself as being very fond of, namely, facts. He has given us splendid facts in the paper, as in everything he has written on sea matters: the collection of facts is magnificent. His statement of the growth of the colonies, I am quite sure, puts a new face upon these questions to most of our minds; for my own part, though I have been considering this question to a certain extent, I never thought before of the enormous growth which has taken place since 1815. It never struck me in that light, but it shows we have in that time altered our position altogether in the world, that whereas we were then a country contained in the British Islands, with some little outlying dependencies, we have now become simply the centre of a great English-speaking Empire. I was very near bringing a book with me, and I am glad I did not, because if I had I should have been tempted to have quoted from it too largely—a book which my brother has drawn up, which is a simple collection of articles from colonial newspapers on this question of Imperial defence, and it is something quite surprising to anybody who will run his eye over those articles to see how ready the colonies are to meet us if we will only go to work to meet them. They seem to say, "You have only to say the word; let us talk it over; admit that you will not give us up; admit that we are brothers; admit that the English Empire is not the British Islands, but is scattered all over the world, and we on our side will stand by you shoulder to shoulder as long as you choose to call upon us." That seems to be the general tone of the colonial press, and that seems to me to answer Captain Field's question; and I am very sure of this fact, that every friendly word uttered towards the colonies in any public assembly in England penetrates to the colonies, and is read there, and produces a corresponding friendly feeling towards the mother country, and I am quite certain that that will be the effect of Mr. Brassey's paper here to-day. I recollect reading in some of the debates—in the New South Wales House of Parliament I think, but I am not sure where—a very strong opinion was expressed in favour of trusting to the Royal Navy, and if necessary paying it, for the outer line of defence of their colonies. They seemed to say that they would wish themselves to confine their own efforts, out of the control of the Imperial Government, to the local defence, but they did not seem at all indisposed to bear charges for a force which should not be colonial, but should be used for the defence of their colony, as well as of any other, of course bearing a proportion according to the number of Her Majesty's ships which were present. I hope Mr. Brassey in his answer will make clear the question that Captain Field referred to. I did not myself gather that he meant this: that England was to build the ships, and that the colonies were to find the men. I rather gathered that he wished that a Royal Commission, drawn from England and the colonies, should meet together for the discussion of the question—amongst others—of defence; that that would be really a detail to be decided afterwards. So soon as any colony had expressed its willingness to contribute its quota, that then the disposition of that quota, and how the money was to be spent, would be decided by a joint Royal Commission. That was what I understood. If it were to be said that an ironclad was to be built by England, and sent out to a colony, to lie there in the harbour to be only manned in time of war, I think I should be rather against that policy. I should rather say that a colony like Australia should provide a quota for the purpose of keeping up a sufficient Imperial naval force for the outward defence, and that then the local arrangements of the colonies themselves should

be entirely devoted to the defence of their harbours against blockade or sudden attacks. Mr. Brassey has very truly represented me in saying I put great faith in a colonial system of naval volunteers, who shall rest the defence of their ports mainly on the use of torpedoes. It is the cheapest mode of defence, especially the spar-torpedo—Mr. Thornycroft's model. It is cheap, and it requires for its use men of great intelligence. The class from which the volunteers would be drawn would be the people to manage such vessels: they would have the necessary resolution and daring to make the attack, and, at any rate, if they did nothing else, I believe they would keep them off by simple fear. But when they had done that, they would leave the Imperial naval force free. We should always know the ports were safe behind us, and we should take care that ships bound to those ports were unmolested on their way towards them. But I should not draw the line so closely as to torpedoes; I would extend it, I think, to the "Gamma" and "Staunch" class of gunboat, a class of ship quite capable of attacking an ironclad, but not capable of keeping the sea, and which seems to be a weapon costing a small sum, and exceedingly available for the defence of ports. I was very much struck with Mr. Brassey's statement of the number of sea-faring men available on the coast of Canada and Newfoundland, and with the facilities which are given for the drill of those men at small inconvenience to themselves on account of the long winter. I cannot help thinking if they, as a small branch of the great matter, were taken in hand, we might be able on occasion to draw on Canada if we wanted it, for I should not be prepared to go to Australia for our seamen. I think the difficulty of the question is this: that up to quite recent years the colonies have been told by us always that, "In point of fact, we do not much care about you, for you can go if you like. You are of no very great service to us: we can get on very well without you. If you give us trouble, we shall say, 'Go.'" It has been the policy of the country for a certain time. That policy, I am quite certain, is reversed, and I hope will never come forward again. I am quite sure as long as the English-speaking nations spread over the face of the earth hold together, it will be impossible for anybody else to make head against us.

