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R.E., &c., &c., in the Chair.

RECRUITING FOR HER MAJESTY'S SERVICE.

By Lieut-Colonel J. McD. MOODY, R.M.L.I.

HAVING personally had five years' experience of the Recruiting Service, in, I may say, all its phases, and to a certain extent all its branches, I am anxious to lay the result of my experience before the members of this Institution, with a hope that the discussion which will follow may have the effect of calling attention to the matter, and inducing the British public to devote to it that sympathy and goodwill without which the present shortcomings can never be removed.

I have entitled my paper "Recruiting for Her Majesty's Service," but as Army recruiting is the burning question of the day, I shall, to a great extent, confine myself to recruiting for the land forces.

Recruiting for the Army.

In a volunteer Army like ours, it will be readily admitted that the question of recruiting in its broadest sense is all-important. When we consider that the only means of obtaining the material out of which our soldiers are made is by going into the open labour market, and competing there with the various industries which, to men of energy and ability, offer prospects of comfort and independence, if not wealth, we need no argument to convince us that the services of the Crown can only attract good men by offering inducements fairly proportionate to those present in other walks of life. The subject has for many years past engaged, and still continues to engage, the attention of public men. So many Royal Commissions and Committees have been appointed to investigate the difficulties in connection with recruiting, that it might be imagined the knotty question has been solved, and that we have now the most perfect and successful system that could be devised. So far, however, as the Army is concerned, this is evidently not the case. Up to last year there were grave deficiencies both in the quality and in the quantity of the recruits.

According to the latest Returns the deficiency, so far as quantity concerned, is in a fair way of disappearing, owing partly to enthusiasm, partly, it is said, to commercial depression, and partly to the new system of very short service, with option of prolongation. The new system also of training Militia recruits immediately after attestation at the dépôt of the territorial regiment, has caused a considerable influx into the Line, of men originally enlisted in the Militia. This, however, is anything but an unmixed good, for the practice has been largely influential in making the Militia a mere feeder to the Line, thus rendering the Militia by many thousands below establishment. Some steps are, however, being taken to induce recruits who have passed through the Army Reserve to enrol for the Militia.

Before going into what I consider to be the causes of, and remedies for, the present unsatisfactory state of things, I will briefly review the terms of service which have from time to time been in force in the Army. These terms have always been regulated by the Army Enlistment Act for the time being. During the 17th century short service was common. Through popular jealousy of the Crown, men were embodied for war, and disbanded on its conclusion.

Previous to 1782 service was occasionally compulsory. Increased Colonial Empire and difficulties of relief at length necessitated passing of an Act of Parliament by which life service was authorized, and this system was principally in vogue at the close of the 18th century. In 1806, during the great wars with Napoleon, the Short Service Act was passed, introducing short service, the first term being seven years in the infantry and ten in the cavalry. Two subsequent engagements of seven years and five years respectively were permitted. In 1808 unlimited service was again introduced. A recruit had the choice of either limited service with a small bounty, or unlimited service with a large one. He generally chose the latter. In 1811 what was termed life service was again introduced, and was the recognized system for nearly twenty years from that date. Life service at that time, however, did not, as a rule, exceed twenty-one years in the infantry, and twenty-four in the cavalry.

In 1847 the Limited Service Act was passed, under which no person was enlisted for more than ten years in the infantry, and twelve years in other branches. If willing and approved, the soldier could engage for eleven years in infantry and twelve in other branches.

In 1855, during the war with Russia, an Act was passed, to be in force for three years, by which any person might be enlisted for a period not exceeding ten years in infantry and twelve in other branches, as authorized by Her Majesty's Order in Council. The three years' enlistment was authorized under this Act. The Act was renewed for a second period of three years, but as no Order in Council was issued, it did not come into operation. The Act of 1847 remained in force, with little modification, until 1867, when, on the recommendation of the Recruiting Commission of 1866, an Act was passed altering the division of service from ten and eleven years to two and nine, with re-engagement so as to complete twenty-one years. These terms continued until short service was introduced in 1870.

quote from an excellent pamphlet,¹ by Captain White, who has made the recruiting question his especial study:—

“The idea of systematic, unmixed short service in the British Army arose from the magnificent results which it had shown during the Franco-Prussian war of 1870-71.

“The chiefs of the English military organization had just awoke to the fact that they had no reserve to fall back upon, and that one day of such slaughter as took place at Wörth or Gravelotte would leave gaps in the only army corps England could put in the field, which it would be difficult, if not impossible, to fill. They had seen a whole nation of trained and disciplined men spring up, fully organized and equipped, and, grouping themselves without hitch or friction around their varied centres, move to all intents and purposes as one machine. As one body passed to the front, its place was supplied from efficient reserves, until over a million soldiers were on their way marching in an ever-increasing stream rapidly, silently, relentlessly to avenge the honour of their fatherland.

“Throughout a war involving life or death to Germany, the system stood the fearful strain, and, without a single breakdown, in six months, brought the people which had held the arbitrament of European affairs for a quarter of a century helplessly and hopelessly to Von Moltke's feet.

“The result simply made Europe stand aghast, with mingled admiration, relief, and fear lest the conqueror should use his awful power for illegitimate ends. England became nervous. She compared her own showy but unsupported Army with the marvellous cumulative force of Germany's sustained efforts, and, grasping at the results without calculation of the means employed to produce them, immediately started a short-service system of her own.”

The system of bounty had been abolished in 1867, having been in force for over seventy years. The Army was, as usual, below its establishment, and there were no great inducements to draw men to the ranks. It may interest my audience if I here give a brief sketch of the progress and vicissitudes of the bounty system. When recruits were required, the standard was lowered, and a sum of money given on enlistment, varying according to the urgency of the case, the highest being 16*l.* 16*s.* in the early part of the century. Out of this bounty, however, a full kit had to be provided. In 1855 a free kit was given, and the bounty reduced to 5*l.* The free kit has since been continued, but the bounty was gradually reduced to 1*l.*, and, as I said before, was finally abolished in 1867.

It was an almost unmitigated evil, for as recruiting rendezvous were always established in public-houses, it tended to produce great demoralization both in recruiters and recruits. Yet, even practical men were singularly unwilling to recommend its discontinuance. The Royal Commission of 1859 suggested its being paid in instalments, and that of 1866, that it should not be increased.

Until 1879 recruits were enlisted by means of the “Queen's shilling,” and even now many persons still believe in its existence. Probably for many years to come it will remain as the synonym for initiation into military service. After receiving the shilling, the recruit could not be attested for twenty-four hours, nor after ninety-six hours from the time of his enlistment. A large number of desertions took place between the enlistment and the attestation. In

¹ “Short Service and the Employment of Reserve Soldiers,” by Captain C. W. White (1885, Cousins & Co.).

1859, out of a total of 11,000 desertions, 2,500 were accounted under this head.

At the present time, when a man offers himself for enlistment receives, instead of the traditional shilling, a notice paper, instructing him as to where and when he is to present himself for attestation; this is in no way binding on him, and he incurs no penalty should he fail to appear. Even after attestation he may claim his discharge within three months, on payment of 10*l*.

Down to 1860 the soldier's position was but an indifferent one, owing to the reforms inaugurated by Mr. Sydney (afterwards Herbert, when Secretary of State for War, and continued by his successors), the position of the rank and file has been vastly improved. Clothing and pay have been increased, better food has been provided, hospitals have been established, sanitary arrangements attended to, and conditions of service relaxed. Yet the fact remains that the Service is still unpopular amongst those classes from which recruits should be drawn. All the efforts of succeeding War Ministers have failed to attract *men* to the ranks, and the boys who form the great bulk of the recruits are not as a rule of the stamp which develop into the best type of the British soldier. The waste, moreover, is enormous from invaliding, desertion, purchase, discharge on bad characters, and a floating prison contingent. Legislation has done all it can in the matter with comparatively little success. For fifty years one constant succession of changes has been going on, and experiment after another has been tried to achieve the two great objects which the country has in view, namely, the creation of a numerous, efficient, and contented Army, and a reliable Reserve.

I am not going to enter into the merits or demerits of short service, which Lord Cardwell instituted in 1870 as a panacea for the then existing evils. It would be difficult to indicate any plan to keep up the Army and produce a Reserve which had not as an element of short service in it. Yet, as a system, short service admittedly failed. It was established on the most uncompromising grounds. Long service was to be quite abolished, and six years with the colours and six with the Reserve to be the extreme limit of a soldier's engagements. Pensions, it was supposed, would gradually decrease, and a large and efficient Reserve be created. Owing to the great waste, however, the Reserve did not grow as rapidly as had been anticipated, and the ranks were not filled. So bad did the state of things become that even a system of bounties was tried two years ago, when men were offered 10*l*. in India and 2*l*. at home to re-engage. The latest modification is the present method of "free service," by which a man can take his choice between short and long service. In the Guards three years with the colours and nine in the Reserve, and in other branches of the Service seven years with the colours and five in the Reserve, is the recognized system. In all cases practically continuous service up to twenty-one years, with a pension, is allowed. It will be seen that the terms of enlistment are now as elastic as possible and compare favourably with those in force at any former period.

The conditions and all particulars concerning enlistment are

widely circulated that they are within the reach of every one. They can be obtained at every village post office throughout the kingdom, and are prominently displayed in every town of importance, besides being circulated by means of advertisements, pamphlets, and the Volunteer Permanent Staff.

And yet, notwithstanding this, the recruits are too often of the wrong class, and the waste is enormous. The Report of the Inspector-General of Recruiting shows that during last year, 1884, we lost—

(a.)	By desertion	4,478
(b.)	„ invaliding.....	2,962
(c.)	„ discharge by purchase (1,751 under three months' service)	3,603
(d.)	„ discharge (bad characters)	940
Total		11,983

exclusive of men whose services were temporarily lost by imprisonment, the average number of whom was 1,512.

The causes of this unsatisfactory state of things have been admirably stated by Captain White in the pamphlet to which I have already referred. He says:—

“In a rich commercial nation like ours, the arts of peace have so thorough a supremacy, that military matters are regarded during peace with a large amount of indifference, mingled with a good deal of impatience at the big figures representing the cost of armed forces, which are looked upon as more or less extraneous to the habitual life of the country.

“Moreover, the individual members of our community are so imbued with the principles of personal freedom, that the discipline and self-abnegation of a soldier's life are instinctively distasteful to them. There is so great a struggle for wealth and position, and the prizes offered in the professional, mercantile, and trading world are so many and so large, that all the best talent of the country is enlisted in the now exciting battle of civilian life. Consequently, the only material at the disposal of the military authorities may be divided into two classes, viz., those who by some want either of physical or mental energy are left behind in the struggle for existence, and those restless spirits who take to soldiering because their slight dispositions render them incapable of the calm concentration necessary for civil success. It is therefore either dire necessity or the infirmity of purpose of youthful vagaries that induces Englishmen in these days to don the uniform of the Sovereign.”

But, besides these predisposing causes, the treatment of the soldier by his fellow countrymen is a deterrent to the influx of suitable recruits. I cannot do better than once more quote the words of Captain White:—

“In England the soldier is at a disadvantage on all sides. In spite of the increased tolerance which the Volunteer movement has given him, he is looked upon generally with distrust and disdain. His uniform subjects him to insult and contumely in places where the humblest of his fellow citizens are treated with consideration and deference. No ‘respectable’ person cares to be seen in the company of a ‘common soldier.’ If he comes of even a moderately well-to-do family, he cannot join them socially, for fear of the disgrace and contamination of his inferior station.”

This fact does not arise from any want of military spirit in the

nation. The Briton is, as he always has been, a fighting animal. The almost unaided development of the Volunteer movement is a very strong proof of it, and has produced a body of over half a million men (including those who have left the ranks) more or less trained in the use of arms. It is the *regular* service only which is looked down upon from the social point of view, and this disdain militates against really successful recruiting.

The internal causes are equally prejudicial. We do not make Service pleasant to the men who are in it. Their tastes and intelligence are not sufficiently appealed to. In the matter of discipline they are treated rather as children than as reasoning and responsible beings. Our system of passes and furloughs is worrying, and punishments by their frequency lose their deterrent effect. The food even now is insufficient and badly served, and the barrack-room is often so uncomfortable as to drive the soldier from what should be his home to the public-house. I am convinced that a remedy may be found for this state of things, but it is only by enlisting the sympathy and co-operation of our fellow countrymen and countrywomen.

Aids to Recruiting.

For successful recruiting it is necessary—

- 1st. To bring the most desirable class of men into the Service.
- 2nd. To induce them to remain in it; and
- 3rd. To provide for their future when they leave.

I will take each of these in turn.

1st. To get the most desirable men, we must secure the sympathy and assistance of every class in the country. We can only do this by showing that the training which the soldier receives during the term of service is one which will, at the end of it, turn him out a better, or at any rate, not a worse man than he was at the beginning.

The reason that we cannot show this now is that we do not sufficiently realize that the Army should be a National Training School instead of what I fear it is now thought to be,—a National Reformatory. As long as this Reformatory impression is abroad, we shall have difficulty in either getting a superior class into the Service, or in *do* get them, in inducing them to remain.

But if we get good men and keep them, we shall be in a fair way towards solving the difficulties in connection with the employment of Reserve men and discharged soldiers; we shall be able to provide for their future. To this point I shall presently recur.

The demoralization of the Army would thus be prevented, and the vast expense incurred by the avoidable waste would quickly disappear. Looking at the latest Returns dealing with this matter, I find that this drain had not existed during 1884, we should this year require a less number of recruits by nearly 12,000 men, and save thereby something like 500,000*l*.

In 1880, Lord Airey's Committee reported that desertion alone cost the country 350,000*l*. This was the direct cost: but still more important than the cost was the demoralization of the deserters.

themselves, and the harm they did the Service wherever they spread through the country. Those discharged as bad characters were even more mischievous. They were freer to recount their experience and to poison the minds of their fellow countrymen. These evils can only be remedied by enlisting the sympathy of the public in the matter.

To tell a labouring man in the street that he is personally interested in the class of men who join the ranks of the Army would elicit a reply more forcible than polite. Yet if he could be persuaded that the ounce of tobacco which he has just bought might be purchased for 3d. instead of 3½d., he might see it in another light. In the same way the citizen in broadcloth is surely interested in the number of pennies he has to pay as income-tax towards the support of the Army, that number depending to a great extent on the quality of our recruits.

I am not therefore unreasonable in urging all classes, on pecuniary as well as on patriotic grounds, to assist the authorities in raising efficient men to keep up the war establishments voted by Parliament and deemed necessary by it for the defence of our great Empire.

Taking into consideration the fact that we are committed to voluntary enlistment, the antagonism existing among the general public recruiting was formerly a matter of surprise to me. Not only is there no assistance given to recruiters, but obstacles are actually thrown in their way by all classes. The English people have the credit of retaining prejudices; and the prejudice against recruiting is one of their strongest. That recruiting is conducted on the Sergeant Kite system is still firmly believed by many. The reason, I suppose, is that the public see the indifferent specimens which we receive, and who disgrace themselves and their uniform, thereby discrediting the good men who enter and remain in the ranks. This feeling has become a tradition now, handed down from the times when the Army was notoriously the sink of the nation, and when its punishments were almost necessarily cruel and excessive.

Those days are now happily past, but their impression remains. It is still considered derogatory to the position of a respectable artisan or even a young labourer to enter the ranks of the British Army, and many a mother in humble life would weep less at her son getting into trouble before a magistrate than at his going to seek his fortune in what ought to be one of the most respected professions of a civilized life.

The remedy for this erroneous impression, as well as for the avoidable waste, is to take care that undesirable characters are kept out. The more successful we are in this, the better men we shall get. This I have found in my own corps. To keep them out let recruiting Officers look to quality instead of quantity. By neglecting to do so we are reduced to the necessity of keeping 5,000 men in prison, and of paying a number of others to look after them.

But the question may be asked: "How are we to judge whether a man is desirable?" Get a character if possible. I trust we shall eventually come to that, even if we have to wait some time. Fail

an authentic character, in cases of doubt, use the telegraph. That is what we do under the Admiralty, and with the best results. Since I have held my appointment I have saved the public large sums by liberal use. Admiralty telegrams are forwarded free; War Office telegrams must be prepaid and charged. Why they, too, should be free I cannot understand: it is only one Government Department helping another. A reference by post is a question of days; by telegraph, of minutes. Moreover, a suspicious character will generally make off before the message leaves the office. I always make a show of sending it. In nine cases out of ten, an experienced recruiting Officer will detect a fraudulent enlistee; this is one means of prevention.

Another is to improve the method of detecting desertion. "Police Gazette" as at present employed is useless. A deserter's name is published about three times. It should be kept in it twelve months. The place where he lived for twelve months before desertion, and his descriptive marks three months after it, should be particularized, and both should be added to the attestation paper. Whenever a constable detecting a deserter, the amount of his reward and the date of his receiving it, should also be published as an inducement to the force. I understand that a contribution from the War Office would be necessary to meet the expense of this publication.

Of course the surest method of detecting deserters and preventing fraudulent enlistment would be by vaccinating in an unusual place. This was recommended by Lord Airey's Committee, and on several other occasions, but the authorities have not yet seen their way to adopting this apparently simple precaution. Vaccination is a simple sanitary measure, and if so done to every soldier—Officer or man—there would be nothing invidious in it.

I will now endeavour to indicate the best method of inducing good and desirable men to remain. The recruits which we get are for the most part little better than boys, and according to the Inspector-General's recent Report we are not to expect much else.

We may take for granted that they are healthy lads, as 428 rejected out of every 1,000 applicants for admission. Being immature they require feeding; the quality and quantity of their rations should be increased, their barrack-rooms should be improved, and, by inducing a higher tone, crime should be diminished.

Whilst maintaining a strict but reasonable and reasoning discipline, let Officers recollect that the soldiers with whom they deal are, to a certain extent, educated men—educated so far as to read the daily weekly papers, and to discuss the topics of the day amongst themselves. They are quite capable of forming opinions on matters which concern their own interests.

These opinions can, I believe, be influenced considerably by the Officers. The influence of Officers or those serving under them is enormous, and is not, I believe, fully realized. The public service of the country are officered by the flower of the nation, drawn principally from the upper middle classes; they are carefully educated

trained morally, socially, and intellectually, and are justly recognize as typical English gentlemen. English Officers, therefore, can always command the confidence and esteem of their men when brought into close contact with them. When exceptional difficulties and dangers have to be encountered, the British Officer who is foremost himself in taking his share will be, and always is, cheerfully and unhesitatingly obeyed. In no case has this been more clearly shown than in the recent operations up the Nile and in the Soudan.

A campaign is, however, incidental in the career of a British soldier—the uneventful garrison life at home and abroad, with all its manifold temptations, occupying the greater portion of his colour service. It is here that character and health are too often ruined, and the foundations of future misery too often laid. Here it is that a Officer's influence can and should be brought to bear advantageously but is, I fear, very commonly ignored. I do not speak only of the Officers in the higher ranks, but of every Officer in the Service. A company Officer, no matter what his rank, has often more influence with the men of his company than the Commanding Officer, as he is brought daily into more intimate connection with them. This influence should be exercised, and would soon be felt. A kindly word of encouragement and sympathy would often allay irritation, and thus prevent crime. Prevention is better than cure, and it should always be recollected that anyone can punish. The wise man punishes with judgment, and is often able to prevent the crime which, if committed, would render punishment necessary.

Crime and Punishments.

I cannot too strongly emphasize, and I repeat, that the Services are not reformatories. They are and should be considered in the light of national training schools. Now that localization is gaining ground (upwards of 50 per cent. of the recruits in 1883 and 1884 having been raised in their own districts) a more reasonable discipline is all the more necessary. Punishments should be made exceptional: as crime decreases they will become less familiar, and the dread of them will greatly increase. At present, owing to their familiarity, they lose what should be their aim and end, viz., their deterrent effect. Imprisonment is thought little of because so many undergo it; and the guard-room is looked upon as a matter of course. While on the subject, I would remark that it seems to me most objectionable that any man should be confined to the guard-room except under the direct authority of an Officer.

I have seen both systems tried in my thirty years' service; and there is no comparison in results. I have seen flogging utterly fail to preserve discipline, and I have seen the moral influence alone of determined Officers preserve it.

The Returns for 1883, published by the Inspector-General of Military Prisons, show fully the offences for which men were tried, the sentences awarded, and the punishments inflicted, in each arm of the Service at home. These show that in the Army at home, num

being 86,000 men, 7,526 were tried by court-martial during the year. Of these one-fifth were non-commissioned officers, of the entire body of whom one-tenth were thus reduced or imprisoned during the year.

The Report of the Brixton Military Prison shows that out of a total of 1,113 men passing through that institution in 1882, 53 had less than 1 month's service; 254 between 1 and 6 months' service, and an aggregate of 652 under 2 years' service. The terms of imprisonment varied from 56 to 672 days. Considering the youth of the Army, it will be as well to bear in mind the class of crime for which the sentences were awarded. We glean this from the Report of the Governor, who states that the prisoners under his charge were most lads "who have given but little trouble." And in his Report for 1882 he says: "In regard to soldiers returning to the ranks, it must be borne in mind that many are mere youths, hardly more than soldiers in name, many having joined their respective corps but a few months, and frequently not even dismissed recruit drill, and the breaches of rules and regulations are to a great extent caused by ignorance and the absence of moral training, most having been allowed to run wild and uncontrolled." It is not creditable to our system that the Governor of the largest military prison, with an aggregate of 1,644 inmates, should find it his duty to make such a report.

