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The Aorist Injunctive in Latin

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change of the scale intervals. It would be equivalent to changing from the first church mode (dominant A, final D) to the third (dominant C, final E) or fifth (dominant C, final F), the distribution of tones and semitones differing in each.

Of the fragments of Greek music that have come down to us, the most important is undoubtedly the Delphic Hymn to Apollo, discovered in 1893. It is in the Phrygian notation, and according to M. Reinach and all other authorities, in the Dorian mode or octave. This example offers no difficulty, for, as I have mentioned above, mese by position and mese by power are the same note in the Dorian mode. M. Reinach points out (*Bulletin de Correspondance Hellénique*, 1893, p. 597) that the note which is by far the most frequently used is C, that is to say, the Dorian mese at the Phrygian pitch: while the one place where a full close has been preserved on the stone shows a descent from C to G, i.e. from mese to hypate, or, according to my suggestion, from the dominant to the final. The Tralles hymn is in the Iastian notation, and M. Gevaert shows (*La Mélodie Antique*, p. 386) that the mode is Iastian. Here D represents thetic mese, and the melody appears to revolve round this note, as round a Gregorian dominant. Hypate meson is A, and the melody does not end on this note, but on E, the fourth below, that is, hypate hypaton, thus maintaining the principle of ending on the lowest note of a tetrachord. Is it possible that we have here a metabole of system producing the *ἐρέπα μέση* alluded to by Bacchius senior?

The second Delphic hymn is attributed by M. Gevaert (*La Mél. Ant.*, p. 451) to the Dorian mode, its notation being Lydian and Hypolydian. This hymn is in a far more fragmentary condition than the last two examples, and therefore much stress cannot

be laid on any deductions from it. It is divided by M. Gevaert into ten sections for convenience of reference. The melody of the first section appears to revolve on D, the mese, and to end on A, the hypate. In the second, third, fifth, and sixth sections E appears to play the part of a dominant, and all these sections end on this note or its octave below. Perhaps here we have again a *ἐρέπα μέση*? Of the last section Van Jan says that it ends on mese, but Gevaert contests this, and supposes that 'le docte professeur de Strasbourg aura, par distraction, écrit mèse voulant écrire hypate.'

With regard to the well-known Graeco-Roman hymns, M. Gevaert shows (*La Mél. Ant.*, p. 40), that in the 'Hymn to Helios' hypate is the principal 'note de repos,' i.e. the final of the various phrases, while 'La mèse (A) remplit bien ici sa fonction médiatrice.' The 'Hymn to the Muse' ends on the Dorian hypate, but mese is not so prominent as in the other examples. The hymn to Nemesis is, according to M. Gevaert, 'in the 'relaxed Iastian' mode, equivalent to the Phrygian octave D to D, but with G as its final. If the hymn be transposed from its original pitch to the octave D to D, it will be found that G is the note most frequently used; and it seems to play the part of a dominant here, in that the melodic design 'circule autour de cette corde centrale.' It is, moreover, the thetic mese in the Phrygian octave, a point in favour of the view that the thetic, and not the dynamic mese is the one to which composers had 'constant recourse.'

But whether thetic or dynamic, does not affect the contention that a note used in the way described must have been analogous to a Gregorian dominant, rather than to a harmonic keynote.

C. ABDY WILLIAMS.

THE AORIST INJUNCTIVE IN LATIN.

In his *Vergleichende Syntax* (Zweiter Theil, pp. 376-383), Delbrück does me the honour of taking my articles on The Latin Prohibitive as the basis of his discussion of 'Der alte Injunctiv Aoristi im Lateinischen.' While I am highly gratified to find that in his own words 'Unsere Ansichten gehen eine gute Strecke mit einander,' I am nevertheless not quite

satisfied with the treatment he accords to certain features of my discussion, and feel that at one point he has quite misinterpreted my meaning. It is with the hope of making my own position clearer, that I venture to offer the following remarks upon Delbrück's treatment.

