Reviews and Bibliographical Notices.

I.—MAUDSLEY: PHYSIOLOGY OF THE MIND.

THE PHYSIOLOGY OF THE MIND. Being the First Part of a Third Edition, Revised, Enlarged, and, in great part, Rewritten, of the *Physiology and Pathology of the Mind*. By Henry Maudsley, M.D. New York: D. Appleton & Co. 1878. 547 pages.

Notwithstanding this work in a somewhat different form, has been long before the reading public, and is, hence, comparatively well known, we shall not be deterred from giving considerable space to a notice of that portion of the new edition now before us.

This is noticeably less confident and aggressive in tone, if not less contemptuous in its references to "metaphysics" and the "introspective psychology" than was the earlier edition, but it contains about the same amount in the way of quotations from Goethe, and the old English physiological psychologists, and the school of Herbart, and the same almost obtrusive assumptions of the Baconian spirit and phraseology. We fancy also we detect in this re-reading, less, perhaps, of a certain peculiarity in an otherwise remarkably excellent and graphic style, which we cannot easily characterize, but which may be described as at times a kind of fine strategy, in statement and expression consciously adopted, we are almost ready to suppose, for the purpose of rendering his writings striking and effective. So far forth as such qualities are exhibited with the appearances of spontaneity they may be interesting or even delightful, but the moment they appear in another garb, they are likely, at the least, to become monotonous. And we must confess, whether right or wrong, to have experienced something akin to the latter feeling in reading the book, and for the somewhat vague reason we have just tried to name.

But taken altogether, this work of Dr. Maudsley's, is perhaps the most interesting and suggestive contribution to the subject of which it treats, that has appeared in the English language for many years. We detect many changes in this new edition as compared with the earlier ones, and generally for the better, but find less in the way of a reference to recent researches in respect to the nervous system than was to have been expected in such a

work, issued in the year 1877. We feel that for some reason Dr. Maudsley cannot have been a very active reader of medical literature during the past decade. On this account we must think the work suffers somewhat. But it contains so much in the way of good matter and good thought, and bears so strongly the impress of its author's individuality, as to compensate largely for any supposed short-comings in the fullness of its survey of recent progress in the anatomy and physiology of the nervous system.

Perhaps no other part of the work, will more challenge the attention of the thoughtful reader, than the first chapter, "On the Method of the Study of Mind." This chapter of 76 pages, is chiefly devoted to an unsparing—even a contemptuous—criticism of the method which it is alleged was formerly pursued in the study of mind; namely, the "psychological" or "introspective," and *per contra*, a warm and almost unqualified defence of the "objective" or "physiological" method of the study of mind. We cannot at present enter into a full examination of the questions which arise on the ground referred to, and which have been the occasion of so much discussion from time immemorial, even down to this hour, but will not let the opportunity pass for examining them with some detail, in the light in which they are placed by the declarations of Dr. Maudsley.

The "introspective" psychology as is well known is mainly based on the phenomena manifested in consciousness. The observer looks within to behold the nature and order of thought and feeling, under the same or varying conditions, external and internal, and accepting the so-called "revelations" or "deliverances" of consciousness *as facts*, proceeds to deal with them (as with any other kind of facts), by analysis and classification, so as to *systematize* our knowledge derived from this source. If what we can discover as done or happening within the "sphere of consciousness" may be regarded as true when judged by ordinary standards, in other words, if these things can be shown to be *facts* as some have considered them to be, there could be no doubt, it would seem, whether *such* facts are as susceptible of scientific treatment as the facts of the physical world are admitted to be. But here arises at once the chief difficulty. Dr. Maudsley, after the example of M. Comte, not to mention others before him, seeks to discredit, not only the facts of so-called self-consciousness, but by consequence, consciousness itself. Thus is the attempt made to remove the very grounds of the "introspective" psychology. For if its revelations are essentially contradictory and false, as they are declared in the plainest terms to be, by Dr. Maudsley, truly a science of psychology can never be built up on such data. One of the chief characteristics of the work before us, is the hostility displayed in it, to consciousness, and the phenomena which appear within its limits. No opportunity however oblique, is missed, for disparaging it, as a faculty of knowledge. But let us proceed to a

discussion of Dr. Maudsley's positions in regard to this question and see if they can bear the tests of even a cursory examination.

In order to place his views before the reader, we will quote a number of passages selected with some care, from the mass of his utterances on the subject in hand. What is consciousness according to Dr. Maudsley?