On the other hand, other Returns showing previous convictions reveal the fact that in 1882 and 1883 men were retained in the Service who had actually been convicted eleven times, and some six times for the same offence. The statement is hardly credible. In addition to the court-martial awards, out of an average strength of 85,900 men, over 140,000 minor punishments were inflicted on Commanding Officers, or 163 per cent. Up to last year, military and naval prisoners were often sent to civil prisons; but, except for shameful crimes, this practice has been discontinued. The cost of escort was, and is now most scandalous, while the sight of a man in military uniform being conducted, handcuffed, through the streets cannot but be most detrimental to recruiting. I believe the remedy is to give Commanding Officers more power—the same, for instance, as is entrusted to naval Captains; and, as far as possible, to carry out all sentences locally, in cells or military prisons, near their headquarters. The prisoners might be employed in all the dirty jobs within the barracks, where they could be seen by their comrades. I am confident that the ridicule to which they would be subjected would be more efficacious as a deterrent than all the punishments that can be inflicted within the prison walls. Of all the useless punishments shot drill is the worst, and yet in some military prisons, and in the cells, it is the only employment available.

Drunkenness has to answer directly or indirectly for seven-tenths of our military crime. To custom, idleness, bad liquor, and want of nourishing food this crime may be ascribed. Custom can only be abolished by establishing a public feeling in the Service against excess in liquor. The influence and example of Officers will here be most useful; and if they will take the matter earnestly in hand, I feel su-

the evil can and will be checked. They must begin with the non-commissioned officers, and look well after the canteens and sergeants' messes. A word in time to a non-commissioned officer or man who smells in the morning like a stale tap-room will frequently cause him to desist before he actually commits himself. Bad liquor should not enter the barracks, but as I will refer to this when I speak of canteens, I will pass on to bad liquor outside the barracks. I have the greatest compassion for men who get drunk in the town. Nine times out of ten it is the vile liquor which causes drunkenness. As the magistrates have so plentifully supplied us with public-houses in our garrison towns, right up to our barrack gates, it would not be too much to ask them to help to undo some of the evil of which they have been the causes, by making it compulsory for the public-houses to supply wholesome liquor. The Adulteration Act is equally applicable to ale or spirits as to milk, and the publican could be prosecuted as easily as the dairyman: there can be no doubt that he as often deserves it. As to the insufficiency of nourishing food I will speak hereafter.

Idleness is the last point which causes not only drunkenness but other crimes. What employment can you give an infantry soldier besides drill and ordinary fatigues? Cavalry, artillery, engineers, and the departments have plenty to do, but the infantry have the bulk of their time on their hands. It may be taken, as a rule, that after 3 o'clock daily an infantryman's time is his own. Without resources confined to within a mile of his quarters, what is he to do? Regimental workshops have been tried, but I fear only in a half-hearted way. The idea is excellent, and should be developed as much as practicable. The men should be kept at something daily, and all day, giving them their night in bed when possible, and their Saturday free after cleaning their barracks. After constant employment during the day, they will be only too glad to keep to their barracks at night. On Saturday they can get away for a long walk into the country. Abolish the mile radius; it is an absurd restriction, and one which tempts to disobedience. Why should not a soldier have his country walk when at leisure, instead of boozing in town? A pass would no doubt be granted, but a man has not always the forethought to ask for one. I should also be inclined to remove the 10 P.M. restriction, and allow men to come into barracks until midnight. Punishment should be short and sharp; a lengthened confinement to barracks is the cause of men breaking out of barracks. A shorter term, with more work would remove the temptation.

Selling necessaries is a frequent crime. Why only the soldier should be punished, I do not know. The civilian purchaser is also liable, yet within my experience I have never known one convicted although in 1883 no less than 1,626 soldiers were tried for this offence.

Food.

I now proceed to speak of "Food," a subject which was most ably

treated by Lieutenant-Colonel Tulloch in this theatre last June whose paper every Officer who has any interest in his men should study attentively. We appeal to all animals through the stomach and as man is no exception to the rule, we may be sure that a recruit is no exception to the man. The Government peace ration is $\frac{3}{4}$ lb. meat and 1 lb. bread still continues, although an increase has been frequently advocated. This increase cannot be too strongly urged.

In the paper to which I have referred Colonel Tulloch has shown by an exact analysis of the soldier's ration, that it is chemically insufficient even for adults doing light work, but still more so for growing lads who are kept hard at work at instruction drill for the greater part of the day. Colonel Tulloch recommends an addition of 1 lb. day to the messing. I should much prefer the addition of $\frac{1}{4}$ lb. meat, even at the increased outlay of 200,000*l.*

I am also greatly in favour of Navy cocoa referred to by Professor De Chaumont, as quoted by Colonel Tulloch; the old-fashioned ordinary Navy cocoa, which contains 80 per cent. of pure cocoa, and 20 per cent. of sugar. If well cooked (and it needs five hours boiling), it would supply a good sustaining beverage for evening and for breakfast, and would go far to prevent that sinking of the stomach which so often first drives the young soldier to the tap. It could be supplied at very small cost from the Admiralty Stores, and though there might be some departmental difficulties and Custom House objections, I presume these might be easily overcome.

The scale of diet amongst the labouring classes is gradually improving, and before long it will be necessary to make corresponding changes in that of the soldier on home service if we want to get recruits of proper physique, or to give Nature a chance of turning growing lads into strong men.

Colonel Tulloch refers to the importance of a careful inspection of all articles of food supplied to the soldier. As this is one of the first duties of the subaltern, it cannot be too strongly impressed on his mind. If the useless visits to the barrack-rooms during meals were discontinued, and the time were spent at the cook-house and provision store, some benefit would result. The Officer should be at the cook-house a reasonable time before each meal; after the meals are issued and dinner more especially, he should be ready in case of complaint. He might visit a few rooms, but not attempt to go round them all. The dinners should be sent direct from the cook-house, in messes, to the barrack-room, and care should be taken that they be served hot.

Barracks.

I now come to the question of barracks.

The comfort of the soldier's barrack-room has not been sufficiently considered. A great deal has rightly been done for his amusement in the way of spacious and comfortable recreation rooms with billiard and bagatelle, libraries, skittle alleys, fives and racket courts, and

¹ "Journal of the Royal United Service Institution," vol. xxviii, p. 778.

theatres. Improved cooking houses have been added from time to time, but except to some extent at the new dépôt barracks, nothing has been done to improve the man's real home—his barrack-room. There are the same whitewashed walls; a shelf for clothing, exposed to all the dust; a straw paillasse renewed quarterly, for the first fortnight as round as a drum, and for the last as flat as a pancake, and not much thicker; an old-fashioned ridge iron-bottomed bedstead; a grate calculated to burn the greatest quantity of coal and give the least amount of heat; and a soft deal floor, which is alternately filthily dirty and soaking wet. The size of the room also precludes all idea of cosiness and comfort. We have only to examine them to realize how little we should like to live in them ourselves. The standard of home comfort throughout the country in the classes from which we should like to obtain our recruits has risen considerably. Great improvements have also been made in all public institutions. Look at the wards of any of our County Asylums for an example of what a barrack-room should be; look at the wards of an old-fashioned workhouse for what they are. We want to get a self-respecting class of men into the Service, and when we have got them we want to keep them. Let us level up our standard of comfort, and we shall go a long way towards success. It need not be done at once, but gradually, keeping in view what is requisite. The expense need not be felt, as it may be spread over a considerable time. A great deal will be done by the men themselves if they are encouraged to do it. If it is impressed on them that their comfort is attended to, you may depend on their meeting you more than half way.

It would be well to divide the rooms where it is possible to do so, so that not more than eight or ten men should be in one room; also to add a few wooden chairs; to give each man a small cupboard at the head of his bed, with a top on which he could write his letters, and with shelves for his clothes. His bedstead should be improved, the iron being replaced by sacking, which could be washed, and the uncomfortable straw by a hair mattress. If hair should be deemed too costly, chopped straw might be substituted. A modern grate should be put in; the saving in coal would soon reimburse the cost. As floors wear out, pitch pine should be substituted for deal. The rooms should be better lighted, and gas regulators should be introduced to stop the present great waste of gas. Wherever possible, varnish might be advantageously substituted for paint. The walls might be coloured in distemper, and neatly stencilled. The baths and washhouses should be improved, and the beastly tubs abolished. The men should be taught to take a pride in their barrack-rooms; they should be moved as seldom as possible, and a system of Dutch cleanliness should be enforced throughout the Service, which it would greatly benefit.

It would surely be no difficult matter to induce the men to take a pride in their rooms, and to vie with each other as to which room should be in the best order. If once such a feeling was established "barrack-damages" would speedily become a thing of the past, and the addition to the men's comfort would be enormous.

Furlough.

I now come to the question of furlough, which to my mind is at all well managed at present. If we really desire men to recruit and be happy in the Service, we should give them furlough as often as they can be spared, and encourage them to spend that furlough with their friends. Nothing is more conducive to the acquisition of recruits, especially in the country districts which supply our material, than the presence of a smart, happy, and respectable soldier with money in his pocket, and nothing but good accounts on his part concerning his Service life. As a practical example of the effect of furloughing, he is worth more than the most persuasive recruiting sergeant, for his opinion will be received with confidence as being unbiassed, and the result of experience without prejudice. If, combined with a greater frequency of furlough, the present system of furlough money were changed, the benefit accruing would be great still. The practice of giving a man a lump sum for his furlough is a temptation to spend it at once, very probably in debauchery and dissipation in a large town. He then goes home to be a burden to his friends and a discredit to his profession. It would be infinitely better to remit his money by weekly instalments. He would then always be independent and with cash in his pocket, while the mere fact of regular supplies coming down would increase his importance among his associates, and so tend to bring in recruits.

His pocket should be eased by inducing the railway companies to take him at half fare, a single fare for return journey, as the suburban lines now do the volunteers. They would rather gain than lose the increased numbers who would travel; and in case of demur, a little easing in the matter of passenger duty would, in all probability, remove objections. By spending his furlough at his home the soldier would keep up his home associations, get the good word of the workmen to establish the popularity of the Service in his neighbourhood, and assist recruiting. He should also be provided with a working suit, so that in case he feels inclined to engage in work of any kind during his leave, he can do so freely and without inconvenience. This would save his uniform.

The working suit is badly wanted for barrack life, and if the order recently promulgated about returning worn-out clothes be persisted in it will be even more necessary.

The soldier on furlough should be permitted to wear his belts.

A sum of "bringing-in money"—say of 10s., payable when the man brought had completed three months' service—might be given with advantage to soldiers on furlough, and extended to reserve and pensioners, but withheld from civilians. Soldiers, however, should be discouraged from hanging about depôts to pick up straggling recruits and claim them as their own.

Canteens.

I will now devote a few words to the very important subject of canteens, the proper management of which has a great influence

the soldier's comfort and welfare. From the time a soldier joins the ranks until he leaves it he will at all stations, except when on active service, find a canteen at his elbow. The model canteen should be managed by a well paid steward, strictly honest, and above taking bribes either directly or indirectly. The provisions should be purchased in the cheapest market, and sold at the lowest price not entailing actual loss. The liquors should be perfectly pure of their kind. They should be so kept after being taken into stock that they should not deteriorate, and the only interest to be considered should be that of the consumer. I fear this model canteen is rarely to be found. Self-interest is allowed to obtain in each department, and so great is the custom, that little trouble is taken to have it otherwise. There are few things a soldier is more interested in than the canteens, and he is sharp enough to know when his interests are looked after or the reverse. Yet it is most difficult to get him to complain, even when he has good grounds. I recollect some years ago being appointed a member of the committee of a large canteen. I was convinced that it was badly managed; and having previously had a rather large experience in the management of canteens, I set to work to put matters right. Yet, in spite of all my efforts, I failed. Vested interests were too strong for me, and after about six weeks I was removed from the committee, my propositions being considered to be of too innovating a nature.

To take one example, I proposed to purchase our bacon at Smithfield, but was told that if we did so we should be obliged to take a ton at a time. I pointed out that our consumption was three tons a month, so that a ton at a time was not an excessive quantity; but it was of no use; I could not carry my point. Again, the committee always judged of the beer by a sample jugful brought to the committee-room at their meeting. I mentioned that our duty was to test it at the canteen bar at uncertain times, and I myself did this. I found the canteen beer, as brought to the committee, bright, sparkling, and palatable, while the tap-room beer was the reverse. I was told the men liked it so; and although the men were encouraged to complain, I don't recollect any complaints having reached us during my short tenure of office.

Monthly balance-sheets should be posted up in the barracks, so that the men may see how the profits are applied. On no one article should an undue or unnecessary profit be made. As a rule, only intoxicating drinks are sold in the canteen. It would be well to have tea and coffee there also. Hot sausages and potatoes, too, should be provided at night at as cheap a rate as possible. By attending to such things the men would be induced to spend their evenings in barracks, and the manifold temptations which beset them in the streets would be, to a great extent, taken away.

Discharged and Reserve Men.

I have so far been endeavouring to show the best methods of meeting the first two necessities of successful recruiting, viz., the obtaining of the best class of men, and keeping them happy and contented in the

ranks. I now come to the third point, namely, the duty of providing for the soldier's future when he leaves the Service or is drafted into the Reserve. So long as the fact of a man's having served the Army is a permanent injury to his position and prospects in after life, so long will really good men be very chary of enlisting, and numbers must be made up from the undesirable class. At present the position of the Reserve man or discharged soldier is a very unfortunate one. It is described with great truth and force by Captain White in the pamphlet to which I have already referred. He says:

"The English Reserve man, be it remembered, has been from six to eight years away, probably a good portion of the time abroad. His training has not fitted him for any position in civil life. His place, supposing him to have had any, has since been filled up in the social world. Boys have grown to men since he has been in the native town or village. The years wasted in the ranks have put him at the tail of the procession. He is twenty-six or twenty-eight years of age. He is generally speaking, no trade. His habits have become fairly set, and they are those of an aimless idler. He comes into a social system where the very fact of his having been a soldier is against him. He is looked upon, more or less, as a vagabond. The testimonials of his Officers are regarded with suspicion. He has to contend everywhere he turns, with men who have been thoroughly trained to the work he seeks, and whose personal character can be ascertained at once from former employers. The few pounds in his pocket soon dwindle away, even if, as is sometimes the case, they be carefully husbanded, and in the majority of instances he sinks into the lowest depths of misery, cursing the day that he ever entered the Queen's Service, and thoroughly embittered against that system of law and order, to which he had given thanklessly the best years of his early manhood. He is an example to the youths with whom he associates not to do as he has done, but to avoid the Army as an unprofitable calling. And thus, instead of acting as a recruiting agent, he, by inveighing against the Army and everything connected with it, deters others from entering the ranks."

No institution has hitherto taken up the case of the discharged Reserve man. The Army Pensioners' Employment Society provides for men with pensions, and therefore less helpless than the unfortunate comrades, of whom we are treating. Moreover, the pensioner, with his one-and-twenty years' good conduct, and his pension as an evidence of it, appeals to a certain extent to the confidence of employers of labour. He is old and bronzed in the countenance, and enlists a certain amount of sympathy. The short service man has no such advantages, and consequently meets only with suspicion and distrust. The employer, desiring a permanent servant, sees a distinct disadvantage to himself in the fact that when he has trained his new *employé* to be useful he may be suddenly called upon to resume his place in the ranks. While, on the other hand, the merchant or trader, who only looks for daily or weekly service, regards him with no favour, and at the best only classes him with the multitude of unskilled applicants for employment, with whom alone he is to compete.

We cannot blame the employer. His experience of discharged soldiers has not probably been a pleasant one. Owing to the sympathetic nature of our discipline, it is unfortunately true that many men, when the prospect of the guard-room and the cells is to be avoided, fail to exercise that self-control to which, as a reasoning person,

apart from fear, their official superiors have probably never appealed. He has, it may be, recommendations from his Commanding Officers and Captain, and means to do well. But temptation comes. The one restraining influence which has been appealed to to keep him straight no longer exists, and he goes wrong. What wonder? when, though a man in years, he has been treated throughout his Army service to a great extent as a child. This is the state of things at present, and the question—the burning question, whose glow will increase each year—is, what is to be the remedy?

Sir Donald Stewart, and those who have supported the scheme inaugurated by Colonel Chapman, have applied themselves to the solution of the difficulty by registering the names of men eligible for employment, and exerting all their energies to procure it for them. Success, however, does not lie with them, but with the British public, to whom alone the soldier who has devoted the best years of his service has a right to appeal. It is a sacred duty devolving on the Government to ensure, as far as possible, that no man suffer from having taken service under it; and no scheme, however well it may look on paper, can possibly succeed until the State recognizes its duty in the matter. Heaven knows the soldier is not over paid for his work. 38*l.* a year, 14*s.* 7½*d.* per week, according to official Returns, is the extent of his emolument, all told, as it costs the State.¹ Surely then the man who for this, less than porter's wages, spends his early manhood, and too frequently his constitution, in the service of the State, has a distinct claim for redress, if that service entails, as it too often does, permanent disadvantage.

There is only one thing to be done, and if done thoroughly, it will be the cheapest in the end. The Government must take active steps to meet the needs of the thousands of poor fellows it yearly turns out upon the world, only keeping an eye on them for its own interests—not theirs. The only plan that I can see, is for the State to give the preference, in its thousands of minor posts, to Reserve and discharged men, to urge strongly and officially the same duty on corporations and municipal bodies, and, if need be, to strengthen its action by putting aside a guarantee fund, as an incentive to employers to give to ex-soldiers, in preference to others, those humble places of trust for which they may be fitted.

The advisability and even pressing necessity of some such action was urged in a paper read by Colonel Moncrieff in January last, at this Institution, embodying the recommendations of Sir Donald Stewart and Colonel Chapman, who, however, deprecate official State action on the score of the people's vested interest in open competition for Civil Service appointments. I, on the contrary, consider that the soldier's claim is superior to any such vested interests, and that it is the paramount duty of the State to recognize that claim.

If this were done, the whole character of the British Army would soon be changed. Men would know that from the time they entered the Service they would be provided for. A better class would quickly respond to the country's call. Men having a tangible prospect in

¹ Report of Lord Airey's Committee, p. 639.

view would vie with each other in preparing themselves, by education and good conduct, for the reward which would be great in proportion to their efforts to deserve it. In this lies almost the gist of the recruiting question. As soon as military service presents advantages which other walks of life are wanting in, so soon will a large proportion of the best men choose it in preference to others. It has its good points already, which no mismanagement can wholly destroy, in satisfying the craving of young blood for change, excitement, and adventure; and now it only requires the sanction of respectability and a confident appeal to the reason of the father as well as to the imagination of the sons of this generation, in order to raise it to its just position in the eyes of the country. A system recently established by the Inspector-General of Recruiting of keeping a register at the depôts of soldiers wishing for employment is excellent, so far as it goes, but we must go further. I would suggest that a central organization should be established in London, at St. George's Barracks, where employers and employed could be brought into communication and interviews arranged. Men might be provided with accommodation and board at a small charge. The system made, as far as possible, self-supporting.

Boy Enlistment.

I now pass on to the important question of "boy enlistment." In 1876 a Departmental Committee devoted considerable attention to the subject and recommended, amongst other things, that the complement of boys should be raised from $1\frac{1}{2}$ per cent. to 3 per cent. of the establishment, and that they should be enlisted from fourteen to sixteen, and at seventeen join the ranks. Most of the Committee's recommendations were, as usual, shelved, the only ones adopted being those which advocated a decrease of pay and clothing. Now it seems to me that, properly conducted, the enlistment of boys is a valuable adjunct to the recruiting system. It is, however, spoiled by the practice of obtaining the material almost exclusively from workhouse children, a point on which I differ from the opinion of the Committee who advocated a continuance of it.

I am not, of course, speaking of the military schools, but of the ordinary charitable and reformatory asylums, which do not give the right stamp of boys for the Army. Being mostly waifs and strays, their physique is bad, and in many cases their morals are worse. Day after day I see boys attested for the land force never, to all appearance, will develop into useful men. Last year fourteen, weighing from 60 to 70 lbs., with a height of 4 feet $5\frac{1}{2}$ inches and chest measurement of 25 or 26 inches, are being taken. Last year fifteen, 4 feet $8\frac{1}{2}$ inches, 28 chest, and 70 lbs. weight, are also attested. They will never probably be fit to take their places in the ranks, and the sums expended on them will be practically wasted. In the Navy we have no difficulty in obtaining lads of fifteen with

¹ A valuable paper on this subject was read before this Institution in April and is published in the *Journal*, vol. xix, p. 399.

average height of 5 feet 1½ inches, and chest measurement of nearly 32 inches. The Army ought to be able to get the same class; but as long as it is satisfied with what it now gets it never will. The Service must be engrafted in the hearts of the people, and parents be taught to confide their children to the military authorities, with the certainty that they will not be ruined by association.

