II.—“APPEARANCE AND REALITY”: A REPLY TO MR. CARR.

By A. J. FINBERG.

THIS paper is in no sense an attempt to defend Mr. Bradley's *Appearance and Reality*. There must be some show of an attack before a defence is required, and I cannot bring myself to see that Mr. Carr's paper was an attack. But others so regarded it, and apparently Mr. Carr. So it is clear that some of us have misunderstood Mr. Bradley. And if I have misunderstood, I am anxious to learn where.

I have observed that, in discussing Mr. Bradley's books, there is only one thing which is regarded as irrelevant—that is, Mr. Bradley's own published account of what he means. I desire to-night to limit the area of discussion to Mr. Bradley's arguments only so far as they are concerned with Mr. Carr's criticisms. Of course, I alone am responsible for the construction I put upon Mr. Bradley's words. And I may as well confess that I am dependent for that meaning upon what is printed in Mr. Bradley's books. I mention this apparently superfluous point, because we have been assured that Mr. Bradley is given to eating in private the words he uses in public. So if Mr. Carr assures me that Mr. Bradley has informed him in private that he attaches “no importance” to some of the arguments employed in *Appearance and Reality*, I must ask to be allowed to regard such confidences as irrelevant. But I do not think Mr. Carr is at all likely to adopt such methods.

The main question Mr. Bradley sets himself to answer in his book is, as I understand it: How, without contradicting ourselves, can we think of Reality? We cannot, with Locke, regard the unknown qualities of the “real essence” as the only

reality, and dismiss all our experience of the world as fantastic; or consider that "primary qualities" give us what "really exists." Again, Hume's classification of some experiences as real and others as "fictions of the mind" is equally impossible. In the chapters criticised by Mr. Carr, Mr. Bradley asks, Can we discover the real existence of Space, Time, Motion, Causation, &c., in our ideas of these phenomena? In his own words, "Do these ideas belong to Appearance or to Reality?" The answer is that they belong to appearance, and as such they have only a relative reality—they are not a "pure negation," as Mr. Carr puts it. What appears must be interpreted by, or brought into relation with, the universe of thought; only thus can we reach the fuller reality of the individual object and of the totality of individual objects. Only a one-sided aspect of reality is ever directly given. What is given must be qualified by thought before even the approximate reality can be thought of with any approach to consistency. Our knowledge, then, never is reality, but it qualifies reality; it may be described as adjectival.

Such a theory does not allow us to reject any appearance as illusory. If what appeared to sense were illusion, how could we find truth? We cannot reject any experience. But each individual experience presents only a partial aspect of reality; taken by itself it proves self-contradictory. But "to deny its existence, or to divorce it from reality, is out of the question. For it has a positive character, which is indubitable fact, and however much this fact may be pronounced appearance, it can have no place in which to live except reality. And reality set on one side, and apart from all appearance, would assuredly be nothing." (*Appearance and Reality*, p. 132.)

Mr. Carr writes, "It is this positive conception of appearance that I desire to criticise." "That contradictions should be true of Reality is surely absurd, but in what sense can we imagine them to be true of appearance? *How can the contradictory appear?*"

To which the answer is obvious, "the contradictory" cannot appear, because there is no such thing in the real world. It is only the reality that can appear. If Mr. Bradley states or assumes that the contradictory appears, his whole argument breaks down. But I have not been able to find any such passage.

Mr. Carr continues, "Contradictory appearance is as unthinkable as contradictory reality"—(which depends on the precise meaning attached to the word "unthinkable;" if it is taken as meaning "not experience-able," I cannot agree). "It is not that there appears to be a contradiction: that would be a mere way of saying that there is error in our conception." But that is exactly the argument. Mr. Bradley does not suggest that fact is anything other than fact. The errors in our ideas are errors that belong to our way of thinking. Mr. Bradley thinks that the aim of metaphysic is to bring our ideas of reality into harmony with our experience, not to reject experience and satisfy ourselves with unmeaning words. Consequently I think Mr. Carr is misrepresenting Mr. Bradley's doctrine when he says "It is that contradiction—in the present example, absolute contradiction—is the positive content of the appearance and exists in the appearance." The example referred to is that "Motion implies that what is moved is in two places in one time." Motion here is an idea of the mind, an ideal conception, consequently not a "thing" that can ever appear to us; the self-contradiction in that idea is therefore not an absolute contradiction but a relative one, relative to our limited powers and experience.