In the first place, it seems to me that the words he sometimes uses in describing the

force of the aorist are open to criticism. He describes this force as invariably 'punktuell'—a term by which he says (p. 14) he means 'dass die Handlung mit ihrem Eintritt zugleich vollendet ist.' I cannot believe that Delbrück really means by these words what he seems to say. If taken literally, the words would make him express the belief that the aorist tense in *bellum gestum est*, or in *πολλὰ γὰρ ἔλυν*, for instance, means that the *act itself* was finished as soon as begun. Anyone who holds the view which the words quoted from Delbrück literally express would have to claim that the aorist could be used *only* of so-called instantaneous acts. I suspect therefore that the particular wording of this definition is due to a lack of care and precision, of which Delbrück is very rarely guilty. I feel sure that Delbrück would at once agree that the aorist tense implies absolutely nothing with reference to the length of duration of an act or a state. The act or state may have lasted for years or only for an instant. The length of duration is something with which the aorist tense is not in the least concerned. What Delbrück evidently means is that, when a person, in referring to any act, uses the aorist tense, he disregards for the moment the progress of the act and *conceives* of it as an entirety. The aorist makes quick work of *the thought* about the act; when used of a past act, it does not necessarily imply anything whatever about the nature of the *act itself*, though of course it is frequently and naturally used of so-called instantaneous acts. If this is what Delbrück means, then our views are identical as regards the fundamental meaning of the aorist tense. In one or two features of its application, we are apparently somewhat at variance, but not so much at variance as Delbrück seems to suppose. On page 381 he says: 'Elmer ist offenbar der Meinung, in *ne feceris* müsse eigentlich der Sinn der Vergangenheit stecken, während tatsächlich der Sinn der Vergangenheit nicht darin liegt, sondern nur gelegentlich als Wirkung des Sinnes der Periode hineinkommen kann.' I confess I do not quite see how my articles, as a whole, could give the impression that I hold the view here ascribed to me. Indeed I distinctly say on p. 6 (138) that *ne feceris* does *not* contain any notion of 'Vergangenheit.' My words are: '*Ne feceris* cannot mean literally "Do not, prior to a certain point in the future, have done it."' In one respect, however, the distinction, it seems to me, still holds. In *ne feceris* there is at least no

thought of the progress of the act. The expression deals with an act in its entirety. The beginning, the progress and the end of the act are brought together and focussed in a single conception. The idea of the act is not dwelt upon, but merely touched, for an instant, and then dismissed. The speaker as it were, makes short work of the thought.' I certainly meant by these words exactly what I understand Delbrück to have intended, when he describes the force of the aorist as 'punktuell.' Our views are then still identical. If I understand Delbrück aright, we start from exactly the same point of view.

We now come, however, to a point of real difference of opinion. At the bottom of p. 383 Delbrück has the following words: 'Es lag gewiss nahe, das Perf. und Präs. gelegentlich in der von Elmer beobachteten Weise zu gebrauchen, denn es ist zuzugeben, dass das Präsens sich für einen auf rapide Ausführung berechneten Befehl nicht eignet, aber das ist nur eine gelegentlich auftretende Folgeerscheinung.' It is clear then that, as far as the distinction between *ne feceris* and *ne facias* is concerned, Delbrück regards the speaker's earnest or impassioned mood, which I claimed was a characteristic accompaniment of the perfect tense, as something that always remains wholly incidental, i.e. something that is not at all suggested by the tense itself. My claim, on the other hand, is that the fundamental meaning of the perfect (aorist) subjunctive is such that it is not natural to use it of the future except when one is (or is pretending to be) thoroughly aroused, or wishes to speak with unusual energy; that this feeling was therefore, at least until comparatively late times, regularly associated with such uses of the perfect tense; and that, in this sense, such a feeling on the part of the speaker may be regarded as an essential characteristic of the perfect tense and the one by which it came to be chiefly distinguished from the present tense in the minds of the Romans. At this point I wish to call attention to what seems to me to be a serious error that is wont to be made in discussing questions of this character. Perhaps I cannot better serve my purpose than by quoting here the following extracts from my *Studies in Latin Moods and Tenses* that is now in press for the *Cornell Studies of Classical Philology*:

'It seems to me that a serious mistake has been made, on the part of grammarians, in making no distinction between the perfect, or aoristic, conception as applied to the future and the same conception as applied to the

past. Undoubtedly the original fundamental idea is the same in both cases, but I contend that the 'perfect (aorist), when used of the future, came to be associated and identified with ideas that were wholly foreign to past uses of the same tense.