The boys now obtained have as a rule no home ties, and hang on to their regiments at all seasons, because they have nowhere else to go to. If on the contrary the Army were associated with the homes of the humbler classes, and recognized as likely to help them in their struggle for existence, the Service would in time become popular amongst them, and the ranks be rapidly filled with good stuff. The boys from the naval training ships are the best recruiters we have for the Navy, simply because they have homes wherein to spend their frequent leave. Their smart appearance and swagger have a great influence in inducing others to join. The Committee recommended that any increase in the boy establishment should be employed as tailors, shoemakers, or musicians. Now for future soldiers I do not think that boys of these trades will prove the most efficient. I would strongly recommend the increase, but alter the age of entry from fourteen to fifteen, and make it compulsory that all boys should enter the ranks at seventeen, if physically fit. I would raise the standard considerably, and especially at sixteen, and see that ages were properly verified. Only boys of proved good character should be accepted. I would also extend the sphere in the regiment in which these boys may be employed, and thus free duty men for their legitimate work. Some might be utilized for the Officers' mess, sergeants' mess, and cook-house; and others employed as writers in the orderly room, and as orderlies. They should be compelled to attend school and drill during certain hours, which might be shortened as they became proficient. As a reward for attention their pocket money might be increased. They should have regular leave, and be encouraged to spend it in their homes, where they would induce others in their neighbourhood to join, and thus, yearly, the local system would be extended on a sound basis. This system would materially reduce waste, for soldiers enlisted as boys hardly ever desert, and in most cases become exceptionally high class and respectable. Any increase in the number of boys should, however, be supernumerary to the establishment.

I have specially excepted our military schools from the condemnation which I passed on "Institutions." I feel, however, obliged to say that I have often noticed that boys from the Duke of York's School are of an inferior physique. It is difficult to assign a cause for this. It is certainly not that the boys are sons of soldiers, for barrack life is not unhealthy; married soldiers are better than the average; and the marked inferiority does not (I understand) exist at Kilmainham. The point is one which seems to call for an inquiry, similar perhaps to that which was held on Greenwich Hospital Schools a few years ago with excellent results. If the site is unsuitable for a school, there would not, I think, be any expense in

moving it, for the land at Chelsea would command a high price than sufficient to pay for new buildings in a better locality. The routine of the school is in fault, or the food, the system, or any else, it ought to be amended or altered. Possibly the boys are too mechanically ; a system under which, as is well known never thrive. On these points, however, I offer no decided opinion merely repeating, what is a very positive fact, that the boys at Chelsea are of markedly inferior physique.

Recruiting for the Royal Marines.

I will now proceed to describe the method of recruiting for this branch of the Service to which I have the honour to belong, viz. the Royal Marines, and the results we attain. The present strength of the corps is 12,405, of whom 2,536 are Marine Artillery and 9,869 Infantry and the annual waste about 1,500. (See Appendix D.) The term of service are 12 years with the colours, with re-engagement for an additional 9 years ; nearly all the men who are permitted to do so re-engage. We have 13 Officers and a corresponding number of commissioned officers engaged on the recruiting service, who are recruited for the Navy. These recruiters are distributed among the provincial towns in Great Britain, the Officers' stations being principally at seaports. Recruits are also raised at the Divisional headquarters at Chatham, Portsmouth (R.M.A.), Gosport, and Plymouth and at the General Recruiting Depot at Walmer. Half the recruits are obtained in the London district. Owing to the territorial system and other causes, the purely country recruits are diminishing.

Although we have no reason to complain of the material we could we would prefer more of the country element. In former years we drew a large proportion of our raw material from the west country, alas, from some of what were in former days our most fertile stores, we seldom get a man. So superior are the west country men that the punishments of the Plymouth Headquarters are just one half those of the other Infantry Headquarters.

Contrary to what appears to be the case with the Army, slackness of work and bad weather are unfavourable for recruiting for the Royal Marines. A fine day in summer or autumn, when work is plentiful, is the time when we get not only the largest numbers, but also the best class of men. The Return of the increase and decrease of the corps during 1884 (Appendix F) will bear out my assertion. In the week ending 12th April only eighteen recruits were raised, the weather being, it may be recollected, bleak and cold, with the standard of measurement, in the week ending 2nd August, the numbers were seventy. On general holidays, such as Lord Mayor's Bank Holidays, and the Franchise Demonstration, recruiting is steady and it is absolutely necessary to withdraw the Recruiting Staff. Appendix H shows the numbers finally approved at the various stations during the year 1884 ; it will be observed that the number raised at Sunderland has been small, although employment has been scarce.

Recruiting in public-houses is a thing of the past ; unfortunately it appears to be unavoidable in some instances that the recr-

rendezvous should still be located in them. For the interests of recruiting, the sooner they are removed the better. Since 1882, when the Admiralty obtained suitable recruiting rooms at Westminster, and we were enabled to remove from the public-house, where the rendezvous had been established for fifty years, we have doubled the number and improved the class. The public-house landlord and my Recruiting Staff parted without regret; we were of little use to him, and he was of no use to us. Since that time the Recruiting Staff have strict orders not to enter a public-house when on duty.

Westminster was, until the last two years, the traditional locality for recruits to apply. Owing to the publicity given to St. George's Barracks by the extensive Army advertisements the recruiting focus has been removed to that neighbourhood, to the great advantage of both the Army and Marines.

With the especial view of attracting country recruits, a descriptive pamphlet is in the press, showing the conditions and advantages of the Marine service. It is to be hoped with the wide circulation through the medium of the Post Office that the additional 500 men proposed in the Estimates will be readily raised, in addition to the numbers required to supply the waste.

The Marines share with the Army what is considered the disadvantage of getting youths (professedly at seventeen years of age), but they have the great advantage of having a General Dépôt.

This Dépôt is situated at Walmer, where, with the splendid bracing sea air and comparative absence of temptation, the youths, having passed a stringent medical examination, rapidly develop. The General Dépôt is, as it were, a manufactory for Marines. Lord Airey's Committee recommended that similar training dépôts for the Army should be established. The only drawback to the efficiency of the Walmer Dépôt is the shortness of the staff; only four Captains and one Adjutant are allowed for 1,600 recruits, each Captain has therefore 400 men in his company, and as correspondence absorbs most of the Adjutant's time, I fear the drill is left greatly in the hands of the serjeant-major and drill sergeants.

By carefully selecting recruits on enlistment and judicious management after enlistment, I am confident the waste may be largely reduced. As an example of what may be done, the following is a return of the avoidable waste and courts-martial at the Royal Marine Dépôt for three years:—

	1882.	1883.	1884.
Bad conduct, including fraudulent enlistment ..	121	117	47
Invalided	12	29	17
Deserted	27	38	17
Courts-martial	113	159	106
Recruits joined	1,484	1,492	1,669

At the end of 1883 the Deputy Adjutant-General of Royal Marine considered the most undesirable class recruited were those of twenty-four years of age. He therefore reduced the limit of accordingly, and at the same time stringent measures were taken keep out undesirable characters; the result is, that not only have better class been recruited, but the corps is and has been for the past nine months considerably above its established strength. At present there was a slight falling off, but the falling off was caused by a class we did not want, being kept out.

The total average waste of the corps is about one-eighth; from avoidable causes about one-twelfth. The large avoidable waste is principally due to invaliding. Considering the great care necessitated the repeated and independent medical examinations as shown by the large number of medical rejections, viz., about 600 men in every 1,000 men examined, I am at a loss to understand why so many subsequently break down. As an illustration of the stringency of examination, I have known a Fleet Surgeon at a marine recruiting station reject 190 out of 200 candidates, many of whom had been previously passed by a civil practitioner. This is an exceptional number of rejections, although others have come close to it. It is impossible that the stringency of the medical examination on enlistment can be increased. We must therefore look for other remedies. My opinion is, that men are allowed to invalid too freely. When they are restless or dissatisfied, they take advantage of this means to leave the Service.

I will here point out the large number of the candidates for the Service who suffer from physical defects; 428 out of every 1,000 were rejected last year for the Army and 600 for the Marines; whilst the proportion of boys for the Navy was still higher. Surely this is a lamentable state of affairs. Is the English race degenerating? It would appear like it. The rejections are due to a variety of causes, some no doubt of a comparatively trivial nature, but yet such as incapacitate a youth from being passed into the Service. Some defects are caused by pure ignorance. Varicose veins, for instance, are frequently due to the tight garters which nearly all labourers wear. Flat feet, again, are often caused by ill-made unyielding boots. I failed to detect a single case of flat feet amongst the barefooted population of a district in Ireland where I was visiting last year. Varicose veins is the great defect in boys. It is much to be wished that the medical press would call attention to the causes of the Service rejections. I am convinced that much good would result.

The behaviour of Marines contrasts favourably with men of other services. About one man in a hundred is tried by court-martial afloat, and one in ten on shore, the difference being accounted for the large powers wisely given to Captains of the Navy, which are great that it is seldom a court-martial is necessary. Of minor offences, there is an average of one to each man embarked, and one to every two men on shore.

The Admiralty have always shown great liberality in all things connected with the barracks of Marines; and we flatter ourselves

that by the care we take of what is provided for our comfort, we show our appreciation of their liberality. The tidiness and cleanliness which a Marine acquires, in his service afloat or ashore, are so fully recognized, and his training in this respect so appreciated, that after leaving the Service he is seldom at a loss for lucrative employment. Even with us, however, the barrack-rooms are still capable of being improved.

The Marines on shore are unfortunately rationed on the Army scale, and share the same short commons to which I have previously referred. It is strange that, although being trained for service afloat, the Customs and Treasury will not sanction our being permitted even to purchase cocoa from naval stores. All convict prisons are supplied duty free; but although the issue has been approved by the Admiralty, for some unaccountable reason it cannot be obtained.

Recruiting for the Royal Navy.

The policy of the Admiralty is diametrically opposed to that of the War Office in relation to terms of service. Whilst the War Office has been doing all in its power to establish short service, the Admiralty has been equally zealous in introducing and extending long service. It will be readily seen that the difference arises out of the necessity of retaining the carefully and expensively trained seaman.

Owing to the great competition of the Merchant Service, the scarcity of English sailors, and the necessity for a higher training of men-of-war's men, it has been judged advisable to enter them all as boys. The Admiralty, therefore, on the recommendation of the Royal Commission of 1858, established training ships for that purpose. The system is expensive, as each boy costs about 75*l.* before he leaves the training ship; but the results are satisfactory.

When we carry our memory back some thirty years, and recollect what the typical blue-jacket of those days was, and compare it with what he is now, we must admit there is a vast change for the better. The old blue-jacket, no doubt, was in his way as good, if not a better sailor than his present representative; but he was an uncommonly difficult bird to catch, and when caught equally difficult to retain. We can scarcely imagine now a huge ship having to wait four months for a crew; yet such a case was not unfrequent.

The scenes on shore in my early days in the Service can now be scarcely credited. When a ship's company had leave, they made the port at which they lay too hot to hold them. They were seldom given a chance of leave, but when they were, they took every advantage of it. Drunkenness, riot, and debauchery were considered the correct thing, and once on shore, there was no getting them off again. I well recollect a line-of-battle ship to which I belonged in 1859 having to delay her sailing for ten days because 150 men (seamen and Marines) were absent without leave.

To Admiral Sir William Martin, in my opinion, belongs the credit of having regenerated the *personnel* of the Navy. Although boy training was established in 1859, it was some years before the system had any effect on the Service. It was in this interval that Sir

William Martin's admirable measures evolved reason out of rowdy. He was appointed Commander-in-Chief of the Mediterranean Fleet in the early part of 1860, the "Marlborough" being commissioned a flag-ship. The bulk of the crews of the ships of the large fleet on station were bounty men, raised hurriedly during the French sea the year before. On reaching the station a great change took place. The contrast between the behaviour of a ship's company new to station, in their first and second general leaves, was marvel. Having frequently been in command of the piquets which poured on shore on such occasions, I can speak from experience. In the first instance we were as busy as we could be in sending off and locking up those who enjoyed themselves in the traditional way; in the second we had nothing to do; the old game was quite up. I with the boy system, I doubt if matters would have mended had the Admiral grappled with the evil. The "Marlborough's" discipline spread through the Mediterranean Fleet and the whole Navy, making the men smart and zealous afloat, teaching them to be respectful and respected ashore.

This alteration in the feeling of the country towards the man of war's man is the cause of the popularity of the Navy, from the recruiting point of view. Let us hope that some Army Officer in an analogous position may be found who will do for the Army what Sir William Martin did for the Navy.

Theoretically, and as a matter of sentiment, the Navy was always popular; but was more especially so with those who did not come in contact with its sailors. The blue-jackets of to-day are just as respected; and, instead of being recruited from the back slums of naval and commercial ports, there are few villages throughout the land which has not a representative amongst them.

I recollect old Mother Wavell, landlady of what was the headquarters of naval recruiting at Portsmouth, boasting that 67 blue-jackets had been raised in her house. I believe she claims a pension from the Admiralty for her services.

I will now touch briefly on naval recruiting of the present day. It is carried on by the following agencies:—

- 1st. Coastguard.
- 2nd. Naval Reserves and Drill Ships.
- 3rd. Harbour and Training Ships.
- 4th. Marine Recruiting Staff.

The classes required to be raised are boys, from whom the sea class are developed, and the non-seamen. At the recruiting stations boys are recruited for the naval training ships, and stokers and artificers for the general service. So successful in late years has been the recruiting of boys, that at the present time there is an excess of some 650. Some three years ago this happy state of affairs did not exist. It was found impossible to keep the numbers of boys up to the requirements, although the standard of measurement was lowered for that purpose to a most unsatisfactory and dangerous degree.

In 1882, the Admiralty determined to extend the system of advertising the advantages of the Service; pamphlets and handbills were

largely distributed through the Post Office, with the result that the normal standard has been retained, nay, frequently raised, and yet "the cry is still they come." What has also contributed to the success is, that the Admiralty determined to take no boys whose antecedents were doubtful, recruiting Officers being held responsible for the thoroughness of the investigation. The bad boys being kept out, the good ones soon flowed in.

On the 1st of January of the current year the training ships had boys from 150 different towns and villages in the United Kingdom, counting London as one. They were raised as follows:—

From shore direct	414
„ Coastguard and other ships	392
„ Coastguard on shore	532
„ Marine Recruiting Stations	1,154

Total entered in 1884 2,492

Of which number 592 were raised in the London district.

The numbers raised in the London district since 1881 inclusive, that being the last year in which the standard was lowered, are as follows:—

	Medically examined.	Approved.	Rejected.
1881.....	762	312	450
1882.....	1,082	404	678
1883.....	1,312	547	765
1884.....	1,295	592	703
Total.....	4,451	1,855	2,596

The 1,295 boys sent forward on medical examination in 1884 represent at least 7,000 applicants. Bearing in mind that all these boys apply direct at the Admiralty Recruiting Offices, without the aid of toutage, the result is most satisfactory. Now that the Admiralty have at last succeeded in obtaining suitable Headquarter recruiting premises, I believe next year the number of applicants to select from will be still greater.

Since the middle of 1882, a character or reference has been forwarded with each boy's papers; and in only one instance did it turn out to be false. I may also state that every courtesy is shown by all classes in their replies to any inquiries, and every assistance given to enable us to obtain desirable lads. I ought specially to acknowledge the assistance we receive from step-mothers.

It will be seen from the following tables not only what a fine class of boys are raised, but how they bring their fellows.

Boys raised in the London District, 1884.

Month.	Medically examined.	Approved.	Rejected.
January	255	125	130
February	107	32	75
March	103	49	59
April	158	81	72
May	67	35	32
June	35	15	20
July	73	36	37
August	82	36	46
September	179	79	100
October	103	41	62
November	76	32	44
December	57	31	26
Totals	1,295	592	703

January, April, and September are our best months, because it is granted in all training ships in December, March, and August. I doubt both boys and their parents—without whose consent boys can be accepted—have frequently discussed the matter before their father arrives from the training ship, and his good word and credit appearance turn the scale. The measurements are equally satisfactory, as will be seen from the average measurements of approved boys.

Boys raised in London District.

Average age, height, and chest measurement.

15 to 15½ years.			15½ to 16 years.			16 to 16½ years.		
Average age.	Average height.	Average chest.	Average age.	Average height.	Average chest.	Average age.	Average height.	Average chest.
yrs. ms.	ft. in.	ins.	yrs. ms.	ft. in.	ins.	yrs. ms.	ft. in.	ins.
15 2	5 2	32	15 8	5 2½	31½	16 2	5 4½	33
Approved 307.			Approved 226			Approved 59.		
Total 592.								

Normal standard.

yrs.	ft. in.	ins.	yrs.	ft. in.	ins.	yrs.	ft. in.	ins.
15	5 0	30	15½ to 16	5 1	30½	16 to 16½	5 3½	32½

Great care is taken with the medical examination, the rejections for causes which can, as a rule, only be detected by a medical man, being about 550 in every 1,000. Some years ago the percentage was still higher, and we were nearly at a deadlock, as Naval Medical Officers hesitated to pass any boy who laboured under the slightest defect, for fear that another Medical Officer, at a subsequent examination, would reject him. A system of special reference to the Admiralty in case of slight defects has been now adopted, with better results.

I may here say a few words about Institutions as regards naval recruiting. Boys from industrial schools and from the various Societies' training ships may be accepted if they meet the requirements of measurement and their antecedents are satisfactory. Industrial school boys are, however, rarely eligible. The training ship boys, on the contrary, are all that can be desired, especially the "Warspite" boys (Marine Society). I consider this is the best managed charity for training boys in the kingdom. The results are wonderful. I am informed by the Inspecting Captain of the Royal Naval Training Ships that, next to coasting boys, the "Warspite's" are the best that he gets. For healthiness and smartness they are a picture, and I see a large number of them, as all who join pass through my hands. An old "Marlborough" Officer is in command. I regret to learn that the funds of this most estimable Society have been of late years much reduced; and that there is thus great danger of a serious diminution in the scope of its operations.

The non-seamen class is still largely recruited at the home ports; but, when required, artificers and stokers are raised at the Marine Recruiting Stations. Men of a very good class are obtained as untrained stokers in the London district; and no difficulty is found in raising men of 5 ft. 6 in. and upwards, with two years' good character. Trained stokers (merchant ships' firemen) are trash; those of them, at least, who are candidates for the Navy.

The question of recruiting artificers is one which is still on an unsatisfactory footing. In a paper read in this theatre in July, 1875,¹ Rear-Admiral J. C. Wilson called attention to the great and growing excess of the numbers of non-combatants borne as part of a ship's company. Although ten years have passed since then, the evil is as great as ever. I would suggest that Marines, after being duly trained, should, when qualified, be utilized as artificers; their numbers being increased correspondingly, and their pay adjusted when thus employed. Men of the higher rating would still have to be obtained from the shore, but a large number of unskilled ones could be drawn from the Marine corps. A beginning might be made with armourers.

The behaviour of the fleet is comparatively satisfactory. The number of naval courts-martial averages 230, and I observed in the last three years, for which Returns have been rendered, in 1880, '81, '82, that no one has been tried more than once. A naval court-martial means business. The number of punishments are about one to

¹ "Journal of the Royal United Service Institution," vol. xix.

each man. The annual increase and waste in the fleet since 1871 shown in Appendix E, also the causes of waste in Appendix G. will be seen that, since Admiral Wilson's paper, desertion, to which called attention, has materially decreased; it is to be hoped it will continue to decrease, as it is still very large. The waste of boys has also been reduced. It will be seen how few men ultimately leave the Navy at the end of their C.S. engagement. They are shown as going on Return G, but are brought on again in Return E.

Naval Reserves.

Before concluding, I wish to say a few words on naval reserves. The reserves are as follows:—

Marines on shore	6,200
Coastguard.....	4,000
Naval Reserve	19,500
Pensioner Reserve.....	1,950
	<hr/>
	31,650

This shows a very respectable total, and let us hope that if it required it will be available. There is a reserve, however, which appears to me we do not utilize, and one which would be most valuable; I mean the trained fighting men who have left us by purchase invaliding, or at the expiration of ten years. I believe these men for a retaining fee of say 6d. a day would gladly enrol themselves and with the machinery of the Naval Reserve Officers they might be incorporated with the Pensioner Reserve, which does not appear to be in a flourishing condition.

Our policy should be that, having once trained a man to arms whether in Navy, Marines, or Army, we should not part with him so long as he is capable of assisting, if required, to defend the State. I would also repeat the advice of an old messmate who is now a Commodore: when a man is leaving you give him a kind word, and if possible a helping hand. Whilst many hard things may be forgotten, the last words will always be remembered, and he will speak well of you, thus assisting recruiting. If possible, a man should not be permitted to leave with an unredressed grievance, real or imaginary. When the grievance is real it should be redressed, when imaginary it can be explained away.

The Admiralty set the Army a good example in giving a preference to naval and marine pensioners in all the billets for which they are suitable. Noteworthy, for instance, are the Admiralty messengers. They compare most favourably with the messengers in the other public departments for civility, smartness, and intelligence. Pensioners, however, should not in peace time be employed in the fleet.

Now I have done. You may, perhaps, think that I have over-stated some of the difficulties in the way of recruiting for the Army as contrasted with recruiting for the Navy or the Marines. That is

difficulties do exist, cannot however, be denied, but I am convinced that with care and management, now that attention is drawn to them many of them will disappear.

