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I.—M. RIBOT'S THEORY OF THE PASSIONS.¹

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I.—M. RIBOT'S DISTINCTION BETWEEN PASSIONS AND EMOTIONS.

Now that the conception of System has become so prominent in men's minds and has been applied fruitfully in many different fields of research, it is time that some psychologist should study the Passions,—the most important and comprehensive systems of the human mind itself. The ordinary psychology of the text-books, which is chiefly analytical in method, cannot do justice to these systems. They are dispersed, where they are not lost sight of, in special studies of sensations, perceptions, and other intellectual processes, as well as in the separate treatment of the feelings and will. A new synthetical psychology is needed to deal with them. For they comprehend the fundamental elements and processes of the mind. They are its epitomes: the most important of the many selves which each of us contains.

In a subject on which it is so easy to write vaguely and repeat platitudes, and so difficult to advance on the general knowledge of literary men and the great observers of character, and to test and systematise their knowledge and raise it to the standard of science, it is fortunate that the work should have been undertaken by so eminent a psychologist as Prof. Ribot. M. Ribot would not indeed suppose that he had created a new science, though there is here a new science to be created. His object seems to have been to

¹ *Essai sur les Passions.* Par Th. Ribot, Paris, 1907 (Felix Alcan).

survey the ground rapidly, to bring together all the chief passions, to distinguish them from the emotions, to give an account of them, not indeed adequate, but true as far as it goes, and to trace them to their roots in our innate disposition or temperament. He has done a service to science in giving to the world his essay on 'The Passions,' as a solitary pendant to the many works it already possesses on the emotions. He has facilitated the work of those who come after him, and has initiated an enterprise that is sure to be continued.

M. Ribot limits his inquiry to three leading questions : "How the passions arise ; how they are constituted ; how they come to an end" (p. 8). The term 'passion' had almost fallen into disuse, supplanted by the term 'emotion,' for which, M. Ribot thinks, we in this country are chiefly answerable (p. 3). Yet the new term has not been used with any greater precision than the old one. It fluctuates from one writer to another, and no one knows what it does or does not include. It may be defined as that which moves us to action, or as a feeling with an abrupt commencement, a culmination and gradual decline ; or as any intense feeling, however initiated, that has an object and is not merely a bodily pain or pleasure ; or we may use it to denote fear, anger, joy, sorrow, surprise, disgust and many other secondary and derived emotions, whatever their degree of intensity or duration, so long as they possess the same quality of feeling and the same characteristic tendencies, that is so long as they can still be identified as fear or anger or joy or sorrow, etc. This is perhaps the use of the term to be preferred, because it makes the quality and tendency of the feeling the predominant consideration, and leaves its vague and varying intensity to be indicated by some phrase or adjective ; for a term which expresses only an indefinable intensity and instability of feeling is not fitted for use in science. Thus in this sense we can have either intense or faint emotions, and either momentary or prolonged ones. There are angers that brood in the mind for days or weeks, and faint but oppressive sorrows that cannot be cast off. But this sense of the term is very different from that of M. Ribot. "Emotion," he says, "is defined in two principal characteristics: intensity, brevity" (p. 6). It commences by "a shock, a rupture of equilibrium" (p. 6). This view seems to rest on a confusion between the emotions that are generated with surprise,—which both gives them an abruptness of feeling and, as Adam Smith observed,¹ heightens

¹ *Hist. of Astronomy*, ch. i.

their intensity,—and others that have a diverse origin,—as those that are accumulated by slow degrees and drop by drop, until the anger or the sorrow cannot any longer be repressed, and those which are borne gently and familiarly on the stream of our thought,—the old regrets and hopes and disappointments that assail us as we project ourselves into the past or future.

In attempting to restore the other term, 'Passion,' to its use in science, M. Ribot rightly gives to it a more restricted signification than that in which it was understood by Descartes, Locke, and Hume. It will no longer denote the emotions of Fear, Anger, Joy, Sorrow and Surprise, as in the lists of these writers, but it will be confined to the more complex and stable feelings, as Gluttony, Drunkenness, Sensuality, Ambition, Avarice, Love of gambling, adventure and sports, political passion, Patriotism and Religion. We must approve of this attempt to find some term to express these chief systems of character and to distinguish them from individual emotions, and the term 'passion' is probably the best, if not the only term in the French language that could be used for this purpose; whether it is the best term in ours is open to question. In attempting several years ago to interpret these same systems I adopted the term 'sentiment' as on the whole the most suitable term in English to express them.¹ The French term 'sentiment' does not correspond to this, has a wider signification, and is nearest in meaning to our term 'feeling'. But passion in English means a violent and uncontrolled feeling. Thus we speak of 'a passion of grief' or of rage. On the other hand, when we speak of a 'master-passion' we are not thinking so much of a violent emotion as of a principle of character of predominant strength and persistence, such as the passion of gambling or of ambition may become. Thus in either case 'passion' means something having predominant strength, though in the one case this may last for only a few minutes and in the other for the greater part of a life-time. Now it is just this conception of predominant strength without relative stability that we do not want to suggest as the essential character of this class of facts. On the contrary we want a term that shall suggest relative stability in all cases without the conception of predominant strength. For the characters in which two or more passions compete with and restrict one another, as party-passion and patriotism, or religion and

¹ "Character and the Emotions," *MIND*, N.S., vol. v., p. 217 *et seq.* See also *Manual of Psychology*, G. F. Stout, bk. iv., ch. ix., § 5.

sensuality, or sexual love and ambition, are much more numerous than the characters in which one passion has freed itself from all control and obtained the mastery. And on the other hand sensuality, avarice, ambition and religion show a relative stability in comparison with most emotions. Thus the term 'passion' is unsuitable because it does not suggest relative stability and does suggest predominant strength. In contrast to it, the term 'sentiment,' in one of its senses in English, does suggest something relatively stable in comparison with emotion without implying either violence or predominant strength. Thus we speak of the 'moral sentiments,' the æsthetic sentiment, the family sentiment.

This term has also another superiority to the term 'passion': it implies a higher intellectual development. Now there is no more striking difference between emotions and sentiments than the poverty or irrationality of thought of the one and the comparative richness and rationality of thought of the other. In joy we are apt to repeat the same foolish exclamations, 'How delightful,' 'How beautiful'; in sorrow the same laments; while violent anger to its sterility of thought joins such a degree of irrationality that it has been called a short-lived madness. But in pride and avarice the higher processes of thought are involved, as essential to their organisation, and in some, as the love of knowledge or art, the highest; while even the love of the pleasures of the table has a superior intellectual development to the corresponding appetite. Thus the term 'sentiment' is better adapted than the term 'passion' to denote those most complex and relatively stable systems of our character that lack a distinctive name. That it also, like the term 'passion' denotes emotions,—though of a more delicate and lofty nature than those which the latter term suggests,—is a disadvantage that we cannot avoid whichever term we employ, because the distinction itself between these two orders of feeling has never been clearly grasped by the common mind. The particular defect of the term 'sentiment' is that it is a weak term, ill-fitted to express the strong loves that grow with our lives and end sometimes by absorbing them. Yet here too we are not without resources, and the term 'Master-sentiment,' though a neologism, is as strong and expressive as the term 'Master-passion,' yet free from that suggestion of violence which, except in certain characters, is as foreign to the ordinary behaviour of these systems as it is destructive of their stability.