'The perfect (aorist) indicative deals with an act that is finished. In presenting a past event, it merely touches the idea of the act and then leaves it. It differs from the imperfect much as "glance at" differs from "gaze at." But this "glance" at the act has nothing to do with the real character of the act itself. This act may have been performed quickly or slowly, energetically or deliberately; it may have lasted for years or only for an instant. With all of these particulars the perfect (aorist) indicative is not in the least concerned. It merely presents the act as one that took place; such an act is now beyond the sphere of anybody's influence—it is no longer a subject of suspense. But with the future use of the perfect subjunctive, circumstances are quite different. The act is now one which is in suspense. Instead of taking a calm view of past events, the speaker is now referring to events whose character, in the case of expressions of the will, he himself is endeavouring to shape and determine, or, in the case of the contingent future subjunctive, would under certain conditions shape and determine. Under such circumstances, the manner of looking at the act came, naturally enough, to be very closely associated with, and dependent upon, the manner in which the act was to be performed. My meaning will be made clearer by the use of English illustrations. Let us take the expression "you went", corresponding to the ordinary aorist of past events, and "be gone!", representing fairly well¹ the use of the aorist of

future acts. In the expression "you went," the speaker is merely stating that, as a matter of fact, the act of going took place in the past. The length of its duration is a matter about which the speaker is not concerned. He merely dismisses the act with a single glance. It is clear that this quick glance at the act of going is not determined, or even influenced in the slightest degree, by the character, or manner, or duration of that act itself. But in the case of the future use of the aorist, illustrated in "be gone!", a moment's thought will show that the manner of looking at the act depends largely on the manner in which the speaker expects or wishes the act to be performed. "Be gone!" represents, to be sure, a quick glance at a future act of going, but this form of expression is chosen only because the speaker wants the act itself to be promptly and quickly accomplished. So, in such uses of the perfect (aorist) subjunctive as in *di faxint*, etc., while the tense primarily indicates the manner in which the act is looked at, it also indicates, with equal clearness, the character which the act itself is thought of as assuming. Every such perfect (aorist) tense hurries the thought and fixes the attention at once upon the accomplishment and completion of the act. And just as the use of "be gone!" instead of "go" shows with absolute certainty that the speaker is thoroughly aroused, so do similar uses of the perfect subjunctive in Latin betray a similar state of mind.'

It only remains now to decide whether this theory that the perfect subjunctive in prohibitions indicates an aroused state of mind harmonizes with actual usage. I cannot feel that Delbrück does full justice to the state of things shown to exist by my collection of instances. Especially unfair, it seems to me, is the manner in which, in testing my theory, he passes by Plautus and Terence, the only authors who freely use both the present and the perfect tenses, and who form therefore the only field where the phenomenon can be satisfactorily studied. I cannot conceive how anyone, who compares all the instances of the perfect and present tenses from the earliest times down to the time of Livy (for which see my articles), can hesitate to admit that, with rare exceptions (comparatively speaking), it is very clear that speakers who use the perfect tense are (or for evident reasons are pretending to be) thoroughly aroused, and that those who use the present tense are perfectly calm and in commonplace situations. I feel all the more justified in insisting upon this as a fact that

¹ I say only 'fairly well' for the reason that some might insist on regarding 'be gone!' as a perfect instead of an aorist. But in either case the expression serves the purpose for which I have used it, as all idea of progress is eliminated from the thought. As applied to the future, the perfect and the aorist resemble each other in that they both alike include the end of the act; they differ in that the perfect represents it as one to be performed prior to a future time, the aorist represents it as one to be performed in its entirety (the end of the act being therefore included) at a future time with no idea of priority. But as the idea of completion, or accomplishment, is common to the two tenses, the expression 'be gone,' however it is explained, is sufficiently apropos. That the perfect and the aorist conceptions approach each other under certain circumstances, is shown by the facts that a Greek aorist seems often best translated by an English perfect and that both tenses are in Latin represented by the same form. In *si venerit*, *videat*, the *venerit* is a perfect subjunctive; in *ne veneris*, the *veneris* is an aorist.

must be recognized, for the reason that this distinction between the tenses has, during the three years since the publication of my articles, been publicly recognized by no less than six authors of Latin grammars.¹ Indeed Delbrück himself does not explicitly deny that my distinction will hold for Plautus and Terence. But he claims that it breaks down when tested by certain passages in Cato and Cicero's Letters, and cites, in support of this claim, especially Cato 4 *vicinis bonus esto : familiam ne siueris peccare*.