The reader would hardly believe it beforehand, but it is not possible to find in the entire work, a full and explicit definition of this important term, though he admits "we are involved in the confusion which comes of the want of an exact agreement as to what is meant by consciousness; we suffer from the want of an exact definition in which men agree." (P. 204, *Am. Ed.*) And yet there is not, as already said, a clear definition of consciousness, in the book. The following passages may serve as well perhaps as any others, to convey our author's meaning:

"Whoever endeavors faithfully and firmly to obtain a definite idea of what is meant by consciousness, will find it nowise so easy a matter as the frequent and ready use of the word might imply. * * * What consciousness is will appear better if its relations be closely examined without prejudice. It will then be seen that it is not separable from knowledge, that it exists only as a part of the concrete mental act; that it has no more power of withdrawing from the particular phenomenon, and of taking full and fair observation of it, than a boy has of jumping over his own shadow. Consciousness is not a faculty or substance, but a quality or attribute of the concrete mental act. There is no consciousness without something of which one is conscious, no abstract consciousness without contents, and it may exist in different degrees of intensity, or it may be absent altogether. In so far as there is consciousness there is certainly mental activity; but it is not true that in so far as there is mental activity there is consciousness; it is only with a certain intensity of representation or conception that consciousness appears." (P. 45-6) "It can hardly be doubted that too much has been made of consciousness in times past, and that instead of mental phenomena revolving round it as the sun of the system, it is rather a sort of satellite of mind,—the indicator which makes known what is being done, not the agent in doing it." (P. 245).

Other passages of similar import might be quoted, but not one which would in brief space throw any stronger light on the real nature of consciousness than those already presented. But from them we may gather, that consciousness is really a subordinate, even an outlying,—faculty of the mind. The distinctions between it and other faculties of mind, are so drawn as to imply that they were made in view of certain errors on the part of the "introspective" psychologists, which we feel sure would be repudiated by such psychologists as but little better than travesties of their real doctrines as to the nature of consciousness. Dr. Maudsley, in this and other parts of his

work, as we shall presently try to show, is combatting in great measure difficulties of his own raising.

We will now endeavor to define what we understand consciousness to be, and then bring our definition face to face with Dr. Maudsley's objections to a reliance on it, in order to see whether consciousness must be relegated to the outer darkness which he has prepared for it.

To define this term "consciousness," is truly a difficult task, as Dr. Maudsley has said, and yet it may be done, with some approach towards clearness. In making an attempt at a definition it will not be possible to enter into a history of the use of the term, by different writers, and in different schools of psychology. By *consciousness* we understand that faculty which mind has, of becoming aware of certain of its own states and acts. Any acts or states of mind, which are not revealed in consciousness, either directly or *indirectly*, are never known, or never become a part of our knowledge. We hear much of "unconsciousness" mental action, or to state it in physiological terms, "unconscious cerebration," and hence much of mind and its operations which lie beyond the confines of consciousness. All this may be admitted. But if *certain of the results* of these unconscious operations of mind are not somehow and sometime projected into the domain of consciousness, and made manifest in its light, they could never be known at all.

It makes no difference whether the final *object* of knowledge is a conscious act or state of the mind, and is hence properly *subjective*, or whether it is in the outer world, and hence is in the fullest sense of the word extra-mental or *objective*, it can only be known or truly felt, in consciousness.

Consciousness does not manufacture its own contents. It is not a creative, but simply a cognitive faculty. It has nothing more to do in creating the mental states or in performing the mental acts, which it cognizes, than the eye has in creating the luminous rays which affect it in vision. It simply knows and feels such acts as occur within, or states of feeling as arise into, its sphere, whether from within or from without by the way of the senses. No matter from what source, even if from the depths of the mind's unconscious activities, or by way of sense observation, all objects of knowledge must be at least indirectly represented in consciousness if they ever are known. Consciousness being passive as regards its objects, since it does not create them. It takes them as they come. If they are in the outer world, and are inadequately represented by defective or diseased sense organs, consciousness is not to blame for the distorted data given it. Unconscious mental action, if it is represented in consciousness, must be in a fragmentary way. From what we *know* of such unconscious action, by reason of its having been made partly known in consciousness, we *infer* what the whole unconscious process must have been. But processes of knowledge into which inference enters largely, are peculiarly

liable to include error. But consciousness is not responsible for the errors that arise in either of these ways.