Major-General BRAY, C.B. : It seems to me, Sir, that the present is a most favourable opportunity for airing this question, seeing that we are confronted with war in almost every direction. However, I do not know that the recruits are actually required, because as I came along the streets I saw on the placards in large letters "England ready for war. England preparing for war." I therefore presume there are plenty of men, and I hope it will prove to be so if the trial comes. As regard recruiting for the British Army, or any army enlisted on the voluntary principle the question may easily be divided into five points. They are: first, a sufficient supply of men for the ranks; secondly, a reliable reserve to feed the fighting line; thirdly, pension for service and for length of service; fourthly, reserve services to count towards a modified pension; and fifthly, boy service under twenty not to count towards pension nor for reserve service. These are the five points of which the whole thing consists, and I will deal with each one separately. First, as regards a sufficient supply of men. During the last four teen years the recruiting has been managed in a variety of ways. A great many orders and circulars have been issued on the subject (in fact I do not suppose any soldier knows them all), and the result is that even though England is preparing for war, we are supposed to be in an extremely bad way to meet a great war or combination of wars, that opinion being the opinion, I believe, of ninety-nine Officers out of every hundred in the British Army at the present moment. This opinion has got abroad through the published journals, and is known to every Embassy in Europe and in every place where these things are studied most carefully. Whether we have got men or not, remains *to be proved*, but we all know that for the Egyptian campaign, where a force of 20,000 or 23,000 men had to be sent into Egypt, the British regiments in England were very much drawn upon for all the best men. There have been second heavy draughts from England (and the Colonies), and the result is that I cannot suppose that the best men and most efficient soldiers in those regiments remain in their different positions in quarters in England, Ireland, and Scotland. The supply of men must always be so managed in all armies that whenever they are wanted they must be forthcoming. By the laws of conscription this is easily managed, and the men are always forthcoming, either one man or a hundred thousand, as they are required. That is a system at which the English have not arrived, though I think very soon they will arrive at it, for it is in the immediate future. But the difficulty of conscription is first the objection of the people. This exists in all countries under conscription, and in a country governed like England by party, it is very difficult indeed for any party to propose conscription except as a *dernier ressort*. In the meantime you are obliged to get the men. We have heard to-day from Colonel Moody that boys are enlisted who are not men, that is, boys from sixteen up to twenty, and it is an open secret that these lads have broken down to that degree in the Soudan that Lord Wolseley telegraphed absolutely to the War Office not to send him any soldier who was not twenty-four years of age. Lord Wolseley is the apostle of short service—but *experientia docet*. That is what is understood by the short service system, and what was feared and expected by experienced soldiers. I think it is perfectly right to take your troops and recruits when you can get them, but though you must keep them from 17 to 20 that period must not count as man service, and until they begin their service at 21 up to 26, they should not be liable to be drafted into the Army of Reserve. The next point is a reliable reserve, and I would call that reserve reliable which can be so numerous and so well organized that it can produce its 10,000, its 20,000, or even 100,000 trained men if they are required. These numbers seem large to our eyes but 100,000 will be required in the immediate future, if not more. Soldiers are now passed into the Reserve after six years, they get sixpence a day, and they are very glad to go when they get tired of military life. They cannot get on if they are not corporals; away they go, as they know mere colour service leads to nothing—no pension in fact. Service in the Army, in the first place, has unfitted a great

many of them for civil life, if they ever were intended for it, and at the six years they do not find permanent berths and occupations in sufficient numbers; the consequence is that these men, hundreds of them, starve all over the country, and they act as an advertisement in the streets and public-houses, an argument against enlisting in the British Army. Surely that should be the soldier's position, as he is in all other countries, an honoured man, allowing an honourable profession, and so far from acting as an advertisement to advise young men not to enlist, he should be distinctly the reverse. The two things that are distinctly required to raise the position of the soldier first is, whether you choose to take him for six or twelve years with the colours, he must have a pension. That is the foundation from which he must start. A man who enters the Army or Navy must know that if he chooses to remain at the end of a certain time, he will have a pension to look forward to. That is the recommendation of Lord Airey's Commission, which was composed of Officers of different branches of the Service, men thoroughly accustomed to the subject they had to deal with, and they made those recommendations under the knowledge that it was impossible to get such men as they required in a voluntary army without having a pension behind them to look forward to. Then as regards the Reserve. A man goes into the Reserve for six years, and at the end of that is twelve years. He has nothing—neither pay, pension, nor profession ought not to be. If a man goes into the Reserve up to a certain time, he ought to be always under the hands of the Government to be called upon in case of war. I think the period should be increased to 12 years, while the 6 years' active service, would make 18 years altogether; but then the man ought to have a pension if he remains 12 years in the Reserve. It should be quite the same pension as a soldier would receive who serves in the ranks for 21 years, but at the end of 6 years with the colours, and 12 or 15 with the Reserve, a man ought to have a modified pension, and if that were the case, the Government would be always available for war, and when you wanted to call up a certain number of men you could call upon them, and you would get them without any trouble about the boy service; I say that that should not count towards pension for reserve. There is one other important matter. I have noticed that in all other countries in Europe the soldiers and sailors are taken for hunting and shooting offices under the Crown in preference to civilians who have not done service for the State. Everybody hears that suggested in England, but why is it not done upon? Surely those men who do service in the field ought to be taken into the Government employment in preference to fellows from the streets, who have done nothing except ask for the appointment, and get it! It is simply because it is the policy of the party system under which you have been governed, and in olden times the party in power used to get all the spoil, and it was divided amongst them even to the smallest post under the Crown. Of course that is not so now, for as a great many of those posts are lost to the Crown and go by competition; there are a great number of them that are not so, and I consider it the duty of the Government, especially a Government that has a voluntary army, to give positions in their gift under the Crown in preference to any civilian outside who have not done service to the Crown. I cannot leave this subject without pointing out one thing which will add to the recruiting of the British Army in the future, the old stamp of soldiers, and that is restoring the regimental numbers. I do not care how it is done, but it *must* be done. I believe almost every day in this room, reading those dispatches from the Soudan has read, as I have done, with astonishment and dismay, "Captain This-and-that of the Middlesex Diddlesex Regiment has been killed or wounded," and I absolutely know what regiment he belongs to; and I find I cannot get anybody else to tell me unless I ask for an Army List; that ought not to be. This system we have from the Russians and the Prussians, and like everything that you take from the East or from anybody else, you take it upside down and wrong side first. A regiment is called a Regiment of the Baltic, or the Azoff Regiment, No. 49, of the Government of St. Petersburg, No. 54, and that regiment is spoken of in ordinary conversation not as the Regiment of Azoff or of St. Petersburg, but as the 49th amongst the men themselves. In the Prussian Army you have the Bran-

Regiment, called the 94th; the Hanover Regiment, numbered 88th. Now the soldiers never put the number last; they always put it first, and that will have to be done again in the British Army. It is distinctly engrained on the hearts of English soldiers that for two centuries their regiments have fought under certain cherished and honoured numbers, and not under those absurd and unmanageable county titles. That *must* be changed. There is another question regarding the recruiting of the Army, which I think is a very important social question. That is, that by Act of Parliament, all soldiers and Officers in uniform should be admitted at half-price into every place of public amusement throughout the kingdom; it should be the soldier's right. I do not suppose that the Officers would go in uniform, but I am speaking of the soldiers. Soldiers in all parts of the world go to places of amusement, and no man dares to ask them for more than half the entrance money, while in many cases they get in free. Why is this? It is because the soldier is not considered an objection; on the contrary, even a private soldier is considered a decoration to these places. That is another point that you have got to insist upon in the interests of the soldiers whom you have commanded, and whom you do now command. It *must* be done, and it *can* be done. It only needs a simple Act of Parliament. Why is it not done? It is because the Government of the country is a party Government, and the moment they did so, there would be an outcry on the part of theatre managers and other interested trades that the Liberals in power had taken away a part of their business. The result is that a Government are afraid of pressure of that kind, and would withdraw from any such proposal. However, that feeling must be done away with, and the Army must be put into its proper position socially, not only with regard to the privates, but also to the Officers. Then again, why should Officers' sons have to pay 800*l.* or 900*l.* in order to qualify for these competitive examinations in order to get commissions? They are obliged now to compete with people who have never had a son, or a nephew, or a father, or a grandfather in the Army, and those men have more money in their pockets, and they are able to give their sons a better education in colleges and schools, while the poor Officer cannot afford to do so, and the consequence is that the sons of Officers are beaten in every direction. What happens? The fathers suffer—the fathers are ruined. I have known several Officers who have paid 800*l.* or 900*l.* in order to try and force their sons through. Those sons have made large numbers of marks—quite enough to qualify any young gentleman to be an Officer—and yet they have failed to get excessive and unnecessarily high marks. That would not be done in Prussia, the country which you are so fond of copying. It would not be done in Russia, nor in France. In fact, it would not be done anywhere except in this country, where as I say they take anything wrong-side, up-side, hind-side, down-side. I do not say that Officers' sons should not qualify for commissions. They are quite as able as any other young gentlemen to do so, but I think the fact of being the son of an Officer of the Army or Navy ought to give him a start, that is to say, he ought to have a thousand or fifteen hundred marks added to whatever marks he had gained at the end of the examination, or there should be qualifying marks for Officers' sons: that is the way in which to reward Officers for their services. In the olden days, the sons of Officers, Colonels, and Generals were certain to have a commission: that was one of the rewards for serving in the British Army; but that has now been taken away, and not only that, but they have put such obstructions in the way, that unless you have your pockets full of money you cannot get your sons into the Army at all. That is one of the things that ought to be altered in favour of the sons of men who have given their lives to the service of the country. I speak in favour of Officers' sons, as it is a part of the question of recruiting—the recruit Officers of the Army. In conclusion, I hope this open and interesting discussion will lead to a reconsideration of the whole question of "Recruiting and Short Service" in the interests both of the Army and the country.

General ALEXANDER, R.M.: I wish to make a few remarks with regard to what has been so strongly insisted upon in the valuable paper we have just heard, with respect to the advantages to be derived from men of good character only being enlisted for the Army. Of course, that is a point upon which we must all be agreed. But even if it were possible,—and I do not think it would be found possible for the Army at large,

although it might be so, for a comparatively small and favourite service like the Marines—would it not be found after a time that a certain number of these men would have become from various causes “bad characters?” And it is in regard to these bad characters that I wish to say a few words. I think it is the experience of most Officers that there are many men who although at times troublesome and badly behaved in garrison, have often proved themselves to be brave and courageous soldiers in the field, and in turning them out (which has been a favourite mode of dealing with these men, much advocated of late years) it seems to me that we not only get rid of trained soldiers, and replace them in many cases by recruits of whose character we know nothing, but we do a great injury to discipline inasmuch as these men become as it were the apostles of misconduct amongst the young men with whom they mix. They are able to point out that in the Army a man who joins without money may after a certain time should he get tired of soldiering, obtain his discharge for nothing as a “bad character,” whereas a “good character” he could only do so by paying a large sum of money. The consequence is a number of young men are induced to follow their example, and to escape from the restraints of military discipline by a persistent course of misconduct. I have had some practical experience on this point; for some time ago, on assuming the command of the Royal Marine Artillery, I was so strongly impressed with the fact that whenever men were discharged for bad conduct it frequently happened that men were sent from the fleet to be discharged as useful or objectionable characters) there was almost invariably an outbreak of misconduct amongst the young soldiers, that I asked the Admiralty for permission to keep these bad characters at headquarters, and undertook in the event of their discharges for misconduct being discontinued, to so arrange the sea-service that no second class men or irregular characters should be embarked. This request was acceded to, although it was reported against on the grounds that in a short time I should have nothing but a residuum of bad characters left at headquarters. The result, however, was that at the end of a year we had had fewer courts-martial, men under punishment, and far less crime, than before, or than at any of the other Divisions—including the Plymouth Division, which we have heard spoken of in favourable terms—and moreover there were out of some eighteen hundred men on shore only thirteen remaining who had been taken off the sea-service roster for bad conduct of every one of these men, including that of those who were supposed incorrigible, was steadily improving. The success of the experiment far exceeded expectations. It is not difficult to explain the cause of this. Under the old system the man who was “going in” for a blank discharge was a swaggering fellow who obtained great influence over the younger soldiers, by persuading them that he was a fine fellow, and that the best thing they could do was follow his example. Under the new system they became poor creatures always under punishment who looked upon by their comrades with pity and contempt. The change was so marked that the impression was created that there must have been some unusual leniency in the punishments to account for it, and one day the defaulters’ books from all divisions were ordered up to town for inspection, when it was seen that I had made it a rule never to let a man off a deserved punishment. Of course I would make no exception of men who have been guilty of crimes for which they have been sentenced to some very heavy punishment such as penal servitude; but in other cases I consider that the discharge of bad characters is one of the very worst means for creating bad characters. I have had another experience; with regard to the so-called “fraudulent enlistment.” Sometimes a man who had got on very well with the Service in some shape or form would come forward and say, “I was a fraudulent enlistment.” Under the old system he was sent before a magistrate who gave him a few weeks’ imprisonment, and he got free. Amongst these were often good and well-trained soldiers, whose places had to be filled by recruits, of whose antecedents nothing whatever was known. I have often gone to a prison as a visiting magistrate, and have found the kitchen in splendid order, a man standing up in it ready for the approbation he was sure to receive, who when asked what he was in prison for, was almost certain to answer “fraudulent enlistment;” I daresay a troublesome fellow but with a physique and bearing which would make him a valuable addition in such positions as our Army has been

lately; and I must say that although the idea of having an army full of men of good character is very fascinating, yet have we any right to expect that the Army will ever be anything but a reflex of the classes of society from which it is drawn? If the men of those classes generally happen to hold a high average of character, the men in the Army will have a like character. And it would be as well to remember that it is a bad regiment that makes bad soldiers, for experience teaches us, whether in a regiment or a ship, it is the Commanding Officer who is responsible for its discipline, and so it is that very often these men become bad characters because they have been made so by the system under which they have been trained. But whatever the mode of dealing with men after they have enlisted may be, if you require men of good character to pay a large sum of money, and that only as a favour, to obtain their discharge, it does seem utterly inconsistent and illogical that bad men should obtain the same privileges for nothing, or a man who declares himself a "fraudulent enlistment" after a short time in prison, where he is usually treated with a certain degree of indulgence. Were we to be less illogical, we should avoid many of the difficulties and complications which now stand in the way of what is the first requirement of all armies—good discipline.

Professor LAUGHTON, R.N.: In a meeting like this, consisting to such a large extent of Army Officers, it is almost presumptuous for me to rise to make any remarks; but there were some points which Colonel Moody touched on that seem to me to admit of illustration from one who has considered the question from the outside. The lecturer spoke at some length of the feeling against the Army amongst our lower classes, and of the difficulties which this puts in the way of recruiting; and he compared this with the very opposite feeling which now exists towards the Navy. It is, however, not so very many years since the two Services were very much on a par with regard to the popular feeling: the lower classes were profoundly suspicious of both, and disliked both. That seems to have been got over now, as far as the Navy is concerned; but in the case of the Army it remains as strong as ever. I think that there can be very little doubt that that feeling, to a great extent at least, originated in the fact, to which Colonel Moody has referred, that the two Services were the sink of the nation. Through the greater part of the last century and at the beginning of this century, when men were wanted for either Service, the ranks were filled up from the nearest prison. If a ship touched at a country place, the magistrates jumped at the chance of getting rid of the bad characters of the neighbourhood, and sent them all on board. I may mention one case which happened towards the end of the last century. A sloop of war put into Pembroke: a murder had lately been committed, and the murderer could not be discovered. No one in particular was suspected; so the local magistrates laid hands on some two dozen well-known and notorious ruffians and sent them on board the sloop, with a request that they might be taken proper care of. Of course, when our ships were manned in this way the discipline was excessively harsh, and the punishments severe. "Starting," that is, irregularly thrashing the men, was a recognized custom; the only limitation was that the sticks used must not be too thick; but anything not thicker than a broom-stick seems to have been approved of. The thief's cat was by no means set apart for a thief's back; in many ships it was considered an indispensable aid to the maintenance of good order. Now that criminals, blackguards, and roughs are kept out of our ships, a milder rule prevails, and the working classes are no longer terrified by the once familiar stories of brutal cruelty. But long after our men had ceased to be raised from the dregs of the population, the tradition remained; and a blue-jacket on leave would have been almost degraded in the eyes of his fellows if he did not behave like a drunken blackguard, or if he came off to his leave. The present system of training our men from their boyhood has unquestionably been the principal cause of the improved state now existing; but the neck of the old system of rowdiness was—as Colonel Moody has said—broken by Sir William Martin, when he was Commander-in-Chief in the Mediterranean. I myself was serving in the Mediterranean fleet at the time to which Colonel Moody has referred, and saw a great deal of Malta; and I can distinctly remember the very curious difference that was noticeable, as he has pointed out, in the state of the town when a ship was giving her first leave and when she was giving her second. I was some little time afterwards a messmate of Captain

Pellew, who had been Sir William Martin's Flag Lieutenant; and he us describe his office as by no means always a pleasant one; for part of his dut to apprehend and hand over to the piquet any man whom Sir William M happened to see taking up more than his proper share of the pavement, or neck-handkerchief was missing, or who exhibited other signs of having been im too freely. Personally, Captain Pellew used to say, he would much rather hav such a man to take his chance of falling in the way of the piquet; but the which Sir William Martin insisted on was, that a liberty-man should not liberty to make a nuisance of himself. Now, the old traditional rowdyism h been stamped out, our discipline humanized, and our men entered as boys of character, the Navy has lost all the "Reformatory" element which Colonel M has so rightly condemned. And, judging from the figures before us, the ph results are admirable. We get boys now of good character, under the sancti their parents, and recommended by the clergymen of their parish; and the re that we get boys under fifteen of 32 inches chest measurement. The Army, o other hand, takes the waifs and strays from the reformatories, gutter child fact, and the result is a chest measurement of 25 inches. I happened the oth to be looking over some of the Returns of military enlistment, and I found recruits of 21 or 22 years of age and 33 inches chest measurement were attested. What are we to call such creatures? From their age, they are not but from their growth they are certainly not men. But this deplorable st things can be put a stop to, and ought to be put a stop to. Creatures of 33 i chest measurement are good for nothing but to choke the hospitals and the pr It can be stopped. We have stamped it out in the Navy. I remember an ord seaman drafted on board a ship I belonged to twenty years ago, who weighed 1 He was at once discharged as useless trash; but the fact remains. Twenty ago we were liable to be infested by such. What the Navy has done the Arm do if it likes. But it is not only in the lower classes that the adverse feelin be found towards the Army. Probably many here may remember a cas occurred some ten years ago, of a poor woman going before a magistrate in Le Sir Robert Carden, I think, and complaining that her son, who was a letter-c had enlisted. She thought it was rather hard, as he was a servant of the (already, and begged that his enlistment might be cancelled. The magistrat he could not do that; but he had the young fellow up before him and slange in unmeasured language, telling him he ought to be ashamed of himself bri his mother to tears, a disgrace to his family and relations. It is difficult t ceive anything more calculated to bring the Army into disrepute. In another that also happened a few years ago, the Adjutant of, I think, one of the regime the Guards, wrote a circular letter to some of the clergymen throughout Surre Sussex, asking them to do what they could to get young fellows from their pa to enlist. One particular clergyman (many here will no doubt remember it) a most violent letter to the papers, saying, "Who were the Guards? Why s clergymen be insulted in that way, and asked to heap infamy on the heads of parishioners by persuading them to join the Army? It was the last thing he s do; on the contrary, he would do all he could to hinder them enlisting." Co clergymen have a great deal of power, and might be most valuable aids to recru but they must be first of all convinced that sending a young man into the A not sending him to his damnation. Colonel Moody, from the limits of his su has not been able to touch on general enlistment for the Navy, but has co himself solely to the boys, with whom he is immediately connected. Theoret the Navy, even now, does enlist also men for short service; but the difficul the way have been found so great, and the organization so imperfect, that the service enlistment is practically unknown. There are, I believe, somethin twenty men entered in a year. I think that is a very great pity; because th a very large number of boatmen, fishermen, and so forth, round our coasts; these men could be induced to enter for two years, three years, or a ship's co sion, and undergo the man-of-war training, then as they passed into the R they could help to form a Reserve in fact as well as in name. We have at p some 19,000 in the Reserve; many of them may be very good sailors, but t them have any idea of man-of-war discipline, and if in time of emergency

should be called out and sent in considerable numbers on board a man-of-war for the first time, the men would be very much adrift, and the ship would be, for some time, very far from efficient. I should like to see it ordered that no man was to be enrolled in the Reserve who had not served for at least three years on board a man-of-war. It is, I fear, digressing from the subject immediately before us, but I feel compelled to say that I should like to see the same rules applied to the Officers; and that no officer of the merchant service should get a commission in the Naval Reserve unless he also had served for three years in the Navy. I am convinced that such a rule would act most beneficially both on the Queen's and on the merchant Service.