Colonel HENRY CLINTON: The speech which has been made by Captain Colomb is exceedingly valuable on many points, especially regarding our conciliatory treatment of the colonies at the present time. If the provinces of North America had been met with such considerate treatment at the time when they were talking of separating from us, they would probably never have separated themselves from England. Then I have to say it is a great mistake to suppose that we can do anything in war if we do not get rid of the Declaration of Paris. There has been a discussion on that subject already in this Institution, and it is therefore unnecessary for me to say anything more; but I am firmly convinced that unless the Declaration of Paris is withdrawn, we can never do anything in war. There is a very speedy method of putting an end to war by sea altogether, if the English choose to make use of it. The fact is simply this, if you will have the goodness to stop the making of large guns for other nations by our own people, if you will put a stop to making torpedoes by our own people, and then warn other nations that no ship will be allowed to leave their ports with a greater thickness of iron or guns of more than a certain size, then all naval war would cease, and a sufficient number of ironclad ram-gunboats would maintain the freedom of all the seas for the benefit of the commerce alike of all nations.

Captain SCOTT, R.N.: Captain Bridge has touched upon a point which is no doubt very important—that is the success of the "Alabama" during the American War. We must, however, remember in regard to the United States losing their trade, that at that time sailing ships were becoming obsolete, and their trade from being principally carried in such vessels was also going down the incline; hence, it only needed a slight push, viz., the additional war insurance, to make the Americans sell their vessels, and their trade to pass with the ships sold to neutrals. This, therefore, is not a parallel case to ours at the present time. With respect to Mr. Brassey's very able paper, I wish again to refer to a point that has been more than once brought forward in this Institution. It is not enough to get weapons stored in readiness, but you must have them put into their right place for use in order to be prepared for war. To get guns ready to be put on board ship when war breaks out;