Whether or not the mental states and acts, which are revealed in consciousness arise from, or represent, extra-mental or more strictly, extra-conscious objects, the mental conditions whatever may be their origin, are apprehended in consciousness *as they are*. What power has consciousness of making or modifying its contents or objects? Of what may we be conscious? Solely of certain of our mental states or acts, and of these alone. And it matters not whether the states of mind of which we are conscious are produced by external or internal causes, all we are conscious of is the resultant act or state of mind, only this and nothing more. Then where is the propriety of applying the term "self" to consciousness, implying thereby that we may be *conscious* of the non-ego? We know well what the position has been and yet is, of the Natural Realists, chief among whom, in later days, was Sir W. Hamilton, who held that we are conscious not only of the ego, but even of a *material* non-ego. We do not certainly know what are Dr. Maudsley's opinions on this subject, but we do know he uses this term of the Natural Realists, and that when it is used advisedly, it involves one of the most serious errors which can be entertained on this subject. There is no consciousness beside *self*-consciousness.

There would seem to be in the minds of many a serious difficulty as to the relation of consciousness to the other faculties of the mind. It is often spoken of as if it were *one* of the faculties of knowledge. It is *the* faculty of knowledge, or *cognitive* faculty. Beside it there is none other. It is not only the general faculty of *knowledge*, but also of *feeling*. In it we have *combined*, knowing and feeling. In its action we have presented the paradox of the thing knowing as being the thing known or conversely the thing known as being the thing knowing. In the play of consciousness the mind knows itself as knowing, and feels itself as feeling. Here, if anywhere knowing and feeling blend in one concrete act. There is no such thing as knowing or feeling out of consciousness. Every mental state or act, however simple, or however complex, in which we truly feel or know, consciousness is *necessarily* present. There may be many mental operations apparently or really conducted outside of consciousness, either forgotten in a common amnesia, or never made known except in some of their remoter results in consciousness, but we could never know this as a fact, or anything as to the nature of such operations, unless they are somehow represented in consciousness. But we cannot prolong this part of the discussion any farther, important as we believe it to be. We will only take the space to say, by way of recapitulation, that if the statements made are correct, that consciousness is the sole general faculty of knowledge and of feeling, that it does not make its own objects,

it is not the *creative* faculty of mind, and only cognizes or feels *mental conditions*, however well they may represent, or however much they may misrepresent their extra-conscious objects, whether these objects are of the ego or non-ego. It may be obliterated for a time, but if so, most if not all the other mental faculties go with it, but do not always return with it. We know well there have been cases which would seem to lead to a conclusion different from the one last stated, but we also know they will not bear the tests of a rigid scrutiny.

Then bearing in mind the few hints given above as to the nature and relations of consciousness, let us proceed to examine some of Dr. Maudsley's objections to consciousness as a faculty of knowledge, and find out if we can what he would supplant it with or trust in its stead. Dr. Maudsley almost seems to have felt himself charged with the mission of giving the *coup de grâce* to "metaphysics" and the "introspective psychology." But this cannot be done in the way Dr. Maudsley has attempted it, save by a disparagement of consciousness, which he seems to regard as the enchanted ground in which a certain class of ill balanced thinkers inevitably are fated to lose themselves. Consciousness is to the "philosophers" and "metaphysicians," what the Bible is to the religious sects. From both, the most bitterly opposed and widely different parties draw their choicest materials. The only hope for a permanent peace lies in getting both out of the way, and in trusting instead in the respective cases to the "light of nature" and the "objective method." But what are Dr. Maudsley's objections to depending on consciousness, or its "revelations?"

They are to begin with;

1. That "consciousness, which does not even tell us that we have a brain, is certainly incompetent to give any account of the essential material conditions which underlie every mental manifestation, and determine the character of it." "The most ingenious introspectionist could never discover from the revelations of self-consciousness that the cause of a particular mood of mind lay in the liver or in the heart, or in some other part of the body; nor could he gain from them the least inkling how essentially the operations of these organs affect the characters of the individual, the actual constitution of his ego, etc., etc."

This really old objection to consciousness and its "testimony," has always appeared to us one of the most singular that could be made. If any considerable body of thinkers had ever pretended that consciousness can directly inform us of the brain and its structure, as it can make known to us states and acts of mind, there would have been some place for such an objection. But who among even the most misguided of the "introspective" psychologists ever made a claim so absurd?