These violent delights have violent ends,
 And in their triumph, die ; like fire and powder,
 Which, as they kiss, consume : . . .
 Therefore love moderately ; long love doth so . . .

Passing from this verbal question which the common accord of writers can alone finally settle, we come to the deeper problem underlying it : How are we to interpret the difference that we feel between emotion and passion or sentiment ? "The more difficult it is," says our author, "to establish clear divisions in the fleeting world . . . of the feelings the more desirable is it to put at least in clear relief certain manifestations of them which seem to possess proper and specific characters of their own . . ." (p. 7). What then are the proper and specific characters of the passions ? Starting from a difference of degree that seems to be familiar to us,—from the greater complexity and duration of the passions in comparison with the emotions, we have to ask : What "belongs to passion and to nothing else" ? (p. 20). These characters seem to M. Ribot "reducible to three, which are, in the order of their importance, the fixed idea, duration, intensity" ("l'idée fixe, la durée, l'intensité," p. 20). We are accustomed to regard the fixed idea as pathological, but our normal ideas, M. Ribot remarks, may be also fixed, and the difference between them he thinks is vague. Scientific and artistic ideas sometimes impose themselves upon us and we become their prey, unable to guide or control them (p. 21).

We had thought that M. Ribot intended to disclose the characters that belong only to the passions, which distinguish them from the emotions, but the first and in his opinion the most important of these characters, the fixed idea, is, in his wide sense of the term, common to passion and emotion. Not only morbid emotions, but ordinary fear, sorrow and anger, while they last, are dominated by their own ideas. And if the ideas of passion last longer, and can therefore with greater propriety be described as fixed ideas, still the difference is one of degree and not the difference of kind that we had been led to expect. We turn next to the second and third characters, and we are offered in all their baldness characters common to all mental states, duration, intensity ("la durée, l'intensité," p. 20).

Failing to obtain the specific characters we had expected, we are brought back to the differences of degree from which we started as the only means of distinguishing between passion and emotion. The passion is just a more complex and stable feeling than the emotion. Its superior

complexity is chiefly shown in its intellectual development, and the different processes involved in that have been carefully analysed by M. Ribot. These are ordinary and 'systematic association,' 'constructive imagination,' 'affective memory,' 'logical operations,' 'constructive reasoning,' and last—the most important of all—judgments of the value of the object, and reasonings in justification of this value (pp. 27 to 42).

These processes, which seem to enable us to distinguish clearly between passion and emotion, all work under the guidance of the 'fixed idea'; and this fixed idea is not merely intellectual: it has its affective side (p. 27). Hence we find M. Ribot repeating in the present essay the conception of passion which he expressed in his earlier work on *The Feelings*. Passion is "a fixed emotion" (p. 27) or a "prolonged and intellectualised emotion" (p. 7). He offers this definition with certain reserves, and these seem to be that, in his opinion, there is at the root of every passion a tendency, which maintains the fixed idea with its feeling, and through it controls the complex intellectual development of the passion (p. 27). But these reserves do not qualify the statement that passion is a fixed emotion, because the emotions also have such tendencies. There are instincts at the roots of fear and anger that account for the characteristic behaviour of each, and may be held to determine the nature of their feelings and ideas. As M. Ribot rightly regards emotion not as an abstraction of feeling, but as a concrete fact constituted of "movements and inhibitions of movements" (p. 6; see also *La Psychologie des Sentiments*, première partie, ch. vii.), his reserve serves only to emphasise an aspect common to both emotion and passion.

We return therefore to the conception of passion as a fixed and intellectualised emotion. What emotion then is it? This important question M. Ribot does not ask.

If we take an example we may perhaps be able to answer this question. What is the fixed emotion of avarice? Is it the joy of the avaricious man in the possession of his wealth, present in the thought of it, expressed in his handling of it, and gloating over the sight of it? This, at least, seems to be the centre of his passion in favourable circumstances, to which his activities converge. But suppose that he loses his wealth or a part of it; or even that he fears to lose it. What becomes of his joy? It is replaced by sorrow or fear. But if his passion is identical with joy, then it ceases to exist when his joy ceases.

Now we know as a fact that a passion does not cease to exist because the joy felt in the possession of its object is

replaced by sorrow at its loss or fear at its apprehended loss. On the contrary the sorrow and the fear are both evidence of its continued existence. If the avaricious man did not feel them in the appropriate circumstances he would not love his wealth. What then is the love of his wealth? what is its fixed emotion? we cannot answer this question.

Now it is true that when an emotion or feeling is 'intellectualised' it tends to become more stable. The more intense our joys, the more unstable and the less intellectual they are apt to be, whereas there are calm and thoughtful joys that have a prolonged duration. Inconsolable sorrows are not violent, or if violent at the commencement, in becoming chronic they are so no longer. They live then in recollection of the dead or lost object, and if at times the vivid image of past scenes revives the first anguish, yet on the whole all prolonged emotions are calm and lacking in intensity. Yet this stability of feeling does not serve to transform them into passions. For if a man were uniformly prosperous, and were to maintain the possession of what he loved most undisturbed, and with rare constancy to preserve the joy or pleasure in its possession, still his passion would not be identical with this most stable joy or pleasure. It would never be true that were misfortunes to come, though they did not come, and his joy or pleasure to be transformed into its contrary, that his passion would cease to exist, or be transformed into its contrary, as love into hate; or that were he to welcome the change and feel the joy or pleasure in the relief from his riches which he felt before in their possession, that he would still love them. Thus a passion is neither identical with an unstable emotion nor with the most stable and intellectualised feeling into which we can conceive it subsiding after the loss of its first intensity.

In a curious section of his work, and as if forgetful of having called passion a fixed emotion, M. Ribot raises the question, "Can the emotions become passions?" (p. 134). Certain of them "with time may be transformed into a state analogous to passion," others cannot. But his thought remains indefinite, and he concludes with his favourite doctrine that "only tendencies engender it" (p. 134). Yet he offers one example of this vital transformation:—the emotion of joy may become the passion for pleasure. There are those who make pleasure the end of their lives. But he does not admit us into the secret of the psychological development. He points out only some of the obvious external conditions,—health, idleness, riches, and perhaps companions (p. 132). Nor does it occur to him that joy may

be the source of many different passions, and that it would be interesting to inquire why under its influence some pursue and others avoid pleasures.