is not the way to be prepared for a sudden outbreak of hostilities. We have long been training and at a considerable cost our Reserve seamen: these men are consequently always learning, but for want of *practice* are, I fear, never getting perfect. What the sailors want is, that when they go on board their own merchant vessels they should carry out what they have been taught. Each merchant vessel should, I think, be armed so as to be in herself formidable. Such a vessel, if commanded by a Reserve Captain, and manned in part by Reserve men who had been keeping up their drill, would be far more formidable than any privateer that could be hastily fitted out to attack her. It should be remembered that these merchant vessels would be handled by men second to none in skill; in fact, many of their Captains are first-rate fellows, and I need not point out to you that their ships carry a splendid weapon which is ready at all times, viz., a straight, powerful, knife-edge iron stem. No wooden vessel struck by such a weapon would have any chance of escape. Given an iron merchant vessel going at enormous speed, and with a powerful stem, and you only want to add two or three light guns—not 64 or 82-pounders which would overstrain her, but 12-pounders; and she would then obtain the character of an armed vessel, and thus give the men confidence in protecting themselves. Besides the light gun and the knife stem there is the spar torpedo, a weapon which our Reserve seamen can easily handle; and as most of our merchant steamers carry whale boats they could be at once provided with an additional means of efficient defence. Then, as to Canada, the merchant ships belonging to that country—manned by their splendid seamen—would be really a very powerful supplement to our force of regular men-of-war if proper arrangements were made in time of peace. We have now got into a habit of considering the ironclad only as a man-of-war, but these merchant vessels are, at least for all points of *defence*, equal to most of our wooden vessels in their speed, in their power of ramming, in their sustained steaming, and in their sea-keeping powers. Turning to what Mr. Brassey has said about the armament for our colonies, I think it is necessary to commence on a small scale of expenditure, and that what is most wanted is first to enrol the seafaring men that are on their coasts for coast defence; likewise to enrol all the traders and their seamen as a naval Reserve, and not to incur the expense of building special war vessels, but rather to utilise all existing means of defence. Let the men be enrolled and also the vessels and boats in which they are accustomed to go to sea, and then what more simple than to drill and afterwards to put torpedoes on board them? In addition to the torpedo armament, which I look upon as mainly servicable for the purposes of defence, you have in your colonies an energetic seafaring people that could be easily organized for defence; and I believe it could be done at a very small cost. My own idea is, that from the instant the Reserve men are called out for drill they should be taken to practical work; let them be put to fortify those positions which are most important, and to make roads to and from them along the coast line. There are no fortifications so cheap or more efficient than sand banks and earthworks. Therefore, your shore drill should commence with erecting such defences, and your naval drill with firing torpedoes, which should be kept at all times ready for use. The colonists, as we hear on all sides, are quite ready to do their part, and I do believe that if that part were pointed out by a Royal Commission, it would have most important results. It would certainly show to other nationalities the latent force and power which this country really possesses. We have seen some newspaper articles lately which tend to give foreigners a very imperfect notion of the actual resources of this country; these affirm that our Empire is so scattered that it has an inherent source of weakness. I venture to maintain, on the contrary, that its extension is an inherent source of strength, for our colonies, settlements, and coaling stations now girdle the earth, and would enable us to keep the seas in time of war. I again affirm that all our ironclads should be sea-going, and that a coast defence ironclad is an anomaly; and I believe that this paper is likely to be of very great service, and I for one think that our hearty thanks are due to Mr. Brassey for coming forward and reading it on the present occasion.

Major-General LOWRY: I beg, as a military man, to express my humble but warm appreciation of the opportune and admirable paper which has been brought with so much pains before us to-day by Mr. Brassey. I rejoice to know that he is

a Member of Parliament, and I trust that many Members of Parliament will be inculcated with the same ideas, and that the very forcible suggestion which he has put before us of a Royal Commission being appointed to inquire into this matter, and so bring it to bear upon our colonies that a system of defence by naval volunteers may be adopted; they will at once strengthen the hands of the mother country and the colonies, and which will be a source of gratification to both. I can, from many years spent in Canada, fully confirm what you, Sir, have said and what Captain Colomb has brought out as to the warmth of the feeling which exists in those colonies towards us, especially in that great dependency of ours of British North America. There are no warmer hearts towards Britain than beat there, and it only requires this country to speak to them and to put forward some system which will draw out their wealth of men and money to enable that country to do much more than she is at present doing for her own defence. We must all feel it, and those especially who have been much in the colonies, that they are not only the peculiar glory, but that they will be the great living strength of this great country; and the more we keep warmly towards them, and the more we develop their love and feeling, the more in the end they will respond to us and become our outlying towers of strength. At this time we are reading in the papers day by day of a threatened Fenian attack on Canada, and I think some gunboats are being placed on the lakes. I have had no connection for some few years with Canada, and I do not know whether crews from our men-of-war at Quebec and Halifax have been furnished for these gunboats, but it certainly would be a most desirable thing if there were always present on the minor lakes of Canada, gunboats thoroughly manned by our Canadian comrades. It is a matter comparatively unimportant whether officered wholly or partially by our colonists. That would be easily settled by a Royal Commission; but that gunboats in a state of thorough readiness and efficiency should be there, that the spirit of our Royal Navy burning in the bosoms of these Canadians should be rightly guided, is a matter of the greatest importance, and for the whole of Canada it is most desirable that some system of naval volunteers should be adopted. I do trust that all that all of us can do, will be done to press forward the matter of a Royal Commission being appointed. Believing it of greatest moment to the future of the country that some system for the defence of our great Colonial Empire should be adopted, and that soon, I for one heartily thank you for the admirable paper you have read.