Who that views consciousness aright can have imagined it as directly knowing brain or brain structure? By the very terms

of its case, as it has always seemed to us, such things are absolutely beyond a direct manifestation in consciousness. And yet, Dr. Maudsley gravely sets himself down to discuss this question, as if it was a recognized article in the creed of the "introspective" psychologists! We know as well as we can know, that "psychologists" have hitherto (and they have not been alone in this matter) neglected a study of the nervous system, in health and disease, in man and the lower animals, and that they have failed in a healthy, practical progress, and hence, have in various degrees in different cases missed the full-orbed method of a study of mind. But what great writer ever laid himself open to these strictures of Dr. Maudsley?

But let us reverse the process, and suppose *if we can* (for the sake of a parallel but contrary case), an individual *without a mental experience*, in short without consciousness to investigate a liver, or heart, or even a *brain*, down to the finest structure of the cortex cerebri, and what would he know of mind, of consciousness, for example? Or suppose we permit Dr. Maudsley to examine the structure of the brain, what information would it give him of the really vast mass of mental acts and states which *are made known in consciousness*? Says he: "No observation of the brain, no investigation of its chemical activities, gives us the least information respecting the states of feeling that are connected with them; as has been aptly remarked, it is certain that the anatomist and physiologist might pass centuries in studying the brain and nerves, without ever suspecting what a pleasure or a pain is, *if they have not felt both*. Even vivisections teach us nothing *except by the interpretation which we give them through observation of our own mental processes*," (P. 62.)

The truth of the case could not be better stated. A study of the nervous organism, however exhaustive, would be utterly barren of results as regards the facts, not to mention the nature of mental operations, unless the observer should supply from his inward *conscious* experience the keys to the interpretation. But the fact that this *is* done, is almost uniformly ignored or forgotten by those who profess to study mind by the "objective" method. Not a single fact which is brought to light in this way but derives its final significance from what has been quietly infused into it from the resources of our experiences in consciousness.

But is it certain that consciousness cannot inform us as regards brain structure or other facts of the physical organism? It is certain that it cannot cognize these things *directly*. They cannot be manifested in consciousness, as are certain of our mental states and acts. But it is just as certain that they can never be known unless *represented* in consciousness somehow. If the observer should study the brain which is probably the instrument of our higher mental operations, shall it not be by looking at it with the eye, or handling it with the hand? We may re-

fine and enlarge our vision by the use of the microscope, or by the use of re-agents may render the delicate structure of the brain more apparent than it is naturally. But in any case we must use our senses. If we do, it seems needless to say, that those sense impressions which reach consciousness are those alone which we can *know*.

It follows, then, that even in our "objective" studies, we must depend on consciousness, and it alone. Its states may not truly represent things as they are in the outer world, or may not reveal all that belongs to our mental lives, but this is not the fault of consciousness. If it does not show our inward experiences as they are, and is hence not to be trusted, how shall we trust it as regards our sense experiences of outward things? If we do not trust it, to what faculty shall we go, and to what faculty would Dr. Maudsley send us? Would the reader believe it, but Dr. Maudsley does not, in fact, point out any faculty by which he would supplant it. But if these remarks are true, is it not clear that Dr. Maudsley's statement is in a certain sense really incorrect, when he declares consciousness can teach us nothing as to structure of the brain?

2. It is objected again that "to direct consciousness inwardly to the observation of a particular state of mind is to isolate that activity for the time, to cut it off from its relations, and, therefore, to render it unnatural. In order to observe its own action, it is necessary that the mind pause from activity, and yet it is the train of activity that is to be observed. So long as you cannot effect the pause necessary for self-contemplation, there cannot be a sufficient observation of the current of activity. If the pause is effected, then there can be nothing to observe, there would then be no consciousness, for consciousness is awakened by the transition from one physical or mental state to another. This cannot be accounted a vain and theoretical objection, for the results of introspection too surely confirm its validity." (P. 17.)

This objection to consciousness as the faculty of knowledge, is based throughout on a singular misapprehension as to its nature. It is here confounded with the voluntary activity of the mind.

Is it true, that "in order to observe its own action, it is necessary that the mind pause from activity?" Most certainly not. The only things manifested in consciousness, are acts and states of mind. No movement or affection of the mind it is probable can occur within the domain of consciousness, but it is known; for the capacity to feel and know certain of its own changes, however they may be produced, is ingrained, to use a physical illustration of mind, in the very tissue of mind. Consciousness is not a faculty which must or can place itself *vis a vis* with some form of mental activity, in order to look upon it *abextra*. All mental activities of which we are or may be conscious, occur in its very midst, permeated by it. It is not true that

"consciousness is awakened *by the transition* from one physical or mental state to another." It is awakened *by the states themselves*, and not the "transitions" from one to another. It is not awakened by "physical" as contrasted with "mental" states. It may be and is aroused by mental states produced by physical causes, but not by the physical conditions *themselves*.