He is more embarrassed to find any plausible reason why certain fixed emotions which he at length recognises, are not and cannot be transformed into passions. He considers three, anger, fear and grief. There are men so irascible that to be angry with some one or something becomes a need, constant as a passion. Here then is a fixed need,—and M. Ribot regards such (*"besoins, instincts, tendances,"* p. 127) as the source of all or most of the passions,—a fixed, or at least a frequently recurring emotion, and an unlimited field of men and things on which to exercise it. Why then is it not a passion? Is it that the need is not always felt, and that the emotion is not constant but frequently recurrent? But what greater constancy have any of our passions? Are their needs always felt? Are they not broken by hunger and thirst and sleep and bodily exercises, even when they have absorbed the most of a man? Are their feelings or emotions any more unbroken? Will they not be liable to constant changes and interruptions, like the emotional life of man himself? All these questions we cannot but answer in the affirmative, and they make the distinction between these two orders of feelings the more embarrassing. What explanation has our author to give? That hate is the passion, and anger the emotion, and that experience convinces us that "the irascible are rarely haters" (p. 130)! And he criticises Bain, who it is true made the mistake of regarding hate as a species of the emotion, anger, because he said that it sufficed to have an irascible temper, and to suffer frequent provocations and offences, for hate to develop as a permanent affection, a blunder he thinks which such a psychologist would hardly have been capable of had he not "misunderstood the difference of nature between emotion and passion" (p. 130)!

The other emotions are as embarrassing; nor will it help us if we refuse to call them emotions because of their relative stability. There is fixed fear and "inconsolable grief". With regard to the latter, M. Ribot resolutely faces the facts. "Are there not here," he asks, "all the characters assigned to the passions: a fixed and importunate idea, duration, intensity?" (*"idée fixe et obsédante, durée, intensité,"* p. 131). "Yet, common opinion will refuse to identify endless sorrow with passion." But his theory affords him no ground for distinguishing them. The best explanation he can find is that the fixed idea of passion is "a part of

oneself," whereas in prolonged sorrow it is "something foreign" ("un corps étranger") from which we cannot escape (p. 132). Now it is true that when we struggle with our grief, the fixed idea connected with it is dissociated from ourself. But the same result overtakes many of our passions. The drunkard, the gambler and the sensualist sometimes struggle with their vices and endeavour to escape from the fixed ideas connected with them. Nor is it true that in grief we always oppose ourselves to its idea. Far from it. No idea are we more apt to hold to as to something sacred. We reject all comfort. To forget seems to us unworthy of ourselves. There is the ideal of unswerving constancy. And how complex is the intellectual development, how unlike what it is in our ordinary emotions,—the living in the past and future,—as in all passions,—the recollection of past joys and happiness, "sorrow's crown of sorrow"; and in the future, the one hope of reunion in death.

We must then judge that M. Ribot's theory fails to interpret the facts admitted by himself, first the difference between the passions and ordinary emotions as something more than a quantitative difference; secondly the difference between the passions and fixed emotions of sorrow, fear, or anger,—where the quantitative differences of stability and complexity may be eliminated; and lastly by conceiving passion as an intellectualised and prolonged emotion, which he at least sometimes does, he is logically bound to conclude, that when this emotion changes, as it should do, in response to changes in the environment,—as joy into sorrow or fear, or desire into satisfaction,—that then the passion itself has come to an end. The source of the failure of the theory to explain such fundamental facts is to be traced, not merely to the vagueness and uncertainty of its principal conceptions, but chiefly, as it seems to me, to this, that M. Ribot has altogether misunderstood the relation in which emotions stand to passions or sentiments. Having conceived of emotion quantitatively and not qualitatively, as distinguished by intensity and brevity, he naturally formed a quantitative conception of passion, as distinguished by the stability and complexity of its feeling. He thus cut the one off from the other. The two states "are not only different but *contrary*" (p. 7). Even when a passion appears to be born suddenly, as sexual love, it "must pass through an embryonic period more or less short during which it will free itself from the characters of emotion in order to assume those which are proper to itself" (p. 140). It must then have been a surprise to him to find that, sometimes at least,

there are still emotions in passions. In one place, he admits that "every passion that has a long duration is crossed by some interruptions of emotion" (p. 7). In what way then does he regard this irruption of emotions into this opposite state of passion? He regards it as a relapse of passion into emotion, or as evidence that there is no true passion (p. 7). Thus children and savages, he thinks, are, on the whole, incapable of passion (p. 26). They live in a world of emotions. And in considering the love of Alfred de Musset for George Sand who both loved and hated one another, and alternated between sudden "gushes of tenderness" and "cries of rage," he remarks that this is not "passion, which is a chronic state, but its counterfeit made up of a succession of acute states or crises; it is a return to the state of emotional disposition" (p. 69). That there is a certain truth in this may be admitted. The more violent our emotions, the more they endanger the stability of passion. For passion is an organised system which involves the control of emotions; and when these break from its control, they are no longer parts of its system, but act on their own account. But suppose that they are not so intense, or that nature in giving a man a disposition to strong emotions gives him also a strong will to control them. What then? We do not know. But in M. Ribot's sense of the term, an emotion that has not reached a certain degree of intensity—a degree quite indefinite—is no longer an emotion. It falls into a third class, which is neither emotion nor passion, comprising all the feelings of our daily life that have only a "moderate intensity" (p. 73; see also p. 5).

Thus the principle underlying M. Ribot's classification is a division of the feelings based on quantitative differences of intensity, stability and complexity. The first class comprises the feelings of moderate intensity, the second those of considerable intensity and instability or the emotions, the third, those which are stable and complex or the passions. And this principle apart from its defect, that, where these differences are either not susceptible of or not subjected to exact measurement, it can only issue in vague statements of little or no scientific value, has here a more serious consequence. Through his application of it M. Ribot has isolated the emotions from the passions and failed to understand their intimate, reciprocal relation.

II.—THE NATURE AND GENEALOGY OF THE PASSIONS.

In one respect M. Ribot's theory of the passions is typical. It represents a new attempt to interpret on the lines which

have generally been followed since Kant the difference between the emotions and passions. Hence in criticising the inadequacy of his theory we criticise also the inadequacy of the older conception which remains, in spite of the fresh way in which M. Ribot deals with it, substantially the same. This older conception is expressed in the simile of Kant that emotion is like a flood that bursts its dam, and passion like a river that wears for itself a deeper bed. The one is a sudden force soon expended; the other grows stronger with the habits of thought and action which it slowly forms. The picturesqueness of the conception and the amount of truth which it contains explains its wide acceptance. There is such a difference as it represents between the feelings; only this difference does not coincide in all cases with that between the emotions and passions. For there are emotions, as we have seen, that have the stability of passions, and like them are strengthened by habit and reflexion, as morbid fears, inconsolable sorrows, and we may add, subtle emotions of respect or contempt that, once felt for an individual, are frequently borne to him for the remainder of his life. And as there are stable emotions, so there are unstable passions as, in so many instances, sexual love. If we then apply the theory consistently we must include in the class of the passions the fixed emotions, and in the class of the emotions the unstable passions. But if we do this we shall be uniting things that we ought most to separate, and separating others that we ought most to unite. And it will be due to the persuasiveness of this conception which has caught just those differences which are most readily observed.

If we pass from these two classes to the third class which M. Ribot has formed, comprising the feelings of "moderate intensity," which are the most frequent in our daily life, this addition to the older theory, possessing the same kind of obvious and indefinite truth, so far from lessening the difficulties in its path, aggravates them. For it is certain that there are passions which through the greater part of their life-history often do not exceed such a moderate intensity of feeling, as the passion for science; while there are other feelings, which the term passion is ill-adapted to express, but which yet have all the stability, complexity and intellectual development assigned to this class, as the calm and steadfast affection for our children and friends. But to make the evil greater: into this third class fall also all our emotions when they do not reach the indefinable standard of 'brevity' and 'intensity' which M. Ribot requires of them, although the lower degrees of anger and fear are still the same emotion as the higher.

possessing the same nature and tendencies in a weaker or less conspicuous form. And thus we take away from the class of the passions and from the class of the emotions what really belong to them, only to confuse their differences in this third class of feelings of moderate intensity.

