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Erdmann's History of Philosophy *Erdmann's History of Philosophy*. English translation. Edited by Williston H. Hough, Ph.M. In Three Volumes. London: Swan Sonnenschein and Co. New York: Macmillan & Co. £2 2s.

Paul Shorey

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the *Herakles* (quoted by Mr. Moulton) would do far more to show the real power of metrical change than the somewhat artificial and fanciful exposition of long passages from Sophocles or Aristophanes.

In spite of the drawbacks mentioned above, Mr. Moulton's book is interesting and valuable, and is, it is to be trusted, the

precursor of others which may tend to rescue Latin and Greek from becoming a mere examination-area, and an exercise-ground for gloss-hunters and *καὶ*-counters.

'A life of merchandise' seems a curious expression. What is the authority for 'entre-acte' (repeated four times)?

W. S. HADLEY.

ERDMANN'S HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY.

Erdmann's History of Philosophy. English translation. Edited by WILLISTON H. HOUGH, Ph.M. In Three Volumes. London: Swan Sonnenschein and Co. New York: Macmillan & Co. £2 2s.

THE translation of Erdmann's *History of Philosophy* was a work worth doing, and the laborious task has been accomplished by Professor Hough and his coadjutors well enough for all practical purposes. We are not likely soon to have an independent history of philosophy from an English scholar, and the history of Erdmann if not the best is at any rate the best tolerably readable and continuous exposition that can be used to supplement the unreadable but indispensable Ueberweg. Erdmann has some grave defects. He is an Hegelian prepared to step in and prove to you in advance of each successive system that it has swallowed (*aufgehoben*?) and therefore surpasses its predecessors which 'did not understand themselves,' and that 'es muss so sein' because it was demanded by the *Zeitgeist*. When strongly moved he is capable of uttering oracles like that which his present *προφήτης* interprets to this result: 'Science is, therefore, comprehended history, the Recollection and the Calvary of the absolute Spirit, to which only out of the cup of this realm of Spirits mantles its infinity.'

These dithyrambs however occur rarely outside of the chapters devoted to the successors of Kant, and the *a priori* construction of the course of philosophic evolution exercises little influence on the exposition, except in the case of the pre-Socratics who have always been regarded as legitimate themes for clever combinations. The taste of some readers will be gratified by finding prefixed to each system a prophecy after the fact in the shape of a demonstration of its world-historic necessity in its time and place. They will have a sense of profound insight

as they read that the Ionic hylozoism was to be looked for in colonies, or that 'because the times had become Roman' (had they then?) Aristotle and Plato had to be replaced by the Stoics and Epicureans. Other readers may simply omit these sections.

A more serious defect is the want of that conscientious erudition that German science boasts as her chief honour, and that gives the unphilosophical history of Zeller its unquestioned supremacy. I do not refer to Erdmann's neglect of bibliography and of what his compatriots by a notable *lucus a non* designate as the 'Literatur' of the subject. It is a waste of paper to reprint Ueberweg-Heinze with every new exposition of the subject, and I cannot admit the natural right to a notice of every dissertation- and program-writer. But a reader who is prepared to work through two thousand pages on the history of philosophy may fairly demand exact controlling references to the original sources. And when Erdmann asserts in his preface that he has found with his own eyes all that he makes the philosophers say we can only ask for example whether he found ἀφύσικοι (Vol I. p. 40) in the text of Aristotle, whether εἰσοπτοιζόμενον (p. 21) occurs in the text of Anaximander or in that of his interpreter, and where in the context of *Parmenides* 156 D he found the Christian conception of 'the union of rest and motion, enjoyment and labour' which Plato 'had beheld only in a passing flash.'

