

Belper to his mother's house in Nottinghamshire and then, towards the end of January, to London, before the recovery took place. It was gradual. In the course of January he seemed to recognise his mother, who had nursed him all through, and later on external things began to affect him now and again in a more or less determinate way. About the end of the month, he had some experiences—which he calls and remembers as dreams—that evidently were his first definite apprehension of the people and things about him, overlaid with fantastic representation. From the beginning of February his perception became more and more clear and his language sensible, till in the second week he could, as he says (being an eager politician), have told the names of all the members for Derbyshire. But then it was found that he had lost all memory not only of the accident, but of the events of some days before. The accident was on a Monday, and he had perfect recollection of where he had been and what he had done up to the morning of the previous Monday; from that time onwards he could recall nothing. The week had been an unusually busy one, full of incidents that he might well remember; and, as it happened, he wrote a letter to his mother on the day before the accident, detailing the events of the previous days. I have seen this letter, and it is possible from it and from other written records to make out the exact history of the week. He sold some cattle, and paid the money into his bank; heard one afternoon a lecture given by a friend to an archaeological society, and entertained the members afterwards at his house; attended a public concert; presided at a meeting for University-extension; wrote, printed and sent out an important circular to a number of Boards of Guardians; took the chair at a public supper; spoke at a great political demonstration; received family intelligence that particularly interested him; and finally, just before the accident, was engaged in the transaction of business of quite special importance to himself. Of all this and more, everything has clean vanished from him; except only that he imagines he has some faintest reminiscence of a dark woman singing and of a number of people on a lawn—but not till after reading his letter which mentions the one and suggests the other. About the cattle (not mentioned in the letter) he inquired in the second week of February, remembering that he had wished for some time to sell them, but having no suspicion of the actual sale some seven days before the accident.

The facts could not be more exactly ascertained, and the present object is only to put them on record. I am unable, where now writing, to compare them with the particulars of other recorded cases, a number of which (according to M. Ribot) are to be found in the *Dictionnaire encyclopédique des Sciences médicales*, art. "Amnésie," by J. Falret, besides one (similar in character to Prof. Bain's) in Carpenter's *Mental Physiology*, p. 450. I have heard privately of one case where, the unconsciousness being limited to a few minutes, the lapse of memory extended to only two or three minutes before the accident that caused it: which is further confirmatory, so far as it goes, of the notion that the length of the unconscious period may somehow determine the extent of the amnesia. On the other hand, there are certainly cases where, upon recovery of consciousness, the circumstances of the accident do not fail to be remembered.

EDITOR.

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#### MILL'S DOCTRINE OF NATURAL KINDS.

I am glad that Mr. Towry has stated this question in the last number of *MIND*, because I think his Note goes far to show that Classification is out of the province of Logic altogether. It is impossible, I believe, to

classify objects in a manner likely to prove of general use without a competent knowledge of these objects and their properties. Certain logicians may possess this knowledge, but if so it is not by their logical researches that they have acquired it. Other logicians who have confined their attention more especially to their own science do not possess it, and I do not believe that general directions as to Classification given by a man who has no special knowledge of particular objects are likely to be of much use to the man who possesses the information which his adviser lacks.

Mr. Towry raises an important issue by his fourth objection. "Are there," he asks, "in nature, classes clearly marked off from each other, classes that ought to be sought for by us?" I recognise fully the importance of the inquiry, but as a logician, and a logician only, how am I to answer it? Does the law of gravitation hold good in the solar system only, or does it extend to the region of the fixed stars? is likewise a very important inquiry; but is it one that a logician can be reasonably expected to answer? And in like manner the question, Are there Natural Kinds or not? is in my opinion clearly one which the physicist, not the logician, is called upon to answer. Then as to the answer, physicists are not agreed. Darwinism is now in the ascendant, but it cannot be said to have been universally accepted. According to this doctrine there are no such things as Natural Kinds separated from each other by impassable barriers; and whenever the line of demarcation between what I may call two adjacent kinds appears to be impassable, it is only because the intermediate members have perished in the struggle for existence. This, at least, is the current doctrine as regards the organic world. As regards the inorganic world, the doctrine of distinct chemical elements separated from each other by impassable barriers (at least so far as the *simple* elements are concerned) is still the current one; but many persons are prepared to accept Mr. Lockyer's theory, that the supposed simple chemical elements are all allotropic forms of hydrogen. Mill would probably have treated coal, plum-bago and diamond as different Natural Kinds, but they are different forms of carbon, passing into each other under known physical conditions. He would probably have also treated heat, electricity and motion as distinct Natural Kinds, each possessing its own laws, but they can all be converted into each other by known processes. At all events, if Mill would not have treated these things as distinct Natural Kinds, he would have rested his refusal to treat them as such on purely physical grounds.