Now in opposition to this principle of classification based on the quantitative differences of the feelings, which confuses their important differences to make way for those which are obvious and indefinable, we shall advance quite a different conception, not based on vague differences of intensity, complexity and stability, but which will interpret the greater stability and complexity of the passion or sentiment which as a rule exists. The difference between emotion and passion is not, as M. Ribot thinks (pp. 7, 130), an opposition of nature, or they would exclude one another, which they do not. Nor does the quantitative difference between them, which as a rule exists, mean that feelings of one degree of intensity, duration and complexity are emotions and feelings of another degree, passions: for in this case also, however artificially our classes were constituted, still they would exclude one another; feelings on one side of an arbitrary line would be emotions and feelings on the other side, passions. The emotions would have no legitimate place or function in the passions, and if they sometimes occurred there we should have to regard them, as M. Ribot regards them, as a relapse from passion into the acute form of emotion (pp. 69, 89). But the emotions have an essential place and function in the passions, and the true distinction between them is the distinction between the same feelings regarded alternately as individuals and as forming a higher organisation. This higher organisation is the passion: passion is organised emotion. In every passion there is a system of self-control regulating more or less efficiently the intensity and behaviour of its emotions; whereas when emotions act independently there is at most the restraint which one exerts on the others; there is no system of self-restraint within the emotion. Thus we speak of the impulsiveness of men given over to the dominance of their emotions; and although fear sometimes excludes anger, and sorrow, joy, this does not imply the self-control of which they stand in need. But a man dominated by ambition or avarice is no longer impulsive: the emotion is controlled by the system.

But the complex nature of passion is not sufficiently defined as organised emotion, it is also organised desire, and here the same system of self-control works to subordinate the lesser desires to the greater. For since many of our emotions have impulses, inseparable from their nature as

fear, anger, shame, disgust, pity, gratitude, etc., and since impulses that are checked are apt to rise into conscious desires that we feel, frequently recurrent desires become part of the life of passions; and in fact it is only when they are either latent, or given over to their few moments of triumph or enjoyment, or perhaps when crushed by sorrow that they do not feel them. Thus passion is an organised system of emotions and desires; but not only or mainly of emotions in the restricted sense of M. Ribot, but more often of delicate or calm emotions which are suggested in the current of our thought. The violent emotions, except in some temperaments, chiefly occur in crises in the history of the passion. For its self-control is exercised in restraining all intensity and violence lest they deflect it from its ends. Hence emotions in their secondary and acquired state as organised in passions have not as a rule the explosive violence of their primitive forms,—and where they have they are apt to break up the organisation of the passion and become again independent forces on their own account. But it would be a mistake to suppose that the diminution of their intensity involves weakness. The anger which explodes uses up its strength at once, and is followed by regret; but when its outward manifestations are checked and its vindictive thoughts multiply and consolidate in calm reflexion, anger is deepened and strengthened: and we have only to think of the steadfast hope that inspires every passion in its first and vigorous growth to see how efficient the calm but strong emotions may be in the service of the passions.

Thus if we take a comprehensive view of any passion from its commencement to its decline we find that it consists in an organised succession of emotions and desires; but we must not infer from this that at every stage of its process its feeling is defined as emotion.

The intellectual development of the passions and the various processes of thought they bring into play have been carefully studied by M. Ribot, and we may admit unreservedly that every passion has a much higher intellectual development than any emotion if we mean by 'emotion' *independent* emotion. In fact if we think of political ambition, the love of truth or art or religion, we shall hardly find it an exaggeration to say that only in the passions are the intellectual powers of a man developed to their fullest extent. Now it is precisely when our thoughts are most defined and closely organised together that the feeling of them is apt to be most undefined and faint. Solitary thoughts rise in our minds and draw with them so often hopes, despondencies or

regrets, or feelings of anxiety or anger ; but these concatenated thoughts will not condense into any emotion that we can name or recognise. We can sometimes say on reflexion that their tone is faintly pleasant or disagreeable ; but not that the state as a whole is either joy or sorrow, hope or despondency. Since then passion requires so much thought and reflexion to organise its emotions and desires, and to accomplish and harmonise its ends, there will be recurrent phases of its history in which it is without emotion. But passionless as it then appears, it is still moved by one or other of its great, controlling desires, it is still from beginning to end an organised succession of desires and emotions.

Finally this theory of the passions interprets their greater stability in comparison with the independent emotions, which as a rule exists. For since a passion has the duration of all of its emotions and desires it must have a greater duration than that of any one of them ; and it has, moreover, the stability which self-control and organisation always manifest in comparison with unregulated impulse.

Let us now see what value this theory has in interpreting the passions which M. Ribot has collected. His list includes gluttony, drunkenness, sexual love, love of sports and adventure, the passion of gambling, avarice, ambition, hate, jealousy ; the passions for art, science, politics and religion, patriotism, the moral passion, the collector's passion for engravings, pictures, books, stamps, etc., the love of pleasure. The first two are ambiguous. They are inordinate appetites or passions according to the meaning we attach to the words. When we call a dog gluttonous we mean that his appetite is excessive. But an appetite is not a passion. It may, like emotion, be organised in the service of passion, or be left in its independence, liable to excess and deficiency. In the second sense, gluttony is the love of the pleasures of the table, something different from appetite though developed from it ; and it is this that M. Ribot understands by the term (p. 48). It is the same with drunkenness and sensuality : and from three natural appetites three passions may be developed, which seem to be varieties of the love of pleasure. But the proper meaning of the terms in English, at least of the two former, is inordinate appetite and not the passion developed from it. Here too we see that just as emotions sometimes have the stability of passions, so our natural appetites have an even greater stability, and that by this characteristic alone we cannot distinguish the passions.

Now if we compare the remaining passions on this list a remarkable fact is disclosed. All of them with the exception

of two, hate and jealousy, are like the three first that we have already considered, varieties of love, and we do not require to strain the meaning of the term to bring out their common affinity. They are the love of sports, the love of adventure, the love of gambling, avarice or the love of wealth, ambition or the love of superiority or power, the love of art, the love of science, the love of a religion, the love of a political party, patriotism or the love of country, the love of collecting and the love of pleasure. Religious passion may seem to be an exception, since fear of its object or of God is more common than the love of him; and what we call the passion may be only a stable fear, like the fear of death. But a stable fear, like an inconsolable sorrow or an indestructible appetite, is not passion in the same sense, but only in the loose and popular meaning of the word. It is always the same emotion; but a passion is sometimes one emotion, sometimes another, according to circumstances. But if the fear issues in certain other emotions, as it often does,—for deliverance from evil fills the mind with joy, and even gratitude to the deliverer,—and there arises from the fear a system of emotions where before was only a single emotion, then the fear which survives is not the passion but one only of its emotions. Religion based on fear has grown into love,—love of its rites and practices or of the being who is the object of it.