These defects however are made good by one great merit. It is Erdmann's habit, wherever it is possible, to expound a system by means of a clear straightforward *résumé* of the chief literary work in which it is set forth. These *résumés* are executed intelligently and in the main accurately, and thus the student instead of losing himself in a maze of abstractions relating to men and doctrines of which he knows nothing is brought face to face with the only realities

touched by the history of philosophy—the writings of the great philosophers. This method is not everywhere applicable, notably not in the sections devoted to ancient philosophy which are for the most part based on the excerpts in Ritter and Preller. But in the chapters on modern philosophy from Descartes to Kant it yields admirable results. These five hundred pages (which are well translated) might well be published separately as a text-book of modern philosophy. They would find many readers who take no interest in the scholasticism of the middle ages or of the post-Kantians, and who would desire more authentic accounts of ancient philosophy than can be found in the first volume.

The translation is in the main correct and fairly readable. 'Gruppe's attempt to vindicate Plato's far more developed astronomical conceptions' (§ 78,4) hardly represents the 'Plato viel ausgebildeter astronomische Vorstellungen zu vindiciren' of the original, and Plato's *στασιώται τοῦ ὄλου* after transference from Greek to German and German to English are hardly recognizable as the 'all-consolidators.' The philosophic terminology has been doubtless much benefited by the revision of the editor, but perfect consistency and accuracy have by no means been attained. The words *Anschauung*, *Vorstellung* and their paronyms present the chief difficulties. It is probably safer to render *Anschauung* everywhere by 'intuition,' *Vorstellung* generally by 'presentation,' and

vorstellbar by 'picturable' or, rarely, 'thinkable.' But in the present work the Hegelian misuse of *Vorstellung* in antithesis now to *Begriff* and now *Idee* makes the translator's task very difficult. Where Greek terms which have not yet become technical, as *αἰσθησις*, *δόξα*, *νοῦς*, etc., find their way into English through translation of their supposed German equivalents, the confusion becomes hopeless. Compare page 113 where *vorstellbar* representing presumably the Platonic *δοξαστόν* is translated 'capable only of being imagined'; page 118 where *Anschauulich* is rendered 'clear to perception' but means rather 'picturable in imagination'; p. 134 where the student would certainly be misled by finding 'theoretical understanding' glossed by *τέχνη*; and page 183 where among several other confusing statements we have an identification of *ὀρθή δόξα* with *ἐπόληψις*. On page 143 we read that Aristotle calls rhetoric the complement of dialectic. *Gegenstück* here represents Aristotle's *ἀντίστροφος* and should be rendered 'counterpart.' Misprints and careless accents, though by no means wanting, are not sufficiently numerous to impair the value of the book. I note among others *ἀφθαρτόν* (p. 22), *δοφία* (p. 109), *μονογένης* (p. 116), *φύλαι* (p. 124), *τύπτωσις* for *τύπωσις* (p. 187). The chapters from Kant to Hegel are an exception to the general excellence of the translation. Vol. II. p. 361, for example, is a literary curiosity.

PAUL SHOREY.

ROHDE'S PSYCHE.

Psyche. Seelencult und Unsterblichkeitsglaube der Griechen. Von ERWIN ROHDE. Erste Hälfte. Freiburg-i.-B. 1890. Akademische Verlagsbuchhandlung von J. C. B. Mohr. 7 Mk.

THIS monograph has a value for mythologists beyond its avowed intention. In his examination of the belief of the Greeks as to the future state of the soul and the ritual practices founded on it, Herr Rohde starts from the Homeric poems, but he is well aware—and this constitutes the peculiar value of his monograph—that the Homeric poems are in reality for mythology no starting-point, but a poetic break, a fault—if we may borrow the metaphor—in the regular stratification of autochthonous tradition. So long as the mythologist insists on beginning with the

poetic and ultimately orthodox Olympian system, so long will he work with the cart before the horse and any intelligible sequence be impossible. No better instance of this could be found than this question of the belief in the after state of the soul, and it is in his clear recognition of the principle of the Homeric *break*, rather than in any special novelty of either fact or theory, that Herr Rohde claims our gratitude. We have only to regret that he tells his story at such needless length and with such tedious iteration.

The gist of his contention is this. Homer (taking Homer for epic tradition generally) believes that *something* persists after death: that something is no more life, though it is called *Psyche*; rather it is the very opposite of life, it is the shadowy double of a man deprived of all the charac-