Physically, it may be true that if a number of objects agree in certain qualities, we can predict their agreement in certain other qualities; and the physicist may also believe with confidence that this agreement extends beyond what he has as yet discovered and that new points of agreement at present unknown will be discovered hereafter. But what right (as Mr. Towry very properly asks) has the logician to assume that any two objects agree in more respects than those in which they are known to agree? It is not for him to anticipate physical discoveries, and discoveries which it is quite possible may never be made.

I do not concur with everything that Mr. Towry lays down in connexion with this subject; but I concur with him (if, indeed, he is disposed to go that length) in thinking that the doctrine of Natural Kinds, whether true or false, is entirely out of the province of Logic, and also in thinking that the doctrine in question has not been substantiated on satisfactory physical grounds.

To avoid misconception, however, I add, that as judgments or propositions usually contain assertions about classes, the logician is bound to explain briefly what classes *are*. But the problem of Classification is not to explain how men in fact classify objects, but how they can classify them

most advantageously, either with a view to investigating their properties or with a view of communicating the knowledge of their properties to others. I do not believe that general rules laid down for this purpose by a logician who is not a specialist will prove of any use; while, if the logician is a specialist, his rules will probably be found useful only in the particular subjects to which he has devoted his attention, and even there may require considerable amendment, as the science advances. I have no faith in rules for classification laid down by a logical Jack-of-all-trades and master of none. This would not, indeed, be a true description of Mill, who was undoubtedly a master in certain departments, but I fear his example has given too much encouragement to a kind of (so-called) Logic which refuses to rest solely on the laws of Mind, and yet does not require a complete knowledge of the laws of Matter. A Logic on the basis of Mill's system, written by a man who had thoroughly mastered all the latest developments of Mathematics, Physics and Psychology, would be a most valuable work, though no doubt destined to be superseded hereafter when these sciences were more advanced. But who is to write it? And as the sciences are advancing with rapid strides in all directions, what prospect is there that we shall ever possess a logician who is thoroughly acquainted with them all? Mill's criticisms on the wave-theory of light are sufficient to show that there was at least one trade in which his position was that of a mere Jack, though a very logical Jack.

W. H. S. MONCK.

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THE ARISTOTELIAN SOCIETY FOR THE SYSTEMATIC STUDY OF PHILOSOPHY (22 Albemarle Street, W.).—At the business meeting, June 6, the Report of the Committee and Program for the following Session were adopted. The Officers of the Society were re-elected. The first meeting of the next (the ninth) Session is fixed for Monday, Nov. 7, at 8 P.M., when Mr. Shadworth H. Hodgson will deliver the Presidential Address,—subject: "The Unseen World". Two evenings in the course of the Session will be devoted to the reading and discussion of short papers by various contributors on some subject fixed beforehand, the papers having been previously circulated among the contributors, so as to give the discussion the form of a "symposium". The *Abstract of Proceedings* for the Eighth Session, including the Report, List of Members, &c., and edited by Professor Wyndham R. Dunstan, V.P., has now appeared. Non-members may obtain copies, as well as Program-cards for the Session, by application to Mr H. W. Carr, Hon. Sec. [The Society is to be congratulated on its first official publication. It runs to 43 pp. The abstracts of papers read, furnished apparently by the writers, differ considerably in length, and in some cases give a very adequate notion of the arguments. Their subjects—somewhat too varied in character to be easily remarked upon here—have all been recorded in previous Nos. of MIND.]

THE JOURNAL OF SPECULATIVE PHILOSOPHY.—Vol. xx., No. 3. The Divine Pymander of Trismegistus (ii.). W. James—The Perception of Time. Hegel—Philosophy of Religion (trans.—Introduction completed). J. M. Long—Classification of the Mathematical Sciences. The Concord Summer School of Philosophy in 1887: Course of Study in Aristotle, and Bibliography.

REVUE PHILOSOPHIQUE.—An. xii., No. 7. C. Seignobos—Les conditions psychologiques de la connaissance en histoire (i.). E. Durkheim—La science positive de la morale en Allemagne: i. Les économistes, les sociologues et les juristes. J. M. Guardia—Les sentiments intimes d'Auguste Comte, d'après son testament. P. Tannery — Le monisme de Mélioss.