We conclude that all the passions on this list with the exception of two are varieties of love; and one of these two is hate. Thus among this variety of loves we meet with the solitary figure of their opposite, hate. For we grow into love naturally; but we are driven into hate by a kind of inversion of our natural life. From the child to the old man love multiplies and branches into new directions, reorganising the same old emotions in new objects; but hate is an ugly episode from which we are in a hurry to escape unless our nature be peculiarly evil. Hence hate is so often a barren passion, which by destruction of its object destroys itself, and branches into no new systems. It is a curious fact that of the varieties of hate most are dependencies and complements of love. Thus patriotism is often accompanied by the hatred of foreigners, and religion by the hatred of heretics, and the love of knowledge by the hatred of ignorance and falsehood, and the love of beauty by the hatred of ugliness. Yet there are a few independent forms of hate of which the most important, in addition to the hatred of individual persons and places, are class-hatred, sex-hatred and misanthropy.

We come next to the other exception, Jealousy. Now it appears to me that M. Ribot has here confused a violent and

prolonged emotion with a passion, and it is a mistake which is likely to arise from the use of the term 'passion' to designate these higher systems. For jealousy is not even a primary and independent emotion, like fear or anger. It is one of those derivative and dependent emotions which seem only to be developed within the system of love.¹ Thus we find it in sexual love, and in the love of anything that we desire to possess exclusively, as power or fame. The proud and vain are prone to it. Louis XIV., according to Saint Simon,² was one of the most jealous of men, and his jealousy was rooted in pride and vanity. He was jealous of statesmen, generals and of any one who threatened to eclipse him in one of the qualities on which he prided himself. For jealousy has a proper place and function in sexual love and pride, being obviously directed to preserve exclusive possession of their objects. It is true that it is, as M. Ribot remarks, composed of opposite elements (p. 65); and the opposition does not merely arise from the conflict between it and other parts of the system of love,—as between the disinterested and tender emotions of sexual love and the desire of exclusive possession; there is a conflict in jealousy itself. There seems to be fused in it the opposite emotions of fear and anger. The jealous man anxiously and persistently strives to separate the woman he loves from the presence of his rival, as the miser tries to hide his gold where it cannot be stolen; and here jealousy acts like fear. But the tragedies of jealousy arise from its other, aggressive element. Anger is felt against the rival and against the woman herself so far as she supports him. Thus a man's behaviour under the influence of this torturing emotion represents one or other of its elements, being timid or violent according to circumstances. If this be true, jealousy and love are not, as M. Ribot appears to hold, two opposite passions combined together (p. 65), but the one is an emotion developed within the system of the passion, through, as far as we can see, a conflict between two of its primary emotions. The relation of a violent and often prolonged emotion, like jealousy, to the passion of love is no more obscure than the relation of love to its other emotions. Like them, unless it be restrained by the system as a whole, it will be more injurious than useful. Inconsolable sorrow which M. Ribot found so hard to exclude from the class of the passions has not any more an independent origin: who ever heard of it where profound love did not precede it and survive with it?

Through the exclusion of jealousy from the list of the

¹ See "Character and the Emotions," *MIND*, N.S., vol. v., pp. 219-220.

² *Mémoires*, xiii., 1.

passions, all of them are now shown to be varieties of love or hate. Does not this remarkable fact suggest that the difference between the passions and the emotions is the difference between love and hate and the emotions? And if we include in the list of the former, friendship, love of the home and the reciprocal affection of the members of it to one another, so far as that occurs, which because of their "moderate intensity" M. Ribot would regard as neither emotions nor passions, the result is still the same: these varieties of love, though not so apt to absorb the whole man as ambition or avarice, have essentially the same organisation. If then there be other passions than love and hate, they must be comparatively obscure or infrequent.

Now we must admit that this distinction between love and hate, on the one hand, and fear, anger, joy, sorrow, jealousy, shame, and all individual emotions, on the other, is not involved in the ordinary meaning of the terms; and from Descartes' *Traité des Passions* to the present time, love and hate have been placed in the same class with these emotions. The dictionary definitions of love take no account of it as a system of desires and emotions, but, when they do not give an alternative expression, as 'regard' or 'affection,' define it by its most conspicuous emotion, as joy or delight, or 'taking pleasure in' something, or tender emotion.¹ And were we to ask, what is the relation of love to the sorrow that arises through the destruction or even prolonged absence of its object, the answer would probably be, that this sorrow is a mere effect or consequence of love. Yet if love is joy or pleasure it ceases to exist when pain has excluded pleasure, and sorrow, joy; which no one would maintain. But the dictionaries cannot give an adequate definition of love, because the conception of it as a complex system of emotions has not been grasped by the common mind.

We come next to the genealogical problem on which M. Ribot lays so much stress. Its importance we cannot deny; but it is much more difficult, in psychology, to show how some constituent of our mind and character has been developed than to analyse it after it has been developed in our mature experience. Where are we to find the facts on which the theory of this development must be based? If there were extant a systematic collection of documents bearing on the development of the passions in the child and the man, then we should have a comparatively safe basis on which to construct such a theory of the passions. When novelists and

¹ See Johnson's *Dictionary*, Art. "Love".

observers of character lend themselves to this great work of psychical research, and instead of seeking mainly to please us, form systematic studies of the growth and behaviour of the different passions, then the science of character—with an influence on human life and destiny which who can now forecast—will advance rapidly in truth, coherence and completeness. In the absence of this essential accumulation of facts we can only form hypotheses which we know not how much we may have to modify in the future. The available evidence at present must be drawn from (1) such recollection of the growth of certain passions in ourselves as we may seem to possess,—and how many of these are sufficiently definite or trustworthy?—(2) the knowledge that joy or pleasure is the conspicuous emotion in love as evidenced by dictionary definitions and the descriptions of psychologists; (3) such accounts as we may be able to collect from novels and biographies.

Premising this much, and that no genealogical theory of the passions can be, at present, more than tentative, we may proceed to give some account of what seem to be the original source and subsequent development of love. If we assume that joy, either suddenly formed, as in sexual love, or, as in friendship, often of insensible growth and accretion, is the first emotion of love (which is only a supposition, for pity or fear may in some cases precede joy), then we have at least a standing ground from which we can calculate the occurrence of other emotions. It seems to be an assured and familiar law of our minds that whenever joy has been felt in the presence of an object with sufficient strength that either immediately, or after a certain interval, during which the object is not experienced, pain or sadness will be felt in connexion with an impulse; and wherever the necessary ideas are forthcoming this impulse will be defined as desire for renewed experience of the object. Hence some definitions of love centre in this desire. Thus Descartes defines love as an emotion of the soul “which incites it voluntarily to unite itself to an object that appears suitable”.¹ Now whether the vague feeling of pain in the absence of the object is further defined as sadness or sorrow seems principally to depend on (1) the length of the absence, and (2) on whether the desire for the presence is felt to be now or for an indefinite future time, unattainable. Further we cannot be certain in this law of the succession of pain, sorrow and impulse to joy whether the pain must be felt before, after, or simultaneously with the impulse.