Mr. Carr continues: "Can appearance be ultimately self-contradictory? A possible reply may be, that it is not appearance that appears but reality, and that the inconsistent content is the result of the divorce of appearance from reality. Such a reply would meet the difficulty if we had positive knowledge of reality, or actual experience of it as reconciling contradictions." Mr. Carr's "possible reply" is, of course, the proper reply. To

his objections the replies are, (1) that we have positive knowledge of reality through our experience. It is the reality that acts upon us, therefore we have this positive knowledge—it can hardly be called negative. And (2) when it is realised that contradictions only qualify our perceptions of reality, it is easy to observe that every action we perform effects a practical reconciliation (if I may be allowed so to express it) of our illogical perceptions. Our idea of motion is illogical, but we can walk across the room in safety, and—sometimes—hit a bird when we try. We could never perform these feats if reality were not in rough practical agreement with our ideas of it, nor if it were, as Mr. Carr supposes, an “unknown x .”

I quite agree with the next sentence. (Our conceptions) “cannot be a full or a true analysis of appearance: what appears is not, and cannot be thought to be, inconsistent with itself.” What appears is the reality, and Mr. Bradley does not regard it as “inconsistent with itself.”

“Mr. Bradley holds that all the conceptions by which we endeavour to understand the world are inconsistent with themselves.” If Mr. Bradley holds any such view I have not been able to find it expressed in his book. For how can a conception be inconsistent with itself? The “content is self-contradictory,” but surely that is not the same thing. A conception is not one of its contents or all of them, any more than a thing is one of its qualities or all of them. If Mr. Carr is thinking of the first paragraph of Mr. Bradley’s Chapter I, I do not think it can bear his interpretation. I will quote it:—“The fact of illusion and error is in various ways forced early upon the mind; and the ideas, by which we try to understand the universe, may be considered as attempts to set right our failure. In this division of my work I shall criticise some of these, and shall endeavour to show that they have not reached their object. I shall point out that the world, as so understood, contradicts itself; and is therefore appearance, and not reality.” And at the end of the last chapter of this First Book are these words:—“The

whole result of this Book may be summed up in a few words. Everything, so far, which we have seen, has turned out to be appearance. It is that which, taken as it stands, proves inconsistent with itself, and for this reason cannot be true of the real." The saying that ideas "have not reached their object" seems to me to mean that they have not accurately distinguished between reality and fiction: "the world, as so understood, contradicts itself," means that unless these ideas are taken as "ideal," we shall be forced to regard the reality as self-contradictory. Some of the contents of these ideas are self-contradictory, therefore they must be classed with what seems, and not with real-existence. And an idea classed as appearance can hardly be classed as real. Mr. Bradley's arguments aim at proving that, so far as our ideas are of appearances, they are obviously incomplete. And before these ideas can be applied to reality they must be modified or transcended by the help of other ideas.

If we follow Mr. Carr in the exposition of his rival theory, I think we shall be able to realise clearly the chief points at issue.

Mr. Carr holds "the reality in the absolute sense of our conceptions of space and time." "Reality is consistent . . . the consistent is timeless, for everything conceived *sub specie temporis* is inconsistent and exhibits contradiction . . . the real will only be found, if found at all, *sub specie æternitatis*." All this is a differently-worded statement of Mr. Bradley's argument (I shall produce additional demonstration later), and which Mr. Carr has been seeking to disprove. He continues:—"Can anything that is ordinarily conceived *sub specie temporis* be also conceived *sub specie æternitatis*? Only by abstracting from content all meaning and leaving bare being." This is the vital point of the whole business. We shall have to return to it, but I will complete the quotation first:—"Are there any objects that are conceived by us *sub specie æternitatis*, and that can only be so conceived? It seems to me that time and space