LORD ALFRED CHURCHILL: I entirely concur in the observations of Mr. Brassey as to the necessity for a Royal Commission composed of representatives of various colonies being appointed for the purpose of investigating this question, and putting it on a proper basis. The observations I wish to make apply more especially to the Australian colonies. There are several colonies within a group, at present somewhat sparsely peopled, and there may be some difficulty in organizing for them a sufficient naval force. However, I think that at present their first endeavour should be in the formation of earthworks at the entrance to the harbours. Most of their harbours are easily defended by means of artillery and torpedoes, and at present there is, I think, one ironclad there, the property of Victoria. I should hope in time we may see, if this question develops itself further, a colonial fleet of ironclads for that especial group; but I think for that purpose the colonies should federate themselves. At present they are all entirely separated one from another, having no sort of control one over another, and it would be necessary therefore for the Home Government to organize a confederation scheme for defence which should be submitted to the colonies and receive their assent. In that case you might arrive at some principle by which they should contribute to the formation of an ironclad fleet for coast purposes, and at the same time as to what amount or proportion of support or assistance should be rendered by the Royal Navy. But in order to do this, I should like to understand what is the nature of the Mutiny Act under which they can serve. Would a naval volunteer serve under the Mutiny Act of the Imperial Government, or have they a Mutiny Act of their own? It may be necessary, in order to carry out my scheme, that the Imperial Government should themselves pass a Mutiny Act applicable to the whole of that group. The same principle would apply to other colonies in other parts. I think that is a question which no doubt will come under the consideration of this Royal Commission. What we ought to do now is to

urge, as a commencement, the appointment of a Royal Commission for the purpose of commencing and investigating this thing. And the Imperial Government should themselves take the initiative in this. You cannot expect the colonies to do it for themselves. It is the duty of the Home Government to take the initiative. I cannot conclude without expressing my own thanks for the admirable paper Mr. Brassey has just read to us: it is not the only occasion on which we have felt deeply indebted to Mr. Brassey for his exertions in this direction.

Major BAYLIS, Q.C.: I have attended many lectures at this Institution, but there have been none in which I have taken a more warm and deep interest than the present. It has given me, and I am sure those who are here present, great pleasure to be here and to have heard the able paper read by Mr. Brassey. There has been much good done in this Institution by the lectures and by papers read here; they have been read in this small room, but the benefit has extended far and near. I think it may also be said of Mr. Brassey's paper that the good which has been done by reading the paper here will be extended far and wide. And it will have this advantage to us, because the good attaches to those who are bound to us, namely, our colonies. I believe the dependencies of England, when they read this paper, as emanating from the United Service Institution, will see that we are alive to the evils in which war may involve them. It is a serious matter, no doubt, for our colonies to feel and know that, when our statesmen think war may be necessary, they too may themselves be involved in war, but they will be glad to learn that this country is also sensitive to its duties, and will do everything to aid them in case of war. I know nothing that will do so much good as the paper which has been read to-day, for we know the value of the self-dependence which it inculcates, at the same time it shows that we care for their interests. I do not believe the colonies wish that England should give them all and every assistance, but what they want is to know what England expects of them, and what England will suggest to them to do for themselves, in addition to aid from the mother country. Well, now that paper suggested that they should, on their part, put their own house in order—that they should look to self-defence and self-reliance; and although, if England be involved in war, we might not look to our colonies and dependencies to defend us, they will, I believe, if necessary, Canada and all the countries connected with dear old England, always stand by her, and I was delighted to hear—unmistakably from those hearty cheers—to-day that dear old England wishes to stand by her colonies, although it has been suggested by one that England wished to be disunited from her colonies. I am sure when they feel that we are on the right course now, that we are endeavouring to suggest to them the best means by which they may be prepared in case of war, they will thank us for this paper, and I have no doubt that these valuable suggestions will lead to very much greater results. I cannot help thinking myself, in my own humble way, it will lead to a communication between the heads of the Government here and the authorities in our colonies, by which they will put their heads together to bring about the best means of rendering efficient defence to the colonies, who will suffer in case of war with England. I do not think it stops there, for I believe the colonies will do their best also to assist England. There is one thing which has relieved my mind considerably, and that is with regard to the "Alabama." We are very glad to hear that that is not a parallel case, and that what happened in the case of the "Alabama" is not possible with us now, and that England is not likely to suffer so much as the Americans suffered, or at all, from these hostile cruisers. This is a great relief to my mind, and I think we have heard very good reasons for it. Our vessels are mostly steamers, and can, therefore, take care of themselves better than was the case with the sailing vessels of the Americans, which fell a prey to the steamers.