¹ *Les Passions de l'Âme*, Deuxième Partie, Art. 78.

Now given the uprising of desire we seem to be able to enunciate another emotional law governing the development of love. In proportion as the desire persists and is not realisable at once, and is subjected to a variety of circumstances, some favourable, others unfavourable to its realisation, the prospective emotions are aroused in the circumstances appropriate to each. These are specially hope, despondency, anxiety, confidence and despair, but also all the primary emotions when aroused by the thought of a future event, as anger when we anticipate opposition and fear when we anticipate danger. Whether they are aroused in any given case of desire, and how many of them, and in what strength, depends on the strength of desire, and the circumstances acting on it, which vary from one case to another. But we may perhaps infer that, in a normal subject, all of them would be elicited were the circumstances sufficiently varied, and the desire sufficiently strong. Finally the last stage of desire is reached, and with the accomplishment of its end, renewed joy or satisfaction is felt, and its process terminates.

Now it is generally at some such stage of the development as in this return to joy after the pains of absence that is constituted that valuation of the object in and for itself which is an essential feature of all love, and recognised as a constituent of the passions by M. Ribot. This valuation may be latent in the first joy, which at least is an essential condition of it, but it seems to be chiefly in the recurrence of joy after sorrow and desire that it rises as a conscious emotional belief into consciousness. And this is implied in the common observation that we never really value anything until we have lost it. Now it sometimes happens that after the first succession of joy, pain, desire and attainment that reunion with the object does not arouse joy but disappointment. We hear people say 'He was delightful at first but afterwards he disappointed me,' or 'What was it that I saw in him that so greatly pleased me?' But when disappointment is felt instead of a recurrence of joy, then the intrinsic valuation of the object which is essential to love is either not constituted or is destroyed. And the process comes to an end. For separation will no longer be followed by sadness and desire; and the object no longer occupying our thought will be forgotten. But where love is constituted there is a recurrence of joy with renewed experience of the object, followed again by pain and desire. And thus in the main, the course of a passion is a recurrent succession of joy, sorrow and desire. For not only does separation from the object occasion desire, but so does also its injury or destruction, its unsatisfied wants,

where it is a human being, or its immaturity, where it is knowledge or wealth or a little child.

With the accumulation of experiences of the object in correspondence with the succession of joy, sorrow and desire, and the prospective emotions, and the emotional belief in the value of the object, memories are formed which in their turn become the source of retrospective emotions. And thus love has its regrets as well as its satisfactions, its delights in past scenes and its disappointments, and so often cannot escape from remorse, self-reproach and shame.

Now although joy may not be the first of this long succession of emotions and desires, it is nevertheless the fundamental emotion of the system. For if, earlier or later, joy were not felt in the presence of the object there would be no feeling of pain in its absence, no sorrow in its injury or destruction, no desire for its presence, possession, or improvement, no hopes or anxieties on its behalf, no disappointments in our expectations of it, no despondencies at failures to reach it, to help it or be reconciled to it, and no regrets for its injury or neglect; and therefore no love. And this essential importance of joy to the development of love we all recognise in certain cases. Thus not only would sexual love be inconceivable without the intense joy in the mere presence of its object, so different from the restless appetite of sex, but even friendship could not be formed without a mutual pleasure in company, nor the mother's love without the tender delight in the sight of her offspring. We only miss the persons or the things or the modes of life that have been a delight or pleasure to us, and we only love those that we miss and which we have joy again in recovering. The mother who does not feel the tender joy in the sight and touch of her child, in tending it and playing with it, does not love it. She may fulfil in part her duties, but coldly without love. And hence it is that so many definitions of love go so far as to identify it with joy or pleasure in the presence of its object. Thus Spinoza defines it as "pleasure accompanied by the idea of an external cause,"¹ and the ordinary dictionary definitions identify it with taking pleasure or feeling delight in the presence of a person or thing. And from Aristotle's time to the present day, where this confusion is either avoided or for the moment forgotten, the position of delight or joy as a cause of love has been constantly recognised. Thus Aristotle says, "It is indeed ever the beginning of affection to find pleasure not only in a person's presence but in the recollection of him too

¹ *The Ethics*, Part iii., Prop. xii., note.

when he is away";¹ and Prof. Westermarck in developing Herbert Spencer's theory of the origin of maternal love as being essentially the love of the weak and helpless, observes, that the mother "is in close proximity to her helpless young from their tenderest age; and she loves them because they are to her a cause of pleasure".² And again of sexual love he remarks: "The tendency to feel some attachment to a being who has been the cause of pleasure—in this case sexual pleasure—is undoubtedly at the bottom of the instinct".³

Now it seems strange that out of all this variety of emotions in the sentiment or passion of love, one emotion alone should possess this function of being an essential basis and condition of all the rest. This fact, if it be a fact, we cannot pass by; we have to explain it: we must inquire by what means joy alone becomes a cause of this organised succession of emotions and desires which love is. Now whatever truth there may be in the contention that the passions are secondary and acquired products of character compared to the emotions ("Toutes les passions étant de formation secondaire, sont nécessairement acquises, . . ." p. 9) still we should not acquire them were there not in the constitution of the mind a secret and instinctive disposition to organise its emotions; and it is this very complex instinct that accounts for those empirical laws of their succession which we have been considering. That is to say the law connecting the cessation of joy with the feeling of an impulse,—whether arising at once or after a certain interval,—and the laws connecting this impulse developed into desire with the occurrence of the prospective emotions in their appropriate circumstances, and the law connecting the cessation of these emotions and desire itself in the attainment of its end with the recurrence of joy as satisfaction, and that connecting this process as a whole with the repetition of it in the changing circumstances of absence, of injury to the object, of its defective or immature state and of its unsatisfied wants,—that all these laws point to the existence of a bond between the emotions which is innate in us and part of the very constitution of the mind. It is this bond that I think we may call an instinct, and there are two things to notice about it, that it is a very complex instinct, connecting together the dispositions to a great many emotions and desires; and secondly,

¹ *The Rhetoric*, Weldon's trans., p. 79.

² *The Origin and Development of the Moral Ideas*, vol. ii., ch. xxxiv., p. 189.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 191.

that this instinct is developed into love by a sufficiently strong feeling of joy, not necessarily an intense emotion.