are such objects. Time cannot be conceived as in time. Duration and succession have no meaning as applied to time itself." (Yet we are to suppose "Time itself" to "exist," and yet have no duration.) "Time is therefore eternal; and if eternal, real; and if real, not inconsistent or self-contradictory." But even if Mr. Carr's logic were impeccable, such a conception of Time *sub specie æternitatis* is still only a conception. Grant that it is as closely correspondent with the reality as any conception can be; that it is Thought purged and transformed to its highest splendour; yet it still remains Thought—ideal, unreal. We can hardly fancy that the reality alters in itself with our conceptions of it. It is, therefore, advisable to keep the two things separate, and not confound our thought with the thing as real existence. So the nature of Time itself cannot be supposed to be affected by Mr. Carr's arguments; it is only that our minds have been enlarged. Instead of having one conception of time we have two. So we can talk of time and not mean Time, and we can confuse ourselves and those who listen to us. And Mr. Carr does not show that our conceptions are inconsistent with the real reality merely by comparing one conception with another, and showing that these differ. For Mr. Bradley's argument does not compel us to believe that people's ideas of things do not differ.

Mr. Carr's mistake evidently springs from the idea that his conception is not a conception, but is real. So we must consider whether a conception manipulated in the manner described can bring us face to face with Ultimate Reality? Can we know the infinite by the simple process suggested? And what an easy process it is! What a pleasant amusement for winter evenings! You take a conception, dismiss all content except "bare being," and there is the noumenon behind phenomena. But why, it may be asked, retain one quality of phenomena and transfer that, and that alone, to real existence? Why should this one quality be taken and the rest condemned? Because, I suppose I may be told, the other qualities are

evidently relative, and cannot, therefore, be true of the real without modification; and, besides, they contradict each other. But if "being" can be perceived, it must have reference to some other to whom it must seem. Our idea of "being" cannot form part of any real subject or existent, as such, for whether we affirm that A is, or A is not, the subject remains the same in either case. The meaning of the statement itself demands that neither more nor less shall be present in the actual world than just the A thought of by me (*cf.* Sigwart's *Logic*, English translation, p. 72 *seq.*). "Being" expresses the relation of a subject of thought to my faculty of knowledge. And that is why as a quality it does not conflict with what is directly given to sense. "Being," as the term is used in *Metaphysic* and *Logic*, is never directly given, but is deduced. It is simply the most general characteristic of every perception.

Mr. Carr's attitude seems to me peculiar. Everything that really matters—for instance, the feelings of pleasure and pain—he is quite prepared to throw overboard. They are secondary qualities, and but seem. But the bare deduced "isness" of these illusory qualities is sacred. The "isness" of appearance is real, but the contents of perception are unreal. No defence of this procedure is given; and I must confess I am unable to imagine any.

But Mr. Bradley's position is clearly defined. Nothing can be thought of until it has attained sentient perception. Sentient perception or experience has reality as an adjective of the real, but the "isness" predicated by experience belongs to the appearance and not to the real existence qualified by the experience. That the presence of the adjective may be taken as an indication of the existence of something is doubtless true. There is real existence certainly, but it just as certainly is not its appearance. In the present case Time and Space are the appearances, and as such they qualify real existence, but are unreal as Time and Space—*i.e.*, as revealed through sensuous

perception. We cannot suppose that every appearance is real in its own nature and as appearance. So Mr. Bradley's position is that Time and Space, in so far as they are ideas of what has been experienced, are appearances, and in so far as they are names applied to what has not been perceived by sense, they have no meaning. In other words: So far as there is any sense in these conceptions they cannot be absolutely real. And to this Mr. Carr replies in effect: If we take these conceptions as, literally, nonsense, they are absolutely real.