Captain HULL, R.N., Hydrographic Department: With reference to the remarks made by Captain Bridge, I may tell him his hopes, with regard to the native sailors of India, have already been, in some respects, realized. I allude to the work now going on under the Indian Marine Survey Department, and, though it may be said that such labours are rather in the service of peace than of war, still, as the old Napoleon managed to conquer Europe by having good maps and knowing how to use them, so (and here I am sure all sailors will agree with me) success in a future naval war will, on the same grounds, greatly depend on our Captains having good

charts and knowing how to use them; therefore, I can say the native sailor of India has already done good work in the defence of that Empire, for when, through the energy of Mr. Clements Markham and Captain Taylor, the Indian Survey was established in 1875, although the Officers were supplied by the Admiralty, the men were found in India. Captain Taylor's staff has already surveyed Moulmein, Rangoon, Chittagong, False Point, Coringa, and Madras. One party is now working in Palk Strait, while Navigating Lieutenant Jarrad and another party are surveying the west coast of Hindostan, to the south of Bombay, the whole of that important part of a survey, the soundings, being taken by native sailors.

Mr. BRASSEY, in reply, said: I am very much obliged to those Officers who have spoken, for the too kind manner in which they have referred to my paper. I was much flattered by the invitation I received from the Council of this Institution inviting me to prepare a paper on the Colonial Naval Reserve; and if what I have written has any effect in setting in motion a scheme for organizing our resources for colonial self-defence, I shall feel thankful that I have been engaged in such a useful task. The point has been referred to by several speakers as to the mode in which the expenditure necessary in carrying out such a scheme was to be dealt with. Captain Field very truly said, after all this is a matter which cannot be undertaken without an expenditure of money; and speaking as a member of the Legislature, I fully appreciate that aspect of the case, and consider that it will require very delicate handling to settle it satisfactorily. Now the foundation of a practical scheme must be, as I have endeavoured to point out, an inquiry by some competent and fully representative body, and I cannot conceive how a more effective mode of inquiry could be devised than that which would be provided by a Royal Commission. As everybody has said, the initiative must be taken by the mother country, and the best mode by which the mother country can point out what is required to be done, and bring home to the appreciation of the colonists the necessity for doing what is necessary, will be provided by giving them the full report on the subject from a Royal Commission composed of naval and military authorities and representatives of the colonists, who would be able to speak on behalf of the Colonial Government as to the ability and willingness of the taxpayers in those colonies to contribute their share. I do not think one can speak definitely on this point until we have had this essential preliminary investigation. No doubt the Commission would begin, as individual writers on this subject have begun, by laying down what are the important and strategical points which you have to defend. Some of these strategical points being coaling stations, necessary bases for naval operations, would be ports of very flourishing trade. We may fairly look, in such a case as that, to the mercantile community to contribute what is necessary. In other cases you have an important strategic point which has not a flourishing trade, which is important in a naval point of view, but not in a commercial point of view; such, for instance, as the Falkland Islands, or perhaps Vancouver. You could not reasonably expect, in such a case as that, that the expense would be met from any other source than the national exchequer. Gibraltar and Malta are important strategical points and defended, and I think very properly so, at the expense of the mother country. I now turn to the question very properly raised by Captain Field with reference to the ships. Those ships which may be considered necessary for the local defence of a flourishing commercial colony would, I think, belong to and be paid for by the colonies. Those ships which you might think it necessary to build for the local defence of places like the Falkland Islands would necessarily be paid for by the Home Government. Each case would have to be dealt with with reference to its local and special circumstances, which would be no doubt properly appreciated by the Royal Commission. I am glad that what I have said with reference to Canada and Newfoundland has been approved by those naval gentlemen who have spoken. In Canada there is a most admirable field for the organization of a naval reserve. There is a large sea-faring population, hardy and loyal, and valuable in every way for naval purposes, and from the necessity of the case unemployed during a considerable portion of the year. And when we come to consider how near the shores of Canada and Newfoundland are to this country, the facilities for communication by telegraph, the means you have of bringing to this country, if required, a very considerable force, so that in a fortnight from the time when your appreciation of the necessity had been formed, you might have your