To understand this better we must consider that each one of the primary emotions is connected with its own emotional disposition in the nervous system or in sub-consciousness, and that these emotional dispositions are themselves instincts, causing us to behave under the influence of fear, anger, disgust, surprise, joy and sadness much as the animals behave under them. But the instinct of which we are speaking is not any one of these instincts at the roots of the primary emotions. Nor yet is it all of these dispositions or instincts regarded collectively. For the primary emotions often act with relative independence of one another. We enjoy moderately a performance at a theatre without experiencing any subsequent sadness through its cessation or desire to witness it again; we experience even sadness independently of joy when it is connected with a depressed state of the bodily functions, and joy independently of sadness when their activity is healthy and vigorous; we experience anger independently of fear, and fear of anger, in their primitive forms, as well as both organically connected in a passion; we experience an independent disgust, as well as that self-disgust when we have missed opportunities of realising the desires of our passions. Thus the instinct on which the development of love is based is not any one of these instincts at the root of the primary emotions, nor all of them as a collection, but is their total existence as an organised system. And the evidence that this is an instinct is that undoubtedly there is a system of emotional dispositions involved in the love of an object, and that however much this system may be developed in our experience and in coming to love the object, still the structure of it seems to be innate and instinctive. For we do not learn by experience to put desire and sorrow after joy in separation from the loved object and in failure to unite ourselves to it afresh; nor again, do we learn by experience to connect with this desire in the changes of circumstances to which it is subject the different prospective emotions; but these manifold connexions are part of the very constitution of the mind. And if we reflect on an instinct which is admitted to be such by both biologists and psychologists,—the maternal instinct of animals,—we shall be brought to the same conclusion. For the behaviour of this instinct is most complex. The mother animal will fight in defence of her young, will conceal them or flee with them when they are in danger, will procure food for them, will play with them, will search for them when they are lost, and

manifest pleasure in their recovery. And it is clear that this is not the conduct characteristic of one of the emotions, but of many combined. Fighting in defence of her young is the manifestation of disinterested anger, fleeing with them or concealing them, of disinterested fear, keeping them in her neighbourhood and playing with them, of joy, wandering disconsolate in search for them, of sorrow and frustrated impulse, and the expressions of pleasure in their recovery, of renewed joy. Thus the maternal instinct is in some way a system of many emotional dispositions, and the particular instincts connected with them, and gives rise to that emotion and conduct appropriate to the circumstances: and however much it may acquire from experience this fundamental structure of it is innate. And if we reflect on those forms of love which seem the most removed from instincts, as avarice or ambition, we shall yet find in them the same structure of emotional dispositions, unlearnt from experience however much else be learnt.

And now to interpret the special relation of joy to this instinct. The instinct of love, though the most complex of human instincts, is not itself love in any proper and complete sense of the term until it has found a suitable object. It must be aroused by and referred to this object before there can be said to exist a love of this object. Now joy is the signal that it has found an object; for the meeting with this object is joy. Often, as in sexual love, it is a most surprising joy, wonder and admiration.

And though I stood abasit tho a lite,
No wonder was; for why? my wittis all
Were so o'ercome with pleasure and delight,
Only through letting of my eyen fall,
That suddenly my heart became her thrall,
For ever of free will—for of menace
There was no token in her sweete face. . . .
Then I study in myself and sayn;
Oh sweet! are ye a worldly creature,
Or heavenly thing in likeness of nature?

But joy is not merely the signal of the union between the instinct of love and its perceived object. It is no mere otiose accompaniment: it has an important function. For it is essential to the development of love that the instinct be related to some object of perception or thought, and secondly that it be bound to this object so that not merely one of the emotions of its system, but all of them, and not merely at one time, but at various successive times, may find in this object an identical point of reference. Now joy can fulfil both of these functions. We cannot love any kind of

object, but we can love any object in the presence of which we feel an enjoyment or delight sufficiently strong. Where we feel no enjoyment the attention is not arrested by the object, unless some other principle detain it. But fear and anger though they detain the attention do not of themselves give rise to love, though often to hate. 'Interest' both directs and detains the attention, but by 'interest' we do not generally mean enjoyment in a thing for itself, but, at most, for something else connected with it. We are interested in any thing or person that arouses our curiosity. The desire of knowledge detains the attention, not for the sake of the object, but itself. Thus we are interested in the young because we desire to know what their future will be; we are interested in a book because we desire to know the conclusions to which it will be brought, or how the plot will develop and what will be the fortunes of the persons represented in it. But such interest does not lead to love unless there arise an enjoyment in the thing for itself. For as soon as our curiosity is satisfied we are done with that thing and pass on to some other.

Now joy does detain attention on the thing for itself, and alone seems to furnish the kind of object which can become an object of love. But, in the first place, this joy must have a degree of strength that we cannot with our present knowledge define. Innumerable things please us, but only a few of them do we come to love. In the second place, this joy must not be merely that diffused joy of health and good spirits, but must be specially aroused by some object of perception or thought.

Joy then seems to be the fundamental, the indispensable emotion in the development of love, that without which the instinct will not develop into love, that which selects an object to be loved, that which must be present at the orientation of the system however many other emotions be absent. Hence it is that we see so many people living together languidly without love, from duty and habit, or bound to some joyless occupation. They do not love the occupation, nor each other, because neither the one nor the other have ever been a joy to them. See on the other hand, how where there has been this joy and the love developed from it, in what a different way this joy has bound them together. For having developed the love, the joy may now be absent for long intervals without destroying the love. But the memory of it remains. And how often but for this memory, when the inevitable disappointments arrive, and exhausting labour has to be undertaken, and misfortune to be borne, on behalf

of the object, should we not cry out, 'What is the good of it?' But this memory holds us constant, and enables us to persevere with courage to the end.

This genealogical theory of love, or any other that we may adopt as an alternative to it, for the reasons that we have already given, can only be advanced tentatively. But at least it seems probable that joy has a quite peculiar relation to love, as evidenced by the common confusion between them, and the number of observations which point to it as the chief agent in the development of the passion.

On the assumption of the truth of this theory we have to add to and modify the definition of the passions which was derived from a statical analysis of them in consciousness. We defined love as an organised succession of desires and emotions, involving self-control, including an emotional belief in the intrinsic value of its object, and possessing recurrent passages in its history, more or less long and frequent, in which the concatenation of its thoughts does not allow of the formation of definite emotions. And some such definition as this we must give when we confine ourselves to the history of love as it appears in consciousness. But love is more than its history; and it sometimes springs into sudden and tumultuous life when its history has hardly begun. It is always a great possibility, and has more possibilities than those which come to fruition. For if it is now inconsolable grief or frustrated desire or a final hope of reunion or remorse for wrongs done to a loved object, the same disposition which caused these emotions in certain situations would in others have caused different emotions. Thus love is a hidden cause as well as a manifest effect. Hence it is that so often in the first fresh and strong love of an object we feel a mysterious power beyond the present emotion approaching to govern our future, and we think sometimes with terror of what we are committed to, and sometimes with terror that this new object of joy may be snatched from us.

She was shy from the great bliss in her bosom,
And was made timid by the fervour of her affection.

We can now give a second and causal definition of love supplementing our former definition. Love is the system which, under the action of joy, organises the dispositions of the primary emotions and desire, and of the prospective and retrospective emotions, on behalf of one and the same object, and which according to circumstances is manifested either as emotion or desire.

These two definitions we may use as tests to decide in a

given case whether what is felt for an object is or is not love. The first leads us to inquire into the history of the feeling in consciousness. If a mother's feeling for her child has been exhibited as a succession of emotions and desires organised on behalf of it, in which two chief desires control the rest, desire to maintain union with her child and desire for its preservation and development, then assuredly this is love. But in other cases where love is suddenly formed, as in sexual love, and sometimes in the passion for science or art, when a young man in the first wonderful moments of a new joy knows what his future career will be, there may not yet be any organised succession of emotions as proof of the existence of love. Yet often there is a vivid consciousness that the power of this first emotion is the power of love; and if we may take the sudden belief as any evidence of its truth, that joy has already aroused the latent instinct of love in relation to its object, so that were the circumstances at once changed and sufficiently varied he would feel any one of the emotions of love appropriate to them, then love already exists although one only of its emotions have been felt. And as if to justify the belief there is sometimes an imaginative forecast of the future in conformity with it, in which the images of events and conduct bring with them an echo of coming emotions. Thus while love must have some emotional effect, an organised succession of desires and emotions is only its fuller manifestation, it remains, in addition to them, a deep-seated cause and instinct ready to arouse any one of the fundamental emotions in the appropriate circumstances.