Admiral GORE JONES: My excuse for saying a few words on this lecture, more especially about the second part of it, the boys, is that I was once Inspector of Training Ships for between three and four years, from 1873 to 1877. I would therefore like to make a few observations on something that has fallen from the gallant Colonel who has given us this most interesting lecture, and to do so I will follow his paragraphs down. He first says, "The policy of the Admiralty is diametrically opposed to that of the War Office in relation to terms of service." So far that we have men entered for long service, it is so, and a very good thing it is too. He then goes on, "Owing to the great competition of the merchant service, the scarcity of English sailors, and the necessity for a higher training of men-of-war's men, it has been judged advisable to enter them all as boys." Nobody in the shape of a seaman could be instructed to fulfil all the various engagements required on board a man-of-war without having been brought up as a boy. There is an old observation why sailors differ from almost every other class of society, and it rests entirely on this, that the sailor is educated *by* his profession, while all other people are educated *for* their profession, and it makes a vast difference in the character of the men. Everybody knows that one sailor is pretty much like another; it all arises from the training on board ship, and being all his life in the free sea air and from all the ideas attached to the sea. But now-a-days he has got to be a learned man; he has got to have an education in gunnery, small arms, torpedoes, and all the *ceteras* of a man-of-war; therefore, unless a man is educated from a boy he will never be a successful man-of-war's man. And it is here that I differ altogether from the gentleman who last spoke, for I do not think that we could get very much assistance, either from fishermen or anybody else. Colonel Moody speaks of thirty years ago, and recollects the blue-jacket of those days. Well, I can add to that I recollect the first ship I went to sea in, the "Formidable," in 1841. We were exactly nine months before we got our ship's company, and the first time we mustered our watch at sea one of the most laughable incidents occurred that I ever recollect on board ship. The first thing the Officer of the watch did when he saw them turn out with long tails, chokers, and all that sort of thing, was to send for the barber, and all these tails were sheared off, so as to make them look something like sailors' jackets. Really and truly we only had eighty seamen on board that ship, a man-of-war of 84 guns and 750 men, and those we got from the "Powerful," which had been paid off a few days before we were commissioned; the rest were all landsmen. Colonel Moody then makes some remarks with regard to Admiral Sir William Martin. The only thing I have to say on that is that Sir William Martin was the only schoolmaster that we have had of late years in the Navy. His school exists to this day, and Officers who have served under him are proud of his teaching. He was a very severe man, but he was the right man in the right place, and we have had no school since. I quite agree as to the good that he produced at Malta, and no doubt the Officer who was in charge of the piquets had much pleasure in finding his disagreeable work lessened. Now we come to the actual recruiting of boys. While I was at the head of the training service we had a greater recruiting agent than any of these mentioned here. When boys came off and were accepted they very often had very good clothes on. We used to have those clothes taken off, mended, cleaned, and sent back to the mothers. The mothers said, "What a good thing it is to send Billy to sea; here he has sent me these clothes, and they will do for Jackie." So far that had a great effect. And when the boys had completed their year in the training service I always saw their money. I said, "How much money have you got?" "Thirty shillings, Sir." "Well, now," I said, "send that

to your mother, you do not want it ;" and off went the thirty shillings to the mother. All the recruiting was carried on through those mothers. They all went and their gossips what a good thing it was to get into the Navy, and the consequence I could have raised 8,000 boys in a year without the slightest difficulty. He came to be reduced to a smaller number I do not know, for I could have raised thousands of boys. However, recruiting now seems to be revived again, and there is an excess. Different Officers have different ideas, and I was succeeded by a man in the training service, a very distinguished Officer, but his ideas and mine were quite different. He went to the Channel with a squadron of brigs, and these wretched boys, perfectly unfitted to go into ships, were kept on deck in the cold nights during watches, many of them without any monkey jackets, and the consequence the brigs came into harbour with so much sickness on board that I think on them sent some fifty to the hospital. This discouraged everybody else, and it was a falling off perhaps then, but there certainly was none before. Colonel M had the recruiting of boys, but I not only had the recruiting, I also had to do the training of boys afterwards. A great many things occurred there which had to be guarded against and counteracted. A great many boys came into the Service with the object of getting a cheap education and then leaving the Service : of these again, came to the determination of leaving the Service by bad conduct. We had to act against both of these. I have seen them at Falmouth go and take a little boots and run away with them in order that they might get arrested and put in charge of the police, and then they thought we would not have them back. Plymouth a fine boy, whom I had a great opinion of, came to give notice that he would like to leave, and was backed up by the then Superintendent of the Dock, who said that his father intended the boy for better things, that he only wanted the boy to get the education which was given free by the country, and then to leave and do better. That is to a certain extent the system at Greenwich, and it is a very one. No boy ought to be allowed to be educated at the public expense except in the Army or the Navy. I objected to this, and although the Admiral wanted much to make an exception in favour of this young man, I carried my point. Another rule that I made was that no bad conduct was allowed to gain what good conduct could not gain, and the consequence was we kept the badly-conducted boys, had no end of letters from the Admiralty stating that boys that had been sent out to have been discharged long ago. They thought so, but I acted for the good of the Service, and these boys, finding that neither bad conduct nor good conduct would get them out of the Service when once they were in it, had to stop, and soon settled down. In all these things of course judgment goes a long way, and as far as desertion went I know our desertion at that time was 1 or 2 per cent. at the outside. We used the telegraph very frequently, and knew exactly where to send. The consequence was a boy never left a ship but we had him on board again within a few hours, and that I am sure is the most effective way of stopping desertion. I hope the Admiralty will stick to the recruiting for the boys, and the boys will come through thick and thin, and take no other men of any sort or kind. They are the finest body of men, I venture to say, that we have under the Crown at the moment, and it would be a great pity to destroy their morale in any way by recruiting from the merchant navy.

Admiral HAMILTON: I did not intend to take part in this discussion, except for a remark that has fallen from General Alexander, namely, that the punishment returns were a criterion of the discipline of a ship or a regiment, or of the capacity of the Officer commanding. I differ from that opinion *in toto*. I myself have commanded two ships of precisely the same class, with the same number of men, and in one ship the punishment returns were fourfold that of the other, not that there was any difference in me or in the system of the ship, but in the case we had a set of blackguards to deal with, and in the other a very good set of men indeed. It is an idea that has led to a great deal of harm. Officers try to curry favour with the authorities by having a low scale of punishment. There is no body of men that would probably illustrate that more forcibly than the Marines themselves, and our lecturer, who I saw rather applauded the remark, has himself exposed the fallacy of it by showing that the punishment in the Marine Division at Plymouth is much less than that in any other division; owing to the b

quality of men got there. The Officers were the same, the system was the same, but the men were different.

Wednesday, April 1, 1885.

MAJOR-GENERAL SIR ANDREW CLARKE, K.C.M.G., in the Chair.

ADJOURNED DISCUSSION.

Colonel EVELYN, 3rd Battalion East Surrey Regiment: It appears to me, Sir, that the constant changes which have taken place during the last twenty years in the periods of enlistment have resulted in proving that no change was necessary, but that short service is utterly inapplicable to colonial service. The terms of ten years for infantry and twelve years for cavalry, as arranged by the Act of 1847, were the best and most suitable to the British Army. When the Franco-Prussian war took place the rapid and wonderful success of the German Army excited great interest in this country, and led to the adoption—perhaps precipitate adoption—of everything Prussian. We are even to this day obliged to wear German spikes on the tops of our hats, and we narrowly escaped the infliction of the Prussian infantry boot, which galls the feet that the soldiers are obliged to wrap them in cloths, and by the use of which the Prussian Army is reported to have lost the services of 40,000 men during that campaign. If such things as these were to be imitated, we could not escape the introduction of the grand Prussian system of short service and Landwehr or Reserve, which was adopted by us without considering the material differences in the condition of our Service and that of the Prussians. They have no Colonies as we have. However the thing has been done, and constant changes have taken place since the Franco-Prussian war, but those changes have not been satisfactory. Sir Lumley Graham pointed out that the sixteen essayists who lately contended for the Gold Medal of this Institution, as well as the referees who adjudged that Gold Medal, were all agreed that short service was incompatible with the conditions of an Indian Army—though perhaps it was necessary for a Home Army. Now, that seems distinctly to lead to the inference that two descriptions of forces are necessary in this country—a Foreign Service Army and a Home Army, an Army capable of defending our hearths, and supporting the Army when engaged in active service in the field. I think it must be remembered that to an Army required only to defend a country from invasion, or only to take part in defensive operations—active or passive—the system of conscription may be fairly and constitutionally applied. Ever since the Anglo-Saxon times, the right of the country to the services of every man for home defence has been acknowledged and recognized. But the power of Saxon, Norman, Tudor, and Stuart Kings to press men for service abroad—service for dynastic or other wars—in which the immediate safety of the country was not concerned, has never been recognized. It has always been opposed, and sometimes it has been opposed with very great vigour. Now for the active Army. I believe, from what I have heard many Officers say, there is a strong conviction that the ten years should be the shortest period of engagement for infantry, and twelve years for cavalry, in a Foreign Service Army. I know I shall be met at once by the objection, "Oh, it is all very well, but we cannot get the men; we cannot get recruits to accept long service!" Now, I do not believe a word of this. It is true that under the system of ten years' service we should not get so many recruits as we do now under the preposterous optional system; but, on the other hand, we should not require half as many, and we should get an army of men instead of an army of boys. Soldiers are always fond of change, and if a man, after three years' service, is given, as at present, the option of discharge, nine out of ten will accept it for the sake of change—particularly if they have to receive deferred pay. I believe the only branch of our regular Service to which a short period is in any degree applicable is the Guards, who never do Indian or Colonial service, and never go abroad except during war. At the end of service I believe a man ought to receive his discharge—if he wants it—but he should have the option, if a good man, of continuing to serve for a pension or to join the Reserve. His period of service should be prolonged in either case. It

the Reserve he should receive a small annual or daily payment, and should be attached to a Militia regiment, and trained annually with it. There is no reason why every Militia regiment should not have two trainings, if necessary, in the year—one for Reserve men and one for their own men. Just as one huntsman hunt alternately two packs of hounds, so with a staff of Militia Officers and Lieutenants, assisted by Officers from the brigade centres, there is no reason why every Militia regiment should not have two monthly trainings if required—one after the other. It is very important that a man on the Reserve should come up for training every year—should go through a certain course of drill and musketry to make him available and keep him up to the mark! I think that is the best system in which a Reserve should be arranged. Now as to the Home Army there are two truths which should be admitted. I believe they are not capable of being doubted. First of all it is not necessary, as far as infantry is concerned, to be efficient, should be constantly under arms; and I think it is equally certain that the country never could stand the enormous expense of keeping on foot the number of men required to ensure our safety. Now, then, if it be admitted that for a Home Army we want men with short service and intermittent service—that is to say, to be allowed to go home during a portion of the year without service—it seems to me that we have in the Militia exactly the description of force required. I believe the Militia to be capable of enormous development. The extreme importance of it is hardly recognized in this country. Call it Militia, or call it what name you will, it is in its essence a Home Service Army, and, as such, I do not see any necessity for any great change in our system in order to get what we want. Not only is the Militia a Home Service Army, but it is competent to supply an army on active service, by supplying it with a constant stream—not of recruits, but of well-trained, disciplined, and seasoned soldiers. The militia service has never been very popular in this country, because it entails expatriation and the monotony of barrack life. It is not that Englishmen object to a little soldiering, or a bit of fighting—and we can get any number of men if we can avoid the drudgery of continuous service or prolonged expatriation in times of peace. And if we do not want that, does not the Militia, or would not the Militia, properly developed, meet our requirements exactly? Having been in this force ever since I left the regular Army—I may say thirty years—during almost the whole of my time I have commanded a regiment, I have some right to speak, and if I had now I think I should show gentlemen present that the management of the Militia ever since its reconstitution in 1853, has been one long course of mistakes, mismanagement, neglect, and injustice. However, I should have to inflict a paper on the subject even to trace slightly the course of events since the year 1853. If the Militia, or whatever it may be called, the Home Army, is to have an organization and is to be managed properly, depend upon it the Officers of experience in it should sometimes be consulted, and that they must have a voice in the administration of the command, and not be shelved as they are at present. The Militia has been completely lowered and snubbed in every possible way—especially by War Office and Horse Guards officials, who have had no experience in the Force, and who can know its peculiarities. I could relate some very striking instances of their ignorance of the legal status and constitution of the Militia which I have found at the War Office and among Officers of high rank—they know nothing about it and they have mismanaged it terribly. With the exception of Colonel Stanley there has been no one at the War Office who had any connection whatever with the Militia. That will have to be altered if the Militia is to be—as it ought to be—the main stem of the military force! It therefore appears to me that recruiting should be based on the following simple principles:—1. Enlist men for the active Army for as long periods as possible, and as they are likely to remain fit for service. 2. Never tempt a man to join the Reserve if engaged and fit to remain with the colours. 3. Every man in the Reserve should go through an annual training to keep him up to the mark. 4. Make the Militia the Home Army, and incorporate into it the Army Reserve. 5. Encourage men to pass from the Home Army into the Home Service Army, but do not degrade the Militia into a recruiting establishment for the Line. 6. Let Officers of experience in the Militia have a voice in its administration.

Lieutenant-Colonel C. F. COLVILLE: Although I have been studying military questions now for about twenty-eight years, I must confess I have never yet been able to grasp the principles which govern our organization and recruiting. We seem to have a most extraordinary knack, in dealing with military matters, of taking hold of the dirty end of the stick. Instead of working down from our military requirements to our recruit, we work from our recruit up to our military requirements! What we do at the present time appears to be this: We send recruiting agents into the country one day to catch whitebait, another day to catch sprats, another day to catch herrings, and, in order to gull the British taxpayer, we call them all fish. Or, in other words, one day we recruit boys, another day hobbledoys, and another day we recruit men, and, in order to gull the British public, we call them all soldiers. And in order to catch these soldiers our conditions of service and terms of enlistment are constantly being changed. It therefore stands to reason that our organization must be constantly varying, and if our organization is constantly varying in order to meet the difficulties of service, how is it possible effectively, economically, or efficiently to meet our military requirements all over the world. I maintain, with all respect, the proper way to do it would be this: that we should first settle definitely and decidedly what our Imperial requirements are, and that question should be settled by leading military men and statesmen in conjunction. Having settled that important point, we should then determine upon what organization will best meet those military requirements, and that I submit should be settled by soldiers alone, without even allowing a whisper to be heard from civilian clerks in the War Office. And having settled upon our organization and our military requirements, we should then settle what conditions of service and what terms of enlistment will best meet that organization, and that question, too, should be settled by military men alone. Having settled these three important points, we should go to the labour market and say, "Now, then, enlist on these terms." If the men are not forthcoming, you must raise the price until they are. It is simply a case of pounds, shillings, and pence. But to alter your terms of enlistment and conditions of service in order to catch men is no principle at all. You may say the country will never consent to pay the price. I say they would; that if you could only get a Government firm enough—a hopeless thing I am afraid at the present time—to put their foot down and say to dinner-eating city aldermen and other money-making city men, "Look here, you won't fight yourselves, you won't have conscription; we won't be responsible for the integrity of the British Empire unless we have an Army on the conditions we lay down, and you must pay the piper," and they would do it. Of course, in addition to paying well, you must make the Service popular, and I can conceive nothing that would conduce to make the Service popular so much as abolishing the present ridiculous, childish territorial titles and restoring the old regimental numbers. The question of regimental numbers reminds me of one other matter, to which I would just call your attention, and that is the calling up the Reserves. When last the Reserves were mobilized, I held a staff appointment as Brigade-Major, and all men coming up to the Reserves in a certain district reported themselves to me for disposal. With hardly any exception the men all said to me, "Please, Sir, can I go back to my old regiment?" I said, "I am afraid you must go wherever you are ordered." I can assure you the disappointment and grumbling was general and universal. The Reserves are now being called up, or part of them, and my own impression is that having found out that they are not to go back to their old regiments, and that they are to be pitchforked here, there, and everywhere, to do any work that is required of them, they will not respond in the unanimous and cordial way in which they did on the last occasion. That is my impression, though I may be wrong—I hope I am. I take it that there is not much difference of opinion amongst Officers, non-commissioned officers, and men in these matters, and although I do not wish in the least to be egotistical, I will mention one fact which bears on the subject. About three weeks ago I received a letter from the Adjutant-General's Department asking if I was desirous of performing duty with the East Kent Regiment. "East Kent Regiment!" I said to myself, "Good gracious! what is that? I never heard of it—I do not know it. Is it a cavalry regiment or an infantry regiment? Is it a Militia or Yeomanry regiment? Is it part of the Corps of Commissionaires, or is it part of the London Fire Brigade?" Well, I could not

answer the question, and, as I could only perform duty there at great inconvenience and pecuniary sacrifice to myself, I requested to be excused. But I can say that had I been asked to do duty with either the 54th or the 11th Foot—both of our dear old regiments I served in over eleven years—I would have walked all the way and served for nothing. I maintain that the same spirit that animated me in these special circumstances animates non-commissioned officers and men, and if you want to get men to do their duty, and to extract the maximum amount of good out of them, you must treat them as if they had feelings, and not as if they were machines and were simply like rifles—interchangeable in all their parts. Of this I am certain that unless our organization and enlistment are carried out from the top to the bottom on some sort of scheme such as I have sketched out, our military machine will continue to be, as it is at present—a patchwork puzzle and a military mud.

Colonel STUART, R.E.: Mr. Chairman and Gentleman, it is not, I think, much to say, and I think you will agree with me, that the paper that was read within these walls last week, on the subject of "Recruiting," was one of the most admirable that ever has been read here, touching, as it did, in a thorough and masterly way, the important points of a most important subject. But when I read at this paper, I see the heading is "Recruiting for Her Majesty's Service," therefore I hope I may be excused from wandering into those interesting by-ways of kindred subjects relating to the Army, but not to this special matter of recruiting, and I should desire to stick closely to my text of recruiting. This subject, as I have said, seems to me of supreme importance. It is a subject of such great importance that I think we should have for the discussion of it not only the soldiers, sailors who generally assemble here, but that in a matter where such great principles are involved, we might with great advantage have for the discussion of such a subject the statesmen of the country and Members of Parliament. I feel sure that they will agree with me that if such men were to come here and discuss this and other kindred subjects, we should receive them with open arms. For, gentlemen, the shaping of the policy and the security of the country, that is what is meant by such a matter as this of recruiting, because military efficiency tends to those ends, recruiting is, I hold, the basis and foundation of military efficiency. If the system of recruiting that we have at present were faultless, then we should not be assembled here to-day. I take it, therefore, for granted that there are faults, and that I refer to those faults. The faults that I would refer to under two large heads: those of inefficiency and extravagance. I say that the present system is inefficient inasmuch as we reckon in the paper strength of the Army—the numerical strength of the Army—the deserters, prisoners, the drunkards, the frequenters of hospitals, malingers, and all the tribe of useless trash and rubbish that we have unfortunately to some extent in the Army. I do not think that Colonel Moody at all overstates the practical effects of enlisting at once into the ranks doubtful boys rather than men. It was mentioned the other day in the papers, and I have not seen it contradicted, that in one of the numerous Egyptian expeditions that we have unfortunately had lately, there was not a man under twenty-three years of age who had not passed through the hospital. I think that is a very significant and lamentable fact, and it points at once to the inefficiency of much of the material and to the question of age, which is very important indeed to the efficiency of the Army. And then what a tale we see told in this paper regarding military prison life and the number of soldiers that are constantly in prison. I think it follows that there is in the Army a very undue percentage of men who do not come up to the proper standard of real efficiency, and therefore I hold that in my small way I have proved my thesis that one of the great faults of the recruit system is that it is inefficient. Then I come to the other great fault, as I say, of extravagance. Well, in all businesses in life in this and every other country, the most extravagant thing you can possibly deal with is human material; it is dear in every way; and in the Army, where we go and recruit a large amount of material that is admittedly inferior, we have to pay not only for inferior men occupying positions in the ranks of the Army, but we have absolutely to pay for hunting them down as deserters and bringing them to justice, and we have to pay for the establishments where those men are being maintained in prison, and in hospitals, and the like. I say that is tremendous extravagance, and, therefore, I hold

that the whole military body bleeds at every pore, and that Inefficiency and Extravagance go hand in hand. It is no use talking of faults without suggesting remedies, and the remedy that I would suggest is that we must make the conditions of service and the payment of the service such as will absolutely attract the men we want to get; really good men of proper age, proper physique, and proper character to come into the Army. And then I say, secondly, that when you have got these men you have so to arrange and treat them that they will not want to desert, and they will not want to purchase discharges or in any other way to leave the Army. Now, to attract men, as a previous speaker said, you must go into the labour market, and you must bid and bid until you can get them, and you can get them easily enough, because you can offer very many advantages in the British Army in the way of training and subsequent situations, and so forth, and in that way you can induce men to join. Then when you have got them, you have to keep them. How are you going to keep them? Now, there is no doubt that those who have touch with the men of the Army do know as practical men that you have to remove such grievances as "stoppages." They are a very great annoyance and grievance to the soldier, and if the soldier thinks that he should have a free ration because he is promised a free ration, and he comes in and he finds he is not to have a free ration, then you ought to give him the free ration and have done with it. Next you have to treat men as men, and not as naughty children who have got to be put to bed at a certain hour and are not to be trusted, and are to be locked up like wild beasts. I do not consider that that is the way to treat men in order to keep them in the Service. Then I think the comfort and convenience of men in barracks should be very much improved. As regards living in barracks, it does seem to me that really good men, men who have proved themselves good and trustworthy, might be allowed to live out of barracks altogether if it so pleased them and they so required. But living in barracks, I should think that every man in his barrack-room should have some means of privacy, and it has occurred to me that in the great barrack-rooms which we have where there is no subdivision, and where you cannot put up permanent structures to interfere with light, ventilation, and so forth, you might very easily put up a couple of iron standards on the foot of each man's bed, and you might have three light iron rods with rings, on which you could hang curtains, and then when a man wanted to be private all he would have to do would be to draw this curtain and there he is, not in a grand castle, but still in a castle of some sort of his own. Now I come to a point which to me is very important. I think expulsion from the Army should be a punishment. Bad men we do not want, and a bad man should be turned out of the Army. We do not want him, we have done with him; we do not want to try and keep him, but to do without him. I think if that condition were carried out, this result would follow, the friends of men who come into the Army, and on whom so much depends, would regard service in the Army not as a stigma but as a thing to be desired, and that we should have good men come in with the consent of their friends. To this end, I think it would be a very practical measure, if in all subsequent recruiting upon the principles to which I have alluded, a written character, which could be obtained—we can all obtain written characters with our servants—a written character should be obtained for every man who is introduced into the Army. To all this there will be an outcry about the expense, "It is dreadful—all this costs money." To that I reply that in every business in this country, or in any other country which is prosperous, there comes a time when there must be a judicious outlay of money to be recouped afterwards with interest. I say that this is one of those cases that you have got a first expenditure to make, with the hope, and I think the certainty, of getting a very excellent return afterwards in such matters of saving as on prisons and on hospitals and on deserters and on drafts and invaliding. I will just mention my own personal experience in this matter of invaliding. I have been on foreign stations where I have seen constant batches, very large batches indeed, of invalids sent home who have to be replaced by drafts from home. I have seen whole regiments really knocked over, incapacitated for service, and sent away for sanitary reasons from one station to another. That is the most expensive thing you can do when you have to send home men who are sick and unable to serve; it costs money to send them out, and it costs money to send men from home to replace them; and

it costs you inefficiency when you take those drafts out of your home battalions and send them out and dislocate the home battalions in order to complete the battalions. Foreign nations have their own system of recruiting, and they care to have good men, because they can take the average manhood of the country. We have not got conscription, and Englishmen say, "We won't have conscription, and it is a moot point whether they will have to come to conscription or not, but at present they enjoy the luxury of no conscription, and that luxury, like other luxury, must be paid for. I may say, in conclusion, that it behoves these crucial days, to be ready for fearful eventualities, and to maintain the efficiency of the *personnel* of the defensive Services as a sacred duty not to be regarded nor negligently overlooked nor shamefully shirked.