Canadian reserves in your home ports, ready to man your ships; when you come, I say, to consider all these things, it must be acknowledged that we have too long neglected a very valuable source of naval power, and one which I trust will be developed by such an organization as the Admiralty with very small expense might very easily establish on those coasts. I am glad to be reminded by my friend Captain Bridge of the resources we have in India. India I look upon as a precious jewel in the national diadem, but it involves the country in immense responsibilities. I will not enter into the question now, but the day may come when it may be to some extent a financial burden to this country. In any case it is satisfactory to know that we not only have responsibilities and burdens to bear in connection with India, but that we derive sources of strength from our Indian connection. I was glad to hear from the observations which fell from Captain Colomb that there has been an expression of opinion officially and in Parliament in the colony of New South Wales to the effect that the colony would be willing to contribute its proportion to the maintenance of such vessels of the Royal Navy as might be permanently stationed in the colonial waters. I think we might reasonably expect such a view to be entertained in a wealthy and increasing colony. I cannot answer the questions which have been raised about the Mutiny Act as a lawyer, for although called to the Bar, I have never practised in the profession.

I thank you very much, and can only say, as I have already observed, it has been a work of great satisfaction to me to have been called upon to prepare this paper; and if it does tend to set a movement on foot which will be of practical value, I shall have been very proud to have taken some part in the matter. With reference to Parliament you must all appreciate this—it is very difficult to rouse the attention of Parliament to new subjects. In such a case as the one which we are discussing, an expression of opinion by the members of the United Service Institution is of great value as an initiatory step before bringing any proposals relating to a Colonial Naval Reserve before Parliament and the country.

The CHAIRMAN: Before I ask you to vote, as I am sure you will with acclamation, your thanks to Mr. Brassey for his very able paper, I would remind you that he possesses peculiar qualifications for speaking to us on this subject. In the first place he commands the body of Naval Artillery Volunteers in England, and he has just been round the world, where he has just visited our colonies and has seen how necessary it is that this step should be carried out. I met him at Hong Kong, a colony in which there is no volunteer force. Hong Kong is a most important British colony, and yet a man might walk for days about it without finding a fort. It is absolutely undefended, except by a few insignificant guns. Singapore is also absolutely undefended. We have in the China and Japan Seas not exactly colonies, but settlements very much of the nature of colonies, viz., settlements on the main land in the treaty ports. It is very difficult to persuade the English inhabitants to move in this matter of creating a volunteer force. Englishmen in those distant parts may fight well enough when driven into a corner, but they for various reasons will rarely combine together to form volunteer forces and submit to drill. You may find at one port some one or more enthusiasts who take the question up, and I do not know what we should do without our enthusiasts, as they form a nucleus. Thus we have, as at Shanghai, a very respectable volunteer infantry force—there is a small force of cavalry and Gatling guns—very much the kind of force that Mr. Brassey has spoken of, that is what we want in all our colonies, as I understand from his paper; and I entirely agree with him. The only difficulty is to start them. I see no reason why the Act authorizing the enrolment of volunteers should not be extended to the colonies and to the treaty ports of China and Japan, and that promptly. We are honoured to-day by the presence of some ladies. Depend upon it that there is a great deal in the power of the ladies in this question. I speak quite seriously. If the ladies in the colonies and settlements referred to would look shyly on any young men who were not enrolled in a corps of volunteers for the defence of the ladies themselves, and of the British interests, then I believe we should find all our colonies and all our outlying settlements thoroughly well defended. I have very much pleasure in returning our thanks to Mr. Brassey for his very able lecture.