So far, therefore, from its being true, that in order for consciousness to give its attention to any form of mental activity, that the activity must cease, the very reverse is true. When activity ceases within the sphere of consciousness, the consciousness ceases, and *vice versa*. The objection is a "vain and fanciful one," and misreads because it misconceives the whole case.

Then it is said that "there is no agreement among those who have acquired the power of introspection," or, in other words, the habit of looking within consciousness. This is only partly true. There is but little difference among psychologists as to what are the *facts* of mental experience, though there have been and there are, wide differences as to modes of dealing with them. But this objection lies with more or less force against all sciences depending on sense observation, as well as against the "introspective psychology."

Over and over again it is asserted that consciousness is a wholly unreliable witness, as to what passes within its domain. But we do not hesitate to assert just the contrary. The fault does not lie with consciousness, but rather in the distorted and fragmentary way in which things are often *represented*, or even misrepresented in consciousness, through defects, or disease of the sense mechanisms, and of the organic seats of mental activity, or in defective processes of reasoning on data given in consciousness. And so on for many other objections to consciousness, or a reliance on it. They are all of them based apparently on erroneous notions of its nature and office.

Dr. Maudsley does not appear to notice sufficiently that in impeaching consciousness in one aspect of the case, he discredits it for all. He does not appear to recognize that there is no faculty of knowledge besides consciousness, whether for things external or internal*.

It seems to us that Dr. Maudsley, in his zeal in behalf of the "objective" study of mind, has unintentionally overstated his case, and in so doing has shown more of the spirit of the partisan than of the judge. Dr. Maudsley is certainly right in directing attention with solemn emphasis to a study of the *material mechanism* of mind, which has been comparatively neglected, but seems to us to have thoroughly lost his balance in his formal utterances in respect to the "method of the study of mind." He, and all those (and they are many) who occupy a similar position, commit just as great an error in abandoning

*See *Metaphysics* of Sir W. Hamilton, p. 397 Et. Seq.

contemptuously the abused "introspective" method, as the older psychologists did in neglecting a study of the nervous system. In short, we feel profoundly convinced that in this case, as in so many others, the truth is not wholly with either party, but lies between them.

To be studied aright, mind must be studied from both sides. Each party must accord to the other equal honesty of aim, and equal intelligence, each permitting the other to make its own definitions, pursue its own methods, and name its own standards of utility. Introspective psychologists must not taunt the anatomist and physiologist, because he fails, as fail he must, to lay bare a thought at the point of the dissecting knife, or to bring into view the fine interior qualitative characteristics of an emotion. Nor, on the other hand, must the anatomist and physiologist pronounce as illusory the objects of the psychologist, because they cannot be brought to the (to such objects) impossible tests to which we can bring those objects which have mensurable, and therefore *quantitative*, as well as *qualitative*, relations. But we cannot pursue this important and tempting theme farther. We will doubtless find abundant opportunity for returning to it, whenever it can be profitably discussed.

But what is mind, according to Dr. Maudsley? He says: "Mind, used in the sense of substance or essence, and brain, used in the sense of organ of mental function, are, at bottom, two names for the same substance." Again, "What is it which, in a physiological sense, we call mind? Not the material products of cerebral activity which pass as excretions into the blood, but the marvelous energy which cannot be grasped or handled." "So likewise with regard to the manifold phenomena of mind: by observation of them and abstraction from the particular we get the general conception, or the *essential idea* of mind, an idea which has *no more existence out of the mind* than any other abstract idea, or general term." Or again, "Instead of mind being a wondrous spiritual entity, the independent source of power, and self-sufficient cause of causes, an honest observation proves incontestably that it is the most dependent of all the natural forces. It is the highest development of force, and to its existence all the lower natural forces are indisputably pre-requisite."

Mind is "nothing more than a *general term*, denoting the sense of those functions of brain which are accompanied by consciousness, and which are commonly described as thought, feeling and will. To deal with mind as a force in nature apart from the consideration of the matter through the changes of which it is manifested, is truly no less vain and absurd than it would confessedly be to attempt to handle electricity and gravitation as forces apart from the changes in matter by which alone we know them."

"The theory of mind as a spiritual entity, which, having an existence independent of body, uses this as its instrument, owes its origin, as other metaphysical entities have owed their origin to this tendency to convert abstractions into entities."