Major ELLIOTT: I rise, Mr. Chairman, to address this meeting with some diffidence. It so happens that I was born, brought up, and educated, not, per barracks, but in the same educational establishment as our worthy and distinguished Chairman. I retired from the Service owing to ill-health, and went to the country to live, but, getting rapidly well, I returned. At that time military flogging came on for discussion in the House of Commons, it was made a partition, the press of the country was teeming on the subject, there was a tremendous controversy going on inside the House of Commons, the whole country was roused on this question. In my early years I have seen 300 lashes delivered on a man's naked back with a cat-o'-nine tails, I have seen a man's back on the stroke of the lash—

General BRAY: I wish to know whether this has anything to do with the subject of recruiting, because it seems to me that the honourable gentleman is entirely away from his subject.

The CHAIRMAN: I understand Major Elliott to refer to the question of military flogging as having a bearing upon recruiting.

Major W. J. ELLIOTT: I was going on to say that military flogging was abolished, and to point out how I had been led into investigating matters of some time affecting recruiting and soldiers. Finding that very few military men were discussing in the press the question of the soldier's treatment, I thought I like to say something from the military aspect of the question. I accordingly wrote my views to a daily paper. I was subsequently sent for by the editor of the paper, and was given a roving commission to go through the barracks within a certain radius of London to see the life of the soldier and to write about it. I had a roving commission, and went about for several months. I went first to the Life Guards' Barracks; I saw their life there, and there were several things which very much surprised me. Colonel Owen Williams received me very kindly, and everything was carefully explained to me. With regard to the food particularly, I was very much surprised; I saw the rations, I saw the way that the barracks was kept; I went into all the barrack-rooms, and, as I say, I was very much surprised at the dinners. I asked, "What is the ration, $\frac{3}{4}$ lb. of meat?" "With or without bone?" "With bone certainly." "Let me see it on the plates." I went and saw it on the plates, and there I perceived some small pieces of meat floating about among potatoes, greens, and so on. I said, "Is this a ration?" "Those great men get for their dinners every day?" "Yes, every day." I said, "how do the men manage to exist? Surely they cannot live on these bits of meat swimming about here?" "Oh," said Colonel Owen Williams, "the men's friends and the Officers help to keep them; it is not half enough meat what with the Officers' contributions and the baskets that the men's friends bring from the country, they manage to keep body and soul together." I went to the Royal Engineers' barracks and other barracks. There were barracks that I found extremely dirty. Of all the barracks that I saw at Chislehurst the Royal Engineers' barracks were the most satisfactory; the men were in a high condition of cleanliness; they had a splendid sergeant-major in that particular province it was to look after the men and the barracks, and that the recreation rooms and so forth were all kept right. I then went to the meat question, and I found the same complaint there as I had found previously, and also, as to their having no butter for breakfast. I went to the War Office, and spoke to him about this matter. He :

would be a very good thing for the men to have more meat. He went into a calculation and found that it would cost about 20,000*l.* a year for butter, and 180,000*l.* for more meat, and, after a long discussion, he told me that it would be about as much use to ask for 180,000*l.* for more meat for the men as it would be to try and get up to the moon. Therefore the whole question had to drop through. I have been extremely pleased to see that in the admirable and able lecture which has been read on this subject, Colonel Moody strongly recommends that another quarter of a pound of meat should be given to the men, for, I believe, as I pointed out to the authorities, that it would pay well to spend that 180,000*l.* I hope that something more will really be done to get the soldier more meat, so that he may be able to make more bone and muscle than he can out of the present rations. Over and over again I found that the meat in the plates, when weighed in the scales, scarcely ever exceeded 4½ ounces. It generally varied from 4¼ to 4½ oz. All I can say is, I should not like to be fed on such short rations, and I really think the men ought to have more meat. I also had to deal with the question of the Reserve soldiers, and I pointed out that the men are soldiers all the time that they are in the Reserve, and that I consider it the bounden duty of the State to take care of them so long as they are soldiers liable to be called upon. Now I come to one particular point, which is rather a painful thing for me to discuss, namely, the question of the inducements that you offer to the soldier to enlist. I must look back to a period of twenty years, to the time when the sergeant-major of every battalion was made sergeant-major for the purpose of looking forward to the Adjutancy of his regiment, and in nine cases out of every ten it was given to the sergeant-major, and was looked upon by the sergeant-major as his positive birthright. So it was with the paymaster-sergeant, the staff paymaster-sergeant looked upon the paymastership as his birthright, and he only took the one post with the object of getting the paymastership of the regiment. I have tried to urge that more commissions should be given to the ranks in order to induce men in these days of education to enlist. Every School Board boy sitting on a stool in a lawyer's office can aspire to the highest posts in commerce or in the professions, and I only hope the day is not far distant when the Army will be made a profession in which any man who enters shall be able to rise to Her Majesty's Commission. Then, I think, we shall have the proper inducement, and shall get the proper material to have a splendid and magnificent Army, such an Army as no other State in the world possesses.

General MCKAY: I have listened to the last speaker with a great deal of impatience, for he has touched upon subjects which are foreign to the point under discussion. We have to consider our present system of getting recruits and what is the hindrance to that system. Now I am speaking to you, gentlemen, as one who joined the Army as a boy and passed through all the gradations up to my present rank, so that I know what it is to be in the ranks, I know its difficulties, and I know what it is to command a regiment. Therefore I do not speak as a novice or as a theorist, but I trust that I speak with some practical knowledge of my subject. First of all, the lecturer alludes to "Competition with other industries of the country." I say that if you were to increase the private soldier's pay to three shillings a day, you would not be able to compete with the industries of the country, and it would be a very great mistake to give such a high rate of pay, you would only get the same individuals that you get now. Again, we are told that the quality of this individual that we call a *recruit* is sometimes a boy, sometimes, as our gallant Colonel says, a "hobbledchoy," and sometimes a man, and we call him a *soldier*. There has not been a period in my military career at which we did not get the boy and we had to make him a man, and when we made him a man, we made him a good soldier in my experience. But the drawback now is, that we have not the time to make the boy the man and the soldier. Again, as to the quality of this individual. I superintended the recruiting in Suffolk and Cambridgeshire. In my early days we had no such thing as a "physical equivalent" in passing men into the Army. If the doctors chose to exercise that responsibility which now is thrown upon them, we should not get into the Army the *weeds* that are loudly and justly complained of, and if their data be of any value the lad of twenty should be relied upon. The "physical equivalent" is based upon data tabulated from statistics for twenty and more years past in the Medical Department.

I say that that "physical equivalent," if honestly carried out, ought to be a country against getting weeds to the extent now heard of. We are accused of Government; the Government make arrangements and issue regulations, I must protect the Government by carrying out those arrangements and regulations. It is all very well to say to the Government "Do this and that!" The Government lay down rules, and if they are disregarded, then let those who disregard be held responsible. It is the same with regard to food; we have just heard the question of food from the former speaker, who has told us he went round London for thirty miles to see how soldiers live. He ought to have gone to West Indies, to India, and to America, where he would have seen something of a soldier's life. I made my remarks upon the food question a little time ago at the theatre, and I say, without fear, that the soldier has plenty to eat in time of peace, and that in war his food must be increased in order to enable him to endure greater hardships than he has to undergo. As to going round the barrack-rooms saying that he has only three ounces of meat and that swimming, I have no knowledge of such experiences in my chequered life in the Army. I think if you ask the majority of men you will find that they do not eat $\frac{1}{2}$ lb. of meat, but all—I mean the bone weighed with the meat. We have not got to the time when we can buy carcases without bone. I do say that the Government contribute very well guarded to secure every soldier a good supply of food, and that he does see he has it. I may also say to this audience that the Service has improved with regard to the variety of ways in which the soldier's food is cooked; there is no comparison between what the soldier is now, and what he was when I joined in 1837. Then as to age, the "physical equivalent" shows that protection, now that you are not to have a soldier under 20. I would go back to the time when they enlisted at the age of 18, for I feel satisfied that a man who came forward and swore that he was 18 when he was 15 or 16, will now swear that he is 20 when he is only 18; and as to characters with the men offering for enlistment, it is all very well for the Engineers to require a character; and why do they do so for their recruits because they have to produce a certificate that he has worked at the names, and suppose the gentleman who has spoken about the "character," something to do with recruiting. Now supposing you have 100 men in the recruiting barracks, and each brings with him a character, how would you know that the character presented is a genuine article? You could not, practically. I have stated before a Commission, and I told H.R.H. the Prince of Cambridge, "Get the recruit when you can catch him, he will not wait till he is 22 and 23 to come into the Army; he will present himself before he is 18 down to definite employment. If he is a good-looking, stout, hearty fellow, keep him, and do something with him." Again, fault is found about the Army from the Militia. The Militia is now affiliated with the Line, an accomplished fact, and we must forget the past. It is affiliated for that, and my view is, that if the country would continue to avoid conscription, it should be done. Let the Army be maintained by voluntary enlistment as at present, let the Militia be kept up to *three times its present establishment* by the same means, let the Volunteer be an efficient without costing the country one farthing for instruction, accoutrements, arms, and ammunition, with the privilege of exemption from the Militia ballot, subject to proving his efficiency as a soldier, and let the Militia supply the quota necessary to keep up the strength of the Army when it fails to do so, by voluntary enlistment, that is my scheme for our need as regards soldiers. Then, again, we come to the treatment of the recruit, and remember him when he was treated very badly, but now he is treated well. I have only recently come from command, and I know he is no longer with that harshness that he used to be in years long ago. There are on points that might be remedied, and those are in the hands of the Commanding Officer. When the dépôt was first opened at Bury St. Edmunds, the recruits enquired about the "tattoo." I said go by the Queen's Regulations, but let any man be confined in the guard-room if absent on tattoo who comes to the barrack-room sober before twelve, which rule I found to work well. If you open the barrack-room from six o'clock in the morning till six o'clock

following morning, when would the unfortunate soldiers, many on guard the previous night, have a moment's sleep? We should not like our own houses to be intruded upon in that style, and why should the barrack-room be? It is in the power of a Commanding Officer to lay down a rule, that every man coming into barracks before twelve can go to his barrack-room, but I must not be understood to say that I allowed the irregularity of absence to pass unpunished either by reprimand or otherwise. The soldier's life is one of discipline and order, and must always be viewed as such when considering his interests. As to allowing the men to sleep out of their barracks as suggested, what a pretty mess we should get into! Provided the alarm went at night or fire broke out, how could you send out to get them into the barracks? Then about the punishments of the soldiers, I must say that there are too many courts-martial. I avoided them thuswise, without detriment to discipline, and I can refer to Lord Chelmsford, who has seen my regiment, as to its state. When a man committed himself in a way that ordinarily he would be sent back to the guard-room for trial by court-martial, to be assembled in three or four days' time (if for a garrison court-martial, two or three weeks), I dealt with him summarily by imprisonment in cells from three to seven days at once, reasoning to myself that if this man goes back to the guard-room, his comrades will sympathize with him, and in place of his misconduct being looked upon as an offence against discipline, his comrades by delay would commiserate him. The result was, that I minimized my crime, my theory being, that "If punishment is to be deterrent, it must follow quick upon the commission of the offence." Thus I managed, and during my personal command I never had a general court-martial in my regiment. I was questioned on one occasion by a General Officer, who thought the number of acts of drunkenness in the regiment from a monthly return rendered, was very great. It was in a station in India, where the men had every opportunity to get drink; I said, "Sir, how many acts of drunkenness are there?" "Ninety." I replied, "Ninety! there are thirty days in the month which gives an average of three per day, and divide 3 by 900, the strength of my battalion, the result is only one-third per cent." I said, "If you took a net and spread it over the intelligent community of Calcutta, including the clergy, you would find more intemperance than that, particularly if you subject them to the tattoo inspection, '*not proving*' as my men were." No, the soldier is not so bad as regards drunkenness as he is thought to be. He wants treating as a man. When he is a boy he must be guided, handled, but not pampered and spoiled; he soon gets into our habits, and he likes his Officers, as he grows into acquaintance with them, for there is no Army where there is such mingling, and such respect and esteem the one with the other. Then as to sickness. Surely with all the pains that can be taken to pass men, and robust men, into the Army, you cannot blame the authorities because a man gets sick. If he goes to Egypt, into a temperature of 109° in mud huts or in tents, do you suppose he is not to be sick; with all your care you cannot prevent it, there must be sickness. Then about non-commissioned officers and commissions, I am an instance of commission myself; I was seventeen years before I got my commission, and, of course, my career has been most successful, but, to my mind, it is a great mistake, and it will be found to be so, to close the higher ranks to men who rise from the ranks; but it would be a greater mistake to allow men to obtain commissions who have not the education to hold the position. A standard is fixed, and has been well fixed, to secure educational qualifications for promotion. When I took the command of the 12th Regiment, I found that the school certificates were not sought after beyond that which would qualify a man to be a non-commissioned officer. I called attention to the subject on my orders and pointed out that I regretted no man strove for a first-class certificate, and promised that I would do my utmost for those who obtained it. Three obtained it; my orderly-room clerk—he was beyond the age for a commission—I got him a good billet, and he is now in a very comfortable position; one of my colour-sergeants obtained it, and he is now a Lieutenant; another man obtained it, but he was disqualified by conduct for anything—he might have been able to read the stars, or to do the most abstruse questions in mathematics—but, alas! he was his own enemy. I mention this to show that if there is a disposition on the part of our young men to join the Army

to rise, there is plenty of encouragement. Men enlisting from the ordinary of society cannot hope to get a commission under eight or ten years, and if get it then, their age, by the age disqualification, excludes them from obtaining rank in the future of command. He cannot aspire to command, which, I think, is a discouraging element in our recent Regulations. There is another point that would impress upon those who have any influence with our War Office author and it is this, that Quartermasters should have the opportunity of becoming Paymasters. Why it is not so is a mystery I cannot solve. This is a discouragement to your recruiting. Your Quartermaster is a good and an excellent man, as such a right hand man to his Commanding Officer, and his commanding Officer would be glad to make him the regimental Paymaster, and there are those in the room who have been Commanding Officers, who could certify that their Quartermasters would have made very good reliable Paymasters. I contend that our system at the present moment is a very expensive one to the Government, if I had the opportunity I could prove it to our celebrated Accountant-General present.

Lieutenant-General LORD CHELMSFORD, G.C.B. : Sir Andrew Clarke and General, I feel quite sure that everybody in this theatre must be quite refreshed at the healthy groove that we have now got into with regard to this discussion. We are very much indebted to my old friend General McKay for the fresh life which he has given to this debate, which I am afraid was getting a little out of order. I shall try to emulate General McKay's example and confine myself to the practical bearing of this question. I am very sorry that I have not had time to study thoroughly Colonel Moody's interesting paper, and I trust he will not consider that I do value it sufficiently if I am not able to touch upon all the questions which he has touched upon in it. Colonel Moody, after recapitulating the several steps that have been lately taken with regard to recruiting, says, "Yet the fact remains that the Service is still unpopular amongst those classes from which our recruits should be drawn." There is the whole secret of our failure in recruiting. Why is the Service unpopular? Of course we all have our own ideas on the subject, but my impression is that the constant changes which have been made in recruiting requirements and conditions have a great deal to say to it. A man who goes into any trade or profession wants to know exactly what his future is likely to be, and whether if he conducts himself properly he will be allowed to remain in it so long as he has the necessary health and strength and provided his conduct is satisfactory. It is quite true, as Colonel Moody says, that at the present moment practically continuous service up to twenty-one years, with a pension, is open to all who choose to avail themselves of it; and I believe myself we have arrived at a state of things in the recruiting history of the country which, if maintained steadily and stamped with the authority of the War Office as being a permanent system, will bring us in good and efficient recruits. We have now services of different lengths, and although I confess that as one of the old school I prefer long service, yet at the same time if you can induce men to come into the Service for shorter terms, and then, treating them as Colonel Moody suggests they should be treated, show them that the Service is really a good Service, and that they can be happy in it and will be allowed to continue on to pension provided their conduct and strength permit it, I believe myself we shall have no difficulty in keeping up the recruiting of the Army to the point which is required. But if, after this present crisis is passed, men are not allowed to enter the Reserve by refusing them their deferred pay on other terms, and then are to be told when they get into the Reserve they shall not be allowed to come back to the colours, however much they may wish it, then I contend you will have exactly the same difficulties to meet that we were suffering from only the other day. Fair, and free trade in recruiting is what is required. Colonel Moody states that the Army should be a national training school instead of what it is now thought to be—a national reformatory. He must permit me to say that I think his views on this point are somewhat Utopian. As General McKay has just said, we must take the class of men that we can get and make the best of them. I do not believe in any system of recruiting which will bring us nothing but what are called well-conducted men with characters; and I believe myself, from my own experience as a Commanding Officer, that we should be making a very great mistake if we were to exclude all men

from the ranks but those with unimpeachable characters. I believe that we should be doing a great national dis-service to the country by depriving those wild young fellows (who after all generally make excellent soldiers when they once come under discipline) of the opportunity of entering the Army, forcing them, as it were, into the lower grades of society, and making them a curse to the whole community. I confess to having a kindly feeling, I will not say for the bad character, but for the wild character. I have seen many of that stamp in my own regiment, and I can safely say I have never for one moment had an impertinent word from one of them, although I have very often had to punish them severely; and I have always felt the greatest confidence that those men would follow their Officers loyally in any difficult undertaking that we had to undertake. It is hopeless to try for an ideal army which is to consist of men similar to those in the Metropolitan Police Force. I should very much like to see our Officers on service commanding an army of that sort, but the thing is impracticable. We must take the men as we find them and try to make them as good soldiers as possible; and I am quite sure with a little trouble and a little addition, perhaps to their comforts as Colonel Moody has suggested, we shall be able to do so. I think we are all very much indebted to Colonel Moody for his admirable paper, and I trust that this subject may be well considered by the authorities. I see here present a gentleman connected with the War Office (Mr. Knox), who has taken great interest in, and has had a great deal to say to, the present, and former systems of recruiting; indeed I believe there is no subject regarding recruiting during the last twenty years that he has not been consulted upon. I hope he will give us the benefit of his views and let us hear whether he approves of what has been suggested, or whether he thinks we are now in the right groove, and that our present system of recruiting does not require any further improvement.