The peculiar position of joy in relation to the different passions of Love does not seem to have been suspected by M. Ribot. In his *Psychologie des Sentiments*¹ he excluded both joy and sorrow from the class of the primary emotions, assigning the curious reason that otherwise he would have to include in the same class bodily pleasure and pain. He discerned no essential difference between joy and sorrow and a pleasant or painful bodily sensation. Yet in the present work he admits them in a "very restricted sense" (p. 131, note). And after remarking that he has sought for the origin of the passions in "needs, instincts, tendencies" ("besoins, instincts, tendances," p. 127), he asks, "Is there another source? Can the emotions become passions . . . ?" (p. 127). One after another, as we have seen, he rejects them. But when he comes to joy he anticipates a different conclusion. He thinks that it may become changed into one passion, the love of pleasure (p. 13).

¹ Introduction, ii., 5, and part 1, ch. ii., 11.

Now joy can no more be changed into a passion than an organ of the body can become the bodily organisation as a whole: but it is the determining emotion of not one passion but all passions of love. Its relation to the love of pleasure is peculiar. Here the element of pleasure is abstracted not only from the joy, but from pleasant bodily sensation, and pursued and valued for itself. It becomes the object of a passion, not the passion itself.

Now if Joy has the unique function we have assigned to it of selecting the objects of so many and such different passions of love, we can hardly suppose that it is always the same in all of them without variations. For the differences of the passions seem to be reflected in the nature of their joys, or the differences of their joys in the nature of the passions. And as there is perhaps no other emotion so rich in varieties as joy, so this may account for the fact that there is no other passion so rich in varieties as love. There is a joy in intellectual, as well as in muscular activity, hence there is a love of knowledge as well as a love of sports and exercises; there is a peculiar joy in the possession of power over other men, and hence ambition; there is a different joy in admiring or reverencing great men, hence the love that surrenders power; there is a peculiar joy in being admired, and hence vanity; there is another joy in beauty, hence the æsthetic passion; and there is a quiet joy which precedes or follows the doing of good deeds, and hence benevolence. Thus the varieties of love seem to depend on our susceptibility to different varieties of joy. And if we ask why in one man one passion is developed and in another man a different passion, we must answer that either there is a greater innate susceptibility to the joy on which the one is based than to that of others, or else that circumstances have favoured the development of the one passion and been unfavourable to the rest.

And now to return to M. Ribot's theory. Instinct is, as we have seen, at the source of every passion; but instinct is not one source and emotion another distinct from it; the activity of the instinct is manifested in consciousness as emotion or impulse.¹ Thus the passion is not only based on the highly complex instinct of love, but also on the instincts which are involved in the dispositions of the primary emotions; and the activity of these instincts is manifested not only in the behaviour characteristic of them, but in corresponding emotions.

Over and above this basis of instinct common to all men,

¹ It is seldom that the relation of instinct to emotion is clearly interpreted. See W. McDougall's excellent account, *Physiological Psychology*, ch. vi., p. 109.

on which the development of their passions depends, there is sometimes also, where a master-passion is developed, an innate disposition peculiar to some. The joy which lies at the source of such a passion, it would seem, must have an extraordinary degree of strength, not the momentary strength of intense emotion, but that persistency or capacity for recurrence which is generally conjoined with a lower degree of feeling. But what is the source of this strength? It is evident that the minds and bodies of men are often adapted to different kinds of work, and that the work for which a man is adapted carries a susceptibility to a corresponding kind of joy and a capacity for the permanent recurrence of this joy distinguishing it from those ephemeral joys so soon destroyed by familiarity or satiety. In one man the surplus energy of his system finds its natural outlet in an activity which is predominantly muscular, and, if he have leisure, he develops the love of some sport or game, in another man in the systematic activity of the higher nervous processes, and he develops the love of some science or art, or he is finely balanced and capable of both. But, in other cases, passions may be developed which do not seem to spring from an innate disposition to a particular kind of joy. Every man enjoys the possession of money, but the disposition to this enjoyment is generally supposed to be acquired and not innate. The passion of avarice often rises on the ruins of other passions that have preceded it in youth, and grows from an acquired enjoyment. And how often is the religious passion seen to be a last resource of the soul to acquire some joy that shall endure, some outlet for its instinct of love, after the disappointments of affection, disgust with sensuality, or the collapse of ambition.

I have ventur'd

This many summers in a sea of glory ;
But far beyond my depth : my high-blown pride
At length broke under me ; . . .
Vain pomp and glory of this world, I hate ye ;
I feel my heart new opened. . . .

Thus the joy which is at the source of a passion may be either one for which we have an innate disposition or one the disposition for which is acquired, and developed into strength by the circumstances of our lives. But in either case it acts only in conjunction with instinct as the other and hidden source of the passion. And where an instinct or innate disposition ripens within and does not meet with its appropriate object without, it commonly happens that a painful impulse is aroused. It may be long before a man discovers the kind of mental activity for which he is fitted ;

and the impulse remains vague and objectless because he does not know what will satisfy it. And thus while an unsatisfied impulse often precedes the first emotion of joy, until its object be discovered and joy for it be felt, the instinct cannot develop into passion, having no common centre to which its several emotions can be referred.

Love, then, being based on a most complex disposition and instinct, relating all the fundamental emotional dispositions in a single system, developed through the selective action of joy, it is obvious that this instinct precedes the growth of the passion in the individual and probably in the race. And if evolution teaches us that the bodily functions, instincts and mental processes of animals are organised for their individual preservation and the preservation of their species, what is this but the precursor of love on a lower plane of existence? For this organisation includes that of their primary emotional dispositions, and these dispositions are therefore already related in a system. Thus long before there is self-love or the altruistic love of the race there is something that takes its place, which acts as an instinct without consciousness of its object and end. Yet although the emotions and appetites of animals are not independent principles of action but regulated in their discharge and related one with another, so that the animal acts as if it loved itself, and pursues its own preservation and welfare, yet we should regard it as a misuse of the term to call this systematic activity self-love; because we think the animal incapable of forming a conception of itself or of understanding in what its welfare consists. Yet here already is all that is most important for love,—the system, and its possible improvement through experience. What does it lack? The higher intellectual processes that are involved in a clear conception of the object and end, the rational choice of the means after comparison and reflexion,—all that improvement of an innate system due to the activity of a conception: and with this the joy based on conception and the consciousness that the animal loves both itself and others. Yet were love used in a broader sense to denote the instinct at its base, there would still be preserved that fundamental distinction, to which the whole of this article has been directed, between any one of our emotional or appetitive dispositions and that system in which they are organised with or without consciousness of their object and end.