It is evident that when Mr. Carr criticises Mr. Bradley's treatment of Time, Space, &c., he is using words in a different sense. Mr. Carr's conception of "bare isness," which he calls Time "in itself," has no connexion whatever with the meaning of Mr. Bradley's Time. Mr. Carr writes: "Duration and Succession have no meaning as applied to time itself; they apply only to that which is in time. Before and after are not conceivable, have no meaning as applied to time itself; they fall within time." Of continuity and discreteness Mr. Carr writes: "To me these attributes appear quite unmeaning as applied to pure space; they are applicable only to the content of space. No break of any kind is imaginable in space. Nothing can divide it in the sense of coming between one part and another." "Infinite divisibility and infinite extensibility . . . are perfectly consistent" as applied to pure space. "It is only where content is involved that contradiction can enter." "All divisions fall within space—are in it, not of it. There are no parts of space . . . the parts do not combine to form the whole, nor is the whole composed of the parts." Space is not a relation, but is it a substance? "I find it impossible to apply such terms as 'solid,' 'repulsive,' 'simple,' or even 'without' and 'within,' to pure space, they seem to me to have meaning only for that which occupies it."

But Mr. Carr objects to the statement that space empty of all content is an unreal abstraction. Mr. Bradley's words are "Empty space—space without some quality (visual and

muscular), which in itself is more than spatial—is an unreal abstraction. It cannot be said to exist, for the reason that it cannot by itself have any meaning. When a man realises what he has got in it, he finds that always he has a quality which is more than extension. But if so, how this quality is to stand to the extension is an insoluble problem. It is a case of 'inherence,' which we saw was in principle unintelligible." To which Mr. Carr replies, "Perceived space . . . must have some quality. But space, as we conceive it, . . . has no visual or muscular quality. But that is no ground for rejecting it as an unreal abstraction. I can annihilate in thought everything that occupies space, but by no power of thought can I annihilate space itself. Figure, colour, solidity, or any spatial quality abstracted from space is nothing, is unrepresentable to the imagination, but space itself is entirely different to its contents." These extracts make it clear that Mr. Carr's conception of space is something that has no connection with space as perceived. He admits that his conception of the unperceived has no meaning, but he does not admit that that is a reason for calling it an unreal abstraction. It rather serves to guarantee its reality, for it does not contradict any of our experience. It is evident, I think, that Mr. Carr's distinction between conception and perception requires examination. As Mr. Carr uses them they seem to agree very much with the slipshod use of such terms in the popular psychology of the moment. But it is evident that what Mr. Carr says of his unmeaning conceptions does not touch Mr. Bradley's arguments which show that all conceptions which are not unmeaning belong to space as perceived.

(With reference to Mr. Carr's statement that "the question of the perception of space has been specially excluded by Mr. Bradley from the argument," I can only ask in astonishment for the production of the passage.)

Of Pure Time Mr. Carr tells us that it is not discrete, "it is one and unchangeable." "It is independent of events" in

time, it is "not a relation of its parts." "Before" and "after" do not qualify it. It is infinite.

Of these conceptions of time and space, Mr. Carr adds, they "may be impossible to represent to the imagination or to realise in thought, but they are not self-contradictory, nor meaningless, nor inconceivable."

I must confess that a conception "impossible to represent to the imagination or to realise in thought" seems to me to be inconceivable and meaningless; though I am glad I can agree with Mr. Carr in thinking that what is meaningless is not self-contradictory. But I fail to see how, whatever view we take of this, it affects Mr. Bradley's main position.

There can be no doubt, I think, then, that when Mr. Carr speaks of Time and Space he does not mean what Mr. Bradley means by the same words. And the difference is seen to depend largely upon the sense in which the words perception and conception are used. So, instead of Mr. Carr's arguments affecting the position they are immediately criticising, they are seen to raise this other question: How far must conception depend upon perception? From the definition I have already given of Mr. Bradley's position it is evident that he regards conception as more closely related to perception than Mr. Carr does. And on this clear issue I do not think Mr. Carr's position can be maintained. He regards perception as the necessary preliminary to conception. But when perception has once existed it can then be totally dismissed as of no importance. The only thing that matters is the knowledge that it shall once have existed, and apparently that is all that is required to constitute a conception. I suppose Mr. Carr would confine perception to sentience, conception to the interpretation and extension by thought of what is given to sense. But the relation in which a conception must stand to sentience is not the same for Mr. Bradley as for Mr. Carr. Mr. Carr's conception is therefore not the exact equivalent for the terms Mr. Bradley prefers, Thought or Idea. I mention this as