Mr. KNOX, C.B.: Appealed to, as I have been, by Lord Chelmsford, I cannot help making some remarks, although I am a civilian, and belong to a body which is evidently not a very favoured one here—the War Office clerks. One gentleman who spoke said he thought it was the bounden duty of the Government to set to work and consider what it was that was really wanted, and on that to base a system of service. As I take it, the whole system which we now have is based upon that one requirement, and that requirement is that as it is quite impossible to maintain our Army sufficient in numbers to meet all the demands that may come upon it, we must have a Reserve. The whole of our Army system is based upon the one requirement—that the Army unsupported by a Reserve is worth little or nothing at all. If any fact were wanted to prove that position, it is the use that we have made in recent years of that Reserve, and the use we now contemplate making of it. We have now 40,000 Army Reserve men to lay our hands upon, and we regard with comparative equanimity the disturbed state of affairs all over the world. There is one point mentioned in the paper which I should like to correct. Colonel Moody says: "I am not going to enter into the merits or demerits of short service, which Lord Cardwell instituted in 1870 as a panacea for the then existing evils. It was established on the most uncompromising grounds. Long service was to be quite abolished, and six years with the colours and six with the Reserve to be the extreme limit of the soldier's engagement." As that is not a correct statement of the facts, and Lord Cardwell's system was entirely different from that, I think in his defence—the defence of a man who is unable now to speak for himself—the memory of gentlemen present should be refreshed upon this point. The system which Lord Cardwell inaugurated was a system of long service and short service combined. The Short Service Act was passed late in 1872. The system which was then started, and the regulation formulated just as he was leaving office early in 1874, was that the Guards were to recruit 50 per cent. short service and 50 per cent. long service, the artillery 50 per cent. short service and 50 per cent. long service, the cavalry and infantry 75 per cent. short service and 25 per cent. long service: so that there was no restriction such as that which is mentioned in the paper when short service was first instituted. Lord Cardwell went out of office in May, 1874, and these regulations were in existence at the time and for some considerable time afterwards. I may say it was in 1878 that the change was made limiting the enlistment in the infantry to short service exclusively. Why was that done? For

the simple fact that very few men could be got to enlist for long service. The alternatives were put before the men, and except in one district, and I believe by one recruiting sergeant, of whom I can tell a story, the short service was in every case accepted in preference to the long service. The story is this. I remember speaking—I think it was to Colonel Peel—about it, and he told me that he had one sergeant who recruited exactly in these proportions—75 per cent. short and 25 per cent. long service. He was so struck with it that he asked him how it was that he did it. “Well,” he said, “I did it in this way. I tackled the first three men I came to in the morning and persuaded them that short service was the finest thing in the world, and that was the system to go in for, and I got them. Then I tackled my fourth man, and persuaded him that long service was the system that he wanted, and that short service was the worst thing in the world, and I got him.” The fact is that those who come forward to enlist are men who are easily persuaded one way or the other by a man with a good power of talking. Yet throughout the population short service was the popular service, and the main reason for giving up long service was that the short service so nearly approximated to the actual facts that it was thought advisable to limit the service of enlistment to short service only. What has short service done as regards the numbers of recruits? It has answered completely so far as the numbers are concerned; we had obtained the numbers of recruits we wanted throughout the whole period that short service has been in existence, except in the one case to which Colonel Moody has alluded. He states that we are now offering bounties, and so on, because short service has broken down. The reason why the bounties were offered to men serving in India to extend their service was this—that an experiment was made for one year in consequence of the recommendations of Lord Airey’s Committee, to limit the enlistment of soldiers to men, or boys, if that expression be preferred, of 19 years of age, and that very limitation to 19 years of age, or its physical equivalent, lost us so large a number of recruits that it was with the greatest possible difficulty we were able to make up the leeway brought about by that change. It was a complete failure, and proved what General McKay has stated that he told the Duke of Cambridge, and what everybody who knows anything about recruiting will confirm—that you must catch the young fellow before he has entered his career in another line of business; for you cannot expect one who has started as a carpenter, or tailor, or trade of that kind, after working two or three years and getting fair wages, to come to you as a matter of wages. He may, however, be possessed with the military spirit which exists in a very large proportion of our population, and he may say, “I will chuck up this thing and go and be a soldier,” and then you may get him; but it will not be a matter of wages with him. Although the numbers that we have induced to join our standards have been entirely up to our demands, still no doubt the waste, as it is called, in the Army is something terrible, and that is the point to which we ought to devote the whole of our attention. It is absurd, however, for people to think that we can arrive at a system which shall be perfect, under which we shall have no waste at all. It seems to be the idea of some that desertion can be prevented, and that everyone who once comes into the Army can be made to stay with it. I believe, as into other professions and trades, men come into the Army and do not like it, and want to get out of it, and if they have a 10*l*. note to pay during the first three months of their service they pay it, and if they have not, they bolt. It is but reasonable that they should do so. The men go into the Service voluntarily, and certainly some of them will find that it is not good enough, as the phrase is, and they will try and get out of it. Lord Chelmsford said he thought it was an ideal with some persons to command an army such as the police are. I took the trouble before I came here to look at the last Returns with regard to the police of the country. I have taken two of the police districts, one the Eastern and Midland Counties, and the other the Southern. In the Eastern and Midland there are 4,900 constables; the waste upon those for the year is 535, or 11·1 per cent. per annum in this force, in which the constables receive over a guinea a week with lodging and clothing. Of those, 325 had resigned—they have the power of resignation at short notice—107 were dismissed, 80 were superannuated, 21 died, and 2 absconded, making up the 535. In the other district, out of 5,516 men we find almost the same waste—552, or 10 per cent.: resigned 295, dismissed 108, died 79, and so

on, showing that in the Police Force, which is much more voluntary than the Army, and much more highly paid, there is almost exactly the same waste as in the Army, excluding, of course, those passed into the Reserve. The Reserve men are, of course, still in the Army, and in the opinion of those whose opinion I most respect they are the backbone and the strength of the Army. The waste in the Army from exactly similar causes is something like 12 per cent. per annum, so that whatever system you may establish in the way of pay and greater liberty and power of departure, I have shown, I think, that you may expect an amount of waste much like what you have at the present time. I should hope, however, that it may be checked to some extent, and I believe the best means of checking it are those which have been generally stated by Colonel Moody: "Their tastes and intelligence are not sufficiently appealed to. In the matter of discipline they are treated rather as children than as reasoning and responsible beings. Our system of passes and furloughs is worrying, and our punishments by their frequency lose their deterrent effect. The food even now is insufficient and badly served, and the barrack-room is too often so uncomfortable as to drive the soldier from what should be his home to the public-house"—and so on. I believe that amelioration in those directions is likely to be the best cure of this extensive waste; but that it can be prevented altogether, or prevented in a very appreciable degree, I believe is extremely doubtful. One other point has been alluded to by Colonel Moody, and that is the employment of men when they leave the Service. I believe that also would be a very great inducement to men to join, but it is a fallacy that I have frequently seen put forward, to believe that the Government can make provision by means of situations at their disposal for the employment of any large number of these men. Take the Police Force. It has often come across my mind that appointments to the Police should be limited to men who have done Army service. How many do you suppose this would provide for? 50,000 men. The annual exodus of men from the Army passing to the Reserve should be between 15,000 and 20,000. It would be necessary if employment from the age of 25 to 55 were to be given to those men, to have half a million positions to meet their wants. To state that proves that it is perfectly impossible for the Government to make provision in the way of employment. The whole Police of the country is only one-tenth of that which would be necessary. But what I believe is really the solution of this difficulty, now that we are keeping the men eight or nine years, is that during that time we should teach them at the expense of the public to do something to enable them to take up a position something better than that of a messenger when they leave the colours. Let the men be relieved from some of their sentry work, some of their barrack-yard drills, and be taught to do something which will make them more useful members of society when they revert to civil life.

Lieut.-General Luard: I have not heard this lecture, nor have I read it, and, therefore, if what I am going to say has been said by others, I can only say I am sorry. I have had something to do of late with seeing men join the Army at Aldershot, and it has struck me that although the rules laid down for the admission of recruits are quite reasonable and good, these rules have not been carried out by the recruiting authorities in the manner in which they should be. Rules have been laid down as to the physical size of the recruit, and though I will not say anything about his height, yet I think his chest measurement is very important. It is laid down that the recruit shall have a chest measurement of 34 inches, or if the medical Officer considers that he is likely to become a fit man, he may go down as low as 33 inches. A batch of recruits came into Aldershot the other day. I inspected them, and seeing that they were under-sized, I had a number of them measured. We measured them; we reported on them to the General Officer Commanding; the Commanding Officer of the regiment reported to the Brigadier; the Brigadier reported to the Lieutenant-General; and the report was sent to the Horse Guards. An order came down that they should be re-inspected by a specially selected medical board. Nineteen were recommended for discharge. The special medical board inspected all those men, and they said that thirteen of them had been improperly enlisted, that they were not fit to become soldiers, and they will therefore be discharged in a few days. Now those men had been kept by the country, I believe, three months before I saw them, and the result will be that they will have been five or six months in the

Service at the country's expense, being clothed and fed, and being all the time under the supervision of the Medical Officers. Whose fault is that? Is not that the fault of the inspecting Officers who made them into the Service? And if rules are laid down, should not those Officers be encouraged to carry them out? And should the medical Officers be encouraged to tempt those children into the Service? I say it is wrong. My idea is this—temptation into the way of a young man which we have no business to do. The sergeant who recruits him that he is 18 years of age—he is induced by falsehood, for he is told that he must be 18, and he is not 18 years of age. If he has to begin the Service at 18, he says he is 18 when he is only 16, 15, or only 14½ years. I say, for a practical nation like this, it is the worst and uneconomical thing possible to take a fellow in at 14½ or 15. I heard the other day of a case which had been referred about the date of birth, and it came out that the recruit was only 14½, although he called himself 18. However, say that he is 15½: he is only 22½ when he is sent, after 7 years, into the Reserve. Is that right? I say that a man should remain from 18 up to 25, and not go to the Reserve then—that should be enforced upon him. I will tell you how I think it should be done—we should not ask the man's age. Of course he tells a lie—of course he would not ask him. The inspecting Officers should say, "I put this boy at 15½, or 16, or 17," or whatever he thinks his age really is, and then he should go to the boy, "Now we will take you at the age I say—we will take you at the age you like to come. We will give you boy's pay, make you a soldier, and at the same time shall be fit to be a soldier on man's pay, and in seven years from that you will go to the Reserve." That would be practical and economical, and it would get service from him at the other end instead of this end, when he is of comparatively no use.

Captain O'CALLAGHAN: I have no wish to controvert the accuracy of the statements, or the soundness of the opinions, expressed in the lecture on one point—the physical inferiority of boys obtained from institutions as compared with those obtained from families; yet I would ask to be allowed to make a few remarks in regard to one industrial school which is not far from this neighbourhood—the Newport Market School; and my reasons for mentioning that school are that it is the only one I know anything about, and that the remarks in the lecture on physical inferiority do not seem quite to apply to boys from that school. The number of boys in the school at present is 68, and of those who leave it every three-fourths join the regiments of Her Majesty's Service. The connection of boys with the school does not cease with their enlistment, because reports are periodically from the regiments as to their progress, and from the last annual report it appears that of 216 boys who joined from that school, only 4 have turned out. As late as last night I visited that school, and saw the boys just before they were going to bed. They looked strong, healthy, broad-shouldered, happy, merry, and I have been told that the authorities of the school are anxious that Officers and others who are interested in the Service, should visit it at any day or hour, giving notice. I thought it well to say, whatever may be the state of boys in other industrial schools, that with regard to this one, at all events, the inference which is stated to exist does not apply.²

Maj.-General GLOAG, R.A.: In the interesting lecture which some of us heard on Friday I find the following prominent points:—1st. Our so-called volunteer system of recruiting has hitherto entirely failed, and the quality and quantity of our recruits have been, and still continue to be, gravely deficient. 2nd. In 1782 our

¹ The system I suggest would bring into the Service a number of youths taken up for the Army in a manner somewhat similar to that already found to operate admirably in the Navy, where no man is now received from the mercantile service but all are brought in after a course of instruction as boys.—R. G. A. LUGAN.

² I should like to add that there has not been a single death in the school mentioned above for 16 years. For 14 years of that time, it was in the neighbourhood of the name of which it still bears; yet the judicious use of disinfectants and the great care taken of the boys in every way, were absolutely successful in preventing mortality. The school now occupies a suitable building in Coburg, Westminster.—E. O'C.

service was necessary. In 1806 short service was first introduced under the Wyndham Act. In 1808 unlimited service was reintroduced. In 1829 life service was reintroduced. In 1847 the Limited Service Act was passed. In 1855 any person might be enlisted for a period of ten years in the infantry and twelve in other branches. Three years' enlistment was authorized under this Act, and it was renewed for three years, but did not come into operation. 3rd. The Act of 1847 remained in force till 1867, when the Recruiting Commission of 1866 recommended an Act, which was passed, altering the times of service from 10 and 11 to 12 and 9 years, with re-engagement to complete 21 years. These terms continued till 1870, when short service was reintroduced. 4th. We then find the bounty system—one which, as every Officer in the Army knows, was an unmitigated evil—was abolished in 1867. The soldier's position till 1860 was, as compared with to-day, an indifferent one. 5th. The loss of men under all these systems—taking 1884 as a typical year—by desertion, invaliding, discharges of all kinds, amounted to 11,933, and this was exclusive of 1,512 prisoners, making a gross loss of 12,495, or at the rate of 5 per cent. in peace time! Think what this loss would amount to in a great struggle with any of the powerful Empires of Europe. 6th. For successful recruiting it is necessary—(a.) To bring the most desirable class of men into the Service; (b.) To induce them to remain in it; (c.) To provide for their future, when they leave. 7th. With regard to this we are told by Colonel Moody, we ought to show that the training the soldier receives during his term of service is one which leaves him at the end of such service better than he was before he joined. 8th. Then follow many facts regarding crime and punishment, food, barracks, clothing, and furlough. The lecturer then winds up by saying: "There is only one thing to be done, and if done thoroughly it will be the cheapest in the end." It is comforting, if true, that only one thing requires to be done. "The Government must take active steps to meet the needs of thousands of poor fellows it yearly turns out upon the world, only keeping an eye on them for its own interests and theirs; and the only plan is to urge upon all public bodies the justice and necessity of employing ex-soldiers in preference to civilians in those humble places of trust for which they may be fitted." 9th. The lecturer then concludes that part of his paper, "Recruiting from the Army," in which I am, as an Army Officer, alone interested, by giving some details concerning boy enlistment and military schools. Boy enlistment and schools are most important, and they cannot be too carefully attended to and utilized to the utmost possible extent. Now, even with all this, as far as we have gone, we have signally failed, if I am to believe what I am told, to get the number and class of recruits that we desire to have! What then shall we do? In the first place, I ask, what number of men do we require for our Army, which shall meet all its demands in such a scattered and immense Empire as ours? Secondly, what proportion of men are our Colonies to contribute to our Army? Conscription is a widely acknowledged evil just because war is such a dreadful evil, and in Great Britain there has been, and still is—though, I believe, not so strong as before—a rooted prejudice against it in any shape. But I confess, if we are to remain a military Power for good purposes, that is, if we are to be able to say to this mighty military Power, and to that mighty military Power, "You shall not do this, or you shall not do that," the tinkering system we have hitherto pursued will only land us in some dreadful disaster. Militia, Volunteers, Short Service, Reserves, all have been more or less carefully fostered under extreme difficulties, with a view of putting off the evil day of compulsory service. But, while we have vast continental armies, capable of being brought up in the aggregate to 12,000,000 or 15,000,000 of trained soldiers, we must not listlessly look on, if we desire to retain our position upon the rôle of Empires. With reference to this a late writer has well said: The advocates of Universal Conscription, and those who look upon our peculiar system of voluntary recruiting, which we are led to believe is the only one suited to our highly developed sentiments of individual freedom and conscience, from an adverse point of view, say "that this latter system simply signifies that the *rich* ease their own bodies at the expense of the *poor*," that is, *that the minority sacrifice the majority to their selfish interests*, "because they are allowed to hire others"—(I might almost say *slaves*, as for the time they are so hired they have neither freedom nor liberty of conscience, nor is it possible under the circumstances that they can, or ought to enjoy such

blessings)—“to do for them what the nation has an undoubted right to expect able-bodied man to do for himself in his own person. The moral fastidiousness displayed by the advocates of the so-called *voluntary* recruiting, and the opposition of the *Universal Conscription* systems, is only surpassed in China, where it is men may procure substitutes for the gallows. Not only this, but we resort to various sorts of systems of recruiting, including the pot-house system and others even to induce certainly not the best class of men to enlist. Well, this may be convenient, even as it was convenient in days gone by to ship criminals to sea, which was not worked out their punishments, and to make them serve in the King's instead of perhaps being hung, as they deserved, but this is not assuredly *voluntary enlistment*. These are not practices which entitle their advocates to look upon other nations, from a high moral pedestal, who only expect and demand able-bodied citizen to act up to the immutable law of nature, *self-preservation* to bear his share in his own and his country's defence.” Moreover, this system of obtaining recruits does not tend to raise the moral status of the soldier nor yet to fire his bosom with national patriotism on a grand scale, but quite the reverse. It must not be forgotten that times have changed, and military manners and customs have changed, among all warlike civilized nations. Nor must it be ignored that in forming our Army it must be so organized that in times of peace and confidence it will not prove oppressive, and in time of war more expensive than our finances can stand, or we shall have, in order to avoid these results, run to increase our already too great National Debt. If the Crimean war added millions to our debt, what would not a great military struggle in Europe, in which we were forced to take part, perhaps under most disadvantageous circumstances, and to fight for our very existence as a military Power, not add to it? Where would all this end? The National Debt is but young, yet how rapidly it has enormously increased! If our financiers are prepared to maintain that they can with safety be indefinitely increased, and can satisfactorily prove this, it matters not what we may do; and if this be true it would be far better to have an army when we want one, from some other Power, with plenty of spare able-bodied men, to fight for us, just as we hire a cab when it rains. The evils that attend conscript soldiers as regards taking them away from useful work applies with even greater force to all Reserve men; witness the howl which invariably arises when the Reserves are called out; but it would not be so bad with Conscription, because, in the first instance, they are but young soldiers. Until “the lion down with the lamb and a young child shall lead them,” we must keep pace with the other great civilized Empires of the world, or sink lower in the scale of nations who shall say how low? This I think no patriotic Britisher would desire. It seems to me—but it is only a humble opinion and must be taken for what it is worth—to be necessary is that we should have a regular standing Army of, say, 300,000 men, of all branches, bound to serve for a period of not more than twelve years, with, in addition, universal conscription or liability to personal military service, without substitution or dotation, for every able-bodied male of twenty years of age, with certain exemptions and limitations determined from time to time by Acts of Parliament, that is by the nation's will, in view of having a thoroughly sufficient and efficient force at all times so that we may no longer be subject to demoralizing panics when any great continental Power proposes to do something or other which we think detrimental to our interests or dangerous to our vast and scattered Empire? The “silver wire” and our insular position no longer render us invulnerable, with steam and electric telegraphs at work. In carrying out a modified system of conscript services of all half-pay and retired Officers below the grade of General Officer, of all discharged soldiers of every class, could well be utilized. By the operation of certain Royal Warrants issued of late years, we have hundreds of half-pay Officers and others forcibly retired, fairly blue-moulding in comparatively early life, who would look upon the day they might be re-employed, in ever so humble a capacity as the brightest spot in the vista of their waning lives. Sir, I have done, already too long tried your patience, and I will only add one word more. That, some years ago, one of the ablest of my younger brother Officers read a paper on Conscription in this place, which was not received with a popular outburst

enthusiasm, but in a cold, frigid, if not hostile manner; but, Sir, the times are critical, and all patriotic subjects of the Crown should speak out, for we must adopt some strong measures if we desire to remain, what we have always hitherto been, and which I trust we ever shall be, the foremost civilizing Power on this planet. Modified conscription, with a standing army, which is absolutely necessary as long as we have to hold India "by the power of the sword," or a return to a local European army in that country, will, in my humble opinion, do much good in Great Britain. It will train young men early in habits of discipline and self-control, it will in a great measure decrease crime in the Army, as we shall have the flower of the nation, we shall thus gain in men and money, and moreover, when the civilized world sees England determined to be overwhelmingly strong, the disturbers of the peace of nations will most assuredly be more circumspect in entering upon any measures which might lead to an outbreak of war, which, in these days of deadly machines for taking life, is more destructive, expensive, and decisive, than it has ever been.