But these quotations will perhaps serve to show what are Dr. Maudsley's opinions as to the nature of mind. They seem to show clearly that he regards it as simply a mere function of brain, and that it perishes, probably, with the dissolution of the brain. There is no such "spiritual entity" as has been called "mind" by some, for this latter is simply a "metaphysical entity," an "abstraction." We cannot enter into a discussion of this subject, farther than to say that we differ deeply from Dr. Maudsley on this subject, even on scientific grounds. The hypothesis of the existence of mind as at least an *intelligent permanent force*, is, in our judgment, a reasonable one, and we feel prepared to maintain it. But we must reserve until a future occasion a discussion of this much agitated question.

Dr. Maudsley regards the doctrine of the "freedom of the will" as simply "nonsense." Here, again, we can only record our square dissent, and if Dr. Maudsley has reasons for rejecting the doctrine in question, we also have what seem good reasons for maintaining it. But it is impossible to discuss such a question within the limits of an ordinary book review.

Matter is declared to be active, possibly *self* active. For he says: "it were wise to ponder well the remarkable operations of which matter is capable, and to reflect upon the wonderful *works which it is continually doing before our eyes*." Does matter in the final analysis of the case, act on its own account, or is it simply acted on? We have no hesitation as to which opinion to adopt—it is the latter. We believe that no more fundamental error could be made, in this case, than to declare matter as *active*—self-active. But this is what Dr. Maudsley does, or seems to do, in common with so many others.

As a sample of psychological exposition, we would refer to Dr. Maudsley's explanation of the origin of a "moral sense."

Says he: "Whence is derived the beginning or first shoot of a moral sense? The answer which may be thought not so fit, which nevertheless I propose to make, is that the root of the moral sense must be sought in the instinct of self-propagation. By the gratification of this instinct, *notwithstanding that it is an act of pure self-indulgence*, the individual does not appropriate matter to himself and increase, but dissipates energy, *giving off from himself something*, which goes to propagate the species, the aim of the instinct being not to benefit the individual—for though its indulgence gratifies him, *he is the less*, by his gratification—but to inveigle him through self-gratification to continue the kind, it is not appropriative, but distributive; not *egoistic*, so to speak, but *altruistic*." (P. 398.)

But how about the female, in such a case, who does not give, but receives, in the most thoroughly egoistic manner? This is what may be called the "seminal" theory of morals, and is surely as material an explanation of a mental fact as could be desired. But we forbear the comment which it so strongly invites.

Dr. Maudsley is evidently not only a thorough-going evolu-

tionist, but a disciple in the school of Comte. He is apparently more thoroughly imbued with the spirit of the "Philosophie Positive" of that author, than with that of the "Novum Organum" of Bacon.

But notwithstanding the formal, and we will even say "doctrinal" errors which pervade the book, it is one of great value, is especially suggestive in its full and graphic accounts of the nervous mechanism in its real or supposed relations to mental action. We can do no less than join the general commendation which it has received, and which on many accounts it merits.

Notwithstanding the wide differences between our own mode of viewing many of the subjects treated and those of our author (and we have by no means exhausted them in this notice), we cannot close without expressing our high sense of the service done by Dr. Maudsley in the province of physiological psychology and mental medicine.

II.—TRANSACTIONS OF THE AMERICAN NEUROLOGICAL ASSOCIATION.

TRANSACTIONS OF THE AMERICAN NEUROLOGICAL ASSOCIATION FOR 1877. Edited by E. C. Seguin, M. D. Vol. II. New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons.

This unpretentious volume of some 200 pages, consists of a resume of the discussions, besides twelve papers presented at the meeting of 1877, and ten of the previous year. The highest praise we can bestow on it is to acknowledge that each article can bear a rigid criticism, which, unfortunately, can be said of but few American society proceedings. But while admiring the originality of the entire work, we ought not to overlook, also, that the different papers are all characterized by an absence of that supreme disdain of foreign literature so prevalent in American writings.

The first paper, by Dr. N. B. Emerson, calls attention to sciatica of syphilitic origin, an affection but little recognized. It is a good instance of a purely clinical study unsupported by post-mortem confirmation. Nevertheless, it seems to us that such papers would gain by greater conciseness of style.

In an article on the "odor of the human body in certain nervous affections," Dr. Hammond relates several cases in which some parts of the skin exhaled an odor of violets or pineapple. An analysis of the sweat rendered it probable that the odor was due to traces of butyric ether. In one case the desired suppression