much of the misunderstanding which seems to prevail with regard to Mr. Bradley's writings seems to depend largely upon a confusion of terminology. As this author's books owe their prominence and great value to the evident necessity for correcting the imperfections of current popular philosophy, it is obvious that such an object can only be attained by the employment, and perhaps invention, of a more accurate terminology. And until it is clearly understood that Mr. Bradley does not habitually use certain words in the loose and inconsistent sense in which, for instance, Mr. Herbert Spencer and Dr. Stout prefer to use them, the value of his contributions to modern thought are likely to be overlooked. Indeed, if this difference in phraseology is to be ignored, I do not see how he can escape being regarded as the writer of nonsense prose unfit for the nursery, in which light he has afforded so much amusement to members of the Aristotelian Society.

Connected with this point I confess I find it difficult to account for Mr. Carr's failure to draw attention to the one point in which Mr. Bradley is in hearty agreement with him; I allude to the evident necessity for transcending in thought what is immediately perceived. In the two or three chapters at the beginning of *Appearance and Reality*, Mr. Bradley argues that as a necessary part of the contents of sentient perception (which is evidently much more than bare sensation) turns out to be inconsistent, therefore Thought is urged on to reconcile them in a higher synthesis. Mr. Carr denies that there is any disparity, but says it disappears if we accept his higher conceptions. He simply offers us a rival metaphysical doctrine, which doctrine has no reason for existing if Mr. Bradley's contentions are not valid; if Mr. Carr's objections could be maintained—viz., that contradictory appearance is as absurd, as inconceivable, and as unthinkable as contradictory reality—his own doctrine of the "Infinite" is unnecessary, for there is nothing to explain. On the other hand, Mr. Bradley

considers that there is something that requires explanation, and, like Mr. Carr, he is prepared to turn to Thought for this. The inconsistency of time "directs us beyond itself. It points to something higher in which it is included and transcended" (p. 207). "Time is not real as such, and it proclaims its unreality by its inconsistent attempt to be an adjective of the timeless. It is an appearance which belongs to a higher character, in which its special quality is merged. Its own temporal nature does not there cease wholly to exist, but is thoroughly transmuted" (p. 209). And of space, its "essential nature . . . is entirely inconsistent. It attempts throughout to reach something which transcends its powers. It made an effort to find and to maintain a solid self-existence, but that effort led it away into the infinite process. . . . And its evident inability to rest within itself points to the solution of its discords. Space seeks to lose itself in a higher perception . . . and against the possibility of space being in this way absorbed in a non-spatial consummation, I know of nothing to set" (p. 222).

There seems to be a superficial resemblance between Mr. Carr's "conceptions" and Mr. Bradley's "higher perceptions." But there are important differences also, and I venture to think they are in Mr. Bradley's favour. To begin with, a higher perception that has meaning seems preferable to a conception that has none. The higher perception answers the purpose for which it exists, by reconciling in an intellectual synthesis the jarring and partial experiences of life. Mr. Carr's conception does not help us with our phenomena. If his ultimate realities have no connexion with our world of experience they cannot reconcile conflicting aspects of experience. If they are connected "we have, in effect, every unsolved problem which vexed us before; and we have, besides, this whole confusion now predicated" of the reality, which is "no longer, therefore, something by itself. But this perplexed attribution was precisely that which the doctrine intended to

avoid." If these "pure" realities have no connexion with our appearances how can they explain them? For, as Mr. Carr carefully points out, pure time and pure space have nothing in common with what seems time and space to us. Mr. Carr's ultimate realities are simply our old friends, "Things in themselves."

Instead of removing any of our difficulties Mr. Carr seems only to increase them; for, in addition to all our other troubles, he would set us wondering how in infinity there is room for two infinities—infinite time and infinite space.