Captain CURTIS, R.N.: The great thing is to keep faith with the men, for if the Government keep faith with the men, the men will serve the Government well. With regard to recruiting, I see a statement in the "Morning Post" that there are 800,000 men less in the rural districts than there were ten years ago. The able-bodied population is coming into the towns, and hence the recruiting must take place in the towns. In 1862 or 1863, coming home in H.M.S. "London" to be paid off, 200 fine fellows, all second-class conduct men, were discharged on the pier, and were told by the Government that their services would not be wanted any more. Where did these men go to? They went to serve in the American Navy, for which they had been trained by our Government (practically). They were some of the finest men that ever stepped on board ship. It was really painful to see them treated in that way; many having been in our Service from boyhood, and looked to our Service for support through life. I must in a measure support General Alexander when he said that flogging did not create discipline. If it is *discreetly* administered, I think, flogging does in a measure create discipline, but in one ship that I was in, and in which there was more flogging than in any other which I have served in, the discipline notwithstanding was the worst that I have ever seen. I say that discipline and maintenance of good order depend, in a great measure, upon the Officers. Let the Officers set a good example to the men, and treat them as rational beings, and then I think that stoppage of indulgences will be quite sufficient punishment in most cases. I say we should treat the men as reasonable beings. The last time that I was at Naples the men went, like the Officers, to see Pompeii and to the country places, and enjoyed themselves thoroughly. I think if Officers and men have leave to go into the country, they benefit their own country thereby, viz., by acquiring a knowledge of others. The lecturer has said that sea-shore lads are the best. I have always advocated enlisting this class. Now I remember when I was in the "Majestic," boys walked all the way from Manchester in order to join the Service, and we had to send many of them back. I think if in every village post-office there were directions put up and posted, so that the boys thoroughly knew what was expected when they came to join a ship, they would not so many of them be disappointed in that way. With regard to the Naval Reserve, I think if our young yachtsmen and our gentlemen owning boats would set an example to the shore population, we might easily establish a voluntary force trained as torpedo men or as artillery men, who would be very useful to assist in beating off an enemy from the coast and protecting fishing fleets. Train lads from 16 to 21, not older. I am sure it would be very important if we could get a Coast Reserve Service of that sort which would be able to defend our coasts within a radius of 25 or 40 miles, and it would be a good thing to hold out a few rewards to such men. We want a force equivalent to our Volunteer Rifles for shore service, and that would enable us to relieve our fleet. There are many boys in the country, fisher lads, who would be sure to come forward and serve if they only knew that they would have a chance of being entered.¹

¹ See Alison's Essays, vol. 2, p. 658, "Ships, Colonies, and Commerce." On the 20th October, 1805, when Napoleon stood on the heights of Ulm, to behold the

General BRAY: I wish to say a few words with regard to the remarks have been made by General McKay. General McKay is a man who has seen Army, and has a thorough knowledge of what he is talking about; all through evident that he knew everything that he was saying as being absolutely true absolutely what occurs in the British Army. I think every gentleman listened to him will be very much obliged to him for having made the remarks that he did, which show that an Officer in his position can see and judge what is good, what is bad, and what is indifferent. We have also listened to a gentleman, Mr. Knox, who belongs to the War Office, and whose name is connected with many changes that have been introduced into the British Army, not altogether, I think, to the advantage of that Army. I feel perfectly satisfied from the hesitating way in which he delivered some of his sentences that precisely the same kind of speech that we have heard delivered over the table to the House of Commons by Mr. Cardwell and Mr. Childers, speeches loaded with platitudes, fallacies, and inaccuracies most misleading to the outside public, think it is a very bold thing for Mr. Knox to do to come here and to have said in that way before an audience of Officers of the Army and Navy who know perfectly well that nearly everything that should not have been done has been done to the detriment of the soldiers and Officers of the British Army for the fourteen years. I also attack, and am ready to controvert, the accuracy of several of his statements. He says "long service" broke down. I deny most distinctly and flatly that long service ever broke down. Long service did not break down; service broke down because the Government would not pay the proper and necessary pensions that were required in the present day for obtaining soldiers. That broke long service down and nothing else. Then the Government introduced short service, and for 14 years the country has been tentatively trying service, 3 years, 6, 9, and 12. They had a War Office Committee, presided by Lord Airey, which made most admirable suggestions, and pointed out that pensions were the solution of the whole questions.

The CHAIRMAN: Will you forgive me? I understand it is the practice of this Institution not so much to criticize and review statements made by those who take an independent part in the discussion, but to limit the criticisms as much as possible to the statements made in the paper. I am afraid if we discussed matters of statements made by each separate speaker, we should be led into rather a difficult field.

General BRAY: Very well. As I cannot discuss the matter here, I now challenge Mr. Knox or any responsible Officer of the War Office to discuss the matter in a large public room in London before a thousand people. I would then be most glad to discuss all the innovations and War Office changes which have been made during the 14 past years, and which the Officers and soldiers of the Army consider only most destructive to its efficiency but revolutionary in character. As Mr. Knox may require assistance, I will throw in the whole of the War Office to help him in his defence.

Colonel MOODY: Mr. Chairman, my Lord, and Gentlemen, I must confess I am much pleased and flattered at the manner in which my poor efforts have been received by the gentlemen who have taken part in its discussion. I laid stress on the good results which would no doubt emanate from the discussion. I am glad to find that it has been so full and exhaustive. In the main the gentlemen who have spoken have concurred in what I wished to urge; and although some instances there has been a little wandering from the strict subject matter the whole the text has been adhered to. I carefully avoided mentioning Conscription, as it cannot be considered practical. If the country refuses to carry out the Militia Ballot Act, it is not likely to permit Conscription. In the discussion of the Prize Essay by Major Hime, R.A., for 1875, the feeling against Conscription

captive German Army defile before him, his steady mind regarded only the future he said to those around him:—"Gentlemen, this is all well; but I want *greater things than these*; I want ships, colonies, and commerce." England has by circumstances, more or less inevitable, acquired these three vital necessities, and now remains for her to hold them.

marked that the subject has not been reopened since. It being taken for granted that the determination of the country is that the public services must be recruited from volunteering sources, it cannot be too strongly urged that it behoves those who will not serve themselves to give every assistance and encouragement to those who will. I cannot lay too much stress on this point. Again, I avoided the vexed question of altering the titles of regiments, although I was quite aware of the strong feeling which exists on this point. Owing to the want of popular sympathy we have hitherto failed to get the right stamp of recruits. Let us secure this sympathy, which it is the bounden duty of all classes to accord, and I feel quite sure that the rank and file will then be placed on a right footing. I again repeat that we must give the men some contingent advantages to look to. I am well aware that, as Mr. Knox has urged, it would be impossible for the Government to provide situations for all Reserve men; but there is no reason why it should not do as much as it can—and that it certainly does not do at present. Parliament has the matter in its own hands; a mere resolution would have the desired effect of compelling the Government in office to fill up certain situations with these men. A Committee of the House of Commons recommended such a measure in 1876; but no action has been taken on the Report of that Committee. Again, a Department Committee, under Mr. Shaw-Lefevre, sat in 1882 to consider what messengerships in public offices might be filled by them; but with the exception of those in the Admiralty and War Offices and park-keepers there has been, as before, no result. There is apparently no eagerness to obtain the services of the trained and disciplined men. I fear it is because there is a feeling that the soldiers' training is not what it should be. Let us remove this feeling, and the difficulty will be overcome. Soldiers must be taught to have confidence in themselves and to respect themselves. When, as a body, they get the credit of doing so, a vast stride will have been made towards the solution of this difficult problem. I do not advocate the teetotal system. I have advisedly said that we must establish a public feeling in the Army against *excess* in liquor. Teetotalism is all very well in its way—and is necessary for some men; but I must say that, as a rule, I prefer to see men able to trust themselves. I would by no means advocate keeping the wild young fellows, referred to by Lord Chelmsford, out of the Army. If our discipline is what it should be, the Army is the very place for them. But what I do most emphatically advocate is the keeping out the vicious class and the fraudulent enlisters. The average youth who enlists is not vicious; but association, and the example of such as are, will and often does make him so. The gaol bird should on no account be taken. This most honourable profession is not the place for such a character. There is no excuse for passing him in, as his appearance cannot be mistaken. With pains you can make the average recruit almost anything you like; but you cannot reform the gaol bird. If once enlisted, he simply moves from one regiment to another, as his fancy directs; and his class fills or helps to fill our military prisons. On the vexed question of age, I consider there is much urged that is fallacious. I would prefer to see all recruits under twenty on enlistment.¹ Get them young and they will stay with you. You must, however, feed them well, so that they may rapidly develop. It was with much regret that I found General McKay, in his eloquent and practical speech, did not agree with me as to the advisability of an increase of the ration. I must, however, adhere to my own opinion on this point—an opinion only arrived at after long and careful observations. I take the men of my own corps as example. We advisedly take recruits at seventeen. The way in which they develop when they first embark and get the liberal Navy rations is truly wonderful. Feed your recruits well, and you will do much to diminish the craving for drink. It is on this point alone that I have advocated any increase of expense, and I am convinced that it would, in the long run, prove the truest economy. All my other suggestions are points rather of management than of money. The great waste in the Police as compared with the waste of the Army is not much consolation. If the average is as great in all the counties as it is in those mentioned by Mr. Knox, there must be something decidedly wrong; but at the worst the numbers

¹ It must be understood that I here referred to the ordinary conditions of service; not to the exceptional requirements of an emergency.—J. McD. M.

in the police force are easily filled up. I plead guilty of a slip in implying the Cardwell established uncompromising short service. It was not adopted until Still, it has been generally understood in the country that short service is the Cardwell system; and, in so speaking of it, I had certainly not the slightest attacking the system or the statesman who introduced it. With all its drawbacks it has given us what we never had before—a large, efficient, and reliable Reserve which is now, at last, steadily increasing. The value of this Reserve at the critical time cannot be expressed. Like everything in our country the conscripts of service are a compromise; and now that we have what may be termed short service, no one can complain. During the last five years a great advance has been made in popularizing the Army, and a careful study of the Annual Reports of the Inspector-General of Recruiting will show what has been done. The present ought now to have a fair trial: to make it successful is the business of those who are charged with the details of its working. I must own to feeling a little disappointed that none of the speakers have referred to the question of boy enlistment. It is a point on which I was especially anxious to elicit the opinions of some very capable Officers who have taken part in the discussion.

The CHAIRMAN: Gentlemen, at this late hour I will not detain you very long, asking you to recognize the great service which Colonel Moody has performed in reading this paper. We all remember that during the last two years both in the press and in Parliament there has been a considerable amount of agitating excitement with reference to the imperial defences of this country. We have heard talks of forts and torpedoes, of fleets, guns and squadrons. It has always struck me that we were creating a fabric without a foundation. Guns and forts, and all the things I have mentioned are very well in their way, but they are both useless and dangerous when you have not got a complete and highly qualified *personnel* to man them when they are wanted: and I say therefore that Colonel Moody in bringing forward this paper at this present moment, when possibly in the immediate future not only your Army but your Navy and your Marines will require a very considerable accession of strength to its present force, has taken a most happy and most opportune step. I only trust that what he has already commenced will be taken up and carried on with, not merely by the soldier and those of us who are directly interested in the matter, as the comrades of soldiers and of sailors, but that the politicians and the public men, and especially those men who guide more or less this country, the press writers in the press, will give some little attention to this matter and educate the public that our great weakness at this present moment, looking at the enormous armies and the conditions of things on the Continent, is in not having a sufficient large number of trained soldiers on our soil. We have had a good deal of discussion to-day about subjects which may perhaps appear to be trifles, but they are nevertheless of the greatest importance not only for the comfort and the contentment of the soldier, but also for attracting civilians into our ranks. I will not say more at this point at the present moment as our time has been exhausted, but at the same time the name of one regiment upon the card of a gallant Officer who has added to my list puts me in mind of a circumstance that occurred when I visited a large Indian cantonment in 1878. I there saw a most beautiful regiment on parade, and the Colonel of the regiment said, "I will show you something still more interesting," and, pointing to two large rows of the usual type of an Indian bungalow, he said, "For months those doors have not been closed." Pointing to a building, a station hospital, he said, "During the same time that door has been opened to receive an inmate." That was the 1st Battalion of the 11th Regiment and I believe that was the normal condition of that battalion for some time in India. I only mention this to show, where Officers are devoted to the interests of their men, what they can do to make a contented and happy regiment. That is one point to which I attach very great importance, but which I think the public mind has lost sight of during the late agitation with reference to our defences, the large expenditure of money which is involved in the construction of forts, building ships or guns, collects about it an enormous number of interests all requiring support an agitation of that kind; but when it comes to a question of recruiting and getting up the *personnel* of the Army, which is after all a question of individual devotion or self-sacrifice by the soldier himself, there is not that amount of interest

taken in the subject which it really demands. The real defence of England and of the Empire is always to carry your hostilities on to foreign soil, and if you do not have a sufficient number of sailors and soldiers and marines, and of your first fighting line of regulars to support that, that defence of England will be disregarded and you will not be able to make it when the hour of trial comes. The traditional history of England which has made her great in the past has been that she has always been in a position to strike a blow outside her own territories, and that is the real key to the difficulty of the position which we must maintain. Among the many practical suggestions that have been made in this discussion, one of the most practical, made by one who spoke from intimate experience of the soldier and of the working of our system both in the Army and in the Militia, came from my old friend General McKay. He has pointed out to us that without any very great dislocation, or without any very great alteration of the present state of things, you have existing an organization at the present moment, the old constitution of the Militia of this country in association with the Volunteers working in harmony, which only requires a few men to set to work for its organization, and a very small judicious extension of expenditure in order to make it a powerful and effective English Army. I will not detain you long, but will ask you to allow me to tender Colonel Moody our thanks for the very interesting lecture that he has given us.

After 18 years' service under Art. 1,033, Royal Warrant, 25th June, 1881.....	..	2	5	2	2	2	2	5	7	13	6	4	4	52
On completing first period.....	964	865	493	344	324	540	500	274	117	127	110	209	209	4,897
As invalids.....	211	279	366	243	310	312	361	298	206	265	239	224	224	3,374
By purchase.....	156	162	231	220	183	183	169	171	147	176	151	159	159	2,108
Under Sec. 81, Army Act of 1881.....	122	102	98	101	91	104	128	154	139	155	181	130	130	1,505
Free by indulgence....	25	31	39	33	38	52	126	160	68	120	92	34	34	818
On conviction of making a false answer on attestation	6	8	7	9	15	7	13	11	9	16	7	7	7	115
For misconduct	86	115	93	96	111	88	84	78	63	85	77	83	83	1,059
Miscellaneous	39	42	52	45	49	37	50	75	51	56	61	40	40	597
	1,923	1,805	1,557	1,226	1,226	1,479	1,550	1,340	868	1,080	1,000	958	958	16,072
Deserted.....	290	286	288	221	261	295	323	396	261	411	318	348	348	3,707
To Army Reserve:														
On completion of ser- vice	1,163	1,010	2,361	929	2,222	2,391	1,053	402	317	314	322	1,788	1,788	14,272
On conversion of service	..	1	4	54	10	13	14	3	124	87	231	172	172	713
On demobilization	2,530	4,328	700	853	62	30	7	15	4	7	4	3	3	8,543
To Auxiliary Forces.....	78	64	76	87	62	71	48	53	61	62	61	68	68	788
Given up as deserters....	12	6	10	12	2	10	3	6	12	15	7	15	15	109
Other causes.....	250	272	143	93	44	108	104	105	66	133	146	48	48	1,512
Total decrease	6,428	7,938	5,261	3,594	4,033	4,551	3,220	2,496	1,828	2,307	2,264	3,503	3,503	47,423
Net increase.....	..	..	..	..	..	..	319	1,125	1,464	659	967	..	..	..
Net decrease.....	3,712	5,654	3,019	1,211	878	1,217	..	..	..	..	..	832	832	11,989

¹ This Return is taken from the Annual Report of the Inspector-General of Recruiting.

² Principally interchanges between the different branches of the Service.

APPENDIX B.

Increase and Decrease of the Army reported during each Month of the Year 1884.

Non-Commissioned Officers and Men—all Arms.													
	January.	February.	March.	April.	May.	June.	July.	August.	September.	October.	November.	December.	Total during the Year.
Effectives on the 1st of the month.....	173,529	174,155	174,346	173,914	174,007	174,066	173,857	174,459	175,313	176,565	178,668	180,534	181,009 (1st Jan. 1885.)
Increase.													
Recruits { Long service ..	147	160	175	114	146	150	106	117	122	165	178	149	1,729
joined { Short service ..	3,632	2,971	2,719	2,291	2,389	2,194	2,656	2,581	2,871	3,463	3,415	2,742	33,924
	3,779	3,131	2,894	2,405	2,535	2,344	2,762	2,698	2,993	3,628	3,593	2,891	35,653
Joined from desertion....	145	115	149	117	125	110	128	116	139	130	140	154	1,568
From Army Reserve ..	3	1	3	1	1	..	1	3	176	416	569	241	1,415
Other causes ²	55	47	25	37	47	29	27	26	45	143	34	56	571
Total increase	3,982	3,294	3,071	2,560	2,708	2,483	2,918	2,843	3,353	4,317	4,336	3,342	39,207
Decrease.													
Dead.....	76	90	191	99	105	119	119	108	154	180	118	162	1,521

After 18 years' service under Art. 1,033, Royal Warrant, 25th June, 1881.....	4	2	5	2	4	7	1	4	4	..	..	35
On completing first period.....	227	319	232	153	207	170	102	81	150	129	232	2,350
As invalids.....	212	235	261	242	223	297	319	282	217	190	215	2,962
By purchase.....	155	237	134	147	181	166	148	144	138	100	121	1,852
Under Sec. 81, Army Act of 1881.....	173	142	158	143	138	132	134	117	132	167	138	1,751
Free by indulgence....	64	116	88	80	139	62	59	55	27	33	38	871
On conviction of making a false answer on attestation	10	15	8	14	12	20	13	22	18	9	19	169
For misconduct.....	92	87	63	101	56	77	74	64	93	78	84	940
Miscellaneous.....	75	68	54	67	49	45	37	46	63	49	48	647
	1,128	1,233	1,148	1,074	1,163	1,117	995	904	945	825	1,028	12,939
Deserted.....	309	321	346	328	329	410	431	439	414	345	353	4,478
To Army Reserve:												
On completion of service.....	1,405	1,276	632	900	846	438	337	452	473	970	1,176	10,160
On conversion of service	231	58	112	105	116	107	21	43	42	71	15	1,032
On demobilization.....	3	..	..	..	1	1	..	1	..	1	..	7
To Auxiliary Forces	69	67	82	76	68	48	48	53	38	60	60	736
Given up as deserters....	13	10	7	11	12	18	9	15	10	24	15	154
Other causes'	32	69	41	50	38	58	40	40	112	56	59	701
	3,356	3,103	2,467	2,649	2,692	2,316	1,989	2,101	2,214	2,470	2,868	31,728
Total decrease.....		3,503										
Net increase.....	626	191	93	59	..	602	854	1,252	2,103	1,866	474	7,479
Net decrease.....	..	..	..	..	209	..	..	..	..	..	..	..

APPENDIX C.

State of the Army on the 1st January in each Year from 1880 to 1885, and the Increase and Decrease during the Year.

—	1880.	1881.	1882.	1883.	1884.	1885.
<i>State of the Army.</i>						
Effectives on 1st January in each year	183,942	181,233	181,742	185,518	173,529	181,008
Establishments.....	180,673	181,325	179,989	185,044	181,156	183,731
supernumerary	3,269	..	1,753	474	..	..
Wanting.....	..	92			7,027	2,723
<i>Increase and Decrease.</i>						
Recruits joined.....	25,622	26,258	23,802	33,096	35,653	141,431
<i>Waste (exclusive of transfers to Reserve).</i>						
Deaths.....	3,186	2,570	2,140	1,707	1,521	11,124
Desertion (net loss).....	3,276	3,011	2,816	2,441	2,910	14,514
Given up as deserters.....	243	141	130	109	154	777
Fraudulent enlisters struck off	168					1,000

Annual Increase and Decrease of the Royal Marines since the Year 1870.

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RECRUITING FOR HER MAJESTY'S SERVICE.

Years.	Gain.			Loss.										Average strength of the Corps, N.C., officers, and rank and file.	Remarks.	Establishment.			
	Ordinary recruits.	Drummers, &c.	Retaken from desertion.	Total gain.	Discharged.						Invalided.	Death.	Desertion.				Claim.	Transported and penal servitude.	Total loss.
					Completed 21 years.	Completed 12 years.	By purchase.	Branded and objectionable.	Free, relinquishing pension.										
1870	1,221	29	49	1,303	100	122	60	95	8	468 (unit 4)	197	215	21	1,221	13,491	4 to Naval Police	13,955.		
1	1,125	26	53	1,209	60	210	66	56	21	473 (unit 4)	101	160	31	1,183	13,629	3 do.	13,955.		
2	1,590	62	73	1,715	132	136	161	90	34	655 (unit 2)	86	246	67	1,610	13,721	14 do.	13,955.		
3	1,595	38	91	1,724	161	162	191	67	18	562 (unit 2)	93	403	88	1,754	13,736	4 do.	13,955 to 4 Aug., 1873, 13,963 after.		
4	1,718	55	122	1,895	227	135	222	90	17	501 (unit 3)	121	434	94	1,867	13,746	4 do.	13,965.		
5	1,539	54	145	1,739	390	190	212	156	33	473 (unit 7)	114	423	22	2,030	13,612	4 do. 12 to Reserve forces 6 to Naval Police 8 to Reserves	13,965.		
6	1,756	34	146	1,936	421	201	181	98	36	415 (unit 2)	82	363	6	1,869	13,693	2 to Naval Police 5 to Reserves	13,965 to 1st October, 13,973 after.		
7	1,830	46	145	2,021	255	137	191	201	26	373 (unit 1)	79	402	6	1,693	13,297	29 to Naval Police 22 to Reserves	13,973.		
8	1,229	39	122	1,390	183	174	214	217	51	495 (unit 2)	92	207	2	1,760	13,294	12 to Naval Police 3 to Reserves	13,973 to 1st April, 13,000 after.		
9	980	20	102	1,102	254	185	200	361	23	618 (unit 4)	74	231	1	1,931	12,603	10 to Naval Police 3 to Reserves	13,000.		
1880	1,565	41	96	1,705	434	39	210	166	21	615 (unit 6)	83	265	5	1,781	12,322	5 to Naval Police 3 to Reserves	13,000 to 1st July, 12,405 after.		
1	1,255	15	66	1,336	319	77	239	200	27	489 (unit 6)	80	290	11	1,723	12,299	12 to Naval Police 1 to Reserves	12,405.		
2	1,463	35	63	1,556	253	128	209	170	9	361 (unit 6)	146	237	32	1,612	12,037	3 to Reserves	12,405.		
3	1,483	52	63	1,598	269	119	241	161	14	435 (unit 4)	76	312	29	1,762	11,917	2 to Naval Police	12,405.		
4	1,707	23	74	1,801	219	118	234	107	3	403 (unit 4)	100	225	26	1,494	...	...	12,405.		
														25	...	...	...		