Let us consider for a moment what attitude it is proper for us to assume towards such a sentence as this. After a careful and exhaustive study of all the instances of the perfect tense from the earliest period down to the time of Livy, we have discovered that, with rare exceptions, it is beyond all dispute that the perfect is associated with emotion and energy of expression, the present with a calm mood and commonplace situations. But there are a few instances of the perfect, namely, the exceptions above referred to, where the tone in which the writer wishes his utterance to be understood is not made clear by the context. If the writer himself could read the passage to us, his voice would, of course, betray the tone. But with only the written page before us, we are left to our own resources to detect that tone. Now when we have found, in all those passages where the tone is beyond all dispute, that the perfect is used only when the speaker is aroused or unusually energetic, is it not allowable to conclude, or, rather, are we not forced to conclude, that, in passages where there is no other indication of the tone intended, the perfect tense still continues to represent the same idea and to betray the same feeling? Now Cato, in the passage above quoted, says *ne siueris* where he might have used any one of the several other forms of prohibition. I presume it will be admitted by everybody that the expression 'Do not

allow it' is one that admits of being uttered in a very commonplace manner, or with great energy. If there are, outside of the expression itself, no certain means of finding out just how much or how little importance Cato attached to this particular prohibition, is it not, nevertheless, natural, under the condition of things which we have found to exist elsewhere, to suppose that the tense of *ne siueris* in itself indicates that Cato wishes to lay great stress upon it, and accordingly chooses the most energetic form of expression? Indeed, the context itself in this instance shows that Cato did attach the utmost importance to this particular prohibition, for he goes on to say that a farmer's success depends upon a compliance with it (*si te libenter uicinitas uidebit, facilius tua uendes, operas facilius locabis, etc.*). When Delbrück says of this passage, 'Es heisst einfach so viel als "verhindere dass sie das thun"' he is indulging in mere assertion and seems to me to be begging the whole question. He adds further 'man soll sich nicht vorstellen, dass die Leute allerhand Böses thun, und der Gutsbesitzer beschäftigt ist, sie daran zu verhindern,' etc. Why then did Cato consider it necessary to give this prohibition at all? The fact that Cato uses the prohibition and makes so much depend upon it, shows very clearly that such a caution was needed. The only question is then : In what tone did he intend it? And the answer to this question must be sought by making a study of all those passages in which this particular form of prohibition is used. I have tried to answer it in the light of such a study. And the few passages like the one cited from Cato must, it seems to me, be studied in a similar manner and interpreted in the light of similar evidence.

One other passage, cited against me by Delbrück, I cannot pass by unnoticed, viz. Cic. ad Att. x. 13, 1 *scribes igitur ac, si quid ad spem poteris, ne dimiseris. Tu Antoni leones pertimescas caue: nihil est illo homine iucundius*. On this passage, Delbrück writes: 'ist darin etwa *dimiseris* mit grossem Ernst, *pertimescas* aber in anderer Stimmung geschrieben? Gewiss nicht, sondern *ne dimiseris* heisst "lass nicht fahren"' und ist punktuell, *caue pertimescas* aber "'sei nicht (beständig) in Angst" und ist durativ.' If Delbrück, at this point in his discussion, had had clearly in mind certain other parts of my article, he would not have written these words under the impression that the change of tense seen in this passage is opposed to the distinction that I make between the

¹ Bennett, *Latin Grammar* § 276, and Appendix § 358 d.; Gildersleeve-Lodge, *Latin Grammar* § 272, 2, Remark, and Gildersleeve, in the *American Journal of Philology*, vol. xviii. 1, p. 123; Schmalz, in the *Berliner Philologische Wochenschrift* for June 20, 1896, column 794; Sonnenschein, in his review of Gildersleeve's grammar, *Classical Review*, vol. x., No. 1, p. 64; Ziemer, in the *Wochenschrift für Klassische Philologie* for April 22, 1896, column 459; and apparently Golling in the *Zeitschrift für die oester. Gymnasien* for 1895, column 1074. The correctness of my conclusions is further acknowledged by Hey in the *Archiv für Lat. Lexikographie u. Grammatik* for 1895, by Giles in *A Short Manual of Comparative Philology*, p. 439, note, and by Buck in *The Oscan-Umbrian Verb System* (University of Chicago Studies in Classical Philology, vol. i. p. 140).