But the serious point at issue is whether our ideal consummation is to include implicitly our world of finite or limited experience, or whether it is to stand apart from our existence, in the abstract "mere being" of some part of this existence. To me, I confess, Mr. Carr's unreal abstractions seem meaningless and devoid of any value. I certainly cannot consider that they annihilate or override my world of experience. For instance, the pleasures and pains which form part of sentient existence seem to me of much more importance than their abstract "isness." As Mr. Bradley says: "The appearances after all being what we experience, must be what matters for us. They are surely the one thing which, from the nature of the case, can possess human value. Surely, the moment we understand what we mean by our words, the Thing in itself becomes utterly worthless and devoid of all interest. And we discover a state of mind which would be ridiculous to a degree if it had not unfortunately a serious side. It is contended that contradictions in phenomena are something quite in order, so long as the Thing in itself is not touched. That is to say, that everything which we know and can experience does not matter, however distracted its case, and that this purely irrelevant ghost is the ark of salvation to be preserved at all costs. But how it can be anything to us whether something outside our knowledge contradicts itself or not is simply unintelligible. What is too visible in our own readiness to

sacrifice everything which possesses any possible claim on us, and what is to be inferred is our confusion, and our domination by a theory which lives only in the world of misunderstanding."

That Mr. Carr's criticisms betray an elaborate and profound misconception of Mr. Bradley's arguments I think I have produced evidence to show. Much of it seems due to Mr. Carr's failure to distinguish between ideas and what they stand for, between predicate and subject, between appearance and reality. On the other hand, what makes Mr. Bradley's book so valuable is its masterly and exhaustive demonstration of the urgent necessity for distinguishing between Thought and what must be regarded as an other to Thought. "Thought's relational content can never be the same as the subject, either as that subject appears or as it really is. The reality that is presented is taken up by thought in a form not adequate to its nature" (p. 179). It is futile to talk about regarding things *sub specie æternitatis*. And the confusion between subject and predicate leads Mr. Carr to mistake the sense in which Mr. Bradley uses the word "contents," and to apply it to the subject instead of to the predicate. It is this failure to distinguish between thought and fact which has led to the production of Mr. Carr's irrelevant abstractions, and which has induced him to regard them as explaining what he endeavours to show needs no explanation.

In the discussion on Mr. Finberg's paper, Mr. CARR made the following remarks :—

Mr. Finberg has done me great honour in devoting a paper to a reply to my criticism of some of Mr. Bradley's arguments in my paper read last session. There are a few instances of mistake as to my meaning which I will notice, and then attempt to reply to some of the criticisms.

1. Mr. Finberg represents me as saying that the ideas of space, time, motion, causation, &c., are in Mr. Bradley's view

a "pure negation." His words are "they are not a 'pure negation' as Mr. Carr puts it." The only passage I can find in which I have used the phrase is that at the beginning of my paper in which I attempt to justify my title, "Mr. Bradley's Theory of Appearance," against a supposed objector who might hold that Appearance is a pure negation (*A. S. Proc.*, 1901-2, p. 215). It is not my own view nor my idea of Mr. Bradley's view.

2. On p. 32 Mr. Finberg quotes a sentence which he says he quite agrees with. Unfortunately the subject of the sentence which he supplies in parenthesis is not the subject of my sentence. It is not "our conceptions," but "the inconsistencies Mr. Bradley finds in our ordinary conceptions" that I have said cannot be a full or a true analysis of experience.

3. The passage Mr. Finberg calls on me to produce (p. 37) he will find in *Appearance and Reality*, p. 35. I must acknowledge that I ought to have specified more distinctly that the question excluded is that of the psychological origin of the perception of space. I did not imagine anyone would fail to understand that intention.

4. Mr. Finberg has called attention to my use of the word "conception." The word is my own choice, but I claim to have used it consistently and I do not think it has caused my critic to misunderstand my meaning. I confess however that if I were re-writing the paper I should be careful to use Mr. Bradley's own word "idea," and if at the time of writing my paper I had had in mind the first chapter of Mr. Bradley's *Logic* in which he carefully defines his use of the word I should most certainly have felt bound to do so. But though I have used a different word I do not think anyone will charge me with meaning a different thing. By our "conceptions" of space, time, motion, causation, &c., I intend only what Mr. Bradley calls our ideas or thoughts of them.

My paper dealt entirely with what I may describe as Mr. Bradley's "inconsistency" argument, and its special

application to the ideas of space, time, motion, change, causation, and activity. I have endeavoured to show that thorough inconsistency is incompatible not only with what Mr. Bradley defines as reality, viz., the self-subsistent, but also with the appearance of such reality. In order to show this I have examined the particular nature of the contradictoriness exhibited by these ideas and have found it to consist in the necessary attribution of infinity to the ideas of space and time. I have argued that infinity rightly conceived is not a source of contradictions in these ideas but is the reconciler of contradictions.

I will now deal with Mr. Finberg's criticisms.

1. I am charged with having misrepresented Mr. Bradley's theory of Appearance, in having said that according to it the contradictory appears. Mr. Finberg reminds me that only the reality can appear; that appearance is appearance of reality. With this view I entirely agree. Appearance belongs to reality; if there be no reality there can be no appearance. But I am examining the "inconsistency" argument, which is that the appearance is appearance and not reality because it is self-contradictory and inconsistent. Consistency is the test by which appearance is distinguished from reality. Reality so far as it is distinguished from its appearance is nothing more than the not-inconsistent which is constituted by the inconsistency of the appearance. The appearance is the whole experience, and that is inconsistent with itself, contradictory through and through. If the appearance exhibits contradiction, the contradictory appears. It is no assumption. It is nothing to the point to say that the contradiction in the appearance is due to the one-sided or partial aspect of the reality. Mr. Finberg quotes my sentence, "It is not that there appears to be a contradiction: that would be a mere way of saying that there is error in our conception." He replies, "But that is exactly the argument." To which I reply, surely not; such a contention would simply reduce

the argument to absurdity. The contradiction in the idea is an actual contradiction. Take the example discussed in my paper, "Motion implies that what is moved is in two places in one time." If what is intended is that there merely appears to be a contradiction, it should have been written, "Motion seems to imply, but does not really imply, that what is moved is in two places in one time." The point of Mr. Bradley's argument is that motion is an absolute contradiction so far as the appearance is concerned.

2. Mr. Finberg objects to my contention that reality with Mr. Bradley is an unknown x . He declares "that we have positive knowledge of reality through our experience." "It is the reality that acts upon us, therefore we have this positive knowledge—it can hardly be called negative." All that I say is that it is not positive knowledge of reality as such, any more than it is direct experience of reality as such. Reality is postulated to justify appearance from which it is distinguished.

3. I am criticised as setting up a rival theory. This rival theory is not my theory, nor have I any theory so far as the present argument is concerned. What I have called in my paper "a simple positive argument, which seems to me to establish the reality in the absolute sense of our conceptions of space and time," is an argument which, though not stated in the terms Mr. Bradley makes use of, was yet, I thought, based on premises that he would grant. I now know that this is not so. Mr. Bradley, in some remarks on my paper that were read in the discussion, said on this point that I appear to assume that the timeless is consistent. I admit that the positive argument in my paper does make this assumption, and if it is not admitted by Mr. Bradley, then of course as against him my argument fails. Mr. Finberg's criticism is based on an entire misconception of my meaning. He represents me as saying that "bare being" is one of the contents of a conception or idea that might maintain the reality of that conception when all other content is gone. At least, this

seems to me the meaning of his long disquisition on my conception of "isness." I never intended any such nonsense as he ascribes to me. The distinction I intended was simply Mr. Bradley's distinction between content and existence, not a distinction between one of the contents and the rest, and I do not suppose content and existence to be separable because distinguishable. My argument was to show that existence *sub specie æternitatis* is existence without content or meaning and therefore unthinkable. The reason I used these terms which are not Mr. Bradley's in criticising Mr. Bradley is that the inconsistencies and contradictions in our ideas which are exposed by his dialectic appear to depend largely, if not entirely, on a distinction between an in-time and a timeless existence.