tenses. So far is this change of tense from being opposed to my theory, that it is exactly what that theory would demand and is in strong confirmation of it. Compare, for instance, my words on p. 14 (146): 'If my distinction between the two tenses is correct, we should expect that a prohibition dealing with mere mental action e.g. "Do not suppose," "Do not be surprised," "*Do not be afraid*" would commonly take the present tense, because such prohibitions would not commonly be accompanied by strong emotion, and, *as far as the interests of the speaker are concerned, it matters little whether the prohibition be complied with or not. Such a condition of things is exactly what we find,* etc., etc. It will be clear from this quotation that *caue pertimescas* is in exact accord with my theory. The act referred to in *ne dimiseris* is something that concerns the happiness and welfare of Cicero and his friends. Cicero, as is shown by the letters written by him at this period, is in terrible anxiety and suspense—he does not know whether his cause is, or is not, past all hope. The failure to comply with the prohibition *ne dimiseris* might mean utter despair, and, naturally enough, he throws his whole heart into the prohibition. But there is nothing about the idea of *pertimescas caue* to call for emotional expression; the mention of the *leones* is a playful allusion to a mere myth that Antonius was wont to ride in a carriage drawn by lions, and how lightly these words are uttered is shown by the sentence that immediately follows them, viz. *nihil est illo homine iucundius*. As regards the meaning of the present tense here and elsewhere, I am in complete accord with Delbrück as will appear more clearly in my *Studies*, above mentioned.

Finally, I come to a state of things which Delbrück's theory, as it seems to me, utterly fails to account for. He claims that, as far as the character itself of the perfect tense is concerned, it is merely 'punktuell,' and that, if the speaker who uses it is frequently aroused with emotion and is speaking with unceremoniousness or with unusual earnest-

ness, this is merely incidental and this tone is not conveyed or suggested by the tense itself. How then will Delbrück account for the fact, brought out in my Latin Prohibitive that there is (at least prior to Livy) not a single instance in Latin literature (whether in prose or poetry) of *ne* with the perfect subjunctive used in a dignified, ceremonious, deferential style. Why does not Cicero, for instance, occasionally use it in addressing the judges? He addresses prohibitions to them with great frequency. Why does he always adopt some other form of prohibition? It cannot be because he has any particular prejudice against *ne* with the perfect subjunctive, for he uses this form of prohibition very frequently in his colloquial styles. In his letters there are fourteen instances of this use and these, almost without exception, are addressed to bosom friends with whom he was wont to throw off all ceremony, often indulging in good-natured raillery and abuse and unrestrained passionate outbursts. If, as I contend, the perfect tense came to be associated and identified with an unceremonious, energetic tone, the absence of this mode of expression from ceremonious styles is fully accounted for. But if the force of the aorist is purely and simply 'punktuell,' then I fail to see why Cicero, for instance, did not occasionally use it in addressing a judge as well as in writing to his legal friend Trebatius, whom he was so fond of hauling over the coals.

It will also be noticed that Delbrück himself admits (e.g. pp. 377, 380) that there are passages which his own theory fails to explain.

While I have felt inclined to question the justness of these few details of his treatment of the Latin perfect subjunctive, I cannot, in closing, refrain from expressing my profound admiration of, and my gratitude for, the monumental services which Delbrück has, by his latest volume, as by his preceding volumes, rendered to all students of language.

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DE VITA CONTEMPLATIVA, 483, 46 f.

*Οὐ ἐνῆργατο διαφερόντως ἡ οἰκεία θεωρεῖν.

A STUDY of the form in which this passage occurs in Eusebius, *H.E.* ii. 17, has led me in view of the variants in the MSS. to a

result differing from that reached by Mr. Conybeare, the most recent editor of the treatise. Philo is describing the allegorical exegesis of the Therapeutae, which, says he, rests upon the idea that the Jewish Law is